IRAQ
THIS WAR IS ABOUT PRIVATIZATION
Ok enough of this crap, about contractors. Lets call a spade a spade, these so called contractors are hired guns; mercenaries attached to the US military. So why isn't the media calling them that? Cause the news would read different. Lets take Fallujah for instance if you heard or read or watched a news broadcast that said four heavily armed mercenaries were ambushed and killed by residents of Fallujah, well that would have a different spin than calling them contractors.
Contractors imply some guys in coveralls working driving a truck or building something or serving food to someone. It does not imply a guy in military khakis carrying weapons. Mercenaries are hired killers however, and calling them contractors as if they were another truck driver, is clever and disingenuous and the media has played right into this rhetorical slight of hand.
Iraq is Bush and the Republicans first full scale Privatized war. Sure mercenaries have been used in other recent conflicts but not on this scale. Bremers role in Iraq is to privatize all existing state owned industries and civil infrastructure.
The military is being supported by 10,000 mercenaries from companies in the US and UK. The UK is the largest supplier of mercenaries, it has several of the largest companies, made up of former SAS, special ops personnel.
The US has recently seen a boom in private security/mercenary companies all headquartered in Virginia around the CIA and Pentagon. These companies are made up of ex US military personnel and ex CIA.
To say that these folks don't understand the military code they once served is ridiculous. The reality is they are outside the Uniform Code of Justice because the US Congress did NOT declare War in Iraq. However in 2000 the US Congress passed a law that would put these 'civilian' mercenaries under Military oversight, they just haven't applied it.
Mercenaries (Military Contractors sic) are part of the overall effort of the US to contract out all the support services in its operations in Iraq. Troop suppliers are contracted out, field operations contain military personnel supported by contracted out food, medical and material supply personnel. Infrastructure is being built by private contractors such as Bechtel and Halliburton. Much of this is not just oil pipelines, but the schools and hospitals, electrical generating stations, etc.
Sure the US says its building hospitals and schools, but lets look at what they are building, private hospitals and private schools. The ideology of privatization and contracting out, so called free enterprise is behind the destruction and reconstruction of Iraq. Saddam was the excuse. The reasons for the war are many, oil security, Israel’s security, most importantly what Bush and his Republicans bring to Iraq is in the words of Senator Elizabeth Dole: "a free market." So privateers are running the country under the protection of mercenaries and US troops.
What about the workers in Iraq? They are not allowed to organize unions under a 1987 law passed by Saddam. Since the state controlled all enterprises all workers were made government employees under the law.
Bremer has continued to use this law to disallow free collective bargaining in Iraq. Independent unions have arisen and workers have gone on strike only to be told by the Coalition Government and its Finance ministry they have no right to strike or unionize. US military forces have attacked union offices in Baghdad.
There are no union or worker representatives present in the Governing Council nor has the UN made any effort to include the workers and their unions in the new government coming into effect in July.Yet the ILO is part of the UN and has not been called in to review the conditions of the working class in Iraq.
This is reality of the war in Iraq, it is to take over the infrastructure of the country, remove it from state control and sell it off to the highest bidder, which is exactly what Bremer and Company are currently doing. State run industries are being sold off at fire sale prices with no concern for the workers in those industries.
Lets look at where all the billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq are going
Mercenaries cost $100,000 a year
Contracted Truck Drivers (like James Halwell) $1000 a week
Average Iraqi Oil worker- $160 a month
This is the real outrage of Bush's Privatization war.
Until the media ends its complicity with the US government by calling mercenaries "contractors" the people of Canada, the US and the UK will continue to be hoodwinked as badly as the Iraqi prisoners.
Printed online at Indymedia, Resist.ca, Rabble.ca, and excerpted in Alberta Views, September 2004
Don't Call them Contractors
Dear Editor
Lets call a spade a spade, these so called military 'contractors' are hired guns; mercenaries, attached to the US military. So why isn't the media calling them that? Cause the news would read different.
Lets take Fallujah for instance if you heard or read or watched a news broadcast that said four heavily armed mercenaries were ambushed and killed by residents of Fallujah, well that would have a different spin than calling them contractors.
Contractors imply some guy in coveralls working driving a truck or building something or serving food to someone. It does not imply a guy in military kahkis carrying weapons. Mercenaries are hired killers however, and calling them contractors as if they were another truck driver is clever and disingenuous, and the media has played right into this rhetorical slight of hand.
The military is being supported by 10,000 mercenaries from companies in the US and UK. The UK is the largest supplier of mercenaries, it has several of the largest companies, made up of former SAS, special ops personnel.
The US has recently seen a boom in private security/mercenary companies all headquartered in Virginia around the CIA and Pentagon. These companies are made up of ex US military personnel and ex CIA.
To say that these folks don't understand the military code they once served is ridiculous. The reality is they are outside the Uniform Code of Justice because the US Congress did NOT declare War in Iraq. However in 2000 the US Congress passed a law that would put these 'civilian' mercenaries under Military oversite, they just haven't applied it.
Until the media ends its complicity with the US government by calling mercenaries "contractors" the people of Canada, the US and the UK will continue to be hoodwinked as badly as the Iraqi prisoners.
Seeing the Forest for the Trees
Thesis on The Kosovo Crisis and the Crisis of Global Capitalism
(originally written May 1999, Bill Clinton set the stage for George W. to invade Afganistan and Iraq for humanitarian purposes.)
The current undeclared war being conducted by NATO against Yugoslavia on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians has been seen as a political act. Both left and right wing commentators those in favour of the war and those opposed have posed their arguments in political and humanitarian terms.
The fact that this war is a direct result of the current crisis of global capitalism, has been overlooked if not out right ignored by those debating on either side of the war.
That politics should be divorced from economics as well as their military implications reveals the short comings of current left wing analysis and critique.
One reason is that this war is happening in our time, at this moment in history.
It is hard to stand back and look at the larger picture, when an immediate
response is demanded by the situation.
But this war is just one more low intensity conflict that has occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union. And in fact more of them will occur as the contradictions of capitalism expand exponentially through the process of global neo-liberalization and the creation of international trading blocs.
A political-economic interpretation of this war is needed to put this moment in its historical context, free of the prejudices of the current power politics at play but by no means ignoring them or their influence.
The current war in Yugoslavia has stabilized the global financial capital market.
The justifications for the war are irrelevant propaganda, the real reason is fourfold:
The launch of the Euro Dollar and the development of the European Union as a perceived threat to American geo-political and military hegemony, and the subsequent need to expand that hegemony in Europe via NATO.
The collapse of the Russian and Asian economies which created a deflationary economic cycle (stagflation).
The increasing exponential boom bust cycle on Wall Street, where the market breaks 10,000 crashes and booms again to 11,000 points all occurring during the war.
The need to destroy excess production in order to stabilize the world market and expand the neo-liberal trade accords and trading blocs, which had been stalled by a mass movement world wide in opposition to those accords. This is a ‘bombing’ war, aimed at the destruction of production capabilities in Yugoslavia weaking it for a Marshall like reconstruction plan via the European Union, and the need for the United States to rid itself of large amounts of costly armaments.
The old adage that when capitalism reaches a crisis it uses war as a way of stabilizing itself should not surprise us at the end of the 20th Century. The fact that capitalism as a global market no longer needs to create ‘World Wars’ but can function with low intensity wars, to do this, is what is new.
Hard on the heals of a year long market depression in Asia, and the complete collapse of the Russian economy in the spring of this year, the world capitalist system now faced a deflationary cycle, mass overproduction and stagflation, economic terms not used since the 1930’s.
The launch of the Eurodollar and the creation of the European Union, added a new trading bloc challenge to American Economic and Political hegemony. The subsequent expansion of euro-capitalists like the Dahlmer-Benz/Chrysler merger are symptomatic of trading bloc hegemonic struggles in this period of global expansion of the capitalist world system.
Both the crash of the Asian trading blocs and the expansion of the EU trading bloc produced a bust on Wall Street.
Since the war began Wall Street has subsequently broken the 10,000 and 11,000 point mark. War is the health of capital and its state.
Most commentators have focused on the political/humanitarian issues around this war. These are not the prime factors for this war, they are the propaganda issues that are used to arouse the support of the various publics.
Like the war against Iraq, which was a low intensity conflict a test ground for the latest in American weapons technology, this war is more about global financial capitalism than about geo-politics or territorial acquisition. The war against Iraq, and the subsequent war in the Sudan, were about maintaining American corporate hegemony over oil. In Iraq’s case the war was to curtail the pending dumping of billions of gallons of oil onto the market which would have disastrous economic consequences for the Transnational Oil Companies and their OPEC client states.
It was a war to maintain market share.
The international intervention in the Sudan, was also an oil war, in order to secure
a stable political and economic situation for predominately American Trans-National Oil companies in the region.
The fact that limited intervention was conducted by the United Nations in Rwanda, was due to the lack of support French Imperialism garnered for its geo-political and economic interests in the region. Destabilization of this region , which is rich in oil, heavy metals and other mineral resources, was in the vested interests not of French Imperialism but its competitors in the European Union and of course the United States.
Yugoslavia is the current victim of the neo-liberal agenda.
Mass mobilizations against the third world debt, the MAI and other trade accords as well as calls for capital controls (such as the Tobin Tax) had been garnering strength and legitimacy when the war was declared.
The war immediately resulted in a boom on Wall Street thus thwarting the very real danger of a deflationary drive towards stagflation in the United States. It allowed the U.S. to reassert its hegemony via NATO over the European Union. And it allowed Russia to be a player in European geo-politics providing a momentary stabilization in its economic and political spiral towards chaos.
The war now allows the United States a greater say in the power politics of dividing up the Balkans, which had been until now dominated by the EU and its most powerful member; Germany.
Conversely it has worked in favour of stabilizing the Euro, as well as cementing the EU as a political as well as economic alliance, with Britain acting as the voice of Europe backing it’s American allies.
Canada’s role in supporting NATO’s war, reveals the depth and dangers of the corporate trade agreements and economic blocs like APEC, NAFTA, the WTO.
These accords, as well as our membership in NATO, compelled the Liberal Government to act as a comprador nation to American Imperialism, completely negating our ability to act independently as a member of the UN Security Council with the right to veto.
This is a market driven war, it is about trade agreements and the expansion of neo-liberal globalization and economic stabilization. National sovereignty, ethnic cleansing and the creation of Balkan democracy are so much propaganda masking the real reason for this war; to remedy the contradictions of an overheated global capitalist world system facing a pending global depression.
Also see:http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/flaws.pdf
The fatal flaws underlying NATO'S intervention in Yugoslavia
By Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd.)
USI, New Delhi April 6, 1999
Iraq
oil
socialism
labour
anarchism
anti-war
political
Politics
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query MERCENARIES. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query MERCENARIES. Sort by date Show all posts
Saturday, January 15, 2005
Tuesday, April 20, 2021
What Laws Constrain This Russian Private Military Company?
By Zarko Perovic Tuesday, March 23, 2021,
A photo of Wagner Group mercenaries at an unidentified location.
Not be sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict to perform official duties as a member of its armed forces.
Arguably, Wagner Group members fulfill factors 1, 2, and 4, given that Wagner employees by assisting rebels in Eastern Ukraine have obstructed the activity of Ukrainian state authorities, received compensation for their work, and are not members of the Ukrainian armed forces.
But factors 3 and 5 would likely not be fulfilled, as Russia would most likely be considered a party to the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine’s position has been that Russia is in fact a party to the conflict and the International Criminal Court has stated that there exists an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. By all accounts it appears that Wagner’s forces in Eastern Ukraine were Russian citizens. And Wagner employees would also likely not fulfill the fifth factor, since, according to a Center for Strategic & International Studies report, Russia is a party to the conflict and Utkin “was subordinated both to the GRU [Russia’s military intelligence agency] and to the Russian military command.” As a result, given that Russia is a party to the conflict and Russian citizens participated, Wagner employees in Ukraine do not fall under Ukraine’s definition of mercenaries.
Mozambique likewise could not use its national law regulating mercenaries to target the Wagner Group for its activities in Mozambique. As described above, the first factor of the Mozambican mercenarism law is outwardly focused: It requires that a mercenary attempt to overthrow a legitimately constituted foreign government by armed violence and therefore does not apply to any Wagner actions in Mozambique. In theory, Mozambique, as well as Azerbaijan and Ukraine, could prosecute the Wagner Group for their mercenary activities in other countries like Libya. However, neither Mozambique nor any other state has currently shown any interest in doing so. Moreover, given that Wagner employees went to Mozambique to help the government fight against Islamic State-linked militants in the country’s Cabo Delgado province, it does not seem likely that the government would have any interest in prosecuting the group.
While Azerbaijan is currently attempting to prosecute Armenian mercenaries who fought against Azeri troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, the country has not taken steps to prosecute Wagner Group members who also allegedly participated in the conflict—and if prosecutors tried, it seems unlikely they would succeed. Azerbaijan’s four-factors test requires mercenaries to be (a) working with a view of material compensation, (b) not citizens of Azerbaijan or living constantly on its territory, (c) participating in a confrontation or military operations, and (d) not directed for execution of official duties (Azerbaijani criminal code, Article 114). The main question is whether any Wagner Group employees in the country were executing official duties: If Wagner members were receiving direction from either the government of Armenia or the independent government of Nagorno-Karabakh, then they would not be considered mercenaries. However, if the Wagner employees were instead receiving most of their direction from the Russian government, which was not a party to the conflict, then these employees would be considered mercenaries and could be prosecuted for mercenarism under Azerbaijani law.
Even if they could be considered mercenaries, however, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan would attempt to prosecute such individuals. Given Russia’s historic role as the chief negotiator between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its capacity to tip the conflict in a certain direction if it were so inclined, Azerbaijan would be unlikely to pursue these cases.
As for the complaint filed by Hamdi Bouta’s brother within Russia under Article 12 of the Russian criminal code, the odds of success appear low. Given that Novaya Gazeta’s complaint for the same case was ignored in 2019, unless the complaint was changed drastically, it is unclear why the Russian Investigative Committee would change its mind.
Could a more expansive legal regime change how companies like the Wagner Group operate? Many legal scholars argue that laws regulating mercenaries are too narrowly written, suggesting that broader statutes could increase prosecutions for such activities. In this view, the definitions of mercenaries used by various laws and conventions are overly narrow, which allows most mercenaries to avoid being classified as such. However, scholars have also noted that mercenaries operate in weak states, which makes enforcement and prosecutions by host governments difficult.
Moreover, even if countries implement more expansive prohibitions against PMSCs like Wagner, it could be argued that there is a risk that these kinds of regulations will—instead of discouraging companies like Wagner—discourage PMSCs that legitimately try to follow the rule of law when providing security services. Jose Gomez del Prado has argued that members of the U.N. Western Group have rejected proposed resolutions by Cuba to regulate PMSCs in order to protect legitimate business activities of these companies. Indeed, the United States and the United Kingdom believe that there are a number of PMSCs that provide important security services and that, while there are problems, the industry is best regulated through self-enforced industry standards like the Montreux Document.
At the same time, a more expansive legal regime could create more stability in countries affected by conflict. The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has been a regular advocate for greater regulation of the PMSC industry and made a draft PMSC convention that was tabled in 2009. Saeed Mokbil, the chairperson-rapporteur for the working group, has argued that the international and domestic legal regulation of PMSCS could promote the rule of law. He has argued that through regulations regarding oversight, registration, licensing, and vetting, there could be a lower risk of destabilization and human rights violations in countries using PMSCs.
In the meantime, it seems clear that the Wagner Group will continue to operate. Companies like Wagner are able to quickly deploy soldiers in combat upon receiving payment and disappear overnight when necessary. Such companies are increasingly in demand—and they are reshaping how conflicts operate around the globe,
SAME AS AMERICAN LAWS FOR 'CONTRACTORS'
By Zarko Perovic Tuesday, March 23, 2021,
A photo of Wagner Group mercenaries at an unidentified location.
(Photo from the Security Service of Ukraine)
On March 11, a Syrian national filed a complaint in Moscow against a company called the Wagner Group, for the torture, killing, and mutilation of his brother by Wagner employees. This complaint is part of a second attempt to criminally prosecute members of this elusive group for this case. The Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta submitted a complaint regarding the case in 2019, but no action was taken.
The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has played a strategically important role in countries such as Syria, Ukraine and Libya—and it’s found itself repeatedly at the receiving end of U.S. sanctions. Wagner has helped Bashar al-Assad’s forces in the Syrian civil war and participated in the Russian takeover of Crimea. But are the group’s actions legal? Though Wagner’s activities are nominally regulated by both international law and the domestic laws of the countries where the group is present, these laws put relatively few constraints on Wagner’s operations.
Background
The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries defines private military and security companies (PMSCs) as corporate entities that “provide[] on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities.” Typically, PMSCs provide a wide variety of military or security services for either governments or corporations—short of participating in combat—and do not receive direction from their home governments on how to operate or receive any assistance. However, Wagner is different from most PMSCs in that Wagner employees often engage in combat operations. Additionally, the company has a close relationship with the Russian government, which actively helps Wagner secure its contracts.
The Washington Post suggests that Wagner may have been founded in 2014 by former Russian security contractor Dimitry Utkin. However, information to confirm that Utkin was the founder is lacking. But at some point over the past few years, Wagner reportedly came under the ownership of Yevgeny Prigozhin—a Russian entrepreneur with close links to the Kremlin who might be familiar to Lawfare readers as the owner of the Internet Research Agency troll farm. Wagner employees were among the “little green men” who participated in the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014 and assisted Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine attempting to secede from the country. The group also became involved in Syria, and New York Times and Foreign Policy reported that U.S.-backed Kurdish fighters killed somewhere around 200 to 600 Wagner employees in the city of Deir al-Zour in February 2018.
In September 2019, Wagner sent 200 of its employees to Mozambique but reportedly withdrew from the country after seven of its contractors were killed there. Beginning in 2020, Wagner employees appear to have been supporting Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya with alleged financing from the United Arab Emirates. Although not fully confirmed, some reports suggest that the group’s employees manned anti-tank positions for Armenian forces during the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. There are also reports that Wagner employees participated in combat, trained, and provided other security services in Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine.
Due to the group’s involvement in conflicts in these countries, Wagner has been repeatedly targeted for sanctions by the U.S. government. In 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department placed sanctions on Prigozhin via executive order for his “extensive business dealings with the Russian Ministry of Defense” and for building bases to support Russian military actions in Ukraine. The Treasury Department has placed additional sanctions on Wagner since then. Most recently in July 2020, the Treasury Department updated previous sanctions against Wagner for its entities’ activities in Sudan.
Legal Context
Wagner is subject to a range of laws and conventions related to mercenarism. The relevant legal regime includes national laws in the different countries regulating mercenaries; the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (ICRUFTM); the Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions; and the Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (OAU CEM).
The below table lists the status of these laws and conventions in countries where Wagner operates (see also the accompanying map). All the listed countries except Azerbaijan have ratified Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention.
Law Source
Country/Countries
ICRUFTM ratified and enacted national law regulating mercenaries
Azerbaijan, Ukraine
Enacted national law regulating mercenaries
Mozambique
ICRUFTM ratified + OAU CEM ratified
Libya
ICRUFTM ratified
Syria
OAU CEM ratified
Rwanda, Sudan
None
Central African Republic, Madagascar
Key. W: where the Wagner Group operates or has operated; blue: where the ICRUFTM has been ratified; light green: where the OAU CEM has been ratified; dark green: where the ICRUFTM and the OAU CEM have been ratified.
These laws and conventions are quite similar, although their exact wording varies, and they typically regulate two things. First, they prohibit individuals from participating in conflicts as mercenaries. Second, they criminalize individuals, organizations, or states engaging with mercenaries such as by recruiting, financing, or training them.
These laws and conventions attempt to regulate companies like Wagner by prohibiting individuals from providing security and military services in certain ways—generally, participating in hostilities, or recruiting, financing, and training mercenaries. Most provisions have a similar definition of mercenaries, though there are some small distinctions among them.
International Conventions
The ICRUFTM has a five-factor test to determine who is a mercenary. Under the convention, a mercenary (a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) is motivated to take part in hostilities for private gain and is promised material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; (c) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (e) has not been sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. Someone who fulfills these criteria and “participates directly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence” is in violation of the convention.
The convention leaves it to states to punish violators of the convention. Under Article 5, states parties “shall make the offences set forth in the present Convention punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences.” So far only 37 countries have ratified the convention: nine in Latin America and the Caribbean; eight of the former Soviet Republics; eight in West Africa; and a few others, including Italy, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The OAU CEM has a test almost identical to that of the ICRUFTM, but the conventions vary on a few points. In addition to the five factors listed in the ICRUFTM, the OAU CEM narrows the definition of a mercenary to “any person who … does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities.” However, it expands the second factor, compensation, by requiring someone to be motivated simply by private gain to be considered a mercenary—not just gain that is substantially in excess of that promised to similar combatants. If someone fulfills all six OAU CEM factors, then this individual is considered to have committed “a crime against peace and security in Africa.” According to Article 7 of the convention, states are to make an Article 1 offense punishable by the “severest penalties under [their] laws, including capital punishment,” but the convention does not prescribe or institute any punishments itself.
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, like the OAU CEM, uses a six-factor test to define who constitutes a mercenary. Those who qualify as mercenaries are not eligible for combatant or prisoner of war status. Like the OAU CEM, Additional Protocol I requires an individual to take direct part in hostilities to be considered a mercenary. However, in defining what constitutes a mercenary, Additional Protocol I uses a definition similar to the ICRUFTM’s regarding compensation, requiring someone to be compensated substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions.
National Laws
Only three countries where Wagner operates have created laws criminalizing mercenarism: Azerbaijan, Mozambique and Ukraine. Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s mercenary laws follow the ICRUFTM and OAU CEM definitions quite closely, while Mozambique enacted its own unique definition.
Ukraine’s definition of a mercenary, under Article 447 of the Ukrainian criminal code, uses a five-factor test similar to the ICRUFTM test. However, Ukraine changes the first factor regarding recruitment and expands it. Instead of covering only “fighting in an armed conflict,” the first factor extends the mercenary definition to people who participate in “military or violent actions aimed at forcible change or overthrow of the constitutional order, seizure of state power, or obstruction of the activity of state authorities on the territory of Ukraine or the territory of other states or violation of territorial integrity.” Regarding the second factor, participating in conflict for private gain, the Ukrainian criminal code follows the OAU CEM in requiring that a mercenary work only for the purpose of obtaining “any personal gain” rather than for compensation that substantially exceeds the gain of combatants of similar rank and function. An individual who fulfills this definition and participates “in an armed conflict, military or violent acts” can be punished with imprisonment of five to 10 years.
In contrast to Ukraine, the criminal code of Azerbaijan applies a three-factor test that is similar to the OAU CEM test but removes the first factor (recruitment) and the fourth factor (no membership in armed forces of a party to the conflict). Moreover, Article 114 of the Azerbaijan criminal code follows the OUA CEM and Ukraine in regards to the second factor (compensation) by requiring only that someone works “with a view of reception of material compensation.” If an individual falls under this definition and participates in a “confrontation or military operations,” this individual “shall be punished by imprisonment for … three up to eight years.”
Mozambique’s criminal code has its own unique two-factor test to define mercenaries. Under Article 163 of the code, individuals commit the crime of mercenarism if they try to overthrow a legitimately constituted foreign government by armed violence and do so with an armed force composed entirely or in part of foreigners. Offenders are to be punished with 16 to 20 years of imprisonment.
While Russia itself criminalized mercenarism under Article 359 of its criminal code, it seems unlikely that the country would ever use such a law against the group due to Wagner’s close relationship with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Russia’s definition of a mercenary is quite similar to Azerbaijan’s in that Russia’s test also removes the first factor (recruitment) and the fourth factor (membership in the armed forces of a party to the conflict). If someone fulfills the definition and participates in “an armed conflict or hostilities,” this crime will be punishable by a “deprivation of liberty for a term of three to seven years.”
Prohibitions on Engaging With Mercenaries
Most of these laws and conventions also regulate engaging with mercenaries. Indeed, except for Additional Protocol I, they typically also criminalize recruiting, financing and training mercenaries.
Article 2 of the ICRUFTM states that “[a]ny person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries” is in violation of the convention.
While the OAU CEM criminalizes recruiting, financing, or training mercenaries, it does so only within the context of undermining the function of a state. Article 1.2 states that mercenarism is committed only when recruiting, financing, or training is done with “the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State.” Moreover, Article 1.2 also defines recruiting, financing, and training much more expansively than the ICRUFTM does, stating that, while attempting to oppose a process of self-determination and territorial integrity, an individual, group, or state:
a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries.
b) Enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said bands.
c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the above-mentioned forces.
Article 447 of the Ukrainian criminal code, like the OAU CEM, criminalizes the recruiting, financing, material support, or training of mercenaries if such actions are aimed at “violently changing, or overthrowing the constitutional order, seizing state power, impeding activities of the state authorities, or violating territorial integrity.” Violations of this law are punished with imprisonment from five to 10 years. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, follows the ICRUFTM definition regarding engaging with mercenaries but also criminalizes “other material maintenance of mercenaries” under Article 114.1 of the Azerbaijan criminal code. Offenders are to be punished with imprisonment of four to eight years. Finally, Mozambique follows the OAU CEM’s more expansive definition of engaging with mercenaries. Violators of the Mozambique law include “all those who voluntarily recruit, organize, finance, supply, equip, train, and transport individuals … as well as those who enlist in these forces.” This crime is punished with imprisonment of 16 to 20 years.
Other Laws
Of course, in addition to laws and conventions regulating the use of mercenaries, Wagner Group members could also be subject to any national laws such as those that punish killing, torture and terrorism if employees committed these actions. This is not entirely hypothetical: In 2017, according to Novaya Gazeta [warning: graphic images], Wagner employees allegedly beat Muhammad “Hamdi Bouta” Taha Ismail al-Abdullah to death by hitting him repeatedly with a sledgehammer and then decapitating him. Bouta was a Syrian national who was forcefully conscripted by the Syrian government in March 2017, deserted the army while he was in Homs, and was killed by Wagner Group members at the Shaer gas field, which had recently been liberated from the Islamic State. Bouta’s brother filed a complaint based on Article 12 of Russia’s criminal code on March 11, which criminalizes actions by Russian citizens that work against the “interests protected by the Code” and against servicemen of Russian military units that commit crimes abroad that violate the Russian criminal code. In addition, reports by Human Rights Watch and Voice of America News indicate that landmines left by Wagner employees in residential neighborhoods of Tripoli, Libya, have killed 52 people since 2020.
If Wagner Group employees were to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of any states parties to the Rome Statute or against the citizens of any states parties, the employees responsible for such an act could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court for violating Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which punishes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Out of all the countries where Wagner has operated, however, only the Central African Republic and Madagascar have ratified the Rome Statute. Ukraine has also accepted the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute on its territory from 2014 onward.
Applying the Law
Despite the many laws codified to regulate mercenaries, Wagner’s operations seem to face few meaningful legal constraints. Prosecutions of mercenaries by state authorities are rarely attempted or carried out.
Might Wagner face any legal consequences for its actions? It’s not clear whether countries that have ratified conventions like the ICRUFTM could prosecute Wagner Group members if they have not made corresponding national laws, due to the conventions’ structure. For that reason, the greatest legal constraints on Wagner’s activities may be in three countries where the Wagner Group has operated that have made national law regarding mercenaries: Ukraine, Mozambique and Azerbaijan. Yet it’s unlikely that any of these three states could succeed in prosecuting Wagner Group members under their national laws.
Ukraine is the country that has come the closest to prosecuting the Wagner Group using its mercenary law. In August 2020, the Ukrainian prosecutor general requested that Belarus extradite 28 alleged mercenaries, some of whom were Wagner employees, for their activities. The Ukrainian prosecutor general alleges that this group participated in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and sought to prosecute them under the country’s terrorism law, Article 258-3 of the Ukrainian criminal code. But under Article 447 of Ukraine’s criminal law, Wagner members would not be considered or prosecuted as mercenaries based on Ukraine’s five-factor test. For someone to be considered a mercenary, the test requires that someone:
Be recruited locally or abroad to take part in armed conflict, military or violent actions aimed at forcible change or overthrow of the constitutional order, seizure of state power, or obstruction of the activity of state authorities on the territory of Ukraine or the territory of other states or violation of territorial integrity.
Participate for the purpose of obtaining any personal gain.
Not be a citizen (subject) of a party to the conflict and not be a person who permanently legally resides in the territory controlled by a party to the conflict.
Not be a member of the armed forces of the state on the territory of which such actions are carried out.
On March 11, a Syrian national filed a complaint in Moscow against a company called the Wagner Group, for the torture, killing, and mutilation of his brother by Wagner employees. This complaint is part of a second attempt to criminally prosecute members of this elusive group for this case. The Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta submitted a complaint regarding the case in 2019, but no action was taken.
The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has played a strategically important role in countries such as Syria, Ukraine and Libya—and it’s found itself repeatedly at the receiving end of U.S. sanctions. Wagner has helped Bashar al-Assad’s forces in the Syrian civil war and participated in the Russian takeover of Crimea. But are the group’s actions legal? Though Wagner’s activities are nominally regulated by both international law and the domestic laws of the countries where the group is present, these laws put relatively few constraints on Wagner’s operations.
Background
The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries defines private military and security companies (PMSCs) as corporate entities that “provide[] on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities.” Typically, PMSCs provide a wide variety of military or security services for either governments or corporations—short of participating in combat—and do not receive direction from their home governments on how to operate or receive any assistance. However, Wagner is different from most PMSCs in that Wagner employees often engage in combat operations. Additionally, the company has a close relationship with the Russian government, which actively helps Wagner secure its contracts.
The Washington Post suggests that Wagner may have been founded in 2014 by former Russian security contractor Dimitry Utkin. However, information to confirm that Utkin was the founder is lacking. But at some point over the past few years, Wagner reportedly came under the ownership of Yevgeny Prigozhin—a Russian entrepreneur with close links to the Kremlin who might be familiar to Lawfare readers as the owner of the Internet Research Agency troll farm. Wagner employees were among the “little green men” who participated in the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014 and assisted Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine attempting to secede from the country. The group also became involved in Syria, and New York Times and Foreign Policy reported that U.S.-backed Kurdish fighters killed somewhere around 200 to 600 Wagner employees in the city of Deir al-Zour in February 2018.
In September 2019, Wagner sent 200 of its employees to Mozambique but reportedly withdrew from the country after seven of its contractors were killed there. Beginning in 2020, Wagner employees appear to have been supporting Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya with alleged financing from the United Arab Emirates. Although not fully confirmed, some reports suggest that the group’s employees manned anti-tank positions for Armenian forces during the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. There are also reports that Wagner employees participated in combat, trained, and provided other security services in Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine.
Due to the group’s involvement in conflicts in these countries, Wagner has been repeatedly targeted for sanctions by the U.S. government. In 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department placed sanctions on Prigozhin via executive order for his “extensive business dealings with the Russian Ministry of Defense” and for building bases to support Russian military actions in Ukraine. The Treasury Department has placed additional sanctions on Wagner since then. Most recently in July 2020, the Treasury Department updated previous sanctions against Wagner for its entities’ activities in Sudan.
Legal Context
Wagner is subject to a range of laws and conventions related to mercenarism. The relevant legal regime includes national laws in the different countries regulating mercenaries; the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (ICRUFTM); the Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions; and the Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (OAU CEM).
The below table lists the status of these laws and conventions in countries where Wagner operates (see also the accompanying map). All the listed countries except Azerbaijan have ratified Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention.
Law Source
Country/Countries
ICRUFTM ratified and enacted national law regulating mercenaries
Azerbaijan, Ukraine
Enacted national law regulating mercenaries
Mozambique
ICRUFTM ratified + OAU CEM ratified
Libya
ICRUFTM ratified
Syria
OAU CEM ratified
Rwanda, Sudan
None
Central African Republic, Madagascar
Key. W: where the Wagner Group operates or has operated; blue: where the ICRUFTM has been ratified; light green: where the OAU CEM has been ratified; dark green: where the ICRUFTM and the OAU CEM have been ratified.
These laws and conventions are quite similar, although their exact wording varies, and they typically regulate two things. First, they prohibit individuals from participating in conflicts as mercenaries. Second, they criminalize individuals, organizations, or states engaging with mercenaries such as by recruiting, financing, or training them.
These laws and conventions attempt to regulate companies like Wagner by prohibiting individuals from providing security and military services in certain ways—generally, participating in hostilities, or recruiting, financing, and training mercenaries. Most provisions have a similar definition of mercenaries, though there are some small distinctions among them.
International Conventions
The ICRUFTM has a five-factor test to determine who is a mercenary. Under the convention, a mercenary (a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) is motivated to take part in hostilities for private gain and is promised material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; (c) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (e) has not been sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. Someone who fulfills these criteria and “participates directly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence” is in violation of the convention.
The convention leaves it to states to punish violators of the convention. Under Article 5, states parties “shall make the offences set forth in the present Convention punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences.” So far only 37 countries have ratified the convention: nine in Latin America and the Caribbean; eight of the former Soviet Republics; eight in West Africa; and a few others, including Italy, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The OAU CEM has a test almost identical to that of the ICRUFTM, but the conventions vary on a few points. In addition to the five factors listed in the ICRUFTM, the OAU CEM narrows the definition of a mercenary to “any person who … does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities.” However, it expands the second factor, compensation, by requiring someone to be motivated simply by private gain to be considered a mercenary—not just gain that is substantially in excess of that promised to similar combatants. If someone fulfills all six OAU CEM factors, then this individual is considered to have committed “a crime against peace and security in Africa.” According to Article 7 of the convention, states are to make an Article 1 offense punishable by the “severest penalties under [their] laws, including capital punishment,” but the convention does not prescribe or institute any punishments itself.
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, like the OAU CEM, uses a six-factor test to define who constitutes a mercenary. Those who qualify as mercenaries are not eligible for combatant or prisoner of war status. Like the OAU CEM, Additional Protocol I requires an individual to take direct part in hostilities to be considered a mercenary. However, in defining what constitutes a mercenary, Additional Protocol I uses a definition similar to the ICRUFTM’s regarding compensation, requiring someone to be compensated substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions.
National Laws
Only three countries where Wagner operates have created laws criminalizing mercenarism: Azerbaijan, Mozambique and Ukraine. Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s mercenary laws follow the ICRUFTM and OAU CEM definitions quite closely, while Mozambique enacted its own unique definition.
Ukraine’s definition of a mercenary, under Article 447 of the Ukrainian criminal code, uses a five-factor test similar to the ICRUFTM test. However, Ukraine changes the first factor regarding recruitment and expands it. Instead of covering only “fighting in an armed conflict,” the first factor extends the mercenary definition to people who participate in “military or violent actions aimed at forcible change or overthrow of the constitutional order, seizure of state power, or obstruction of the activity of state authorities on the territory of Ukraine or the territory of other states or violation of territorial integrity.” Regarding the second factor, participating in conflict for private gain, the Ukrainian criminal code follows the OAU CEM in requiring that a mercenary work only for the purpose of obtaining “any personal gain” rather than for compensation that substantially exceeds the gain of combatants of similar rank and function. An individual who fulfills this definition and participates “in an armed conflict, military or violent acts” can be punished with imprisonment of five to 10 years.
In contrast to Ukraine, the criminal code of Azerbaijan applies a three-factor test that is similar to the OAU CEM test but removes the first factor (recruitment) and the fourth factor (no membership in armed forces of a party to the conflict). Moreover, Article 114 of the Azerbaijan criminal code follows the OUA CEM and Ukraine in regards to the second factor (compensation) by requiring only that someone works “with a view of reception of material compensation.” If an individual falls under this definition and participates in a “confrontation or military operations,” this individual “shall be punished by imprisonment for … three up to eight years.”
Mozambique’s criminal code has its own unique two-factor test to define mercenaries. Under Article 163 of the code, individuals commit the crime of mercenarism if they try to overthrow a legitimately constituted foreign government by armed violence and do so with an armed force composed entirely or in part of foreigners. Offenders are to be punished with 16 to 20 years of imprisonment.
While Russia itself criminalized mercenarism under Article 359 of its criminal code, it seems unlikely that the country would ever use such a law against the group due to Wagner’s close relationship with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Russia’s definition of a mercenary is quite similar to Azerbaijan’s in that Russia’s test also removes the first factor (recruitment) and the fourth factor (membership in the armed forces of a party to the conflict). If someone fulfills the definition and participates in “an armed conflict or hostilities,” this crime will be punishable by a “deprivation of liberty for a term of three to seven years.”
Prohibitions on Engaging With Mercenaries
Most of these laws and conventions also regulate engaging with mercenaries. Indeed, except for Additional Protocol I, they typically also criminalize recruiting, financing and training mercenaries.
Article 2 of the ICRUFTM states that “[a]ny person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries” is in violation of the convention.
While the OAU CEM criminalizes recruiting, financing, or training mercenaries, it does so only within the context of undermining the function of a state. Article 1.2 states that mercenarism is committed only when recruiting, financing, or training is done with “the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State.” Moreover, Article 1.2 also defines recruiting, financing, and training much more expansively than the ICRUFTM does, stating that, while attempting to oppose a process of self-determination and territorial integrity, an individual, group, or state:
a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries.
b) Enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said bands.
c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the above-mentioned forces.
Article 447 of the Ukrainian criminal code, like the OAU CEM, criminalizes the recruiting, financing, material support, or training of mercenaries if such actions are aimed at “violently changing, or overthrowing the constitutional order, seizing state power, impeding activities of the state authorities, or violating territorial integrity.” Violations of this law are punished with imprisonment from five to 10 years. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, follows the ICRUFTM definition regarding engaging with mercenaries but also criminalizes “other material maintenance of mercenaries” under Article 114.1 of the Azerbaijan criminal code. Offenders are to be punished with imprisonment of four to eight years. Finally, Mozambique follows the OAU CEM’s more expansive definition of engaging with mercenaries. Violators of the Mozambique law include “all those who voluntarily recruit, organize, finance, supply, equip, train, and transport individuals … as well as those who enlist in these forces.” This crime is punished with imprisonment of 16 to 20 years.
Other Laws
Of course, in addition to laws and conventions regulating the use of mercenaries, Wagner Group members could also be subject to any national laws such as those that punish killing, torture and terrorism if employees committed these actions. This is not entirely hypothetical: In 2017, according to Novaya Gazeta [warning: graphic images], Wagner employees allegedly beat Muhammad “Hamdi Bouta” Taha Ismail al-Abdullah to death by hitting him repeatedly with a sledgehammer and then decapitating him. Bouta was a Syrian national who was forcefully conscripted by the Syrian government in March 2017, deserted the army while he was in Homs, and was killed by Wagner Group members at the Shaer gas field, which had recently been liberated from the Islamic State. Bouta’s brother filed a complaint based on Article 12 of Russia’s criminal code on March 11, which criminalizes actions by Russian citizens that work against the “interests protected by the Code” and against servicemen of Russian military units that commit crimes abroad that violate the Russian criminal code. In addition, reports by Human Rights Watch and Voice of America News indicate that landmines left by Wagner employees in residential neighborhoods of Tripoli, Libya, have killed 52 people since 2020.
If Wagner Group employees were to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of any states parties to the Rome Statute or against the citizens of any states parties, the employees responsible for such an act could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court for violating Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which punishes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Out of all the countries where Wagner has operated, however, only the Central African Republic and Madagascar have ratified the Rome Statute. Ukraine has also accepted the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute on its territory from 2014 onward.
Applying the Law
Despite the many laws codified to regulate mercenaries, Wagner’s operations seem to face few meaningful legal constraints. Prosecutions of mercenaries by state authorities are rarely attempted or carried out.
Might Wagner face any legal consequences for its actions? It’s not clear whether countries that have ratified conventions like the ICRUFTM could prosecute Wagner Group members if they have not made corresponding national laws, due to the conventions’ structure. For that reason, the greatest legal constraints on Wagner’s activities may be in three countries where the Wagner Group has operated that have made national law regarding mercenaries: Ukraine, Mozambique and Azerbaijan. Yet it’s unlikely that any of these three states could succeed in prosecuting Wagner Group members under their national laws.
Ukraine is the country that has come the closest to prosecuting the Wagner Group using its mercenary law. In August 2020, the Ukrainian prosecutor general requested that Belarus extradite 28 alleged mercenaries, some of whom were Wagner employees, for their activities. The Ukrainian prosecutor general alleges that this group participated in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and sought to prosecute them under the country’s terrorism law, Article 258-3 of the Ukrainian criminal code. But under Article 447 of Ukraine’s criminal law, Wagner members would not be considered or prosecuted as mercenaries based on Ukraine’s five-factor test. For someone to be considered a mercenary, the test requires that someone:
Be recruited locally or abroad to take part in armed conflict, military or violent actions aimed at forcible change or overthrow of the constitutional order, seizure of state power, or obstruction of the activity of state authorities on the territory of Ukraine or the territory of other states or violation of territorial integrity.
Participate for the purpose of obtaining any personal gain.
Not be a citizen (subject) of a party to the conflict and not be a person who permanently legally resides in the territory controlled by a party to the conflict.
Not be a member of the armed forces of the state on the territory of which such actions are carried out.
Not be sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict to perform official duties as a member of its armed forces.
Arguably, Wagner Group members fulfill factors 1, 2, and 4, given that Wagner employees by assisting rebels in Eastern Ukraine have obstructed the activity of Ukrainian state authorities, received compensation for their work, and are not members of the Ukrainian armed forces.
But factors 3 and 5 would likely not be fulfilled, as Russia would most likely be considered a party to the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine’s position has been that Russia is in fact a party to the conflict and the International Criminal Court has stated that there exists an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. By all accounts it appears that Wagner’s forces in Eastern Ukraine were Russian citizens. And Wagner employees would also likely not fulfill the fifth factor, since, according to a Center for Strategic & International Studies report, Russia is a party to the conflict and Utkin “was subordinated both to the GRU [Russia’s military intelligence agency] and to the Russian military command.” As a result, given that Russia is a party to the conflict and Russian citizens participated, Wagner employees in Ukraine do not fall under Ukraine’s definition of mercenaries.
Mozambique likewise could not use its national law regulating mercenaries to target the Wagner Group for its activities in Mozambique. As described above, the first factor of the Mozambican mercenarism law is outwardly focused: It requires that a mercenary attempt to overthrow a legitimately constituted foreign government by armed violence and therefore does not apply to any Wagner actions in Mozambique. In theory, Mozambique, as well as Azerbaijan and Ukraine, could prosecute the Wagner Group for their mercenary activities in other countries like Libya. However, neither Mozambique nor any other state has currently shown any interest in doing so. Moreover, given that Wagner employees went to Mozambique to help the government fight against Islamic State-linked militants in the country’s Cabo Delgado province, it does not seem likely that the government would have any interest in prosecuting the group.
While Azerbaijan is currently attempting to prosecute Armenian mercenaries who fought against Azeri troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, the country has not taken steps to prosecute Wagner Group members who also allegedly participated in the conflict—and if prosecutors tried, it seems unlikely they would succeed. Azerbaijan’s four-factors test requires mercenaries to be (a) working with a view of material compensation, (b) not citizens of Azerbaijan or living constantly on its territory, (c) participating in a confrontation or military operations, and (d) not directed for execution of official duties (Azerbaijani criminal code, Article 114). The main question is whether any Wagner Group employees in the country were executing official duties: If Wagner members were receiving direction from either the government of Armenia or the independent government of Nagorno-Karabakh, then they would not be considered mercenaries. However, if the Wagner employees were instead receiving most of their direction from the Russian government, which was not a party to the conflict, then these employees would be considered mercenaries and could be prosecuted for mercenarism under Azerbaijani law.
Even if they could be considered mercenaries, however, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan would attempt to prosecute such individuals. Given Russia’s historic role as the chief negotiator between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its capacity to tip the conflict in a certain direction if it were so inclined, Azerbaijan would be unlikely to pursue these cases.
As for the complaint filed by Hamdi Bouta’s brother within Russia under Article 12 of the Russian criminal code, the odds of success appear low. Given that Novaya Gazeta’s complaint for the same case was ignored in 2019, unless the complaint was changed drastically, it is unclear why the Russian Investigative Committee would change its mind.
Could a more expansive legal regime change how companies like the Wagner Group operate? Many legal scholars argue that laws regulating mercenaries are too narrowly written, suggesting that broader statutes could increase prosecutions for such activities. In this view, the definitions of mercenaries used by various laws and conventions are overly narrow, which allows most mercenaries to avoid being classified as such. However, scholars have also noted that mercenaries operate in weak states, which makes enforcement and prosecutions by host governments difficult.
Moreover, even if countries implement more expansive prohibitions against PMSCs like Wagner, it could be argued that there is a risk that these kinds of regulations will—instead of discouraging companies like Wagner—discourage PMSCs that legitimately try to follow the rule of law when providing security services. Jose Gomez del Prado has argued that members of the U.N. Western Group have rejected proposed resolutions by Cuba to regulate PMSCs in order to protect legitimate business activities of these companies. Indeed, the United States and the United Kingdom believe that there are a number of PMSCs that provide important security services and that, while there are problems, the industry is best regulated through self-enforced industry standards like the Montreux Document.
At the same time, a more expansive legal regime could create more stability in countries affected by conflict. The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has been a regular advocate for greater regulation of the PMSC industry and made a draft PMSC convention that was tabled in 2009. Saeed Mokbil, the chairperson-rapporteur for the working group, has argued that the international and domestic legal regulation of PMSCS could promote the rule of law. He has argued that through regulations regarding oversight, registration, licensing, and vetting, there could be a lower risk of destabilization and human rights violations in countries using PMSCs.
In the meantime, it seems clear that the Wagner Group will continue to operate. Companies like Wagner are able to quickly deploy soldiers in combat upon receiving payment and disappear overnight when necessary. Such companies are increasingly in demand—and they are reshaping how conflicts operate around the globe,
By promoting instability in southeastern Ukraine and becoming involved in the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has shown growing resolve to militarily challenge the United States both within and beyond Russia’s self-proclaimed zone of “privileged interests.” Russian participation in these conflicts has also highlighted a new-old tool to fulfill Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions: the so-called Private Military Companies (PMC), irregular and de jure illegal private armies that directly or indirectly operate in the service of the Kremlin. PMCs have a deep historical legacy of helping Russia pursue state interests, and the sophistication and scope of Moscow’s use of this instrument continues to grow and evolve. Russian readiness to employ PMCs rests on “plausible deniability,” the commercialization of war, and the principle of asymmetricity. These three components have made PMCs an important, cost-effective means for Russia to act as the de facto key player in “gray zones”—both incidental and created by Moscow—and regional conflicts along its periphery as well as in places as far off as Central Africa and beyond.
Though a series of forthcoming reports, this project seeks to explore the issue of Russian PMCs through the lens of continuity and tradition. The main project investigator, Dr. Sergey Sukhankin, a Research Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, will employ a broad range of primary- and indigenous secondary-source data to explain how Russia employs these irregular formations and what the West should do about it.
Please find the latest reports in this series below:
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