Showing posts sorted by relevance for query MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, December 22, 2021

 

U.S. military-industrial complex sees war as shortcut to profits

Source
People's Daily Online
Editor
Wang Xinjuan
Time
2021-12-22 

By Zhong Sheng

Over the years, U.S. military expenditure has continuously hit record highs while the country's fiscal deficit worsened, behind which lies the strong influence of the country's military-industrial complex.

Throughout the U.S. history, its military-industrial complex, a mighty interest group, has repeatedly manipulated the country's political decision-making and seen wars as a shortcut to profits, prompting the U.S. government to cause one catastrophe after another in the world.

War is big business for the U.S., as Peter Kuznick, a history professor at the American University in the U.S., put it sharply.

To create inelastic demand for arms trade, the U.S. military-industrial complex has been bent on pushing U.S. foreign policy toward wars and conflicts.

“The U.S., driven by political-corporate greed, robbed Afghanistan of stability and tranquility for two decades,” said an article published on the website of Pakistan Observer.

In the Afghan war where loss is reckoned in lives, the only winner is the U.S. military-industrial complex, the article pointed out.

“The decisions to start and sustain wars are thus shaped by people with vested interests in extending the war as long as possible,” the article continued.

The five biggest U.S. defense contractors—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman—acquired as much as $2.02 trillion from the U.S. government’s funding for the war in Afghanistan, according to the Security Policy Reform Institute, an independent think tank in the U.S.

The fact that U.S. top weapon companies grabbed huge profits from the war in Afghanistan mirrors the age-old special existence of the military-industrial complex in the U.S.

During World War II, a structural connection between the giant war machine of the U.S. and the country’s economic system was forged and a huge interest group composed of the U.S. military, military industrial enterprises, politicians, and scientific research institutions took shape.

“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government,” warned former U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower in his farewell speech delivered in 1961.

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex,” Eisenhower added.

However, in the following decades, the influence of the military-industrial complex hasn’t been curbed, but penetrated deeply into the decision-making process of the U.S.

General Dynamics got off to a good start this year; although the world becomes more and more dangerous for mankind, the company has seen a good sign of stable demands, said Phebe Novakovic, chairman of General Dynamics, in April. Her remarks revealed that the U.S. military-industrial complex is actually composed of a bunch of vultures.

It is no secret that U.S. military industry companies spend large sums of money on lobbying U.S. politicians, donating money to their election campaigns and funding the so-called policy experts to ensure policies are in their favor.

Representatives from military industry companies have also frequently taken advantage of the “revolving door” to hold a position in key decision-making departments.

Statistics suggest that more than 4,000 military-industrial complex lobbies are active in today’s U.S. political arena.

The military-industrial complex can not only make sure that its own interests are not affected by changes of government, but can often prevent government from making decisions that may shrink its slice of the cake, even if these decisions are in line with the public interest.

The U.S. government has unrestrainedly provided resources for arms dealers, sacrificing investment in its public goods and increasing the risks of wars, which has done itself and others no good, commented Erica Fein, the Senior Washington Director of American anti-war coalition Win Without War.

To ensure strong demands for arms trade, the U.S. military-industrial complex has continuously incited the government to create imaginary enemies, never hesitating to arouse people’s fear and stirring up trouble.

The U.S. is searching for enemies around the world under the guise of safeguarding national security and promoting democracy and freedom, of which one of the drivers is the interests of the military-industrial complex, as American observers noted.

If it had not been the Russians, the U.S. would have devised some other rivals to replace them as a justification for its military aggression, George Kennan, who formulated the U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union, said in a speech in his later years.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has successively launched the Kosovo War, the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and many other wars, in which American arms dealers have made a great fortune.

For a long time, the U.S. military-industrial complex has repeatedly packaged wars as a proper option for U.S. foreign policy in a bid to pursue its own benefit, which has caused endless pain for people in other countries and led to turmoil and unrest in the world.

Such consequences make people around the world couldn’t help but wonder: What the U.S. has done to shoulder the international responsibilities it has kept talking about? How has it safeguarded the human rights it always spouts off about? Where is the so-called democracy that it couldn’t stop boasting about?

(Zhong Sheng is a pen name often used by People’s Daily to express its views on foreign policy and international affairs.)

Thursday, July 30, 2026

Russia Sustaining War Machine Despite Western Sanctions – Analysis


Image: Grok

July 30, 2026
By Dr. Taras Kuzio


Key Takeaways:

Despite successive Western sanctions packages, Russia’s military-industrial complex has expanded since 2022 by exploiting major sanctions gaps, leaving many defense-linked companies, chemicals, and dual-use technologies outside existing restrictions.

Russia continues acquiring critical military components through intermediary states, parallel imports, and weak export controls, while thousands of companies—particularly in the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong—facilitate sanctions evasion and sustain Russian weapons production.

Ukrainian intelligence has documented extensive Western-made components in Russian missiles, drones, aircraft, and air defense systems, demonstrating that U.S., European, and Asian technologies remain integral to Russia’s precision-strike capabilities despite sanctions.

The West is still imposing new sanctions on Russia due to its war against Ukraine. On July 23, the European Union adopted its 21st sanctions package against Russia, and on July 28 the U.S. Senate advanced sanctions legislation targeting Russia’s energy sector (Council of the European Union, July 23; Kyiv Post, July 29). Western sanctions, however, have not successfully completely inhibited Russia’s military-industrial complex. The paradox of Russia’s military-industrial complex is that, as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found, it grew after the imposition of Western sanctions and the decline in arms exports following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2026). This is because Western sanctions are allowing Russia to continue to build weapons systems that are being used against Ukraine.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said at the 2025 Group of Seven (G7) meeting, “There’s not a lot left to sanction from our part.” At least half of the Russian companies that supply the military-industrial complex, however, remain unsanctioned (Euromaidan Press, February 9). Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, includes 21 companies—e.g., Innovation Hub, Mayak Production Association—that are not sanctioned and have links to the military-industrial complex (Dixi Group, March 4).

The West faces two main difficulties when imposing sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex. According to Andrey Zayakin at The Insider, it is “not always clear which goods are being imported specifically for military use.” Additionally, “when one company is sanctioned, a substitute soon appears in its place, and while new Western restrictions are being introduced, the Russian military-industrial complex has time to adapt” (The Insider, February 18). Russia acquires technology through intermediary countries, parallel imports, secondary markets and weak end-user controls (Ukraine Business News, April 9). Western sanctions have slowed down but not ended the supply of Western goods to Russia’s military-industrial complex.


There are no sanctions on chemicals used to produce mechanical lubricants and military-grade tires. Western and Chinese companies provide motor oil additives and lubricants (Kyiv Independent, February 16). Raw glycerine is not sanctioned and continues to be exported to Russia despite its use for the manufacture of propellants and explosives. Russian petro-chemical manufacturers supply the military-industrial complex (Dekleptocracy Project, April 30).

Machine-building equipment from 15 Taiwanese, 13 German, 8 Czech, 6 Swiss, 3 Japanese, and 1 U.S. company was exported to Russia despite its dual-use for the military-industrial complex (Kyiv Independent, June 19). Russia’s leading tank maker, Uralvagonzavod, uses Western machines that require parts and software updates. Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) documented 300 Western companies exporting machinery to Russia that is essential to its military-industrial complex (Kyiv Post, March 26, 2025).

Many Western companies continued to supply Russia’s military-industrial complex through corrupt middlemen and via intermediary countries such as Türkiye, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan—countries not sanctioned. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) directly, and through Hong Kong, continues to be a major supplier to Russia’s military-industrial complex (Freedom Hong Kong, February 2026).


In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed two decrees sanctioning 24 individuals and 27 companies supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex, including those circumventing Western and Ukrainian sanctions from countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (President of Ukraine, February 7 [1],[2]).

The HUR documented 6,000 companies violating sanctions by trading with sanctioned Russian military-industrial complex companies, of whom 4,000 were Chinese (including those from Hong Kong) and the remainder from Türkiye, the Gulf states, the Middle East, and India (The Insider, March 11). A Dutch national registered the Redwing Metal company in Türkiye to re-export components and machinery from the European Union to Russia (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, June 19). A Polish–Ukrainian investigation found the Polish company Famot Pleszew had exported machinery to Russia (United24 Media, January 25, 2025; FrontStory, March 13). Fifty Western components are used in Russian shipbuilding and by the ship repair companies Kronstadt Marine Plant, Sevmash, and the Baltic Shipyard (Euromaidan Press, March 18).

Russia’s military-industrial complex is assisted by two well-established sanctions evaders—Iran and North Korea. Western components are found in Iranian Shahed drones, which are used to build Russian Geran drones. Iranian drones used to attack Cyprus and the Gulf states during the U.S.–Israeli conflict with Iran used Western components (United24 Media, March 5).

The number of Western components used by Russia’s military-industrial complex is very high, and Western governments are failing to close the channels used to export them to Russia. The HUR maintains an extensive database of components from 33 countries used by the Russian military-industrial complex. As of April, the HUR’s database included 1,635 components used in 218 Russian military-industrial complex plants (HUR, accessed July 29).

After analyzing debris from nearly 500 Russian drones and 50 missiles launched in an October 2025 attack on Ukraine, the HUR found they contained tens of thousands of Western components, which included 1,500 in the Iskander cruise missiles, 405 in the Kalibr cruise missiles, and 192 in the Kinzhal ballistic missiles (President of Ukraine, October 6, 2025). In another analysis of a Russian attack in May, the missiles Russia fired were built this year using 100 components from the United States (Texas Instruments, AMD), Germany (Harting Technical Group), and the Netherlands (Nexperia) (Kyiv Post, May 15). The largest share of components comes from the United States, the PRC, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan. Fewer components are from Czechia, Sweden, and Australia.


The Kyiv Independent, posing as a Russian defense company in 2025, ordered U.S. chips to prove how easy it was to buy them—and, if they had wished, export them to Russia (Kyiv Independent, January 24,March 10, 2025). An investigation by BILD magazine found Russian postal workers in Germany were sending components to Russia (BILD, January 25; United24 Media, January 26). Russia has built military communications systems using radio bridges, antennas and networking equipment from the U.S. company Ubiquiti (The Insider, February 20).

A third of the Russian military-industrial complex companies (e.g., Krasny Oktiabr, National Institute for Aviation Technologies, Yashz Avia) that build SU-57 planes used to launch the devastating KH-59 glide bombs at Ukraine are not sanctioned (Euromaidan Press, April 20). Russian glide bombs include components from the United States (Altera Corporation, Analog Devices, CTS, Texas Instruments, Linear Technology, MaxLinear, Sipex, American Semiconductor, Products Integrated), Ireland (Antena manufacturing, Taoglas), Switzerland (Ublox, TE Connectivity, Axicom STMicroelectronics), Japan (Din-Tek Semiconductor, Okuma Corporation), Taiwan (Akira Seiki), South Korea (Samsung Machine Engineering), and the PRC (Kyiv Independent, November 17, 2025). Components from the German company Guhring LLC are found in the SU-30 Russian fighter jet and S-400 air defense system (The Insider, July 3). The Pantsir S1 air defense system uses 52 Western components (Kyiv Post, May 12; Militarnyy, July 5).

The two main needs of Russia’s war machine are components for missiles and drones that are launched nightly at Ukraine. The Kh-101, 3M-14, KN-23/24, Iskander 9M728, and Kinzhal KH47M2 cruise and ballistic missiles, which have been launched against Ukraine, include components from the U.S. companies mentioned above, as well as AMD, Anderson Electronics, Intel-USA, Motorola, Vicor Corporation, and Microchip Technology, alongside Dutch, Swiss, German, Swedish, Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean parts. Eighty to ninety percent of the guidance systems in Russian cruise missiles are Western.

Components from 16 U.S., Swiss, Chinese, and East Asian companies are found in the KH-101 cruise missile—64.3 percent of the components in the KH-101 cruise missile are U.S., 17.9 percent German, 7.1 percent Swiss, 7 percent Dutch, and 3.6 percent Taiwanese. A ballistic missile fired at Kyiv in April 2025 used 116 mainly U.S. components (Kyiv Independent, October 6, 2025). Seven hundred ninety-nine shipments of XP Power microchips were exported from the United Kingdom to Russia via Hong Kong and are used in its KN-23/24 ballistic missiles (The Telegraph, February 16).

Russia’s Lancet and Zala reconnaissance drones use many Chinese components as well as components from 12 U.S. companies (Kyiv Independent, November 21, 2024). Besides the U.S. companies listed above, these also include components built by Nvidia, National Semiconductor, Micron Technology, Xilinx, Qorvo, Bel Fuse and Semtech Corporation.

Russia’s Molniya-2R reconnaissance drone includes Chinese and U.K. (Raspberry Pi5 Microcomputers) components (Euromaidan Press, December 22, 2025). Russia’s Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg reconnaissance drone depends on foreign parts, including 33 U.S., five Swiss, Taiwanese, Dutch, and Chinese components (Euromaidan Press; United 24 Media, April 13).

Russia’s Orion, a plagiarism of the U.S. Reaper drone, is built by 43 Russian companies, a third of whom are not sanctioned. Orion uses components from many U.S. companies listed earlier (Kyiv Independent, November 5, 2025)


The HUR documented U.S., Swiss, Japanese, Taiwanese, Dutch, Irish, and Chinese components in the Shahed 107 Iranian drone rebuilt by Russia as Geran-1 (Kyiv Independent, November 25, 2025). Russia’s Geran-2 drone uses the rotary encoder sensor built by the Austrian company AMS-Osram. The Geran-2 uses a clock buffer built by the Indian company Aura Semiconductor. Russia’s Geran-3 drone (using Iranian Shahed 238 specifications) includes 45 Western components (Euromaidan Press, September 16, 2025). Half of these are from U.S. companies (including Infineon Technology, Sipex Corporation, Adesto Technology, Alpha and Omega, and other U.S. companies listed earlier), with the remainder from Switzerland (seven companies, including U-Blox and STMicroelectronics), Germany (including Infineon Technology and Bosch), the PRC (six companies), United Kingdom (Raspberry Pi, Futura Technical Services), and Japan (Rubycon Corporation) (The Telegraph, February 18).

With turbojet propulsion and triple the speed of the Geran-1, 2, 3, and 4 drones at 300 and 400 miles per hour, Russia’s most advanced Geran-5 drone is a major technological upgrade. Geran-5 bridges the gap between low-cost loitering munitions and high-speed cruise missiles to bypass Ukrainian air defenses. Geran-5 includes components from six U.S. companies (in addition to the U.S. companies listed earlier, Monolithic Power Systems and CTS Corporation), and the German company Infineon (Kyiv Independent, January 22).

Historically, sanctions have never been 100 percent effective. Nevertheless, Western governments could take a greater number of steps to tighten sanctions on chemicals, components, and machinery exported to Russia for use by its military-industrial complex. Russia’s military equipment is being used today against Ukraine, but with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence and military leadership predicting Russia could be ready to launch an attack on NATO’s territory between 2027 and 2030, its weapons, which use a high number of Western components, would then be used against the West.


This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation



About Dr. Taras Kuzio

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He is co-author of The Four Roots of Russia’s War Against Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2026); co-editor of Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine (Columbia University Press, 2025); Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win (Jamestown Foundation, 2024), and Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War (Routledge, 2022). He can be found on X/Twitter @TarasKuzio
View all posts by Dr. Taras Kuzio →


A Crown Jewel In Peril: Russia’s Arctic Aggression Masks Nuclear Vulnerability – Analysis


File photo of Russian Submarine Vepr by Ilya Kurganov. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

July 30, 2026
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Carl Parkin


Key Takeaways:

Russia is expanding Arctic control for trade and military power projection. It is developing the Northern Sea Route into a Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, requiring Russian permission and icebreaker escorts, while rebuilding bases and prioritizing the region in its foreign policy.

Melting ice is increasing the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet. Two-thirds of Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are based on the Kola Peninsula; longer transit times to protective ice and the ice’s retreat toward allied waters erode a key Cold War-era defensive layer.

NATO has an opportunity to exploit this vulnerability but must proceed cautiously. The Alliance is boosting Arctic presence through Arctic Sentry, new ASW assets, and icebreakers. Aggressive tracking of Russian SSBNs could deter gray-zone activity, yet risks provoking overreaction or use-it-or-lose-it pressures.



(FPRI) — Russia sees opportunity in the Arctic. For centuries, ever-present sea ice has made the region hostile to trade or military exploitation. But as the ice melts, that reality is changing. Russia plans to capitalize on the economic benefit of arctic trade, is increasing its military presence in the region, and is leveraging its dominance to conduct disruptive gray zone activity against US allies. But the retreat of arctic ice may not work entirely in Russia’s favor. As the ice melts, Russian nuclear weapons are becoming more vulnerable. Allies must thread the needle between appropriately exploiting this vulnerability, and avoiding Russian overreaction.
Russia’s Arctic Interests

A significant portion of Russia’s Arctic power projection is based on its dominance of regional trade. Russia is expanding the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a long-established shipping route between Russia and Asia, into a broader trade network known as the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor. Russia maintains tight control over the area by requiring that international vessels obtain both Russian permission and icebreaker escort from its fleet to transit the route.


This behavior is part of a broader pattern of Russian lawfare in the region, leveraging contested legal claims to restrict allied freedom of movement in the Arctic. After Russia passed a law in late 2022 regulating the navigation of warships in the NSR, allied-aligned analysts have debated whether to conduct a freedom of navigation operation there, However, the risks have ultimately outweighed the benefits and Russia maintains de facto dominance over the route.

This dominance is reinforced by a strengthening military posture. Russia has revitalized its Arctic military forces for over a decade by rebuilding Soviet-era bases and modernizing air defense capabilities. In its 2023 foreign policy concept, Russia listed the Arctic as a priority region, second only to its near abroad in Eastern Europe. However, Russia’s foreign policy and military expansion seems to increasingly serve its trade decisions, rather than the other way around. Cargo volumes in the NSR have fallen over the past two years, reaching a new low of 37 million metric tons last year and bucking Putin’s 2018 ambitions of traffic reaching 80 million by 2024. The NSR’s relative economic weakness indicates the true purpose of Russian regional dominance: power projection.

Russia’s lawfare and military expansion facilitates military control, which in turn shields Russia’s gray zone warfare activities. Russia’s “shadow fleet” of vessels, sailing under flags of convenience, has been increasingly implicated in the destruction of undersea infrastructure, as well as its broader sanction-evasionefforts. Russia’s control over the surrounding waters facilitates these activities, allowing the shadow fleet to move with impunity across increasingly broad swathes of Arctic waters.

A Crown Jewel in Peril


While the Arctic is presently a region of Russian strength, it also houses one of Russia’s most precious, and historically most vulnerable, assets: its nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs. According to US intelligence estimates, two-thirds of Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are based on the Kola Peninsula – the region of Russian near-Arctic territory closest to the Norwegian border. The peninsula is highly militarized, and sits at the core of Russia’s Arctic power projection. It is home to the headquarters of Russia’s Northern Fleet at Severomorsk and a submarine base at Gadzhyievo, which hosts both Cold War Delta-IV and modern Borei-class ballistic missile submarines.

Russia’s crown jewel of nuclear deterrence did not come to reside in its freezing home by happenstance. During the earliest days of the Cold War, the Soviets had not yet developed intercontinental-range missiles to mount on their submarines. To carry out a nuclear strike against the United States—or to patrol in a region from which they could do so—their SSBNs had to navigate close to the US’s Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. But these locations close to US coastlines were within range of a large network of US passive acoustic sonar sensors called SONOS, which could detect and track Soviet submarines, thereby minimizing the submarines’ value as a deterrent force.

Soviet espionage eventually identified this vulnerability, and the USSR quickly moved to better secure their naval nuclear deterrent. Instead of transiting subs through risky, distant waters, they developed longer-range sea-launched missiles capable of hitting the United States from the Barents Sea and nearby Arctic waters closer to home. To further secure these local submarine patrol areas, the Soviets constructed “bastions,”or zones of layered defenses where SSBNs could safely reside, surrounded by networks of sensors, mines, escorting attack submarines, and other naval assets.


But the layered bastion defense was not the only thing protecting Soviet submarines. The surrounding Arctic ice served, in effect, as a security blanket for vulnerable SSBNs.

SSBNs are pursued by mixed forces of planes, helicopters, and ships, equipped with various sensors designed to detect submarines in their underwater hiding places. Additionally, submarines can be followed, or “tailed,” by other submarines. All of these methods of submarine detection are further complicated by the presence of surface sea ice. Large ships struggle to navigate zones with heavy sea ice and the sensor arrays they tow for submarine detection can be disrupted by unpredictable ice floes. Some anti-submarine planes and helicopters can detect submarines through the ice by identifying the magnetic field disruption caused by their hulls, but their munitions are unable to punch through thick “pack ice,” especially when traveling at the low altitudes required for submarine tracking. Finally, the sound wave detection methods used to tail submarines underwater are made unreliable as they pass into the sonically active marginal ice zone, where ice breakup causes significant acoustic anomalies.

Altogether, the under-ice environment is much safer for submarines than the open ocean, especially when actively evading an opposing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) force. The decline in Arctic ice could remove one of the layers of protection Russia relies on to secure its SSBN fleet, reintroducing an early Cold War vulnerability in a modern context.


Measuring the Danger


Geospatial analysis reveals just how bad this challenge is for Russia. The following figure shows how long Russian submarines would need to traverse to safer under-ice waters, assuming that they could travel in a straight line at maximum speed, a scenario which is unlikely in practice.


Graphic courtesy of Carl Parkin based on data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)

The figure demonstrates that these transit times are growing longer across all seasons, especially in late summer, when record lows of around 20 hours from the 1980s are blown out of the water by 35+ hour transit times in recent years. Additionally, the upper curve of the graph observed during summer months is stretching horizontally. This indicates that the length of “ice summers,” when traversal times are at their highest, is getting longer, meaning there are more days each year where Russian submarines are further from the protection of ice.

But traversal time isn’t the only variable that should concern Russia—the following figure shows that as the ice melts, it is receding further into the waters of its adversaries. While the 1980s saw sea ice regularly reaching through the gap between the archipelagoes of Svalbard (demilitarized, and controlled by Norway) and Franz-Joseph Land (Russian-owned), the ice is now hiding itself behind Svalbard and moving closer to the coast of allied-controlled Greenland, where US bases create far more dangerous waters for a Russian SSBN.


Graphic courtesy of Carl Parkin based on data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)


Allied Opportunities


These estimates deserve a caveat: other variables may improve submarine survivability in the Arctic region. A recent study found that changing water temperatures in the Arctic are affecting how sound propagates, perhaps providing a hider’s advantage to SSBNs. The Arctic soundscape is also changing as a whole, with ice breakup and increasing commercial activity creating more ambient noise in the region, which helps mask the sounds of nuclear submarines.

Nevertheless, the changing extent of Arctic sea ice will affect the vulnerability of Russian SSBNs in the future, and alter the overall dynamics of naval warfare in the Arctic. In the mid-1980s, in response to the Soviet bastion strategy, the Allies implemented a new Maritime Strategy designed to be implemented in the event of war. The centerpiece of this plan was a naval surge into the Barents Sea, enabling an aggressive campaign to hunt down Soviet SSBNs. This strategy was criticized at the time for its feasibility in the Arctic’s harsh, icy conditions. As the environment changes, it may become more feasible.

NATO is already rising to meet the Russian threat in the Arctic, in part due to pressure from the Trump administration. In December 2025, NATO reorganized its Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, to include Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, “reinforc[ing its] posture in the High North” and creating a new “strategic bridge between North America and Europe” according to US Air Force General Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In February of 2026, the Alliance launched the Arctic Sentry vigilance activity, after US President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte agreed that “NATO should collectively take more responsibility for the defense of the region.” Arctic Sentry will intensify NATO’s force presence in the Arctic: the United Kingdom will double its troops in the Norwegian arctic to two-thousand over the next three years, and Sweden will lead a new four-thousand strong land force based in Finland. The operation will also involve integrated sensing and the construction of new infrastructure in NATO’s Arctic nations.

The Alliance is also pursuing high profile anti-submarine warfare modernization and expansion efforts. Germany has ordered eight P-8 Poseidon aircraft, massive derivatives of the Boeing 737 equipped with sensors designed to track submarines, and Norway has purchased at least five British Type 26 frigates, another anti-sub platform. To traverse through the ice that still remains in the contested Arctic, the US has signed a pact with Canada and Finland to construct a new fleet of allied icebreaker ships to challenge Russia’s long-held icebreaker dominance.

Altogether, NATO seems well-poised to exploit the emerging vulnerability of Russian submarines in the coming years. It has reason to do so: Russia’s submarine-based harassment is increasing. The UK Ministry of Defense recorded a 30 percent increase in Russian submarines entering British waters in the past two years, and the UK deployed forces in April to deter a covert Russian operation to sabotage its undersea cables. Russian subs may be less likely to engage in escalatory, gray zone activity if they are more aggressively tracked, tailed, and held at risk. While shifting from chasing off attack submarines to chasing down SSBNs may seem like a radical escalation, it is not without precedent given the extreme vulnerability of the Russian submarine force prior to its transition to bastion basing, and the explicit plan to destroy SSBNs laid out in the Maritime Strategy.


While Russia increased the rate and scope of its naval exercises across territorial and allied-aligned waters indiscriminately up until 2022, it now seems to have refocused to a more defensive, preparatory posture in the Barents Sea. This shift could indicate that Russia has recognized the emerging vulnerability to its submarine bastions, and is looking to secure its SSBN force regardless of the state of the Arctic ice. In doing so, Russia has revealed a soft spot. NATO has the opportunity to probe this vulnerability in an attempt to curtail Russian gray-zone activity.

However, regardless of its Cold War precedent, NATO should be cautious when employing this strategy. The Alliance must be explicit that its tracking and tailing of SSBNs is a reaction to Russian submarines’ gray zone activity, intended to re-establish a red line rather than conduct a counterforce first strike. Military innovations that threaten the efficacy of Russia’s nuclear forces have shaken Russia in the past, provoking it to resurrectand complete escalatory Cold War-era weapons proposals, such as the nuclear-powered cruise missile. Inciting further overreactions should be avoided by the Alliance if possible. Furthermore, in a worst case scenario, tracking SSBNs could lead to use-it-or-lose-it pressures in an emerging conflict. NATO should consider the balance of risks and benefits in its approach when attempting to deter future Russian aggression.


About the author: Carl Parkin researches nuclear risk and the history of US defense policy. He is currently a research fellow with the University of Chicago Existential Risk Lab.


Source: This article was published by FPRI


About Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Founded in 1955, FPRI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.
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Friday, July 14, 2006

Liberals Military Heritage

Crash of a Canadian Forces helicopter, which killed 3 and injured 4 off Nova Scotia, occurred while aircraft was under restrictions because of past mechanical troubles

EDITORIAL: Keep our Snowbirds airworthy

Under the Trudeau government the Canadian state focused less on external military operational capacity and more on the use of the military for domestic problems.

One was the Trudeau fear of insurrection in Quebec post the FLQ crisis, the other was the idea that the military should also be used for domestic emergencies, like clearling snow from Toronto streets or clean up after storms.

The Trudeau government also looked at the military as an opportunity to offer jobs to Maritimers whose local fishing industry was in decline. Along with the policy of promoting the depopulation of the Maritimes by promoting fishers to take up work elsewhere in Canada, the military offered trades training to the unemployed.

Combined with the Liberals ideology that the military was for peace keeping, and their disdane for NATO (though unlike the NDP they never admitted to wanting to leave NATO, they merely provided the absolute minimum required to maintain membership) military equipment purchased was for domestic use.

After WWII the dismantling of the merchant marine directly impacted on Canada's ability to maintain its ship building ability.

Under the Mulroney government the final destruction of Canada's indigenous ship and aircraft building industry was sealed with the Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA. What the Liberals had wrecked with indifference, the Conservatives now finally killed with its sucking up to the U.S.

Under the Chretien Liberals, a new policy was introduced, one that bespoke the Liberals frugality with taxpayers money, post-Mulroney's spending spree, the government would only buy used military equipment at bargain basement prices, and would continue to maintain old outdated equipment past their expiry date.

There are no such thing as accidents. The failure of the Submarine fleet, the aging helicopter fleets, the dangerous outdated fleet of Tudor aircraft for Canada's Snowbirds, all this is the direct result not only of the Canadian Governments failure to fund the military but the result of the death of Canada's own homegrown ship and aircraft industries. The Liberals had no use for an indigenous Military Industrial complex, satisfied being a branch plant supplier to the US for its war operations.

The Liberals focused their policies on domestic peace keeping, increasing the capabilities of the military and police to monitor the Left, Labour, the Anti-War movement and Quebec nationalists.

Under the Conservatives, both Mulroney and now the Harpocrites, the military industrial complex that did exist in Canada was further reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water for the benefit of the Americans.

Today the military is being funded to buy new equipment, from the U.S. And that includes secondary manufacturing and maintance, something Canada once was famous for, is now being contracted out.

The failure to subsidizde the Canadian Military Industrial complex was a political choice of the Liberals, they had little use for the Military, except to quell another Quebec crisis. For the Conservatives its a political choice as well, to integrate the Canadian Military Industrial complex into the American one. Meaning that our military will be supplied by the American Military Industrial complex.

Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum.

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Saturday, February 07, 2026

Trump’s $1.5 Trillion ‘Dream’ Military’


by   | Feb 6, 2026

Reprinted from TomDispatch

What constitutes national security and how is it best achieved? Does massive military spending really make a country more secure, and what perils to democracy and liberty are posed by vast military establishments? Questions like those are rarely addressed in honest ways these days in America. Instead, the Trump administration favors preparations for war and more war, fueled by potentially enormous increases in military spending that are dishonestly framed as “recapitalizations” of America’s security and safety.

Such framing makes Pete Hegseth, America’s self-styled “secretary of war,” seem almost refreshing in his embrace of a warrior ethos. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is another “warrior” who cheers for conflict, whether with Venezuela, Iran, or even — yes! — Russia. Such macho men revel in what they believe is this country’s divine mission to dominate the world. Tragically, at the moment, unapologetic warmongers like Hegseth and Graham are winning the political and cultural battle here in America.

Of course, U.S. warmongering is anything but new, as is a belief in global dominance through high military spending. Way back in 1983, as a college student, I worked on a project that critiqued President Ronald Reagan’s “defense” buildup and his embrace of pie-in-the-sky concepts like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as “Star Wars.” Never did I imagine that, more than 40 years later, another Republican president would again come to embrace SDI (freshly rebranded as “Golden Dome”) and ever-more massive military spending, especially since the Soviet Union, America’s superpower rival in Reagan’s time, ceased to exist 35 years ago. Amazingly, Trump even wants to bring back naval battleships, as Reagan briefly did (though he didn’t have the temerity to call for a new class of ships to be named after himself). It’ll be a “golden fleet,” says Trump. What gives?

For much of my life, I’ve tried to answer that very question. Soon after retiring from the U.S. Air Force, I started writing for TomDispatch, penning my first article there in 2007, asking Americans to save the military from itself and especially from its “surge” illusions in the Iraq War. Tom Engelhardt and I, as well as Andrew Bacevich, Michael Klare, and Bill Hartung, among others, have spilled much ink (symbolically speaking in this online era) at TomDispatch urging that America’s military-industrial complex be reined in and reformed. Trump’s recent advocacy of a “dream military” with a proposed budget of $1.5 trillion in 2027 (half a trillion dollars larger than the present Pentagon budget) was backed by places like the editorial board of the Washington Post, which just shows how frustratingly ineffectual our efforts have been. How discouraging, and again, what gives?

Sometimes (probably too often), I seek sanctuary from the hell we’re living through in glib phrases that mask my despair. So, I’ll write something like: America isn’t a shining city on a hill, it’s a bristling fortress in a valley of death; or, At the Pentagon, nothing succeeds like failure, a reference to eight failed audits in a row (part of a 30-year pattern of financial finagling) that accompanied disastrous wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Such phrases, no matter how clever I thought they were, made absolutely no impression when it came to slowing the growth of militarism in America. In essence, I’ve been bringing the online equivalent of a fountain pen to a gun fight, which has proved to be anything but a recipe for success.

In America, nothing — and I mean nothing! — seems capable of reversing massive military spending and incessant warfare. President Ronald Reagan, readers of a certain (advanced) age may recall, was nicknamed the “Teflon president” because scandals just didn’t seem to stick to him (at least until the Iran-Contra affair proved tough to shed). Yet history’s best candidate for Teflon “no-stick” status was never Reagan or any other president. It was and remains the U.S. warfare state, headquartered on the Potomac River in Washington, D.C. And give the sclerotic bureaucracy of that warfare state full credit. Even as the Pentagon has moved from failure to failure in warfighting, its war budgets have continued to soar and then soar some more.

Forgive the repetition, but what gives? When is our long, national nightmare of embracing war and (wildly overpriced) weaponry going to end? Obviously, not anytime soon. Even the Democrats, supposedly the “resistance” to President Trump, boast openly of their support for what passes for military lethality (or at least overpriced weaponry), while Democratic members of Congress line up for their share of war-driven pork. To cite a cri de coeur from the 1950s, have they no sense of decency?

The Shameless Embrace of Forever War and Its Spoils

I’m just an aging, retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. Who cares what I think? But America should still care about the words of Dwight D. Eisenhower, also known as Ike, the victorious five-star general of D-Day in 1944 and beyond, and this country’s president from 1953 to 1961. Ike was famously the first significant figure to warn Americans about the then-developing military-industrial complex (MIC) in his farewell address to the nation. Yet, even then, his words were largely ignored. Recently, I reread Ike’s warning, perhaps for the 100th time and was struck yet again by the way he highlighted the spiritual dimension of the challenge that is, all too sadly, still facing us.

In case you’ve forgotten them (or never read them), here are Ike’s words from that televised address in January 1961, when he put the phrase “the military-industrial complex” in our language:

“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

“We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.”

Those were the prescient words of the most senior military man of his era, a true citizen-soldier and president, and more than six decades later, we should and must act on them if we have any hope left of preserving “our liberties and democratic processes.”

Again, wise words, yet our leaders have seldom heeded them. Since 1961, the “disastrous rise of misplaced power” when it comes to the MIC has infected our culture, our economy, even — to steal a term from the era of the disastrous American war in Vietnam — our hearts and minds. Indeed, despite the way the MIC failed so spectacularly to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese, the Afghans, the Iraqis, and other embattled peoples across the globe in various misbegotten and mendacious wars, it did succeed spectacularly over the years in winning the hearts and minds of those who make the final decisions in the U.S. government.

In an astonishing paradox, a spendthrift military establishment that almost never wins anything, while consistently evading accountability for its losses, has by now captured almost untrammeled authority within our land. It defies logic, but logic never was this country’s strong suit. In fact, only recently, we reached a point of almost ultimate illogic when America’s bully-boy commander-in-chief insisted that a Pentagon budget already bloated with cash needs an extra $500 billion. That, of course, would bring it to about $1.5 trillion annually. Apologies to my Navy friends but even drunken sailors would be challenged to spend that mountain of money.

In short, no matter what it does, the Pentagon, America’s prodigal son, never gets punished. It simply gets more.

More, More, More!

Not only is such colossal military spending bad for this country, but it’s also bad for the military itself, which, after all, didn’t ask for Trump’s proposed $500 billion raise. America’s prodigal son was relatively content with a trillion dollars in yearly spending. In fact, the president’s suggested increase in the Pentagon budget isn’t just reckless; it may well wreck not just what’s left of our democracy, but the military, too.

Like any massive institution, the Pentagon always wants more: more troops, more weapons, more power, invariably justified by inflating (or simply creating) threats to this country. Yet, clarity of thought, not to speak of creativity, rarely derives from excess. Lean times make for better thinking, fat times make for little thought at all.

Not long ago, Trump occasionally talked sense by railing on the campaign trail against the military-industrial complex and its endless wars. Certainly, more than a few Americans voted for him in 2024 because they believed he truly did want to focus on domestic health and strength rather than pursue yet more conflicts globally (and the weapons systems that went with them). Tragically, Trump has morphed into a warlord, greedily siphoning oil from Venezuela, posturing for the annexation of Greenland and all its resources, while not hesitating to bomb IranNigeria, or most any other country. Meanwhile, China and Russia lurk in the wings as scary “near-peer” rivals and threats.

Although Trump’s supporters may indeed have been conned into imagining him as a prince of peace, this country’s militarism and imperialism clearly transcend him. Generally speaking, warfare and military boosterism have been distinctly bipartisan pursuits in America, making reform of any sort that much more difficult. Replacing Trump in 2028 won’t magically erase deep-rooted militarism, megalomaniacal imperial designs, or even the possibility of a $1.5 trillion military budget. Clearly, more, more, more is the bipartisan war song being sung inside the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House these days.

Taking on the MICIMATTSHG, or Blob

Ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern coined a useful acronym from the classic military-industrial complex, or MIC. He came up with MICIMATT (the Military-Industrial-Congressional-Intelligence-Media-Academia-Think-Tank complex) to highlight its blob-like growth. And it’s true that Congress and the rest are all deeply implicated in the blob. To which I’d add an “S” for the sporting world, an “H” for Hollywood, and a “G” for the gaming sector, all of which are implicated in, influenced by (as well as influencing), and often subservient to Ike’s old MIC. So, what we now have is the MICIMATTSHG. Recall that Ike warned us about the “disastrous rise of misplaced power” if we failed to challenge it back in 1961. Recall that he also warned us that the MIC could change the very structure of our society, making America far less democratic and also far less free. And most subtly, he warned us that it might also weaken America spiritually.

What did he mean by that? To reference a speech Ike made in 1953, he warned then that we could end up hanging ourselves from a cross of iron. He warned that we could become captives of militarism and war, avid believers in spending the sweat of our laborers, the genius of our scientists, and the blood of our youth, pursuing military dominance globally, while losing our democratic beliefs and liberties at home in the process. And that, it seems to me, is exactly what did indeed happen. We the people were seduced, silenced, or sidelined via slogans like “support our troops” or with over-the-top patriotic displays like military parades, no matter that they represented something distinctly less than triumphant in their moment.

And it never ends, does it?  Americans in various polls today indicate that they don’t want a war against either Venezuela or Iran, but our opinions simply aren’t heeded. Increasingly, we live in a “might makes right” country, even as military might has so regularly made for wrong since 1945.

And what in the world is to be done? Many things, but most fundamentally it’s time as a society to perform an “about-face,” followed by a march in double-time away from permanent war and toward peace. And that, in turn, must lead to major reductions in Pentagon spending. The best and only way to tackle the inexorable growth of the blob is to stop feeding it money — and stop worshipping it as well. Instead of a $500 billion increase, Congress should insist on a $500 billion decrease in Pentagon spending. Our task should be to force the military-industrial complex to think, improvise, become leaner, and focus on how most effectively to protect and defend America and our ideals, rather than fostering the imperial dreams of the wannabe warlords among us.

Trump’s current approach of further engorging the imperial blob is the stuff of national nightmares, not faintly a recipe for American greatness. It is, in fact, a sure guarantee of further decline and eventual collapse, not only economically and politically but spiritually as well, exactly as Ike warned in 1961. More wars and weapons simply will not make America great (again). How could they when, as Civil War General William T. Sherman so famously observed, war is “all hell”?

Americans, we must act to cut the war budget, shrink the empire, embrace diplomacy, and work for peace. Sadly, however, the blob has seemingly become our master, a well-nigh unstoppable force. Aren’t you tired yet of being its slave?

On the 250th anniversary of America’s founding, which was predicated on resistance to empire and military rule, it should be considered deeply tragic that this country has met the enemy — and he is indeed us. Here the words of Ike provide another teachable moment. Only Americans can truly hurt America, he once said. To which I’d add this corollary: Only Americans can truly save America.

As we celebrate our nation’s birthday this July 4th, wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could save this deeply disturbed country by putting war and empire firmly in the rearview mirror? A tall task for sure, but so, too, was declaring independence from the mighty British Empire in 1776.

Copyright 2026 William Astore

William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF) and professor of history, is a TomDispatch regular and a senior fellow at the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN), an organization of critical veteran military and national security professionals. His personal substack is Bracing Views. His video testimony for the Merchants of Death Tribunal is available at this link. His new book, made up of the 110 pieces he wrote for TomDispatch, is American Militarism on Steroids: The Military-Industrial Complex, Unbounded, Uncontained, and Undemocratic.

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands (the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novel Every Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War IIand Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story.'