SMOKERS’ CORNER: AT THE CROSSROADS OF SECULARISM AND ISLAM

Nadeem F. Paracha 

Published January 8, 2023 

Illustration by Abro

The South Asian Islamist theorist Abul Ala Maududi (d.1979) detested secularism. His ideas went a long way in constructing what came to be known as ‘Political Islam’. These ideas also influenced a number of Islamist ideologues outside South Asia.

A synthesis began to emerge when Maududi’s ideas engaged with Islamist ideologues in Arabia and Iran. At the core of the synthesis was an impassioned castigation of secularism. It was denounced as being a European concept that was inherently anti-religion.

But non-Islamist scholarship and studies on secularism in the last three decades have demonstrated that there are various kinds of secularism within the Western world. The same scholarship also maintains that secularism as an idea or its implementation in non-Western regions has deeper roots in those regions’ own histories and conditions.

The baseline thought behind secularism is the state’s neutrality towards religion. In various European countries, this thought has evolved to mean the right to practise religion as long as this right is not abused to challenge the writ of the state and disrupt the democratic contract between the state and society.

Islamist ideologues often posit secularism as being against Islam. However, an exploration of the history of Western secularism reveals that the problem is often with the Islamists’ cherry-picked interpretations

The state is to remain religion-neutral, treating religion as a citizen’s personal matter. The state can only intervene if it establishes that the matter has become publicly problematic and is causing discord.

This strand of secularism is the product of 17th and 18th century Enlightenment — a period in Europe and in the US that emphasised the importance of reason, science and material progress over ‘superstition’, monarchism, clericalism, traditionalism, etc. Most Enlightenment thinkers advocated the separation of the Church and the state. However, they did not call for the obliteration of religion.

They wanted religious texts to be ‘disenchanted’ and/or simplified and freed from superstition. The Enlightenment thinkers wanted religion to operate as a constructive social current (instead of an impediment) in an era of rapid political, economic and social changes.

So why did most Islamist ideologues explain Western secularism as anti-religion? I think it was a case of cherry-picking. They chose to focus more on the idea of secularism that emerged in France during the tumultuous 1789-99 revolution in that country.

Revolutionary French secularism was the product of a strong anti-clerical current in French society. Most common folk and intellectuals in France had accused the nexus between the monarchy and the Church as being entirely exploitative and the main culprit behind the country’s economic woes.

Compared to other European countries and the US, the strand of republicanism in France was more intense. During the revolutionary period, priests and clerics were violently persecuted, until the arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored order. Nevertheless, republicanism in France remained strong.



The US political scientist Elizabeth Hurd differentiates secularisms in the US and most European countries from French secularism, which is also referred to as ‘laïcite’. According to Hurd, the former strand of secularism seeks to preserve the liberties of citizens to think, organise and worship (or not) as they wish; whereas laïcite gives priority to the state and to common national identity over religion. But it is in no way anti-religion.

Many Islamists also mistook the overt anti-religion policies of some former communist regimes as secularism. Scholars of secularism desist from calling these regimes secular because they often tried to suppress established religions with an, albeit atheistic, creed built around a cult of personality.

Another flaw in the Islamists’ perceptions of secularism was their assumption that it was an entirely Western construct. Early Islamist thinkers were shocked when the Turkish nationalist Kamal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman caliphate and declared Turkey to be a modern republic. Indeed, Ataturk was influenced by French republicanism, but his secularisation policies were largely rooted in the political and economic turmoil that his country had plunged into in the 19th century.

When European powers began to encroach upon the political and economic interests of the Ottomans, it was the caliphate which responded by secularising many legal and social aspects of the empire. From 1839, the caliphate began to roll out a series of reforms. The reforms were introduced to sustain the empire and meet the changing needs of Ottoman society.

Therefore, Ataturk evolved something that was already in motion. This produced a secularism that was formulated to suit Turkish society. Turkish intellectuals, such as the sociologist Ziya Gokalp, played a prominent role in arguing for a secular Turkish nationalism as a way to address economic and political turmoil in Turkey. He contributed in coining the word ‘laiklik’ for Turkish secularism.

Unlike European and US secularisms, Turkish secularism was not religion-neutral. Instead, it gave the state the power to monopolise Islam and regulate it in the public sphere. It accepted Islam as being Turkey’s major religion, but one that was to be regulated according to the country’s modern nationalist and republican aspirations.

Indian secularism too was formulated according to India’s nationalist aspirations. It took into account the country’s religiously diverse society. Indian secularism is not about expunging religion from the public sphere, as such. It is about treating all Indians as equal citizens, no matter what their religion. It’s another thing that Hindu nationalists are of the view that Indian secularism is tilted more towards benefitting non-Hindus. They want to see it gone, or at least recognise India’s Hindu majority.

In Muslim-majority Pakistan, its founders conceptualised a project in which Islam was not used as a theocratic expression, but as a concept to formulate a political identity and nationalism.

According to the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, when religion is used to formulate a nationalist idea or identity, the ritual and theological aspects of the faith decrease. Taylor sees this as part of the secularisation process. During the first two decades of Pakistan, the state formulated a secularism which saw the state regulate Islam in the public sphere, but continue using it as a nationalist expression.

This strand of secularism also took shape in various other Muslim-majority nation-states. Islamists abhorred it, because it limited their participation in the project. Therefore, they began to explain it as a Western concept and anti-Islam, before barging in (from the 1970s onwards) and redirecting the project’s orientation towards building a more Islamist nationalism.

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 8th, 2023

Why the new French secularism is no longer exportable

Sari Hanafi 

MIDDLE EAST EYE
3 August 2023 

Despite the merits of 'historical secularism' promoted by France around the world, the exclusionary and divisive character of the 'new secularism' has undermined its universality

Two women at a march in Paris against Islamophobia on 10 November 2019,

 following an attack on a mosque in Bayonne, France (Reuters)

The recent exclusionary policies in France have led many to question French new secularism and the problems inherent in its imposition on societies both within and outside of the country.

French secularism is not what it was at the beginning of the 20th century. While its main tenet, which guarantees individual freedom and equality, is still perfectly universal, there is no sociological evidence to suggest that secularisation should lead to a decline in religiosity.

Indeed, historical secularism has a number of virtues that give it a universal scope, including the protection of religion from the authority of the state and the protection of the state from any hegemony of the clergy.


This observation is based on a forthcoming study on the influence of French secularism among Arab groups on the secular left and on French efforts to enforce its version of secularism.

'Ethnocentric'

Undermining the universality of French secularism is its "ethnocentric" character, born of the Christian reformist conception of religion.

French secularism has taken religion in the Christian manner - more specifically in the manner of the Protestant Reformation - by reducing it to individual belief and freedom of conscience, and confining it to private spaces, such as the home and the church. As a result, rituals or any other public forms of religious affirmation (such as the wearing of the Islamic headscarf) tend to be considered an unacceptable form of proselytism.

In the name of defending the ideals of the French secular left, certain intellectuals and media figures have no hesitation in transforming themselves into "faqih" (Muslim jurist) or "mufti" to "prove" that the veil "is not part of Islam", or that it is a "symbol of the slavery of women". In a totally ethnocentric display, they project onto Muslim societies meaning and cultural interpretation that emanate only from European culture.

Such arguments clearly violate the most basic freedoms, since it is up to each individual to define and give meaning to his or her social behaviour.


In a totally ethnocentric display, defenders of French secularism project onto Muslim societies meaning and cultural interpretation that emanate only from European culture

The French law banning headscarves in schools and for civil servants in public institutions, passed on 15 March 2004, can legitimately be seen as an explicit violation of the freedom to practise religion. Driving this legislation more than anything appears to be the sheer rejection of, and genuine obsessive disgust for, the headscarf by the majority of French society.

In her 2009 book, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, American philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues for the condemnation of any legislation built on the subjective rejection of the actions of others. She further asserts that moral or legal judgments cannot be justified or legitimised by feelings of disgust or other forms of subjective rejection.

The exclusionary secularism "a la francaise" has been, alas, replicated in some European countries, while others resist. Where French lawmakers are banning what is part of the conception of the "good" in a society, such as diversity and individual freedom, their counterparts in the UK and Norway (not to mention the US, Canada and Australia, where the famous "Burkini" originated) see no contradiction in a Muslim policewoman wearing a hijab or a Sikh policeman wearing a turban.

Very recently, this radical opposition was once again expressed in at least two ways. A campaign launched by the Council of Europe to promote diversity among women, including the freedom to wear the headscarf, was met with virulent criticism - leading to its cancellation.

The French scholar Florence Bergeaud-Blackler saw it as part of a romanticisation of the veil that ignored the fact that some women are "raped, vitriolised and burnt if they do not wear the veil".

It is not anecdotal to add to this French exceptionalism that, of all the members of the European Union, only Paris - through the voice of Sarah El Haïry, in her capacity as state secretary for youth, some of whose relatives wear the headscarf - officially protested against the Council of Europe's campaign. This "secular identity", to use Jean Baubérot's words, transforms Islam into a religion alien to European culture and incompatible with democratic values.

A 'good life' for all

The most radical defenders of the new secularism in France consider secularism not simply an instrument of governance, but an objective in itself. In their view, secularism is no longer a means of implementing the values of political liberalism - ie the values of freedom, equality and pluralism - within the framework of a democratic state; they see it as an intrinsic bearer of universal values, whatever the consequences, for society.

The notion of pluralism here suggests diversity and a plurality of concepts that make it possible to think about the "good" and, therefore, a good life for different groups in society and for the individuals comprising them. In its "new" sense, however, secularism takes into account the historical conditions and cultural environment of only one segment of society (albeit a majority).

France: Veiled Muslim women and the politics of the new secularism

Read More »

For example, while the presence of a cross in public school classrooms is considered contrary to secularism, a cross in the public square of a country characterised by its Christian architectural heritage cannot be considered as such. When the liberal conceptions of justice and the "good" compete, society resorts to debate in the public sphere using public reason or moral justifications derived from culture, tradition and the influence of globalisation.

The affirmation of secularity poses no problem as long as the reasoning does not go beyond a sphere that is audible and acceptable to all citizens. It is difficult to distinguish in these reasonings between what is merely a composite vestige of religious teaching and cultural practice and other sources or moral references.

Secularism, therefore, plays the role of a means (and not an end in itself) of the grammar that makes it possible to control the pace of this debate and respect the concept of citizenship while accepting, for example (in the area of religious or ethnic cults, rituals and fests), exceptions for the benefit of minorities, as long as these exceptions do not harm society as a whole.

In a society where Christians make up the majority, it is natural that certain official holidays would have Christian origins. But this should not preclude citizens of other faiths from celebrating their own holidays, as is the case in France and Germany. In France, while six of the 12 national holidays observed are Catholic events, proposals to observe Muslim and Jewish holidays have only been met with controversy and disdain. Meanwhile, the French government recently requested that teachers in Toulouse provide the number of student absences during the Eid al-Fitr celebration, triggering alarm among Muslim families and criticism from anti-racism groups.

Negative vision

In addition to being a universal value, the French new secularism has deemed itself an authority for passing restrictive legislation against minority religions. In place of any public debate on what is common in French culture, minorities with different lifestyles (including all religious practices and rituals forming the "good life") are legislated against unilaterally.

After its legislation on the headscarf, France adopted a law specifically against the burka, then yet another against the burkini, even though it is very difficult to establish that these practices in any way harm the majority or the social contract.

This normative frenzy continues in France with more recent cases: the French Football Federation's ban on interrupting a match to allow Muslim players to break their fast during the month of Ramadan, or the education minister's use of the notion of "religious symbols by destination" to ban the long dresses worn by some schoolgirls.

All this has led French political scientist Olivier Roy to warn against such an "extension of the domain of the norm" and of laws in several western countries, and against the shrinking of the public space for negotiation, debate and even dialogue.

In secular settings, the dissociation of politics and religion certainly makes sense whenever it is a question of limiting the exercise of politics by clerics whose action is confined exclusively to the interests of their believers. The politicisation of religion and the moral role it intends to play, negatively or positively, has become evident in many countries, including so-called "secular" ones.

The electoral influence of the churches has become clear in many democratic countries, where it affects both the left and right. In Brazil, the same Pentecostals who voted for Lula (and got 100 MPs in 2016) went on to vote for Jair Bolsonaro. Yet no one has called for a ban on "political Christianity".

So it is no longer acceptable to focus solely on the negative role of religiosity, politically and socially, because of its possible role in trajectories of radicalisation, sectarianism, or social and political subjugation.

In other contexts, religiosity can serve social progress, civic solidarity and/or resistance to colonialism and authoritarianism.

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Rafik Chekkat

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The distinction between the political and religious spheres should simply mean the respective autonomy of religious and temporal institutions. However, the reality today, particularly where the Muslim minority is concerned, is quite different: the temporal authority is exercising dominance over religious institutions.

When former President Nicolas Sarkozy called for the organisation of the Muslim community in France, it was clear, even before elections were held, who would lead these communities. He mandated that he alone would nominate 30 percent of the council.

The France of Emmanuel Macron has equally discouraged any attempt at genuine representation of the Muslims of France, as this would "constitute obstacles to their assimilation policy" - a vague, albeit oft-repeated phrase in the French political class.

While the principle of state neutrality is necessary for the autonomy of religious institutions, this does not mean that the state can refrain from fairly managing and regulating religious pluralism, especially in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society.

Dispelling these wrong notions is essential to establishing a 'soft' secularism that is not divisive, and would be necessary and even indispensable to each society

If we look at a wide range of political systems - from the most repressive authoritarian regimes to liberal democratic states - we see that most of them are involved in managing religious pluralism. In such a configuration, the state may have different roles. This depends on its vision of the moral dimension of religion. It can be positive (policies of integration and inclusion, policies of recognition) or negative (policies of exclusion, prohibition of religious manifestations, cultural indifference, policies of non-recognition or misrecognition).

The new French secularism of exclusion focuses only on this negative vision and has become the fatal weapon of the (extreme) right. From Rachida Dati to Fadela Amara, the French parties have never chosen political actors (to be ministers or MPs) from Arab or Muslim origin, other than those supposed to have distanced themselves as much as possible from the culture of their ancestors, which is nonetheless that of a large segment of the Muslim community in France.
'Soft' secularism

There remains no question of the positive virtues of historical secularism that France has helped to promote throughout the world. However, for the reasons outlined, the new secularism promoted in France over the past few decades can no longer be exported as it has been in the past.

Firstly, religion is often wrongly regarded as a social sphere that is completely separate from the rest of society. But like Canadian socio-anthropologist Francois Gauthier, I refuse to see society as divided into distinct compartments, one of which is religion. Religious, cultural, political, social and economic spheres are, in fact, traversed by common logic that makes it possible to encompass a given society in its entirety, just as Marcel Mauss did.

Dispelling these misunderstandings is essential if we are to establish a "soft" secularism that is not divisive, and would be necessary and even indispensable to each society: a secularism that cannot be set up as an end in itself, sacralised and blind to the conditions under which it is implemented in each national or communal context.

Secularism is merely a mechanism - albeit to a great extent - capable of effectively affirming the values of the liberal political project.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Sari Hanafi is a Professor of Sociology, Director of Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, and Chair of the Islamic Studies program at the American University of Beirut. He is the President of the International Sociological Association.He is also the editor of Idafat: the Arab Journal of Sociology (Arabic) and Chair of Islamic Studies program. Recently, he created the “Portal for Social impact of scientific research in/on the Arab World" (Athar). He was the Vice President of the board of the Arab Council of Social Science (2015-2016). He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales-Paris (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) (1994). He is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters on the sociology of religion, among various other publications.

DUPLESSIS SCION

Legault Implied Quebec Identity Has Catholic Roots & Justified It By Calling It 'Heritage'

Story by Thomas MacDonald • Yesterday 

MTL Blog

Premier François Legault reignited the debate about his party's conception of secularism in Quebec on Easter Monday with a tweet celebrating the perceived Catholic origins of the province's "culture of solidarity."


Legault Implied Quebec Identity Has Catholic Roots & Justified It By Calling It 'Heritage'© Provided by MTL Blog

"Catholicism has also given us a culture of solidarity that distinguishes us on a continental scale," the tweet from the premier reads. That line actually comes from an April 7 Journal de Montréal opinion piece by sociologist and columnist Mathieu Bock-Côté, which Legault shared in his Twitter post.

Bock-Côté also argues that Catholicism "served as a basis for [Quebec] collective identity" following the British conquest and that this "sense of the collective leads us today to resist the fragmentation of society under the pressure of multiculturalism."

Legault's tweet amassed hundreds of comments by Monday afternoon, some from Twitter users praising the statement, but many more from critics who accused the premier of hypocrisy given his insistence on the secularism of the Quebec state.

Legault's government notably passed the controversial Bill 21, which bans many public servants from wearing religious symbols while performing their duties. Many have said the measure unfairly targets religious minorities, especially Muslim women.

The premier later returned to Twitter to defend the tweet, writing in response that "we must distinguish between secularism and our heritage."

François Legault accused of hypocrisy for tweet praising Catholicism

Story by Katelyn Thomas, Montreal Gazette • Yesterday

Quebec Premier François Legault holds a news conference in Montreal on Friday March 24, 2023.© Provided by The Gazette

Twitter users were quick to accuse Premier François Legault of hypocrisy on Easter Monday for tweeting a line from a Journal de Montréal column crediting Catholicism for “(engendering) in us a culture of solidarity that distinguishes us on a continental scale.”

Legault was quoting from a Mathieu Bock-Côté column titled “ Praise of our old Catholic background 

The premier’s post drew criticism from those on both sides of the secularism debate given Quebec’s controversial Bill 21 , which bans most government employees from wearing religious symbols at work. Those who take issue with Bill 21 have pointed out the law disproportionately affects Muslim women, raising concerns about whether the ban is meant to target specific religions.

“See, they would’ve had some plausible deniability on the religious headwear ban if he didn’t tweet this out,” one Twitter user wrote in response to Legault’s tweet.

The controversial tweet came less than a week after Quebec announced plans to ban prayer rooms in schools . Education Minister Bernard Drainville said on Wednesday he would issue the directive to all school service centres, adding that prayer rooms in schools are not compatible with official secularism. He added students who want to pray could do

By 12:30 p.m., Legault’s tweet had more than 335,000 views, 550 responses and 300 retweets, including 250 quote-tweets. The attention had prompted him to respond to his original post with: “We must distinguish between secularism and our heritage.”

In addition to citizens, several politicians had weighed in on his post. Marwah Rizqy, Liberal MNA for Saint-Laurent and spokesperson for education, had responded saying “we all write tweets we regret.”

“You have a duty of reserve and neutrality as premier of all Quebecers in our secular state,” Rizqy wrote.

Monsef Derraji, Liberal MNA for Nelligan, for his part wrote: “A premier who supposedly advocates the secularism of the state. What a lack of judgment!”

He has long claimed that certain long-standing Christian symbols on public edifices don't contradict his idea of secularism. Christian crosses, for example, still adorn many school buildings. His government did, however, vote to remove a crucifix that hung in the National Assembly chamber in Quebec City.

This is not the first time Legault has received criticism for a statement about Catholicism. He came under fire during a visit to California in 2019 after claiming offhand that "all French Canadians" are Catholic.

The controversial tweet came less than a week after Quebec announced plans to ban prayer rooms in schools . Education Minister Bernard Drainville said on Wednesday he would issue the directive to all school service centres, adding that prayer rooms in schools are not compatible with official secularism. He added students who want to pray could do so, but “discreetly” and “silently” without designated rooms.

By 12:30 p.m., Legault’s tweet had more than 335,000 views, 550 responses and 300 retweets, including 250 quote-tweets. The attention had prompted him to respond to his original post with: “We must distinguish between secularism and our heritage.”

In addition to citizens, several politicians had weighed in on his post. Marwah Rizqy, Liberal MNA for Saint-Laurent and spokesperson for education, had responded saying “we all write tweets we regret.”

“You have a duty of reserve and neutrality as premier of all Quebecers in our secular state,” Rizqy wrote.

Monsef Derraji, Liberal MNA for Nelligan, for his part wrote: “A premier who supposedly advocates the secularism of the state. What a lack of judgment!”

 

Former Liberal MNA Christine St-Pierre also weighed in, drawing attention to gender inequality within Catholicism.

Quebec comedian Sugar Sammy also commented.

“Secularism is important except once on Twitter,” he wrote.

 

 

Islamophobia in France

Stop the Fires of Hatred!

by Salah Lamrani / May 30th, 2025

As summer approaches, the French government and its media echo chambers are once again launching an Islamophobic offensive. By seizing on a newly released report about the so-called ‘influence’ of the Muslim Brotherhood, they are using a crude pretext to target and suppress any visible expression of Islam in society. This comes in the wake of the brutal murder of 22-year-old Aboubakar Cissé, a Malian-born carpenter who was stabbed 57 times while praying in a mosque — a horrific hate crime. We are republishing this article from last summer as a stark testament to the deep-rooted, cartoonish racism and bigotry that pervade the so-called “Cradle of Human Rights.” Although originally written for the French CGT Education teachers’ union, the article’s author has since been expelled for criticizing the Confederation’s stance on Gaza (see this petition).

The summer period is notoriously prone to forest fires, a formidable threat to our natural resources and the surrounding biodiversity. However, there is an even more insidious danger spreading through our societies, undermining our values and cohesion: irresponsible hate speech. A reminder of some recent occurrences is in order.

Occitan Hearth

At the end of April, in elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools in the Academies of Toulouse and Montpellier [French southern cities of the Occitania region], a survey on “absenteeism” during the month of Ramadan and the Eid al-Fitr holiday, particularly affecting priority education zones [underprivileged areas with a significant Muslim community], targeted exclusively Muslim pupils. Commissioned by the Interior Ministry, this survey was required from schools by the police and the Ministry of Education. This situation provoked a legitimate outcry.

Following the denunciation of these stigmatizing practices — which turn a basic practice of Islam into a security issue — fraught with illegality, since religious statistics (even non-nominative ones) are strictly regulated in France, the authorities, as usual, talked a lot of hot air: “clumsiness”, “badly formulated message”, “autonomous research by an intelligence officer”, “study of the impact of certain religious holidays on the operation of public services”… As if cops were known for carrying out sociological investigations in schools; as if a religion other than Islam had ever been in the line of fire; as if occasional absences, provided for in the Education Code and legally unassailable (for the time being), could harm the functioning of Europe’s most overcrowded classrooms — after Romania.

A wet-finger estimate in [the right-wing newspaper] Le Figaro, announcing a “record absenteeism rate” on the day of Eid al-Fitr 2023 due to an alleged “TikTok trend,” is said to have prompted this investigation, which is perhaps intended to provide more quantified data for future witch-hunts. The data, moreover, is hardly usable, for while some school heads and inspectors have encouraged staff to respond to these tendentious surveys, which we can only deplore and denounce, others have fortunately dissuaded them from doing so — not to mention the fact that it is difficult to presume the reason for an absence on a Friday just before the national school holidays.

The question immediately arose as to the motives behind such a survey. Was it “only” a question of stirring up yet another unfounded controversy at the expense of the Muslim community? Or is the government planning to call into question an acquired right that is in no way contentious, in the name of an ever more narrow and misguided interpretation of secularism (which could tomorrow attack pork-free or meat-free menus in school canteens, ban any refunding of half-boarding fees for Muslim pupils during the month of Ramadan, etc.)? Will staff be the next targets of these investigations? Already, some non-teaching staff have been refused a “religious holiday” leave, which is illegal and unacceptable. Any attempt to generalize these measures on the pretext of “combating separatism” and “ensuring the smooth running of the public education service” must be fiercely opposed.

PACA Hearth and Ministerial Fuel to the Fire

On June 15, the Mayor of Nice and President of the Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur (PACA) Regional Council, Christian Estrosi, issued an alarmist press release denouncing “several extremely serious incidents” which had occurred the previous day in three Nice elementary schools, and which were reported to the School Inspection Office, then to the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes Department, and the Prime Minister, Elisabeth Borne. The following day, the French Minister of Education, Pap Ndiaye, went even further, speaking of “intolerable facts,” the “mobilization of the Values of the Republic teams in all the schools concerned to ensure full respect for the principle of secularism on a permanent basis,” and the implementation of “the necessary government measures” to ensure respect for secularism — or “laïcité” — in schools.

The alleged “facts”? Some children in 4th and 5th grades were said to have “performed the Muslim prayer in their school playground” or organized “a minute’s silence in memory of the Prophet Mahomet[1].” These were nothing more than rumors, as the expressions of doubt (“it is reported to me,” “or”) and the conditional tense (“These unacceptable situations would also have taken place in secondary schools”) clearly underlines. Worse still, before even the slightest verification of these absolutely insignificant alleged facts (it’s just a handful of 9–10 year olds having fun in the playground), Christian Estrosi likened these “attempts at religious intrusion into the sanctuaries of the Republic that are our schools” to “religious obscurantism attempting to destabilize us” and to “families who left to wage jihad in Syria,” who are reportedly beginning to return to France and sending their children “to our schools.”

Pap Ndiaye and Christian Estrosi

And without even waiting for the results of “the General Inspectorate’s investigation to establish the facts precisely and draw the appropriate conclusions” (no kidding), the full force of the law was brought to bear against this allegedly dangerous “slide” (which at this stage has not even gone beyond the stage of gossip): “meeting with all the departments concerned to set up an action plan,” “reinforcement of State action to ensure that these attacks on secularism are firmly combated,” “campaign to prevent and combat radicalization,” “firm, collective, and resolute response,” setting up “secularism and values of the Republic training courses” which “will be the subject of a common module bringing together all personnel…” The joint press release from Christian Estrosi and Pap Ndiaye concluded with a fanfare worthy of this outpouring of catastrophist press releases, disproportionate means, and withering epithets: “the principle of secularism is non-negotiable in our Republic.” Such a display of paranoia and hysteria is not surprising from the reactionary clown Estrosi, whose secular fervor is otherwise well known, but considering what Pap Ndiaye was before he plunged body and soul into the political cesspool (Pap Ndiaye was a Professor at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, focusing his research on the compared history of racially discriminatory practices in France and in America, and the Director of the French national museum of immigration], one can only feel a bitter mixture of disgust and pity)[2].

Christian Estrosi’s uncompromising crusade for secularism: “Defending our Christian traditions also means defending the heritage of our elders, who also built our Nice countryside”.

An Eternal Flame

The deep-seated motivations behind such Islamophobic outbursts are well known and have unfortunately become a constant in the discourse of Emmanuel Macron and his minions. Having faced massive popular opposition with the pension reform, they now resort to a despicable strategy of scapegoating, reminiscent of the darkest hours of France’s history. In a notorious debate with Marine Le Pen, President of the Far-Right Party “Rassemblement National” (National Rally), Macron’s Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin accused her of being “too soft” on Islam and refusing to “name the enemy”: “You say that Islam isn’t even a problem… You need to take vitamins, you’re not harsh enough!”

During a special evening dedicated to Samuel Paty [French teacher who was beheaded by a radicalized Islamist for showing his pupils derogatory Charlie Hebdo cartoons depicting the Prophet of Islam], Darmanin also denounced “communitarianism” and the “baser instincts” of “separatism” related to clothing or food (again, no kidding). He criticized clothing stores offering “community outfits” and the “halal sections” of supermarkets, portraying these as shocking practices. His aim was to link these cultural practices, which are perfectly harmless and consensual, to terrorism — a despicable process of amalgamation, stigmatization, and the appropriation of far-right discourse that is increasingly overt in the discourse and practices of Macron and his ministers.

Far from deterring the Rassemblement National’s electorate, this trivialization has only served to consolidate and grow it, providing a vigorous “vitamin” treatment regularly administered to hate speech by those in power and their media echo chambers.

The infamous Charlie Hebdo contributed on this ominous issue with a cartoon (“School reinvents itself” — “We bring our homework to school”) and a comment: “The question is how to deal with these cases, which involve particularly young children. The ten-year-old boy who incited his classmates to observe a minute’s silence for the Prophet was the subject of ‘worrying information’ sent to the Alpes-Maritimes departmental council, as the Nice education authority told Charlie Hebdo. An alert was also issued to the prefecture for ‘suspicion of radicalization’. ‘The child doesn’t become flagged as a serious threat to national security,’ we’re told. The idea is for the intelligence services to rule out any threat and check that the parents are not dangerous.’ In the meantime, the schoolboy has been excluded from the school canteen and has taken an early vacation. ‘We can’t afford another Samuel Paty,’ says a member of the Rector’s entourage.”

In any case, it wouldn’t be the first time that alleged TikTok “cyber-attacks on secularism” or other unverified gossip causes an uproar in the services of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Education. Let us mention the controversies surrounding the wearing of the abaya and the deployment of the Orwellian concept of “improvised religious clothing,” promoted during the dubious “laïcité” training courses imposed on all teaching staff throughout France. These courses provide instructions and even rhetorical and legal tools to track down alleged intentions behind the “suspicious” dresses of presumably Muslim girls. A dress bought at H&M could thus fall under the “law banning ostentatious religious signs” (which really only targeted the Islamic veil) and earn the targeted schoolgirls summons, reprimands, or even threats and exclusion if they refuse to dress in a “republican” manner: a “morality police” doubled with a “thought police” in short. And it seems that the French authorities have just introduced a “children’s games police [3].” Are we soon to see SWAT teams in primary school playgrounds? The degree of insanity is such that a sneeze from a swarthy pupil that sounds vaguely like “Allahu Akbar” would be enough to trigger such an intervention.

Extinguishing the fires or fanning them?

At a time when violence, including far-right terrorism targeting our fellow Muslim citizens, is reaching worrying proportions, the government persists in fanning the flames of hatred with its pyromaniac actions, exacerbating the real dangers threatening civil peace. The government’s approach involves all-out repression, police and security abuses with total impunity [the French police are lately becoming seditious and openly rebellious, literally demanding a license to beat up and even kill without being bothered by any kind of justice procedure], and over-instrumentalizing trivial facts to raise the specter of fantasized threats. These tactics only serve to pit citizens against each other and divide the French society.

The republican school urgently needs resources, not diversionary strategies, artificial tensions, or a perpetual call into question of the status and fundamental rights of users and staff. The “non-negotiable” secularism promoted and ardently defended by the CGT Educ’action aims to ensure the serenity and cohesion of the educational community, not to transform staff into zealous police auxiliaries or confine an entire population to the status of suspect or “enemy within,” to be constantly monitored and held at bay.

The Republic guarantees freedom of worship and equal treatment for all its citizens. Anyone committed to republican ideals must protest against this frenzied desire to ignite bonfires from the most microscopic twigs, and against stigmatizing and discriminatory practices that tarnish France’s image abroad and regularly elicit condemnations from human rights associations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. National Education staff, in particular, must oppose these practices and report them to local union sections, which must vigorously defend all members of the educational community (staff, pupils, parents…) who fall victim to them.

ENDNOTES:

[1] The minute’s silence isn’t precisely a well-known practice in Muslim liturgy. As for the spelling “Mahomet,” we can only deplore the fact that despite the presence of the first name Mohammed in the top 10 of most given names in the current French population, and its position in the top 50 of names on French war memorials from the First World War, this backward-looking and contemptuous name dating from an era of antagonism between Christianity and Islam, and felt as an insult by millions of Muslims, remains in use.

[2] Like a downsized version of Voltaire fighting fanaticism in the days of the Inquisition, Pap Ndiaye has also taken to TV to denounce these “manifestations of religious proselytism in schools,” gargling in big words, notably BFM WC (“These facts are not acceptable in the School of the Republic… It is only natural that the Nice Academy, the Nice Rector, and the Nice Mayor should react firmly to ensure respect for the principles of secularism, which is why I have signed this joint declaration with the Nice Mayor… The parents have been summoned… The pupils have been reminded of their obligations with regard to religious neutrality, and they have been given training, because we’re talking about children after all… In secondary schools, [for similar acts] there can be sanctions [or even] temporary or permanent exclusions…”). Pap Ndiaye did not hesitate to spread false Islamophobic information, namely that these children all belonged to the Muslim faith, which was denied by Eliane’s testimony to BFM Côte d’Azur, whose non-Muslim grandson took part in these children’s games: “He should check his sources because my grandson was part of the group playing and imitating prayer. There was no intention, no religion in the middle, it was really just a game… The stigmatization of children is really lamentable… That’s why we no longer have confidence in politicians, because everything is blown out of proportion to unbelievable proportions, and this harms solidarity and life together.”

[3] Let us remind that to be valid, Muslim prayer (especially in congregations) requires the age of puberty, a precise timetable, ablutions, specific clothing, orientation towards Mecca, etc.; so many conditions that it is simply impossible to meet in an elementary school playground during the lunch break.

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Salal Lamrani is a French literature teacher and union activist. Translation by the author. Read other articles by Salah.

COMMENTARY
Separation of church and state? Let's get real — that's over. So what do we do now?
Jefferson's "wall of separation" is history. There are other, better ways to fight the Christian right's onslaught

By JACQUES BERLINERBLAU
PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 12, 2022 12:00PM (EST

Neil Gorsuch, Jesus and Thomas Jefferson (Photo illustration by Salon/Getty Images)

During oral arguments in the case of Shurtleff v. City of Boston, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch made a pointed reference to "so-called separation of church and state." What precisely this aside was meant to convey is unclear. Yet Gorsuch's dismissive comment laid bare what many have known for some time: "Separationism," as a judicial and legislative doctrine, is on life support. Courtesy of the Christian right, it languishes in a theologically-induced coma.

The many Americans who yearn for secular governance, believers and nonbelievers alike, must confront this truth, accept it and innovate accordingly. They need to do so expeditiously, given the Supreme Court's hard pro-religion turn — a turn that advantages a white conservative Christian majority at the expense of religious moderates, religious minorities and nonbelievers.

Gorsuch may have just been trolling, but he had a point. Let's ask ourselves some hard questions about the "separationism" we know (and love).

If we really had a "wall of separation," the Supreme Court wouldn't appear receptive, as it does in Carson v. Makin, to affirming "a religious right to government funds" for schools that teach a "biblical worldview." Huge Christian crosses honoring fallen soldiers wouldn't sit on state property (American Legion v. American Humanist Association). The recently re-established White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships would not exist. Symbolically, Christmas videos from the Trump White House wouldn't be permitted, nor would Joseph Biden's shout-outs to St. Augustine on Inauguration Day.

RELATED: "Christian flag" case reaches Supreme Court: Is the Proud Boys flag next?

We have no real separation in the United States. Luckily, separationism is just one type of secularism. There are others. The secularist movement in the United States, however defined, has an interest in learning about them and thinking outside of the box — as well as beyond the purported wall between religion and government.

Secularism is a governing policy in which the state regulates the relationship between itself and its religious citizens, and also between religious citizens. A secular state strives to balance freedom and order. It must provide citizens who are beholden to very different worldviews with as much freedom of religion or — since demographics are changing rapidly in this regard — freedom from religion as possible. Simultaneously, it secures the civil calm required for them to enjoy those freedoms.

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Other nations teach us that these secular goals are achievable without separationism. India's beleaguered secular model accentuates sarva dharma sama bhava, or "equal respect for all religions." Far from walling itself off, the government accommodates faith communities. India's constitution, for instance, even makes provisions for Muslims to abide by their own law codes.

French secularism is altogether different. Laïcité, as it is known, doesn't separate itself from religion: It actively controls it. French laws strike Americans as overly severe (e.g., prohibiting public display of religious attire, like burkas). French citizens, though, overwhelmingly prefer a strong state grip on religion, a preference conditioned by centuries of traumatic clashes with the Catholic Church.

France and India are constitutionally secular. The United States, as Christian conservative activists cheerfully note, is not. There is no constitutional guarantee of separation. Instead, there are a few dozen ambiguous words in our founding documents, 16 of which read: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

In 1802 President Thomas Jefferson interpreted these sparse clauses to say that a "wall of separation" must exist between church and state. That was a radical and unpopular opinion — especially with the Great Awakening on the horizon. Even James Madison, author of the First Amendment, did not share his colleague's separationist zeal. Jefferson's opinion was mostly ignored until 1879, when it surfaced in a Latter-day Saint polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States. It then lay dormant for another 70 years!

While separation is often assumed to be a foundational principle of American democracy, it was first operationalized as a judicial framework in the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case. Soon thereafter, nondenominational prayer in public schools was deemed unconstitutional (Engel v. Vitale, 1962), as were daily Bible readings (Abington School District v. Schempp, 1962). Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) prohibited "excessive government entanglement" with religion. When John F. Kennedy exclaimed in 1960: "I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute," he was trumpeting the new separationist status quo.

By the 1970s, that status quo was in the crosshairs of a resurgent religious right. That triumphant onslaught aside, separationism's constitutional basis was always wobbly. In Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), Chief Justice William Rehnquist pronounced the wall metaphor to be based on "bad history" which "should be frankly and explicitly abandoned." As indeed it soon was; 37 years later, Justice Gorsuch took a victory lap.

Instead of demanding something the Constitution doesn't guarantee (i.e., a wall of separation), secularists ought focus on something it does: equal protection for all citizens, as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. Borrowing from India, they might advocate for the equality of all believers (and non-believers). "Equal-rights secularism" would highlight the legal inequalities that conservative Christian political activism fosters.

Thus, no county clerk could deny a marriage license to a same-sex couple in the name of religious liberty. No single notion of when life begins could assume the status of law. As dozens of religious organizations noted in their amicus curiae brief for Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization: "[T]here is a diversity of views both within and across religions concerning the nature and timing of the beginning of life." A secularist should argue that to subject a Jewish woman in Texas to a conservative Catholic standard of fetal viability renders the former unequal to the latter.

Borrowing from laïcité, American secularists might emphasize how privileging the rights of a few religious groups threatens order. When worshipers congregate during a pandemic, that's not free exercise, but reckless endangerment. When extremists storm the U.S. Capitol, that's not protected free speech, but sedition. Even colonial-era constitutions stipulated what the First Amendment somehow never mentioned: Your free exercise can't threaten public safety. American secularists should demand equal protection, literally.

Enough with walls. This rigid (and illiberal) metaphor undersells the complex task secularism performs in multicultural societies. Instead, secular legal and cultural activism should focus on the lawlessness and inequality that arise when LGBTQ persons, nonbelievers, religious minorities and religious moderates are forced to live under one particular religious conception of God.

Read more from Salon on religion in America:
How Christian nationalism drove the insurrection: A religious history of Jan. 6

Religion scholar Anthea Butler on "White Christianity" and its role in fueling fascism

Catholics will control two branches of government. What does that mean for American Christianity?

JACQUES BERLINERBLAU
Jacques Berlinerblau (@Berlinerblau) is a professor of Jewish civilization at Georgetown University. He has written numerous scholarly books and articles about secularism, his most recent being "Secularism: The Basics" (Routledge).