Trump Unleashes LNG and Drilling Free-for-All
President Donald Trump wasted no time flexing his pro-fossil fuel stance, approving the first LNG export permit since Biden’s controversial pause last year and creating a new energy council to expand U.S. oil and gas production. The move is a sharp policy reversal and seeks to reinforce America’s position as the world’s top hydrocarbon producer.
Commonwealth LNG, the long-waiting recipient of this permit, can now proceed with its 9.5 million metric tons per annum (mtpa) export facility in Louisiana, targeting markets in Asia and Europe. The approval effectively ends the uncertainty caused by Biden’s freeze on new LNG export authorizations—a pause that the administration initially framed as temporary but dragged on into perpetuity.
Trump lifted that freeze the moment he stepped back into office.
Beyond LNG, Trump has reopened over 600 million acres of offshore federal waters for oil and gas development, reversing restrictions imposed during Biden’s tenure. The newly formed energy council, led by Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, is set to drive policy aimed at maximizing domestic energy output.
Industry players are already moving fast. Cheniere Energy (LNG) and Energy Transfer have signaled plans to accelerate their LNG export projects, while offshore drillers are eyeing fresh opportunities in newly opened federal waters.
Trump’s latest moves are sure to inflame environmental opposition, but legal hurdles are unlikely to slow things down much. A federal judge recently blocked Biden’s LNG moratorium, ruling the pause unjustified. With regulatory roadblocks disappearing and demand for U.S. LNG soaring—especially in Europe, which remains eager to replace Russian gas—the American LNG boom is back in full swing.
The question now isn’t whether U.S. energy dominance will continue, but just how much Trump is willing to push the envelope. And if history is any guide, he won’t be playing it safe.
By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com
Shell Sees LNG Boom Through 2030
In its Surge, Archipelagos, and Horizon scenarios, LNG demand remains strong in the near term but diverges after 2030.
Shell: demand for oil is not going away, and it will be there in the 22nd century.
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The world’s top LNG trader, Shell, expects global demand for liquefied natural gas to jump at least through 2030 in all scenarios it has modeled in a new energy security report.
The 2025 Energy Security Scenarios, which the supermajor says are not expressions of Shell’s strategy or business plan, show that LNG demand is set for significant growth in the near term in all three scenarios.
Most analysts expect that by 2030, LNG demand will be fueled by growing consumption of LNG in Europe to offset the loss of Russian pipeline gas supply and ensure enough gas in storage for winter heating seasons, as well as rising demand in Asian economies, to replace part of the coal-fired power generation and to use more gas in industrial production.
Supply, on the other hand, is also set to grow, especially after 2027—thanks to major new expansion projects in the world’s second-largest LNG exporter, Qatar, and to new projects launching in the world’s biggest exporter, the U.S.
Shell’s Three Scenarios of the Future of Energy
In all three of Shell’s scenarios, LNG shows significant growth in the near term, fuelled by ongoing projects in Qatar and the USA, reaching around 550 million tonnes per year (mtpa) by the end of the decade.
“Divergence between the scenarios is a function of project timelines up until about 2030, but after that, the scenarios diverge significantly as the different scenario drivers take hold,” the supermajor said in the report.
Shell has modeled its new energy security expectations with the rise of AI in mind. The three scenarios are dubbed Surge, Archipelagos, and Horizon and reflect different economic, geopolitical, and energy transition assumptions for the near future and the long term.
In Surge, Shell assumes that AI technologies take root and lead to a period of stronger economic growth and a surge in energy demand globally.
The Archipelagos scenario assumes that the security mindset that is very visible today becomes entrenched worldwide, with national self-interest prevailing. In this scenario, Shell expects global sentiment to shift away from managing emissions towards resource, border, and trade security.
Finally, the Horizon scenario assumes that the world reaches net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 and delivers a global average temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2100.
Surge is the most bullish scenario for energy and LNG demand and supply growth, with LNG supply continuing to grow, reaching 700 mtpa. Most of the additional supply would come from new projects in North America, some of which will involve new field production and new LNG facilities. LNG’s market share of overall global gas demand would reach around 25% by 2050, up from around 14% in 2024, Shell says.
Heightened focus on energy security in the Archipelagos scenario will have a net effect of a well-balanced and stable LNG market throughout the 2030s, plateauing at around 600 mpta.
In Horizon, the net-zero scenario, global gas demand would need to begin declining this decade for net zero in 2050. This would begin to affect LNG, with demand peaking in the early 2030s. This results in existing infrastructure operating at low utilization rates as demand falls faster than the natural decline rate of the assets.
Actual global economic and political developments and demand for fossil fuels, including LNG, will certainly be somewhere between these scenarios. Currently, the world appears closest to the Archipelagos model, with energy and trade security at the top of buyers' minds.
Oil Demand
Shell’s scenarios also include estimates of peak oil demand, depending on the scenario. But in all three models, electrification of road transport is the main reason for the world reaching peak oil demand, which is after 2030 in Archipelagos and Surge and before 2030 in the net-zero Horizon model.
However, demand for oil is not going away, and it will be there in the 22nd century, Shell says, noting that in Horizon, oil is used solely for petrochemicals by 2100.
Shell also stressed in its report that global oil demand is likely to grow by 3?5 million barrels per day (bpd) into the early 2030s, with a long but slow decline after that as petroleum remains an affordable and convenient fuel, particularly in transport, and an important feedstock for the petrochemical industry.
Finally, Shell highlights that continued oil and gas investment will be needed in all three scenarios, including Horizon.
“Upstream investment is currently around $600 billion a year. This will be required for decades to come as the rate of depletion of oil and gas fields is two to three times the potential future annual declines in demand,” Shell said.
The supermajor, along with the other European oil and gas giants such as BP and Equinor, has recently announced a return to the basics, targeting to boost hydrocarbon production and scaling back investments and targets in the renewable energy sector. The pivot has not been only dictated by the heightened energy security and affordability issues since 2022, but also by Big Oil’s charm offensive to offer compelling returns to shareholders.
By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com
By Tsvetana Paraskova - Feb 13, 2025,
Shell projects global LNG demand to grow significantly through 2030 in all scenarios.
In its Surge, Archipelagos, and Horizon scenarios, LNG demand remains strong in the near term but diverges after 2030.
Shell: demand for oil is not going away, and it will be there in the 22nd century.
The world’s top LNG trader, Shell, expects global demand for liquefied natural gas to jump at least through 2030 in all scenarios it has modeled in a new energy security report.
The 2025 Energy Security Scenarios, which the supermajor says are not expressions of Shell’s strategy or business plan, show that LNG demand is set for significant growth in the near term in all three scenarios.
Most analysts expect that by 2030, LNG demand will be fueled by growing consumption of LNG in Europe to offset the loss of Russian pipeline gas supply and ensure enough gas in storage for winter heating seasons, as well as rising demand in Asian economies, to replace part of the coal-fired power generation and to use more gas in industrial production.
Supply, on the other hand, is also set to grow, especially after 2027—thanks to major new expansion projects in the world’s second-largest LNG exporter, Qatar, and to new projects launching in the world’s biggest exporter, the U.S.
Shell’s Three Scenarios of the Future of Energy
In all three of Shell’s scenarios, LNG shows significant growth in the near term, fuelled by ongoing projects in Qatar and the USA, reaching around 550 million tonnes per year (mtpa) by the end of the decade.
“Divergence between the scenarios is a function of project timelines up until about 2030, but after that, the scenarios diverge significantly as the different scenario drivers take hold,” the supermajor said in the report.
Shell has modeled its new energy security expectations with the rise of AI in mind. The three scenarios are dubbed Surge, Archipelagos, and Horizon and reflect different economic, geopolitical, and energy transition assumptions for the near future and the long term.
In Surge, Shell assumes that AI technologies take root and lead to a period of stronger economic growth and a surge in energy demand globally.
The Archipelagos scenario assumes that the security mindset that is very visible today becomes entrenched worldwide, with national self-interest prevailing. In this scenario, Shell expects global sentiment to shift away from managing emissions towards resource, border, and trade security.
Finally, the Horizon scenario assumes that the world reaches net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 and delivers a global average temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2100.
Surge is the most bullish scenario for energy and LNG demand and supply growth, with LNG supply continuing to grow, reaching 700 mtpa. Most of the additional supply would come from new projects in North America, some of which will involve new field production and new LNG facilities. LNG’s market share of overall global gas demand would reach around 25% by 2050, up from around 14% in 2024, Shell says.
Heightened focus on energy security in the Archipelagos scenario will have a net effect of a well-balanced and stable LNG market throughout the 2030s, plateauing at around 600 mpta.
In Horizon, the net-zero scenario, global gas demand would need to begin declining this decade for net zero in 2050. This would begin to affect LNG, with demand peaking in the early 2030s. This results in existing infrastructure operating at low utilization rates as demand falls faster than the natural decline rate of the assets.
Actual global economic and political developments and demand for fossil fuels, including LNG, will certainly be somewhere between these scenarios. Currently, the world appears closest to the Archipelagos model, with energy and trade security at the top of buyers' minds.
Oil Demand
Shell’s scenarios also include estimates of peak oil demand, depending on the scenario. But in all three models, electrification of road transport is the main reason for the world reaching peak oil demand, which is after 2030 in Archipelagos and Surge and before 2030 in the net-zero Horizon model.
However, demand for oil is not going away, and it will be there in the 22nd century, Shell says, noting that in Horizon, oil is used solely for petrochemicals by 2100.
Shell also stressed in its report that global oil demand is likely to grow by 3?5 million barrels per day (bpd) into the early 2030s, with a long but slow decline after that as petroleum remains an affordable and convenient fuel, particularly in transport, and an important feedstock for the petrochemical industry.
Finally, Shell highlights that continued oil and gas investment will be needed in all three scenarios, including Horizon.
“Upstream investment is currently around $600 billion a year. This will be required for decades to come as the rate of depletion of oil and gas fields is two to three times the potential future annual declines in demand,” Shell said.
The supermajor, along with the other European oil and gas giants such as BP and Equinor, has recently announced a return to the basics, targeting to boost hydrocarbon production and scaling back investments and targets in the renewable energy sector. The pivot has not been only dictated by the heightened energy security and affordability issues since 2022, but also by Big Oil’s charm offensive to offer compelling returns to shareholders.
By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com
Clouds Thicken Over Africa’s Biggest LNG Project
TotalEnergies in 2021 declared force majeure on work on the facility amid intensified fighting between local political factions.
At the end of last year, the French supermajor tried and failed to convince the outgoing Biden administration to release some $5 billion in state loans for Mozambique LNG.
Originally, TotalEnergies was supposed to start shipping LNG from the facility in 2024.
Mozambique LNG, a project with a price tag of $20 billion, may never see the light of day despite the bullish outlook for LNG demand. It seems that not everyone has heard the news that the world is going to need even more LNG in the future.
Work on Mozambique LNG has been suspended since 2021 when project lead TotalEnergies declared force majeure on work on the facility amid intensified fighting between local political factions. Now, it is planning a restart—and it is facing the consequences of years of transition campaigning.
First, at the end of last year, the French supermajor tried and failed to convince the outgoing Biden administration to release some $5 billion in state loans for Mozambique LNG. This is hardly a surprise given the Biden admin’s attitude to natural gas and LNG. The problem is that it is unclear whether the Trump admin would be willing to release the money given President Trump’s focus on American-produced energy, as noted in a recent update on Mozambique LNG by climate think tank the International Institute of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
“In January, President Donald Trump signed the Unleashing American Energy executive order, which ended the pause on further LNG export permits,” the IEEFA wrote. “Does this fit with US funding for a French, Japanese, Indian and Thai project, particularly in the context of questionable long-term LNG demand?”
This is certainly a pertinent question, at least in its first half. As for the questionability of long-term demand for liquefied natural gas, it seems there is a pretty strong case for it in the context of current price trends in Europe. This week, gas prices reached the highest since 2023 as peak seasonal demand drove gas stocks lower, deepening fears Europe may end winter with depleted reserves—and then need to refill them.
LNG demand is strong and about to get stronger as more supply comes online, despite the IEEFA’s—and other transition outlets’—insistence that the world is moving away from hydrocarbons. Despite all the efforts put into that move, even coal demand is still growing on a global level, after all.
However, the Mozambique LNG case is complicated because of the security situation in that part of the country—and the fact that the original financial backers of the project include pro-transition governments such as Keir Starmer’s in Britain. That government is reportedly looking for ways to get out of its loan obligation for Mozambique LNG because its transition agenda no longer fits with the project and, quite likely because money is finite and it needs all it can find to pour into that agenda.
Northern Mozambique has been struggling to contain an Islamist insurgency. It was the reason why TotalEnergies put the LNG project on hold back in 2021. Now, the situation is improving with the help of the Rwandan authorities—and Rwandan troops, financed by the European Union, which has the most interest in the project restarting. Yet not all is controversy-free around this deployment, and European capitals are locking horns over the alleged involvement of the Rwandan army in support of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The allegations have already prompted protests in Brussels and calls for sanctions—as if Mozambique LNG needed any further complications.
In the end, however, demand for energy would have the final say. Originally, TotalEnergies was supposed to start shipping LNG from the facility in 2024. Now, Rystad Energy projects the start date could be delayed to 2030. Yet if LNG demand does boom as expected, it will justify the $20-billion investment in the project and any additional investments that need to be made to ensure a secure environment for the facility. In the end, it’s all about energy supply security.
By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com
By Irina Slav - Feb 13, 2025
TotalEnergies in 2021 declared force majeure on work on the facility amid intensified fighting between local political factions.
At the end of last year, the French supermajor tried and failed to convince the outgoing Biden administration to release some $5 billion in state loans for Mozambique LNG.
Originally, TotalEnergies was supposed to start shipping LNG from the facility in 2024.
Mozambique LNG, a project with a price tag of $20 billion, may never see the light of day despite the bullish outlook for LNG demand. It seems that not everyone has heard the news that the world is going to need even more LNG in the future.
Work on Mozambique LNG has been suspended since 2021 when project lead TotalEnergies declared force majeure on work on the facility amid intensified fighting between local political factions. Now, it is planning a restart—and it is facing the consequences of years of transition campaigning.
First, at the end of last year, the French supermajor tried and failed to convince the outgoing Biden administration to release some $5 billion in state loans for Mozambique LNG. This is hardly a surprise given the Biden admin’s attitude to natural gas and LNG. The problem is that it is unclear whether the Trump admin would be willing to release the money given President Trump’s focus on American-produced energy, as noted in a recent update on Mozambique LNG by climate think tank the International Institute of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
“In January, President Donald Trump signed the Unleashing American Energy executive order, which ended the pause on further LNG export permits,” the IEEFA wrote. “Does this fit with US funding for a French, Japanese, Indian and Thai project, particularly in the context of questionable long-term LNG demand?”
This is certainly a pertinent question, at least in its first half. As for the questionability of long-term demand for liquefied natural gas, it seems there is a pretty strong case for it in the context of current price trends in Europe. This week, gas prices reached the highest since 2023 as peak seasonal demand drove gas stocks lower, deepening fears Europe may end winter with depleted reserves—and then need to refill them.
LNG demand is strong and about to get stronger as more supply comes online, despite the IEEFA’s—and other transition outlets’—insistence that the world is moving away from hydrocarbons. Despite all the efforts put into that move, even coal demand is still growing on a global level, after all.
However, the Mozambique LNG case is complicated because of the security situation in that part of the country—and the fact that the original financial backers of the project include pro-transition governments such as Keir Starmer’s in Britain. That government is reportedly looking for ways to get out of its loan obligation for Mozambique LNG because its transition agenda no longer fits with the project and, quite likely because money is finite and it needs all it can find to pour into that agenda.
Northern Mozambique has been struggling to contain an Islamist insurgency. It was the reason why TotalEnergies put the LNG project on hold back in 2021. Now, the situation is improving with the help of the Rwandan authorities—and Rwandan troops, financed by the European Union, which has the most interest in the project restarting. Yet not all is controversy-free around this deployment, and European capitals are locking horns over the alleged involvement of the Rwandan army in support of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The allegations have already prompted protests in Brussels and calls for sanctions—as if Mozambique LNG needed any further complications.
In the end, however, demand for energy would have the final say. Originally, TotalEnergies was supposed to start shipping LNG from the facility in 2024. Now, Rystad Energy projects the start date could be delayed to 2030. Yet if LNG demand does boom as expected, it will justify the $20-billion investment in the project and any additional investments that need to be made to ensure a secure environment for the facility. In the end, it’s all about energy supply security.
By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com
LNG Is A Sellers Market For Now
By Irina Slav - Feb 12, 2025
Europe has been driving global LNG trade since the start of the year.
Europe will need liquefied natural gas—for lack of sufficient pipeline supply—for quite a long time.
By regulating the purchase of certain volumes of LNG by individual members, the European Union is harming itself.
Europe has been driving global LNG trade since the start of the year, buying every cargo it can to secure energy supply during the coldest months of the year. Once spring comes, however, it will need to begin to refill its fast-emptying storage to prepare for next winter—and its fondness for overregulation may turn suicidal.
Global LNG imports were set to hit a 12-month high for January, reaching 38.12 million tons, according to data from Kpler. A lot of this went to Europe, which once again outbid Asian nations for the superchilled fuel that the EU said it would only need for another few years. It doesn’t look that way right now. Right now, it looks like Europe’s leadership needs to sit down and have a good deep thought about securing long-term supply.
Just how critical the situation has become, we can see from reports such as this one from Reuters, which said earlier this week that Europe was now diverting LNG cargos from Australia and Oman. While Omani LNG makes cost-effective sense for Europe, Australian LNG is, as a rule, too expensive given the distance between the two continents. Of course, there was also the matter of record Russian LNG imports, even as European politicians repeatedly called for a ban on these imports.
So, it is as clear as can be that Europe will need liquefied natural gas—for lack of sufficient pipeline supply—for quite a long time. It would be, therefore, wise in this context to come up with ways to, once again, ensure this supply will be available. Yet this is not the approach that collective European authorities have taken. These authorities have instead opted for mandating the purchase of certain minimum volumes—shooting themselves in the foot yet again.
This is exactly how Reuters authors put it in a recent article, where they discussed the EU’s collective gas buying system that is based on these mandates. On the face of it, the system makes all the sense in the world. It aims to ensure that every country that has a storage facility has filled it up to 90% by November, reducing the risk of a shortage in the winter months that come with peak demand.
It is below the face that the problems hide, however. Mandating certain volumes that have to be purchased by a set date turns the global LNG market into a sellers’ market, as noted by Reuters, and this is not a positive for a buyers’ club that has to count its pennies, because Europe has come to a point where it needs to count its pennies.
There is the problem of pricing out poorer nations as well. It happened in 2022, it happened in 2023, and it happened last year. Essentially, it has become a trend since the moment that Europe gave up on Russian pipeline gas—and celebrated the fact. Once refill season hits in Europe, Asian nations with slim energy import budgets start looking for more coal to import as LNG becomes way too expensive for them. In fact, it also tends to become too expensive even for wealthy Asian importers such as China and Japan.
So, by regulating the purchase of certain volumes of LNG by individual members, the European Union is harming itself and the climate it so wants to protect by motivating poorer countries to switch from gas to coal in a brilliant example of unintended consequences. It is also giving perhaps too much pricing power to LNG sellers, which they would undoubtedly take advantage of to the fullest. Last but not least, this approach to securing gas supply is losing importers money in other ways as well—while risking the security of supply.
Reuters explained the paradox in its analysis of Europe’s gas market by noting how overheated trade in LNG ahead of Europe’s refill season—amid emptier-than-usual storage—had pushed summer 2025 futures prices higher than the prices for 2026. The publication then went on to note that few traders would feel motivated to stock up on gas now when they could sell while the prices are higher. Germany made matters worse by suggesting that the government subsidize the purchase of the refill quota volumes, which is literally money in the bank for traders.
Meanwhile, those obliged to store gas for next winter will be losing money while they store it—instead of selling it at the elevated prices. Sadly, despite the good intentions of the gas refill mandates, they still need to be done in a market environment rather than in a vacuum, and that means market forces affect them—and not in a positive way. There is also the additional problem of storing gas bought at high prices, to be sold at much lower prices as the market normalizes after refill season. Germany got burned with that a couple of years ago, and it wasn’t the only one. Alas, with purchase and refill mandates, there really isn’t any way around this pain.
By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com
Europe has been driving global LNG trade since the start of the year.
Europe will need liquefied natural gas—for lack of sufficient pipeline supply—for quite a long time.
By regulating the purchase of certain volumes of LNG by individual members, the European Union is harming itself.
Europe has been driving global LNG trade since the start of the year, buying every cargo it can to secure energy supply during the coldest months of the year. Once spring comes, however, it will need to begin to refill its fast-emptying storage to prepare for next winter—and its fondness for overregulation may turn suicidal.
Global LNG imports were set to hit a 12-month high for January, reaching 38.12 million tons, according to data from Kpler. A lot of this went to Europe, which once again outbid Asian nations for the superchilled fuel that the EU said it would only need for another few years. It doesn’t look that way right now. Right now, it looks like Europe’s leadership needs to sit down and have a good deep thought about securing long-term supply.
Just how critical the situation has become, we can see from reports such as this one from Reuters, which said earlier this week that Europe was now diverting LNG cargos from Australia and Oman. While Omani LNG makes cost-effective sense for Europe, Australian LNG is, as a rule, too expensive given the distance between the two continents. Of course, there was also the matter of record Russian LNG imports, even as European politicians repeatedly called for a ban on these imports.
So, it is as clear as can be that Europe will need liquefied natural gas—for lack of sufficient pipeline supply—for quite a long time. It would be, therefore, wise in this context to come up with ways to, once again, ensure this supply will be available. Yet this is not the approach that collective European authorities have taken. These authorities have instead opted for mandating the purchase of certain minimum volumes—shooting themselves in the foot yet again.
This is exactly how Reuters authors put it in a recent article, where they discussed the EU’s collective gas buying system that is based on these mandates. On the face of it, the system makes all the sense in the world. It aims to ensure that every country that has a storage facility has filled it up to 90% by November, reducing the risk of a shortage in the winter months that come with peak demand.
It is below the face that the problems hide, however. Mandating certain volumes that have to be purchased by a set date turns the global LNG market into a sellers’ market, as noted by Reuters, and this is not a positive for a buyers’ club that has to count its pennies, because Europe has come to a point where it needs to count its pennies.
There is the problem of pricing out poorer nations as well. It happened in 2022, it happened in 2023, and it happened last year. Essentially, it has become a trend since the moment that Europe gave up on Russian pipeline gas—and celebrated the fact. Once refill season hits in Europe, Asian nations with slim energy import budgets start looking for more coal to import as LNG becomes way too expensive for them. In fact, it also tends to become too expensive even for wealthy Asian importers such as China and Japan.
So, by regulating the purchase of certain volumes of LNG by individual members, the European Union is harming itself and the climate it so wants to protect by motivating poorer countries to switch from gas to coal in a brilliant example of unintended consequences. It is also giving perhaps too much pricing power to LNG sellers, which they would undoubtedly take advantage of to the fullest. Last but not least, this approach to securing gas supply is losing importers money in other ways as well—while risking the security of supply.
Reuters explained the paradox in its analysis of Europe’s gas market by noting how overheated trade in LNG ahead of Europe’s refill season—amid emptier-than-usual storage—had pushed summer 2025 futures prices higher than the prices for 2026. The publication then went on to note that few traders would feel motivated to stock up on gas now when they could sell while the prices are higher. Germany made matters worse by suggesting that the government subsidize the purchase of the refill quota volumes, which is literally money in the bank for traders.
Meanwhile, those obliged to store gas for next winter will be losing money while they store it—instead of selling it at the elevated prices. Sadly, despite the good intentions of the gas refill mandates, they still need to be done in a market environment rather than in a vacuum, and that means market forces affect them—and not in a positive way. There is also the additional problem of storing gas bought at high prices, to be sold at much lower prices as the market normalizes after refill season. Germany got burned with that a couple of years ago, and it wasn’t the only one. Alas, with purchase and refill mandates, there really isn’t any way around this pain.
By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com
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