WWIII
Philippine Politics And Conflict Management With China In The South China Sea – Analysis
Not long after the formation of a grand political alliance between the Duterte and Marcos clans for the 2022 Philippine national elections, the united front has collapsed and a war of words has become the new normal between the warring camps, with each side accumulating political ammunition to use against the other—locally and internationally. The foundations of the Duterte family’s alignment with the Marcoses go back to August 2016, when then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte ordered the transfer of the remains of the current president’s father, former president Ferdinand Marcos Sr., to the Heroes’ Cemetery—an act no Philippine president had ever dared to perform, given the longstanding debate over whether the late president was a hero or a dictator. Yet, Duterte did not mind risking his political capital to finally put the divisive issue to rest, and the Marcos family was extremely grateful. One could argue that it was the “Duterte magic” that helped Marcos Jr. win the presidency in 2022 because when he ran for vice president in 2016—prior to his alliance with the Dutertes—he lost to Leni Robredo.
Noticeably, when Marcos Jr. ran for president in 2022, he won on a ticket with Rodrigo’s daughter, Sara Duterte, as his vice-president. By bandwagoning with the Dutertes, Marcos Jr. benefited from the legitimacy of a sitting president who is said to have been the most popular outgoing Filipino president. Since there is no such thing as a free lunch, the likely quid pro quo for the Dutertes would be for Sara to be the next in line for the presidency in 2028. However, fissures started to emerge early on, as Marcos Jr. did not give in to Sara’s desire to head the Defense department, instead appointing her as Education Secretary. Sara’s sense of entitlement likely stems from the fact that the Marcos family is indebted to her family for what they did to Marcos Sr. In July 2022, a new variable was introduced into the Philippine political landscape when Marcos Jr.’s cousin, Martin Romualdez, was elected as House Speaker, though he is said to have ambitions for even higher office.
Consequently, Duterte ally and former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was removed from her position as Senior Deputy House Speaker for an alleged attempt to stage a coup against the House Speaker. Congress afterward launched an investigation into the allocation of confidential funds to Sara as Vice President and Education Secretary. Besides taking a different approach on the war on drugs, the Marcos Jr. Administration has started to dangle possible cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in relation to former president Duterte’s drug war excesses which could lead to the former president’s arrest. Duterte retaliated by calling the House “corrupt” and President Marcos Jr. a “drug addict.” The Marcos Jr. government also tried to dismantle the media platform of the Dutertes, SMNI, by arresting its leader on criminal charges. In addition to this, Sara is being threatened with impeachment.
Crucially, concurrent with these dramatic domestic episodes, geopolitical tensions were rising between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea (SCS). For instance, there was a rocket debris incident in November 2022 in which the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) forcibly seized space debris from one of its rocket launches from the Philippine Navy. A month after Marcos Jr.’s state visit to China in February 2023, a CCG vessel pointed a military-grade laser at a Philippine vessel on a Rotation and Resupply (RORE) mission to Second Thomas Shoal—a maritime feature where the Philippines has a grounded commissioned naval vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre. By April 2023, the Philippines and US governments had announced an expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites from five to nine. In September of that same year, Rodrigo Duterte met with PRC President Xi Jinping in Beijing for confidence-building talks, although collisions at sea ensued in the following months. March 2024 became a critical moment for the Philippines because the CCG unleashed its strongest watercannon assault on a Philippine resupply boat, injuring four Philippine Navy sailors.
Disagreeing with the Marcos Jr. government’s approach of allegedly escalating tensions with China, the Duterte camp, through former presidential spokesperson Harry Roque, publicized that a “gentleman’s agreement” with China on Second Thomas Shoal had been reached during Duterte’s watch, which was affirmed by the Chinese Embassy. Duterte himself also began accusing Marcos Jr. of being “pro-US.” For Marcos Jr., Duterte’s commitment to China was a secret agreement, while Sara faced criticism from oppositionists for not being as vocal as other high-ranking officials in condemning China’s SCS actions. Unsurprisingly, the House initiated an investigation into the so-called gentleman’s agreement. China also became stricter to the point of seizing air-dropped supplies for soldiers stationed on Second Thomas Shoal.
Pattern of scrutiny
In Philippine politics, there is a recurring pattern: when a president is succeeded by an opposition figure, the controversial actions of the previous administration often come under scrutiny. This was seen when then-President Benigno Aquino III disparaged Arroyo’s dealings with China (i.e., NBN-ZTE broadband project and NorthRail project). This pattern is now evident in how Marcos Jr. addresses issues related to the Dutertes. Against this backdrop, the worst and most dangerous encounter between the Philippines and China took place on June 17, 2024, when a melee resulted in a Filipino sailor losing his thumb after his vessel was rammed by the CCG, drawing widespread international condemnation. A month after the incident, China and the Philippines, through the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM), agreed on a “provisional agreement” which was welcomed even by Washington. In fact, contrary to what critics say, China and the Philippines have continued to engage beyond the BCM, with President Marcos meeting President Xi on the sidelines of the 2023 APEC Summit, and in early 2024, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary Enrique Manalo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holding direct phone discussions.
While both the “gentleman” and “provisional” agreements share the objectives of de-escalating tensions with Beijing while resisting China’s hard-power pressure, differences can be found in terms of political environment, modality, and diplomatic semantics. First, during Duterte’s tenure, the political deal with China was widely perceived to be disadvantageous to the Philippines because of his submissive rhetoric on China. This made it easier for people to allege that his agreement with China was in violation of the Constitution. But under Marcos, the political posture is assertive and principled. These disparate approaches impress upon the public whether the government is negotiating from a position of strength or weakness.
Second, with the gentleman’s agreement, the compromise was done in private and informally. Under this agreement, China will permit the Philippines to conduct RORE missions provided that prior notification is given, only essential supplies (e.g., food, water, medicines) are transported, and operations should be limited to one Coast Guard vessel and one civilian vessel. To ensure the continuation of this arrangement post-Duterte, China reportedly spoke directly to Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos, the Commander of the Western Command (WESCOM), which is the unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines responsible for the South China Sea. China bypassing the DFA underscores Beijing’s preference for a backdoor approach. Significantly, Admiral Carlos had served as WESCOM chief during Duterte’s administration, making him a familiar figure to the Chinese in these dealings. This is similar to when China, through its defense attaché in Manila, was willing to work with an appointed backchannel negotiator, then-Senator Antonio Trillanes, during the Aquino III Administration, to defuse the ongoing standoff at Scarborough Shoal in 2012.
Shady agreements
According to China, the Philippines upended the status quo in February 2023 when Manila reversed Duterte’s China-friendly policies by bringing in construction materials to shore up the dilapidated BRP Sierra Madre. China maintains that they recorded a conversation with Admiral Carlos indicating that higher-ups in the Philippine defense and security establishment were aware of the arrangement. In fact, this issue gave rise to two other gentleman’s agreements. China claims that a gentleman’s agreement was also reached in Scarborough Shoal with Duterte where China allowed small-scale fishing around the Shoal but restricted access by Philippine military and coast guard assets to the 12-nautical mile territorial waters. China also contends that in the 1990s, the Philippines said that it would tow away the beached LST-542-class tank landing ship (BRP Sierra Madre). But for the Philippines, as far as gentleman’s agreements are concerned, it was China that reneged on the agreement for mutual withdrawal of vessels in Scarborough Shoal in 2012.
In contrast to the gentleman’s agreement, the provisional agreement was done transparently and formally by the DFA, with the same issuing a statement that Manila had reached a consensus with Beijing that will not prejudice “respective national positions.” Third, since there was no joint statement on the provisional agreement, both parties came up with their individual statements. China insists that, like the gentleman’s agreement, it will allow RORE missions provided there is prior notice and “on-site verification,” but the PRC will resolutely oppose the delivery of “large-scale” construction materials meant for building “fixed facilities” or a “permanent outpost.”
The Philippines rejects “prior coordination,” as it connotes consent, and instead says that there will only be an “exchange of information.” Regardless of nomenclature, and despite the absence of an explicit statement allowing the Philippines to make repairs to the BRP Sierra Madre, Philippine RORE missions have been successful since this time, and are no longer being harassed.
Furthermore, China only prohibits “large scale” repairs, and the Philippines will likely not compromise maintaining the ship as the inability to repair it will eventually lead to its collapse and the loss of the Philippine’s claim to the shoal. Overall, this provides a contextual clue that what is said in public may differ from what happens behind closed doors. Despite this, some quarters demand a publication of the details of the agreement.
The current Duterte-Marcos rift is a domestic struggle for power. Both parties’ political strategies and tools employed foreign policy issues to strike at the other, but incumbent Marcos Jr. has the advantage of political power—commanding not just the bully pulpit but the machinery of the state. Due to the two families’ diverging value systems and opposing stances toward China and the United States, it appears that the great powers have their proxies in the Philippines. Additionally, because of Marcos Jr.’s disagreements with the Dutertes over policy, he has indirectly allied himself with the liberal opposition which, to some extent, props up his political capital. Marcos Jr. has also demonstrated that striking a deal with China is possible without being defeatist or fatalistic. While a provisional agreement was reached regarding Second Thomas Shoal, workable arrangements in other maritime hotspots such as Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal are also needed for broader regional stability. Philippine leaders worry that we might see a repetition of the precedents set in Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, where China had carried out land reclamation, established unilateral control, and denied the Philippines fishing rights access
This article was published at Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)
Aaron Jed Rabena is an Assistant Professor at the Asian Center in the University of the Philippines.
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