An Assessment Of Decommissioning Of Obsolete Coal-Fired Power Plants In Turkey And Consequences – OpEd
In recent years, several aging, inefficient, and technologically outdated coal-fired power plants (CFPPs), formerly owned by Turkish state institutions, have been sold off to private entities. These sales were often conducted at prices well below the plants’ real market value, prompting questions about transparency and public interest[^1]. However, the more serious issues began after the transfer of ownership.
Upon acquisition, many private operators delayed essential environmental investments—particularly flue gas treatment systems—by exploiting legal exemptions or leveraging political connections[^2]. This allowed the plants to continue operating with outdated, highly polluting technology, reaping short-term financial benefits at the expense of public health and the environment.
Over time, the local coal reserves these plants were originally designed to burn have become depleted. In response, operators turned to nearby agricultural zones, including olive groves and fertile farmlands, attempting to convert them into new lignite mines. This not only caused severe environmental degradation but also provoked public backlash. The new coal sources, when found, were typically low in calorific value and costly to extract, further undermining the plants’ economic viability[^3].
Some companies have proposed converting these facilities to run on imported coal or natural gas. However, boilers and combustion systems built 40–50 years ago for domestic lignite are generally unsuitable for other fuels without extensive modifications. The high cost of such retrofitting—coupled with the plants’ advanced age—has rendered conversion projects largely impractical. As a result, most plants have failed to meet modern environmental standards or extend their operational lifespans.
This situation highlights a core contradiction in Turkish energy policy: short-term profitability has often taken precedence over long-term environmental and technical sustainability. Had timely modernization been pursued—or had newer, more efficient, and environmentally friendly plants been built in the first place—both environmental damage and societal costs could have been significantly reduced. As it stands, many of these facilities are now idle, their coalfields exhausted, and their contribution to sustainable energy generation marginal at best[^4].
There are notable exceptions. The Soma, Tunçbilek, and Çatalağzı plants differ in that they lack their own coal mines and rely heavily on state-run coal suppliers—namely, TKİ (Turkish Coal Enterprises) and TTK (Turkish Hard Coal Enterprises). In Soma, for example, TKİ maintains long-term contracts with multiple small-scale producers. These producers supply washed lignite suitable for industrial use, but also generate substantial amounts of low-quality, dusty coal that only power plants can consume. If the plants shut down, this low-grade coal becomes unsellable, creating financial strain for TKİ. Consequently, continuing to operate these plants—even at a loss—has become a necessity to sustain state-run coal production[^5].
Recently, market conditions have become increasingly unfavorable for domestic coal-fired generation. Renewable energy sources are becoming cheaper, while prices for imported coal and natural gas have also declined. This undermines the competitiveness of plants running on Turkish lignite. Additionally, firms operating under royalty-based models (rödovans) must pay high fees to the state, further inflating fuel costs. Under these circumstances, only facilities like Tufanbeyli might manage to remain profitable. For others, a structured shutdown plan seems inevitable, and the country’s carbon neutrality goals may be achieved more by market dynamics than government policy[^6].
However, shutting down Soma, Tunçbilek, and Çatalağzı would significantly reduce TKİ and TTK’s production capacities. This would likely face strong resistance from labor unions and opposition parties. Ironically, the same groups often oppose government subsidies for these plants, highlighting a complex policy dilemma. Some smaller plants, such as Cates and Eren, produce almost exclusively for internal consumption. Their closure might not cause noticeable disruption, yet decommissioning them remains politically and logistically challenging.
Turkey’s energy strategy must evolve beyond financial metrics. Environmental sustainability, social impact, and technical feasibility must all be considered as integral parts of long-term energy planning.
Footnotes
[^1]: “Kamu Santrallerinin Özelleştirilmesi ve Değerleme Sorunları,” TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri Odası Raporu, 2022.
[^2]: Çelik, A., “Enerji Yatırımları ve Çevre Mevzuatında Muafiyetler,” Enerji ve Hukuk Dergisi, 2021.
[^3]: Yılmaz, E., “Zeytinliklerin Madenciliğe Açılması ve Hukuki Sonuçları,” Çevre ve Enerji Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2023.
[^4]: Direskeneli, H., “The Real Cost of Delayed Modernization in Turkish Thermal Power Plants,” Energy Insight Weekly, 2024.
[^5]: TKİ Faaliyet Raporu, 2023.
[^6]: International Energy Agency (IEA), “Turkey Energy Profile 2024: Trends and Carbon Neutrality Pathways,” Paris, 2024.
Haluk Direskeneli, is a graduate of METU Mechanical Engineering department (1973). He worked in public, private enterprises, USA Turkish JV companies (B&W, CSWI, AEP, Entergy), in fabrication, basic and detail design, marketing, sales and project management of thermal power plants. He is currently working as freelance consultant/ energy analyst with thermal power plants basic/ detail design software expertise for private engineering companies, investors, universities and research institutions. He is a member of Chamber of Turkish Mechanical Engineers Energy Working Group.
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