Kurdistan: ‘Turkey must choose between the status quo, endless war and peace with the Kurds’.

Monday 17 March 2025, by Salih Azad


Following the appeal by Abudllah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), for his movement to lay down its arms, what are the prospects for the Kurdish people? L’Anticapitaliste spoke with Salih Azad, head of the Kurdish Democratic Centre in Marseille.


Can you shed some light on Öcalan’s call? Will the PKK dissolve itself?

Discreet talks have been going on for some time and have taken a positive turn. The PKK was founded in the 1970s against a backdrop of the Cold War in which armed struggle was the only possible option. This struggle led to recognition of the existence of the Kurdish people and, above all, of their fight for their legitimate rights. In 2025, conditions are different. The PKK as it existed has ‘had its day’ and a new chapter may be opening today. If the Turkish state is prepared to listen to Öcalan’s appeal, if the Kurdish question is no longer seen as a question of terrorism, a peaceful and democratic solution may be possible.

Twice in 25 years, most recently in 2009, Öcalan has made attempts in this direction, both of which failed. Turkey (a nation-state of Turks alone) is the consequence of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after 1918, to the sole benefit of the British and French imperialists. This model is no longer viable. Given the situation in the Middle East, Turkey is at a crossroads and can no longer pursue the policy it has pursued to date.

Turkey must choose between the status quo, endless war and peace with the Kurds. This will not be easy. This war has claimed more than 10,000 victims on both sides; 5,000 villages have been razed to the ground; deportations and torture have gone on for forty years.

Can we trust Erdoğan?

Turkey has no other choice. The Turks, but the Kurds too, aspire to live in peace.

Does Öcalan’s appeal also concern Kurdish organisations in Syria, Iraq or Iran?

For the moment, no. It is up to the Kurds in these regions to decide freely on their strategy.

If this process succeeds, what will be the effects on the region?

The effects could be very significant. We may be on the brink of a historic moment. But let’s not forget that ISIS is still a mortal danger for the region, especially after Ahmed al-Sharaa, who came to power in Syria through al-Qaeda and ISIS, and is still supported by Erdoğan.

Thousands of jihadist prisoners of all nationalities were being held in camps in Syria and are about to be released. Their children, indoctrinated in the ideology of ISIS for years could be a real danger.

What will happen to the Rojava ‘model’ in this context?

Rojava will continue to uphold its multinational, multi-faith and democratic ‘model’, especially if Turkey’s ‘anti-terrorist’ war comes to an end. If this peace process succeeds, if the ‘terrorist’ label disappears, the whole Kurdish question will take on a different character and will finally be able to be extended. This could be the first step towards the community of free peoples to which we have long aspired. Not a ‘Kurdish state’, but a free, secular, democratic state for all the peoples living in this land: Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Persians and so on.

All in all, are you rather optimistic?

Yes, I admit that I am optimistic. As I said, Turkey has no other solution. And this issue will eventually affect other states in the region, like Iran perhaps. That’s my hope for the whole of the Middle East.

L’Anticapitaliste 7 March 2025


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Salih Azad
Salih Azad is head of the Kurdish Democratic Centre in Marseille.


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The Kurdish issue, Öcalan’s call and developments in Rojava

By Hamit Bozarslan

Published 20 March, 2025

First published at ANF English.

Abdullah Öcalan’s historic February 27 declaration marked a turning point in discussions on the democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. By challenging the state’s long-standing claim that “there is no Kurdish issue, only a terrorism problem,” he forcefully revealed the historical reality and legitimacy of the issue.

Professor Hamit Bozarslan, a Middle East expert and faculty member at the Paris School of Social Sciences, spoke about the historical roots of the Kurdish issue, Öcalan’s call and recent developments in Northern and Eastern Syria.

Today, discussions on the democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue are once again taking place. On February 27, Mr. Öcalan framed his call within a historical context. Before addressing this historic call, what is the Kurdish issue that we are discussing today, and what kind of historical trajectory does it have?

The Kurdish issue is, above all, a matter of denial. Kurdistan has been a geographical entity for more than a thousand years. Both Arab and Persian sources mention Kurdistan.

Throughout history, events such as the formation of Kurdish emirates, the shaping of Kurdistan between Ottoman and Persian rule, and the destruction of Kurdish emirates in the 19th century are well known. However, the emergence of the Kurdish issue as a problem began with the establishment of new nation-states and their adoption of a radical nationalist approach. These states refused to recognize the existence of the Kurds as a distinct people and forcibly imposed a national identity, thereby denying the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue, first and foremost, is about rejecting this denial.

Secondly, the Kurdish issue is the struggle of the Kurdish people to reject the status imposed upon them and to become active agents in shaping their own history and lives. Without accepting this, the resolution of the Kurdish issue is impossible. Moreover, the Kurdish issue is not merely a phenomenon associated with violence; it is a process that began long before violence became a factor.

The Kurdish issue did not arise due to imperialist interventions. On the contrary, the resolution of the Kurdish issue must come from within Kurdish society itself. For this, the process of Kurds becoming historical subjects must be recognized and legitimized. There are two fundamental bases of legitimacy here.

The first is the recognition of the Kurdish issue as a national issue in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The second is the acknowledgment that Kurdistan is a region that extends beyond the borders of existing states and that the Kurdish issue should be addressed as a Middle Eastern reality. Without understanding and accepting these two fundamental points, a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue cannot be found.

How did the Kurdish issue take shape in the early years of the Republic? How have the policies of “one nation, one language” and the state’s response to uprisings affected the present day?

Before these uprisings even began, the denial of the Kurdish issue was already a reality. Take the case of Sheikh Said, for example. Before the Sheikh Said uprising, there was the 1924 Constitution, which did not acknowledge the existence of Kurds. The Kemalist movement had made promises to the Kurds. In 1919 and 1920, the Kemalist movement needed the Kurds, but from 1921 on, we see a complete shift. However, the Kurdish issue was still not being explicitly mentioned. When we look at what happened in Dersim and Koçgiri, we see that major massacres took place.

The uprisings were a consequence of existing policies and massacres. In other words, they were a direct result of this policy of denial. They began when Kemalism betrayed its promises to the Kurds. They also started when Kemalism accepted the partitioning of Kurdistan. It is essential to read the state’s secret reports from 1925. Kurds were perceived in two ways: either as a biological threat to Turkishness or as raw material that could strengthen Turkish demographics. But for this “raw material” to be utilized, Kurds had to abandon their Kurdish identity and integrate into Turkishness. That is why I believe the issue is not solely connected to the uprisings.

We are specifically discussing Turkey here. I believe the Kurdish issue in Turkey is extremely important. It has shaped Turkey’s past, blocked its future, and still has the potential to hinder Turkey’s progress. Alternatively, if resolved, it could open the way for Turkey. However, radical nationalism is also present in Syria, Iraq and Iran. The Kurdish movement is fragmented because it belongs to a divided society. Yet, since the 1920s, there has been an overarching vision that unites all of Kurdistan. In response to the division, Kurds have symbolically united.

One of the responses to this division has been the writing of Kurdish history. Historians may not fully accept this Kurdish historiography because it is partly based on legends and myths. However, it remains a deeply rooted part of Kurdish collective memory. It includes a sense of mapping, a national flag and a shared identity. All of these elements unify the Kurds. We are witnessing a unification that transcends borders. That is why I believe we must discuss the Kurdish issue in Turkey. But as we engage in this discussion, we must also recognize that the Kurdish issue in Turkey is a part of, and a significant component of, the broader Kurdish issue in the Middle East.

What have been the key breaking points in recent history regarding the Kurdish issue? Which periods stand out?

The most significant breaking point has been the persistent denial of not only the Kurdish issue in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire but also the broader Kurdish issue in the Middle East, from the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) to the present day. We have seen this in Iraq as well. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey adopted a harsh stance against the Barzani movement. Although some changes occurred under Özal, when we look at the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey continued to perceive Iraqi Kurdistan as almost an enemy and carried out numerous interventions against it.

It is important to recall the developments that took place after 2003. The discourse of “The Kurds are our enemies,” “Kirkuk is Turkish and will remain Turkish,” and “The Mosul province is Turkmen and will remain Turkmen” persisted until 2007-08. Over the past decade, Turkey’s hostile approach toward Rojava has become particularly evident.

Turkey does not accept Rojava gaining any form of legitimate status and has pursued a strict policy against it. The breaking points are not limited to within Turkey; they also stem from Turkey’s broader Middle East strategies.

Although Turkey pursues a broad foreign policy, its central axis has often been the Kurdish issue. For instance, the crisis with Russia in the 2000s and the subsequent rapprochement were directly linked to the Kurdish issue. The near-total destruction of Afrin and the interventions that reached the level of ethnic cleansing were consequences of the Turkey-Russia agreements.

Similarly, one of the key factors in Turkey’s crisis with the United States has been the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue is not just a matter affecting Turkey’s internal dynamics; it is also a significant source of crisis in Middle Eastern and global politics, one that Turkey struggles to manage.

Under what historical and sociological conditions did the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) emerge, to which Öcalan has now made a call for change and transformation. Did the issue of denial that you mentioned shape the PKK’s emergence?

The emergence of the PKK was shaped by both historical and sociological factors. First and foremost, historical factors played a major role. To understand the formation of the PKK, one must examine the historical ground from which it emerged. This foundation was shaped by social mobilization and the Kurdish awakening of the 1960s. Immediately after, the 1971 military coup took place, which was of great significance for the Kurds. Up until 1971, the Kurdish movement believed that the Kurdish issue could be resolved within a constitutional framework.

However, the 1971 coup made it clear that this was not possible. Another crucial development was the defeat of the Barzani movement in 1975. The collapse of Barzani’s guerrilla insurgency, which had lasted for fifteen years and was highly successful, led to significant radicalization among the Kurds. It was within these historical conditions that the PKK took shape. At the same time, there was also a sociological dimension. The 1970s were a period of severe economic crisis in Kurdistan, during which a new generation emerged while the old intelligentsia weakened. This new generation carried strong plebeian dynamics, which positioned them as elements capable of radicalization.

The PKK was not the only actor of that period. Alongside the Kurdistan National Liberators (KUK), another organization that embraced armed struggle, it became one of the most significant actors resorting to violence. Subsequently, the [September 12] 1980 military coup took place, dealing severe blows to Kurdish identity. During this period, the PKK reorganized itself outside of Turkish Kurdistan, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, and later initiated an insurrection and guerrilla war in 1984. At the time, very few observers believed that this guerrilla movement, which began in 1984, could succeed.

However, the Kurdish youth, who had been forced into an underground socialization process during the 12 September period, viewed this insurrection and guerrilla movement positively and joined rapidly. From this point on, a new process began with the participation of young people in the PKK’s movement, symbols, and actions. Over time, this process expanded, leading to the formation of the Kurdish political movement and the establishment of Kurdish identity as a hegemonic issue within Kurdish society. It also influenced developments within the Kurdish diaspora.

As I said, the 1970s and 1980s were critical years for both the Kurdish issue and the emergence of the PKK from a historical and sociological perspective.

We are talking about an armed struggle that has been ongoing for half a century. To put it concretely, what gains have the Kurdish people achieved through the PKK’s fifty-year struggle?

We are speaking of a half-century-long process. However, the 1960s were already highly dynamic years for both Turkey and Kurdistan. The PKK emerged within this historical framework, both continuing and breaking away from that legacy. There is a dialectical relationship here; continuity and bifurcation.

Bifurcation refers to a process that radicalizes to its ultimate limits while simultaneously necessitating an inevitable break. For the PKK, this rupture was essential because the radicalization of the process made it unavoidable. However, the consequences of this rupture extended beyond the PKK itself, leading to much broader transformations.

One of the most significant outcomes has been the emergence of a new political class within Kurdish society. There were already Kurdish groups engaged in politics before. For example, in 1977, a Kurdish candidate was elected as mayor in Diyarbakır (Amed). There were also Kurdish movements within various political parties. However, the formation of a political movement that explicitly identified with Kurdish identity and became a hegemonic actor across a vast region of Kurdistan only became possible from the late 1980s on.

The PKK was at the center of these developments. One of the most crucial transformations has been the institutionalization of Kurdish politics. Today, we are talking about a political movement that cannot be thought of independently of the PKK, yet it cannot be entirely reduced to the PKK either. For instance, the political movement shaped by the HEP-DEP [People's Labour Party or Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP, and Democracy Party or Demokrasi Partisi, DEP] tradition, which now appeals to millions of voters, emerged within the broader framework set by the PKK, but it is not solely defined by it.

Over the past 40 years, Kurdish society has undergone a significant intellectual transformation. The Kurdish intellectual class, which was weak in the 1980s, has now become much stronger. Kurdish culture has become highly vibrant. There is an ongoing process of both transmission and redefinition between different generations.

The women’s movement has also been a crucial part of this transformation. There was already a women’s movement before the PKK, but it became significantly stronger under the PKK’s influence. Today, there is a vast sociological difference between Kurdistan in 1984 and Kurdistan in 2024. However, within these changes, elements of continuity also persist.

Today, we are witnessing a historic call from Öcalan. You mentioned that the existence and legitimacy of the Kurdish issue were still not acknowledged. At this point, has the existence of the Kurdish issue been officially recognized?

No, it has definitely not been officially recognized. However, there has been a slight change compared to five or six months ago. In this change, we see that the regime has been forced to re-legitimize Öcalan. Everyone has now realized the strong link between Öcalan and the Kurdish issue. The expectation from Öcalan was that, in his first statements, he would say, “I founded this terrorist organization, and I am dissolving it,” without mentioning the Kurdish issue at all. However, when we look at Öcalan’s statements, we see quite the opposite — he speaks of a century-long Kurdish issue and frames the PKK’s guerrilla war not as a matter of terrorism but as an issue of violence that must be understood within its historical conditions. Thus, Öcalan’s message is clear: “We are not a terrorist organization. The Kurdish issue is not a terrorism problem; it is a national issue.”

Reading between the lines of this call, this is the reality that emerges. Therefore, it is difficult to predict how much longer the Kurdish issue can continue to be denied.

However, when we look at Erdoğan’s and the Minister of National Defense’s statements, it is clear that the state still perceives the Kurdish issue as either a terrorism or an imperialism-related matter. Yet, we are starting to hear some exceptions and dissenting voices. For instance, Numan Kurtulmuş is one of the figures who, in some way, acknowledges the existence of the Kurdish issue. Bülent Arınç, in his speech in Erbil, almost had to admit that the Kurdish issue is a national issue. Compared to six months ago, there are now more dissenting voices within the ruling bloc. Even in Devlet Bahçeli’s rhetoric, some shifts can be observed.

The fact that Öcalan is no longer being referred to solely as a “terrorist leader” but also as the founding leader of the PKK indicates this shift. So, there are some advancements, but there is still no institutional state policy that recognizes the Kurdish issue as a legitimate reality.

I describe these developments as “small” because they have not yet transformed into long-term, institutionalized changes. There are many small developments, such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel’s remarks while receiving a delegation from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). 

Will these small developments gradually lead to a new institutional approach, a shift in the state’s discourse, and the recognition of the Kurdish issue both in Turkey and the Middle East? I remain quite hesitant. However, despite everything, it is clear that the process should not be obstructed. Or at the very least, the Kurdish side should not be the ones responsible for blocking it.

You interpret Öcalan’s statements more in terms of what they do not say or do not include. You highlighted critical aspects regarding the PKK’s emergence. Now, when we look at Öcalan’s call, we see a declaration that is firmly grounded in historical context. At this stage, how should Öcalan’s call for change and transformation within the PKK be understood?

At this point, it is difficult to know what is happening behind the scenes. However, when we examine the PKK’s evolution over the past twenty years, we see that the organization has repeatedly stated on various occasions that the era of armed struggle is coming to an end and that a new historical phase must begin. In other words, we are not facing an entirely new phenomenon, but rather new conditions. The peace process between 2013-15 ultimately collapsed due to several factors, including Erdoğan and the ruling bloc’s refusal to accept it, the rejection of the process by radical nationalism in Turkey, and developments in Syria. Therefore, while it is possible to discuss the opening of a new phase today, this possibility is still filled with uncertainties.

For this process to evolve into a permanent transformation, certain aspects must be extended over the long term, institutionalized, and legitimized. Even now, we cannot be certain that those engaging in talks with Öcalan will not face arrest tomorrow. In other words, the situation remains entirely ambiguous. Many things are possible, but nothing is certain.

From my perspective, for the past decade, the heart of Kurdistan has been beating in Rojava. Today, the most critical issue is the protection of Rojava and the securing of its status. When we analyze Öcalan’s statements, we do not see any indication that Syrian Kurds should dissolve themselves and become ordinary Syrian citizens or that Syria should revert to being the “Syrian Arab Republic”. On the contrary, Öcalan’s call appears to be directed explicitly at the PKK and its affiliated armed units. At this moment, the most crucial issue seems to be persuading Turkey to recognize the legitimacy of Rojava and establishing a roadmap for this.

Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK released a statement indicating that disarmament could be discussed. What would laying down arms mean for the PKK? Does this signify the end of the organization?

No, it definitely does not mean that the PKK’s struggle has come to an end. The PKK, in one way or another, continues and will continue to exist and struggle. Today, the PKK’s armed activities are largely limited to responding to Turkish military attacks. However, when we take a broader perspective, we see a highly dynamic Kurdish society, particularly in Turkish Kurdistan and the diaspora.

Within these societal dynamics, 99% of activities are already conducted in non-military spheres. These are not underground or secret activities; on the contrary, they take place openly, in the public eye. Today, a Kurdish politician who decides to run for mayor is fully aware that they risk arrest at any moment. A Kurdish journalist who openly expresses their identity faces the same threat. Even an academic writing a Kurdish-language textbook for children risks pressure and imprisonment.

Despite all this, the Kurdish movement is no longer an underground movement. On the contrary, the biggest driving force behind Kurdish politics and struggle now unfolds in the open, in front of society. Kurdish society has reached this point. It is no longer possible to say that clandestine activities constitute a determining factor in the Kurdish movement. The social dynamic, in every way, is now a visible and public dynamic.

With the fall of the Assad regime, the balance of power in the country continues to shift rapidly. In this process, General Commander of SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], Mazloum Abdi and the leader of HTS, the jihadist group in power in Syria, Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani), signed an eight-point agreement that serves as a roadmap. How do you interpret this agreement, and what does it mean?

This is a very recent and historic development, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions at this stage. However, it is important to recall the key points emphasized by Mazloum Abdi in the context of this agreement. The most striking aspect is the apparent acceptance of the principle of decentralization. It is widely understood that the current Autonomous Administration [of North and East Syria] will undergo changes, but the crucial question is: What will be the scope of these changes? Will there be an Autonomous Administration limited to Kurdish regions, or will a broader autonomous governance structure be established that extends beyond Kurdish territories? What will the institutional framework of this new administration look like? These questions remain unanswered for now. However, the main point of contention between the Kurds and HTS, which can be described as a militia regime, has been the issue of decentralization. Based on Mazloum Abdi’s statements, it appears that a common understanding has been reached on this matter.

Another significant provision in the agreement is the issue of “transferring existing institutions to the state.” This does not mean the complete dismantling of existing structures. If this transfer takes place within the framework of decentralization, it also implies preserving or formally recognizing a certain level of autonomy. However, as I mentioned earlier, it is still too early to make a definitive assessment of this process. The agreement is relatively short, recognizing the Kurdish issue, the status of Kurds in Syria, and the need for their rights to be constitutionally safeguarded. Beyond that, it is currently difficult to make further interpretations. However, if decentralization has indeed been accepted, it suggests that Kurdish institutions will be maintained in some form, though the exact name and structure of this entity remain uncertain.

At the same time, extreme caution is necessary. We have seen what happened in Latakia as what occurred there was a massacre of immense scale. The mobilization of pro-Bashar al-Assad forces and the killing of a thousand civilians cannot be justified in any way. This atrocity evokes memories of the great massacres in Ottoman and Turkish history, particularly those targeting Alawites. Even more concerning is the fact that HTS refuses to take responsibility for these massacres. This stance suggests either that HTS lacks control over other militia forces or that it is displaying an extreme level of hypocrisy. Moving forward, we do not know whether a strengthened regime will adopt a different strategy toward the Kurds. Therefore, the Kurds must be extremely vigilant. For now, the presence of the United States in the region remains an important guarantee for the Kurds. However, the duration of this presence is uncertain. Still, at least for the time being, the continued presence of the U.S. provides a level of security for the Kurds.

We have transitioned from an era where Kurdish existence was denied to a period where the constitutional protection of all Kurdish rights is being debated. One of the key provisions of the agreement states: “The Kurdish community is an indigenous part of the Syrian state, and the Syrian state guarantees their citizenship and all constitutional rights.” Considering this provision in particular, as well as the overall content of the agreement, can this be regarded as a success for the Kurds?

If these principles are fully implemented, it will be a significant achievement for the Kurds. This provision marks the first time in Syria’s century-long history that Kurds are officially recognized as a fundamental component of the country. This recognition has been a long-standing goal of Kurdish intellectuals and political movements in Syria. From a historical perspective, particularly in the 1920s and later during the radical shifts of the 1950s and 1960s, Kurds found themselves navigating between two radical movements: one aimed at integrating into Syrian society and another focused on being part of Kurdistan. This is a critical distinction, Kurds are being acknowledged as part of Syria, yet they are also being recognized as Kurds. Recognizing Kurds as Kurds inherently acknowledges their connection to Kurdistan as well.

A similar process can be observed in Iraq. During the 2000s, Iraq experienced both a “re-Iraqization” and a “re-Kurdistanization”, two interconnected processes. If the Kurds in Syria are constitutionally recognized as part of the country, this would be a historic milestone for them. However, caution is necessary. HTS is currently quite weak, and transforming a militia force into a full-fledged state is an immense challenge. It remains unclear whether HTS truly envisions a secular, democratic, and pluralistic Syria. Furthermore, whether HTS can effectively control other militia groups is highly uncertain. Reports indicate that some of the militias responsible for the massacres of Alawites are the same groups that participated in the ethnic cleansing in Afrin (Efrîn). Some of these militias have received direct support from Turkey or consist of mercenaries funded and armed by the Turkish state.

HTS must dismantle these groups, not just disarm them, but completely eliminate their presence. Whether HTS is capable of doing this remains uncertain. Therefore, the Kurds must focus on advancing the constitutional process and working toward the establishment of a decentralized Syria. However, while doing so, they must also remain acutely aware of the uncertainties of the future and proceed with extreme caution.

Before traveling to Damascus, Abdi reportedly held a meeting with various ethnic and religious groups within the Autonomous Administration. One of the key provisions of the agreement guarantees the right of all Syrians, regardless of religious or ethnic background, to participate in the political process and state institutions based on authority and responsibility. In essence, this clause mirrors the existing system in Rojava. But is it feasible to implement this provision? Is there an effort to extend the Rojava model to all of Syria?

I believe that the future Syria will not be a country shaped solely by constitutional principles. Instead, a multilayered structure may emerge, where different regions implement different social and political formulas. For example, when looking at Christians, they do not have a defined territorial base. There is no concentrated Christian-majority region, yet their rights and representation must be safeguarded. The Druze, on the other hand, hold a distinct position. Despite being entirely Arab in identity, they possess both territorial and religious uniqueness in the border region. As for the Alawites, they do have a specific regional base, but that area is also home to a significant Sunni population.

When it comes to Kurdistan, meaning present-day Rojava, we can speak of a dual structure. First, there is Rojava as a region predominantly inhabited by Kurds. Second, there is a broader Autonomous Region under Kurdish control, extending beyond Kurdistan’s historical boundaries. Initially, the Kurds did not intend to move toward Raqqa, but because it served as the second capital of ISIS, capturing the city became unavoidable. It was a necessity in the fight to eliminate ISIS. The key question for the future is whether the Kurdish movement wants to maintain control over Raqqa. Or, if the Arab population there demands the continuation of the Autonomous Administration, would the Kurds withdraw? At this stage, there are no clear answers to these questions.

For this reason, representation is not an issue that can be resolved with a single formula. Unless it is violently sabotaged, as in Latakia, we are likely to witness a long-term process in which different regions implement different governance models. These models cannot be implemented overnight; we may need to think in terms of the 2030s or even 2035. The greatest advantage for the Kurds is that they have been governing themselves for the past twelve years. Institutionally, they are far ahead of other groups. Municipalities, schools, hospitals, and Kurdish-language education systems are in place. Additionally, there are three universities in Kurdistan. However, despite these advancements, it will take time to determine the final map of Syria’s future.

Officials from the Autonomous Administration stated that the agreement aligns with the letter sent by Öcalan to Rojava, emphasizing that this development signifies the Kurds becoming a recognized partner in the Syrian state. What are your thoughts on this?

Since we do not know the full content of Öcalan’s letter, it is difficult to make a direct assessment. However, based on the information I have gathered, Öcalan reportedly said, “There is no reason for the Kurds to exhaust their forces at the Tishrin Dam. The Kurds need to go to Damascus.” This suggests that he might have emphasized the need to resolve many issues not only through armed struggle but also by directly engaging with Damascus and negotiating. It is possible that he expressed such a perspective, which would indicate that recent developments have unfolded in line with Öcalan’s expectations or recommendations.

The idea of the Kurds “becoming a partner in the state”  most likely refers to their constitutional recognition as a fundamental component of Syria. Moreover, this recognition could be at a relatively high level. For instance, it is uncertain whether Abdi might hold a significant position as a general in the future Syrian military. If Abdi were to secure a position within the Syrian army while maintaining his Kurdish identity and preserving Kurdish military units, this would be a highly significant development.

A comparable situation can be observed in Iraqi Kurdistan. Of course, there have been serious challenges, and unresolved issues remain, particularly the Kirkuk question must not be overlooked. However, at the same time, the Kurds play a decisive role in Iraqi politics. Today, the formation of any government in Iraq is highly dependent on Kurdish support. The Kurds not only have their own parliament but also hold considerable influence within the Iraqi parliament.

While the Kurdish side remains steadfast in defending Rojava’s status, the Turkish state has pursued a policy aimed at eradicating the Kurdish presence in the region since the beginning of the Syrian war. In recent developments, Rojava’s military structure has repeatedly been used as a pretext by Turkey. However, with this agreement, Turkey’s justifications have essentially been rendered void. Does this signify the collapse of Turkey’s Rojava and Syria policy?

Yes, you are absolutely right on this point. Turkey’s hypothesis that “there is no Kurdish issue in Syria” has completely collapsed. We now have an eight-point agreement signed by Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani). The mere existence of this agreement signifies that the Kurdish reality in Syria has been recognized. Moreover, the agreement was signed by Abdi, whom Turkey has long labeled as a “terrorist leader”. This, in turn, demonstrates that Abdi is now recognized as a legitimate political actor in Syria. He is not only acknowledged as a legitimate Kurdish representative but also as a key figure representing the Autonomous Administration. And this recognition is not confined to Kurdistan alone, it extends to Syria as a whole, where he is now seen as a legitimate actor in the broader political landscape.

From this perspective, as you pointed out, Turkey’s reading of the region, its political impositions, and its attempts to legitimize its strategy of violence have all collapsed. However, Turkey is deeply entrenched in rigid ideological positions and radical nationalist sentiments. Predicting how such an ideology will respond to these developments is difficult. If Turkey were to act rationally, it would welcome these developments, acknowledge Rojava’s existence, and even attempt to leverage Rojava’s position to gain influence in Syria. A power seeking to maintain a foothold in Syria putting aside ethical concerns and evaluating the situation purely from a geostrategic standpoint would recognize Rojava’s legitimacy. Any external power that acknowledges Rojava’s legitimacy could gain a much stronger position in Syria. However, the issue here is one of rationality. The real question is whether Turkey’s current leadership is capable of adopting such a rational stance. At this stage, it is difficult to predict.

It has been reported that the United States and certain international powers played a role in the agreement signed between Abdi and Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani). Does the involvement of these powers indicate that Rojava’s status is beginning to gain international recognition?

Yes, at this stage, we can say that such a recognition is emerging, but it has not yet reached an official or legal level. It is known that two days before the agreement was signed, a U.S. representative met with Abdi for significant negotiations. These discussions were most likely related to the continuation of U.S. influence in the region and relations with Damascus. Additionally, reports indicate that Abdi traveled to Damascus aboard a U.S. helicopter to sign the agreement. All of these developments point to a form of de facto recognition. However, the critical issue is transforming this de facto recognition into a legally binding status, one that engages states and the international community in a legal framework. When recognition remains only de facto, its future remains uncertain. This is why the Kurds must approach this process with extreme caution.

The future remains unpredictable, and it is difficult to determine how things will unfold. This is precisely why the presence of the U.S. in the region holds immense strategic importance. Careful and calculated steps must be taken during this period. On the other hand, much of Turkey’s rhetoric over the past decade has effectively collapsed. If the Damascus administration, which Turkey has supported, is now engaging with Abdi, signing an agreement with him, and recognizing him as a legitimate actor in Syria, then Turkey loses its ability to frame this as “negotiating with terrorists”. The Turkish state can no longer sustain its narrative that any engagement with Abdi constitutes legitimizing terrorism.

Middle East: What an end of the PKK would mean for Kurds

Jennifer Holleis

DW

MARCH 8, 2025

Following the call by Abdullah Ocalan to disband the Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, and to lay down arms, Syrian affiliates and the PKK headquarters in Iraq remain ambivalent. What are their options?

Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq are uncertain about their future after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for all forces to lay down arms.

Image: DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP/Getty Images

Kurds in the Middle East have been in a state of limbo since Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, gave his pioneering speech in late February.

In his historic address, he said, "Convene your congress and make a decision. All groups must lay down their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself."

While an official date for such a congressional meeting is yet to be announced, the PKK already stated on March 1 that they would comply. They also declared a unilateral ceasefire.

This could mark the beginning of the end of the PKK and their 40-year-old violent struggle for independence on Turkish territory.

However, until such an end of the PKK is confirmed, Ankara will continue to consider not only Turkey's PKK as a terrorist organization, but also the PKK headquarters in Iraq and affiliates in Syria.

Turkey expects all groups to dissolve, without exception.

In his speech, however, Ocalan did not specifically mention any of the Kurdish forces and administrations outside Turkey, although he did refer to ‘all groups,’ which could be interpreted as referring to Syrian affiliates also.

He also failed to offer an alternative roadmap for the around 35 million Kurds who remain the largest ethnic group without their own state.

The Kurds live in a vast territory, which is split across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia. While they share a common ethnic identity and are predominantly Sunni Muslims, they do not have cross-border representatives, common policies or a joint military defense unit.

PKK spokespeople in Iraq and Syria had different reactions to Ocalan's call.

Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF, says that Ocalan's call does not apply to his group.

Image: Bernat Armangue/AP/dpa/picture alliance

Kurds in Iraq

Analysts widely agree that the PKK headquarters in northern Iraq will most likely follow Ocalan's call.

"Once the PKK's congress formally declares it's dissolution and renounces armed struggle, this decision would cover both southeast Anatolia in Turkey [where the Kurdish majority in Turkey live] and militants directly operating under the PKK leadership structure in north Iraq," Nigar Goksel, Turkey and Cyprus project director at the conflict-prevention organization International Crisis Group, told DW.

The president of the semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region in Iraq's north, Nechirvan Barzani, has already urged the PKK to "commit to and implement this [Ocalan's] message."

Hopes are that an end of the armed fight between Turkey and the PKK in Iraq will not only end ongoing strikes by the Turkish military in the area, but eventually improve political and economic ties between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.

Furthermore, the PKK's dissolution would most likely also improve the political situation in Syria's northeast where Turkey and Kurdish forces have been fighting for years.

"If these groups [in Turkey and Iraq] fully disband and undergo a DDR process [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration], this will unlock unprecedented opportunities for good governance and stability in northern Syria as well as alter the balance of power across the country," Burcu Ozcelik, senior research fellow for Middle East Security at the London-based think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told DW.

It remains to be seen if or to what extent Syria's PKK-affiliates will continue their political roadmap.Image: Orhan Qereman/REUTERS

Kurds in Syria

Yet, both analysts highlight that the Kurdish forces in Syria don't see Ocalan's call as ultimately binding for themselves.

Kurdish forces consist of the Kurdish Syrian People's Protection Unit (YPG), who are at the core of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF.

According to Ozcelik, the YPG is organically and institutionally linked to the PKK, and it is unimaginable that Turkey would agree to the YPG’s survival as it currently stands.

However, Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF, already said that the call to dissolve did not apply to his group.

"It is not related to us in Syria," he stated.

He still welcomed Ocalan's call.

"If there is peace in Turkey, that means there is no excuse to keep attacking us here in Syria," Abdi said.

"If the PKK genuinely and demonstrably lays down arms and disbands, meaning that the armed cadres physically hand over their weapons to state authorities as the process would demand, it will be the dawn of a new era," Ozcelik stated.

She also said, however, that this "will not mean that PKK-affiliates operating in northeastern Syria will now have free rein."

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raq's PKK headquarters are most likely to follow Abdullah Ocalan's call to dissolve.Image: Younes Mohammad/IMAGO

Is an end of the PKK a path to unity?

Ocalan's call for an end of the PKK coincides with an unprecedented situation in Damascus that arose after the fall of Syria's longtime dictator Bashar Assad in December.

Syria's new interim government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has called on the Kurdish forces to integrate into the national army.

However, the Kurdish forces insist to operate as an individual unit within the army.

So far, the Syrian government has rejected this and also didn't invite the SDF to the country's first national dialogue conference in late February.

While it remains to be seen if, or to what extend the SDF might integrate, the focus of the Kurdish forces is "not on disarmament," Nigar Goksel told DW.

And yet, once the PKK dissolves, the links between the Kurdish forces in Syria and the PKK would effectively be severed, she added.

In turn, Burcu Ozcelik sees that Ocalan's call for an end of the PKK could actually help the Kurds in Syria to gain a political foothold.

"If the Syrian Democratic Forces is able to credibly distance itself from the PKK and its affiliates, and contest in the political space of the new Syria as a pro-democracy party through legal guarantees, it will open the path for political mobilization," Ozcelik said.

Jailed Kurdish PKK leader urges group to disarm and dissolve  02:07


DW's Aref Gabeau contributed to this article.

Edited by: Carla Bleiker


Jennifer Holleis Editor and political analyst specializing in the Middle East and North Africa.

 

Mazloum Abdi (Syrian Democratic Forces): ‘The HTS administration and those seeking a solution to the Syrian crisis must work to stop the attacks on North and East Syria’

By Mazloum Abdi & Hawar News Agency

Published 29 January, 2025

First published at Hawar News Agency. Slightly abridged and edited for clarity.

In this interview, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi assessed the rapid developments and changes on the military, security, and political fronts since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Abdi also discussed the continuous attacks launched by the Turkish occupation state and its mercenaries and the latest developments in the dialogue with the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham administration and between Kurdish political parties.

He praised the role of the people and youth in resisting the attacks and strengthening their forces, noting the continuation of dialogue with the HTS administration. He emphasized the importance of political dialogue to end the Syrian crisis, calling on the international community to put pressure on the Turkish occupation to stop its attacks as a first step towards building a new Syria.

A month and a half have passed since the fall of the previous Syrian regime. During this period, Syria has witnessed significant military and diplomatic developments. How do you assess this phase? What is the current reality in Syria from your perspective?

In fact, more than a month and a half have passed since the fall of the Ba’athist regime and the historic change in Syria. The Syrian people, regardless of their different components, are generally pleased and happy with this change, especially the coexisting components in the regions of North and East Syria, including the Kurds. This is because, with the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the people of the region were among the first to participate in the protests and sit-ins against the regime. Therefore, they, more than any other parties, are happy with the fall of the Assad regime.

Today, gradually, the situation is becoming clearer and more evident, but the situation has not yet taken a clear direction for everyone in Syria. Syria has entered a new phase, and there will be no turning back; the country will not return to previous stages. All parties, starting from the Syrian people, through the regional countries, and up to the international powers, no longer wish to see the country experience a civil war or any disturbances and tensions again. All parties are striving to benefit from this current change and seize the opportunity to build a new Syria.

At first, the international powers were apprehensive about the phase and the change and who had reached Damascus, but the situation and positions of those parties have become clearer and more evident. Now, those parties want to continue with the new administration in Damascus, but at the same time, they want to push that administration to change some of its aspects.

We, in the SDF, and also the representatives of the components of North and East Syria, want the current change to be a foundation for a new phase in Syria.

The new phase in Syria is met with significant challenges that generate concerns among the general Syrian population. The most important of these is the existing and evident security vacuum. We hear about violations by parties seeking to destabilize the security of Syrian regions. The economic situation remains deteriorating and continues to worsen. 

Syria is still under sanctions. Economic sanctions have not yet been lifted from the country, and international powers have not reached a complete consensus to lift those sanctions, because the country has not yet reached the new administrative form required by the Syrians, and the responsible parties have not yet reached a stable position. Additionally, there are challenges and concerns such as how the new administration will politically approach the future of the country, and foremost among all this is the continuation of external attacks on Syrian territory.

All these matters are considered challenges facing the Syrian people and hindering the country’s return. However, in general, we can say that we are going through a historic and new phase, and it is necessary for everyone, whether the Syrian community or international and regional powers, to cooperate and work together to build a Syria based on acceptance of others.

Over the course of approximately 14 years of the Syrian revolution, three administrations have emerged on the ground. One of them collapsed, which was the previous Ba’ath regime, and it has now been replaced by HTS. There are also two existing administrations known as the Euphrates Region and the West Euphrates Region. The West Euphrates Region is managed by the interim government, which is not favored in its form and system, and it is interim in name based on past experiences and its reality. 

Our current administration [the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, AANES] has produced results in our regions, whether on the institutional, political or military level. We have an administration that works to empower the principles of democracy, and we certainly wish to play an effective and significant role in the new Syria.

In light of calls for dialogue as a path to achieving sustainable peace in Syria and the approach to building Syria, the region of North and East Syria are subjected to intense attacks by the Turkish occupying state and its mercenaries, especially in the Tishrin and Qaraquzak dams. What are the objectives of these attacks, and what are the most significant field developments related to them?

This is a significant and obvious contradiction, as the majority of Syria is witnessing a phase of war cessation. There may be some minor skirmishes, but there is relative stability, and there is no ongoing war or battles. There are only attacks on areas in North and East Syria. As you mentioned, there are attacks on our areas such as Qaraquzaq and the Tishrin Dam, and our other areas are still subjected to daily bombardment by Turkish warplanes and artillery. 

This is a major contradiction from Turkey and does not align with the situation of Syria that is currently being discussed, which suggests that Syria has entered a phase of crisis resolution. At such a time, the groups linked to Turkey, called or referred to as the “[Syrian] National Army” [SNA], supported by Turkish air and artillery, continue to attack our areas.

With the fall of the Assad regime, and in order to stop these attacks and the war, so that our people, like the rest of the Syrian people, can enjoy a state of stability and the cessation of war, we have proposed many initiatives and suggestions. As you know, for example, what we proposed to stop the attack on Kobani, and we are still proposing, and now to stop these attacks on the Tishrin Dam and the Qaraquzaq Bridge, there are suggestions we are making and work is being done on that through intermediaries, foremost among them the United States of America. There are also other parties working on that, and we have efforts, and we approach any proposal that comes to us to stop these attacks with all positivity.

I want to emphasize that these attacks contradict and hinder both domestic and international efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis. Therefore, the administration in Syria and the parties seeking to find a solution to the Syrian crisis must, above all, work to stop the attacks on the region of North and East Syria. Without this, we, as the peoples of North and East Syria, cannot work effectively in the upcoming political phase for Syria. Thus, our support and efforts for Syria are conditional upon stopping the attacks on our regions.

What are the latest field developments in the Qaraquzaq and Tishrin Dam fronts. Why is there such insistence from Turkey and its mercenaries to attack and escalate specifically in those two fronts, despite all the proposals?

The Tishrin Dam and the Qaraquzak area are geographically located between Manbij and Kobani. In order to prevent the continuation of attacks and war, and to completely stop the war, we reached an agreement with the other party to withdraw our forces from Manbij. However, what we have witnessed are attempts to cross the agreed-upon borders, move to the east of the Euphrates, and continue the attacks.

The borders where it was agreed that the attacks would stop are the natural geographical borders. We left Manbij based on an agreement that ensured the war would stop at the banks of the Euphrates River from the west of the Euphrates, and we were open to the Turkish army reaching the site of the Tomb of Suleiman Shah. On the other hand, the agreement extended to the countryside of Manbij but it extended to the area of the Tishrin Dam, which was not among the areas that the SNA would reach.

But we have witnessed that they tried to reach the eastern Euphrates and control the region by crossing either from the Qaraquzaq Bridge or the Tishrin Dam to besiege Kobani. However, the resistance of the local people thwarted that and pushed them back to the western Euphrates after some of their groups crossed to the eastern Euphrates from the Qaraquzaq Bridge. They are still trying to reach the eastern Euphrates from that front. If the goal is to return the tomb of Suleiman Shah to its location, we are open to that. But if it is a prelude to a new war on the region, we will certainly not allow it and we will continue to confront those attempts.

As for the Tishrin Dam area, they tried to advance and seize the Tishrin Dam and cross to the east of the Euphrates and to the Serrin area to complete the siege of Kobani. The battles and their attacks are still ongoing, and since their plan is exposed to us, we repelled those attacks. Our defense in the Tishrin Dam area is part of protecting Kobani from that plan.

Our decision is summarized in not allowing the implementation of that plan and the forceful entry into our areas. We know that until a general and comprehensive ceasefire is reached with Turkey and the armed groups associated with it, the plan to occupy other areas of the region will continue. Therefore, our resistance and confrontation will also continue. Our forces’ decision is clear and we reaffirm it once again: we will not allow the crossing of the dam and reaching the eastern Euphrates, no matter the cost.

Are there any surprises in terms of military developments that will be revealed in the upcoming stages of confronting the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries? Just as we have recently seen the emergence of aerial units within your forces?

I mentioned in previous meetings that the SDF are not what they used to be. For about four years now, our forces have been working on developing their military capabilities and resorting to various military tactics, all within the context of defense, because we are a force formed for self-defense, not for attack. Among these are protection methods, tunnel warfare and trenches, as well as measures to protect against aerial bombardment. There are many significant measures that have been implemented across all our regions. In the context of these measures, everyone should know that any attack on our regions will not be a walk in the park. At this stage, we have proven this through the methods of protecting our forces from Turkish aerial bombardment.

And also on the technical front, we have measures that have proven successful in thwarting and failing attacks launched against our regions, whether they are ground attacks as we witness today in the Tishrin Dam area, or aerial attacks, including what we have demonstrated by downing several Turkish drones. We have many other new methods that are being worked on more extensively to thwart aerial and ground attacks on our regions. What has been revealed so far is just a part of those measures to protect our areas, and they are local products with local names that will be known later.

After the announcement of general mobilization and recruitment by the SDF and the AANES, the residents responded widely. What is your message to them in this critical phase?

We have entered a historical phase, as I mentioned, and the general mobilization was necessary to align with this phase, as the region is in the process of consolidating and ensuring the achieved gains. All peoples in such phases resort to this, and it is essential. There is an aspect of this general mobilization that pertains to the entire people of North and East Syria, and we witness this general mobilization today among the entire population. 

Everyone is mobilized to protect their areas in various ways and methods. We see the protection of neighborhoods, villages, and towns being carried out voluntarily, ensuring security and stability alongside their security and military forces. These are efforts we highly appreciate, and this is what we have come to expect from the peoples of the region in such types of attacks and phases that we have witnessed throughout our revolution within the Syrian crisis.

The other aspect is related to the youth within the community and their involvement in the military forces to confront external attacks and strengthen the SDF. Yes, our SDF has significant strength, but it needs to be reinforced to become even stronger because we are heading towards a future beyond just achieving gains. This phase requires greater involvement in these forces, whether temporarily or in the long term, in terms of volunteering and engagement.

It is the responsibility of the youth at this stage to strengthen the SDF, because strengthening these forces will enhance the position of the Syrian DDF in the upcoming stages, whether in negotiations with the HTS administration in Damascus or in repelling external attacks on the region. Therefore, everyone must fulfill their national duty.

Since late November, the SDF and the people of the region have resisted the attacks of the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries, starting from Afrin and al-Shahba to Kobani and the Tishrin Dam. How do you assess the resistance shown by the fighters and the people? What is its impact on Syrian and international public opinion?

The decision to resist and confront is not just the decision of our fighters or a specific military leadership, but rather a popular decision that our people in North and East Syria believe in, because they are certain and aware of the Turkish plans and those connected to them. This is evident in what we see with our people heading to the Tishrin Dam and protesting there.

On this occasion, we highly appreciate and evaluate the moral support and the protests of our people against these attacks, and we consider it a historical resistance. It is an expression of their deep connection to their forces and their achieved gains, and we commend their continuous resistance. Our people desire nothing but the cessation of attacks on their regions, facilities, and forces, and to live in security and stability within the upcoming Syria after the fall of Assad.

What is your assessment of the international stance on the recent Turkish attacks? What is your message to the United Nations and the international community regarding the Turkish attacks and the situation in North and East Syria?

From the beginning, there have been attempts and endeavors to stop these attacks, most notably the Global Coalition and the US, and this popular resistance from the people of the region, with its various components, has the greatest influence that pushes these parties to these positions, and these endeavors are still ongoing. An example of this is what we witnessed regarding Kobani, and what we are witnessing today with the region remaining in a kind of stability and in the rest of the regions of the region, is the result of the continuous support of these parties for our forces and the peoples of the region. 

The popular resistance and the resistance of the SDF fighters in the Qaraquzak area, as well as the ongoing resistance in Tishrin Dam, contributed to pushing all parties to increase support for our forces and increased the efforts of international parties to mediate for a permanent ceasefire, so just as there was a move for Kobani, there are efforts to cease fire in the Tishrin Dam area, the efforts have limited the expansion of these attacks, but have not yet yielded results to stop the attacks in the Tishrin Dam and Qaraquzak area.

Therefore, we believe that we must continue our historic resistance, and the attacking parties must be certain that they will not be able to enter the dam and cross it by force and with such ease. Our decision is clear, which is not to allow the occupation and to confront it, and our forces have always proven that they are capable of implementing the pledges and decisions that they make to themselves. Our military resistance on the one hand, and our diplomatic efforts on the other hand, will continue, and we believe that in this way we will ensure that the stage ends with victory.

The resistance of our fighters and the resistance of our people in the Tishrin Dam area will direct us to a new stage that begins with a comprehensive ceasefire and entering the post-war, dialogue and construction stage. Therefore, all parties, primarily the international powers and the Global Coalition, must be aware of the demands of our people and stand by them and pressure all parties, primarily Turkey, to stop these attacks. I am confident that stopping these attacks will turn into the beginning of political dialogue in Syria.

There are repeated allegations of tension and clashes between the SDF and HTS. Which parties are pushing for this? Who benefits from fueling a conflict between the two parties? What is the impact of this on the Syrian people and their future?

So far, no clashes have occurred between us. When the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation [by HTS] began, they contacted me and explained that their target was the Syrian regime, and that they were not targeting areas of the SDF, and that they were not seeking to cause clashes or clashes between us and them. To this day, with the help of mediators, there is coordination between us militarily in Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and even in the city of Aleppo. 

Many parties spread these allegations with the aim of destabilizing the security and stability of the region and pushing the two parties to clash in order to exploit it for other agendas, but we in the SDF and the other party, HTS, are aware of these plans and who is behind them, so we will only say that their plans will fail.

Do you mean to say that there is a third party trying to drag you into a fight with HTS? If that happens, what are its repercussions and which of those parties will benefit from that?

Of course there is a third party, there are local parties, and some countries are trying hard and by all means to cause a fight between us, and there are also Syrian figures, in addition to some groups that spread discord, and this is happening openly and not in secret. Sometimes we see them go out in Umayyad Square in Damascus and talk about clashes and fighting, and they call for that. But in general all parties, including the SDF, HTS and international powers, while there is dialogue and a national project, believe the fighting should not return.

Certainly with the return of the fighting, all parties will be harmed by it, and before everyone else, the Syrian forces are the ones who will receive the greatest harm, and the interests of the international powers present in the region will be harmed. I believe that everyone is aware of this matter, and that is why no one seeks to resolve the Syrian crisis through armed conflict. Resuming the internal Syrian conflict again will not be in the interest of any party.

There is ongoing talk about negotiations between you and the leadership of HTS. What is the nature of the relationship between the two parties currently? What are the most prominent points that you are discussing in these discussions, what have you agreed upon and what are the points of disagreement between the two parties?

I believe that our people and all components of North and East Syria are seeking to know the nature of the relationship between us, what we have reached, what we are discussing. Currently, the discussions are ongoing. 

First, we went to Damascus to know their opinions and point of view, and they were also trying to know our point of view. We held a long meeting with the leadership of HTS, Mr. Ahmed al-Sharaa, and common points emerged between us and we agree on them, regarding the future and nature of the SDF within the Syrian army in the future, the unity of Syrian lands, the rejection of division, and the necessity of activating dialogue and a political solution.

We think about Syria as a whole, we want a unified Syria, and we have no intention of separatism. Many are promoting that we are working to build two armies in Syria and establish a state within a state. We have no intention in this direction. Our goal and political plan are clear. In the basic lines, there is no disagreement between the two parties.

But there are ongoing discussions and negotiations about the mechanism, how and the content of implementing these points, and the timing of translating these matters. We agree that Syria should have one army and the SDF should be part of it, but in what way will the SDF be integrated with the Syrian Ministry of Defense? The SDF has been present for ten years and consists of all the components of North and East Syria, and it has many military institutions affiliated with it. There are also preparations underway to build a new force, not a previously unified force, and we must join it.

Having a new army requires a lot of time and work. There is a disagreement between us and them about the timing of the period in which this army should be formed, and about how to activate the closed crossings within the areas of the Autonomous Administration, and for this reason the meetings will continue.

Currently, there are clashes and fighting in the Tishrin Dam, and the dam is a national institution and concerns Syria in general, and for this reason this problem must be resolved with the Damascus administration. As I said, previously in the basic lines we agree and there is no disagreement between us, and most importantly there is the intention of dialogue between the two parties. For this reason things must proceed slowly and with complete patience. There are some parties trying to rush the matter, but we see that any action that is done in a hurry can have negative results. We say that matters must be resolved step by step without thinking about time in order to have a solid foundation and not be a reason for problems to appear again.

Also, we are currently working on how to include this region in the political process, and they must also be clear in this context: how we will join the national dialogue that will be held or the transitional government that they say will be formed within two or three months? What is our place in this government? These points must be clarified. Also, on what principles will the future Syria be built, whether it is democratic or not, and what is the form of the state, as it concerns all Syrians.

In the end, I can say that we agree that the Syrian situation should be resolved through dialogue, and blocking the way for parties that are trying to spread discord. There is encouragement from the parties and international powers to work in the context of the dialogue, and for us to be present in Damascus. They also, as the Damascus government, have representatives in our regions.

A few days ago, a meeting was held, we shared our point of view with them, and they also presented some demands, and in turn, we sent them our demands, and I believe that we will be responded to, and when some points are clarified, we can hold meetings at the level of the General Command between us and them, in order to work on implementing some practical steps, but the steps that will be implemented must be discussed and clarified between us.

I am confident that from now on we can work on some points, including the issue of fighting terrorism and ISIS. There is al-Hol Camp where thousands of people from inside Syria are held, and for this reason a delegation or a committee from Damascus must go to our areas to coordinate between us and al-Hol Camp administration and clarify how to return them to their areas, and study opening the crossings, including Qamishlo and Tal Kocher, since the crossings are linked to the government in Damascus.

Could you please tell us about the demands you received from the HTS administration, if it is possible to disclose them of course?

We have previously explained some of them in the context of our dialogue, and since those demands are under discussion and dialogue, I do not want to go into detail about those demands. Now I would like to apologize, and I believe that the information we have provided about our relationship is sufficient for this moment.

Conflicting statements have been issued by HTS administration officials regarding the SDF, some of which talk about an ongoing dialogue and others call for the dissolution of the forces and the surrender of weapons. How do you evaluate these statements? What can you conclude from that?

There are many reasons for this contradiction in the statements. There is pressure being exerted on them and there are demands from international powers and regional countries, and there are challenges on the ground. For us, the most important are the statements of the HTS leadership, Mr. Ahmed al-Sharaa. We have direct channels of communication with the HTS leadership and the Damascus administration, and there are parties moving between us and they are present in Damascus and come to us. Our relations are conducted at the leadership level. In this context, I do not believe that there is any disagreement between us regarding the dialogue and its continuation.

Regarding the unity of the Kurdish ranks in the region, especially after your recent visit to Erbil and meeting with the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, have you met with other Kurdish parties? What is the position of those parties? What are the latest developments in this area (the unity of the Kurdish parties in Syria)?

The visit we made to Hewler was private, no other meetings took place outside the framework of this visit, but a phone call took place between us and the President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, and as you know we have relations with the President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Pavel Talabani, and we are in constant contact with him. In general, this is a new stage for everyone and for the Kurds as well, and therefore steps must be taken, as achieving Kurdish unity at this stage is more important than ever.

We in the SDF are not only concerned with the Kurdish people, but with all the components of North and East Syria. There are some parties that systematically seek to limit the issue of North and East Syria to the Kurds only, this is not true. All components of the region have been fighting for ten years in one trench, and the blood of all components has been shed in the same trench. The SDF are made up of the sons of all components of North and East Syria.

We will continue our struggle to ensure the rights of the components of North and East Syria in the future Syria, and our efforts in this regard will continue, but this does not mean that we put the Kurdish issue on the sidelines; on the contrary, the more the Kurds show strength at this stage and unite their ranks and voices, we will achieve our goals and protect our gains. There is an urgent and greater need than before to achieve Kurdish unity.

The position of the Kurdistan Region is positive, and they want to provide assistance to Rojava and North and East Syria in our dialogue and negotiations with Damascus. In my opinion this is a positive and important position at this stage, and all Kurdish forces must stand by Rojava so that Rojava can guarantee its rights. The support and assistance of the Kurdistan Region to Rojava at this stage is very important and what is happening in this regard so far is good.

It is necessary in the coming days for the Kurdish political parties in Rojava to meet. For our part, we discussed this issue during our visit to Erbil and it was one of the main topics and it also enjoys support from Hewler as well.

As part of what we have learned from our visit, we will meet with the Kurdish forces in Rojava in the coming days, and we will try to unify their position and political program regarding the Kurds in Rojava, and form a unified body in the name of the Kurds to go to Damascus to conduct negotiations. This will support the position of the AANES and the SDF on the issue of North and East Syria. The communication channels between us are continuous and have not been interrupted, there is a positive atmosphere, everyone is ready for that. We are waiting for a meeting program to be set, to meet with all parties, and to gather them at one table to discuss the issues.

Earlier in 2020, there were meetings between them and they had common political visions, and according to the situation, they should meet again to make some adjustments. They should unify their demands and determine what they want. 

The main goal of the dialogues is to form a unified body called Rojava to go to Damascus and demand their rights. First, they should agree on a unified program and go to Damascus to present their demands to the Damascus administration. I believe that this is urgent and necessary on the one hand, and on the other hand, the conditions are favorable for the Kurdish forces to agree, and we will help them in this matter until the end.

Yes, as soon as possible, in the next few days, I think we may start holding these meetings tomorrow.