KURDISTAN
Syria’s government and Kurdish-led forces struck a sweeping deal on Friday to integrate Kurdish fighters and their administration into the central state, after weeks of fighting that shrank Kurdish control across the country.
Issued on: 30/01/2026
By: FRANCE 24
Members of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrive at the Kurdish-held city of Ain al-Arab, also known as Kobane on January 23, 2026, after they withdrew from the Al-Aqtan prison in the Raqa province of Syria. © AFP
Syria's government and Kurdish forces reached a comprehensive agreement on Friday that included the gradual integration of the Kurds' forces and administration into the central state, following weeks of clashes between the two sides that led to a ceasefire.
The agreement, shared by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian state television, came after the Kurds lost control of swathes of territory to government forces during weeks of fighting.
They now find themselves restricted to Kurdish-majority areas, having once held sway over much of north and northeastern Syria.
Syria's government and Kurdish forces reached a comprehensive agreement on Friday that included the gradual integration of the Kurds' forces and administration into the central state, following weeks of clashes between the two sides that led to a ceasefire.
The agreement, shared by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian state television, came after the Kurds lost control of swathes of territory to government forces during weeks of fighting.
They now find themselves restricted to Kurdish-majority areas, having once held sway over much of north and northeastern Syria.
The agreement stipulates that government forces will enter the Kurdish-controlled cities of Hasakeh and Qamishli in the northeast, while three Syrian army brigades will be created out of the SDF.
Damascus and the SDF on Sunday extended their ceasefire for 15 days while pursuing talks on integration.
Syria's new Islamist authorities, who took over after the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, are seeking to extend state control across Syria.
Syrian security forces will "be deployed in the cities of Hasakeh and Qamishli" in the northeast, currently controlled by Kurdish forces, while a separate brigade will be created for the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane in the north.
The agreement deals a blow to the Kurdish minority's hopes for self-rule, after having established a de facto autonomous administration in areas under their control during Syria's 13-year civil war.
(FRANCE 24 with AFP)
The Kurds and the Syrian Regime
Thursday 29 January 2026, by Gilbert Achcar
Recent developments in northern Syria – particularly east of the Euphrates – carry grave implications for both the Kurdish condition and the broader Syrian situation. Let us examine these implications, beginning with the Kurdish issue.
The Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria now finds itself in a critical predicament, having lost a substantial portion of the territory it hitherto controlled. These losses include predominantly Kurdish enclaves located within largely Arab regions, such as Aleppo, as well as predominantly Arab areas east of the Euphrates, notably Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The principal cause of this setback lies in the Trump administration’s abandonment of the alliance Washington had forged more than a decade ago with Syria’s Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS. Tom Barrack, the Trump administration’s local representative, cynically declared that the usefulness of these Kurdish forces to Washington has “largely expired.”
Once again, the Kurdish national movement is paying the price for its reliance on an ally whose unreliability is historically well established. In the early 1970s, the Kurdish movement in northern Iraq, led by the Barzani family, wagered on the support of the Shah of Iran against the Baathist regime. That gamble ended in disaster when the Shah stabbed the movement in the back after securing his own objectives through a deal with Baghdad. Having used the Kurdish movement as a card in his confrontation with Iraq, he got rid of it once his goals were achieved. Since the 1990s, the Barzani family has allied itself with yet another bitter enemy of the Kurdish people: the Turkish state. They will not support the forces led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northeastern Syria against Turkey and its allies, just as they do not support Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces in northern Iraq in the face of repeated Turkish incursions. Instead, they seek to extend their influence into northern Syria with Ankara’s approval.
The PYD, for its part, is also reaping the consequences of the contradiction between its proclaimed principles and its actual practices. Although the party claims adherence to the anarchist ideas espoused by the leader of the PKK in the Turkish prison where he is detained, and subsequently adopted by his organization, it failed to establish genuine democratic self-rule in the Arab-majority areas it seized with US backing east of the Euphrates. Rather than empowering local communities, it imposed its authority in a manner widely perceived by the Arab population as Kurdish nationalist domination. This explains the rapid collapse of PYD-affiliated forces in those regions: local Arab tribes preferred to reintegrate into the Syrian state under the new Damascus regime, particularly as Washington shifted its support away from the Kurdish movement and toward the Syrian government. Had the Arab majorities in these regions experienced authentic democratic self-governance, they would undoubtedly have been willing to defend it against any attempt by a Damascus-based regime to dismantle it in order to reimpose centralized authority.
Turning to the Syrian situation more broadly, any observer of recent events cannot fail to notice the striking contrast between the new Syrian regime’s posture toward Kurdish-controlled areas in the north and its stance toward the Israeli occupation and the Druze-majority region bordering the occupied Golan Heights in the south. This contrast evokes the slogan raised by the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement in 1976, following the brutal intervention of Hafez al-Assad’s regime to suppress them and extend Damascus’s control over Lebanon with Washington’s approval: “A lion [asad in Arabic] in Lebanon and a rabbit in the Golan.” A similar characterization aptly describes the behaviour of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime, which acts like a lion against the Kurds in the north while accommodating the Zionist state – going so far as to conclude security arrangements with it – despite its occupation of a strategic portion of Syrian territory for nearly half a century.
Whatever may be said about the undemocratic policies pursued by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in its drive to consolidate control over Syrian state territory – policies discussed previously (see “Syria: Fishing in Troubled Waters”, 6 May 2025) – a fundamental distinction nonetheless exists from the standpoint of the new regime’s interests between, on the one hand, extending its authority over the predominantly Arab areas east of the Euphrates, along with their oil fields, which represent a vital source of revenue for the Syrian state, and on the other hand, the continuation of its campaign against Kurdish-majority regions in the north, despite the high potential cost in lives and resources such a campaign entails, and although it offers no meaningful benefit to the new regime in Damascus.
This raises an obvious question: why is HTS pursuing a battle it does not need, at a time when it faces far more pressing political and economic priorities – priorities that serve its own interests, let alone the country’s? The answer lies plainly in the interests of the Turkish state. Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria constitutes a Turkish concern, rooted in its connection to the Kurdish national liberation movement that challenges the Turkish state itself from within. It is not, nor should it be, a Syrian concern. The involvement of the new Damascus regime in this conflict is simply another manifestation of its subservience to the Turkey-US alliance, just as the Assad regime was subordinate to the Iran-Russia axis. The principal beneficiary of this entire dynamic remains the Zionist government, whose regional power has been strengthened to an unprecedented extent.
27 January 2026
Translated for the author’s blog from the Arabic original published in Al-Quds al-Arabi on 27 January 2026. Feel free to republish or to publish in other languages, with mention of the source.
Attached documentsthe-kurds-and-the-syrian-regime_a9393-2.pdf (PDF - 981 KiB)
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Syria
Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?
Rojava: Political Autonomy, Social Bases, and Imperial Dynamics
Why Syria needs better governance...and a new kind of opposition
Syria’s future won’t be secure through Israel normalisation
Suweida Under Fire: The Consolidation of Power in Damascus, and Sectarianism
Kurdistan
Türkiye: From the Kurdish movement to mass mobilizations
Dissolution of the PKK and new perspectives
Kurdistan/Turkey: A Newroz of hope against a backdrop of coup d’état
Türkiye: Political Crisis and Democratic Movement
Kurdistan: ‘Turkey must choose between the status quo, endless war and peace with the Kurds’.
Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon. He is currently Professor of Development Studies and International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. A regular and historical contributor to the press of the Fourth International, his books include The Clash of Barbarisms. The Making of the New World Disorder (2006), The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives (2012), The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (2022). His most recent books are The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China, from Kosovo to Ukraine (2023) and the collection of articles Israel’s War on Gaza (2023). His next book, Gaza, A Genocide Foretold, will come out in 2025. He is a member of AntiCapitalist Resistance in Britain.
Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?
Wednesday 28 January 2026, by Joseph Daher
Despite Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), agreeing on another ceasefire on Tuesday, infighting and tensions in the country continue. [1]]
The SDF have called on a general mobilisation of Kurds to defend their territories amidst the government’s military offensives that seek to consolidate their power in Syria.
Weeks of clashes saw government armed forces advance into the Kurdish majority neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo, which resulted in the forced displacements of over 100,000 civilians. This culminated with government forces capturing large parts of the provinces of Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, following the withdrawal of the SDF.
Damascus’ military offensive in Aleppo, as well as other SDF-controlled areas, took place after the expiration of the 31 December 2025 deadline stipulated in the 10 March 2025 agreement. Brokered by Washington between the interim Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, the agreement sought to integrate both civilian and military wings of the SDF into the state. However, the political deadlock remained.
What’s more, the military escalation took place just two days after a meeting in Damascus between the Syrian authorities and the SDF, which had US military personnel in attendance.
It’s clear that during the ongoing negotiations, the Syrian authorities were developing a plan to first launch a military operation in Aleppo, and then extend it to other SDF controlled areas. They rallied various Arab tribes – which have been in contact with al-Sharaa for some time now – in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa in order to prepare a general offensive against the SDF.
This was all done with the support of Turkey, as well as a green light from Washington.
Uncertainty
The initial 18 January ceasefire and 14-point agreement, provided for the entry of Syrian armed forces into the northeast of the country and the integration of the SDF into the national army. Nevertheless, this did not stop government military escalation.
A new agreement was settled on Tuesday 20 January. Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) announced that Syrian government armed forces will not enter the centres of the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli. They will remain on the outskirts. Damascus also stated that Syrian military forces will not enter Kurdish villages, and that no armed forces will be present in those villages other than local security forces drawn from the residents of the area.
In addition, according to SANA, Abdi is expected to "propose a candidate from the SDF for the position of Deputy defence minister, as well as a candidate for Hasaka governor, names for parliamentary representation, and a list of individuals for employment within Syrian state institutions." However, many uncertainties remain regarding the viability of this agreements and its implementation.
At the same time, the situation in the notorious al-Hol camp in Hasaka – which houses families and affiliates of the Islamic State (ISIS) – is generating genuine fear, with alarming reports regarding the escape of hundreds of ISIS members.
Foreign support
Whilst the US (along with France) had officially been working to de-escalate tensions between the two actors, and despite being the SDF’s long-standing partner in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), Washington has not imposed any meaningful pressure to stop the Syrian government’s military actions.
In fact, the US has become an important supporter of the new ruling authorities, as evidenced by the multiple meetings between Trump and al-Sharaa, as well as the removal of Caesar sanctions in December 2025.
Clashes escalate between Syrian forces and SDF, forcing civilians to flee
On its side, Ankara has been pressuring the SDF to dissolve and integrate into the Syrian army. It is worth noting that Turkey considers the group an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as a terrorist organisation. Turkish officials have reiterated, on multiple occasions, since the beginning of the Syrian government’s military offensive that it is willing to fight Syrian Kurdish-led forces alongside the Syrian Army.
Turkey also shelled areas of Qamishli last night, and it is widely believed it provided significant logistic assistance in the latest military operations.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has become one of the most important regional players in Syria, particularly in the north of the country. By supporting the Syrian authorities dominated by Hay’at Tahrir Sham (HTS), Ankara has consolidated its influence over the country.
Other than pushing for the return of Syrian refugees and seeking to profit from the economic opportunities offered by reconstruction, Turkey’s main objective is to deny Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, perceived as a national security threat, and dismantling the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
Weaknesses
In just a few days, the Syrian ruling authorities captured two-thirds of the territories held by the SDF. Beyond the immediate geo-strategic aspects, this rapid advance also demonstrates the limitations of the AANES’ political project amongst non-Kurdish populations, especially Arabs. Over the years, sections of the Arab population have protested against discrimination, targeted ‘security’ practices, and imprisonment of activists, as well as lack of real representation within AANES institutions.
Instead of trying to develop strategies to win consent of Arab popular classes in the areas under their control, SDF leaders have instead collaborated with tribal leaders in order to manage the local populations. However, these tribal leaders are known for changing their loyalty according to the who the most powerful political actors of the moment are, and focusing on defending their own material interests. As the balance of forces have progressively shifted in the favour of Damascus, the tribal leaders followed suit.
Furthermore, the SDF’s leadership misplaced confidence regarding continued US support, as well as their lack of interest in building wider and deeper political alliances with the country’s democratic and progressive forces, weakened the sustainability of the SDF’s political project.
Ultimately, the recent military offensive by the government’s armed forces should be read as part of the continued attempt by current Syrian ruling elites to centralise power and its rejection of a more inclusive path for Syria’s future.
This has been the case since Assad’s fall. In the months that followed, significant human rights violations were committed under al-Sharaa’s leadership, notably the massacres of Alawite and Druze populations on the coast and in Sweida. Alongside these attacks, the ruling authorities have also sought to curb democratic rights and freedoms.
Furthermore, the ruling authorities and their supporters are accused of entertaining an aggressive discourse against Kurds and the SDF, with allegations of significant racism and human rights violations committed by government forces and affiliated armed groups.
For example, Syria’s Minister of Endowments, Mohammad Abu al-Khair Shukri, issued a religious directive urging mosques across the country to celebrate what he described as “conquests and victories” by Damascus-aligned forces in eastern Syria, and to pray for the success of the Syrian Arab Army’s soldiers.
Furthermore, by specifically encouraging the mention of verse six of Surah al-Anfal from the Holy Quran, it suggests that he intended to make a reference to the 1988 Anfal military campaign. This was carried out by Saddam Hussein against Kurds in today’s Kurdistan Iraq, which was marked by chemical attacks, mass killings, and widespread destruction.
Despite this concerning context, regional and international rulers have continued to support the Syrian ruling authorities, legitimising and strengthening their power over the country.
Therefore, despite al-Sharaa granting linguistic, cultural, and citizenship rights to the Kurdish population in Syria, as well as official positions within the state, legitimate fears remain.
A top priority now for progressive and democratic forces in Syria is to stop the bloodbath, allowing for the safe return of displaced civilians, and struggling against hate speech and sectarian practices in the country. Syria’s future is at stake. Indeed, the new ruling authorities have shown that their plans are not a radical rupture with the authoritarian practices of the former regime.
No plans for democratic and inclusive political representation and sharing of power are currently provided by Damascus. All Syrians seeking democracy, social justice and equality should be worried about these dynamics, and should struggle against them with all their might.
21 January 2026
Source: The New Arab.
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Footnotes
[1] Photo: Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa sighned a ceasefire agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on January 18, 2026. [GETTY
Joseph Daherr is a Swiss-Syrian academic and activist. He is the author of Syria After the Uprising: The Political Economy of State Resilience (Pluto, 2019) and Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (Pluto, 2016), and founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He is also co-founder of the Alliance of Middle Eastern and North African Socialists.
Kurdistan
Rojava: Political Autonomy, Social Bases, and Imperial Dynamics
Tuesday 27 January 2026, by Foti Benlisoy
The rapid advance in northeastern Syria of military forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional administration, resulting in their seizure of the large, predominantly Arab parts of the territory previously under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), undoubtedly constitutes a profoundly destabilizing development in terms of the region’s geopolitical balance. [1] At the time of writing, it was not yet clear whether forces loyal to the Damascus government would continue their advance into areas densely populated by Kurds, nor whether the declared ceasefire would once again be violated.
In such a scenario, an escalation of fighting and the re-emergence of attempts at massacres targeting civilians–similar to those previously witnessed along the coast and in Suwayda–cannot be ruled out. In the face of this possibility, which must not be underestimated, it is an unavoidable duty to engage in active solidarity with the Kurdish people, to demand an end to the operations carried out by forces affiliated with Damascus, and to stand firmly alongside the Kurds’ democratic national demands.
These developments, which radically transform the military and political balance of power in the country and effectively bring the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria to an end, clearly amount to a serious defeat for the SDF. The SDF no longer enjoys the advantages that once derived, in negotiations with Damascus, from controlling roughly one third of the country’s territory. It is evident that the Sharaa administration, backed by the United States, will seek to establish a centralized system of governance, pushing the Kurds–at best–into the position of a minority granted certain cultural rights on an individual basis. The presidential decree issued on 17 January, which recognizes some aspects of Kurdish identity rights, makes clear that the Kurdish question in Syria is not being approached as an issue of self-government or self-determination, but rather as a minority rights problem. However, it should not be overlooked that the Sharaa administration–one that can hardly be said to embrace cultural and political pluralism as a guiding principle–has in practice contributed to the emergence of an aggressive, anti-Kurdish racist climate in the country, one that could very well lay the groundwork for a comprehensive assault on the Kurdish population.
Bourgeois Geostrategy and Revolutionary Politics
The defeat experienced here does not signify the end of Kurdish national demands, but rather the end of the Rojava experience–or, more precisely, of the experiment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. That an autonomous region once promoted as an alternative model for all of Syria should be effectively dismantled within a matter of days has sparked–and will rightly continue to spark–intense debate, both in Syria and across the region, regarding the geopolitical transformations such an outcome may trigger, as well as the extent to which regional and international powers shaped this result. The roles played by Turkey and the United States in facilitating Sharaa’s military operations, Israel’s pursuit of accommodation with the Sharaa administration that rendered this offensive possible, and the implications of these developments in northeastern Syria for other parts of the country–such as Suwayda–are all critical points of discussion.
Yet to leave the debate at this level–that is, to consign the defeat in Rojava to the exclusive domain of regional studies specialists, international relations experts, and military analysts–would be a grave mistake. Reducing the political and social developments of the region commonly referred to as the “Middle East,” a term coined by the British Foreign Office, to questions of geopolitics and geostrategy is a widespread and dangerous error. To interpret every development in the region as nothing more than a chessboard on which great powers and regional actors measure their respective power and interests is, from the outset, to exclude an entire geography from the field of radical or revolutionary politics.
In her article entitled “Social Democracy and The National Struggles in Turkey” published in 1896, Rosa Luxemburg pointed precisely to this problem:
In the party press, we all too often encounter the attempt to represent the events in Turkey (that is, in the Ottoman Empire – ed.) as a pure product of the play of diplomatic intrigue (…). What is above all striking about this position is that it is in no way fundamentally different from the bourgeois standpoint. In both cases, we have the reduction of great social phenomena to various ‘agents’, that is, to the deliberate actions of the diplomatic offices. On the part of bourgeois politicians, such points of view are, of course, not surprising: these people actually make history in this sphere, and hence the thinnest thread of a diplomatic intrigue has great practical importance for the position they take with regard to short-term interests. But for Social Democracy, which at the present time merely elucidates events in the international sphere, and which is above all concerned to trace back the phenomena of public life to deeper-lying material causes, the same policy appears to be completely futile. On the contrary, in foreign policy as in domestic politics, Social Democracy can adopt its own position, which in both spheres must be determined by the same standpoints, namely by the internal social conditions of the phenomenon in question, and by our general principles. [2]
From this standpoint, it is essential, when considering developments in Syria, not to limit ourselves to purely geopolitical debates but also to draw political lessons from this sudden transformation. For Rojava has been one of the most important experiences of this century for the international left. Like every major emancipatory movement, this experience must be assessed primarily on the basis of its concrete political and social practice. That, under the extremely harsh conditions of the Syrian civil war, an attempt was made–by reference to the idea of democratic confederalism–to establish a communalist, self-governing, and gender-egalitarian order, and that this experiment is now facing a serious retreat, constitutes a challenge that the radical and revolutionary left must confront.
Imperialism and resistance
The initial reaction of the international left to developments in Rojava was outrage at what was perceived as the United States’ betrayal of the Kurds. Rightly regarded as yet another example of imperialist hypocrisy, this development was often accompanied by a highly didactic, “we told you so” critique, asserting that the Kurdish movement should never have relied on U.S. support in the first place. Tariq Ali’s tweet, “Since 2001, some of us have pleaded with Kurdish leaders not to fall into the illusion that by collaborating with the United States they would be serving their own interests,”is a typical expression of this approach.
Whatever justified elements such a critique may contain, when advanced on its own and when it disregards the concrete conflicts and contradictions confronting the Kurdish movement, it risks reproducing the arguments of Turkish, Arab, and Persian nationalisms, which have long claimed that Kurdish national aspirations have, from past to present, almost always been nothing more than an instrument of imperialism.
Yet to question–in the name of an anti-imperialist political correctness–the fact that, a decade ago, the Kurdish movement, engaged in a life-and-death struggle against ISIS, received support and assistance from the United States, or even to present this support as the cause of today’s retreat, is akin to questioning the British support received by Yugoslav and Greek partisans in their resistance against the Nazis. At that time, the Kurdish movement was compelled, to borrow a metaphor used by Lenin in another context, to reach a compromise with imperialist “bandits” in order to “save its skin.” [3]
However, the struggle against ISIS and the Kurdish movement’s incorporation into the international anti-ISIS coalition produced, under the conditions of the Syrian civil war, a highly fragile and sui generis new geostrategic reality. U.S. support enabled the Kurdish movement–that is, the YPG/YPJ forces–to gain control over a vast territory far beyond the areas inhabited by Kurds. This represented a major opportunity for the movement, but it also brought with it enormous problems. The Kurdish movement found itself confronted with what is known as “overstretching,” that is, an expansion beyond its political and military capacities.
The way to mitigate, as far as possible, the pathologies created by the fact of de facto controlling nearly one third of the country with a limited social base lay in broadening the movement’s social foundations. This could only be achieved if the program implemented in these newly acquired territories found a concrete resonance among the local population, if it succeeded in mobilizing at least part of that population and binding it to the new order.
From Mobilization to Diplomacy
The creation of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces was meant to respond precisely to this need: winning over the Arab population living in the territories liberated from ISIS. The claim was that the system of “democratic confederalism,” shaped through institutions of “democratic autonomy,” would constitute, across this vast geography in which Kurds are a minority, an alternative form of governance capable of serving as a model for the entire country. However, for this claim to become reality–and thus for the active consent of the Arab majority in these territories to be secured–this model would have needed to produce tangible transformations in the daily lives of the population, generate concrete gains, and offer a future horizon worth struggling for.
The rapid disintegration witnessed in the Arab-inhabited areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the hasty retreat of SDF forces, compelled to withdraw abruptly in the face of what amounted to an uprising by the Arab population in the territories they controlled, demonstrate that this was not the case. They show that the autonomous administration lacked real foundations in Arab regions. This situation is often attributed to the shifting allegiances of Arab tribes in the region, but this explanation requires closer examination. Essentialist “explanations” that present Arab tribes’ sympathy for the Sharaa administration as a “natural” and immutable demographic fact rooted simply in their Arab identity, or that claim these communities are structurally incapable of sympathizing with political orientations such as democratic autonomy–supposedly specific to the revolutionary left–are merely manifestations of a new orientalist approach that reduces regional politics to an endless struggle among sects, clans, and tribes.
All of these debates about tribes constitute an indirect indicator of the extent to which the SDF prioritized compromises with tribal leaderships over political and economic measures aimed at empowering workers and the oppressed in the region and mobilizing them within the framework of democratic confederalism. The strategy of governing local Arab communities through agreements with tribal leaders and by granting them positions collapsed as soon as the balance of power shifted. Joseph Daher summarized this situation in a recent article as follows:
Instead of developing strategies capable of winning the consent of Arab working classes in the areas under their control, the SDF leadership opted to cooperate with tribal leaders in order to govern the local population. Yet these tribal leaders are known for shifting their allegiance according to the most powerful political actors of the moment and for prioritizing their own material interests. As power relations increasingly shifted in favor of Damascus, tribal leaders positioned themselves accordingly.[[Joseph Daher, “Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?”].]
Because the SDF was unable to broaden its social base, its capacity to govern large parts of Syria became increasingly dependent on the diplomatic and military support provided by the United States. In order to ensure the survival of the autonomous administration, a political approach that prioritized diplomacy over social mobilization came to dominate. The consequences of this pragmatic relationship of dependence are now plain to see. With the shift in U.S. policy on Syria, it quickly became evident how fragile the foundations of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria were. At this point, however, what must be discussed is not abstract moral conclusions about the inevitable problems of dependency created by the support of one imperialist power or another. We already know that imperialist powers cannot be the friends of any people or any liberation struggle.
The crucial issue lies in the conditions that led to the deepening of this relationship of dependence. ISIS attacks, the deepening of ethnic and sectarian fault lines by the civil war, and especially Turkey’s hostile stance were factors that had already significantly narrowed the SDF’s room for maneuver over the past decade. Under these conditions, the sustainability of this atypical situation of territorial dual power that emerged from the struggle against ISIS could only have been possible through local organs of power rooted in popular demands, capable of mobilizing the population–or at least a significant part of it. Despite the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s claims to the contrary, it is possible to say that it failed to achieve this in Arab-majority areas and was unable to render effective the institutions of democratic autonomy that might have expanded its social base. The retreat and disintegration now underway, which must be understood not only as military events but also as social phenomena, stem from this political weakness.
A Practical Internationalism
In the age of multipolar imperialism, we will clearly encounter ever more frequent examples of major social struggles, uprisings, and revolutionary initiatives being instrumentalized, “hijacked,” or betrayed by international and regional powers. Drawing the correct lessons from the Rojava experience is therefore essential. If internationalism is to cease being an abstract moral stance and acquire a practical character, we must confront the complex problems that Rojava has brought to the fore. Standing up to the pressure created by imperialist powers’ attempts to distort, appropriate, and absorb liberation struggles will not be possible by retreating behind abstract principles, but only through the construction of practices, organs, and institutions capable of enabling and sustaining social and political mobilization from below.
Debating the lessons of the experience of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria should not take precedence over our duty of solidarity; on the contrary, it should complement it. Today, solidarity with the Kurds of Syria who are under siege is not merely a moral duty, but a political necessity: as long as the Kurds – a people fragmented and subordinated following the imperialist partition after the First World War – are unable to exercise their right to self-determination and to secure their democratic national rights, the emergence of a progressive alternative in the region will remain an illusion. It is precisely for this reason that we need a practical internationalism that sees the Kurds’ struggle against this multidimensional oppression as inseparable from the resistance against Zionism in Palestine and from the uprising against the regime in Iran, and that understands all of these struggles as different–if contradictory–moments and stations of the same fight.
26 January 2026
Translated from Turkish by the Imdat Freni (Emergency Brake) Translation Collective.
Attached documentsrojava-political-autonomy-social-bases-and-imperial_a9384.pdf (PDF - 1012.1 KiB)
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Footnotes
[1] Photo: A man waves a Syrian flag while a group of civilians destroy a statue of an SDF fighter in the city of Tabqa after the Syrian army took control of it, in Tabqa, Syria, on 18 January 2026. © Photo Reuters
[2] Article first published on 8, 9, and 10 October 1896 in the Sächsische Arbeiter-Zeitung, the press organ of the German Social Democrats in Dresden.
[3] Lenin, “Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder”.
Foti Benlisoy is a revolutionary Marxist activist from Turkey. His articles and books mainly focus on Marxism, ecology, and racism.
Thursday 29 January 2026, by Gilbert Achcar
Recent developments in northern Syria – particularly east of the Euphrates – carry grave implications for both the Kurdish condition and the broader Syrian situation. Let us examine these implications, beginning with the Kurdish issue.
The Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria now finds itself in a critical predicament, having lost a substantial portion of the territory it hitherto controlled. These losses include predominantly Kurdish enclaves located within largely Arab regions, such as Aleppo, as well as predominantly Arab areas east of the Euphrates, notably Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The principal cause of this setback lies in the Trump administration’s abandonment of the alliance Washington had forged more than a decade ago with Syria’s Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS. Tom Barrack, the Trump administration’s local representative, cynically declared that the usefulness of these Kurdish forces to Washington has “largely expired.”
Once again, the Kurdish national movement is paying the price for its reliance on an ally whose unreliability is historically well established. In the early 1970s, the Kurdish movement in northern Iraq, led by the Barzani family, wagered on the support of the Shah of Iran against the Baathist regime. That gamble ended in disaster when the Shah stabbed the movement in the back after securing his own objectives through a deal with Baghdad. Having used the Kurdish movement as a card in his confrontation with Iraq, he got rid of it once his goals were achieved. Since the 1990s, the Barzani family has allied itself with yet another bitter enemy of the Kurdish people: the Turkish state. They will not support the forces led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northeastern Syria against Turkey and its allies, just as they do not support Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces in northern Iraq in the face of repeated Turkish incursions. Instead, they seek to extend their influence into northern Syria with Ankara’s approval.
The PYD, for its part, is also reaping the consequences of the contradiction between its proclaimed principles and its actual practices. Although the party claims adherence to the anarchist ideas espoused by the leader of the PKK in the Turkish prison where he is detained, and subsequently adopted by his organization, it failed to establish genuine democratic self-rule in the Arab-majority areas it seized with US backing east of the Euphrates. Rather than empowering local communities, it imposed its authority in a manner widely perceived by the Arab population as Kurdish nationalist domination. This explains the rapid collapse of PYD-affiliated forces in those regions: local Arab tribes preferred to reintegrate into the Syrian state under the new Damascus regime, particularly as Washington shifted its support away from the Kurdish movement and toward the Syrian government. Had the Arab majorities in these regions experienced authentic democratic self-governance, they would undoubtedly have been willing to defend it against any attempt by a Damascus-based regime to dismantle it in order to reimpose centralized authority.
Turning to the Syrian situation more broadly, any observer of recent events cannot fail to notice the striking contrast between the new Syrian regime’s posture toward Kurdish-controlled areas in the north and its stance toward the Israeli occupation and the Druze-majority region bordering the occupied Golan Heights in the south. This contrast evokes the slogan raised by the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement in 1976, following the brutal intervention of Hafez al-Assad’s regime to suppress them and extend Damascus’s control over Lebanon with Washington’s approval: “A lion [asad in Arabic] in Lebanon and a rabbit in the Golan.” A similar characterization aptly describes the behaviour of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime, which acts like a lion against the Kurds in the north while accommodating the Zionist state – going so far as to conclude security arrangements with it – despite its occupation of a strategic portion of Syrian territory for nearly half a century.
Whatever may be said about the undemocratic policies pursued by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in its drive to consolidate control over Syrian state territory – policies discussed previously (see “Syria: Fishing in Troubled Waters”, 6 May 2025) – a fundamental distinction nonetheless exists from the standpoint of the new regime’s interests between, on the one hand, extending its authority over the predominantly Arab areas east of the Euphrates, along with their oil fields, which represent a vital source of revenue for the Syrian state, and on the other hand, the continuation of its campaign against Kurdish-majority regions in the north, despite the high potential cost in lives and resources such a campaign entails, and although it offers no meaningful benefit to the new regime in Damascus.
This raises an obvious question: why is HTS pursuing a battle it does not need, at a time when it faces far more pressing political and economic priorities – priorities that serve its own interests, let alone the country’s? The answer lies plainly in the interests of the Turkish state. Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria constitutes a Turkish concern, rooted in its connection to the Kurdish national liberation movement that challenges the Turkish state itself from within. It is not, nor should it be, a Syrian concern. The involvement of the new Damascus regime in this conflict is simply another manifestation of its subservience to the Turkey-US alliance, just as the Assad regime was subordinate to the Iran-Russia axis. The principal beneficiary of this entire dynamic remains the Zionist government, whose regional power has been strengthened to an unprecedented extent.
27 January 2026
Translated for the author’s blog from the Arabic original published in Al-Quds al-Arabi on 27 January 2026. Feel free to republish or to publish in other languages, with mention of the source.
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Syria
Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?
Rojava: Political Autonomy, Social Bases, and Imperial Dynamics
Why Syria needs better governance...and a new kind of opposition
Syria’s future won’t be secure through Israel normalisation
Suweida Under Fire: The Consolidation of Power in Damascus, and Sectarianism
Kurdistan
Türkiye: From the Kurdish movement to mass mobilizations
Dissolution of the PKK and new perspectives
Kurdistan/Turkey: A Newroz of hope against a backdrop of coup d’état
Türkiye: Political Crisis and Democratic Movement
Kurdistan: ‘Turkey must choose between the status quo, endless war and peace with the Kurds’.
Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon. He is currently Professor of Development Studies and International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. A regular and historical contributor to the press of the Fourth International, his books include The Clash of Barbarisms. The Making of the New World Disorder (2006), The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives (2012), The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (2022). His most recent books are The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China, from Kosovo to Ukraine (2023) and the collection of articles Israel’s War on Gaza (2023). His next book, Gaza, A Genocide Foretold, will come out in 2025. He is a member of AntiCapitalist Resistance in Britain.
Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?
Wednesday 28 January 2026, by Joseph Daher
Despite Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), agreeing on another ceasefire on Tuesday, infighting and tensions in the country continue. [1]]
The SDF have called on a general mobilisation of Kurds to defend their territories amidst the government’s military offensives that seek to consolidate their power in Syria.
Weeks of clashes saw government armed forces advance into the Kurdish majority neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo, which resulted in the forced displacements of over 100,000 civilians. This culminated with government forces capturing large parts of the provinces of Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, following the withdrawal of the SDF.
Damascus’ military offensive in Aleppo, as well as other SDF-controlled areas, took place after the expiration of the 31 December 2025 deadline stipulated in the 10 March 2025 agreement. Brokered by Washington between the interim Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, the agreement sought to integrate both civilian and military wings of the SDF into the state. However, the political deadlock remained.
What’s more, the military escalation took place just two days after a meeting in Damascus between the Syrian authorities and the SDF, which had US military personnel in attendance.
It’s clear that during the ongoing negotiations, the Syrian authorities were developing a plan to first launch a military operation in Aleppo, and then extend it to other SDF controlled areas. They rallied various Arab tribes – which have been in contact with al-Sharaa for some time now – in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa in order to prepare a general offensive against the SDF.
This was all done with the support of Turkey, as well as a green light from Washington.
Uncertainty
The initial 18 January ceasefire and 14-point agreement, provided for the entry of Syrian armed forces into the northeast of the country and the integration of the SDF into the national army. Nevertheless, this did not stop government military escalation.
A new agreement was settled on Tuesday 20 January. Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) announced that Syrian government armed forces will not enter the centres of the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli. They will remain on the outskirts. Damascus also stated that Syrian military forces will not enter Kurdish villages, and that no armed forces will be present in those villages other than local security forces drawn from the residents of the area.
In addition, according to SANA, Abdi is expected to "propose a candidate from the SDF for the position of Deputy defence minister, as well as a candidate for Hasaka governor, names for parliamentary representation, and a list of individuals for employment within Syrian state institutions." However, many uncertainties remain regarding the viability of this agreements and its implementation.
At the same time, the situation in the notorious al-Hol camp in Hasaka – which houses families and affiliates of the Islamic State (ISIS) – is generating genuine fear, with alarming reports regarding the escape of hundreds of ISIS members.
Foreign support
Whilst the US (along with France) had officially been working to de-escalate tensions between the two actors, and despite being the SDF’s long-standing partner in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), Washington has not imposed any meaningful pressure to stop the Syrian government’s military actions.
In fact, the US has become an important supporter of the new ruling authorities, as evidenced by the multiple meetings between Trump and al-Sharaa, as well as the removal of Caesar sanctions in December 2025.
Clashes escalate between Syrian forces and SDF, forcing civilians to flee
On its side, Ankara has been pressuring the SDF to dissolve and integrate into the Syrian army. It is worth noting that Turkey considers the group an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as a terrorist organisation. Turkish officials have reiterated, on multiple occasions, since the beginning of the Syrian government’s military offensive that it is willing to fight Syrian Kurdish-led forces alongside the Syrian Army.
Turkey also shelled areas of Qamishli last night, and it is widely believed it provided significant logistic assistance in the latest military operations.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has become one of the most important regional players in Syria, particularly in the north of the country. By supporting the Syrian authorities dominated by Hay’at Tahrir Sham (HTS), Ankara has consolidated its influence over the country.
Other than pushing for the return of Syrian refugees and seeking to profit from the economic opportunities offered by reconstruction, Turkey’s main objective is to deny Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, perceived as a national security threat, and dismantling the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
Weaknesses
In just a few days, the Syrian ruling authorities captured two-thirds of the territories held by the SDF. Beyond the immediate geo-strategic aspects, this rapid advance also demonstrates the limitations of the AANES’ political project amongst non-Kurdish populations, especially Arabs. Over the years, sections of the Arab population have protested against discrimination, targeted ‘security’ practices, and imprisonment of activists, as well as lack of real representation within AANES institutions.
Instead of trying to develop strategies to win consent of Arab popular classes in the areas under their control, SDF leaders have instead collaborated with tribal leaders in order to manage the local populations. However, these tribal leaders are known for changing their loyalty according to the who the most powerful political actors of the moment are, and focusing on defending their own material interests. As the balance of forces have progressively shifted in the favour of Damascus, the tribal leaders followed suit.
Furthermore, the SDF’s leadership misplaced confidence regarding continued US support, as well as their lack of interest in building wider and deeper political alliances with the country’s democratic and progressive forces, weakened the sustainability of the SDF’s political project.
Ultimately, the recent military offensive by the government’s armed forces should be read as part of the continued attempt by current Syrian ruling elites to centralise power and its rejection of a more inclusive path for Syria’s future.
This has been the case since Assad’s fall. In the months that followed, significant human rights violations were committed under al-Sharaa’s leadership, notably the massacres of Alawite and Druze populations on the coast and in Sweida. Alongside these attacks, the ruling authorities have also sought to curb democratic rights and freedoms.
Furthermore, the ruling authorities and their supporters are accused of entertaining an aggressive discourse against Kurds and the SDF, with allegations of significant racism and human rights violations committed by government forces and affiliated armed groups.
For example, Syria’s Minister of Endowments, Mohammad Abu al-Khair Shukri, issued a religious directive urging mosques across the country to celebrate what he described as “conquests and victories” by Damascus-aligned forces in eastern Syria, and to pray for the success of the Syrian Arab Army’s soldiers.
Furthermore, by specifically encouraging the mention of verse six of Surah al-Anfal from the Holy Quran, it suggests that he intended to make a reference to the 1988 Anfal military campaign. This was carried out by Saddam Hussein against Kurds in today’s Kurdistan Iraq, which was marked by chemical attacks, mass killings, and widespread destruction.
Despite this concerning context, regional and international rulers have continued to support the Syrian ruling authorities, legitimising and strengthening their power over the country.
Therefore, despite al-Sharaa granting linguistic, cultural, and citizenship rights to the Kurdish population in Syria, as well as official positions within the state, legitimate fears remain.
A top priority now for progressive and democratic forces in Syria is to stop the bloodbath, allowing for the safe return of displaced civilians, and struggling against hate speech and sectarian practices in the country. Syria’s future is at stake. Indeed, the new ruling authorities have shown that their plans are not a radical rupture with the authoritarian practices of the former regime.
No plans for democratic and inclusive political representation and sharing of power are currently provided by Damascus. All Syrians seeking democracy, social justice and equality should be worried about these dynamics, and should struggle against them with all their might.
21 January 2026
Source: The New Arab.
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Footnotes
[1] Photo: Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa sighned a ceasefire agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on January 18, 2026. [GETTY
Joseph Daherr is a Swiss-Syrian academic and activist. He is the author of Syria After the Uprising: The Political Economy of State Resilience (Pluto, 2019) and Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (Pluto, 2016), and founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He is also co-founder of the Alliance of Middle Eastern and North African Socialists.
Kurdistan
Rojava: Political Autonomy, Social Bases, and Imperial Dynamics
Tuesday 27 January 2026, by Foti Benlisoy
The rapid advance in northeastern Syria of military forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional administration, resulting in their seizure of the large, predominantly Arab parts of the territory previously under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), undoubtedly constitutes a profoundly destabilizing development in terms of the region’s geopolitical balance. [1] At the time of writing, it was not yet clear whether forces loyal to the Damascus government would continue their advance into areas densely populated by Kurds, nor whether the declared ceasefire would once again be violated.
In such a scenario, an escalation of fighting and the re-emergence of attempts at massacres targeting civilians–similar to those previously witnessed along the coast and in Suwayda–cannot be ruled out. In the face of this possibility, which must not be underestimated, it is an unavoidable duty to engage in active solidarity with the Kurdish people, to demand an end to the operations carried out by forces affiliated with Damascus, and to stand firmly alongside the Kurds’ democratic national demands.
These developments, which radically transform the military and political balance of power in the country and effectively bring the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria to an end, clearly amount to a serious defeat for the SDF. The SDF no longer enjoys the advantages that once derived, in negotiations with Damascus, from controlling roughly one third of the country’s territory. It is evident that the Sharaa administration, backed by the United States, will seek to establish a centralized system of governance, pushing the Kurds–at best–into the position of a minority granted certain cultural rights on an individual basis. The presidential decree issued on 17 January, which recognizes some aspects of Kurdish identity rights, makes clear that the Kurdish question in Syria is not being approached as an issue of self-government or self-determination, but rather as a minority rights problem. However, it should not be overlooked that the Sharaa administration–one that can hardly be said to embrace cultural and political pluralism as a guiding principle–has in practice contributed to the emergence of an aggressive, anti-Kurdish racist climate in the country, one that could very well lay the groundwork for a comprehensive assault on the Kurdish population.
Bourgeois Geostrategy and Revolutionary Politics
The defeat experienced here does not signify the end of Kurdish national demands, but rather the end of the Rojava experience–or, more precisely, of the experiment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. That an autonomous region once promoted as an alternative model for all of Syria should be effectively dismantled within a matter of days has sparked–and will rightly continue to spark–intense debate, both in Syria and across the region, regarding the geopolitical transformations such an outcome may trigger, as well as the extent to which regional and international powers shaped this result. The roles played by Turkey and the United States in facilitating Sharaa’s military operations, Israel’s pursuit of accommodation with the Sharaa administration that rendered this offensive possible, and the implications of these developments in northeastern Syria for other parts of the country–such as Suwayda–are all critical points of discussion.
Yet to leave the debate at this level–that is, to consign the defeat in Rojava to the exclusive domain of regional studies specialists, international relations experts, and military analysts–would be a grave mistake. Reducing the political and social developments of the region commonly referred to as the “Middle East,” a term coined by the British Foreign Office, to questions of geopolitics and geostrategy is a widespread and dangerous error. To interpret every development in the region as nothing more than a chessboard on which great powers and regional actors measure their respective power and interests is, from the outset, to exclude an entire geography from the field of radical or revolutionary politics.
In her article entitled “Social Democracy and The National Struggles in Turkey” published in 1896, Rosa Luxemburg pointed precisely to this problem:
In the party press, we all too often encounter the attempt to represent the events in Turkey (that is, in the Ottoman Empire – ed.) as a pure product of the play of diplomatic intrigue (…). What is above all striking about this position is that it is in no way fundamentally different from the bourgeois standpoint. In both cases, we have the reduction of great social phenomena to various ‘agents’, that is, to the deliberate actions of the diplomatic offices. On the part of bourgeois politicians, such points of view are, of course, not surprising: these people actually make history in this sphere, and hence the thinnest thread of a diplomatic intrigue has great practical importance for the position they take with regard to short-term interests. But for Social Democracy, which at the present time merely elucidates events in the international sphere, and which is above all concerned to trace back the phenomena of public life to deeper-lying material causes, the same policy appears to be completely futile. On the contrary, in foreign policy as in domestic politics, Social Democracy can adopt its own position, which in both spheres must be determined by the same standpoints, namely by the internal social conditions of the phenomenon in question, and by our general principles. [2]
From this standpoint, it is essential, when considering developments in Syria, not to limit ourselves to purely geopolitical debates but also to draw political lessons from this sudden transformation. For Rojava has been one of the most important experiences of this century for the international left. Like every major emancipatory movement, this experience must be assessed primarily on the basis of its concrete political and social practice. That, under the extremely harsh conditions of the Syrian civil war, an attempt was made–by reference to the idea of democratic confederalism–to establish a communalist, self-governing, and gender-egalitarian order, and that this experiment is now facing a serious retreat, constitutes a challenge that the radical and revolutionary left must confront.
Imperialism and resistance
The initial reaction of the international left to developments in Rojava was outrage at what was perceived as the United States’ betrayal of the Kurds. Rightly regarded as yet another example of imperialist hypocrisy, this development was often accompanied by a highly didactic, “we told you so” critique, asserting that the Kurdish movement should never have relied on U.S. support in the first place. Tariq Ali’s tweet, “Since 2001, some of us have pleaded with Kurdish leaders not to fall into the illusion that by collaborating with the United States they would be serving their own interests,”is a typical expression of this approach.
Whatever justified elements such a critique may contain, when advanced on its own and when it disregards the concrete conflicts and contradictions confronting the Kurdish movement, it risks reproducing the arguments of Turkish, Arab, and Persian nationalisms, which have long claimed that Kurdish national aspirations have, from past to present, almost always been nothing more than an instrument of imperialism.
Yet to question–in the name of an anti-imperialist political correctness–the fact that, a decade ago, the Kurdish movement, engaged in a life-and-death struggle against ISIS, received support and assistance from the United States, or even to present this support as the cause of today’s retreat, is akin to questioning the British support received by Yugoslav and Greek partisans in their resistance against the Nazis. At that time, the Kurdish movement was compelled, to borrow a metaphor used by Lenin in another context, to reach a compromise with imperialist “bandits” in order to “save its skin.” [3]
However, the struggle against ISIS and the Kurdish movement’s incorporation into the international anti-ISIS coalition produced, under the conditions of the Syrian civil war, a highly fragile and sui generis new geostrategic reality. U.S. support enabled the Kurdish movement–that is, the YPG/YPJ forces–to gain control over a vast territory far beyond the areas inhabited by Kurds. This represented a major opportunity for the movement, but it also brought with it enormous problems. The Kurdish movement found itself confronted with what is known as “overstretching,” that is, an expansion beyond its political and military capacities.
The way to mitigate, as far as possible, the pathologies created by the fact of de facto controlling nearly one third of the country with a limited social base lay in broadening the movement’s social foundations. This could only be achieved if the program implemented in these newly acquired territories found a concrete resonance among the local population, if it succeeded in mobilizing at least part of that population and binding it to the new order.
From Mobilization to Diplomacy
The creation of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces was meant to respond precisely to this need: winning over the Arab population living in the territories liberated from ISIS. The claim was that the system of “democratic confederalism,” shaped through institutions of “democratic autonomy,” would constitute, across this vast geography in which Kurds are a minority, an alternative form of governance capable of serving as a model for the entire country. However, for this claim to become reality–and thus for the active consent of the Arab majority in these territories to be secured–this model would have needed to produce tangible transformations in the daily lives of the population, generate concrete gains, and offer a future horizon worth struggling for.
The rapid disintegration witnessed in the Arab-inhabited areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the hasty retreat of SDF forces, compelled to withdraw abruptly in the face of what amounted to an uprising by the Arab population in the territories they controlled, demonstrate that this was not the case. They show that the autonomous administration lacked real foundations in Arab regions. This situation is often attributed to the shifting allegiances of Arab tribes in the region, but this explanation requires closer examination. Essentialist “explanations” that present Arab tribes’ sympathy for the Sharaa administration as a “natural” and immutable demographic fact rooted simply in their Arab identity, or that claim these communities are structurally incapable of sympathizing with political orientations such as democratic autonomy–supposedly specific to the revolutionary left–are merely manifestations of a new orientalist approach that reduces regional politics to an endless struggle among sects, clans, and tribes.
All of these debates about tribes constitute an indirect indicator of the extent to which the SDF prioritized compromises with tribal leaderships over political and economic measures aimed at empowering workers and the oppressed in the region and mobilizing them within the framework of democratic confederalism. The strategy of governing local Arab communities through agreements with tribal leaders and by granting them positions collapsed as soon as the balance of power shifted. Joseph Daher summarized this situation in a recent article as follows:
Instead of developing strategies capable of winning the consent of Arab working classes in the areas under their control, the SDF leadership opted to cooperate with tribal leaders in order to govern the local population. Yet these tribal leaders are known for shifting their allegiance according to the most powerful political actors of the moment and for prioritizing their own material interests. As power relations increasingly shifted in favor of Damascus, tribal leaders positioned themselves accordingly.[[Joseph Daher, “Should Kurdish freedoms be sacrificed for Syria’s centralisation?”].]
Because the SDF was unable to broaden its social base, its capacity to govern large parts of Syria became increasingly dependent on the diplomatic and military support provided by the United States. In order to ensure the survival of the autonomous administration, a political approach that prioritized diplomacy over social mobilization came to dominate. The consequences of this pragmatic relationship of dependence are now plain to see. With the shift in U.S. policy on Syria, it quickly became evident how fragile the foundations of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria were. At this point, however, what must be discussed is not abstract moral conclusions about the inevitable problems of dependency created by the support of one imperialist power or another. We already know that imperialist powers cannot be the friends of any people or any liberation struggle.
The crucial issue lies in the conditions that led to the deepening of this relationship of dependence. ISIS attacks, the deepening of ethnic and sectarian fault lines by the civil war, and especially Turkey’s hostile stance were factors that had already significantly narrowed the SDF’s room for maneuver over the past decade. Under these conditions, the sustainability of this atypical situation of territorial dual power that emerged from the struggle against ISIS could only have been possible through local organs of power rooted in popular demands, capable of mobilizing the population–or at least a significant part of it. Despite the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s claims to the contrary, it is possible to say that it failed to achieve this in Arab-majority areas and was unable to render effective the institutions of democratic autonomy that might have expanded its social base. The retreat and disintegration now underway, which must be understood not only as military events but also as social phenomena, stem from this political weakness.
A Practical Internationalism
In the age of multipolar imperialism, we will clearly encounter ever more frequent examples of major social struggles, uprisings, and revolutionary initiatives being instrumentalized, “hijacked,” or betrayed by international and regional powers. Drawing the correct lessons from the Rojava experience is therefore essential. If internationalism is to cease being an abstract moral stance and acquire a practical character, we must confront the complex problems that Rojava has brought to the fore. Standing up to the pressure created by imperialist powers’ attempts to distort, appropriate, and absorb liberation struggles will not be possible by retreating behind abstract principles, but only through the construction of practices, organs, and institutions capable of enabling and sustaining social and political mobilization from below.
Debating the lessons of the experience of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria should not take precedence over our duty of solidarity; on the contrary, it should complement it. Today, solidarity with the Kurds of Syria who are under siege is not merely a moral duty, but a political necessity: as long as the Kurds – a people fragmented and subordinated following the imperialist partition after the First World War – are unable to exercise their right to self-determination and to secure their democratic national rights, the emergence of a progressive alternative in the region will remain an illusion. It is precisely for this reason that we need a practical internationalism that sees the Kurds’ struggle against this multidimensional oppression as inseparable from the resistance against Zionism in Palestine and from the uprising against the regime in Iran, and that understands all of these struggles as different–if contradictory–moments and stations of the same fight.
26 January 2026
Translated from Turkish by the Imdat Freni (Emergency Brake) Translation Collective.
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Footnotes
[1] Photo: A man waves a Syrian flag while a group of civilians destroy a statue of an SDF fighter in the city of Tabqa after the Syrian army took control of it, in Tabqa, Syria, on 18 January 2026. © Photo Reuters
[2] Article first published on 8, 9, and 10 October 1896 in the Sächsische Arbeiter-Zeitung, the press organ of the German Social Democrats in Dresden.
[3] Lenin, “Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder”.
Foti Benlisoy is a revolutionary Marxist activist from Turkey. His articles and books mainly focus on Marxism, ecology, and racism.
