Eight countries, eight red caps: TIME drops controversial and MAGA-misunderstood cover

Copyright TIME screenshot

By David Mouriquand

Published on 06/03/2026 - EURONEWS

The cover of TIME magazine's 23rd March issue has been unveiled, and it is not only dividing the internet but showing that even some of Trump's MAGA base aren't happy with his interventionist foreign policy.

TIME magazine has never been afraid to ruffle feathers and use its cover as a way to contribute and reflect current affairs, as well as spark debate. Its upcoming issue has done just that, dividing social media and going viral mere hours after its unveiling.

The 23 March issue’s powerful and striking cover features a collection of eight MAGA hats with “America” replaced with the name of nations including Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Syria.

It serves to illustrate the publication’s feature story titled "Trump's War" by Eric Cortellessa, who examines not only the aftermath of the strike that killed Iran's Supreme Leader but also how Donald Trump's MAGA slogan seems to extend to his foreign policy – despite Trump running for reelection as the self-styled “Peace President”.

“Trump promised to end wars, not start them,” reads an extract from the article, which has been circulating online. “Instead, he has deployed military force in increasingly dizzying ways. No other modern American leader has directed assaults in as many countries in such a short span of time.”

As of writing, the TIME post on X featuring the cover has amassed nearly 800K views, with reactions ranging from praise for TIME’s political commentary to outrage given the ongoing war in the Middle East.

Surprisingly (or maybe not?), many Trump supporters seem to have misinterpreted the cover, which comments on the ills of American interventionism.

MAGA supporters online are praising the cover for championing Trump, with one user writing: “Trump delivers. Like him or not, you can’t say this about many other Presidents before him. Kudos to Trump.” Another states that TIME “has certainly come a long way”, while one adds: "I am surprised that THIS is the new cover of TIME Magazine. Even they are recognizing our President Trump as a major consequential historical figure."

One fan even posted a picture of Trump with the caption: “We did not elect him to be nice – we elected him to get the job done.”

Relate

There has been some pushback over the cover being pro-Trump.

One user wrote "I love all of the MAGA Cult members who think TIME is praising him here", while another penned: "I think this is meant to be subversive.. like Trump is more interested in other countries than the actual one he promised to 'make great again'.”

Many also reshared a drawing by Carlos Latuff...

Some criticism even came from his MAGA base, buttressing the results of a new poll from Fox News which shows that more than half (57 per cent) of US citizens disapprove of Trump’s performance in office.

“Trump campaigned on “no new wars” “wanting the dying to stop" and “on day one I will end all foreign wars” - Total and complete betrayal of MAGA and America First. We never changed. Trump did.”

The recent Fox News survey shows the majority of voters are unhappy with Trump’s handling of immigration, foreign policy and the economy. Six in ten said Trump was focused on the wrong issues.

However you choose to interpret TIME’s latest cover, one user managed to sum things up nicely: "Eight countries, eight red caps, zero words needed - Time made the most efficient political argument of the year without writing a single sentence."

Pakistan: Persistent Peril In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – Analysis

A map of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region. Credit: VOA

March 10, 2026
SATP
By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty


On March 7, 2026, three Policemen were killed while 31 people, including five Policemen and 26 civilians, were injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast in the Rustam Bazaar area of Wana tehsil (revenue unit) in the South Waziristan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). According to the Police, the explosion occurred when Policemen on routine patrol were present in the area, around 5 pm. Wana Circle Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Asghar Ali Shah said that the explosive material had been planted at the main entrance of the supermarket and was detonated through a remote control or timed device.

On March 7, two people were killed while seven sustained injuries when a quadcopter drone attacked relatives of the Police peace committee in the Manjiwala area of Lakki Marwat District.

On March 6, one person was killed while 19, including two Security Forces (SFs) personnel, were injured in a suicide attack near the Chashma Pul Check Post on the Bannu-Miranshah main road in the Miranshah tehsil of North Waziristan District. Police disclosed that the blast was caused by the detonation of explosives in a vehicle near the checkpost. The Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB)-linked Aswad-ul-Khurasan claimed responsibility for the suicide attack, adding that the bomber was from the Al-Hamid suicide force.

On March 4, two Government officials were killed when a bomb landed in the Miranshah camp, the administrative headquarters of North Waziristan District.


On March 4, four terrorists including a key ‘commander’ were killed when a deadly clash erupted between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the mountainous area of Ghaljo Narai in Orakzai District. According to local Police, during the exchange of fire, ISKP’s key ‘commander’, Haji Rehman aka Haji Dada, was killed along with three of his associates.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 276 terrorism-related fatalities, including 48 civilians, 71 SF personnel and 157 terrorists, have been reported in the current year, thus far, in KP (data till March 7, 2026). During the corresponding period of 2025, the province recorded 442 fatalities (47 civilians, 83 SF personnel and 312 terrorists).

KP recorded a total of 2,359 fatalities (268 civilians, 455 SF personnel and 1,636 terrorists) in 545 incidents of killing in 2025, as against 1,363 such fatalities (288 civilians, 421 SF personnel, and 654 terrorists) in 487 such incidents in 2024, registering an increase of 73.07 per cent in overall fatalities. On year-on-year basis, overall fatalities have been on a continuous rise since 2020, with an increase from 130 (30 civilians, 69 SF personnel, and 31 terrorists) in 2019 to 216 (61 civilians, 57 SF personnel, and 98 terrorists) in 2020, 301 (72 civilians, 108 SF personnel, and 121 terrorists) in 2021, 527 (119 civilians, 173 SF personnel, and 235 terrorists) in 2022 and further, 941 (205 civilians, 329 SF personnel, and 407 terrorists) in 2023.


Significantly, overall fatalities declined between 2014 and 2019, barring 2018, when they increased to 167, from 129 in 2017. Fatalities had fallen from 946 in 2013 to 607 in 2014, 298 in 2015, and 215 in 2016. Overall fatalities in 2025, at 2,359, broke record of highest fatalities in terrorism-related incidents over the preceding 15 years, since 2009, when 5,883 fatalities were recorded in the province.

Other parameters of violence also underlined the deteriorating security situation in the province in 2025. Fatal terrorism-linked incidents jumped from 702 in 2024 to 766 in 2025, the highest since 2009, when there were 1,432 such incidents. The number of major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) increased from 140 in 2024 to 245 in 2024, the highest since 2009, when there were 341 such incidents; the resultant fatalities in such attacks also increased from 891 in 2024 to 1,913 in 2025. Similarly, KP accounted for an increased number of explosions, from 142 in 2024 to 159 in 2025 (the highest since 2013, when there were 198 such incidents), with the resulting fatalities in such attacks spiking from 207 to 327.

Similarly, the province recorded an increased number of suicide attacks, from 15 in 2024 to 18 in 2025, with resultant fatalities rising from 93 in 2024 to 151 in 2025. In the worst attack, on June 28, 2025, 13 SF personnel were killed when a suicide bomber rammed an explosive laden vehicle into a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle belonging to the Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) in the Khadi Khel area of Mir Ali tehsil in North Waziristan District. At least 24 persons, with 14 civilians – including women and children – sustained injuries. Following the attack, SFs launched a sanitisation operation in the area, killed at least 14 terrorists. The Hafiz Gul Bahadar affiliated Aswad-ul-Harb’s sub-faction, the Huzaifa suicide bombing cell, claimed responsibility for the attack. The Ittehadul Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) umbrella alliance linked to Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) also claimed for the attack.

Despite a year of rampant violence, the territorial footprint of terrorist groups actually diminished across the Province’s districts. Of 40 districts in KP, 24 recorded terrorism-related violence in 2025, as against 28 Districts in 2024, according to the SATP database. Of 40 districts, 22 districts registered terrorism-related incidents in 2023; 16 in 2022; 21 in 2021; and19 districts in 2020.


The most violent district in 2025 was North Waziristan, with 498 fatalities, followed by Dera Ismail Khan (245 fatalities), Bannu (234 fatalities) and South Waziristan (225 fatalities). In 2024 as well, North Waziristan was the most violent district, with 271 fatalities, followed by South Waziristan (163 fatalities), Khyber (137 fatalities) and Kurram (126 fatalities). In 2023, again, North Waziristan was the most violent District, with 151 fatalities, followed by Peshawar (122), Dera Ismail Khan (109) and South Waziristan (107). In 2022, again, North Waziristan District accounted for 177 fatalities, followed by Peshawar (87), Bannu (60) and Dera Ismail Khan (43). In 2021 again, Waziristan recorded the maximum of 106 fatalities, followed by South Waziristan (51), Peshawar (25) and Bajaur (22). In 2020, North Waziristan recorded 110 fatalities, followed by Peshawar (27) and South Waziristan (21).

In 2025, sectarian violence in KP did not increase, while the province had experienced significant escalation in such violence in 2024, particularly due to the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslim groups in Kurram District. Though sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslim groups is not a new phenomenon in Kurram District, the renewed skirmishing in the district, commencing November 21, 2024, took over a hundred lives. Despite curfews and a ceasefire, sporadic violence continued till the end of 2024. The KP Government disclosed, on January 1, 2025, that both warring Shia and Sunni tribes in Kurram Districts finally signed a peace agreement after more than three weeks of efforts to broker a ceasefire.

Despite the peace agreement, the warring groups never entirely ceased their exchanges of fire. On January 16, 2025, 10 persons, including six drivers, two passengers and two soldiers, were killed in an attack on an aid convoy carrying essential goods to the sectarian violence-marred Kurram District, near the Bagan area. Six terrorists were killed in SF retaliation. At least 10 terrorists and four SF personnel also sustained injuries during the clash. Further, on February 17, 2025, nine persons, including five SF personnel, a truck driver, a passer-by and two attackers, were killed, while another 15, including four drivers and one Police officer were injured, when an aid convoy, consisting of 64 vehicles, en-route to Parachinar, were attacked by unidentified terrorists in the Char Khail, Uchit Baghan and Mandori areas. Another major sectarian attack in the District was on September 3, 2025, when unidentified assailants attacked a passenger vehicle near the Ahmad Khan Kalle area of Kurram, killing at least seven people.

The surge over the past years, in terrorism-related violence in the province can be attributed to three principal factors. First, the United States (US)-Western withdrawal from neighbouring Afghanistan. Second, the fall of Kabul to the Taliban on August 14, 2021. And finally, the collapse of ‘official talks’ between the Pakistan Government and the TTP on November 28, 2022. The spike in violence in KP was foreseeable, when TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali, in the wake of the collapse of peace-talks, asked his fighters to resume attacks.

When the US pulled its forces out from Afghanistan in 2021, it left behind around USD 7 billion worth of military equipment and weapons, including firearms, communications gear, and even armoured vehicles. The Afghan Taliban seized these weapons during the chaotic US withdrawal. On October 10, 2025, Pakistan’s ISPR spokesperson, Major General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, claimed that weapons left behind by the US after its withdrawal from Afghanistan had fallen into the hands of TTP militants. Speaking at a press conference in Peshawar, Chaudhry asserted that the Pakistan Army had seized a number of American-made weapons during recent operations against militants. He confirmed that military assessments indicated more than USD 7 billion worth of weapons were abandoned in Afghanistan, many of which were being used by TTP. Chaudhry added that more than 3,000 militant attacks had occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province over the preceding three months.


With the fall of Kabul to the Afghan Taliban on August 14, 2021, TTP found support from their ideological brothers in their campaigns against Pakistan. On February 4, 2026, the 37th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), revealed that the attacks on Pakistan by the TTP from Afghanistan increased. The report noted that Afghanistan had become a sanctuary for militants who used its territory to launch attacks on Pakistan, but also came at a time when the country was facing a renewed spate of violence. The report noted,
There was an increase in attacks in Pakistan launched by TTP (Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan) in Afghanistan, which led to military exchanges. Regional relations remained fragile. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) was under sustained counter-terrorism pressure, but it retained a potent capability, coupled with intent to conduct external operations.


The collapse of ‘official talks’ between the then PTI-led Pakistan Government and TTP on November 28, 2022, further aggravated the security situation in the province. On December 16, 2024, the then KP Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur claimed that between 22,000 and 24,000 TTP members, had found safe haven in Afghanistan. Gandapur also claimed that an additional 16,000 to 18,000 TTP fighters were operating inside Pakistan. He acknowledged that Pakistan lacked the capacity to maintain law and order along its extensive border with Afghanistan.

On December 6, 2025, the KP Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) released terrorism statistics for the year, showing a rise in attacks on the Police and significant increases in arrests and intelligence operations. According to the CTD, attacks on the Police rose from 327 in 2024, to 510 in 2025. The CTD also reported the arrest of 25 high-value terrorists, whose carried a bounty on their heads. Intelligence operations increased slightly, by 3 per cent, with 2,791 operations conducted in 2025 compared to 2,703 in 2024. Overall arrests surged from 744 in 2024 to 1,244 in 2025, marking a 40.2 per cent increase. Despite the rise in arrests, terrorist attacks decreased only marginally, with 137 attacks recorded in 2025, compared to 147 the previous year. The number of registered terrorism cases rose by 50 per cent, from 1,058 to 1,588. Police also carried out 320 retaliatory operations in response to 158 terrorist attacks.

Further, on December 14, KP Police released a detailed report revealing that 502 persons, including civilians and security personnel, were killed in terrorism incidents during 2025. According to the report, a total of 1,588 terrorist incidents occurred, resulting in the deaths of 223 civilians and injuries to 570. Additionally, 137 Police personnel were killed and 236 were wounded, while 18 law enforcement personnel from other agencies also lost their lives. The report highlighted the toll on the Federal Constabulary, with 124 personnel killed and 244 injured.

Amid a surge in terrorism-related incidents in the province, SFs were increasingly struggling to respond effectively to the evolving tactics and advanced weaponry used by the terrorist groups. On March 27, 2025, KP Inspector General of Police (IGP) Zulfiqar Hameed acknowledged that the provincial Police lacked the modern equipment necessary to combat the emerging threat. He revealed that militants had begun deploying sophisticated weapons and technologies, including quadcopters, which local law enforcement agencies were currently unable to counter due to technological limitations. Highlighting the growing capability gap, Hameed stated that “They [terrorists] have acquired the latest US weapons and modern gadgets. They’re carrying out quadcopter attacks. If we don’t advance, how will we fight back, since we don’t have anti-quadcopter technology?” He further emphasized that conventional weapons and traditional policing methods were no longer sufficient to counter the evolving nature of terrorist operations.


The Provincial security establishment is constrained not only by the absence of modern and advanced weaponry to confront increasingly capable militant groups, but also by a significant shortage of senior leadership within the Police, the first line of defence against terrorist attacks. On January 8, 2025, KP IGP Zulfiqar Hameed wrote to the Provincial Government, urging it to take up with the Federal Government the issue of a severe shortage of officers in the BPS-18 [Basic Pay Scale 18] and BPS-19 [Basic Pay Scale 19] cadres. In the letter addressed to the Home and Tribal Affairs Department, the IGP noted that the province faced a deficit of 87 officers in these senior ranks, including 48 vacant posts in BPS-18 (Superintendent of Police) and 39 in BPS-19 (Senior Superintendent of Police).

According to the communication, the KP Police had 131 sanctioned posts in BPS-18, but only 83 officers were currently available. These included 21 officers from the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) and 42 encadered officers, leaving an overall shortfall of 48 positions. Similarly, out of 57 sanctioned posts in BPS-19, only 18 officers were serving – comprising 11 PSP officers and seven encadered officers – resulting in 39 vacancies. The letter further requested the Provincial Government to engage with the Federal Government to facilitate the immediate posting of PSP officers, preferably those with KP domicile, in order to fill the vacant posts and strengthen the leadership capacity of the Police force in the province.

The continuing political confrontation between the PTI-led Government in KP and the Federal Government led by the PML-Nawaz, following the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, has deepened mistrust between the two administrations, undermining coordinated efforts to counter terrorism in the province. On January 2, 2025, the then KP Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur sharply criticized the Federal Government’s policies, arguing that they had contributed to the resurgence of militancy. He asserted that terrorist incidents had increased since the end of Imran Khan’s Government, attributing the trend to what he described as misguided policy decisions at the Federal level.

Subsequently, on April 1, 2025, the then KP Chief Minister’s Adviser on Information, Barrister Muhammad Ali Saif, emphasized that terrorism was a grave national challenge that should not be politicized. His statement called upon the Federal Government to demonstrate its commitment to combating terrorism by strengthening KP’s economic capacity. He urged the immediate release of the province’s pending financial dues, including funds related to hydropower revenues and counter-terrorism initiatives, noting that these payments remained outstanding despite repeated reminders.

While the Federal and Provincial Governments continue to tussle over counter-terrorism coordination and cooperation, Pakistan has repeatedly blamed Afghanistan for allegedly sheltering and patronising anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from its territory following each major attack on Pakistani soil which Afghanistan continues to deny. Amid the escalating exchange of accusations between the two countries, the confrontation intensified on February 22, 2026, when Pakistan carried out a series of predawn airstrikes in eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan, reportedly killing at least 18 civilians, including women and children, and injuring several others. In a statement on X, Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting claimed the strikes targeted camps associated with TTP, its affiliates, and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). It linked the operation to recent suicide attacks in Pakistan, including incidents in Islamabad, Bajaur and Bannu, asserting these were directed by the Afghanistan-based terrorist leadership. The Afghan government rejected these claims, stating that civilian areas, including homes and a madrassa, were struck, and condemned the operation as a violation of its sovereignty, warning of a measured response.


On February 26, 2026, the Afghan forces reportedly launched cross-border attacks targeting military positions in Pakistan. Tensions between the two countries intensified further when Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab-lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) on February 26, 2026. Amid the Pak-Afghan clash, the TTP ‘chief’ Noor Wali Mehsud announced a new spring offensive against Pakistani SFs. This latest directive, named Operation Khyber (or Ghazwa-e-Khyber), was announced by TTP’s Leadership Council on March 4, 2026. The announcement marks a significant escalation in the group’s campaign amidst the ongoing clash between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. The directive explicitly instructs militants to focus attacks on Pakistani military outposts, Police, and SF personnel. “Today, on 17 Ramadan 1447 AH (March 2026), after the annual operations of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan titled AL-Khandaq have concluded with many successes, the movement wishes to enter the next phase. According to the instructions of the leadership council, this phase has been named Operation Khyber,” the announcement read. All martyrdoms will be avenged on Pakistan SFs, TTP concluded.

With the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict unfolding along Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province is likely to bear the brunt of collateral damage and intensified terrorist violence. The volatile security environment along the border not only risks civilian hardship and disruption of economic activities, but may also create opportunities for militant groups to exploit the instability, potentially leading to an escalation in cross-border infiltration, retaliatory attacks, and further deterioration of the already fragile security situation in the province.

Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

SATP

SATP, or the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) publishes the South Asia Intelligence Review, and is a product of The Institute for Conflict Management, a non-Profit Society set up in 1997 in New Delhi, and which is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. The Institute was set up on the initiative of, and is presently headed by, its President, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd).

Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, the influential insider now leading Iran?

For decades, Mojtaba Khamenei operated in the shadows, building influence inside Iran’s clerical and security circles without ever holding an official post. Chosen as Iran’s supreme leader, the 56-year-old cleric now steps into the most powerful role in the country after his father was killed in US-Israeli air strikes.


Issued on: 09/03/2026 - RFI

A woman poses with a picture of Iran's new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei during a rally in central Tehran on Monday 9 March 2026. AFP - ATTA KENARE

Iran’s Assembly of Experts, the clerical body responsible for appointing the country’s supreme leader, elected Mojtaba Khamenei on Sunday during a secret meeting in the holy city of Qom, local media reported.

His name had recently been raised by US President Donald Trump in an interview with the American news site Axios. Trump warned that if Mojtaba Khamenei became supreme leader, “he would be killed like his father”.

Mojtaba Khamenei's wife – the daughter of hardline politician and former parliament speaker Gholamali Haddadadel – was among those killed on 28 February, the first day of the US-Israeli offensive.

For years he had been seen as a possible successor to his father, Ali Khamenei. His prospects appeared to grow after the death of another potential contender, former president Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash in 2024.

Why Iran's 'beheaded' power structure may outlive Ali Khamenei

Years building influence

The younger Khamenei spent decades cultivating close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and strengthening his influence within Iran’s clerical establishment.

He has consistently opposed supporters of dialogue with Western countries during efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

“He has strong constituency and support within the IRGC, in particular amongst the younger radical generations,” Kasra Aarabi, of the US-based organisation United Against Nuclear Iran, which monitors the activities of the Revolutionary Guard, told Reuters.

Khamenei's rise has also drawn criticism from within Iran’s political system. Some opponents argue that he does not have the religious qualifications required to become supreme leader.

Others say his appointment goes against the intentions of the founders of the Iran, who sought to break with the dynastic traditions of the former monarchy of the shahs.

Between Tehran's agents and opposition exiles, France caught in Iran's shadow war

Shaped by revolution

Born in 1969 in the city of Mashhad, Mojtaba Khamenei grew up as his father joined Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s movement against the shah.

He later fought in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 and studied theology in the seminaries of Qom, the centre of Shia religious learning.

He holds the clerical title of hodjatoleslam, a rank below ayatollah in the Shia hierarchy, and wears the black turban of a sayyed – indicating direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Mojtaba Khamenei has never held an official position within the government. While he has occasionally appeared at rallies supporting the regime, he has rarely spoken publicly.

Since 2019 Khamenei has been under sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Department, which said he represented the supreme leader “in an official capacity even though he was never elected or appointed to a government position”, apart from working in his father’s office.

The US also said he had been given certain powers by his father and maintained close ties with the commander of the Quds Force – the Revolutionary Guards unit responsible for operations abroad – and with the volunteer Basij militia.

It said those links were used “to advance his father’s regional destabilisation goals and domestic oppression”.

How the war in Iran is testing Europe’s US military base network

Power and wealth

The new supreme leader heads a financial empire stretching “from shipping in the Persian Gulf to Swiss bank accounts, British luxury real estate and a major Western intelligence service”, an investigation by the US media outlet Bloomberg reported earlier this year.

He is also often seen as having played a role in the rise of ultra-conservative former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected in 2005. Khamenei supported Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election four years later, which triggered a wave of protests.

In 2022 he became a frequent target of demonstrators during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest movement that erupted after the death in custody of student Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating the country’s strict dress code.

His wife, the daughter of hardline politician and former parliament speaker Gholamali Haddadadel, was killed on 28 February in US-Israeli air strikes, along with several members of her family.

ANALYSIS

Khamenei replaces Khamenei: Iran defies Trump, signals continuity

Iran’s choice of Mojtaba Khamenei to replace his slain father, Ali Khamenei, as supreme leader signals the entrenchment of hardline cleric power and a continued resistance amid the US-Israeli military onslaught. It also underscores US President Donald Trump’s policy failure to detail the goals of the war.


Issued on: 09/03/2026 -

FRANCE24
By: Leela JACINTO

A woman poses with a picture of Iran's new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and his late father Ali Khamenei at a rally in in central Tehran on March 9, 2026. © Atta Kenaré, AFP

After more than a week of massive US and Israeli bombardments, around 1,200 reported Iranian deaths, seven fallen US soldiers, damaged infrastructure, skyrocketing oil prices, blocked ships and grounded flights, Iran got the new leader that everyone expected for years.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been named Iran’s new supreme leader as the Islamic regime faces an existential crisis. The message from the Assembly of Experts, the body empowered to appoint the new leader, was clear to Iran and the world. The Velayat-e-Faqih, the Shiite political doctrine underpinning Iran’s Islamic Republic, would continue, the resistance would not be cowed, and the change that many Iranians longed for was nowhere near.

Khamenei was appointed the new leader barely a week after Iranian authorities confirmed the death of his 86-year-old father in the initial round of US-Israeli strikes. Amid rumours about the logistical difficulties of holding a vote and speculation over whether the war could strengthen a reformist voice, the decision was swift and unambiguous.

Trump trying to gauge whether new ayatollah is 'a leader he can work with'

Imagen de archivo de Mojtaba Jamenei, durante su participación en el mitin anual de las milicias Quds. Teherán, 31 de mayo de 2019. AP - Vahid Salemi
10:58

“The message is very clear. It's a message of resoluteness sent by the Iranian government,” said FRANCE 24’s Siavosh Ghazi, reporting from Tehran the morning after the announcement. “The members of the Assembly of Experts have stated that he is continuing his father’s legacy…In effect, the result of the war that was started by [US President] Donald Trump and [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu is to replace an 86-year-old with a 56-year-old. So, nothing changes, and the message is: We will stay the course – and continue to resist the Americans and the Israelis.”

To prove the point, Iranian state media followed up the announcement, which was broadcast Monday around 1am local time, with a report of a new attack on Israel. “Iran fired a first wave of missiles under Ayatollah Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei toward [the Palestinian] occupied territories,” declared state radio stations while state TV aired a photograph of a projectile bearing the slogan, "At Your Command, Sayyid Mojtaba", using an Islamic honorific.

Iran’s oil-rich Gulf neighbours also received a business-as-usual message hours later, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar reporting new explosions and attacks on Monday. The Asian markets, opening for a new week of trading, reflected the economic strains of Iran’s blockage of the Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of the world's oil is transported. Oil prices soared to a historic high of $120 per barrel on Monday morning before falling in a whiplash trading session.

‘Going full dynasty’

Nearly half a century after the Islamic Revolution overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy, the appointment of another Khamenei as leader of the republic was a statement of defiance. During Ali Khamenei’s final years, experts examining likely succession candidates noted the difficulty of choosing his son for a regime that “prides itself on overturning thousands of years of monarchical rule”.

But in the end, the dynastic transfer of power passed without a hitch. “This is not surprising in the sense that all revolutions tend to replace what they destroyed with something very similar,” said Rouzbeh Parsi, a history professor at Sweden’s Lund University. “So, in that sense, going full dynasty is not necessarily surprising. There's also an element of this in Shia theology, where the notion of sacredness and the notion of charisma and leadership goes in succession within the family.”

Iran goes 'full dynasty' © France 24
04:59  

While his father was in office, Mojtaba Khamenei did not have an official government position. But his years of work at the supreme leader’s Beyt office as a sort of aide-de-camp, personal assistant and confidant to his father put him at the centre of political, economic and, most importantly, security networks in Iran.

Iran’s supreme leader is the ultimate authority over all branches of government and head of a security establishment that includes the army, navy, intelligence institutions and, above all, the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a parallel armed force that includes allied organisations such as the Basij militia.

The IRGC also wields economic clout, accounting for nearly 25% of the Iranian economy, according to some estimates.

Khamenei was believed to be his octogenarian father’s right-hand man for several years, fueling speculation that the son was effectively managing the day-to-day running of the state.
Security links, economic assets, religious credentials

Born in 1969 in the city of Mashhad, Khamenei fought in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war with an IRGC division, several of whom ascended to powerful intelligence positions within the force, cementing his links within an organisation that grew to become the country’s most influential institution.

After his father became supreme leader in 1989, he had access to the billions of dollars and business assets spread across Iran's many bonyads, or foundations funded from state industries and other wealth once held by the former shah.

During his father’s rule, Khamenei used his proximity to the leadership to amass his own power, according to US and Israeli sources. US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks in the late 2000s suggested that he served as his father’s “principal gatekeeper” and had been forming his own power base within the country.

At a time of crisis, Khamenei’s familiarity with the ropes of administration and knowledge of the shadowy workings of the IRGC – also known as “the Guards” – was viewed as an asset, according to experts.

Khamenei also takes over the position of the Islamic Republic’s spiritual leader with the required religious credentials, unlike his father, who was a midlevel cleric when he replaced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic in 1989.

Khamenei’s clerical studies include instruction in a respected seminary in the holy city of Qom. It was followed by more than a decade of teaching dars-e kharej — the highest level of seminary instruction in Shiite Islamic jurisprudence. He reached the clerical rank of ayatollah in 2022, according to the Qom seminary’s news agency.

This puts him in a secure position in Iran’s power circles, according to experts. “We have to remember that his father needed a decade or so to shore up his own credibility and his own ability to run the system. Now, Mojtaba comes with stronger cards in terms of his connections, but also a weaker position in that he's going to be more dependent on those groups, most likely the Revolutionary Guards,” said Parsi.
‘Replacing the Taliban with the Taliban’

The second of Ali Khamenei’s six children, the new supreme leader was believed to be extremely close to his father. The 56-year-old cleric takes over the post a week after his father, his mother Mansoureh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, his wife Zahra Adel and one of his sons was killed in the US-Israeli strikes, according to the Iranian government.

The loss is unlikely to see him leaning towards a diplomatic solution to end the current conflict. It also dashes hopes of a reformist faction taking over or influencing the office of the supreme leader.

“I think for the moment, they're all united in that they see an existential threat in the Israeli and American war, and that this is something they need to deal with first,” said Parsi.

Iran’s proxies in the region, including the Houthis in Yemen and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have also fallen in line, pledging allegiance to the new leader.

Across the Persian Gulf, Iranian attacks on the oil-rich Gulf monarchies in retaliation for the US-Israeli strikes have also strengthened the Islamic regime’s ability to disrupt global oil shipments, which in turn determine the power balance in the region, according to some experts.

“What Iran has done is increase the pressure on the Americans, that the whole global system, that the Americans, in a sense, underwrite,” said Parsi. “The Iranians are able to influence what is happening and are making it very difficult for the Americans to contain this conflict to just one country, so the rest of the world would go about their business. That is not the way things are going. The fact that the Americans don't seem to have a clear strategy of what they want with this war, just makes it easier for the Iranians to, in a sense, play this game.”

Last week, Trump declared that he wanted a say in the appointment of Iran’s new leader. That was not to be. As supreme leader, Khamenei, like his father, is now high in the sights of US-Israeli decapitation strikes. But the Islamic regime has delivered its message of continuity no matter the decimation of top personnel.

For some experts, Iran’s appointment of a newer version of an old leader underscores the failure of the US in the region, which was in stark focus during the 2021 Taliban takeover in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Several Iran experts took to social media on Monday to elaborate the point. “The U.S. spent 20 years and trillions of dollars replacing the Taliban with the Taliban,” said Iranian political analyst Ali Alizadeh on X. “Trump replaced Ayatollah Khamenei with Ayatollah Khamenei in just 9 days. The most efficient U.S. president ever,” he noted wryly.

Thinking About The Unthinkable: Iran’s Grand Plan To End U.S. Presence In The Middle East – OpEd

March 10, 2026 
By Michael Hudson


Iran and Donald Trump have each explained why failure to fight the current war to the end would simply lead to a new set of mutual attacks. Trump announced on March 6 that “There will be no deal with Iran except unconditional surrender,” and announced that he must have a voice in naming or at least approving Iran’s new leader, as he has just done in Venezuela. “If the U.S. military must utterly defeat it and bring about a regime change, or else you go through this, and then in five years you realize you put somebody in who’s no better.” It will take at least that long for America to replace the weaponry that has been depleted, rebuild its radar and related installations and mount a new war.

Iranian officials likewise recognize that U.S. attacks will keep being repeated until the United States is driven out of the Middle East. Having agreed to a ceasefire last June instead of pressing its advantage when Israeli and regional U.S. anti-missile defenses were depleted, Iran realized that war would be resumed as soon as the United States could re-arm its allies and military bases to renew what both sides recognize as a fight to some kind of final solution.

The war that began on February 28 can realistically be deemed to be the formal opening of World War III because what is at issue are the terms on which the entire world will be able to buy oil and gas. Can they buy this energy from exporters in currencies other than the dollar, headed by Russia and Iran (and until recently, Venezuela)? Will the present U.S. demand to control of the international oil trade require oil-exporting countries to price it in dollars, and indeed to recycle their export earnings and national savings into investments in U.S. government securities, bonds and stocks?

That recycling of petrodollars has been the basis of America’s financialization and weaponization of the world’s oil trade, and its imperial strategy of isolating countries that resist adherence to the U.S. ruler-based order (no real rules, but simply U.S. ad hoc demands). So what is at issue is not only the U.S. military presence in the Middle East – along with its two proxy armies, Israel and ISIS/al Qaeda jihadists. And the U.S. and Israeli pretense that it is about Iran having atomic weapons of mass destruction is as fictitious an accusation as that levied against Iraq in 2003. What is at issue is ending the Middle East’s economic alliances with the United States and whether its oil-export earnings will continue to be accumulated in dollars as the buttress of the U.S. balance of payments to help pay for its military bases throughout the world.

Iran has announced that it will fight until it achieves three aims to prevent future wars. First and foremost, the United States must withdraw from all its military bases in the Middle East. Iran has already destroyed the backbone of radar warning systems and anti-aircraft and missile defense sites in Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, preventing them from guiding U.S. or Israeli missile attacks or attacking Iran. Arab countries that have bases or U.S. installations will be bombed if they are not abandoned.


The next two Iranian demands seem so far-reaching that they seem unthinkable to the West. Arab OPEC countries must end their close economic ties to the United States, starting with the U.S. data centers operated by Amazon, Microsoft and Google. And they not only must stop pricing their oil and gas in U.S. dollars, but disinvest in their existing petrodollar holdings of the U.S. investments that have been subsidizing the U.S. balance of payments since the 1974 agreements that were made to gain U.S. permission to quadruple their oil-export prices.

These three demands would end U.S. economic power over OPEC countries, and thus the world oil trade. The result would be to dedollarize the world’s oil trade and re-orient it toward Asia and Global Majority countries. And Iran’s plan involves not only a military and economic defeat for the United States, but an end to the political character of the Near Eastern client monarchies and their relations with their Shi’ite citizens.

Step 1: Driving the United States out of its Middle Eastern military bases

Iraq’s parliament has continued to demand that U.S. forces leave their country and stop stealing its oil (sending most of it to Israel). It has just approved legislation yet again directing that American forces leave their country. Meeting with senior advisor to Iraq’s interior minister and his accompanying military delegation in Tehran last Monday (March 2), Iran’s Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi reiterated the demand that Iran has been making for the last five years, ever since Donald Trump closed his first administration on January 3, 2020. by ordering the treacherous assassination of the two top Iranian and Iraqi anti-terror negotiators, Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were seeking to avoid an all-out war. Seeing that Trump is now continuing the same policy, the Iranian commander stated: “Expulsion of the United States is the most important step toward the restoration of security and stability to the region.”


But all the Arab kingdoms are hosting U.S. military bases. Iran has announced that any
country permitting U.S. aircraft or other military forces to use these bases will risk immediate attack to destroy them. Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already come under attack, leading Saudi Arabia to promise Iran not to permit the U.S. military to use its territory for part of its war.

Spain has banned the U.S. use of its airfields to support its war against Iran. But when its Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez forbade the United States from using them, President Trump pointed out at an Oval Office news conference that there was nothing that Spain really could do to prevent the U.S. air force from using the Rota and Morón installations in southern Spain that the U.S. and Spain share, but which remain under Spanish command. “And now Spain actually said we can’t use their bases. And that’s all right, we don’t want to do it. We could use the base if we want. We could just fly in and use it, nobody is going to tell us not to use it.” What would Spain do to prevent it, after all? Shoot down the U.S. aircraft?

This is the problem confronting the Arab monarchies if they try to deny U.S. access to their own U.S. bases and airspace to fight Iran. What can they do?

Or more to the point, what may they be willing to do? Iran is insisting that Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Near Eastern monarchies close all U.S. military bases in their kingdoms and block U.S. use of their airspace and airports as a condition for not bombing them and extending the war to the monarchic regimes themselves.

Refusal – or inability to prevent the U.S. from using bases in their countries – will lead Iran to force regime change. This would be easiest in countries in which Palestinians are a large proportion of the labor force, as in Jordan. Iran has called for Shi’ite populations in Jordan and other Near Eastern countries to overthrow their monarchies to break away from U.S. control. There are rumors that Bahrain’s king has left the country.

Step #2: Ending the Middle East’s commercial and financial linkages to the U.S.

Arab monarchies are under further pressure to meet Iran’s ultimate demand that they decouple their economies from that of the United States. Ever since 1974, they have tied their economies to the United States. Most recently, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have sought to use their energy resources to attract computer data centers, including Starlink and other systems that have been associated with U.S. regime-change and military attacks on Iran.

Opposing U.S. plans to tightly integrate its non-oil sectors with the Arab OPEC Middle East, Iran has announced that these installations are “legitimate targets” for its drive to expel America from the region. One cloud computing manager suggested that Iran’s AWS attack on Amazon’s data center was targeted because it was serving military needs, much as Starlink (which the UAE is interested in financing) was used in February in the U.S. attempt to mobilize demonstrations against Iran’s government.
Step #3: Ending the recycling of OPEC oil exports into U.S. dollar holdings

The most radical Iranian demand has been for its Arab neighbors to dedollarize their economies. That is a key to preventing U.S. businesses from dominating their economies and hence their governments. An Iranian official told CNN that Iran has accused companies that buy U.S. government debt and invest in Treasury bonds of being partners in the war against itself, because it sees them as financiers of this war. “Tehran considers these companies and their managers in the region as legitimate targets. These individuals are warned to declare their capital withdrawal as soon as possible.”

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are indeed discussing withdrawing from U.S. and other investments, as Iran’s blocking of Hormuz has led them to stop producing oil and LNG now that their storage capacity is full. Their income from energy, shipping and tourism has stopped. The Gulf States met on Sunday, March 8, to discuss drawing down their $2 trillion in U.S. dollar investments (mainly from Saudi Arabia). The threat is that this is an initial step to diversifying OPEC investment outside of the U.S. dollar.

In conjunction with U.S. surrender of its military bases in the Middle East, such decoupling from the dollar would greatly reduce U.S. control of Middle Eastern oil. It would end the U.S. ability to use this oil trade as a chokepoint with which to coerce other countries into adhering to Trump’s America First ruler-based order (his own whims, with no clear rules).


For the monarchies themselves, the changes demanded by Iran to end the U.S. war to control the Middle East may have an effect similar to the aftermath of World War that ended the epoch of European monarchies. In this case, it may end monarchic regimes in many of the countries whose economies and political alliances have been based on an alliance with the United States.

For starters, pressure is now on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, all of which have agreed to join Trump’s Board of Peace. Indonesia, with the world’s largest Islamic population, has just withdrawn its offer to provide 8000 troops for his Gaza “peace plan.” And Iran is pressuring Arab monarchies to follow suit by withdrawing to protest U.S. policy.

Will they do so? And will they go so far as to end U.S. access to bases in their territory? runs if they try to avoid being offensive to the United States, they will leave themselves open to Iranian accusations that they are not really opposing the war. But if they follow Iran’s request, they run the risk that the United States may simply seize or at least freeze their dollar holdings to force them to change their mind.

Iran is putting pressure on the most U.S.-friendly Arab monarchies. The last few days have seen it attack two Saudi oil depots, and a drone has hit a desalination plant in Bahrain in response to an attack launched from Bahrainian territory on Iran’s desalination plant at Qeshm Island. Most of the Arab kingdoms depend on desalination to a much higher degree, topped by Saudi Arabia at 70% and Bahrain at 60%. That makes Bahrain’s attack akin to the folly of fighting with bricks while living in a glass house oneself.
Collateral effects of Iran’s goal to drive the United States out of the Middle East

Iran will escalate as Israel and the U.S. military exhaust their supply of anti-aircraft and missile defense, enabling Iran to launch its serious attack on a scale that it stopped short of last June when it agreed to a ceasefire. It will start using its most sophisticated missiles to attack Israel and other U.S. proxies.

There’s nowhere to put additional Arab oil production now that Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to all but its own ships, most of which are carrying oil destined for China. The storage tanks are full, with nowhere to save new production, which has therefore been forced to stop. And as for liquified natural gas, which is exported mainly by Qatar, its LNG gas works have been bombed. They will have to be rebuilt, which will take two weeks plus an equal time to put them back online by cooling this gas properly.

In any case, no ships are even trying to approach Hormuz because Lloyd’s of London is not issuing insurance policies. The U.S. military has recently sunk or seized Russian ships carrying oil, but the soaring oil prices have led it to permit such transfers in order to stem global inflation. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said the Treasury Department is examining whether additional sanctioned Russian crude shipments could be released to the market. “We may unsanction other Russian oil,” he said. “There are hundreds of millions of barrels of sanctioned crude on the water … by unsanctioning them, Treasury can create supply.” His remarks follow a U.S. decision to issue a temporary 30-day waiver allowing Indian refiners to purchase Russian oil in an effort to maintain global supply.


Throughout the world, rising oil and gas prices will force economies to choose between having to cut back domestic social spending in order to pay their dollar debts. This war is splitting the US/NATO West from the Global Majority, by creating strains that Japan, Korea and even Europe no longer can afford. The chaotic effect of the U.S. attack has destroyed the narrative that has enabled U.S. diplomats to demand subsidies and “burden sharing” for its global military spending. The predicate fiction is that the world needs U.S. military support to protect it against Russia and China, and now Iran, as if these countries pose a real threat to Europe and Asia.

But instead of protecting the rest of the world by waging the present Cold War, the chaos in world oil and gas markets resulting from its attack on Iran shows that the United States actually is the greatest threat to the security, stability and prosperity of its allies. Its attack has fallen largely on its closest allies – Japan, South Korea and Europe. Their gas prices have soared by 20% and are now on their way further upward today. Korea’s stock market has plunged 18% in the last two days. All this is shifting support for removing U.S. control of Near Eastern oil and reorienting it to a market free from U.S. demands for control and dollarization of the world’s energy trade.

Michael Hudson

Prof. Hudson is Chief Economic Advisor to the Reform Task Force Latvia (RTFL). Michael Hudson is President of The Institute for the Study of Long-Term Economic Trends (ISLET), a Wall Street Financial Analyst, Distinguished Research Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri, Kansas City and author of Killing the Host (2015) Super-Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (1968 & 2003), Trade, Development and Foreign Debt (1992 & 2009) and of The Myth of Aid (1971). For more of his writing check out his website: http://michael-hudson.com

Saudi Aramco Cuts Oil Output as Hormuz Crisis Chokes Exports

By Charles Kennedy - Mar 09, 2026

Saudi Aramco has begun reducing oil production at two of its fields as the disruption around the Strait of Hormuz starts to choke off crude exports across the Gulf, according to sources cited by Reuters on Monday.

The move comes just hours before the Saudi oil giant is due to report its 2025 earnings on Tuesday, placing the focus squarely on whether the world’s largest oil exporter can keep crude moving during the escalating U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.

It was not immediately clear which oilfields were affected or how much production had been reduced. Aramco declined to comment on the reported cuts.

The production curbs mark one of the clearest signs yet that the disruption around Hormuz is beginning to constrain supply from the region that normally exports roughly a fifth of the world’s oil. Tanker traffic through the strategic waterway has slowed sharply in recent days as military activity, security risks and insurance cancellations make shipping increasingly difficult.

Aramco has begun rerouting some crude cargoes to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, attempting to bypass the Strait of Hormuz using Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline network. The system allows the kingdom to move crude from its eastern oilfields to export terminals on the Red Sea, avoiding the Gulf shipping lane.

However, the pipeline cannot fully replace the massive volumes that normally leave Saudi Arabia through Hormuz, meaning export bottlenecks are now beginning to appear as storage tanks fill.

Other Gulf producers are running into the same export constraints as the shipping crisis spreads across the region’s energy system.

Crude output from Iraq’s southern fields has plunged by roughly 70% since the war began, dropping to about 1.3 million barrels per day from roughly 4.3 million barrels per day previously. Southern Iraq accounts for the vast majority of the country’s oil production and exports.

“Crude storage has reached maximum capacity, and the remaining output after the major cut will be used to supply the country’s refineries,” a Basra Oil Company official told Reuters.

Export activity has slowed dramatically. On Sunday, only two tankers were loaded at Iraq’s southern export terminals, each carrying about 2 million barrels. The vessels remained in the Persian Gulf according to vessel-tracking data.

Kuwait has now begun taking similar steps as storage fills across the region. Kuwait has started shutting in production at several oilfields because the standstill in tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has left the country with limited capacity to store additional crude.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Kuwait Confirms Oil Output Slowdown as Storage Fills Up

Press handout image courtesy KPC

Published Mar 8, 2026 3:56 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Kuwait's national oil company has announced plans to start throttling down production, confirming concerns that it would have to start shutting down within days due to limited storage capacity. It is the latest consequence of Iran's Strait of Hormuz attacks, and it follows shortly after Iraq began ordering its largest oilfields to shut in wells because of an absence of empty tanker tonnage to take on cargoes. 

In a statement, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) said that the measure is purely a precaution, and it will be reviewed regularly. The firm said that its supplies to the domestic market are assured, and that it is "fully prepared to restored production levels once conditions allow." 

The shutdown occurred a few days ahead of a predicted deadline, and analysts suggest that KPC decided to throttle back output early at some fields in order to preserve a buffer of remaining storage. Reduced-output wells are faster and easier to reactivate than wells that have been fully shut in. 

Iran is serious about its closure order, and has attacked at least two vessels physically located in the Strait of Hormuz since it was issued last week. Western tonnage has largely given up the crossing, save for a handful of vessels transiting with transponders turned off - and not all of them are tankers. By contrast, the National Iranian Oil Company continues to load cargoes at Kharg Island and to dispatch its shadow-fleet tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining de minimus supply for its Asian customers. It has also begun to use its Jask oil terminal on the Gulf of Oman, on the eastern side of the strait, according to TankerTrackers.com. 

The tightening supply picture in the Mideast is beginning to have price effects. Oil prices could spike as high as $150 per barrel within weeks if the strait remains closed, Qatari Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi told the Financial Times on Friday. He confirmed that all of the major GCC exporting nations will have to declare force majeure eventually if the shutdown continues, he warned. 

Iraq's fields have already cut production from 4.3 million bpd to 1.3 million bpd because storage has been fully filled, according to Reuters. For now, the only remaining available outlet for Iraqi oil is for domestic production. 

Oil Price Shock Could Worsen If U.S. Seizes Iran’s Strategic Oil Island

By Charles Kennedy - Mar 09, 2026

JP Morgan has warned that Iran’s oil production could be slashed in half and oil exports could virtually stall if U.S.-Israeli seize Iran's Kharg Island, worsening the ongoing global oil shock. Located in the Persian Gulf, the continental island is the "backbone" of Iran's oil infrastructure, handling approximately 90% of its crude exports. 

The island collects oil transported via pipeline from Iran’s largest producing fields, including Marun, Ahvaz and Gachsaran. Iran--OPEC’s third-largest producer--pumps about 3.3 million barrels of crude and an additional 1.3 million barrels of condensate and other liquids per day.

Oil prices have surged to near-pandemic levels, with Brent crude for April delivery up 5.7% to trade at $98.13 per barrel at 12.06 p.m. ET, while the corresponding WTI crude contract was up 4.84% to change hands at $95.30 per barrel.

"A direct strike would immediately halt the bulk of Iran’s crude exports, likely triggering severe retaliation in the Strait of Hormuz or against regional energy infrastructure," JP Morgan said.

According to JP Morgan, cited by Arab media, Iran ramped up exports from Kharg Island in the days leading up to attacks by U.S. and Israel to near record levels in excess of 3 million bpd, nearly triple its normal clip at 1.3 million to 1.6 million bpd. According to Kpler, the island’s storage capacity is roughly 30 million barrels of crude, with current storage at approximately 18 million barrels, enough for 10-12 days of exports under normal conditions.

A seizure or direct attacks on Khrag Island would be unprecedented. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Iran during the hostage crisis of 1979, but did not order strikes on the island. Ronald Reagan, Carter’s successor,  targeted Iranian vessels and missile batteries while protecting ships during the 1980s Iran-Iraq Tanker War but also refrained from attacking the island. Similarly, Iraqi forces did not hamper operations at the island during the war.

"Although Iraqi forces struck some ‌terminals and tankers during the eight-year war, Kharg remained largely operational and damage was typically repaired quickly, demonstrating that disabling it would require sustained, large-scale attacks," JP Morgan said.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Report: White House Considering a Raid to Seize Kharg Island

Thin oil slicks emanate from the terminal complex at Kharg Island (file image courtesy NASA)

Published Mar 8, 2026 7:34 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The Trump administration is contemplating a series of special forces operations inside of Iran, potentially including a raid to seize Kharg Island, according to Axios. Kharg is home to the crude loading port at the heart of Iran's oil export industry. 

Kharg Island is located at the far northern end of the Arabian Gulf, opposite Kuwait and about 20 nautical miles off the coast of mainland Iran. It handles the overwhelming majority of Iran's crude exports, and by nameplate capacity, it is rated for moving far more than current Iranian national output. Its primary customers are privately-held refineries in China, which consume the overwhelming majority of Iranian oil. 

Kharg Island has a strategic location next to the shipping lanes for Iraq and Kuwait. Officials who spoke to Axios mentioned Kharg in the context of a campaign to retrieve Iran's high-enriched uranium fuel supply from the tunnel complex at Isfahan, which was buried by previous U.S. strikes last year. Seizing Kharg Island could yield a useful refueling point for this and other special-ops incursions into Iranian territory, and for exercising control over the region's sea lanes. 

Iran is unlikely to be able to mount an effort to retake the island in the near term: the U.S. has established air superiority along the coast, and conventional Iranian naval forces have been substantially destroyed by concerted action from U.S. Central Command. Last week, CENTCOM claimed that it has sunk more than 30 Iranian warships since the conflict began. 

The ultimate goal, according to former Lockheed marketing executive Jarrod Agen, now the director of the National Energy Dominance Council, is to take control of Iran's oil. 

"Ultimately, we’re not going to have to worry about these issues in the Strait of Hormuz because we’re going to get all of the oil out of the hands of terrorists," Agen said in an interview on Fox Business. 

Almost all of Iran's oil production occurs on land in mainland provinces, and full control of the infrastructure would require more thorough intervention (political or military) than the capture of Kharg Island alone.

India Offered Refuge to Iranian Frigate Before U.S. Navy Sank It

IRIS Dena's stern lifted and broken by a U.S. Navy heavyweight torpedo, March 4 (USN)

Published Mar 9, 2026 2:51 PM by The Maritime Executive

 The sinking of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena was a matter of great sensitivity for India, as the warship had just attended an international naval exercise at New Delhi's invitation. The vessel's loss was more sensitive still because she had been offered Indian refuge from the war, foreign minister S Jaishankar said Monday. 

IRIS Dena was under way off the coast of Galle in southern Sri Lanka on March 4 when she was torpedoed by a U.S. Navy submarine. The blast lifted Dena's stern out of the water and broke her keel, sending her quickly below. As is standard in submarine warfare, the attack sub departed without intervening to assist survivors; Sri Lankan responders pulled 32 survivors and 87 bodies from the water. 

On March 1, just as hostilities between the U.S. and Iran were getting under way, India had granted permission to a request from Iran for Dena and two other ships to moor at an Indian port. The support ship IRIS Laval pulled into Kochi and reached the safety of an Indian naval facility on March 4, Jaishankar said. Dena was sunk the same day, and support ship IRIS Bushehr sought refuge in Sri Lanka on March 5. 

It is unclear why Dena departed India and did not seek safety, especially when the U.S. was actively attacking Iranian Navy vessels in the Mideast. To date, U.S. forces have destroyed more than 30 Iranian warships, and the strikes continue: On Monday, social media footage emerged showing the destruction of a Shahid Soleimani-class corvette at Bandar Landeh. A headline-worthy event on its own in peacetime, the latest attack on an Iranian warship was a footnote in the broader war, unreported by mainstream media. 

Aftermath of a reported U.S. strike on an Iranian warship at Bandar Landeh, corroborated by thermal sensing from FIRMS (social media)

Two Iranian Boxships Under Way With Suspected Rocket Fuel Cargoes

Iranian boxship Barzin (VesselFinder file image)

Published Mar 8, 2026 9:00 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The Washington Post has suggested that two vessels owned by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) have left the port of Gaolan in Zhuhai, China, destined for Bandar Abbas and potentially laden with sodium perchlorate - a chemical used for manufacturing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.

Sodium perchlorate is the primary material used to manufacture ammonium perchlorate, which in turn makes up 70% of the standard fuel load of most of Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Iran used to have some ability to manufacture sodium perchlorate on its own, and could also obtain supply from Russia. But a substantial proportion of Iran’s requirement from sodium perchlorate has for some time been met by importing the material from China on board a shuttle of IRISL ships.

The Washington Post provided no evidence that these particular ships had been loaded with sodium perchlorate, basing its report on an analysis of previous movements and the sanctioned status of the two named ships. Large numbers of IRISL ships ply the China to Bandar Abbas route, carrying a variety of cargos. Both the container ships, the Iranian-flagged Shabdis (IMO 9349588) and the Hong Kong-flagged Barzin (sometimes traveling as the Fanreach, IMO 9820269), are subject to secondary sanctions by the US Treasury’s OFAC on account of their control by IRISL. But Barzin has also been linked to a previous suspected shipment of sodium perchlorate, which left Gaolan on October 2 and arrived in Bandar Abbas on October 16 last year.

The IRISL ships plying this particular route can normally carry more than 5,000 20-foot containers apiece. The Maritime Executive has tracked numerous mixed cargos on their passage from China to Iran, and specifically the deliveries from Shanghai to Bandar Abbas made by IRISL cargo ships MVs Golbon and Jairan. These two vessels brought in a total of 58 containers of sodium perchlorate used for manufacturing solid fuel for ballistic missiles, a consignment widely believed to have precipitated the explosion in Bandar Abbas which devastated the commercial port area on April 26 last year. Hence containers loaded with sodium perchlorate typically would form only a small part of an overall cargo. 

The explosion at the Rajaei Port container park in Bandar Abbas on April 26

Dual-use products, and specifically if they were being conveyed on a ship belonging to IRISL, should fall under the provisions of UN Security Resolution 1929, which cautions states to be aware of IRISL’s sanctions-breaking activities and its role in supporting Iran’s missile development, manufacture and maintenance activities. UNSCR 1929 specifically covers weapons systems related (or dual-use) materials.  It calls on "States to inspect any vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items. States are also expected to cooperate in such inspections on the high seas and are obligated to seize and dispose of the prohibited items when they are found." These sanctions have been strengthened since snap-back sanctions were re-imposed by the UN Security Council on September 28 last year.

Chinese unwillingness to observe UNSCR 1929 was evident last year when a US special operations team intercepted a ship off Sri Lanka and confiscated part of its cargo. The material seized consisted of dual-use components manufactured in China, such as spectrometers and gyroscopes, which can be used to improve the precision of guided missiles. The components were en route to Iran.

On November 12 last year, coincident with the interception at sea, the US Treasury sanctioned a widespread network of companies based in China, Iran, Turkey and the UAE involved in the supply and delivery of dual-use components used for Iranian ballistic missile and drone production. The sanctions notice detailed supply, shipping routes, and one specific ship, the Panama-flagged bulk carrier Shun Kai Xing, sometimes known as the Honestar (IMO 9187368). The Honestar was cited in the US Treasury notice for shipping "a computer numerical control machine used to produce fiber optic gyroscopes, guidance and control systems for weapons systems including ballistic missiles and UAVs."

Other IRISL ships suspected of carrying dual-use cargos on the China to Bandar Abbas route include the Basht (IMO 9346536), Rayen (IMO 9820245), Behta (IMO 9349590), Artavand (IMO 9193214) and the Elyana (IMO 9165827).