It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Sunday, May 11, 2025
UK to limit skilled visas for graduate-level jobs in key migration reform
British PM Keir Starmer faces growing pressure to reduce net migration following the strong performance of Nigel Farage's anti-immigration Reform UK party in this month's local elections.
UK plans to end 'failed free market' immigration policy
To restrict skilled worker visas to graduate-level jobs
British PM under pressure to cut net migration
The British government outlined plans on Sunday to end what it called the "failed free market experiment" in mass immigration by restricting skilled worker visas to graduate-level jobs and forcing businesses to increase training for local workers.
Under the government's new plans, skilled visas will only be granted to people in graduate jobs, while visas for lower-skilled roles will only be issued in areas critical to the nation's industrial strategy, and in return businesses must increase training of British workers.
The Labour government said the changes will be part of a policy document, known as a white paper, to be published on Monday setting out how ministers plan to reduce immigration.
High levels of legal migration were one of the major drivers behind the vote to leave the European Union in 2016 with voters unhappy about the free movement of workers across the bloc.
After Britain eventually left the EU in 2020, the then Conservative government reduced the threshold to allow workers in categories such as yoga teachers, dog walkers and DJs to be eligible for skilled worker visas.
"We inherited a failed immigration system where the previous government replaced free movement with a free market experiment," Yvette Cooper, the British interior minister, said in a statement. "We are taking decisive action to restore control and order to the immigration system."
While post-Brexit changes to visas saw a sharp drop in the number of European Union migrants to Britain, new work visa rules and people arriving from Ukraine and Hong Kong under special visa schemes led to a surge in immigration.
Net migration, or the number of people coming to Britain minus the number leaving, rose to a record 906,000 people in the year to June 2023, up from the 184,000 people who arrived in the same period during 2019, when Britain was still in the EU.
UK Government to close care worker visa for overseas recruitment, says Cooper
NATION CYMRU
11 May 2025
Home Secretary Yvette Cooper. Photo Lucy North/PA Wire
The UK Government is going to close the care worker visa for overseas recruitment as part of its immigration reforms, the Home Secretary has said.
Yvette Cooper said rules around the visa will be changed to “prevent” it being used to “recruit from abroad”, but that companies will still be able to recruit from a pool of thousands of people who came to the UK on care visas for jobs that did not exist.
Ministers are due to publish their Immigration White Paper on Monday which will also include changes to skilled visa thresholds and tighter restrictions on recruitment for jobs on skills shortages.
Officials are looking to bring down net migration, which reached 728,000 in 2024, but ministers are not going to set an overall target, which Ms Cooper labelled as a “failed approach”.
‘New restrictions’
The Home Secretary told Sky News on Sunday Morning with Trevor Phillips that ministers are going to “introduce new restrictions on lower-skilled workers” because “what we should be doing is concentrating on the higher-skilled migration and we should be concentrating on training in the UK”.
“We will be closing the care worker visa for overseas recruitment,” she added.
Under current rules, to qualify for a care worker visa a person must have a certificate of sponsorship from their employer with information about the role they have been offered in the UK.
The Home Secretary told the BBC the rules around the system will change to “prevent” it being used “to recruit from abroad” but “we will allow them to continue to extend visas and also to recruit from more than 10,000 people who came on a care worker visa, where the sponsorship visa was cancelled”.
“Effectively they came to jobs that weren’t actually here or that were not of a proper standard,” she added.
“Care companies should be recruiting from that pool of people, rather than recruiting from abroad, we are closing recruitment from abroad,” Ms Cooper said.
“We’re doing it alongside saying we need to being in a new fair pay agreement for care workers,” she added.
Reduction
She told the BBC programme that she expects the changes to skilled worker visas combined with changes to the care visa which “will come in in the course of this year” will lead to a “reduction of up to 50,000 fewer lower-skilled visas over the course of the next year”.
However, she declined to put a number on the overall net migration target, telling Sky News it left previous governments with “broken promises”.
“We’re not going to take that really failed approach, because I think what we need to do is rebuild credibility and trust in the whole system,” she added.
Shadow home secretary Chris Philp said he would support the changes to care worker visas, but the 50,000 “tweak” is “not enough”.
“We would go further and tomorrow we intend to push to a vote in Parliament a measure that would have an annual cap on migration voted for and set by Parliament to restore proper democratic accountability, because those numbers were far, far too high,” he said.
Skills shortages
According to the Home Office, with the White Paper there will be tighter restrictions on recruitment for jobs with skills shortages, businesses will be supported to take on more British workers and employers will be told to develop plans to train staff in the UK.
In an attempt to reduce the number of low-skilled workers coming to Britain, the skilled visa threshold will be increased to graduate-level.
Officials will also set up a labour market evidence group to examine which sectors are reliant on overseas workers.
The department have also said there will be reforms to deportation and removal rules. Under the proposals, the Home Office will be informed of all foreign nationals convicted of offences and officials say it will make it easier to remove people who commit offences.
The Liberal Democrats have called on the Government to “step up” and pay care workers “properly”.
The party’s health and social care spokeswoman Helen Morgan said: “Labour must step up and take proper action to address recruitment shortages including paying our care workers properly and rolling out a plan for career progression.
“This action must be taken without delay to ensure patients can receive the high quality care they need.”
The white paper comes less than a fortnight after Reform UK took control of 10 councils in England in the local elections.
Nigel Farage’s party also beat Labour to victory in the Runcorn and Helsby parliamentary by-election.
Deputy leader Richard Tice told Sky News on Sunday that the party’s strong performance in the local elections was “because people are raging, furious, about the levels of both legal and illegal immigration”
Industry and union attack plans to ban overseas care worker recruitment
Care England has labelled the change a ‘crushing blow to an already fragile sector’. Home Secretary Yvette Cooper appearing on the BBC 1 current affairs programme, Sunday With Laura Kuenssberg (BBC/PA)
Plans to end overseas recruitment for care workers have been labelled as “cruel” and ministers told the sector would have “collapsed long ago” without foreign staff.
The Government has been urged to “reassure overseas workers they’ll be allowed to stay” after Yvette Cooper announced that recruitment from abroad would be closed.
CareEngland has labelled the change a “crushing blow to an already fragile sector”, while Unison has said that “hostile language” has seen applications for care visas “fall off a cliff”.
Martin Green, Care England’s chief executive accused the Government of “kicking us while we’re already down”.
“For years, the sector has been propping itself up with dwindling resources, rising costs, and mounting vacancies,” he said.
“International recruitment wasn’t a silver bullet, but it was a lifeline. Taking it away now, with no warning, no funding, and no alternative, is not just short-sighted – it’s cruel.”
According to figures released in January 2025, applications to come to the UK on a health and care worker visa fell sharply last year.
Overall there were 63,800 applications between April and December 2024, compared to 299,800 a year earlier.
A ban on overseas care workers bringing family dependants with them to the UK came into force in 2024.
Applications to come to the UK on a health and care worker visa fell sharply last year, according to figures released in January (Jeff Moore/PA) PA Archive
Christina McAnea, general secretary of the Unison union said that the “NHS and the care sector would have collapsed long ago without the thousands of workers who’ve come to the UK from overseas”.
“Migrant health and care staff already here will now be understandably anxious about what’s to happen to them. The Government must reassure these overseas workers they’ll be allowed to stay and continue with their indispensable work,” she added.
She also called on the Government to “stop describing care jobs as low skilled” and “get on with making its fair pay agreement a reality”.
The Independent Care Group told the Government it has got it “badly wrong”.
Chairman Mike Padgham said that “we do try to recruit staff from this country, but we simply haven’t been able to get the numbers we need”.
“There are currently around 130,000 vacancies in social care. Overseas recruitment brought in around 185,000 much-needed workers. ”
Ms Cooper said rules around care visas will be changed to “prevent” them being used to “recruit from abroad”, but that companies will still be able to recruit from a pool of thousands of people who came to the UK on care visas for jobs that did not exist.
The Home Secretary told Sky News on Sunday Morning with Trevor Phillips that ministers are going to “introduce new restrictions on lower-skilled workers” because “what we should be doing is concentrating on the higher-skilled migration and we should be concentrating on training in the UK”.
“We will be closing the care worker visa for overseas recruitment,” she added.
Under current rules, to qualify for a care worker visa a person must have a certificate of sponsorship from their employer with information about the role they have been offered in the UK.
Restricting staffing during shortage has the care sector worried
Like in the NHS, there is a chronic shortage of carers, with an estimated 70,000 domestic care workers leaving the sector over the last two years.
Image:Residents of a care home in Newport play Bingo
"A crushing blow" is how Care England described government plans to scrap the social care visa scheme, which allows carers from abroad to work in the UK.
It is a move which care providers say makes the crisis in social care even worse.
Skills for Care, the organisation that monitors the workforce in the sector, estimates that an additional 540,000 care workers will be needed by 2040 to meet population needs.
This raises critical questions about where these workers will come from if neither the funding nor the migration route exists.
Caught in the middle: the old and vulnerable.
China remains steadfast in upholding international economic and trade order
AT the request of the US side, China and the United States kicked off on Saturday a high-level meeting on economic and trade affairs in Geneva, Switzerland. China decided to make contacts with the US side after taking full account of global expectations, national interests and appeals from US businesses and consumers.
China possesses strong resilience and ample policy tools to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests. It stands ready to work with the international community to jointly oppose all forms of unilateralism, protectionism and economic coercion.
Whether the road ahead involves negotiation or confrontation, one thing is clear: China’s determination to safeguard its development interests is unshakable, and its stance on maintaining the global economic and trade order remains unwavering.
The United States’ reckless abuse of tariffs has flagrantly contravened World Trade Organisation rules and destabilised the global economic order. Far from serving any legitimate purpose, these punitive duties represent a deliberate attempt to upend the multilateral trade system, inflicting damage on the rightful interests of countries around the world.
Beijing stands ready to work with the international community to jointly oppose all forms of unilateralism and protectionism
For the United States itself, its tariff offensive amounts to economic self-harm: while it cannot cure underlying structural problems, it has triggered financial market volatility, fueled domestic inflation, eroded industrial capacity and raised the risk of recession.
As the world’s two largest economies, China and the United States share a profound stake in ensuring the soundness and steadiness of their commercial ties. The US business and academic communities have consistently stressed that international trade is not a zero-sum game but should foster mutual benefit and shared success. US policymakers should heed these rational and objective voices, and take concrete steps to restore China-US trade relations to a path of healthy and stable growth.
Given mounting calls for economic stability, the decision to sit down for negotiations represents a positive and necessary step to resolve disagreements and avert further escalation. But as China has consistently emphasised, meaningful dialogue can only proceed on the basis of mutual respect, equal consultation and mutual benefit.
If Washington is truly committed to resolving trade frictions through dialogue, it must first confront the harm its tariff-driven policies have inflicted not only on the global trading system, but also on its own economy and citizens.
It must honor established international trade rules and adhere to principles of fairness and justice. Talks should never be a pretext for continued coercion or extortion, and China will firmly reject any proposal that compromises core principles or undermines the broader cause of global equity.
Confronted with US protectionism and economic bullying, China has deployed decisive countermeasures and rallied multilateral support through the United Nations and other global forums to amplify the call for justice. China’s actions defend not only its own legitimate development rights but also the shared interests of the wider international community, particularly smaller and developing nations.
China has taken note that some economies are also engaged in negotiations with the United States. It must be emphasised that appeasement cannot secure peace, nor can compromise earn respect. Upholding principled positions and defending fairness and justice remain the right way to safeguard one’s legitimate interests.
At its heart, this is not just a trade dispute — it is an encounter between two fundamentally different visions in this age of economic globalisation: one rooted in openness, cooperation and shared growth; the other driven by confrontation, exclusion, and zero-sum mentality.
The talks in Switzerland mark a crucial step towards resolving the issue. However, its ultimate resolution requires sufficient strategic patience and perseverance, as well as the international community’s steadfast support for justice. China entered the Geneva talks with confidence in its solid economic fundamentals. Its economy grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025; in 2024, its total goods imports and exports surpassed 43 trillion yuan (about 5.94 trillion US dollars), with a more diversified set of trading partners and improved export composition.
Meanwhile, policy innovation and market vitality are working in tandem: new fiscal and monetary measures, ranging from interest-rate cuts to targeted support for innovation and social welfare, have further bolstered growth prospects and strengthened China’s ability to weather external shocks.
At a time when globalisation is under strain and protectionism is on the rise, China has chosen not to lock itself up. Instead, it has doubled down on opening up, advancing trade and investment liberalisation with renewed determination and creating opportunities for shared development across the globe.
China’s position is clear: no matter how the global landscape shifts, it will remain committed to openness, using the reliability of its own development to help offset the uncertainties facing the wider world.
Trade wars and tariff battles yield no winners. A stable and constructive China-US relationship serves the interests of both nations and the world at large. It is through sustained dialogue, responsible management of differences and deeper win-win cooperation between the world’s two largest economies that the global economy can gain the confidence and momentum it urgently needs.
AMIDST worsening ties between India and Pakistan, a noticeable feature was the differences in how citizens of both countries responded to the threat and fallout of violence. Pakistanis mostly, though not exclusively, turned to humour and nihilism around the possibility of Indian incursions. Indian social media, on the other hand, was dominated by jingoistic calls for escalating violence and revenge.
Events of the past week confirmed what many have observed for at least the past two decades: on national security issues, mainstream Indian political parties, news media, the cultural sphere, and internet using citizens tend to follow the state’s line tout court. The outcome of this homogeneity is an information ecosystem with little scepticism, no reluctance towards the idea of violence, and a deluge of misinformation. At the time of writing — before the ceasefire was announced — Indian news and social media accounts had proudly declared the destruction of Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, a fact that apparently eluded the residents of these cities.
None of this stands to absolve Pakistani news actors and social media users. There is a long history of anti-India jingoism on this side as well. In the current stand-off, celebrities who posted conciliatory messages after the first wave of cross-border attacks were heavily criticised and labelled as sell-outs by social media users.
But, before Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes against India, the overall atmosphere remained tinged with a degree of scepticism towards kinetic action and mainstream news reporting. This reluctance was not the outcome of some progressive, pacifist turn among Pakistani urbanites, but instead, the result of the last three years of domestic politics.
The fallout between the PTI and the state has led the latter’s favourability to drop among large segments of the population most likely to voice their views on the internet. The urban middle classes (among other groups), from KP through Punjab to Karachi, have parked their loyalties with Imran Khan, and in opposition to his incarceration.
Political legitimacy in India is generated not through tangible material gain but through right-wing communalism, nationalism, and the selling of — unattainable — dreams.
But there is another factor at play here as well. The economic crisis of the last few years has exacted a heavy toll on Pakistanis as a whole. There is a sense of disillusionment and exhaustion with the status quo, and with a government that has failed to keep up even the bare minimum of its end of the bargain. With struggles for both political rights and basic economic survival taking centre stage, generating support for the kinetic actions of a government lacking popular legitimacy would have appeared difficult.
The Indian state does not face such a crisis of legitimacy, at least in its heartlands. But the way this legitimacy is created and sustained deserves further scrutiny. Some suggest that the Indian state under Modi delivers on economic growth, basic security, and a rise in the standard of living, which explains the full-throttled support that it gets online.
But the reality is far more complex. It is well documented now that the gains of rapid economic growth in India have increasingly accrued to the top. Since liberalisation began in earnest, wealth differentials have ballooned considerably. As per the World Inequality Database, the top one per cent now holds about 33pc of national wealth while the bottom half of the population holds about 6pc; in 1991, these shares were 16pc and 9pc, respectively.
Among firms, there is a growing tendency towards monopolisation, aided by the state, that cuts across different sectors. As detailed in a paper by Pranab Bardhan, the 20 most profitable firms generated 14pc of total corporate profits in 1990, 30pc in 2010 and 70pc in 2019. These monopoly capitalists with close ties to the state now have a large footprint in Indian news media as well, which partly explains the lopsided nature of national security reporting in the country.
Mounting income and wealth inequality, and the creation of an enclave economy (which mostly caters to the needs of the well-off), are undisputed facts. India’s structural transformation is a strange one in so far that agriculture contributes a small share (15pc) to total output, yet employs nearly 45pc of the labour force. The vast majority of Indian workers, especially in the populous northern and central states, find themselves in low-skilled informal work that operates barely above basic subsistence levels.
In this context, political legitimacy is generated not through tangible material gain but through right-wing communalism, nationalism, and the selling of (unattainable) dreams. To the vast swathes of young men, the shiny enclaves of tier-1 cities like Mumbai and Bangalore are shown as a possible future, as long as they oppose the enemy (domestic minorities and their allies beyond borders), and fall in line behind the ruling party in its civilisational mission of Hindutva dominance.
The outcome of this strategy is what we see on the internet today. Organised troll and disinfo armies intervene not just in South Asian matters, but in right-wing discourse around the world. And they are ably supported by plenty of regular citizens chomping at the bit for war, laying out violent fantasies of conquest, and dreaming of restoring masculine honour.
This formula is proving to be remarkably successful for Modi and the broader right-wing Indian ecosystem. They can continue to deliver economic growth to their ultra-rich benefactors, and allow for just enough to trickle down to sustain a conservative middle class. For everyone else, especially those subsisting on the margins, temple politics, the tadka of Hindua cultural dominance, and dreams of ‘Akhand Bharat’ will remain sufficient. All the while drowning out and bullying dissident and progressive voices, and making the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the region ever more remote.
TIME is running out. According to the latest Human Development Report, published by the UNDP this past Tuesday, Pakistan ranks among the 26 states that scored the lowest on its Human Development Index. In terms of quality of life, it is ranked at a measly 168th out of 193 countries. It is the only country in South Asia, apart from Afghanistan, that is listed in the ‘low human development’ category. The rest of the 24 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. But there is a silver lining in this dark cloud. This year’s report, which focuses on the possibilities unlocked by AI for human development, notes that, if adopted strategically, technology can significantly enhance human potential. It has now been a year since the UNDP’s Pakistan arm published the National Human Development Report 2024, which had been subtitled ‘Doing Digital for Development’. Disappointingly, the agency has noted that Pakistan’s digital landscape remains largely unchanged since then, even though it is home to one of the world’s largest workforces of freelancers and promising AI talent. Pakistan’s problem is that it has struggled to address digital inequalities, which mirror existing socioeconomic divisions.
A large chunk of Pakistan’s population of some 250m is at risk of economic impoverishment if the state does not prioritise investments in digital development. Half of the country still does not have access to smartphones, computers and even basic internet services, according to UNDP. With the rise of AI, the ‘have nots’ — especially the 42pc of the workforce that is currently engaged in automatable jobs, as estimated by the agency — are at risk of being left further impoverished while the privileged few — those who not only have access to modern technologies but also to tools that can teach them how to utilise them — are catapulted forward. It is these inequalities that Pakistani policymakers must be constantly wary of and work to mitigate as AI gradually becomes more mainstream and starts threatening jobs held by low- or unskilled workers. As the UNDP points out, legislative measures, like the National AI Policy 2024 introduced by Pakistan, are just not enough: the state needs to proactively ensure universal access to digital tools, affordable infrastructure and public sector readiness to reap the benefits of the AI transformation. The opportunity is there: it is a matter of whether we take it or get left behind.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
IT was April 1994. Pakistan’s army chief Gen Waheed Kakar was on an official visit to Washington. Pakistan was under military and economic sanctions imposed by the US on the nuclear issue in 1990. As a result, a wide range of military equipment including 28 F16s that Pakistan had paid for was embargoed.
Against this backdrop, the nuclear issue dominated most of Gen Kakar’s meetings. In one meeting with top US military and State Department officials, which I also attended as Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, our American interlocuters offered to release all our equipment including the planes if Pakistan agreed to freeze its nuclear programme and allow a one-time inspection to verify a cap on enrichment. Gen Kakar listened patiently and then politely told his hosts: “Gentlemen, I come in friendship but we in the East do not measure our relationship in planes and tanks. You can keep our F16s and our money. Our national security is non-negotiable.”
I recall this meeting as one example of how resolutely and uncompromisingly Pakistan maintained its position on an issue vital to its security. Had it not done so and caved into international pressure it would not have acquired the nuclear capability which is and has been the guarantor of the country’s security. There has been no all-out war between Pakistan and India since both neighbours became nuclear powers, despite regular crises, skirmishes and military confrontations.
The latest crisis has again thrown this into sharp relief. True, India has acted on its doctrine of limited war under the nuclear threshold, to try to push the boundaries and enlarge space for this in every successive crisis. It has also become the first nuclear power to attack another nuclear state by missiles and air strikes. It has sought to create a ‘new normal’ by launching kinetic actions in mainland Pakistan whenever there is a terror attack in occupied Kashmir, for which it holds Pakistan responsible without evidence.
Pakistan’s strategic capability remains the guarantor of its security against a full-scale war.
In the latest crisis, India used all the instruments of modern, hybrid warfare — ballistic missile strikes, drones, disinformation, psy-ops and weaponising water to undermine deterrence. But Pakistan’s conventional capabilities deterred India from provoking an even larger conflict. Pakistan’s counteractions (initially downing Indian fighter aircraft) imposed heavy costs on India for its aggression. Retaliating to the second round of unprovoked Indian attacks, including on its air bases, Pakistan launched a military operation involving air strikes, missiles and armed drones against Indian military bases and infrastructure in and much beyond Kashmir. A ceasefire followed soon after brokered by Washington and announced by President Donald Trump.
Pakistan’s military response was designed to re-establish deterrence while blunting the aims of limited war and thwarting India’s effort to seek space for conventional war under the nuclear overhang. India’s reckless actions escalated the crisis to a dangerous level and drove it into uncharted territory — almost to the edge of all-out war. But its military brinkmanship had to stop well short of Pakistan’s known nuclear red lines. Thus, were it not for the nuclear factor, a full-scale war could have broken out.
The story of Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear capability is worth recalling to remind ourselves of the formidable challenges that were faced — and overcome — to acquire it. Confronted with an implacable adversary Pakistan initially pursued a strategy of external balancing by forging military alliances with the West to counter India and its hegemonic ambitions.
But the lesson of the country’s defeat and dismemberment in 1971 was that it could only depend on itself for its security. India’s nuclear explosion in 1974 was a turning point. It convinced Pakistan of the imperative to acquire nuclear weapons. Western countries, however, sought to punish Pakistan for India’s explosion by adopting discriminatory policies and denying it technology.
Pakistan faced innumerable obstacles in its nuclear journey. It braved Western embargoes, sanctions and censure, US opposition and unrelenting international pressure to stay the course. It took the country 25 years of arduous effort to build a strategic capability and even longer to transform that into an operational deterrent with an effective delivery system. That objective could not have been achieved if successive civilian and military governments had not all pursued this regardless of costs but confident that a firm national consensus backed the effort.
The book Eating Grass by Feroz Khan, published some years ago, describes the fascinating interplay between geostrategic shifts, key political and scientific figures and evolution of strategic beliefs, which shaped Pakistan’s nuclear decisions. It is a riveting insider account of the country’s quest for a nuclear capability and the challenges it encountered. Its title is inspired by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s much-cited remark that if India built the bomb, “we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own”.
Khan explains how Pakistan mastered the nuclear fuel cycle despite heavy odds. He credits this not to a few individuals but to the collective determination of hundreds of people in the civil-military establishment. However, what ultimately determined nuclear success was the cadre of scientists and engineers whose talent was tapped in the country’s early years and who were motivated by the resolve not to let India’s strategic advances go unanswered.
A book that focuses on a different aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear journey is The Security Imperative: Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy by Zamir Akram, an outstanding diplomat. Nuclear diplomacy played a critical role in the country’s efforts to develop a strategic capability which Akram chronicles with illuminating insights. A key theme of his book is how Pakistan’s diplomacy navigated through the discriminatory landscape erected by the West, while advancing its nuclear and missile programmes.
As a diplomat I witnessed first-hand the international pressure mounted on the country. Pakistan was asked to unilaterally sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, agree to inspection of its nuclear facilities, sign up to negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty in the UN’s Conference on Disarmament and curb its missile development. Pakistan said no to all of the above to protect its security interests.
Because of such decisions and the exceptional efforts of those who built Pakistan’s strategic capability its security is assured against a full-fledged war by India. Similar commitment is needed to deal with internal challenges, especially to build a strong, self-reliant economy so that the country is not vulnerable to external pressure.
The writer is an attorney teaching constitutional law and political philosophy.
EIGHTY years ago this week, the Germans surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Forces. This week, King Charles of England began a four-day commemoration of that event. It seems like an ironic anniversary celebration, particularly from the perspective of South Asia where we are poised at the brink of a large-scale war. The cynics among us cannot help but consider the possibility of a third world war beginning on the same days of May when World War II ended.
The details of war, some verified and confirmed and others less so, are everywhere in conversations, text messages, Instagram reels, TV shows, TikTok, etc. Schools open, schools closed, exams proceeding, exams cancelled, work schedules gone awry, business trips that cannot be taken, concerns about the availability of food, etc — all of it amounts to creating confusion and dread. One friend told me that she had stored up two months of groceries in her deep freezer, and is adding to it every day.
This seemed a bit extreme to me. However, people respond to uncertainty in unusual ways. The ordinary person in war situations has little control over what his or her government chooses to do. At the same time, the impact of the decisions of their governments and militaries are inevitably felt most by these same ordinary people.
It is the nature of the human mind to try and create certainty, and the inherent unpredictability of war is a challenge to this. The current barrage of information with doses of misinformation presents a situation in which individuals try to mitigate feelings of helplessness. Hoarding food is one way to do this — to feel that one can be prepared for terrible circumstances whose details are yet not known. People feel something must be done and to prepare for the worst. Then because of one’s preparations they imagine themselves as somewhat safe. War is the ultimate disruption in human life.
War is the ultimate disruption in human life. The continuing sense of crisis is traumatising in its ability to cast one into some parallel universe where the certainties of the old do not apply. In the accounts of the people who endured the travails of World War II, there are stories of attempts to create some semblance of normalcy even in the shadow of complete devastation. Even after schools were closed, parents tried to set up lessons for their children at home. When tea or coffee was not available, some burnt rice and added it to hot water and drank it in the morning-to keep up the ritual of having a warm drink to begin their day. Maintaining this routine of familiarity, clinging to the rhythms of a normalcy that is gone is essential for survival.
Survival, therefore, is not a matter of physical security alone. The trauma of war is not simply that of living or dying; it is — as the younger generations of South Asians would learn in the event of a full-scale conflict — a matter of enduring a million other smaller traumas. Ever since the terror attack on Pahalgam on April 22, people have had trouble focusing on work, focusing on studies, focusing on the other details of life that otherwise are central to our existence. The spectre of conflict means everything else has
less meaning and yet everything still has to be done. Work assignments have to be completed, exams to be taken, children fed, and chores completed. The tension of looming doom takes a heavy toll on human psychology. When war ends, even the living are left with the weight of having survived the debilitating burdens of many small traumas.
In the current situation, there are claims and counterclaims and attacks and retaliations. Drones are raining down. Rhetoric is at fever pitch; each side touts its strength and killing abilities. To be against killing and against war in this moment is likely to be deemed unpatriotic. So very few would raise their voice against the utter senselessness of ego, bombs and the ability to kill large numbers. Everyone seems to forget about the human devastation if hostilities were to be translated into the deployment of nuclear weapons — how complete an end that would be.
It is possible, as the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish once wrote, leaders will declare war and then leaders will shake hands. Hostilities that began will ultimately end. Only the mother waiting for the dead son or the girl waiting for her father or the wife waiting for the husband will be left with their loss. For those that incur those losses, the war will never end — it will continue for the rest of their lives.
I WANTED to start this piece by writing the amount I spent last year on wellness treatments. I was unable to do so for two reasons: the first being that midway through accounting, I was embarrassed by the amount I’d spent for pain-management related work. Second, I could not ascertain whether a grossly expensive injection of Botox (almost Rs100,000 — don’t judge, I was desperate at the time for pain relief) constituted wellness or fell under the purview of conventional medicine. If wellness is the opposite of illness, and everything related to the pain in the neck hadn’t worked so far, because I was avoiding steroid-based painkillers, then Botox should count as wellness.
By that definition, so should exercise — yoga and strength training (Rs48,000) plus walking (free unless you count the Fitbit I bought a few years ago). What else counts? One-day breath-work session (Rs7,000)? Let’s not forget the prescription supplements I had to procure from the UK (Rs70,000), then have delivered to my friend in the UAE and wait until someone could bring them to Karachi. This doesn’t include the costs involved in embarking on an elimination diet — removing gluten, wheat, dairy, red meat and sugar. It was an expensive venture but it was perhaps the most effective for treating inflammation. That reminds me, I should also include the fees for the functional medicine doctor too (Rs15,000).
As you can imagine from the aforementioned, I have spent a lot of money on wellness in my quest to avoid illness.
Although my pain fluctuates — folks with chronic pain are familiar with good days, bad days — I have made great strides in other areas of health, like gut and brain clarity. There are many studies that show the inextricable link between the two — healthy gut means healthy mind.
Wellness has been reduced to a product or service one can buy.
However, all this has resulted in depleted bank accounts. And a regret for choosing such a poor-paying profession.
Wellness doesn’t come cheap.
According to the Global Wellness Summit Report 2024, roughly one in every $20 is spent on wellness in the US, and the global wellness economy is expected to rise to $8.5 trillion by 2027.
The report says global wellness spending falls into personal care and beauty, physical activity, healthy eating, nutrition and weight loss, public health and prevention, and wellness tourism. New categories like mental wellness, wellness real estate, and workplace wellness are gaining momentum, valued at $181 billion, $398bn, and $51bn, respectively.
But who is wellness for and why is it not egalitarian, irrespective of class and gender, ethnicities and tribes. I’m so happy that people can take time off for mental health reasons, but let us remember who can afford to do so.
Some scholars have said wellness can be traced to ancient times, even religious belief, that says your body is your temple. That translates to ‘my body is mine to protect’. I shall eat, work out, drink as I please and now, I have more access to, for example, organic produce in Pakistan. Self-care, thus, becomes exclusionary because it ignores how my well-being comes at the cost of someone else’s labour.
In the last decade, I have come across more experiential-based offerings in the wellness industry in Pakistan like sound baths, breath work, guided meditations, cacao ceremonies, yoga retreats in the mountains and so forth. There’s a wonderful two-day wellness festival too which aims to be inclusionary. There was certainly a boom in such offerings during the pandemic which made isolation and by extension a reset, mandatory. With more time to be online, consumers and retailers grew in abundance. A better version of you was possible if you have the money for it.
Therein lies the rub: the wellness industry provides a sense of community but it is paradoxically individualistic. Its messaging is to fix yourself, to make you feel morally superior to others who, frankly, do not have the means to focus on their health. It also ignores the role of genetics and environmental factors.
Wellness thus has been reduced to a product or service you can buy. The pandemic gave people an opportunity to go outside but as soon as the lockdowns eased, and capitalism returned with full force, the outdoors was replaced with more ‘spaces’ to practise wellness.
People want to achieve ‘high-level wellness’ as Dr Halbert L. Dunn wrote in 1959 in a scientific journal as “a condition of change in which the individual moves forward, climbing towards a higher potential of functioning”.
What, however, is that functioning for? I worry that we are trying to become more functional for more work. I wasn’t able to find that answer but I hope I’ve given you room to pause and reflect on these questions. Be well.
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
AS in the past, the evolving war-like situation in the subcontinent has triggered cries in both India and Pakistan for all internal political differences to be forsaken in the name of ‘national unity’. Amongst the most notable examples of what this means in practice are the public statements issued by India’s two major left-wing parties, the Communist Party of India (CPI), and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), following India’s strikes inside Pakistan on May 7.
Both parties have aped the Modi regime’s narrative about Pakistan harbouring ‘terrorists’ and the righteousness of targeting the ‘infrastructure’ (read: civilians) responsible for the Pahalgam attacks of April 22. The statements are uncritical of Indian state policy and only cursorily mention the need for diplomatic solutions to avert war.
Other Indian opposition parties, including the Congress, have expressed similar positions. But the parliamentary communist parties, with a long history of challenging state nationalism whilst also being principally anti-war, appear to be entering unchartered territory.
Bear in mind that the CPI and CPI-M have both remained largely critical of the Indian government’s support for Zionist war crimes against Palestinians since October 2023. They have repeatedly demanded that India re-adopt its historical policy of support for Palestinian self-determination, refusing to be drawn into the dominant discourse of dehistoricising Palestinian militancy and engaging in blanket condemnation of Hamas as a ‘terrorist’ organisation.
The CPI and CPI-M are threatening their very own political creed.
Even if India’s otherwise robust left has been less willing to challenge the Indian state with regards to the question of Kashmiri self-determination, it has at various points acknowledged the organic roots of militancy in held Kashmir rather than just pawn off all responsibility to the proverbial ‘foreign hand’. But by taking the positions they have vis-Ã -vis burgeoning conflict with Pakistan, the CPI and CPI-M are threatening their very own political creed.
This is no small matter, especially when looked at from the perspective of the much smaller and embattled Pakistani left. To oppose state militarism in this country can be a perilous endeavour, as evidenced by the repression faced by progressive forces. But despite the propaganda in official and online media, left-progressives have not retreated from their principled positions.
It is not just in India that it is becoming more difficult for what can broadly be called the anti-war left to survive, let alone thrive. Hindutva is not the only extreme ideology to have taken hold through ‘democratic’ institutions. We all live in political environments dominated by an increasingly xenophobic right wing, undergirded by entrenched military-industrial-media establishments. But this is exactly why surrendering to majoritarian sentiment is anathema for anyone committed to a long-term horizon of justice, egalitarianism and lasting peace.
The CPI-M ought to have learned from its own historic defeat in what was once its bastion of West Bengal in 2011. Having ruled one of India’s largest states for over three decades, its downfall was triggered by a symbolic decision in 2007 to dispossess thousands of peasants in Nandigram so as to set up a special export zone. The peasantry was the bedrock of CPI-M’s politics, but by acquiescing to the then dominant logics of neoliberal globalisation, the party turned its back on its social base, and signed its own death warrant.
In the intervening two decades, the CPI-M has been unable to recover lost ground in West Bengal, though re-taining governmental power in Kerala. The socialist left in Pakistan is not currently equip-ped to take state power, so parliamentary communism in India still represents an inspiration of sorts. But by unequivocally supporting the Modi regime in its warmongering, both the CPI-M and CPI have greatly reduced their lustre.
At the time of writing, India has further escalated tensions by flying drones into major Pakistani cities, triggering panic and creating further space for hawkish elements in the Pakistani political and intellectual mainstream. The drones are reportedly imported from Israel, a symbol of the growing synergy between Zionism and Hindutva. Surely it is this nexus that Indian progressives should be seeking to challenge.
At the very least, those on the left in the subcontinent and beyond must stop uncritically deploying the language of ‘terrorism’ at the behest of the state, thereby trampling upon the real histories of structural oppression which explain so many conflicts in our region and world. In the fog of war hysteria and disinformation, this much clarity is a must.
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
INDIA and Pakistan are being driven, inexorably, towards a confrontation that neither side wants but neither side can avert. The drivers of conflict have multiplied, the limits tested by these episodic stand-offs have been stretched, and the points of contact between their militaries during the kinetic manoeuvres in each of these stand-offs has multiplied.
From the first such stand-off, perhaps in 1990, till today, there is an unmistakable trajectory of escalation. What is driving this?
One of the big drivers is India’s attempt to end its difficulties in occupied Kashmir using a violent development model that has lain behind the rise of Narendra Modi. The model was born in the early 2000s that saw two pivotal developments in both India and Pakistan. Up until 9/11, Pakistan was being pushed increasingly towards global isolation and its economy was depleted to near breaking point. The country had undergone three rounds of debt rescheduling and just finished a gruelling, short-term Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF that left the populace battered with unemployment and sharply rising energy costs. There was no further growth path for Pakistan in those years other than deeper structural reform, which was proving too heavy a burden even for a dictator with near absolute power.
However, 9/11 changed all that overnight. Instantly, Pakistan went from being an international pariah to a front-line state in a superpower’s war, and was eventually crowned with the status of ‘major non Nato ally’. The volume of money that poured into the country, coupled with the generous terms of debt rescheduling extended by the Paris Club in December 2001, impacting a total debt stock of $12.5 billion, allowed the regime of Gen Musharraf to pump growth to unprecedented levels, creating a bubble economy that made more fortunes for more people than any similar period in the country’s history.
Modi’s model of development rested on the ability to efficiently dispossess people and take land required for large-scale projects.
This sudden reversal of fortunes in Pakistan came as a rude shock to our neighbours in India. Over the course of the 1990s, India and Pakistan were locked in a stand-off over Kashmir, which left India increasingly embattled by the uprising in the occupied territory and Pakistan in the grip of sanctions and isolation. India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the uprising in occupied Kashmir, and of providing training and cover to militants in the troubled valley. At one point, Pakistan came close to being placed on the State Department’s list of sponsors of terrorism, a designation that would have had far-reaching implications for the country had it come to pass.
By 2001, India’s policy of imposing a crushing isolation on Pakistan was finally bearing fruit when 9/11 came along and reversed it all. This was a big shock to the Indian foreign policy establishment, which had shouldered a tremendous cost in men and materiel for repression of the uprising in occupied Kashmir, under the hopes that pressure on Pakistan would eventually cause the uprising to die down. All those hopes were dashed once Pakistan became a superpower favourite again.
The Congress party had seen its fortunes sag throughout the 1990s, losing power to the BJP by the end of the decade. But in 2004, it scored a surprising victory at the polls and renewed its electoral strength again in 2009 by increasing its seats in the Lok Sabha from 153 to 206.
Yet trouble brewed behind this double movement in the early 2000s, which had seen the return to power of the Congress party in India and a reversal of Pakistan’s fortunes. This was when Modi made his appearance on the big stage of Indian politics with the Gujarat riots in 2002, cynically using communal hate and violence as a tool to grab power. Once in power, Modi unrolled a model of violent development, which fused rent-seeking alliances with billionaires at the federal level, with high levels of public expenditure on infrastructure projects to promote ports, power plants, luxury urban housing developments and more. This model of development rested on the ability to efficiently dispossess people and take land required for large-scale projects, high levels of government spending and a close, symbiotic relationship between wealthy elites, the party apparatus and the government machinery of India.
Fortunes changed following the Great Financial Crisis in 2008. The Congress party was at a loss for ideas on how to restart growth in India, and Musharraf’s growth bubble burst comprehensively while Pakistan’s troubles with the US mounted. As Pakistan sank once more into its pre-9/11 state of isolation coupled with a depleted economy, the Congress party hurtled towards its most stunning electoral defeat ever in 2014. That was Modi’s year, when he also brought this model of violent development as his party’s vision for achieving a final resolution of New Delhi’s long-running Kashmir problem.
Two ideas were central to this vision, and both have a pedigree in India’s policy conversation going back at least to the early 2000s. One was to revoke Kashmir’s special status granted under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The second was to cast off the constraints of the Indus Waters Treaty. With both these done, the government would be in a better position to use public funds to initiate large-scale infrastructure projects through which to select winners and losers within Kashmir. The idea was to reward those who would play ball with the government, and crush those who wouldn’t.
These are the broad developments that imparted such inexorable momentum to the episodic return of stand-offs between India and Pakistan. Modi’s India wants to make Kashmir its own, regardless of the wishes of Kashmir’s inhabitants. Pakistan is determined to thwart this ambition, regardless of the cost it has to pay along the way. Neither side can win in this situation. Yet none can afford to lose either.
THE suspension of disbelief required to follow the Indian media these days must qualify as an extreme sport. One imagines viewers needing a cup of tea and a lie-down afterwards, if only to reorient with reality.
Consider, for example, the breathless ‘coverage’ that has been aired by several Indian news channels regarding their military’s campaign against Pakistan. During Thursday night’s transmissions, one claimed that Islamabad had fallen, another that Peshawar had been bombed; one that Lahore was in the crosshairs of Indian tanks, and another that the Karachi port was in flames. One promised that an F-16 had been shot down, while another that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had surrendered. But it was the gaggle of ‘experts’ on a live Times Now broadcast, excitedly proclaiming that a ground invasion of Pakistan was underway, that truly captured the absurdity of it all.
Truth is the first casualty of war, but it is nonetheless jarring to witness its assassination on such an industrial scale. That the fog of war obscures the truth is understandable, but for newsrooms to actively add to the fog rather than try to pierce it, less so. That said, the media on this side of the border is also not above blame. A few television channels and the so-called experts featured on them have been acting irresponsibly. They must avoid unconfirmed or unverified reports and concentrate more on sensible reporting.
But at least Pakistani media is publicly censured when it is unable to do justice to its duty. Many will openly state that they do not trust it to report truthfully and reliably and will be more open to what independent sources and foreign media have to say. One wonders if there is a similar level of self-awareness next door, where major news networks seem engaged in a race to outdo each other in patriotic theatre, unmoored from any discernible restraint.
Reports that social media platforms like X and Meta have been ‘legally’ coerced into blocking thousands of accounts to protect New Delhi’s narratives should invite global concern over the health of the world’s so-called ‘largest democracy’. More so because the ‘information’ being fed to the Indian people is patently false, dangerously misleading, and designed to whip up base sentiments. Media irresponsibility can lead to the creation of unrealistic expectations in the minds of ordinary people, and these expectations, when unmet, often turn into pressure on leaders to ‘do more’ against the perceived enemy. This is how skirmishes escalate into battles, and battles into full-blown wars. It bears repeating that in times of crisis, it is the journalists’ job to inform, not inflame. The dereliction of this duty has dangerous real-world consequences. Media on both sides of the border would do well to heed this warning.
The writer is the author of Development Pathways: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 1947-2022.
THE April 22 Pahalgam incident has evoked a hysterical reaction from India, which has attacked Pakistani and Azad Kashmir cities killing innocent civilians, including children, and damaging the Neelum-Jhelum hydel works. Within five minutes of the Pahalgam attack, Indian media started pointing fingers at Pakistan alleging it had enabled the terrorist attack. Two weeks later, India attacked without providing a shred of evidence of Pakistan’s alleged involvement. The purpose of this article is to urge Indian policymakers to avoid prolonging their actions as the political, social and economic costs for their own country are substantial, and instead, examine their policy stance dispassionately.
India ranks fifth among global economies and has an impressive record of rapid economic growth, which has lifted several hundred million out of poverty. It is one of the world’s leading exporters of IT and IT-enabled services, and aspires to become a developed economy by 2047, with the size of its economy projected to range between $23-35 trillion. This requires an uninterrupted and continuously upward moving growth curve. India is also working hard to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is among a group of developing countries leading the movement towards a multipolar world with the expanding role of BRICS.
Given this wide range of ambitions, any attempt to disrupt regional peace through kinetic or non-kinetic actions will derail it from its chosen path. Peaceful and cordial relations with neighbouring countries, on the other hand, would enhance the prospects of attaining these ambitions.
There have been past instances, such as in the 2001-02 stand-off, when Indian policymakers made sensible decisions and withdrew from the path of prolonged confrontation. The Indian troops were mobilised in large numbers in 2001-02 along the Pakistan border and as Zahid Hussain recently noted “there was an imminent threat of a full-fledged war between the two countries, but sanity prevailed. Not only was war prevented, but a more substantive peace process between India and Pakistan was also witnessed”.
The economic costs of military adventures, along with at least six other channels, can adversely affect the trajectory of India’s path towards prosperity and influence as a regional power. Elevated risk perception, trade routes and supply chain disruptions and uncertainty about the future would activate the channels highlighted below.
Any attempt by India to disrupt regional peace will derail it from its chosen path.
Cost of military adventures: Foreign affairs forums on the economic impacts of a full-scale India-Pakistan war estimate the daily cost of mobilising operations could reach $670 million with broader economic losses potentially reaching $17.8 billion, which is equivalent to a 20 per cent GDP contraction over four weeks of conflict. According to Antonis Bhardwaj, a short-term conventional India-Pakistan war could cost between INR14.6bn and INR50bn a day in direct military expenses. A prolonged conflict, accounting for broader macroeconomic impacts could lead to economic losses exceeding $17.8bn daily. Global capability centres: 1,800 offshore corporate offices owned by hundreds of foreign-based MNCs operate in India; they generated earnings of $65bn in 2024. During the last few years, over 150 GCCs have provided back-office, legal, accounting, engineering, design, product development, consulting and architect services, and they act as R&D centres. Many other corporations are thinking of following suit. The principals of existing and planned centres may have second thoughts if political tensions or cross-border incursions continue from time to time. Tourism: India receives 10m tourists every year recording a growth rate of 20pc, contributing $30bn in foreign exchange earnings. The tourist industry has a high multiplier effect on local economies and is a source of significant employment in hospitality, transport, entertainment, handicraft and many other ancillary services. Empirical evidence shows that there is a drop in tourist visits even if there is a semblance of disturbance or violence or threat in the host country. Thus this 20pc annual growth in tourism may be lost. Financial markets: External capital flows, FDI, foreign portfolio investment, external commercial borrowings, nonresident Indian deposits and workers’ remittances have contributed to the build-up of large foreign exchange reserves and financed the large excess of capital flows over and above those required to finance the current account deficit. Foreign investors own about $800bn worth of Indian stocks — roughly 16pc of India’s market cap. Foreign funds are not insensitive to the larger political and economic ecosystem. Financial markets would experience capital flight. Moody’s analytics estimates that potential foreign investment outflows of $10-15bn would take place within the first month of conflict. Defence spending: India has allocated $78.7bn in the FY25 budget for defence. Many voices are pleading to further increase the allocations to modernise and upgrade equipment. An increased threat perception of incursions, war or skirmishes across the LOC or international borders may, in fact, result in larger budgetary allocations for defence. In a country where 800m people still receive subsidised food ration it would be unfortunate if the resources are diverted from welfare to military goods.
Foreign direct investment: India is one of the major recipients of FDI with a cumulative amount of $1.05tr. These flows have increased 20 times from FY01 to FY24 from $237m in 1990 to $71bn 2024. The RBI Bulletin has observed that India is poised to benefit from supply chain realignments, diversified FDI sources and engagement with global investors seeking resilience and scale, given its already established trade linkages. These linkages and realignments would be at risk of rupture if confidence in the economy falters as a result of worsening cross-border skirmishes.
Indus Waters Treaty: The IWT’s unilateral abeyance is hardly justifiable on moral and legal grounds. Given the growing hazards of climate change the two countries along with China and Bangladesh should negotiate an arrangement where food security, water availability and the energy needs of the lower riparian countries are ensured. A potential humanitarian crisis — for which India would be blamed — should be avoided.
Many neutral observers have opined that given Pakistan’s struggle to put the economy on track, its fight against TTP and BLA terrorism and its banning of the Lashkar-i-Taiba and other extremist groups and prosecution of their leaders, it is highly implausible that it would indulge in proxy wars.
Published in Dawn, May 10th, 2025
Why Modi keeps pushing India to the brink of war with Pakistan
The lesson of Modi’s entire public life has been that playing with fire benefits his politics — from the inferno of Gujarat in 2002 to Muslim massacres in Delhi in 2020.
Around two months before his latest derangement, India’s Narendra Modi paid tribute to his RSS inspiration, Veer Savarkar. As the founding father of Hindutva, Savarkar’s ideas have long informed Modi’s actions.
And those ideas are pretty basic. “India should follow the German example to solve the Muslim problem,” Savarkar said in 1938, “…Germany has every right to resort to Nazism and Italy to fascism — and events have justified those -isms.”
Given such events reduced Europe to the bloodlands of World War II, Modi now wishes the same for South Asia: Pakistan and India have been closest to war in half a century; fighter jets tango overhead; and a new generation wakes up to the sirens their grandparents once had to. At the brink of war, again
But we’re here now, and it mostly has to do with Delhi’s own neuroses: the rabid base, the status anxiety, and an occupation that refuses to resolve itself. Modi’s annexation drive in Kashmir was demographic change 101; the “Muslim problem”, to quote Savarkar, would be resolved, even if India had to shred its own supreme law to do it.
But no one asked Kashmir’s sons and daughters. The Pahalgam attack wasn’t a cause; it was a reply — one that came on the heels of mass murder and repression.
Even here, however, Pakistan’s response was to condemn it, call for a neutral probe, and talk up peace. India’s response was to try and choke the water supply to an entire civilian population, fire missiles at a three-year-old girl, and name its operation after the hair choices of married Hindu women.
Because Modi takes the same policy decision each time there’s a Kashmir crisis: to externalise it to Pakistan, and then scream revenge. For Uri in 2016, for Pulwama in 2019, for Pahalgam today. The evidence provided — for an accusation that could lead to nuclear war and the end of the world: none yet.
Instead, the prime minister has again rushed to the border on fumes: at the close of India’s saffron decade, Modi has fed off his manic base, and his base has fed off him — peace is political suicide. Every election demands a war, and every corpse is campaign fodder.
More the pity for his Western allies, long banking on India as the region’s net security provider. But while the ’20s may vary from century to century, a Nazi is still a Nazi.
And no Nazi ever stopped his ingress without a punch to the face: courtesy the excellent Pakistan Air Force doing its job, and only its job (other services take a hint), five planes were shot out of the sky in the middle of their bombing run. CNN,Reuters, and French intelligence would also confirm the first-ever demise of a prize Rafale, India’s shiny new toy. Memes against drones
Hence, also, the second problem: in the same way that Modi’s revenge in 2019 climaxed with wing commander Abhinandan getting checked for microchips on his return from Wagah, the 2025 remix saw Pakistani pilots use Chinese tech to down million-dollar death machines. As Western defence contractors looked on aghast, the global war economy changed overnight.
Of course, much of this is the world the West has made for us: amid the rivers of blood in Gaza, amid the collapse of the post-1945 world order, amid free reign to genocidairres in Tel Aviv and to brutes in Moscow. Asked about the Pak-India conflict, vice president JD Vance shrugged, “None of our business”.
So be it: Pakistan would have to stand up to bullies on its own. Now it has — Modi’s war kicked off with the IAF losing five warplanes, all to self-defence. Before Pakistan could even mention retaliating, Operation Sindoor had become Operation Duckshoot.
None of this was meant to happen: the lotus boys have been trying for escalation for some time now — a goofy theory they’ve borrowed from fellow dimestore Nazis in Israel. Borders, balance, proportion, none of it means anything. All international law is to be discarded, while targets are to be inflicted with shock-and-awe violence.
Just that it hasn’t worked there, and it especially isn’t working here. As one US defence czar put it, “Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire.”
But the lesson of Modi’s entire public life has been that playing with fire benefits his politics — from the inferno of Gujarat in 2002 to Muslim massacres in Delhi in 2020. Where this throughline stops is Pakistan: at the Muslims that got away, and learned to shoot back.
Repelled at the outset, Delhi has tried sating its far-right hordes in other ways. It switched to suicide drones swarming Pakistan’s cities. It tried to change the subject online, by unleashing its IT zombies. (The usual Hindutva triple feature followed: fake news, rape threats, and pornography.)
Yet headlines across the world carried on: this jet, that jet, Dassault stocks versus Chengdu’s. Even The Economist, an otherwise reliable Pakistan-basher, pointed to the conflict’s core cause: “India needs to end its self-defeating repression of the part of Kashmir it controls.”
India’s legacy media didn’t fare much better. After destroying Karachi port — if entirely on the Internet — war hawk Barkha Dutt took cover in a blacked out hotel, where she told us the “moonless night did not even allow for a sliver of light” — nor, perhaps, a sliver of integrity. By the time morning broke, the only thing India had managed to end was Fawad Khan’s Instagram.
If there was a story in all this, it was, as always, Pakistanis themselves. Facing neo-fascists next door and indifference abroad, they responded with memes and jokes. When force was called for, they mostly urged it in defensive terms. They called out their own state for its censorship, for its unrepresentativeness, for its tone-deaf ministers, yet rallied behind the white and green. They mourned seven-year-old Irtiza Abbas Turi, while refusing to mirror Hindutva’s poisonous demonisation of children. And they refused to part with their humanity, wishing for peace from start to end.
The author is an advocate at the Lahore High Court. He is a partner at Ashtar Ali LLP, where he focuses on constitutional law and commercial litigation. He is also a columnist at Dawn.
