Western Hydrocarbon Imports From Russia Since The Ukraine Crisis – Analysis
By Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
By Bipandeep Sharma
Western analysts and policymakers have been highly vocal in criticising India’s oil imports from Russia. Some of these experts have been consistently propagating a strong anti-India narrative that India’s significant purchase of Russian oil since 2022 has been a major factor in support of Russia’s military action in Ukraine. India accounts for about 5.6 million barrels of crude oil consumption per day, which is expected to reach around 6 million barrels per day in the near future. The International Energy Agency has highlighted that India’s growing energy needs over the next two decades would contribute to a 30 per cent increase in global energy demand. Eighty per cent of India’s crude oil and 51 per cent of its gas requirements are met by heavy dependency on imports.[i]
An increasing population, along with the continuously rising demand for energy and rapidly growing industrialisation, necessitates that India meets its oil and gas needs from reliable global sources that can supply them at favourable prices and at consistent rates. This is precisely why India’s oil imports from Russia witnessed a significant uptick after February 2022. Significant discounts, favourable conditions for crude cargo deliveries to Indian ports, steady and consistent supply flows have been the key factors in India’s increased imports of Russian crude oil. This has not only ensured India’s energy security but also enabled Indian refineries to meet global demand for refined oil products.
Major EU and other Western-aligned states (some of which are even NATO member states) have, in fact, increased their hydrocarbon imports from Russia, despite their geopolitical rivalry since 2022. Despite multiple rounds of Western sanctions on Russian companies, many Western states continue to import significant quantities of Russian oil and gas. According to estimates by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Russia earned around € 969 billion in revenue from global fossil fuel exports (Oil, Gas and Coal) from February 2022 to October 2025, and these figures continue to tick upwards.[ii] Of this total of EUR 969 billion, EU countries account for more than € 215 billion in imports from Russia. China alone accounts for around EUR 280 billion, whereas India’s imports from Russia stand at just € 156 billion.
If hydrocarbon import data from Russia for the major Western allies (i.e., Türkiye, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the UAE) are added to EU fossil fuel imports, the combined total of imports since the Ukraine–Russia conflict is around € 422 billion. This makes the Western states and their allies accountable for about 44 per cent of Russia’s total hydrocarbon imports.
It is, therefore, ironic that since the advent of the Ukraine–Russia war, the EU and Western states have been consistently targeting India’s oil imports from Russia. However, when it comes to their own combined net fossil fuel imports from Russia, the figures remain vastly underreported. Türkiye alone accounted for around € 90 billion in fossil fuel imports (€ 61 billion of oil, € 21 billion of gas, and € 8 billion of coal) from Russia from January 2023 to October 2025. This even surpassed the combined import figures of the EU member states, totalling € 67 billion during the same period.
Similarly, analysis of EU member states’ LNG imports suggests that, despite their tough public statements to limit LNG imports from Russia by 2027, they have purchased around € 120 billion worth of Russian liquefied gas over the last 3.5 years. These states imported around € 4.5 billion worth of LNG from Russia in the first half of 2025.[iv] According to a report published by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, EU bloc imports of LNG from Russia increased by 7 per cent year on year in the first half of 2025. The report further suggests that in this increase, France accounted for 41 per cent of Europe’s imports of Russian LNG, followed by Belgium (28 per cent), Spain (20 per cent), the Netherlands (9 per cent) and Portugal (2 per cent).
Western double standards are further evident in the US’s latest round of sanctions in October 2025, which targeted two major Russian oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil, to curb India’s imports of Russian crude oil.[vi] Germany, however, managed to obtain exceptions from the US for the two German subsidiaries of Rosneft, namely Rosneft Deutschland GmbH and RN Refining & Marketing GmbH, to protect its energy interests.
Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán post his recent meeting with Donald Trump has claimed that he has managed to obtain an “indefinite waiver” from US sanctions for Hungary for the use of Russian oil and gas however US sources highlight that this exemption to Hungary is for just one year.[viii] Japan, despite being a strong US ally, continues to import around 9 per cent of its LNG from Russia. Despite the US’s continued pressure on Japan to limit its LNG imports from Russia, Tokyo has emphasised that these imports are crucial to its energy security. The situation remains similar of other Asian Western allies, such as South Korea and Singapore, regarding their LNG imports from Russia.
Conclusion
The government of India has consistently emphasised that India’s purchase of Russian crude oil aims to safeguard the interests of Indian consumers by ensuring a stable and affordable energy supply amid volatility.[x] Further, Indian refineries have also played a crucial role in meeting global refined petroleum product needs, with Europe topping India’s list. In a highly interdependent and interlinked global energy market, demonising India by singling out its oil imports from Russia and labelling those as a factor of support for Russia’s military agendas in Ukraine is irrational.
Secondly, targeting Indian oil imports from Russia and ignoring European and Western allies’ individual, as well as combined LNG imports from Russia, requires one to ask how this is not a factor in supporting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine? Thirdly, it is essential to note that despite multiple rounds of sanctions against Russia, its hydrocarbons have found ways to reach global consumer markets. This is primarily due to the realistic needs of nations.
Pressuring Indian companies to limit their supplies from Russia might or might not have implications for Russia, but China could fill these new potential disruptions to the demand-supply chain. This could further make not only Russia but also the EU and like-minded Western states dependent on China, as China maintains the capacity and capability to increase oil purchases from Russia and supply refined petroleum products to European and Western markets. Finally, the crisis in Ukraine continues to remain honest and challenging. Its solution lies in dialogue and in addressing each side’s realistic concerns. Weaponising global energy trade via undertaking selective approaches risks worldwide energy and economic security.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
- About the author: Bipandeep Sharma is a Research Analyst at the Non-Traditional Security Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He works on Polar Regions where his core areas of expertise is on Polar Geopolitics. Here at the institute he focuses on security and strategic developments in the Arctic; aspects of Antarctic governance, and on emerging issues of climate change and economic development in these regions.
- Source: This article was published by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (MP-IDSA)
[i] “India’s Growth Linked to Energy and Maritime Strength: Shri Hardeep Singh Puri”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Government of India, 29 October 2025.
[ii] “Payments to Russia for Fossil Fuels Since 24 February 2022”, Russia Fossil Tracker, 4 November 2025.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Malte Humpert, “EU Talks Tough on Russian LNG, But Buys More Than Ever in 2025”, High North News, 30 October 2025.
[v] “Europe’s LNG Buildout Slows Amid Anticipated Decline in Gas Demand”, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 30 October 2025.
[vi] Weilun Soon, “Understanding the Latest US Sanctions on Russian Oil”, Bloomberg, 24 October 2025.
[vii] Liubava Petriv, “US Temporarily Lifts Sanctions on Rosneft Subsidiaries in Germany”, United 24, 3 0ctober 2025; Bradley T. Smith, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Rosneft Deutschland GmbH and RN Refining & Marketing GmbH”, Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of Treasury, 29 October 2025.
[viii] Gergely Szakacs, “Hungary’s Waiver from US Sanctions on Russia Energy is Indefinite, Minister Says”, Reuters, 8 November 2025.
[ix] Berk Kutay Gökmen, “LNG Imports from Russia Play ‘Extremely Important Role in Japan’s Energy Security’: Minister”, Anadolu Ajansı, 21 October 2025.
[x] “Official Spokesperson’s Response to Media Queries on Comments on India’s Energy Sourcing”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 16 October 2025.
[xi] Sukalp Sharma, “India’s Diesel Exports to Europe Skyrocket in Run-up to EU Ban on Fuels Made from Russian Oil”, The Indian Express, 6 September 2025.
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
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