Against U.S. imperial war on Venezuela! An interview with Marea Socialista’s Gonzalo Gómez
First published at Tempest.
On the morning of January 3, U.S. forces, with 150 jets, armed helicopters, and state-of-the-art drones, launched an attack on Venezuela. Strikes hit Venezuela’s largest military complex in Caracas along with targets in La Guaira, Miranda, and Aragua. Less than 90 minutes later, Maduro was kidnapped and flown out of the country.
In a subsequent press conference, Trump announced that the U.S. would “run” Venezuela until a “safe transition will take place,” meaning a neocolonial transition. In the same press conference, Marco Rubio made it clear that this was to set a precedent for all of Latin America when he said, “If I lived in Havana and were part of the government, I would be worried.”
With this act of naked imperial aggression, the Trump administration has entered a new phase of imperial assertion, one defined by open seizure of territory, resources, and political authority. The so-called rules-based order has been exposed as a hollow fiction. No longer even evoked, it has given way to the raw exercise of force justified on the pretext of narcotrafficking.
For Latin America, this is not just merely an episode of aggression but also a profound wound to regional dignity and self-determination, one whose consequences will reverberate far beyond Venezuela. The acting president, former Maduro vice president Delcy Rodriguez, has spoken of “collaboration and dialogue” with Trump and the United States, which is to be understood in terms of tutelage and cooperation with full access to oil. This so far has been endorsed by the entire executive branch, the military leadership, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). It remains to be seen whether fractures will emerge.
It is important that Trump is going for this “transition” rather than turning to Venezuelan opposition leaders Edmundo Gonzalez and Maria Corina Machado because he believes it can guarantee him greater control and stabilization for his plans of colonial or semi-colonial domination.
Since returning to office, Donald Trump has dramatically escalated U.S. pressure on Venezuela. What began as sanctions and rhetorical threats has increasingly taken the form of military intimidation, maritime attacks, oil seizures, and covert dealmaking—often justified under the language of “counter-narcotics” or “national security.” At the time of this interview (before the January 3 attack and abduction), the U.S. had carried out over 30 attacks on boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, killing at least 107 people.
At the same time, Trump has quietly extended Chevron’s access to Venezuelan oil under opaque and constitutionally dubious arrangements, even as his administration labels Venezuela a “terrorist state” and doubled the bounty on Nicolás Maduro’s arrest.
These developments raise urgent questions: Why is the U.S. escalating now? What explains the contradictions between sanctions, military aggression, and continued oil exploitation? How do internal divisions within Trump’s camp—between hardline regime-change advocates and energy-sector pragmatists—shape U.S. policy? And how has Maduro used U.S. threats to justify intensified repression at home, particularly against workers, left critics, and popular organizations?
To help unpack the meaning and consequences of Trump’s latest moves—and to clarify what an independent, anti-imperialist left position should be—Tempest’s Anderson Bean interviews Venezuelan socialist Gonzalo Gómez from Marea Socialista on Venezuelan politics and U.S.–Latin America relations.
Note: This interview took place before the events of January 3.
Trump has intensified sanctions, deployed a massive military presence in the Caribbean, authorized lethal attacks against boats, and seized Venezuelan oil. And yet, at the same time, he has extended Chevron’s license to operate under opaque and secretive terms. How should we understand this combination of escalation and accommodation? What is genuinely new here, and what represents an acceleration of existing U.S. policy?
I think there is a double game being played by both sides. Trump plays carrot and stick: They are contradictory elements and, at the same time, they combine dialectically in the service of his goals and interests.
This situation also seemed functional to the survival of Nicolás Maduro’s government under the conditions Venezuela is currently experiencing. What is new, one could say, is the intensification of military-type actions: the air-naval encirclement, the attacks on boats of alleged drug traffickers (I’ll make an observation about this later), and the restrictions on air traffic and on the movement of vessels carrying Venezuelan oil products — not Chevron’s. Now they also say they attacked a supposed drug production center on land, which is also unclear.
That represents an increase in pressure on Venezuela and on the government of Nicolás Maduro, fundamentally on military terrain. But these are still fairly limited actions, and they seem more directed at generating scenarios that force negotiations with the government, or that allow the United States — Trump — to obtain some concession from Nicolás Maduro’s government.
They are not yet decisive actions, beyond the fact that they signify an intervention or could be a prelude to something more serious that may come later. These actions are evidently an escalation compared to simple sanctions — both sanctions against regime officials and broader economic sanctions. But they also appear to be a message to the rest of Latin America and to the pro-imperialist far-right opposition demanding signals from the Trump government. They also speak to the positioning of the United States on the geopolitical and strategic plane: its increasingly intense competition with China and Russia and its attempt to prevent any Latin American government from deepening relations with these other emerging imperialist powers, which are gradually reducing U.S. space and influence.
The United States wants to reassert itself in the Caribbean and retake control. Of course, conditions have changed, and today many governments are emerging on the extreme right with neoliberal policies that are openly pro-imperialist. This also gives the Trump government opportunities to attack the Venezuelan government.
On the issue of opacity, I think it’s important to emphasize that, on the one hand, business with Chevron falls within the framework of the so-called — or rather, misnamed — Anti-Blockade Law, which in reality is not anti-blockade at all. Instead, it serves to manage operations, transactions, and contracts carried out by the Venezuelan government. In Venezuela, what exists is a process of dismantling sovereignty, of denationalization, of advancing agreements with mixed enterprises, and a historic retreat of the state-owned oil and gas company PDVSA’s sovereign capacity for oil production.
Although PDVSA still produces perhaps more than 50 percent of total oil output, today one could say that Chevron may be accounting for about one fifth, around 20 percent, of production.
This seems contradictory, because the country that is militarily attacking Venezuela maintains licenses allowing a U.S. transnational corporation to operate in the country and allows oil tankers carrying Chevron’s oil to pass through to the United States. Trump, incidentally, says that the Venezuelan government receives little direct benefit in hard currency and that the proceeds mainly go toward maintaining installations, operational and technical costs, etc. But the opposition has said — or complained — that through negotiations, agreements, or contracts with Chevron, the Venezuelan government has obtained around four billion dollars.
In any case, this serves as a negotiating tool, because Venezuela depends increasingly on U.S. oil companies.
Whether Chevron remains in Venezuela or not ends up being the object of transactions or concessions on both sides and ultimately becomes functional to this game between the Maduro government and the Trump government.
Also I think, perhaps the term “accommodation” needs clarification: Who is accommodating whom? In some way, both sides accommodate each other within the corresponding tensions, and either side may be willing to make any move in pursuit of its own interests.
The Venezuelan government accommodates the pressure from the Trump government because it maintains Chevron, despite presenting itself as anti-imperialist, as a defender of sovereignty, and as a defender of the national oil industry. Yet it maintains a petroleum company from the aggressor country and depends on it for a significant portion of production. So what kind of anti-imperialism is that?
One might say it is “realpolitik,” because PDVSA is not in a position to produce that oil, and if it did not, it would have an impact on the Venezuelan people. But in reality, I do not believe that Venezuelan oil extraction is generating better conditions for the Venezuelan people, because it is appropriated by the bureaucracy and by a policy that benefits national elites — whether from the government or local capitalism — along with imperialism itself.
No one has talked about the possibility of Venezuela taking control of the production currently handled by Chevron, or of seeking a mechanism for technical and productive recovery, as it had in the past. And nobody knows anything, because there is no way to audit what is done with PDVSA, with Venezuelan oil, and with the companies operating in Venezuela.
A revolutionary, anti-imperialist, socialist government would propose full nationalization under workers’ and social control with audits of all operations — or at least a progressive plan to achieve that. And that is not happening.
So yes, there is accommodation. It seems that what they want is to maintain this type of relationship. The Trump government is interested in not leaving space that could be occupied by China, Russia, Iran, or other countries. It is also interested in obtaining information about Venezuela’s oil industry, which Chevron allows it to do. And it holds a lever: At a certain moment it can say, “We stop producing oil” and provoke a sudden impasse for Venezuela.
The government of Nicolás Maduro does not appear to be taking preventive measures in the face of this. On the contrary, it is exposing us to an even greater vulnerability vis-à-vis imperialism.
These attacks are occurring at a moment of deep exhaustion inside Venezuela: collapsing wages, mass migration, unresolved elections, and severe repression. At the international level, they also coincide with the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America and the growing presence of China, Russia, and Iran. Can you speak about the moment in which this recent escalation of attacks against Venezuela occurs, and the political and geopolitical context of that escalation?
I think it occurs at a moment when U.S. imperialism — and Donald Trump as head of government — are seeking to reposition and recover U.S. power and influence, which had been declining in the face of China’s momentum and Russia’s military power.
They are doing this through force, through faits accomplis, and through dismantling the multilateral international legal system and international treaties — that is, through an abrupt, de facto approach.
To defend its space, it is striking that Trump is willing to agree to peace in Ukraine by ceding territory to Russia without European involvement. At the same time, we observe China’s actions around Taiwan, and the United States positioning itself in the Caribbean as if the world’s regions were being marked out under the primary control of one power or another. That is the scenario we are seeing.
But Venezuela’s situation, from the standpoint of the interests of the population and the working class, has not improved at all due to these pressures and actions by Trump. On the contrary, they have served to harden Nicolás Maduro’s government, to provide excuses for increased repression and authoritarianism, and to attack union sectors in order to contain any possibility of struggle, demands, or internal protest.
This repression is also directed against the left opposition. It does not represent a numerical threat, but it is a symbolic threat, because it challenges the government’s claim to be left-wing, anti-imperialist, and socialist, by pointing out that it is in fact an authoritarian government with anti-worker policies and even some neoliberal policies.
This situation has allowed the regime to sustain its rhetoric and victimization as an anti-imperialist force before certain sectors internationally. And internally, conditions have worsened: There are fewer democratic freedoms and fewer possibilities for organization and action. And I’m not referring only to the government’s claiming that it is defending itself against the far-right opposition like María Corina Machado — who supports an invasion and offers Venezuelan resources to the United States — but also against grassroots sectors and the population for making any demand at all, even for speaking on social media.
The bureaucracy is far more intolerant today than before, and it finds justification for this in the external situation.
There appear to be marked divisions within Trump’s camp: One faction including the oil lobby and figures like Richard Grenell favors maintaining the Chevron channel; another, led by Marco Rubio and Florida hardliners, pushes for total isolation and regime change. How do these competing priorities explain Trump’s erratic swings and what do they tell us about his real objectives?
Beyond the fact that this may reflect real sectors within Trump’s government — on one side, people close to the oil lobby, and on the other those representing Cuban migration in Florida — I think Trump arbitrates between these two seemingly opposing policies. Both serve his carrot-and-stick tactic.
At a certain moment when [U.S. special envoy Richard] Grenell arrives and presents himself in Venezuela, they explore possibilities of opening doors or flexibilizing certain things in exchange for immediate concessions, such as the release of U.S. prisoners. On the other side, [U.S. Secretary of State] Marco Rubio draws boundaries — what lines cannot be crossed — and blocks the development of Grenell’s initiatives. I think this is part of the same game. It is not contradictory; it ends up being functional to Donald Trump’s policy, and Trump is the one who arbitrates it.
The Maduro government rhetorically denounces U.S. aggression, but at the same time maintains joint ventures with U.S. corporations under the Anti-Blockade Law while repression intensifies against workers, unions, and left critics. How has Maduro responded to the recent attacks, and how has this affected repression inside Venezuela?
As we said before, the interventionist siege and everything the Trump government is doing have led the Venezuelan government to harden internal conditions: increasing repression, intolerance, and further restricting democratic freedoms. The union movement is caught up in this. The government always carries out cosmetic operations and puts on shows — such as the so-called “union constituent assembly” — and then says, “we’ve held tens of thousands of assemblies to consult the working class about production.”
But nobody talks about wages, collective bargaining, union freedoms, or the ability to freely form unions or act. That is completely closed.
Chevron policy goes down a path that is not that of a revolutionary government of workers or the people. The government does not talk about restoring production centered on PDVSA with democratic participation of the working class in controlling oil operations — technical workers, professionals, and so on — nor about social auditing. On the contrary, it has been increasing opacity in all economic actions and increasingly trying to work with private capital.
In Marea Socialista, we say that Venezuela today has a form of lumpen capitalism governed by a corrupt bureaucracy that, in recent years, has destroyed everything that had been advanced in the early years of the Bolivarian Revolution.
Contradictorily, this scenario is more conducive to the government maintaining the type of control it currently exercises.
And just to add one more thing: Several boats have been sunk that Trump claims belonged to drug traffickers. In some cases, the Maduro government says they were fishermen. But the Trump government presents no evidence or indications, does not confiscate recoverable goods, does not show drugs, and does not recover bodies. More than that, they have allegedly executed surviving victims, and those victims have no names.
It’s as if they were sardines, not human beings. Where did they come from? What are their communities, their families, their neighborhoods? In Venezuela, there is only diplomatic denunciation: “Boats were sunk, people were killed extrajudicially.” Fine — but where are the data, the lists, the details about these people?
There is a dehumanization of the conflict, and both sides are engaging in something similar. As for the right-wing opposition, it is appalling: They do not fundamentally question what is happening. Some may have said they oppose interventionism, but not María Corina Machado. So yes, boats were sunk — but no one really talks about the people.
My final question is about what the Left’s position should be, both internationally and inside Venezuela. How can the Left oppose U.S. imperialist aggression and extrajudicial violence without aligning itself with an authoritarian, neoliberal government that is privatizing the oil sector, jailing union leaders, and crushing democratic rights? What would a genuinely anti-imperialist, working-class alternative look like at this moment?
We must adopt, first and foremost, a firm anti-imperialist position: against interventionism, against any possibility of invasion, against violations of Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty. We must denounce this frontally, as well as those collaborationist sectors — such as María Corina Machado — that support, approve, or remain silent in the face of what is happening. In reality, they call for U.S. intervention and offer to hand over Venezuela’s resources. That would produce a future equal to or worse than what we have under Nicolás Maduro.
Beyond the internal struggle, we must promote a sustained, deep international campaign with all forces willing to confront U.S. interventionism without aligning with the Maduro government.
This clear anti-imperialist stance does not mean giving political support to Nicolás Maduro’s government. We must continue denouncing its anti-democratic, corrupt, and anti-worker character, and continue demanding democratic, social, and labor rights for Venezuelans and the working class. We must demand improved living conditions. The government claims there is economic growth, but it does not raise wages or comply with the Constitution regarding the minimum wage. People cannot cover the basic cost of living.
We must demand the restoration of freedoms and the ability to organize and mobilize. This is also fundamental to defending the country: You cannot defend a country based solely on the will of a bureaucracy that decides everything about the government and the military while oppressing the population and subjecting it to unacceptable conditions. That creates vulnerability to imperialism and space for the far right and for confusion among the population about those proposing intervention as a solution.
So: neither imperialist intervention nor authoritarian, oppressive, anti-worker government. We must demand our rights, organize, and mobilize to defend them, and thereby be in better conditions to defend the country against imperialism.
This also implies a truly anti-imperialist and nationalist policy toward dealings with companies like Chevron and others — even from other powers — seeking sovereign and independent alternatives for the functioning of our principal national industry, while also attempting to overcome extractivism.
Beyond the internal struggle, we must promote a sustained, deep international campaign with all forces willing to confront U.S. interventionism without aligning with the Maduro government. In Marea Socialista, this was part of a resolution approved at the recent Third Congress of the International Socialist League, presented together with sections from Ecuador and Colombia, because the aggression goes beyond Venezuela.
We propose an international solidarity campaign, with mobilizations and protests in all possible countries against Trump’s interventionism. This must also involve allies inside the United States willing to mobilize against Trump’s policies — against militarism and interventionism — and who understand that this is also part of defending the U.S. working class against the abuses of that government: its treatment of migrants, the most vulnerable sectors, and workers.
That needs to be encouraged, just as it was demonstrated that the large mobilizations against the genocide in Gaza by Israel — with the collaboration of the Trump administration — were important in helping to put a stop to what was happening.
I would like to conclude by reiterating that we oppose imperialist intervention, we oppose the pro-imperialist and pro-intervention far right, and Venezuela’s way out cannot come from either of them. Nor does it lie in unconditional defense of Nicolás Maduro’s government, whose nature we already know.
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