Showing posts sorted by date for query URUGUAY. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query URUGUAY. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Saturday, November 23, 2024

Trump, Trumpism, and the Polycrisis

By Jeremy Brecher
November 22, 2024
Source: Strike!


Image via Strike!/Jeremy Brecher


“Polycrisis” is a word that has recently come into use to characterize the way crises in many different spheres – ranging from geopolitics and economics to climate and pandemic – are aggravating each other and even converging. Trump and Trumpism, like similar leaders and movements around the world, took off in the era of polycrisis and reflect many of its themes. They are also likely to severely aggravate the dynamics of the polycrisis.

Although Trump and Trumpism are deeply rooted in American history, they are also an aspect of the emerging era now widely referred to as the global polycrisis. The polycrisis shaped many of the conditions that promoted the rise of Trumpism. Trumpism, in turn, echoes many of the themes of the polycrisis. Trump’s actions will go out not into a peaceful world order, but into a world order in polycrisis, where the effects of almost any actions are difficult to predict. And his actions are likely to significantly aggravate the polycrisis, in particular making it more violent, unpredictable, and folly-ridden.

Trump and Trumpism must be understood in the context of the polycrisis. In his address to the 2024 Republican National Convention, Donald Trump said,


We have an inflation crisis that is making life unaffordable, ravaging the incomes of working and low-income families, and crushing, just simply crushing our people like never before. They’ve never seen anything like it.

We also have an illegal immigration crisis, and it’s taking place right now, as we sit here in this beautiful arena. It’s a massive invasion at our southern border that has spread misery, crime, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities all across our land. Nobody’s ever seen anything like it.

Then there is an international crisis, the likes of which the world has seldom been part of. Nobody can believe what’s happening. War is now raging in Europe and the Middle East, a growing specter of conflict hangs over Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and all of Asia, and our planet is teetering on the edge of World War III, and this will be a war like no other war because of weaponry. The weapons are no longer army tanks going back and forth, shooting at each other. These weapons are obliteration.[1]

Trump’s description of the world is like a distorting funhouse mirror reflection of reality – the reality of the polycrisis. However fallacious his interpretations and proposals, terrifying threats are a reality in the era of polycrisis.

In reality, inflation has ravaged the incomes of working and low-income families, and the recent inflation is only one manifestation of an out-of-control global economy that has been crushing people since the Great Recession of 2007. In reality, millions of people have been driven from their homes around the world by war, globalization, and climate change. In reality, misery, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities has in fact been occurring, not as a result of immigration, but of the dismantling of public programs that reduce poverty, disease, and destruction. War is indeed raging in Europe and the Middle East, and a growing specter of conflict does hang over Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and all of Asia. Our planet is indeed teetering on the edge of World War III, and that would indeed mean “obliteration.” That is the reality of the polycrisis.

Trump’s claims that he and he alone can fix the problems he describes would be laughable if they weren’t so dangerous. But the real reality is as scary as the one he portrays. It is little wonder that millions of ordinary people are suffering from anger, fear, and pain. They are reacting to reality.

The era that preceded the polycrisis, roughly from the fall of the Soviet Union to the Great Recession, was marked by unilateral global hegemony by the United States. It was marked by a neoliberal globalization which imposed unregulated corporate power on every country and institution. It saw political power determined by elections in most countries, however unequal those elections may have been. And it saw governments and corporations at least shadowboxing against the threat of climate change.

This relatively stable if unjust world order has been transformed into the polycrisis. Unipolar US hegemony has been replaced by multiplying wars, the rise of Great Power conflict, and the decline of international cooperation inside and outside the UN. It has also been marked by fragmentation of the global economy and Great Power struggle to dominate what are still global economic networks. International climate protection has become a transparent sham, and major political forces, including the soon-to-be leader of the world’s most powerful country, deny the reality of climate change. The remaining institutions of democratic rule have been shredded by a transition to transparent plutocracy on the one hand and the rise of movements, parties, and national leaders who resemble the classic fascists who rose a century ago – similarly the product of burgeoning global disorder.

The past dozen years have witnessed the rise of movements in dozens of countries that resemble the classic fascism of 1920-1945. They manifest smashing of democratic institutions, contempt for constitutions and laws, utilization of violence for political purposes, scapegoating of racial, ethnic, gender, political, and other minorities, hostility to transnational cooperation, authoritarian dictatorship, and a variety of related characteristics. To include the many manifestations of this phenomenon, rather than exclusively those who proclaim themselves fascists, I refer to it as the new “para-fascism.”

Donald Trump is a paragon of this new para-fascism. His rise to power has coincided with that of para-fascists around the world. In Europe these include Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; the Law and Justice Party in Poland; Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary; ruling coalitions in Sweden and Finland; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party; and Alternative Fur Deutschland, among others. In South America similar parties control or share governmental power in Uruguay, Argentina, and until recently in Brazil. In Asia, India’s government under Modi and the Philippines under Duterte and Marcos, Russia under Putin, Turkey under Erdogan, and Israel under Netanyahu have become increasingly para-fascist. China has moved to an expanded nationalism and an authoritarian recentralization of power, though it differs in many ways from other para-fascisms.

Para-fascism – and notably Trumpism — is a child of the polycrisis. The Great Recession, while not the cause of the polycrisis, can serve as a convenient marker for its emergence; as Philippine scholar and activist Waldon Bello noted, the “buildup of fascist movements and parties didn’t start till 2011, i.e. post-Great Recession.” The polycrisis helped make possible the rise of Trump and other para-fascist leaders. They in turn reflected, echoed, and even incorporated many features of the polycrisis:The polycrisis embodies the breakdown of international cooperation and the rise of national conflict. Trumpism is characterized by hatred of globalism and celebration of ethno-nationalism.
The polycrisis is a period of declining US hegemony, Great Power conflict, and war. Trump’s overriding theme, “Make America Great Again,” is a direct response to this reality.
The polycrisis is marked by the emerging conflict between the rising power of China and the relatively declining power of the US – sometimes referred to as an example of the “Thucydides trap.” The demonization of China and the attack against Chinese development has been a central theme of Trump’s approach to international affairs – one echoed by President Joe Biden during the Trump “interregnum.”
The polycrisis represents a transition from globalization’s global economic integration to Great Power battles to control global economic networks. Trump’s pugilistic economic nationalism represents both a reflection and an intensification of this trend.
The polycrisis has seen the decline of democracy and the breakdown of limits on plutocracy. Trump puts this tendency on steroids with his outright attacks on democratic institutions and his transformation of plutocracy into kleptocracy – aka politics by theft.
The polycrisis has seen a near total failure to restrain the climate destruction that is no longer just a threat but an everyday reality. Trump not only denies the reality of climate change but aims to do everything in his power to aggravate it through expanded fossil fuel extraction and burning.

Listen to this on Youtube

Notwithstanding his claims to fix the threats people are facing, Trump in power will only aggravate the polycrisis. The rubbishing of safeguards provided by democratic governance will amplify irrational policymaking and exacerbate popular feelings of powerlessness and alienation. Outlandish increases in military spending, designed to implement the fantasy of renewed US global domination, will lead instead to ruinous nuclear and conventional arms races. Trump’s style of provocation, deliberate unpredictability, and unrestrained folly will lead to intensified conflict, strange shifts in alliances, deliberately aggravated chaos, and wars. His energy policies will put climate catastrophe on steroids. This exacerbated polycrisis will produce a self-amplifying feedback loop that will increase the fear and anger that are prime sources – and prime resources — of Trumpism.

[1] “Read the transcript of Donald J. Trump’s Convention Speech,” New York Times, July 19, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/19/us/politics/trump-rnc-speech-transcript.html



Jeremy Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for Sustainability. He has been active in peace, labor, environmental, and other social movements for more than half a century. Brecher is the author of more than a dozen books on labor and social movements, including Strike! and Global Village or Global Pillage and the winner of five regional Emmy awards for his documentary movie work.



Life With and After Trump

November 21, 2024
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.





How does one take seriously having a vaccine denier in charge of public health? How about having the world’s richest corporate owner in charge of cutting regulatory agencies? Or having the other foxes in the henhouse, much less Oval office-ing the degenerate ringmaster himself? I would guess all who read this article feel outrage and horror, but also more than a little scared.

Do you go to bed at night or get up in the morning with thoughts, fears, and dread that you want to jettison? Turn off the news. Turn it off. Turn it off. Enough already. Set aside the articles. Stop the flow. Netflix calls. A novel beckons for attention. Go for a walk, get some fresh air. Maybe have a drink or ten. Perhaps throw a fit, or maybe just snarl a lot.

I get all that. And I am not going to tell you that going to meetings or attending them online, reading or writing calls to action, thinking about what to do and how to do it, and urging friends, neighbors, workmates, and family to join you in it will banish the nightmares and bring on only joyous dreams. To fight the power can certainly have inspiring, energizing, and joyous moments, but it will also have plenty of frustrations, strains, drains, and flat out boring moments. It is, however, the only thing that can lead to better days.

In that context, as dreadful as things may now feel, as immobilizing as Trump’s barbarity may feel, the current humane, radical, and/or revolutionary task is to block near-term Trumpian successes while preparing to pursue longer term positive campaigns and agendas. Why? Five reasons. To prevent continued and new Trump-inspired damage at home and abroad.To show that Trump is beatable. He is not someone to start supporting or to double down in support of. Don’t do it. He is someone to usher into ignominy.To prevent structural changes we would have to later roll back.To develop vision we truly desire and means to win it, not just to survive.To contribute to and, yes, to enjoy emergent hope and community.

Trump’s appointments aim to establish a police state. Please read that again. That is our immediate setting. It is not rhetoric. It is not hyperbole. His appointments will seek to trash democracy and participation and increase corporate control. They will try to normalize my-way-or-the-highway rule. Trump’s appointments are not only unqualified and even anti-qualified, they are also shock and awe provocations. They are bludgeons to rob our initiative, but despite their weirdness, each is also smartly attuned to Trump’s perverse, homicIdal aims.

Trump himself is simultaneously a nightmare and a sick joke. As a wannabe dictator, he seeks dominance. As a degenerate clown, he caterwauls toward history’s garbage bin. Which persona will predominate?

As Trump tries to dramatically change society from its horrendously flawed present into a drastically worse future, I believe more than enough people will extricate from his lies, see through his false promises, and overcome their understandable fear and depression to resist both Trump and his appointees. Enough people will resist his border, deportation, spying, coercing, impoverishing, repressing, sickness-inducing, militaristic, misogynistic, racist, and corporatist agendas to scuttle his aims.

Indeed, resistance is already surfacing. But resistance doesn’t automatically succeed. To win, resistance must become a persistent, continuous and unified force. It must attract and retain steadily more public participation. It must manifest increasingly more mutual aid and solidarity. It must raise social costs that elites do not wish to meet. Is that possible? And is it possible before Trump solidifies his support and transforms institutions to his specifications?

Most of Trump’s voters mainly supported what they thought was a positive possibility that he would shake things up so that they might benefit. They wanted change and rightly thought he would cause change. He successfully deflected their realizing it would be change for the worse.

Trump’s voters also secondarily supported prospects of his overcoming problems that don’t exist or fears that are greatly exaggerated but which he will only make worse. And finally, some of Trump’s voters thought he would protect old ways of living against new disorienting trends.

So how do we raise social costs for Trump and more for elites that support or simply put up with his aims?

If we uncompromisingly reach out to many of Trump’s voters while we (and Trump’s own actions) reveal Trump’s true aims and do so while Trump is restrained by fierce resistance, many and we should hope even most of his voters will reject what they come to see as Trump’s negative effects.

On the other hand, if we do not reach out to Trump’s voters and if we do not block Trump in coming months then even his weakly supportive voters will see Trump pull off one programmatic step after another, each of which he will celebrate as serving their interests, as freeing them, and as punishing their enemies, and in that case their tenuous support for him may become deeper and more intense. People who voted for him but voted down ballot for the likes of AOC or for reproductive rights or for a higher minimum wage, or who voted for Trump but would have preferred to vote for the likes of Bernie Sanders, may fall deeper and more intensely in thrall to him. To prevent that is essential.

Activism to block Trump’s agenda needs to welcome and to provide supportive opportunities for participation and leadership to voters for Harris as well as to non voters and indeed to anyone who is already horrified by the specter of a Trump-defined future but who lacks prior experience of active dissent and is thus not already plugged in. Activism should welcome all, but offer suitably different strokes for different folks.

We can’t stop Trump much less move on to win positive change without greater numbers. True enough, you might agree, but you may nonetheless have doubts about succeeding. And I get that things look grim, but does anyone need that point repeated over and over again? To say it will be hard to block Trump and to reverse MAGA and to finally fully rebut fascism’s morbidity is true. But to say that it won’t happen, or at any rate that it won’t happen for years and years, is self-fulfilling unwarranted defeatism. We have to face facts, yes, but not spin them into worse than they are. Defeatism feeds fascism.

Okay, you may feel, but why is defeatism unwarranted? Trump won a big battle. True, but we won many progressive referendums for increased minimum wages, reproductive rights, labor gains, and other progressive results, including in red states. Still, Trump will forever claim a mandate, and will certainly try to parlay his actually narrow electoral victory of between 1% and 2% into some immediate Trumpist gains.

He will try to bludgeon or shock passive acceptance. He will point to whatever early reactionary Trumpian gains he manages to enact to try to galvanize support for more reactionary steps. If in response we move quietly aside or we even jeer in righteous anger while we predict our own coming defeat, we will indeed be defeated.

To resist Trump’s every effort, to start to reverse them and to tirelessly tatter his aura of invulnerability, to reduce rather than ratify people’s fear of him, and to interrupt and then hack away at his level of support and build sufficient active unified resistance to finally replace him is all mandatory. And it will happen. But how fast it will happen, which includes with how little human and social loss along the way, will depend mainly on two things.

First, Trump’s overreach and rate of personal unravelling, and second the pace with which resistance spreads, becomes wholistic rather than atomistic, and reaches out to inspire ever wider activist rejection of Trump’s agenda.

That sounds nice, you might think, but is it real? What about the people who voted Democrat? And beyond them, what about the Democratic Party itself? Won’t they be a dead weight of passive resignation? Or won’t they, however well meaning, drag growing opposition to Trump into Democratic Party let’s get back to business as usual-ism? Will we prevent full blown fascism but return to from where fascism emerged?

Just as Trump’s voters are not peas in a pod, so too for Harris’s voters. Some Harris voters will abstain from resisting Trump, perhaps too comfortable, too scared, too convinced it is futile, or sometimes maybe even donning a red hat. Some will resist Trump but with the express intention of returning to fondly remembered business as usual. Some will begin to resist, including people at higher and higher levels of income and influence, but only the more they feel that Trump’s actions are generating resistance that may come for them next. Not praiseworthy, but relevant. And already happening.

Some will want to return to pre-Trump stability but also to enact some serious and meaningful gains for various constituencies and even regarding sustainability for all of humanity. That is also already happening. It’s praiseworthy but not fundamental. And some will want to move past all of that to prepare the way to win fundamentally new economic, political, and social relations. That is praiseworthy and fundamental, but very far from predominant.

How many people will move toward which new posture will not depend exclusively on peoples’ genes or even their personalities. Nor will it depend only on their incomes or their social identities. It will depend somewhat on all of that but also, and crucially, more on what they encounter in coming weeks and months, including on our words and the scope and effectivity of our resistance, and how welcoming our efforts are to new participants.

The Democratic Party will of course reject fundamental change, and for the most part it will even reject meaningful gains whenever it feels they might expand beyond meaningful to fundamental. The avalanche of essays, interviews, and talks that have recently railed at today’s Democratic Party as an agent of oppressive hierarchy and injustice are correct. It is.

Then again, such observations have been correct even in just my own experience, ever since the mid 1960s. And have been correct from still earlier, way earlier, for people even older. I tend to wonder, therefore, when I read such observations, especially in progressive and seriously leftist venues, who are they written for? Once or twice, as a kind of gentle here’s what we all know reminder, I might understand. But over and over in such venues, as if only the author knows? As if it is some kind of newly discovered wisdom? It seems to me that the people who read those essays in progressive outlets already know what they are being told. So what is the editorial point?

The real world truth is that a very large component of resistance to Trump is going to come from organizations and also spontaneous projects with considerable history and even deep roots in Democratic Party activities. If this is not the case, our prospects for preventing full-on fascism will be insufficient. So rather than disparaging such efforts, it seems to me that to try to discern, describe, and debate what to do next along with but not literally melting into such efforts will be more helpful.

When some left writers seem to carelessly dismiss every elected or appointed Democrat much less every voter for Harris as abettors of genocide, misogyny, racism, and corporate domination, they are wrong in the same way as when some left writers seem to carelessly write off all of Trump’s voters as lunatic fascists. These narratives not only ridicule and reject people who are needed for resistance to win, but even people who are already hell bent on resisting.

So, yes, the Democratic Party is part of the repressive, oppressive society that has spawned Trump, produced Trump’s voters’ warranted alienation and anger, and also manipulated and distorted some of the perceptions of Trump’s and indeed of all voters. So of course we don’t want to swear allegiance to the Democratic Party. We even want to keep it in our minds and not forget that it is, as a whole, very much not our ally, but the opposite. But, at the same time, to prevent Trump implementing gain after gain and increasing his support by himself touting his every gain will depend in large part on how many Harris voters resist and, indeed, on how many Democratic Party affiliated actors and organizations resist.

But in that case, a question arises. As we fight to reveal and reject Trump, what do we who aren’t about returning to business as usual seek instead? What do we desire for life after Trump? Is it premature to even ask? After all, we know we have to remove Trump before we can construct better than what we had before Trump.

Indeed, this was one of the costs of a Trump victory. If Harris had won we would now be able to fight for positive and even fundamental change toward a much better future. With Trump having won, we have to first fight against vicious negative fundamental changes that would impose a much worse future. It is also true that on the road to life after Trump Republican majorities in the Senate and House will need to be erased. And then Republican ownership of the White House will need to be erased as well. That is another price of Harris losing. But that isn’t our final goal. Of course not.

It is true, however, that to work to remove Trump can tend toward, can welcome, and can even celebrate and enforce business, government, culture, and households as they were before Trump—or it can begin to inspire desires for and even develop means to win gains toward implementing gains that go fundamentally beyond yesterday’s normal. For that matter, the wherewithal to resist fascism will thrive better if it is fueled and oriented by positive desires for more than restoring the conditions and circumstances that earlier led us toward fascism. We all know that, don’t we? We all know that getting back to everything being broken for us but working fine to serve power and wealth is not our ultimate aim, don’t we?

But if the whole goal isn’t only for the Democrats to win midterm elections in two years so the House and Senate become Democrat dominated, and only for Democrats to win the Presidency in four years so a Democratic Administration replaces Trump (or Vance), then what do we want? If those interim steps are important but not defining, then what do we want for life after Trump?

My answer is, I want Life After Capitalism, After Misogyny, After Racism, After War, After Ecological Denial. What’s your answer? But I am not delusional. We are not going to do all that in four years. What we can do, however, while we stop Trump, is to also think through our aims and methods and begin to implement new approaches able to keep going forward after Trump, even as they are also essential to defeating Trump.

Sanders, AOC, Michael Reich, maybe even Gavin Newsom, and plenty of others whose work I don’t know are saying something halfway similar. They are saying that they in the Democratic Party need to jettison the practices and commitments that their Party has been emphasizing for decades. Those folks are not revolutionaries the way I, for example, prefer. But the odd thing is that they do appear to be self critical of their team. They are saying they have failed. But they are not saying they give up, Trump wins. They are not saying to Trump, go ahead and trample everything. They are not saying they will just try to survive until Trumpism runs out of energy.

No, they are saying that they are not only going to fight, they are going to change their ways, or at least try to. They are going to try to reach out more widely and more aggressively to people who work and not to people who own workplaces, or in some cases, those who boss those who obey. Okay, I won’t belabor that some of them, yes, some of them in the Democratic Party, even if saddled by not yet fully rejecting such basics as private ownership and patriarchy, are sincerely taking stock and seeking to change their ways. But I will merely say that we need that and should welcome that, and not ridicule it and them, and call it mere manipulation.

And I will add, can’t we do as much regarding our team? Our movements? Our organizations? To blame Harris, Democrats, mainstream media, social media, widespread ignorance, rampant apathy, malignant cynicism, all past American history, and even in some degree the whole population is all true enough. It may even be an important part of usefully understanding our emerging context. But what about our own faults? What about the problems we have, within our team.

There is going to be resistance. A whole lot of resistance. What are some things we might want to consider about how our resistance unfolds? Maybe that growing in size and scope and not in verbosity or outrage is the primary measure of success. Maybe that each perspective welcomed as part of the whole needs to respect and welcome and even support and nurture and certainly not rail at and reject every other perspective welcomed as part of the whole. Maybe that to tell ourselves things we already know is not near as important as to find ways to constructively communicate with those who we don’t know and don’t yet agree with. Maybe that to raise social costs for elites is our only road to success and for that it needs to be all willing hands on deck, in turn reaching for unwilling hands too.


ZNetwork is funded solely through the generosity of its readers.Donate


Michael Albert`s radicalization occurred during the 1960s. His political involvements, starting then and continuing to the present, have ranged from local, regional, and national organizing projects and campaigns to co-founding South End Press, Z Magazine, the Z Media Institute, and ZNet, and to working on all these projects, writing for various publications and publishers, giving public talks, etc. His personal interests, outside the political realm, focus on general science reading (with an emphasis on physics, math, and matters of evolution and cognitive science), computers, mystery and thriller/adventure novels, sea kayaking, and the more sedentary but no less challenging game of GO. Albert is the author of 21 books which include: No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World; Fanfare for the Future; Remembering Tomorrow; Realizing Hope; and Parecon: Life After Capitalism. Michael is currently host of the podcast Revolution Z and is a Friend of ZNetwork.




Elections and Popular Struggle in Uruguay
November 22, 2024
Source: Ojalá


Frente Amplio supporters waiting for the results of the national elections. Montevideo, October 27, 2024. Photo © Martín Varela Umpierrez via Ojalá



Uruguay is undergoing political dynamics similar to those at work in the rest of Latin America: governments swing from one party to another and there has been a general and increasingly polarized shift to the right . On the last Sunday of November, Uruguayans will vote in the second round of the presidential election, selecting a head of state who will hold office for the next five years.

In the first round on October 27, Yamandú Orsi, the candidate of the progressive Frente Amplio (FA), won 44 percent of the vote, but polls suggest that the outcome of the second round will be close.

His rival is Alvaro Delgado from the National Party, the right-wing party currently in power. Delgado won 27 percent of the vote in the first round. Four other parties joined with the National Party to create the Republican Coalition (CR, in its Spanish acronym), which together won just over 47 percent of the vote in the first round. The CR, a recent creation, defeated progressives in the second round of the 2019 election.

Whoever wins the presidency in late November will need to seek support outside of their bloc, as neither coalition has a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The FA won 48 seats, the CR 49 and Identidad Soberana two. The new president will be weaker than those of previous governments, when ruling parties enjoyed parliamentary majorities. The FA has a slight advantage in the senate, with 16 out of 30 senators.

The results of the first round unfolded mostly as expected, although there were some surprises. The first was the shoddy results of the military party, which is called Cabildo Abierto (this translates roughly as “Open town council”), which went from three senators and 11 deputies down to only two seats in parliament.

The other surprise was the entry of Identidad Soberana [Sovereign Identity] into parliament, with two seats. Gustavo Salles leads the party. He is a histrionic lawyer, who cultivates an anti-establishment persona, a critic of extractivism and Agenda 2030 and an anti-feminist crusader who claims to defend traditional family values.

Cabildo Abierto continues to support the Republican Coalition, while Identidad Soberana called on its supporters to spoil their votes in the second round. Members of these small parties will be key to the formation of majorities in congress.

There were also two referenda during the national election in October. One sought to allow police to legally carry out nighttime house searches; the other sought to modify the management of pension funds. Both failed to pass, receiving only around 40 percent of votes.

These referenda can be interpreted as a positive experience, despite the failure to pass the changes to pensions, especially as we think through future challenges. Referenda are a well-established tool in Uruguay that require organizational effort and allow for the production of popular mandates. The results suggest a possible rupture between social organizations and a progressive government, should it return to power in Uruguay.

Frente Amplio candidate Yamandú Orsi speaking to the media prior to the presidential debate. Montevideo, November 17, 2024. Photo © Martín Varela Umpierrez via Ojalá.
Legislation by the people

Uruguay’s constitution establishes means through which citizens can repeal or propose new laws or amend existing ones. There are two mechanisms to do so: a referendum, in which a vote is held to strike down an existing law, and a plebiscite, which is used to change the constitution.

Activating a plebiscite or referendum requires signatures from 10 percent of the electoral roll (approximately 270,000 people). Parliament can also convene a plebiscite. In this case, signature collection mandated the plebiscite on social security, whereas the parliament mandated the one on nighttime raids. Both needed to win a simple majority of votes to pass.

Radical organizations have often used popular consultations to resist neoliberal privatization. There have been more than 20 plebiscites and referenda since the return of democracy in 1985.

Right-wing parties endorsed and promoted the plebiscite on night raids; unions, social organizations and some left-wing parties championed the one on pensions. The right expected a stronger voter turnout for the measure on nighttime raids, as it drills down on punitive proposals in a climate of growing insecurity and expanding drug trafficking in working class neighborhoods.

The vote on social security reform effectively anticipates the balance of power should Frente Amplio return to government. This reform rested on three main ideas: to return the retirement age to 60 (the current government raised it to 65), to tie pension payments to the minimum wage and to eliminate the private fund management system known as the Pension Savings Fund Administration (AFAPS).

The demand for these changes emerged in response to reforms passed by the right-wing government. The Frente Amplio did not support them, although some individual members did. That’s why there were Frente Amplio members campaigning for the Yes position and also for the No position.

The Communist Party, the Socialist Party and other smaller groups were among supporters of the plebiscite within the Frente Amplio. Although the Communist Party received the second highest number of votes within the Frente Amplio’s coalition, it still received less votes than in 2019. Many of the union leaders who supported the pension reform belong to the Communist Party.

Former president José Mujica was chief among opponents of the plebiscite within the FA. He stated on several occasions that approving the reform would cause economic chaos. More than 100 economists affiliated with the Frente Amplio also criticized the proposed reforms to the pension system, arguing that they were not in the country’s best interest. Should the FA win, almost the entire group in charge of the new government’s economic policy, including the future Minister of Economy, will be among opponents of the reform.

Along with antagonists in the FA, all of the right-wing, the pension companies themselves, the chambers of commerce and agribusiness rejected the reform.

It is important to note that privatized pension funds are the financial engine of forestry, soybean and real estate speculation among other economic sectors. Eliminating the AFAPS would have been the best course of action for those of us who oppose dispossession in Uruguay, as it is a key investor in extractive and industrial sectors. Between 1996 and 2023, 37 percent of AFAPS’s total investments went to road and rail infrastructure, 28 percent to agricultural and forestry activities, and seven percent to real estate.

The most powerful within the system are well aware of all this. They campaigned in the media and used right- and leftwing personalities to generate fear and spread half-truths and lies. In spite of this, 40 percent of the population voted to back the reform.

Many of the Frente Amplio’s voters disregarded the advice of party economists and the “wise old man,” as Mujica is called. Seventy percent of FA voters voted in favor of pension reform. In addition, 30,000 voters (which is approximately 1.5 percent of the electorate) voted only for pension reform and not for candidates for office.

It appears that FA voters are willing to take greater redistributive and anti-profit pension risks than FA party leaders. Most of the latter signaled clearly that “business” will not be touched, even if it means that retirees who paid taxes and worked all of their lives receive a pension that puts them well below the poverty line.

National Party candidate Álvaro Delgado prior to the presidential debate. Montevideo, November 17, 2024. Photo © Martín Varela Umpierrez via Ojalá.
Struggles beyond the ballot box

Many of the social forces deployed in Uruguay in recent years do not translate into party politics and the programs that dominant political actors and coalitions advance lack significant differences.

This is the case of the feminist fight against patriarchy and more recent struggles against plunder and dispossession, especially those linked to water.

Uruguay’s parliamentary left is fully integrated into the dynamics of capital. Its developmentalist outlook and blind faith in economic growth makes it dependent on extractive initiatives. It has become increasingly pragmatic, assuming the dominant economic logic without proposing major changes in the social order. Only a few dare to go out on a limb and make awkward statements about care for the environment, as if it were something external, as if everything can be fixed through payments, as if what we do to the earth we are not doing to ourselves.

It seems that the urgency around the salt water crisis that rocked Montevideo last year did not reach progressive insiders, nor has the community’s capacity to respond to acute hunger brought on by the pandemic. Once again, political actors call for cash transfers to poor families. Their insistence on cash transfers comes in a context of a high level of community organization that led to the creation of more than 700 soup kitchens.

Connections between these struggles and other community initiatives and the parliamentary left are scarce or non-existent. This stands in contrast to the deep connections between left parties and more traditional forms of mobilization, such as labor unions.

We desperately need to stop the advance of extractivism and violence in Uruguay. Without romanticizing popular referenda, they can be powerful tools for identifying the lack of real differences between competing electoral factions. They are one way in which we can intervene in a concrete and timely manner to help create the future we’re fighting for.


Diego Castro is a professor at the University of the Republic in Montevideo and author of the book Mandato y autodeterminación. Pistas para desarmar la trampa estadocéntrica published by Bajo Tierra Ediciones.



Friday, November 22, 2024

Uruguay readies for polls with left hoping for comeback

Agence France-Presse
November 22, 2024

Frente Amplio candidate Yamandu Orsi (L) and rival Alvaro Delgado (SANTIAGO MAZZAROVICH/AFP)

Uruguayans go to the polls Sunday with the leftist alliance of celebrated ex-president Jose Mujica hoping to reclaim the country's top job five years after a right-wing victory based on concerns over crime and taxes.

Former history teacher Yamandu Orsi of the leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front) will go head-to-head with ex-veterinarian Alvaro Delgado of the National Party, a member of outgoing President Luis Lacalle Pou's center-right Republican Coalition.

Orsi, 57, is seen as the understudy of 89-year-old "Pepe" Mujica, a former leftist guerrilla lionized as "the world's poorest president" during his 2010-2015 rule because of his modest lifestyle.

Orsi had garnered 43.9 percent of the October 27 first-round vote -- short of the 50-percent cutoff to avoid a runoff but ahead of the 26.7 percent of ballots cast for Delgado, 55.

The pair came out tops from a crowded field of 11 candidates seeking to replace Lacalle Pou, who has a high approval rating but is barred constitutionally from seeking a second consecutive term.

Polls point to a tight race Sunday, with Orsi only marginally ahead in stated voter intention in South America's second-smallest country.


Other parties within the Republican Coalition have since thrown their support behind Delgado, boosting his numbers.

"Conditions are in place for us to take charge... to make the changes the country needs," Orsi told a closing campaign rally Wednesday.

Delgado, for his part, told supporters Uruguay was better off today thanks to the Republican Coalition in charge, adding: "I am prepared" to lead.

- Liberal mold-breaker -

A victory for Orsi would see Uruguay swing left again after five years of conservative rule in the country of 3.4 million inhabitants.

The Frente Amplio coalition broke a decades-long conservative stranglehold with an election victory in 2005, and held the presidency for three straight terms.

It was voted out in 2020 on the back of concerns about rising crime blamed on high taxes and a surge in cocaine trafficking through the port of Montevideo.

Polling numbers show perceived insecurity remains Uruguayans' top concern five years later.

The first round of voting was accompanied by a referendum in which Uruguayans were asked whether police should be allowed to carry out nighttime raids on homes as part of the fight against drug trafficking. The initiative failed.


Voting is compulsory in Uruguay, one of Latin America's most stable democracies which boasts comparatively high per-capita income and low poverty levels.

During the heyday of leftist rule, Uruguay legalized abortion and same-sex marriage, became the first Latin American country to ban smoking in public places and the world's first nation, in 2013, to allow recreational cannabis use.

Tuesday, November 19, 2024

Tractor-driving French farmers protest EU-Mercosur deal

PETITE BOURGEOIS LANDOWNERS REVOLT


By AFP
November 18, 2024

French farmers staged a new wave of action to protest the adoption of a trade pact between the European Union and four South American countries - Copyright Lehtikuva/AFP Heikki Saukkomaa

French farmers launched Monday a new wave of action to protest the adoption of a trade pact between the European Union and four South American countries they fear would threaten their livelihoods.

Paris is leading resistance against ratification of the trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that would create the world’s largest free trade zone.

On Sunday, French President Emmanuel Macron defended France’s resistance to the proposed blockbuster deal as he visited Argentine’s Javier Milei, ahead of a G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro. He said France would “continue to oppose” the trade deal.

On Monday, angry French farmers used tractors to block roads and erected wooden crosses during protests across the country, urging Macron and the government to do more.

“Stop the promises, start with actions”, read a sign unfurled along a road in the southeastern town of Le Cannet-des-Maures.

“Macron, your agriculture is dying and you are looking elsewhere,” read another banner.

Local farmers also placed a cross next to a mock-up gallows with a message reading “France’s agriculture in danger”.

In the eastern city of Lyon, farmers tore off municipals signs and deposited them at the stairs of a museum.

Yohann Barbe, spokesman for the FNSEA, France’s top farming union, speaking to broadcaster Europe 1, said that the scale of the protests was going “to be unprecedented”.

“Farmers are still just as irritated as ever by a government that is dragging its feet.”

The new wave of rallies came after farmers across Europe including France earlier this year mounted rolling protests over a long list of burdens they say are depressing revenue.

Life is hard for French farmers, who complain about excessive bureaucracy, low incomes, and poor harvests.

The proposed trade pact has provoked fresh anger because farmers fear any agreement would open European markets to cheaper meat and produce that are not forced to adhere to strict rules on pesticides, hormones, land use and environmental measures.

On Sunday, Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau warned farmers there would be “zero tolerance” in the event of “lasting” roadblocks.

bur-sb-kd-as/sjw/rl

Sunday, November 17, 2024

 

WWIII

To Prepare for a Pacific War, U.S. must Harden Southern Flank

Maritime traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)
Vessel traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)

Published Nov 16, 2024 3:57 PM by CIMSEC

 

 

[By Henry Ziemer]

The United States’ foundations as a global great power rest in no small part on its status as a regional hegemon. No single country in the Western Hemisphere can make a serious bid to balance Washington’s economic and military might, to say nothing of competing with the close but often-overlooked bonds of trade, culture, and family which constitute vital elements of U.S. strength in the region. Because they are so easily forgotten however, the United States has shown an alarming willingness to take its position in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for granted. The 2022 National Security Strategy proudly proclaims that “No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere,” but the U.S. defense posture in LAC is at risk of being outflanked by extra-hemispheric competitors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first among them.

While the PRC has led with economic engagement in its approach to LAC countries, military considerations have not been far behind. China has funded dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, most notably ports and satellite ground stations throughout the region. Today, Chinese-owned or operated ports dot the coastlines of LAC countries, secretive satellite ground stations collect signals intelligence in Argentina, and potentially Cuba, and PRC-supplied weapons have made their way into the hands of dictatorial regimes like Venezuela. In the event of a Pacific War, these capabilities and more would likely be leveraged by China to collect intelligence on and disrupt U.S. operations within the Western Hemisphere, as well as leverage its soft power within the region to court influence and keep LAC governments neutral or even sway some towards overt support of Beijing’s position in the conflict. While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.

Fortunately, the next three years present a number of opportunities for the United States to meaningfully strengthen its southern flank. Specifically, the United States should prioritize better coordination between its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and strengthen ties with regional allies such as Colombia and Argentina. Finally, any strategy aimed at countering China’s expansion in LAC must incorporate a resource-backed counteroffer to PRC investment in strategic sectors like ports, telecommunications, and power generation.

Why LAC Matters to the PRC

China’s relations within its own “near abroad” understandably figure heavily in most analyses of potential Indo-Pacific conflicts and their outcomes. To a lesser extent, scholars have also looked to Africa and the Middle East as regions that would be critical to secure China’s energy imports during a conflict. Even less understood, however, is the importance that the Western Hemisphere holds for the PRC and its ability to wage war from an ocean away. This is a major blind spot, as LAC has emerged over the past two decades as a keystone region for China’s economy and industry, exemplified by Brazil’s longtime status as the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment.

LAC, and particularly South America, is a vital source of natural resources to China. While the Middle East is crucial for China’s energy supply, the Americas are a linchpin of China’s food and mineral imports. In 2022, Brazil alone accounted for nearly 23 percent of China’s food imports, and nearly 60 percent of its soybean imports in particular. Maintaining access to LAC’s rich agricultural industry will be critical for China to continue to feed its 1.4 billion inhabitants in the event of a major conflagration.

LAC is also a key supplier of critical minerals to China, especially copper and lithium. Chile and Peru together accounted for half of China’s copper imports in 2022, while as of May 2024 Chile and Argentina provided a staggering 97.7 percent of China’s lithium carbonate. These minerals are essential for China’s economy as a whole, but also its defense sector as they are instrumental in everything from high-capacity batteries used to sustain fleets of autonomous systems, to the wiring and interconnects needed for basic vehicles and communications systems. More high-end capabilities depend on a staggering variety of rare minerals and metals, such as niobium, a critical component in advanced aeronautics and hypersonic missiles. Brazil sits roughly 94 percent of global niobium reserves, leading the PRC to assiduously cultivate an ownership stake over roughly a quarter of Brazilian niobium production.

Finally, China, like Russia, has almost certainly realized the benefits that a presence within the Western Hemisphere can accrue in terms of capacity for horizontal escalation. Moscow, under the so-called Primakov Doctrine has practiced this frequently, pursuing military maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere as a tit-for-tat escalation in response to U.S. support for Ukraine. In July 2024 for instance, Russia dispatched two naval flotillas to Cuba and Venezuela in direct response to U.S. easing of restrictions on long-range strikes by Ukraine into Russian territory. For China, the cultivation of dual-use infrastructure, combined with support for anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, would surely prove an asset in the event of war in the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding the Risks

China’s current position in the Western Hemisphere presents three key wartime risks for the United States: (1) control over ports and maritime choke points, (2) dual use of space infrastructure to degrade U.S. space capabilities and threaten the homeland, and (3) disinformation and diplomatic pressure towards U.S. allies and partners.

The first risk is potentially the most proximate and decisive in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese state-owned or based firms currently own or operate at least twelve ports across the LAC region. This includes the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on either side of the Panama Canal. The ports are leased and operated by Hutchison Ports, a Hong Kong-based private company which acquired the sites in 1997. While even at the time observers raised concerns over the potential for the Chinese government to exercise undue influence over Hutchison’s operations along this critical maritime artery, over the past decade the PRC’s steady erosion of Hong Kong’s independence only elevates this risk. Indeed, in 2017 a slew of laws, notably the National Intelligence Law, National Defense Mobilization Law, and National Defense Transportation Law, underscored that the Chinese government can enlist the services of any private company for the purpose of nebulously-defined national security interests. Two PRC state-owned companies, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), were also part of the winning bid to build the $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal, a major undertaking which (after serious delays) has at last begun to move forward.

The confluence of PRC infrastructure and China’s impressive soft power influence in Panama opens up a potential nightmare scenario for the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific war. In such a scenario, China could either directly, or through a proxy, sabotage port infrastructure on either side of the canal, disrupting or entirely preventing transit through the choke point for a period of time. Not only would this serious impact U.S. trade and shipping, it would cripple the United States’ ability to quickly shift forces between Atlantic and Pacific theaters. With current wargames suggesting the first phases of a naval clash would result in major losses, the added weeks it would take for reinforcements to transit around the Strait of Magellan rather than through the Canal Zone could prove decisive.

While loss of the Panama Canal is one of the most clear-cut risks presented by China’s power position in LAC ports, it is by no means the only way China could leverage maritime infrastructure to its advantage. Ports by their nature collect massive amounts of data on the shape and flow of international trade. The PRC’s planned port and special economic zone in Antigua, together with other PRC-controlled ports, may grant Beijing a one-of-a-kind window into commerce moving throughout the eastern Caribbean and the sea lines of communication which run through it. In the case of ports directly owned or operated by PRC-based firms, like the Brazilian port of Paranaguá or the planned Peruvian megaport of Chancay, this intelligence-gathering capacity could be turned into an operational capability by strategically delaying or seizing key shipments to snarl supply chains for key goods and apply economic pressure on the United States and allies. Finally, presence in regional ports may allow the PRC to carry out more sensitive sabotage operations targeting associated maritime infrastructure, particularly the undersea cables which comprise the backbone of global internet communications. While perhaps not decisive in their own right, China’s position in LAC ports could accord it a host of benefits that are currently underappreciated in planning around a potential Pacific conflict.

Ports are not the only dual-use infrastructure of note. In recent years, reports have highlighted a proliferation of PRC-operated space infrastructure stretching from the very tip of the Southern Cone through Venezuela, and potentially even into the Caribbean. Most notable among these is the Espacio Lejano Research Station operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and located in Neuquén, Argentina. Authorized in 2014 under the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the site has become notorious as a “black box” which even Argentine government authorities struggle to gain access to. To date, two inspections have been conducted of the facility, one in 2019 and another more recently under the Milei administration in April 2024 – indicating that serious political will is needed to gain access. In both cases, the Argentine delegation coordinated with the Chinese embassy prior to arrival, and the overall inspection process was relatively perfunctory, doing little to assuage U.S. or Argentine concerns about the facility’s potential for military use.

Neuquén was notably also the first ground station operated by the PRC outside Chinese territory and capable of providing telemetry tracking and control (TT&C) which enables the maneuver and operation of satellites and other orbital vehicles. The facility’s strategic location in the southern hemisphere was also particularly important to supply TT&C capabilities for China’s Chang’e 4 and 5 lunar probes. Neuquén, and similar ground stations in turn compliment China’s growing space presence in Antarctica where in 2023 the PRC announced plans to begin construction of a new dual-use satellite ground station at its Zhongshan research base. TT&C is not just important for satellites and other scientific craft, it is vital for the operation of hypersonic glide vehicles, which conduct complex maneuvers that depend on ground data links for guidance and to better evade missile defenses. China, which according the Congressional Research Service, has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic weapon tests as the United States, could use this network of ground stations in the event of a conflict to strike at the United States from the south, in doing so evading U.S. missile defenses which are primarily concentrated on northern approaches. Chinese space infrastructure in LAC could furthermore help the PRC collect key data on the orbits and locations of satellites in doing so enabling PRC anti-satellite warfare capabilities during a Pacific war scenario.

The final risk involves PRC use of diplomatic influence alongside dis- or mis-information campaigns to shape the political environment in LAC to its favor in the event of a war with the United States. Key targets in such a scenario would likely be the seven LAC countries which still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Beijing would undoubtedly seek to isolate and pressure these countries to shift their recognition prior to or even during a PRC invasion of the island. China could cooperate with other U.S. adversaries to magnify the effect of its disinformation campaigns. According to one report, in Argentina, Chinese and Russian media outlets work in concert with one another to produce “a virtuous cycle of disinformation.” Critically, these efforts would not need to actively sway countries into fully backing China’s campaign (with the exception of those regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua likely predisposed to do so already), but would instead merely need to convince governments to remain on the sidelines. 

China could also use its economic heft as the number one or two trading partner for a majority of LAC countries to ensure neutrality, if not support from countries in the region. Again, the case of Russia proves instructive of how an authoritarian regime can deploy messaging and economic pressure to compel LAC governments. Shortly after his inauguration, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa proposed selling $200 million in legacy Russian and Soviet weaponry to the United States in exchange for new equipment (the United States would presumably pass the weapons it received along to Ukraine). Moscow retaliated by threatening phytosanitary restrictions on Ecuadorian banana imports, while launching a media push to claim that if the deal moved forward, Ecuador would make itself a belligerent on the side of Ukraine. The pressure worked, Noboa relented, and Ecuador’s banana exports continued apace. China, which carries significantly more economic weight in the region than Russia could prove a frightening prospect indeed for any government considering taking a vocal stance against the PRC in wartime. 

Taken together, the PRC has quietly amassed a host of capabilities within the Western Hemisphere to give it both tactical and strategic advantages against the United States in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, for its part, has been slow to react to the scope of this threat and adjust priorities in LAC accordingly.

Bolstering Readiness in the United States’ Shared Neighborhood

There are a number of steps the United States can and should take between now and 2027 to gird itself and its regional allies in preparation for potential conflict with China.

Better Integrate SOUTHCOM in Pacific War Planning: A lack of integration across U.S. combatant commands risks cultivating a myopic view of Pacific war. Given the PRC and PLA’s global ambitions, any future conflict with China is unlikely to be restricted solely to one theater. As the above sections have illustrated, there are a number of areas where China could pursue a horizontal escalation strategy to gain an edge against the United States. Fostering greater exchange and intelligence sharing across combatant commands should be a priority to ensure the United States is ready to fight and win a war on multiple fronts. One early step could be to create a designated role for SOUTHCOM in key Pacific exercises like the Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare exercise. LAC militaries such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, already participate in this exercise. Carving out a greater role for SOUTHCOM could help bolster U.S. defense ties with regional militaries and build closer partnerships across combatant commands.

Another area for increased cooperation could be a cross-cutting effort across SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and partner governments to tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, a threat which plagues communities and ecosystems across the Pacific. While not directly applicable in a warfighting scenario, such an effort would serve to build greater partnership and information sharing between combatant commands, and build goodwill among partners throughout the Pacific domain. 

Double Down on Defense Cooperation: While China has made headway in defense cooperation activities, the United States remains by far the preeminent security partner for the vast majority of LAC countries. However, more can be done to strengthen these ties and build partner capacity to respond to potential malign PRC activity in the hemisphere. One easy step would be to amend the Department of Defense’s Section 312 and 321 requirements that foreign military education training focus on “developing countries.” The Department of Defense’s current standards for designating a country as “developing” prevent partners like Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana, from benefiting from U.S. training programs. Amending these to include a more nuanced standard would open the door to a much wider array of military-to-military engagement.

Furthermore, the United States should seek to rise to the occasion in cases where LAC governments have already expressed interest in a closer security partnership. Ecuador, which is currently contemplating reversing a constitutional prohibition on foreign military basing to allow for a reopening of the former U.S. naval base at Manta could be a key ally in this effort. Argentina, which is currently pursuing an ambitious military modernization effort, and has expressed a desire to rise to NATO Global Partner status, could be another.

Harden Allies Against Chinese Economic Coercion: China’s investments in critical infrastructure throughout the region pose risks not only for the United States, but its LAC allies and partners as well. For instance, two PRC based companies, China Three Gorges Corporation and China Southern Power Grid International, now collectively control the entirety of Lima, Peru’s power supply. Combined with the forthcoming port of Chancay, China has a number of vectors through which it can apply pressure against a Peruvian government seeking to pursue a policy against Beijing’s interests. The State Department could lead a regionwide effort with allies and partners to map and evaluate risks posted by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. The findings of this review should also be passed along to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for review and to help prioritize investments aimed at reducing the amount of influence China can wield over LAC government through its infrastructure projects and trade links.

Conclusion

Future conflicts will not be constrained to a single geographic region. In the event of a Pacific war between the PRC and United States, LAC will almost undoubtedly find itself a zone of contention, whether it wishes it or not. Failure to incorporate this understanding into U.S. contingency planning for such a conflict therefore creates risks not just for the United States itself, but also its regional allies and partners who may find themselves in the crosshairs of PRC coercive efforts. There is still time to patch key vulnerabilities in the region, but a recognition LAC’s important role in future global crises cannot come soon enough.

Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on great power competition, transnational organized crime, as well as security and defense in the Western Hemisphere. His writing and commentary have been featured in CSIS, War on the Rocks, the Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.


OSG's CEO Proposes One-Cent Export Tax to Fund U.S. Tankers

OSG
File image courtesy OSG

Published Nov 17, 2024 5:01 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

In the event of a major war in the Western Pacific, U.S. forces are going to need fuel, and a lot of it. Government estimates of the supply needs for carriers, warships and ground forces run in the range of 50 million gallons per day, all of which would have to be transported over the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. U.S. war planners are well aware that the U.S.-flag tanker capacity to deliver this fuel is insufficient. The U.S. Tanker Security Program (TSP) subsidy has helped to offset this deficiency by recruiting 10 product tankers into the U.S.-flag fleet, but may not be enough in its current form. Sam Norton - CEO of Overseas Shipholding Group - has a plan to do much more, and make foreign consumers of American energy pay to do it

According to Norton, a 30-ship Tanker Security Program fleet would go a long way towards bridging the national security gap, but the cost of tripling the program, would be significant. By his calculations, a viable plan for keeping 30 tankers in the TSP would require subsidies of about $400 million to cover the "higher operating costs of crewing and maintaining a US flag vessel." 

Applying a levy of $0.01 per gallon on the 125 million gallons of refined fuel that American exporters ship out of the country every day would raise $400 million a year, Norton pointed out. He noted that this $0.01 per gallon tax on foreign buyers would be a tiny fraction of the $0.184 tax that American citizens pay on each gallon of gasoline at the pump. The gas tax raises billions for the Federal Highway Trust Fund, which is an economic and national-security priority. 

"The US deems maintenance of its federal highway systems a necessity and asks taxpayers to bear the cost of that priority. Doesn’t a similar commitment to maintaining maritime logistical readiness at a cost of only one percent of the money spent on federal highways demand equal attention?" Norton asked. 


China Responds Angrily to Philippines' Plan to Buy U.S. Missile System

Mid-range Capability Launcher
Courtesy U.S. Army

Published Nov 14, 2024 9:54 PM by The Maritime Executive


China has responded angrily to news that the Philippine government might purchase an American-made missile system that could be used for coastal defense or medium-range strike. The Philippine military is reorienting its strategy to focus on defense against an external threat, and an intermediate-range missile system would augment its newly-purchased BrahMos antiship missiles

Last weekend, the Financial Times reported that Manila might buy the Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC), also known as the Strategic Mid-range Fires System (SMRF). The Typhon is a truck-mounted system that can launch the Tomahawk cruise missile and the SM-6 supersonic air defense missile. The latest variants of these two missiles have anti-ship capabilities, and the Tomahawk could reach mainland China from Luzon. 

The U.S. Army deployed one Typhon launcher to the Philippines during an exercise in April, and it has remained in place - much to China's ire. Despite Beijing's objections, Manila may buy the Typhon for its own use, without relying on U.S. forces to operate it. 

"We do intend to acquire such capabilities. We will not compromise our right to obtain these kinds of capabilities in the future within our territory," said Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, speaking to the FT.

Beijing has been building up its strike capabilities in the region for years: it has constructed seven large artificial island bases off the Philippines' western coastline, and it has fully militarized three of them with strategic runways, fighter squadrons, air defense systems and antiship missile systems, according to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The Asia-Maritime Transparency Initiative has observed HQ-9 surface-to-air missile systems and YJ-12B antiship cruise missile batteries at Chinese island installations in the Spratlys since 2018.  

However, China is unwilling to accept similar weapons installations in other countries, and has urged Manila to send the Typhon system home to the U.S. immediately. "The Philippines, by bringing in this offensive strategic weapon, is enabling a country outside the region to fuel tensions and antagonism," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian on Thursday. "Such a move is provocative and dangerous, and it is an extremely irresponsible choice to its own people and people of all Southeast Asian countries." 

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

 

Organ donation: Opt-out defaults do not increase donation rates


Longitudinal study examines organ donation rates in five countries that have changed their organ donation default policy from opt-in to opt-out




Max Planck Institute for Human Development




With the demand for donor organs far outstripping the supply, calls for changes in public policy are growing. An opt-out (‘presumed consent’) default policy is often seen as a promising approach. This policy stipulates that all adults are automatically considered potential organ donors after their death, unless they explicitly withdraw their consent during their lifetime. In contrast, the opt-in (‘explicit consent’) system requires potential donors to actively consent to donate their organs after they die. The discussion around implementing an opt-out policy has recently gained traction again in Germany, raising the question of whether such a change in policy would actually lead to an increase in the number of deceased organ donors.

A recent analysis of all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found no significant difference in deceased donor rates between opt-in and opt-out countries, but significantly fewer living donors—individuals who voluntarily donate organs, like a kidney, while alive—in opt-out countries. However, such cross-sectional analyses cannot control for all country-specific factors like health infrastructure, culture, and religious issues—all of which can influence donation rates. 

To address the limitations of prior research, the current study used a longitudinal approach, analyzing changes in deceased donor rates over time in five countries—Argentina, Chile, Sweden, Uruguay, and Wales—that had switched from an opt-in to an opt-out default policy. This method provided a more reliable assessment of the  impact of opt-out policies by controlling for long-term trends and country-specific factors. 

Data was collected from international databases, including the International Registry in Organ Donation and Transplantation (IRODaT) and the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation (GODT). Of the 39 countries that had changed from explicit to presumed consent by December 2019, only five could be included in the analysis due to a lack of historical data for changes made before the IRODaT database was launched in 1996 and because presumed consent practices often existed informally prior to formal legislation. 

Consistent with previous cross-sectional analyses, the study found that switching the default from opt-in to opt-out did not lead to any increase in organ donation rates in the five countries considered. Moreover, the results indicated that the opt-out default did not cause even a slight upward curve in organ donations: the long-term trend remained the same, showing no change in the rate following the switch. As expected, the results did show a reduction in deceased donations with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with only a slow recovery observed by 2022. 

“Simply switching to an opt-out system does not automatically lead to more organ donations,” states author Mattea Dallacker, who led the project at the Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. “Without accompanying measures, such as investments in the healthcare system and public awareness campaigns, a shift to an opt-out default is unlikely to increase organ donations. There is no easy solution to the complex challenge of boosting organ donation rates,” she continues. 

The study also underscores the crucial role of relatives in organ donation decisions. Even in presumed consent systems, where individuals are considered donors unless they opt out, families are often consulted and can override the presumed consent. Since many people do not talk about their donation wishes with loved ones, presumed consent can lead to uncertainty and hesitation among families, potentially resulting in refusals.

“A possible alternative to the opt-out system is a mandatory choice system,” says Ralph Hertwig, Director at the Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. “This would allow citizens to explicitly register their consent or objection to organ donation, when applying for a driver’s license or ID card, for example. This active choice system could prompt people to make an informed decision, which would eliminate the perceived ambiguity about their preference that appears to lead to higher family refusal rates. Good and accessible information about organ donation is essential for informed choice,” Hertwig continues.

 Key points: 

  • Longitudinal study examines organ donation rates of deceased individuals in five countries with an opt-out system (Argentina, Chile, Sweden, Uruguay, and Wales).
  • The switch from an opt-in to an opt-out default policy did not increase organ donation rates in the five countries studied. 
  • To reduce uncertainty and improve donation rates, countries need to invest in transplant coordination services and infrastructure, encourage individuals to talk about their donation wishes with relatives, and train medical teams to navigate difficult conversations with families.