Monday, January 06, 2025

 

Syria, geopolitics and the left



Published 

Syrian's celebrating

First published in Spanish at publico.es on December 12. Translated by Art Young for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal. Subtitles and footnotes added by translator.

I am going to be very harsh: there is something morally nauseating about Western hypocrisy, which has always killed civilians or let them be killed everywhere in the name of democracy and human rights. But there is something no less repugnant in the hypocrisy of the self-styled “anti-imperialist” left, which effectively manages to smother the dreams of liberation of many ordinary people under a mountain of pontifical studies looking on “balance of forces”, “capitalist interests” and “foreign manipulation”. Curiously enough, these studies always present the United States or one of the “pawns” it has manufactured in CIA laboratories as the central actor. These left analysts always know everything, no matter what is happening or where. They apply their 20th century schemas to an increasingly complex and elusive reality, and scorn all those who are “deceived” into struggling and dying by Evil, which only ever has one name and one goal.

Samuel Johnson said “patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels”. The same could be said of “geopolitics”: it too is the refuge of the lazy, the fanatics and, in general, the conspiracy theorists. To be sure, it is an unfortunate fact that no one can avoid geopolitics; it is impossible to understand anything about what is happening in the world today without meticulously analysing the situation on the ground. But the hypocritical and sectarian nature of certain leftists’ geopolitical obsession is revealed by the fact that the more they focus their attention on the Great Game or World Chess, the more factors they ignore. One after the other, they proceed to ignore any factor that does not fit their monotheistic version of history; the most important of which are the very peoples in whose name they claim to be acting. When something happens somewhere in the world that they cannot fit into their schemas (be it Maidan in Ukraine or the “Arab revolutions”), the first thing that they do is abandon the most inconvenient actor: the people. They do this with a dehumanising contempt whose nihilism competes with that of the European far right. Implicitly or explicitly, this contempt has entailed supporting [Russian president Vladimir] Putin in Ukraine and [former president] Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

The role and bias of this geopolitical obsession becomes very clear as soon as one compares, for example, their different attitudes toward Palestine and Syria. When it comes to Palestine, Palestinians have the right to fight the occupation by any means necessary; but the same does not apply to Syrians who are fighting tyranny. When it comes to Palestine, the left invokes human rights, international law and even the United Nations with its international courts; the rest of the time it disdainfully denounces these same norms and institutions. On the other hand, when it comes to Syria, the left has justified bombings and massacres in the name of the same “war on terrorism” it rejects elsewhere, and rightly so. When it comes to Palestine these leftists do not raise the issues of Hamas’s Islamism or the intervention of the Iranian theocracy; instead they speak of Israel’s crimes and the Palestinians’ right to sovereignty. When it comes to Syria, on the other hand, all the talk has been and remains focused on HTS’s Islamism, Turkey’s long hand, or US interests, and never the crimes of the regime or those of its international allies (Russia, Iran, Hezbollah). Of course they also ignore the Syrian people’s right to a little bit of that freedom that we feel is being threatened here in Spain. Palestinians are never prevented from defending themselves against their executioner on the grounds that a free Palestine might become another Arab dictatorship or fall into the hands of jihadists. Yet Syrians are told they are not allowed to overthrow their own executioner on the grounds that Assad’s replacement might be worse (worse for whom?). Palestinians are victims and we rightly and passionately demand they be recognised as subjects. Syrians are just pawns of the US or sub-pawns of the US’s Islamist pawns (just like Ukrainians who defend their land against Russia are “Nazis”). In short, in Palestine the focus is always on humanity; in Syria (and Ukraine) the focus is always on context.

‘Anti-imperialist’ hypocrisy at work

As I noted in a previous article: Western hypocrisy focused its attention on Ukraine; “anti-imperialist” hypocrisy focused on Palestine. No one focused on Syria. In the end, all three peoples have lost out. During this past year it has often been pointed out, correctly, that the Palestinian ordeal did not begin on October 7 with the war crimes committed by the Islamist resistance; that it all began in 1947, if not before, and that in recent years Israel continued to uproot trees, demolish houses, torture children, plunder territory and regularly bomb Gaza, while the mass media looked the other way. Yet the same thing can be said of Syria: it did not all start on December 1, when an Islamist organisation that very few people knew anything about took over the city of Aleppo. If we do not want to go all the way back to Hafez al-Assad’s coup d'état in 1971, we can start in March 2011, when a peaceful people’s revolution first demanded reforms and then, in response to brutal repression, the overthrow of his son and successor, Bashar. Since then, 320,000 civilians have been killed, mostly at the hands of the regime and its allies, and until this week there were 100,000 prisoners and missing persons. They too were victims of that atrocious regime whose fall many of us are celebrating today. Moreover, since 2016, after Russia’s and Iran’s intervention reversed the balance of forces to the benefit of the dictatorship, bombs had continued to fall in areas that Damascus did not control, such as Idlib. Russian bombings destroyed bakeries, hospitals and schools, just like in Gaza (and Ukraine). But this never bothered the self-styled “anti-imperialists”, who, on the contrary, distrusted the revolution as long as it was peaceful and rejoiced in its militarisation, radicalisation and Islamisation. This allowed them, and Assad, to treat all opponents as “terrorists”. They never supported, not even rhetorically, all those Syrian activists who, had they been Spanish, would have been protesting in the squares during the 15M movement1, but instead ended up in mass graves in Hama or Homs. They never found anything to admire in the hundreds of democratic councils that, for a certain period, managed the liberated cities, including Aleppo itself. Even today I still hear some friends (yes, friends!) talk about the destruction of Syria ... by the US, even though President Obama — I do not forget — allowed the Assad regime to use chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, and its only intervention in Syria has been against ISIS and in support of the Kurdish Communists (which, I openly confess, pleased me).

Now, after Assad’s overthrow, not only are these same “anti-imperialists” not happy to see prisoners freed from jail — the slaughterhouses of the dictatorship — they also fail to join in the joy of the families who have been reuniting after years of separation, or the relief and enthusiasm of the majority of Syrians without whose help the unexpected triumph of this ultra fast military offensive would have been impossible. On the contrary: as some of the messages I have received show, these people are hoping that the very evil jihadists, according to them, who have liberated Damascus will immediately start chopping people’s heads off and imposing sharia. They do not like the fact that the new authorities, whether they are hypocrites or not, have avoided reprisals, are making inclusive speeches and are negotiating with all forces on the ground, including sectors of the regime who have not fled the country and without which a transition would be impossible. It is not that these leftists are waiting for things to go wrong (it certainly could); this is precisely what they want to happen.

Syria: The first mass slaughter broadcast in real time

Like with Palestine today, everyone could see everything that was taking place in Syria between 2011-16. It is not true that the slaughter we are witnessing today in Palestine is the first in history to be broadcast in real time. The same thing happened in Syria at the start of the last decade. In fact many Syrians, like my friend Leila Nachawati, naively thought that the visibility of Assad’s crimes, which a legion of activists and journalists broadcast live, would have served to halt them or, at least, reduce their number and intensity. “Today,” she thought back then, “what happened in Hama in 1982 cannot happen again,” referring to when the Assad family secured control of the country for three decades by killing between 10-30,000 Syrians in the dark. Alas, she was wrong and admitted so in her excellent novel, Cuando La Revolución Termine (When the Revolution Ends). The characters in the novel painfully express the extent to which international indifference increased the suffering and despair Syrians were already experiencing. Indeed, we were all living witnesses to the massacres perpetrated by the regime, just like today with Palestine, and we did nothing about it back then. Well, actually, some people did do something: they supported Assad in the name of anti-imperialism (just like they support Putin in Ukraine today) in much the same way the global far right supports Israel against the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Another geopolitics is possible

Another geopolitics is possible. This was demonstrated a few days ago, when no one could imagine the imminent collapse of the Syrian tyranny. Nachawati published an excellent article that lays out all the complexities, endogenous and exogenous, that have emerged in the region and which therefore rule out any magical revolutionary solution for Syria, just as there is none for Palestine. However, this complexity should not prevent us from now joining in the hopes of millions of Syrians who have reasons to contemplate the future with reservations, but also to celebrate the overthrow of Assad, his mafia family and his autocratic allies. They know this step is a minimum and necessary condition, although perhaps not a sufficient one, for the construction of a more just and democratic future in their country and throughout the world. Is this not what we want for Palestine? There, Hamas’ crimes on October 7 did not prevent us from standing in solidarity with the Palestinian people, nor from being aware of the complexity of their just struggle against Israeli Zionism; a complexity that, in their case, would not prevent us from rejoicing if, even in a new undemocratic world order (or with the unimaginable support of the US and the European Union), they were to achieve their liberation. For we also know that there is no future for Palestine and for the world without the defeat of genocidal Israeli Zionism.

At this point in an earlier draft of this article, written five days ago [December 7] when the rapid fall of Damascus could not yet be foreseen, I recommended a very beautiful text by Ayham Al Sati, a Syrian refugee in Spain, in which the author laid out, in remarkable Spanish, a lacerating combination of fear and hope that one of the most afflicted people of the planet has endured for decades. I am retaining that recommendation in this version as a tribute to those Syrians who have suffered as much as he has and who share his viewpoint; and who, like him, feel a little less fear and a little more hope today. Please let the Syrians enjoy this historic Sunday without spoiling their celebration by questioning the legitimacy of their joy from our Olympic distance, acting like card sharks who move pieces around on a geopolitical chessboard from the last century.

Another geopolitics is possible: complex analysis, simple principles; context and humanity. This is the opposite of what self-styled “anti-imperialists” have done during these years with regards Syria and continue to do with Ukraine, applying Occam's razor2 to suit their nihilistic ideological blinkers, thereby abandoning peoples on the ground who rise up against dictatorships if they are not “on our side”, or those who defend their land from invaders, unless they are Palestinian. Everything is much more complex than what these geopolitical chess fanatics — who are actually playing checkers — claim is the case; everything is also much simplier. We have to read more and study more. We must also ask people more questions, directly or indirectly.

The Syrians themselves have shown us the way: we can — yes we can — support Palestinians, Ukrainians and Syrians all at the same time. We do not know what will happen after tomorrow. Syrians are very diverse and many international interests are entwined in the region, but the extremely rapid collapse of a bloodthirsty regime that, with Russian and Iranian collaboration, seemed to have consolidated its power (and that was about to normalise relations with Europe) shows that the fall of Damascus was not on anyone’s agenda. For that very reason, it should oblige us to scale back the arrogance of all our schemas. As was the case during the Arab revolutions, many actors will be forced to adjust their strategies. They will have to begin by recognising the relative autonomy of local forces (the Islamists, Kurds, SNA (Syrian National Army)3, the democratic opposition, and the remnants of the regime). Above all they will have to take into account the unexpected existence (after so many nightmarish years) of the common people, their aspirations and their powers of resistance.

Every Syrian has won and every Syrian has lost. Whoever wants to rule Syria will have to rely on all the forces that the HTS offensive itself has brought to light, thereby reducing its hegemony. In a situation where no one can claim victory for themselves and where everyone feels that they have lost something — or a lot or everything — in recent years, an agreement might perhaps be more feasible. Suddenly, there is a possibility (unimaginable only a week ago) that Syrians might be the ones who decide their own fate. We must therefore let them explore. Today, in any case, let us allow them to bury their dead, pay homage to their heroes, welcome their friends released from the dungeons, reunite with their mothers, return from exile and dance in the liberated squares, caressing in their head and hands the Syria that these years had stolen from them. Whatever happens from now on, no one can deny that Syria is a better country today. We could go further and say: in contrast to the suffering of the past decades, for a few hours Syria is and will be the freest country in the world.

  • 1

    An anti-austerity movement that began in Spain on May 15, 2011.

  • 2

    A problem-solving principle that suggests the simplest explanation is often the best one.

  • 3

    Despite its name, the SNA is not the army of the Syrian state. It is one of a number of armed coalitions that opposed the Assad regime, which was mainly based in northern Syria and is backed by Turkey. 

Israel’s massive attack on free Syria: Background and motivations



Published 
Air bases, weapons and defense systems, and intelligence and military buildings belonging to the former Syrian regime being destroyed.

First published at Their Anti-imperialism and Ours.

It didn’t take long: from the moment the Assad regime collapsed and the rebels entered Damascus, Israel’s massive land and air attack began. As long as all these arms depots, military airports, intelligence centres, scientific research centres, air bases, air defence systems, ammunition manufacturing facilities, “ small stockpiles of chemical weapons,” and Syria’s entire naval force were safely in the hands of the Assad regime, Israel never touched them. As Syrian revolutionary commentator Rami puts it, Israel has “known their location the whole time but felt safe knowing that they were in Assad’s hands, who uses them exclusively on Syrians,” and certainly never against Israel. “Now that Free Syrians are in control Israel panics and starts bombing them all,” in order to prevent, as countless Israeli leaders have declared, these weapons falling into the hands of the former rebels, who Israeli leaders have described as a “hostile entity.”

According to Ben Caspit writing for al-Monitor, since the rebels took control of Syria, “Israel says it has attacked some 500 regime targets, dropped 1,800 precision bombs, destroyed about half of Assad’s air force, much of the regime’s tanks and missile launch capabilities, 80% of its air defense systems, all its explosive UAVs and 90% of its radar systems as well as the chemical weapons still held in Syria.” The open source intelligence monitor OSINTdefender claims the IDF has eliminated some 70-80 percent of Syria’s military capacity, the locations including “anti-aircraft batteries, Syrian Air Force airfields, naval bases, and dozens of weapons production sites in Damascus, Homs, Tartus, Latakia, and Palmyra,” resulting in the destruction of “Scud Tactical-Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, Surface-to-Sea, Sea-to-Sea, Surface-to-Air and Surface-to-Surface Missiles, UAVs, Fighter Jets, Attack Helicopters, Ships, Radars, Tanks, Hangars, and more.”

“ Israeli warplanes bombed the intelligence and customs buildings in the Syrian capital, Damascus.” The intelligence buildings? Wonder what deals between Israel and the Assad regime they did not want anyone to find there? The Golan sale, perhaps? The dealings between Israel and the Assad regime over Israel’s bombing of Iranian and Hezbollah targets? Indeed, it is feared that Israel may be destroying evidence against Assad that could be used by the new authorities to place charges against him in the International Criminal Court.

Israel then went right on to completely destroy Syria’s naval fleet, under the nose of Russia’s still present air and naval bases in Tartous and Latakia. The massive strikes Israel launched on Tartous on December 15 were described by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights the “most violent strikes” in the region since 2012. A gigantic mushroom cloud fireball blew up over the region, “the explosion was so powerful that it was measured as a 3.1 magnitude earthquake on the seismic sensor.”

Israel expands into the Golan

Israel has also invaded further into the Syrian-controlled side of the Golan to create a “buffer zone” (for its already Golan “buffer zone” 57-year occupation) against the Syrian rebel forces. While it is unclear exactly how much territory has been seized, a map from The New York Times shows the territory held by the IDF as of December 13.

It is clear Israel intends to keep much of the new territory it has conquered. Defense Minister Israel Katz said the IDF would stay on “the Syrian side” of Mount Hermon “during the coming winter months as Israel aims to prevent the border region from falling into the wrong hands.” For Israel, a “temporary” stay has traditionally meant forever, as with the main part of Syria’s Golan Heights which Israel conquered in 1967 and illegally annexed in 1981. According to Ben Caspit writing for al-Monitor, a senior Israeli military source said that Israeli troops “will not retreat until the threat to Israel’s border is removed, which could take “ between four days and four years.”

According to Al Jazeera’s Muntasir Abou Nabout, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have also destroyed roads, power lines, and water networks in Quneitra province (the Syrian-controlled side of the Golan) when people refused to evacuate. “Israeli tanks are now stationed in towns and villages in Syria’s southwest as the Israeli military expanded its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights.”

In the villages of the al-Rafid region of Quneitra, Israel cut water and electricity to pressure the people to leave, but they refused, and demanded all weapons be handed over. According to one local interviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “no one knows what their aim is, but for sure they have created a new enemy in the future for themselves.” The local also claimed “they [the IDF] removed the people of the village of Rasm al-Rawadhi under threats, and they prevented those who left the village of al-Hamidiya from returning.”

The IDF also invaded Daraa province, troops deploying in Ma’aryah village in Al-Yarmouk Basin, “patrolling and searching some residents.” They also attempted to enter Abdeen village, “but the residents confronted them and prevented them from entering the village.”

Meanwhile, the Israeli government “unanimously approved” a plan to double the 31,000 Israeli settler population in the Golan Heights itself. When Israel seized the territory in 1967, some 130,000 Syrians were expelled, but some 20,000 Syrian Druze still remain amidst the settlers and steadfastly refuse Israeli citizenship. Yet now Israel is attempting to stir up separatism among the Syrian Druze in the Hader region of the Golan, claiming they want to join Israel out of fear of the new Syrian authorities, despite the strong participation of the Druze in their main region of Suweida and their leaderships in the revolution.

Arab League condemns, US supports Israel; Russia hands over posts to Israel

On December 13, the Arab League strongly condemned this Israeli aggression, and separately Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia Egypt and the UAE have issued strong statements.

Not surprisingly, the US has supported Israel’s aggression, National Security Adviser Sullivan claiming “ what Israel is doing is trying to identify potential threats, both conventional and weapons of mass destruction, that could threaten Israel and, frankly, threaten others as well, and neutralize those threats,” as Israel destroys virtually the entire Syrian arsenal with its US-supplied weaponry. The US also supported Israel’s expansion into the Syrian Golan, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller explaining the collapse of the Assad regime “created a potential vacuum that could’ve been filled by terror organizations that threaten Israel.” Sure, he stressed that Israel’s stay should be “temporary,” but the world knows that US words mean nothing in relation to Israel’s actions – indeed Israel’s occupation of the rest of the Golan in 1967 was also supposed to be temporary.

Meanwhile, it was reported on December 9, just as the Israeli attack was mounting, that Russia, as it withdrew from the south, handed over to Israel two facilities in Daraa, and an observatory on Mount Tel Al-Hara. As Russian forces have been based in the Golan region since 2018 under a Putin-Trump-Netanyahu-Assad agreement to keep both Syrian rebels and Iran-backed forces away – to protect both the Assad regime and the Israeli occupation concurrently – this story rings likely.

Israeli leaders explain their aggression

As the revolution took Damascus and Assad fled early on December 8, IDF Chief Herzi Halevi announced that “combat operations” in Syria were to begin, stating that Israel was now fighting on a “fourth front” in Syria in addition to Gaza, West Bank and Lebanon. Israel’s massive attack on Syria had begun. On December 9, Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz “announced that he had directed the army to establish a “safe zone” on the Syrian side, free of weapons and “terrorist” infrastructure, as he put it,.

Most memes did not go past Israeli propaganda such as Netanyahu’s claim that these events are a “direct result” of Israel’s military campaign against Iran and Hezbollah and his assertion that “this is a historic day in the history of the Middle East.” Sure, who wouldn’t want to feign happiness and try to take credit for the collapse of such a monstrous regime. More important however was what Netanyahu also said: “We gave the Israeli army the order to take over these positions to ensure that no hostile force embeds itself right next to the border of Israel.” On December 15, Netanyahu followed this up claiming that Israel’s actions in Syria were intended to “thwart the potential threats from Syria and to prevent the takeover of terrorist elements near our border”.

Katz also doubled down, declaring on December 15 that “The immediate risks to the country have not disappeared and the recent developments in Syria are increasing the intensity of the threat, despite the rebel leaders seeking to present a semblance of moderation.” On December 18, Israel’s deputy foreign minister Sharren Haskel described HTS as “wolves in sheep’s clothing” and stated “we are not going to be fooled by nice talk,” claiming “these rebel groups are in fact terrorist groups” and went on to remind about Jolani’s past al-Qaeda links.

Likudist Diaspora Affairs Minister Amachai Chikli made the case more openly, stating that “ the events in Syria are far from being a cause for celebration. Despite the rebranding of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its leader Ahmed al-Shara, the bottom line is that most of Syria is now under the control of affiliates of al-Qaeda and Daesh. The good news is the strengthening of the Kurds and the expansion of their control in the north-east of the country (Deir ez-Zor area). Operatively, Israel must renew its control at the height of the Hermon … we must not allow jihadists to establish themselves near our settlements.”

The Israeli calculus in the days before the fall

All of this was already discussed in the uncertain days between the first offensive that took Aleppo and the collapse of the regime ten days later. As we will see, Israeli leaders were not exactly “delighted,” as a somewhat unfortunate piece by Juan Cole claimed.

Israel has always supported the Assad regime against the opposition (see next section); this put it on the same side as its Iranian enemy, with the difference that it preferred the regime without Iran – hence Israel’s strong decade-long partnership with Russia starting with its 2015 intervention to save Assad; since then, the Israel-Russia agreement has allowed Israel to bomb Iranian and Hezbollah targets anywhere in Syria at will, and the world-class Russian S-400 air defence system will not touch them. But Israel always left the Assadist war machine intact.

During Israel’s devastating war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime did nothing to come to the aid of its ally at its moment of existential need, indeed it closed Hezbollah recruitment offices, banned Syrian citizens from fighting abroad, prohibited the traditionally Iran-connected Fourth Division from transferring weapons or providing accommodation to Hezbollah or Iranian forces, confiscated Hezbollah ammunition depots in rural Damascus. The regime even took 48 hours to comment on Israel’s murder of Nasrallah. From the beginning of the Gaza genocide, the Assad regime refused to open a front on the Golan like Hezbollah did in southern Lebanon, as has been widely noted in many reports; the Syrian regime, according to the Lebanese al-Modon, instructed its forces in the Golan “ not to engage in any hostilities, including firing bullets or shells toward Israel.” Palestinians were arrested for attempting to hold rallies in solidarity with Gaza.

Since Israel had just come through a war with Hezbollah, it could see the opportunity presented by Assad’s treachery to pressure Assad for more, ie, to completely cut the Iranian weapons transfers to Lebanon. During his November visit to Moscow, Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer told his Russian hosts that Israel would propose to the US to lift or freeze sanctions on the Assad regime in exchange for any such efforts to prevent the flow of weapons to Hezbollah (indeed this demonstrates how outside of reality are the conspiracy theories that claim, with zero evidence, that Israel was somehow “behind” the HTS offensive that led to fall of Assad, whatever that even means).

As such, taken by surprise, like everyone else, by the rapid successes of the Syrian revolution, Israel tended to adopt a plague on both your houses view, ie, withholding support for Assad in order to pressure his regime for more in its moment of weakness, while warning of the dangers from the other side. Israeli foreign minister Gideon Saar’s view expressed on December 3 that “Israel doesn’t take sides” as “ there is no good side there” was probably closest to the mainstream Israeli view. Saar also said that Israel should “ explore ways to increase cooperation” with the Kurds, “we need to focus on their interests.”

On November 29, Netanyahu held a security consultation with “defence” chiefs. He was told that Hezbollah’s forces will now likely shift to Syria, “in order to defend the Assad regime,” which they assessed would “bolster the likelihood of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire holding,” making these developments “appear to be positive” in the short-term, but “the collapse of the Assad regime would likely create chaos in which military threats against Israel would develop.” The first point, that the blows suffered by the Assad regime “forces all members of the axis to focus on another theater that is not Israel,” is likewise considered “a net positive for Israel” by Nadav Pollak, a former Israeli intelligence official at Reichman University in Israel. In other words, both sources suggest that Israel saw Iran and Hezbollah being in Syria, fighting for Assad, as a “positive” because they are thereby not focused on Israel.

Regarding the second point, the “military threats” which may arise, Channel 12, reporting that the meeting also raised concerns that “strategic capabilities” of the Assad regime, including “the remnants of [its] chemical weapons,” could fall into the jihadists’ hands, so the IDF “is said to be preparing for a scenario where Israel would be required to act,” ie to destroy this weaponry before it falls into rebel hands, which of course is exactly what has come to pass.

A number of prominent right-wing Israeli spokespeople or security spooks made the case for supporting Assad more forcefully. For example, on November 29, Dr. Yaron Friedman at the University of Haifa penned an article in Maariv claiming that HTS “controls internal terrorism over the entire province of Idlib” and “like Hamas,” receives the support of Turkey and Qatar. He notes that “the opposition consists mostly of Sunni fanatics from the Salafi Jihadi stream” who “look like Hamas terrorists.” He stressed that while “Assad is far from being Israel’s friend … he is the old and familiar enemy” under whom “Syria has not waged a war against Israel for more than fifty years,” while “ Bashar al-Assad has not lifted a finger in favor of Hamas or Hezbollah since the beginning of the war in Gaza.” Therefore, “the Islamic opposition that aims to turn Syria into a center of global jihad is a much more dangerous enemy. The option of Syria under the rule of Assad under the auspices of Russia is still the least bad from Israel’s point of view.”

Eliyahu Yosian, former intelligence officer from Israel’s notorious Unit 8200 – suspected of being behind Israel’s massive cyber-terrorist attack on Hezbollah members pagers which blew off people’s faces and hands – explained on December 5, “Personally, I support Assad’s rule, because he is a weak enemy and a weak enemy serves our interests. No-ne can guarantee who will come after Assad’s fall.” He noted that Israel can attack in Syria “every so often in coordination with Russia and without any threat.” Therefore “ We must support Assad’s existence.”

One possibility discussed was for Israel to invade and establish a “buffer zone” in southern Syria if the regime collapsed or was close to collapsing.

This view was put forcefully by Lt.-Col. Amit Yagur, another former senior intelligence officer (who had earlier called for Israel to “ drive Iran out of Syria”). On December 6, he claimed that what the rebels had achieved constituted “a tectonic collapse of the Sykes-Pilot agreement, a major collapse of the foundations of the old order,” and therefore “we need to ensure there is a buffer zone between us and the Sunnis.” This buffer zone “could be fully secured by IDF officers,” which however was “less realistic,” or “ guarded by forces of Assad’s regime,” which presumably he thought was more realistic, “so that we don’t end up with a shared border with these guys,” making reference to October 7.

Not all Zionist commentators held these views. Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University, explained that there are voices now challenging the “ the traditional Israeli approach of preferring Assad — the devil we know,” with a view of delivering a blow to Iran by getting rid of the Assad regime. In fact, one of the problems for Israel was the same problem for Russia and Iran – if the despot you have relied on for decades to service your varied and even opposing interests can no longer maintain that “stability,” but on the contrary, his house collapses like a pack of cards, then continued support would not just be a bad investment, but be utterly pointless.

In this light, what is striking about all these views expressed above – even just days before the regime’s collapse – is how extraordinarily unrealistic they were; they all seemed to imagine that Assad still had a chance! Such blindness at such a late date suggests wilfulness, ie, Israel was so invested in the regime’s survival that it impossible to imagine it not being there, even if only running the buffer zone! Indeed, even Zisser notes of the move among some Zionists towards accepting Assad’s downfall as a defeat for Iran, “for the moment at least, the Israeli leadership is not considering such a possibility.”

Background: Israel and the Syrian revolution 2011-2018

Anyone confused about this should not be. If you have been exposed to either mainstream media or tankie propaganda depicting Israel and the Assad regime to be enemies, this documentation below will demonstrate that throughout the Syrian conflict, Israeli leaders (political, military and intelligence) and think tanks continually expressed their preference for the Assad regime prevailing against its opponents, and were especially appreciative of Assad’s decades of non-resistance on the occupied Golan frontier.

Of course that does make them friends, but the “conflict” between Israel and Syria is quite simple: Israel seized Syria’s Golan in 1967 and has steadfastly refused to ever negotiate it back. That is not an Assad issue; it is a Syrian issue, the opposition has made continual statements on Syria’s right to use all legitimate means to regain the Golan. When asked if he would follow his close Arab allies – Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Jordan – in establishing relations with Israel, Assad’s response noted only the Golan, avoiding mention of ‘resistance’ or Palestine: “Our position has been very clear since the beginning of the peace talks in the 1990s … We can establish normal relations with Israel only when we regain our land … Therefore, it is possible when Israel is ready, but it is not and it was never ready … Therefore, theoretically yes, but practically, so far the answer is no.” Assad, in other words, wanted to be Sadat, but Israel didn’t let him.

From 2012:

Israel’s intelligence chief, Major General Aviv Kochavi, “ warned that “radical Islam” was gaining ground in Syria, saying the country was undergoing a process of “Iraqisation”, with militant and tribal factions controlling different sectors of the country”, and claiming there was “an ongoing flow of Al-Qaeda and global jihad activists into Syria”. He said that with the Assad regime weakening, “the Golan Heights could become an arena of activity against Israel, similar to the situation in Sinai, as a result of growing jihad movement in Syria.”

From 2013:

“Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Israel would erect a new security fence along its armistice line with Syria because “We know that on the other side of our border with Syria today, the Syrian army has moved away, and global jihad forces have moved in.” “We must therefore protect this border from infiltrations and terror, as we have successfully been doing along the Sinai border.”

In an interview with BBC TV, Netanyahu called the Syrian rebel groups among “the worst Islamist radicals in the world… So obviously we are concerned that weapons that are ground-breaking, that can change the balance of power in the Middle East, would fall into the hands of these terrorists,” he said.

“Israel’s military chief of staff has warned that some of the rebel forces trying to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may soon turn their attention southward and attack Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights. We see terror organisations that are increasingly gaining footholds in the territory and they are fighting against Assad,” Lieutenant-General Benny Gantz said at a conference in Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. “Guess what? We’ll be next in line.”

Israel also “worries that whoever comes out on top in the civil war will be a much more dangerous adversary” than Assad has ever been. “The military predicts all that (the 40-year peaceful border) will soon change as it prepares for the worst.” The region near the occupied Golan has become “a huge ungoverned area and inside an ungoverned area many, many players want to be inside and want to play their own role and to work for their own interests,” said Gal Hirsch, a reserve Israeli brigadier general, claiming Syria has now become “a big threat to Israel” over the last two years.

Israel’s Man in Damascus – Why Jerusalem Doesn’t Want the Assad Regime to Fall’ – heading in Foreign Affairs (May 10, 2013), article by Efraim Halevy, who served as chief of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002.

Israeli defence ministry strategist Amos Gilad stressed that while Israel “is prepared to resort to force to prevent advanced Syrian weapons reaching Hezbollah or jihadi rebels”, Israel was not interested in attacking Syria’s chemical weapons at present because “ the good news is that this is under full control (of the Syrian government).”

[comment: as we can see, the Israeli view that chemical weapons were no problem in Assad’s hands but must be destroyed if he falls, being enacted now, goes way back]

From early 2015:

Dan Halutz, former Chief of Staff of the IDF, claimed that Assad was the least harmful choice in Syria, so western powers and Israel “should strengthen the Syrian regime’s steadfastness in the face of its opponents.” Allowing Assad to fall would be “the most egregious mistake.”

From 2015 (shortly before the Russian intervention to save Assad which Israel supported):

IDF spokesperson Alon Ben-David stated that “The Israeli military intelligence confirms that the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to protect the Syrian regime has dramatically declined, making the Israeli military command more cautious of a sudden fall of the Syrian regime which will let battle-hardened jihadist groups rule near the Israeli border;” as a result, military intelligence services are “working on the **preparation of a list of targets** that are likely to be struck inside Syria, **after a possible fall of the Assad regime**.”

[two points: first, clearly, that “list of targets” has come in handy now that “the fall of the Assad regime” has come about; second, this also suggests that Israel was not against Iran and Hezbollah being in Syria as long as they were only defending Assad, rather than delivering missiles to Lebanon]

From 2015 (after onset of Russian intervention):

At the time when Israel is getting ready for the first coordination meeting with Russia over their joint intervention in Syria, Israeli military sources have confirmed the existence of consensus within Tel Aviv’s decision making circles over the importance of the continuation of the Assad regime. Military affairs commentator Alon Ben-David quoted a source within the Israeli Joint Chiefs of Staff as saying “the best option for Israel would be for the Assad regime to remain and for the internal fighting to continue for as long as possible.” In an article published in Maariv newspaper, the military source pointed out that the continuation of the Assad regime, which enjoys international recognition, relieves Israel of the burden of direct intervention and of deep involvement in the ongoing war. He noted that Israel agrees with both Russia and Iran on this matter.

Israel will provide Russia with intelligence information about opposition sites in Syria to facilitate Moscow’s military operations, Channel 2TV reported, noting that a delegation of Russian army officials will arrive in Israel to coordinate the military cooperation.

From 2017:

The ‘Begin-Sadat Centre’ think tank published an article claiming that as Israel is “surrounded by enemies,” it “needs those enemies to be led by strong, stable rulers who will control their armies and prevent both the firing on, and infiltrations into, Israeli territory,” noting that both Assads had always performed this role. The fact that “Syria is no longer able to function as a sovereign state … is bad for Israel” and therefore “ a strong Syrian president with firm control over the state is a vital interest for Israel. Given the Islamist alternatives to his rule, Syria’s neighbours, including Israel, may well come to miss him as Syria is rapidly Lebanonised.”

From 2018 (as Assad regime re-took the south all the way to the Golan “border” with Israel from the rebels, with the support of Trump, Putin and Netanyahu):

Israel’s National Security Adviser, Meir Ben Shabat, declared in early June that Israel has no problem with Assad remaining in power as long as the Iranians leave; Knesset member Eyal Ben Reuven stressed that the stability of the Assad regime was “pure Israeli interest.” Another Israeli politician told Al-Hurra TV that “ There’s no animosity nor disagreement between us and Bashar al-Assad … he protects Israel’s interests … We now will return to the situation as it was before the revolution.”

Not to be outdone, Netanyahu declared “ We haven’t had a problem with the Assad regime, for 40 years not a single bullet was fired on the Golan Heights.”

In case this was not yet clear enough, at a July meeting with his US counterpart, Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot stressed that Israel will allow “only” Assad regime forces to occupy the Golan “border”.

After noting that “the Syrian front will be calmer with the return of the Assad rule,” the fascistic Lieberman stressed that “Israel prefers to see Syria returning to the situation before the civil war, with the central rule under Assad leadership.” Further, he noted that “ we are not ruling anything out” regarding the possibility of Israel and the Assad regime establishing “some kind of relationship.”

It is clear from this summary that Israel’s attack today as soon as Assad was overthrown has been planned for years for precisely such a time precisely because Israel wanted his rule to continue.

Syria’s condemnation of Israel to UN Security Council – and demands that Syria “fight Israel”

In a joint letter to the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly dated December 9, the new Syrian government stated that it “ condemns in the strongest terms this Israeli aggression, which represents a serious violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement … It also constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, the unity and integrity of its territories, and contradicts the principles and Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of international law, and Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 497.” The letter then “renews its call on the United Nations and the Security Council to assume their responsibilities and take firm measures to compel Israel to immediately cease its ongoing attacks on Syrian territory, ensure that they are not repeated, and withdraw immediately.”

Much has been made of the fact that, while condemning the Israeli aggression in the UN, the new government has not been very vocal otherwise. There are also literal mountains of disinformation around in social media, in mindless memes and photoshop cut-up jobs, claiming the new government wants to “make peace” with Israel and so on (some useful rebuttals here). Many Assad-loving keyboard warriors are condemning the new government for not “fighting” the Israeli attack.

After 50 years of the Assad regime never firing a shot across the Golan demarcation line, these heroes now condemn a government for not “fighting Israel” in 10 days in power.

One might have noticed that the first thing Israel did was to destroy Syria’s entire military arsenal before it could do anything at all, a military arsenal that Assad never once used against the occupation regime. Presumably they expect Syria to fight the neighbouring genocidal military powerhouse, its warplanes and missiles, with sticks and stones.

As Jolani put it, quite logically, “the general exhaustion in Syria after years of war and conflict does not allow us to enter new conflicts.” That is not a call for a “peace” treaty with the occupation, but a statement of fact. The Syrian people have just come through a 14-year war against their own genocidal regime, the regime of Sednaya-Auschwitz, but these western keyboard heroes now believe that the only way the new Syrian government can show its mettle to them (since this is what is important) is by plunging into war with another genocidal regime.

What they might also consider is that while it is Russia that has been bombing the Syrian people for a decade, the new leadership came to an agreement with Russia that it could keep its naval base in Tartous for now, committing itself to not allowing it to be attacked! That’s because they don’t want conflict with that nuclear-armed genocidal power either. This follows HTS’s overtures to Russia earlier in the offensive, when it declared “the Syrian revolution has never been against any state or people, including Russia, calling on Russia “not to tie [its] interests to the Assad regime or the persona of Bashar, but rather with the Syrian people in its history, civilisation and future” as “ we consider [Russia] a potential partner in building a bright future for free Syria.” The government has also made direct contact with Iran, pledging to protect Shiite shrines, but also giving safe passage to exiting Iranian forces, despite their years of crimes in Syria.

If anything, Jolani’s statement that Syria is in no state to enter a new conflict just now due to exhaustion could well be interpreted by Israel as a medium-term threat. The statements by Israeli leaders justifying their aggression suggest that’s how they view it. Right now, the important thing is for Israeli aggression, destruction and occupation to end, and shooting your mouth off with jihadist slogans, where Israeli leaders and many world leaders and media keep reminding everyone of HTS’s distant past “al-Qaeda” links, would be extremely foolish. No doubt Israel would prefer they did, so it could then bomb Damascus and receive congratulations from its uncritical US backer.

For the entire year since October 7, the Assad regime and Russia had bombed the liberated enclave of Idlib where HTS was ruling, under the cover of Gaza. The entire time, people in Idlib and other opposition-controlled regions were out demonstrating their support for Gaza, while being bombed. The charges against HTS in particular make even less sense, given its strong support for Hamas and for October 7, for better or worse. Jolani has also been filmed boasting that “ after Damascus comes Jerusalem,” but of course this kind of rhetoric, so reminiscent of similar Iranian rhetoric, should be taken metaphorically. Yes, any new regime can sell out – there are no guarantees about anything – but if it did, it would face a Syrian population overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian, and there is little point in idle speculation now.

Rather, when Jolani says the focus right now is on stabilising the situation in Syria, this is completely logical. A fractured Syria, getting even more destroyed by foolishness, would have no ability to help Palestinians or to revive its place in the Arab world. More importantly, this is a very critical and dangerous time for the Syrian revolution, when putting a step wrong can have devastating consequences.

With Russia cutting off wheat supplies, Syria is looking for food; the search for literally hundreds of thousands missing is still going on, with the most horrific discoveries turning up in slaughterhouses like Sednaya; people are having to face the grim reality that the majority will not be found alive, as enormous mass graves are being discovered; hundreds of the released have lost their memories and their minds; basic services have had to be restored; the rush is on to preserve as much intelligence information as possible, before being stolen by looters or destroyed by Israeli bombs; the mass return of millions of Syrians has begun. This is what is important; this is what Israel is trying to disrupt with its aggression.

The way in which the Sunni-majority led revolution has made overtures to Christians, Shiites, Alawites, Druze and Kurds has to date been exceptional and has been key to the success of the revolution. The main fault line at present is in the northeast, largely controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Two things are happening. On the one hand, some of the Arab-majority regions within the SDF-run autonomous statelet have revolted against the SDF and joined the main body of Syrian governance, particularly in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa. On the other hand, Turkey, via its proxy SNA, is also attacking Kurdish regions aiming to destroy Kurdish self-rule; while Manbij, which they took from the SDF via a US-negotiated agreement, is a majority Arab city, they are now threatening to move on iconic Kurdish Kobani. To date, HTS has had a much better approach to the Kurdish question and to relations with the SDF than Turkey and the SNA have, but the future is uncertain.

This Turkey-Kurdish question cannot be dealt with in this essay, but how the government deals with it is crucial to the revolution. Israel sees division as a means of entry, Israeli propaganda projecting the Druze and Kurds as Israel’s natural allies. As seen in some of the statements above from Israeli leaders such as Amachai Chikli and Gideon Saar, supporting “the Kurds” is promoted as a key Israeli geopolitical interest; meanwhile, Israel is trying to get the Druze in the Golan to join Israel. There are even fantastic ideas of a ‘Druze state’ in southern Suweida, and a Kurdish state in the east, forming a bridge to Iraqi Kurdistan, with an oil pipeline joining them to Israel; “by leveraging ties with the Syrian Druze and fostering collaboration with Israel’s Kurdish allies, the foundation for this corridor can begin to take shape,” claims the Jerusalem Post. Both the main Druze leadership in Suweida – a key part of the revolution – and the Druze spiritual leadership in Hader itself, along with the Kurdish SDF leadership, completely reject such ideas. But this demonstrates how an increased Turkish-SNA attack on the Kurds, or any step wrong by HTS on religious minorities such as the Druze, could be exploited by Syria’s enemies.

Israel’s interests

This example suggests one important Israeli interest – using the instability and moment of weakness of a revolution to make a land grab – no need to explain why the permanent ‘Greater Israel’ project would want to do that – and extending its hegemony into a chunk of the Arab region via “minorities.” However, this exploitation of minority issues is not only about fostering its influence, but also a means to undermine the revolution. There is no mystery about Israel wanting to do this: genocidal colonial settler-regimes like Israel – like other imperialist states – hate popular revolutions, especially in the Arab world. Not only did Israel have a good working relationship with the Assad regime as demonstrated above, but more generally the mutual existence of apartheid Israel and Arab dictatorships has always been symbiotic.

Many “left” Assad apologists, who are embarrassed that Israel has only attacked after the downfall of Assad, are trying to save face by saying “see, Assad’s fall makes Syria weak and Israel can do what it wants.” Think of that for a moment: it is an argument that people should not overthrow dictators, even genocidal ones, because when you make a revolution you get attacked by imperialist powers or other powerful reactionary states. Perhaps Russians should not have made a revolution because Russia first temporarily lost a great chunk of territory to the invading German army at Brest-Litovsk, and then had to face another 20 or so western armies of invasion. The argument is ludicrous, and counterrevolutionary.

Let’s look at three aspects that make Israel terrified of the Syrian revolution.

Concern about ‘jihadists’ and ‘terrorists’

The first, the most superficial, is the one that Israeli leaders promote, and is most useful for mass consumption: as seen in so many of the quotes above, Israel does not want “terrorists” or “jihadists” to get their hands on weapons that were previously safely in the hands of the Assad regime, because they might use them to launch attacks “on Israel” (or more likely, the occupied Golan). This cannot be dismissed out of hand. At an immediate level, Israel would have such a fear, especially in times of “chaos,” when a new government does not have clear control of all armed forces and so on.

But any such attacks would do nothing to help Syria, let alone Palestine, whatever the illusions in certain quarters. On the contrary, it would simply be grist in the mill of Zionist propaganda about being “under attack by terrorists” and allow Israel to destroy the whole of Syria, with full US support. Whatever the past rhetoric of HTS, the fact that it has pledged not to do that is entirely logical, especially in current circumstances, and politically defangs Israel’s arguments.

Threat of spread of uprising via regional Sunni Islamist populism

The second aspect is the regional Sunni ‘Islamist’ aspect, not meaning fanatical ‘jihadism’ but more the populist Muslim Brotherhood-type connections between these activists in Sunni majority countries Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine and the Gulf. HTS’s marked ‘softening’ puts it more in this camp than anything related to its distant past al-Qaeda connections. The support given by Hamas – the Palestinian MB – to the Syrian revolution both in 2011-2018 and now flows quite organicially from these connections, as does the support given to Gaza by HTS and other Syrian rebel groups and a year of demonstrations in Idlib and northern Aleppo. The MB has been a major opposition force in Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere, and in Jordan in particular it has played a major role in mobilising against the Jordanian regime’s collaboration with Israel.

Put simply, a popular revolution in one Arab country may be just too good an example for people suffering under other Arab dictators whose relationships with Israel are more out in the open than the one it had with Assad, and these religious-political connections may facilitate this. The fact that the ‘Abrahams Accord’ countries (in its broadest sense, all who had relations with Israel) and the ‘Assad Accord’ countries were the same – Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Jordan etc, with Saudi Arabia supportive but more reticent on both – can be best understood as both an alliance for counterrevolution generally, and an anti-MB alliance in particular. The overthrow of the Jordanian or Egyptian regimes in particular would be a huge boost to the Palestinian struggle.

In this light, we read that Israel’s Security Agency (Shin Bet) Director Ronen Bar and IDF Military Intelligence Directorate chief Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder visited Jordan on December 13 to meet Maj. Gen. Ahmad Husni, director of Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, “ amid concerns the unrest in Syria could spill over to the Hashemite Kingdom.” According to the Jewish News Syndicate, “Jerusalem is worried that the overthrow of the Assad regime by Syrian rebel factions including terrorist elements led by the Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham could destabilize Jordan … The talks come against the backdrop of fears in Jerusalem that extremist groups in Jordan could try to replicate the swift ouster of Bashar Assad by attempting to remove King Abdullah II from power.”

According to the Jerusalem Post, “Arab diplomats have also expressed alarm over a potential “domino effect” in the region. … An Arab diplomat from the region said this week that authorities in Egypt, Jordan, and neighboring states are monitoring Syria closely. There is growing apprehension that the Syrian rebellion could inspire Islamist movements elsewhere.” Meanwhile, Anwar Gargash, an adviser to the UAE president, has stated that “ the nature of the new forces, the affiliation with the [Muslim] Brotherhood, the affiliation with Al-Qaeda, I think these are all indicators that are quite worrying.”

In this light, the Biden administration has just asked Israel to approve U.S. military assistance to the Palestinian Authority’s security forces for a major operation they are conducting to regain control of Jenin in the West Bank. According to Axios, the PA “launched the operation out of fear that Islamist militants — emboldened after armed rebels took control of Syria — could try to overthrow the Palestinian Authority.” One Palestinian official said “It was a Syria effect. Abbas and his team were concerned that what happened in Aleppo and Damascus will inspire Palestinian Islamist groups,” also claiming that Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia support the operation in Jenin to prevent “a Muslim-brotherhood style or an Iranian-funded takeover” of the PA.

At this stage it is unclear to what extent such ‘fears’ will eventuate, but these moves, visits, talks and statements suggest there is concern within the local ruling classes.

More dangerous threat of democratic, non-sectarian revolution to Zionist project

The third and most fundamental aspect is, once again, related to the spread of revolution, but not specifically the Sunni ‘Islamist’ connection. On the contrary, the extent to which the Syrian revolution can maintain its current popular, democratic and non-sectarian potential could have a dramatic impact on the region – including Israel. It was counterintuitive that a former Sunni jihadist organisation like HTS would lead with the outreach to Christians, Shiites, Alawites, Druze and Kurds, yet it happened. And while the complete hollowness of the regime was the main secret to the rapid success of the revolution, the other crucial ingredient was precisely this non-sectarian element; the descent into sectarianism, deliberately fostered by the Assad regime, was a crucial cause of the failure last time.

Israel’s bluster about being “the only democracy in the region,” while an obvious nonsense in relation to its subjected Palestinian population, holds some truth regarding the Israeli population. By being able to point at ugly dictatorships in the Arab and neighbouring Muslim world, Israeli leaders promote the idea that their anti-Israel agendas are the work of evil tyrants who want to drive out Jews. The fact that many are also run on a sectarian basis – including those are democratic such as Lebanon – further mirrors and is used to further justify Israel’s own racist, sectarian system.

The Arab Spring was the first region-wide attempt at democratic revolution, which however was largely destroyed. In 2019 there was a second round, in Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan and Algeria. What was very pronounced in the first three in particular was their specifically anti-sectarian content. In both Iraq and Lebanon, the movements against sectarian rule were put down, in Iraq brutally crushed by the ‘axis of resistance’ Shiite militia at a cost of hundreds of lives, while in Lebanon Hezbollah also used violence against the movement, thereby saving the rule of all the sectarian elites; in Sudan the democratic opening was overthrown by the military; a few years later, we also saw the Iranian regime crush its own ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement. All of this made the region safer for Israel’s own racist, sectarian project.

By contrast, the victory of democratic, non-sectarian forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Sudan and elsewhere would have represented a far larger political challenge to Zionism than harsh but hollow words from ugly regimes, which only facilitate Zionist siege ideology.

It may well be a struggle for the Syrian revolution to maintain the course; the mobilised Syrian revolutionary population will need to fight all attempts to restrict democratic space or to stir sectarianism tooth and nail. But if their struggle does succeed, a democratic, non-sectarian Syria could likewise have an electrifying regional impact.

Israel is trying its hardest to make sure it does not succeed.

 

Centenary of the Communist movement in India: Achievements, lessons and challenges



Published 

100 years communist movement India

First published at Liberation.

The communist movement in India is now a century old. While there are different opinions regarding the actual foundation day of the communist party, the CPI and CPI(ML) both recognise 26 December 1925 as the formal foundation day of the CPI as a party. By all accounts, we can identify the early 1920s as the period when communist ideas and activities had begun to take shape in India and the movement is therefore clearly a century old in India.

The purpose of this paper is however not to revisit the history of the communist movement in India but to draw inspiration and lessons from the past to focus on the challenges of the present. Broadly we can divide the first century of the communist movement in India into four phases - the colonial era, post-Independence period leading to the Emergency and its aftermath, the post-1990s period of neoliberal policies and aggressive ascendance of Hindutva far right, and the current period of outright fascist offensive.

Internationally too, this period can be divided into similar phases. While the period till 1949 witnessed the remarkable global rise and consolidation of the communist movement marked by victorious revolutions in Russia (November 1917) and China (October 1949) and decisive politico-military defeat of the fascist alliance in World War II, the victorious Cuban revolution (1959) and defeat of US imperialism in the Vietnam war (1975) marked the high points of the post-War period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War phase and pushed the world into a new phase of imperialist aggression and corporate plunder. While the communist or socialist movement is yet to regain lost ground in the old Soviet bloc region, during this period it has discovered more hospitable turf in Latin America and Asia. However, in large parts of the world we are currently witnessing a renewed rise of the fascistic far right.

During its formative years, the initial inspiration and impetus for the communist movement came from the success of the Russian revolution and from the deep urges of freedom from colonial rule, feudal oppression and social slavery within India. Beyond the formal camp of communists, the impact of the Russian revolution ran deep in India's anti-colonial awakening and the quest for social equality and emancipation. From Bhagat Singh and his comrades to Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore and from Ambedkar to Periyar, we can see this impact in India's freedom movement, social justice movement, literature and other fields of popular culture.

In some countries communists were successful in emerging as the leading political force in the course of anti-colonial struggles and integrating the agenda of national liberation with the task of building or advancing towards socialism. In India, communists made considerable progress, but did not succeed in emerging as the leading current. Yet the catalytic impact of the communist ideology and movement was far more than the actual organizational strength of the Communist Party. The greatest youth icon of India's freedom movement, immortal martyr Bhagat Singh, was a communist pioneer in many ways. The communist leadership in building powerful movements to fight landlordism, organising the working class, championing social equality and communal harmony produced a wider impact and gave the freedom movement a broadly progressive orientation.

While the freedom from colonial occupation came with the trauma of territorial partition, unprecedented communal carnage and displacement of millions of families across the border, it was significant that the Constitution of India which was written and adopted after that traumatic turning point in Indian history rejected the idea of making India a Hindu state and opted for a secular democratic character for the new republic with equal rights for all citizens regardless of their religious identity. The RSS and Hindu Mahasabha which wanted a Hindu Rashtra and doggedly opposed the Constitution remained isolated and weak. In the first parliamentary election held between 25 October 1951 and 21 February 1952, the communist party emerged as the second largest party with 16 MPs and together with the RSP, PWP and Forward Bloc, the Left camp won 22 seats followed by 12 seats won by the Socialists while the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh won only 4 and 3 seats respectively.

The growing communist footprint in India's electoral map saw the communists emerge as the first non-Congress party to head a state government when communists under the leadership of Comrade EMS Namboodiripad won the first assembly election in the newly created state of Kerala. The government was of course not allowed to complete its full term and became the first victim of the toppling of an opposition government, a trend which has now assumed phenomenal proportions in the current Modi era.

The radical trend of the communist movement also tried to reignite the revolutionary flame of the Tebhaga and Telangana struggles and that's how Naxalbari happened in May 1967 and the CPI(ML) was born two years later. The peasant upsurge of Naxalbari blazed a revolutionary trail across the country and the spirit has endured in spite of the most brutal state repression. Even though the militant upsurge failed to achieve its goal of turning the 1970s into the decade of people's liberation, it took the communist movement deep into India's most oppressed social segments and backward areas.

In electoral terms too, the biggest expansion of the communist influence happened in the post-1967 period, with the beginning of the historic decline and split of the Congress in the late 1960s and especially in the wake of the Emergency. Land reforms, wage struggles and defence and extension of democracy through local self-government were the key planks that sustained and expanded the communist influence and enabled the Left to lead three state governments and send a sixty-strong contingent to Parliament only two decades ago.

Over the last decade and a half, the electoral strength of the Left in India has however suffered a steady and serious decline. The decline in West Bengal was triggered by an attempted policy adjustment with the corporate-driven development paradigm at the cost of the welfare agenda. The resultant rightward shift within the state was soon reinforced by the rapidly rising fascist consolidation in the all-India context.

Indeed, the rise and consolidation of fascism in India today poses the biggest challenge not just to communists but to the very constitutional vision of modern India as a secular democratic republic and an open and diverse society. Communists will have to reestablish themselves at this juncture as the most courageous and consistent champion of democracy and bulwark of resistance to the onslaught of Indian fascism.

I prefer the expression Indian fascism to the more generic term fascism in India to take due note of the national and historical peculiarities of fascism in today's India. Way back in the early period of rise of fascism in Italy, Spain and Germany, the international communist movement had rightly identified fascism as an international political trend with national specificities. The rise of fascism in India today is happening against the global backdrop of a renewed aggressive surge of the far right, but we can never lose sight of the typically Indian dimensions of this phenomenon especially given the crucial historical role of the RSS.

Unlike the various instances of European fascism in the first half of the twentieth century which had a rather stormy rise and fall, Indian fascism has had a very slow and steady rise, gathering momentum only in the last three decades, more particularly since the ascent of the Modi regime in 2014. While drawing strength from the regressive features of Indian society, especially the caste system, the patriarchal order and the feudal survivals that have had a long lease of life in the absence of a decisive rupture that could only be accomplished through a victorious democratic revolution, Indian fascism has also deeply penetrated the institutional mechanism of parliamentary democracy and formed an intricate nexus with India's crony capitalism. It also leverages the Indian state's strategic partnership with the US-Israel axis, the global attractions of the Indian market and India's resources and the growing presence of the Indian diaspora in the international arena. We should also take note of Hindutva's close ideological ties with Zionism and growing outreach among other far-right ideologies under the emerging international brand of national conservatism.

To build a powerful resistance to the escalating fascist onslaught, the communist movement will have to sharpen the edge of anti-caste and anti-patriarchal struggles alongside a sustained anti-corporate mobilisation of the working people. While there has never been an easy electoral escape from fascist forces entrenched in state power, every effort must be made to weaken and isolate the fascist camp in the electoral arena and rescue the Constitution and the Republic from their clutches. This of course calls for the fullest utilisation of the united front strategy, the broadest possible mobilisation of all forces opposed to the fascist regime, to combat the fascist campaign of hate, lies and violence and defend the rights and interests of the people.

We are now nearing the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Indian republic. It is remarkable that right at the time of adoption of the Constitution, its architects had forewarned us about the pitfalls that could obstruct and derail the journey of the republic. Some of the most insightful remarks were made by Dr. B R Ambedkar in his address in the Constituent Assembly on 25 November, 1949 on the eve of the adoption of the Constitution. It was Ambedkar, the chairman of the drafting committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly, who warned us right then that "however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad (if) those who are called to work it happen to be a bad lot." Today, we are facing precisely such a juncture when the RSS, which was explicitly opposed to the Constitution and its core ideas and principles in the formative years, today controls the reins of state power, and the result of this paradox is there before all of us. We now have High Court judges who say majoritarianism is law, Governors who take special interest in obstructing and toppling non-BJP state governments, and parliament sessions that are used as a slaughterhouse of dissent and debate only to pass dubious unconstitutional laws.

In the same address, Ambedkar had identified bhakti in politics, the cult of hero-worship, as "a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship" and had stressed the need to reinforce political democracy with social democracy. A year earlier while introducing the draft of the Constitution he had described democracy in India as "a top dressing on an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic" thereby posing the task of democratisation of the Indian social soil for the sustenance of the constitutional 'top dressing'.

It is also remarkable that the Constitution had upheld individual citizens, and not the much romanticised traditional village communities, as the constituents of the Republic and preferred the expression 'we, the people of India' in all their diversity as the collective democratic identity instead of entertaining the delusional idea that India had already become a nation. Ambedkar categorically considered caste as the biggest anti-nation impediment and emphasised the inseparable trinity of liberty, equality and fraternity as the foundation of social democracy and national cohesion. The Constitution was also alive to the perils of majoritarianism and overcentralisation and was careful to safeguard minority rights and federal interests from these fatal threats. And let us also remember the most categorical warning that Hindu Raj becoming a reality would be the greatest calamity for India and had to be prevented at any cost.

The communist movement today has to lead India out of this calamitous juncture. The calamity being perpetrated every day using the levers of state power will have to be resisted tooth and nail to rescue the beleaguered republic and fortify democracy on a stronger foundation. The communist movement will have to rise to the occasion and ensure a decisive defeat of fascism through all-round democratisation of the society and state.

Communists in India also have the responsibility of finding solutions to the unresolved challenges before the international communist movement. There are questions left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union that are particularly relevant for communist parties in positions of governance whether in post-revolution situation or otherwise. In Soviet Union eventually the communist party got so cut off from the people and so completely immersed in governance and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state that after seven decades the entire structure eventually evaporated without any major military intervention from outside or within. Apart from economic stagnation and foreign policy distortions, clearly there was a great lack of internal democracy and dynamism leading to a massive loss of popular support and even legitimacy of the communist party's governing role. The erosion of the 'from the masses and to the masses' communication between the party and the people upsets the equilibrium between the people, party and the state. Communists in power in any set-up will have to be seen to be superior in terms of democracy, transparency and accountability in comparison to bourgeois dispensations. This is a major lesson that communists everywhere must learn from the Soviet debacle.

Socialist models everywhere have made a mark for themselves in terms of redistributive equity, alleviation of poverty and unemployment and basic improvements in conditions of life and work for the working people. But when it comes to processes of production, the use of machines and technology and its adverse implications in terms of environmental degradation and human alienation, there has been little to demarcate existing socialism from capitalism. This is another area where in today's conditions of climate crisis, environmental degradation and growing unemployment and redundancies caused by indiscriminate use of labour-displacing technologies, socialist models will have to stand out in qualitative contrast to the destructive and disastrous trajectories of capitalism.

To conclude, let me return to the compelling national context. As history would have it, over the last few decades the communist movement in post-independence India had branched into diverse streams and formations. Today in the face of the unprecedented crisis of our Republic and the constitutional rule of law, communists must come ever closer with the necessary sense of urgency. The greater the unity of the fighting ranks, the stronger will be the anti-fascist resistance and the brighter will be the future of India's democracy. Paraphrasing the Communist Manifesto, we can say we have nothing to lose but the fetters of fascism while the promises of freedom await to be redeemed.

This paper was presented at the International Seminar on The Future of Marxism, Democracy & Socialism (18-20 December 2024), organized by the EMS Chair for Marxian Studies and Research, University of Calicut.

 

Proletarian China: A century of working-class struggle


Published 

Proletarian China: A century of Chinese labour

Proletarian China: A century of Chinese labour
Edited by Ivan Franceschini and Christian Sorace
Verso and Made in China Journal 2022

This book covers a century of working-class history in China. From the struggles of workers on the Beijing-Hankou railway in the 1920s to that of the Jasic factory workers in 2017-18, the book deals with a range of working-class battles over pay, conditions and union rights.

It also deals with government policies towards workers, both before and after the 1949 Chinese revolution.

Before 1949, workers faced repression from warlords and the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist Party) regime. After 1949, the policies of the Communist Party government changed markedly in different periods.

In the early post-revolution years, state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers gained job security and social benefits. But during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), unrealistic production targets meant unsafe working conditions.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong talked of workers' revolution, but then brought in the army to restore order. After Mao’s death, tens of millions of SOE workers lost their jobs while migrant workers from the countryside were exploited by transnational corporations. Then, after the global financial crisis caused mass sackings in private industry, there was a partial revival of the SOE sector.

The book is a collection of articles by different authors. Many of them deal with the situation of workers in particular workplaces and their struggles to improve their pay and conditions or defend job security and workplace rights from attacks by employers and the government.

While the book is mainly focussed on mainland China, there are also chapters on struggles in Hong Kong and Taiwan. There is a chapter on Xinjiang, where detained Muslim workers produce clothes for the world market, and where, according to Darren Byler, the Chinese government is building a “new iteration of racialised capitalism and contemporary settler colonialism”. [p. 710.]

Most of the articles are written by academics who have studied Chinese history and politics, but there are also some contemporary accounts of early workers struggles written by activists directly involved with them.

One example is a report by a student activist on a visit to a railway workshop at Changxindian near Beijing in 1920. The workers had invited students to help them set up a Labour School for Continuing Education.

The students, who had been radicalised in anti-imperialist protests against the Versailles treaty, which had given Japan control over the Chinese province of Shandong, realised the need to link up with workers, some of whom had also participated in the protests.

The CPC’s early years

Many of the students involved in making links with workers later participated in the formation of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which was established in 1921.

The CPC promoted the building of industrial unions and the creation of workers' schools. Lin Chun, in his chapter on the founding of the CPC, says that:

The CPC and the labour movement literally grew together as exemplified in a strike by 8,000 workers over humiliating treatment .... in the British-American Tobacco factories in Pudong near the Party's founding congress. Li Qihan, who worked with tobacco, machinery, textile and print workers, was dispatched to lead the victorious strike. [p. 62-63]

The CPC initiated the formation of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat, which led a wave of strikes:

Most legendary were strikes by the seamen in Hong Kong, miners in Anyuan, and Kailuan, railroad workers along such arteries of communication as the Lanzhou-Lianyungang, Beijing-Fengtian and Beijing-Hankou railways, and textile and service workers in Shangdong and the Yangzi river delta. [p. 63]

In September 1922, the CPC led a strike at the Anyuan coal mine in Jiangxi province. Elizabeth Perry writes:

Launched in the name of the CPC-sponsored Anyuan Railway and Mining Workers Club, the dramatic five-day walkout by more than 13,000 miners and railroad workers succeeded in winning major concessions for the strikers: payment of back wages, improved working conditions, reform of the labour contract system, and a guarantee of recognition and financial support for their workers’ club. [p. 69]

In 1923, representatives of railway workers met in Zhengzhou to form the Beijing-Hankou Railway Federation of Trade Unions. Several delegates were arrested. Thirty thousand workers went on strike, but the protest was “drowned in blood”, according to the editors. [p. 74]

United Front

Following this defeat, the CPC was urged by Soviet advisers to seek an alliance with the GMD. Led at that time by Sun Yat-sen, the GMD appeared relatively progressive. Based in the south of China, it was in conflict with the northern warlords. Later, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, it was to turn on the CPC and massacre its members.

Formalised in January 1924, this alliance was known as the United Front. It was an uneasy alliance, but in the opinion of the editors it enabled “important steps forward for the Chinese labour movement.” [p. 87]

In 1925 there was a strike wave in Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai. A Japanese foreman killed a worker. Later British police fired on a demonstration of workers and supporters, killing at least ten. The strike spread to involve 200,000 workers. The eventual settlement offered only modest gains for the strikers, but the strike made the CPC-led Shanghai General Labor Union the “recognised representative of labour in the city”, according to Perry. [p. 72]

During the Shanghai general strike, solidarity strikes occurred around the country. The most notable was the Canton-Hong Kong strike, which continued after the Shanghai strike ended. The Hong Kong strike committee put out a set of demands, including freedom of speech and association, the right to strike, equality under the law, universal suffrage, eight hour workday and a minimum wage.

The strike against British interests in Hong Kong and Guangzhou (Canton) continued into early 1927. It was called off because of the priority given to the Northern Expedition. This was a military offensive by the GMD, with the support of the CPC, against the Northern warlords. 

As the GMD army approached Shanghai, the CPC led an uprising against the warlord who controlled the city. But soon after the army entered Shanghai, it combined with gangsters to carry out a massacre of Communists and worker militants.

Mao concluded from this that the CPC needed to build its own armed force. The CPC turned its attention to the countryside and the peasantry.

It established the Hailufeng soviet, where land rent and debts were abolished. [p. 127] The Hailufeng soviet was crushed in 1928, but the CPC continued to work in rural areas and build a peasant-based army.

In the cities, Communist-led unions were replaced by gangster-controlled yellow unions. Despite this, there were some strikes over economic issues. In particular, there were strikes over the rice allowance, a payment given to workers if the price of rice went above a certain level. In 1930 there was a wave of strikes over the allowance. Underground Communist activists took advantage of the discontent to promote strikes or slowdowns.

Japanese invasion

During the 1930s Japan invaded China. Once again there was an uneasy alliance between the GMD and the CPC, known as the Second United Front, to resist the invasion.

During this period the CPC was allowed to publish a newspaper in Chongqing, the GMD’s wartime capital (although there was a wave of repression against distributors and readers in 1941). After the defeat of Japan, the United Front broke down and the paper was banned in 1947.

The paper included reports from factory workers about their conditions. It became a forum for workers’ grievances. Joshua Howard comments: “Many of the issues that workers raised in their letters had an impact on the social policies and political campaigns of the Communist regime in the early 1950s.” [p. 166]

In 1948 there was a strike by women workers in a cotton mill in Shanghai. The workers occupied the factory. The police attacked, killing three workers and injuring 500. Nevertheless, the workers won some of their demands.

At that time the CPC was severely repressed. Despite this, the CPC had a presence in the textile mills. Some of its members had jobs as teachers in evening classes run by the Young Women’s Christian Association, while others had joined or set up social groups for workers who had come to Shanghai from particular localities. CPC members made contact with many textile workers and participated in the strike.

The 1949 revolution

In 1949, Mao’s peasant army entered Beijing and other cities. Initially, not much changed for most workers. Mao’s program of New Democracy included "a set of policies intended to foster and develop capitalist industry while protecting workers’ interests.” [p. 196]

But implementation of pro-worker policies was uneven.

In general, workers in high priority industries like steel and machine building won substantial benefits and even some degree of control over their working conditions, while changes came more slowly for workers in construction and textiles, especially in smaller cities and in the private and collective sectors of the economy. [p. 196]

In some workplaces, supervisors used violence against workers. In August 1951 a young woman worker died after being beaten by a male supervisor in a silk mill in Wuxi. This prompted the local CPC leadership to intervene. Robert Cliver writes:

Recognising the need for action, in September 1951 Party leaders launched the Democratic Reform Campaign in Wuxi's silk filatures, specifically targeting the feudal management system, along with counterrevolutionaries and agents of the defeated Nationalist Party among the filatures' supervisors. The campaign elicited a flood of complaints and accusations about the brutal mistreatment of women workers at the hands of male supervisors, as well as many other inequities that had remained unchanged in the factory regime since 1949... [p. 195]

Party cadres carefully controlled the process, first meeting with workers in small groups to identify the worst offenders, then organising mass struggle meetings at which women were encouraged to voice their accusations, and ultimately punishing the perpetrators. [p. 201]

Similar events happened throughout China. Cliver describes it as a “form of controlled class struggle.” [p. 201]

The Democratic Reform Campaign was the first in a series of mass campaigns launched by the CPC. It was followed by the “3 Antis” campaign, targeting corrupt government officials, and the “5 Antis” campaign, targeting illegal activities by capitalists. The latter helped prepare the ground for the nationalisation of all urban industry during the ’50s.

Such campaigns were initially directed mainly against people holding prominent positions, such as managers, officials and capitalists. But they could also be directed against ordinary workers accused of petty theft, etc. Campaigns were also used as a way to pressure people to work harder. Jake Werner says that: “...the campaign form was increasingly employed to tighten labour discipline and ratchet up labour intensity.” [p. 229]

Worker participation

During the early 1950s, Chinese industrial workers gained benefits including health insurance, medical care, literacy education, child care and improvements in working conditions.

Forms of worker's participation were established. In private companies these were known as “labour-capital consultative conferences”. [p. 199] In state-owned enterprises they were called “factory management committees”. [p .222]

By 1956, urban industry had been completely nationalised. According to Chen Feng, “A substantial proportion of industrial workers benefited from the new system, which provided them with access to housing, education and health care, as well as lifetime employment.” [p. 276]

But these conditions applied only to permanent workers. Many temporary workers were dismissed, often being forced to return to their home villages. This was a major reason for protests in the 1950s.

There were also disputes over wages, safety and other issues. According to the editors,

many workers saw their conditions deteriorate....in this period, management’s despotic power over the working class, alongside a maladroit reform of the wage system in the second semester of 1956, heavily hit the material interests of the workers, leading to a wave of strikes. [p. 265]

Pressure to meet output targets led to excessive workloads and unsafe conditions.

The strike wave led to a debate within the party over the right to strike. Initially Mao was supportive. In early 1957 there was a short-lived period of relatively open discussion, with Mao saying “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.” However, this was followed by a wave of repression in the second half of the year.

This affected the union movement: at least 22 leading cadres of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) were purged, including the editor of the Workers Daily. After this, the union federation lost all relevance and was dissolved a few years later, during the Cultural Revolution. Though later revived, it remained ineffective.

The Great Leap Forward

The Great Leap Forward (GLF), launched in 1958, set unrealistic targets for the rapid expansion of production. This led to increased deaths from industrial accidents.

An example is the coal mining industry. In the early 1950s, the government introduced safety policies that reduced death rates. But the pressure to increase production undermined these policies, particularly during the GLF.

According to Tom Wright,

The number of workers killed in Chinese coal mines increased from around 600 in the mid-1950s to more than 6,000 in 1960. [p. 305]

This included 650 miners killed in a massive explosion at the Laobaidong mine in May 1960.

There was a revival of concern for safety in the early 1960s, but the Cultural Revolution undermined safety institutions. China’s coal mines remained unsafe in the following decades, though since 2003 safety has greatly improved.

Rural areas

During the GLF (1958-60) there was a rapid transition to extremely large rural collectives, known as communes, involving thousands of farmers. At the same time, excessive production targets were imposed. According to Jonathan Unger,

Huge quantities of grain were shipped off to the cities and onward abroad as exports while rural officials competed to exaggerate the size of local harvest yields. The consequence of all this was a collapse in rural production during 1959 and 1960 and a plunge into starvation in many parts of the countryside. [p. 338]

Following this disaster, the collectives were re-organised. Production was put in the hands of teams containing between 15-40 households who collectively owned a block of land.

This system was very successful. The production team not only organised the growing of crops, but provided a range of services to its members. Unger writes:

In many villages, by the late 1960s or 1970s, almost free health care and elementary schooling were being provided through production team revenues — reaching much of rural China for the first time in history. Production teams also paid for the sustenance of orphans, widows, and the childless elderly. In much of rural China, mortality rates declined dramatically and the length of villagers’ lives began to approach that in developed nations. [p. 339]

But Unger argues that the production teams were undermined by the “top-down” nature of the Chinese political system. The national leaders were “unwilling to give the production team members enough leeway in figuring out what crops to grow or enough say on how their own teams and villages were run.” [p. 340]

For example, the government insisted that most of the land be used for growing grain rather than vegetables or fruit trees or animal husbandry. This caused discontent, reducing farmers’ support for collective agriculture.

Cultural Revolution

In 1966 Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, which initially involved students but then spread to the working class. Joel Andreas writes:

Between autumn 1966 and the spring of 1969, workers organised huge rallies, marches, factory occupations, sieges and street battles involving tens of millions of people… Workers across the country divided into rebel and conservative factions: the rebels were inspired by Mao Zedong’s call to challenge local Communist Party authorities, while the conservatives defended those authorities. [p. 406]

Andreas asks whether the rebels were simply following Mao or acting independently. He says the answer must be “nuanced”.

On the one hand, the rebel movement was inspired by Mao, it could not have existed without his support and rebel workers generally did their best to follow his lead. On the other hand, the rebels were self-organised, they effectively challenged factory and municipal party authorities and they forcefully raised demands for popular participation. [p. 406]

Although the rebels generally followed Mao’s lead, there were times when they did not:

There were a number of accounts, for instance, of workers’ efforts to raise economic demands, which took place in the early weeks of the workers' movement, before Mao denounced “economism”. Many workers attempted to win improved conditions and welfare in their own work units and temporary workers organised a remarkable national movement to demand permanent status. [p. 407]

Eventually however Mao suppressed those rebels who did not follow his instructions. He “called on the military to dispatch small teams of officers to factories to oversee the formation of ‘revolutionary committees’ comprising these officers, veteran Party cadres and ‘mass representatives’ — that is, leaders of the rebel groups.” [p. 409] Those rebels who resisted were repressed.

Abandoning collective farming

Mao died in 1976. By 1978 a new leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping had taken control. The new leadership began to implement market-oriented policies. It replaced collective agriculture by household farming.

Unger says that the farmers were unhappy with “commands from above” under the collective system.

However, the farmers did not abandon collective agriculture and revert to household-based farming on their own. Orders to do so came from above in the early 1980s. [p. 458]

Under the new system, the land remained property of the production team, but was allocated to households based on the number of family members. In many cases, land was periodically reallocated as the number of family members changed, but the government is now discouraging this practice. It has begun encouraging agribusiness.

Pressures have been exerted on villager small groups to lease all their land to a large-scale farmer or corporation — sometimes on contracts lasting several decades. [p. 465]

Meanwhile increasing numbers of young people have left the villages to work in the cities:

The number of migrant workers from the countryside has now swelled to more than 200 million. [p. 462]

Family members were separated:

Practically all of the young villagers who sought work elsewhere in China after the disbandment of collective agriculture moved without their families, because China’s system of household registration (hukou) erected legal barriers to migration. [p. 463]

Initially most factories hired young women, often dismissing them when they were 24 years old. Men often worked in construction. But as the demand for factory workers increased, women with children were recruited. Often both husbands and wives worked in the city leaving their children in the care of their grandparents in their village.

1989

By 1989, after a decade of market reforms, the editors say there was “a growing sense of uneasiness caused by the incipient dismantling of the welfare system, widespread management corruption and inflation.” [p. 495] When students protested in Tiananmen Square, workers joined them. They also established independent unions.

According to Yueran Zhang,

workers not only mobilised on a massive scale but also developed an independent political agenda and strategic outlook that was somewhat at odds with what the students had in mind. [p. 496]

When the government declared martial law and sent troops into the city, workers built barricades. But they also brought food and water to the soldiers and talked to them, convincing them to stop their march.

During the struggle to obstruct the military, workers started to realise the power of their spontaneous organisation and action. A huge wave of self-organising ensued. [p. 498]

New workers organisations mushroomed. Zhang compares the situation to Petrograd in 1917. The radicalisation of the workers terrified the party leaders. Zhang says that “workers faced much more severe repression than students both during and after the massacre”. [p. 499]

According to Zhang, the main source of working class discontent was the

expansion of managerial power over the operation of state-owned factories… As staff and workers' congresses were systematically disempowered and deactivated, workers lost their limited power over decision-making in factories and directly experienced managerial despotism at the point of production...

With workers feeling oppressed, mistreated, stripped of their dignity, and facing increasing power inequalities, they aspired to democracy first and foremost in the workplace. [p. 500]

Workers had a different conception of democracy than the students:

Democracy as defined by the workers entailed the replacement of bureaucracy with workers’ self-management, and the first step towards this goal was to establish democratic and independent workplace organisations.... In sharp contrast, the democratic ideal articulated by intellectuals and students comprised a set of supposedly universal liberal values. [p. 501]

After the movement was crushed, workers were treated much more harshly than students:

....except for a few leaders, students were let go, whereas workers were violently prosecuted on a much wider scale. [p. 503]

During the 1990s, many students who had participated in the 1989 protest became part of the middle class, while many workers lost their jobs.

Whereas the economic reforms of the 1990s greatly benefited intellectuals and students, they almost completely destroyed the urban working class. As the majority of state-owned enterprises were restructured, downsized, and privatised, workers lost their jobs or faced much worse working conditions and meagre benefits and protections. [p. 504]

SEZs and migrant workers

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are areas where foreign investors are given incentives to establish factories employing low-paid Chinese workers. They predominantly employ migrant workers from the countryside.

The first SEZ was established in Shenzhen in 1980. Foreign investors came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, but they were often supplying clothing, footwear or toys to be sold by big Western companies.

Anita Chan writes of the “extremely long working hours, repetitive tasks, a poor environment, abusive treatment, toxic air, and industrial injuries.” [p. 508] She also writes of “slave-like working conditions” in the early 1990s. [p. 506]

The working conditions attracted international attention in 1993, when a fire in the Zhili toy factory killed 87 workers. Labour NGOs (non-government organisations concerned with workers’ rights) in Hong Kong developed a code of conduct for the toy industry. Unions and other activists campaigned to shame the transnational corporations that benefited from the super-exploitation of Chinese workers.

Labour law

In 1994, the Chinese government adopted a labour law for the first time. According to Sarah Biddulph, the law was adopted in response to “increasing labour unrest and a series of workplace disasters that occurred in 1993.” [p. 514)

The law made individual contracts “the cornerstone of the labour relationship.” [p. 518] It specified workers must be paid at least the minimum wage, a standard 44 hour week with overtime pay if working beyond that, paid holidays and parental leave, etc.

However, many workers were excluded from these protections. Biddulph says:

Enactment of the legal concept of ‘labour relationship’ has effectively excluded large swathes of the Chinese workforce, leaving aside migrant workers, rural labourers, members of the armed forces, government officials, domestic workers, students on training programs, independent contractors and retirees. [p. 520]

Deficiencies in the law contributed to “widespread worker unrest”, including over non-payment of migrant workers’ wages. [p. 524] The government responded with the introduction of new laws in 2007-8. Although the new legislation was “more worker-friendly”, [p. 524], it did not change the basic structure of the law, which remains based on individual contracts.

Labour NGOs

Beginning in the 1990s, activists began setting up organisations giving advice to workers on their legal rights. Early examples were the China Working Women’s Network in Shenzhen and the Female Migrant Workers’ Club in Beijing. According to Jude Howell, these groups faced “periods of government harassment and suspicion.” [p. 527]

Conditions for labour NGOs improved in the early 2000s. China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, which led to greater international scrutiny. A new leadership came to power in China (Hu Jintao as party secretary in 2002, and Wen Jiabao as premier in 2003) with a rhetoric of “people-centred development”. Hong Kong NGOs helped establish labour NGOs in China.

NGOs provided services, legal advice and advocacy. They monitored codes of conduct for transnational corporations. The focus was on individual rights, not collective struggle.

However, Xi Jinping, who became party leader in 2012, adopted a more repressive attitude. In 2015 there was a wave of arrests:

… security agencies made a sweep of rights-based organisations and activists, including rights lawyers, feminists, dissidents, critical academics, and labour activists. [p. 532]

Meanwhile, workers continue to strike and protest.

The violation of labour laws and poor conditions of work continue to vex workers, who carry on striking, protesting, or voting with their feet. [p. 533]

Attempts to create independent unions

There have been several attempts at creating unions independent of the sole officially permitted union federation, the ACFTU.

A section of the 1989 pro-democracy movement developed an orientation to the working class. Some tried to imitate Poland’s Solidarity. One example was the Free Labour Union of China, formed in 1991.

According to Kevin Lin,

the FLUC focused on the deteriorating conditions of state-sector workers as market reforms undermined their welfare. [p. 537]

In 1992 they published a pamphlet criticising the economic reforms, and saying that the CPC was no longer the party of the working class.

Another group, the League for the Protection of the Rights of Working People, did not openly challenge the CPC but called for the restoration of the right to strike.

A third group, the Federation of Hired Hand Workers, focused on the conditions of migrant workers.

But regardless of whether or not they explicitly criticised the CPC, these groups were seen as a threat. Lin reports:

The leaders and key participants in these groups were rounded up within a year or two, and many were handed harsh sentences. [p. 542]

In subsequent decades, there were many outbreaks of rebellion, but these did not result in the creation of independent unions.

Huge layoffs in SOEs

During the second half of the ’90s, there was a huge wave of lay-offs in state-owned and collective enterprises.

According to William Hurst, by the end of 1998, the number of laid-off workers had increased to “at least 30 million”. [p. 548] Dorothy Solinger cites an internal report saying that the number of unemployed was close to sixty million by 2001. [p. 557]

At the 1997 CPC congress, general secretary Jiang Zemin advocated “cutting workers to increase efficiency”. [cited by Hurst, p. 547] Lay-offs of SOE workers had been occurring since the ’80s, but previously they were kept hidden. Now they were openly encouraged.

Firms received quotas for what percentage of staff should be laid-off and sometimes had to scramble to meet them, shedding workers they actually needed to maximise efficient production. [p. 549]

Smaller SOEs were privatised. Workers were sacked, then invited to re-apply for their old jobs, often with lower pay, worse conditions and no job security.

The 2008 global economic crisis led to a change of policy. China’s private sector was severely affected by the global crisis. Thirty million workers lost their jobs. [p. 592]

To revive the economy, the government had to revitalise the state sector.

Indeed, the massive fiscal stimulus the central government injected into the economy had a principal effect of showering credit and investment on SOEs, rendering workers still employed in them a new kind of blue-collar aristocracy. Wages and working conditions improved markedly, where they had been declining precipitously for most of the previous twenty-five years. [p. 551]

However, by this stage more than 60% of state-sector jobs had already gone.

Worker resistance

Job losses created huge discontent. According to Solinger,

an internal report of the Ministry of Public Security claimed that 30,000 mass incidents occurred in the first nine months of 2000. The figure included protests of all kinds, but a great many of them were over issues of job loss and unpaid wages and pensions. [p. 557-558]

One example was a strike in the city of Liaoyang in March 2002. For more than a week, tens of thousands of workers marched through city streets. They came from twenty state-owned factories that went bankrupt.

They demanded payment of back wages, pensions and unemployment allowances owed to them for months or years. They also demanded the removal of the head of the local government. They accused both the local government and enterprise management of corruption.

In response to the protests, the Chinese government adopted a “carrot and stick” approach. According to Ching Kwan Lee, “officials rushed to offer workers most of the money they were owed”. Some corrupt local officials were arrested, demoted or removed. But at the same time,

the local news media condemned the protest leaders as troublemakers who “colluded with hostile foreign forces”. [p. 565-566]

Two worker leaders were given prison terms of four to seven years.

In the longer term, worker protests such as the Liaoyang strike forced the government to show more concern for people’s welfare. Ching Kwan Lee writes, “labour unrest....generated pressure for social policy changes.” [p. 566]

Labor contract law

In 2002 Hu Jintao took over as CPC leader. He spoke of creating a “harmonious society”. One aspect was improving conditions for workers.

In 2008 three new laws were adopted: the Labour Contract Law, the Employment Promotion Law and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law.

The LCL provided that workers must be given written contracts. It was meant to improve job security. It did improve the situation for some workers, but not all.

According to Mary Gallagher,

The strengthened employment security regulations of the LCL have enhanced the workplace conditions for formal standard workers, while those caught in precarious and unstable employment are bereft of these protections. [p. 588]

The increasing numbers of digital platform workers are classified as individual contractors and have no protection.

Nanhai Honda strike

On March 17, 2010, workers at the Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing Company in the Nanhai district in Foshan city, Guangdong province, went on strike. The mobilisation involved 1800 workers and lasted 27 days.

According to Chris Chan and Elaine Hui,

The strikers listed 108 demands, but consistently named two as the major issues: a wage increase of 800 yuan for all workers, and democratic reform of the trade unions, as the existing union did little to represent the workers' interests. [p. 618]

The workers won pay rises of 500 yuan for regular workers and 600 for the interns who made up 80% of the workforce. There was no real progress on democratising the union.

The Honda strike inspired a wave of strikes throughout China’s vehicle industry.

Foxconn suicides

In May 2010 a group of activists in Hong Kong drew attention to the high incidence of suicides among workers at Foxconn plants in China. By December 2010 the number of known cases had risen to 14 dead and four others injured while attempting suicide. All were young rural migrant workers.

Foxconn is a Taiwanese company that produces electronic devices, such as computers and phones, in China for international corporations such as Apple.

Jenny Chan argues that

workers’ depression, and suicide in extreme cases, is connected to their working and living conditions in the broader context of the international political economy. Foxconn’s management regime — including its heavy reliance on young workers, low-cost and just-in-time assembly, and “flexible” wage and working hours policy — is a response to the high-pressure purchasing practices of global corporations. [p. 629]

An ever-shorter production cycle, accelerated finishing times and compulsory overtime requirements placed intense pressure on Foxconn assembly-line workers. New workers in particular were reprimanded for working “too slowly” regardless of their efforts to keep up with the “standard work pace”. [p. 630]

Foxconn is able to impose these harsh conditions because of the ineffectiveness of the official trade union:

The toothless role of Foxconn’s trade union mirrors nationwide trends of managerial control over employees and the absence of substantive worker representation at the workplace level. [p. 631]

Nevertheless, some of Foxconn’s one million Chinese workers have fought back.

Worker-led strikes and protests at numerous Foxconn sites were part of a pattern of growing labour unrest across coastal and inland China. [p. 632]

In some cases the workers have been aided by “support structures provided by NGOs, progressive student groups and human rights lawyers”.

Labour NGOs under attack

An increasing number of workers took their cases to arbitration committees and courts, resulting in long delays in hearing cases. Many workers and some NGO activists were dissatisfied with this individualistic approach.

Some NGOs, particularly in Guangdong province, began encouraging workers to organise, elect representatives and engage in collective bargaining with employers, demanding not only their legal rights but also improved pay and conditions.

According to Chloe Froissart and Ivan Franceschini,

Between 2011 and 2015, workers obtained hundreds of billions of yuan in wages, layoff compensation, social insurance and housing fund contributions and other benefits through collective bargaining. [p. 689]

However, the government, headed since 2013 by Xi, took repressive measures against some of these labour NGOs.

In December 2015, the police detained a couple of dozen labour activists in Guangdong, eventually charging five of them. In January 2019, authorities arrested another five labour NGO activists who in the past had played some role in promoting collective bargaining.

Jasic struggle

In early 2017 workers at the Jasic welding equipment manufacturing company in Shenzhen began a struggle that lasted more than a year and attracted nationwide and international attention and solidarity.

According to Manfred Elfstrom, the workers suffered

managerial physical and verbal abuse, the company’s constant redefinition of rest days, extensive fines for work rule infractions, and underpayment of social insurance premiums and housing allowances. [p. 694]

The workers took their complaints to the local labour bureau and won some concessions. But the company refused to return money already deducted from workers’ pay.

In 2018 workers launched a unionisation drive. Leading activists were attacked by thugs and roughly escorted from the plant. When they returned, police detained and beat them.

On July 27 that year, after a night time rally, police arrested 30 protesters. When protesters gathered to demand their release, at least 12 more were arrested.

Information about the case circulated among leftists on the Chinese internet. A Jasic Workers Solidarity Group was formed. Students came from other cities including Beijing to support the Jasic workers.

On August 26, 2018, police stormed an apartment shared by student supporters of the Jasic workers and arrested about 40 people.

By early 2019 the movement had largely been suppressed. But this experience shows the potential to build a broad movement of workers and their allies that challenges capitalist exploitation.