From confrontation to engagement: The strategic logic of US rapprochement with Russia

By Dmitry Pozhidaev

Published 8 March, 2025

First published at Elusive Development.

US re-engagement with Russia under the Donald Trump administration came as a shock to many, particularly its European allies. For decades (with a brief interruption in the 1990s and early 2000s), Washington’s stance toward Moscow had been defined by containment, sanctions and military deterrence. Yet, seemingly overnight, rhetoric shifted from hostility to engagement. Was this development truly so unexpected? Beyond Trump’s numerous campaign pronouncements — most notably his claim that he could end the Russo-Ukrainian war in 24 hours — what deeper strategic logic underpins this apparent tectonic shift in US foreign policy?

Far from an impulsive departure from tradition, this recalibration reflects a broader evolution in US strategic thinking. The US is moving away from the territorialist logic of power, which relies on costly military interventions and direct control, toward a more economically-driven and cost-effective strategy of influence. At the heart of this shift is an effort to reduce strategic overhead, leverage economic tools over military force, and pursue selective engagement where it serves US interests. More critically, this shift is tied to the global realignment of power, particularly the growing challenge posed by China. If rapprochement with Russia can weaken Beijing’s influence while securing US economic and strategic advantages, the move from confrontation to engagement becomes less of an aberration and more of a calculated response to shifting geopolitical realities.

This analysis was written before the February 28 White House meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a failed diplomatic encounter that laid bare the transactional nature, economic pragmatism and geopolitical concerns that define the current US administration’s approach to its partners — Ukraine included. While this text focuses on US-Russia relations, that meeting served as a stark illustration of how Washington’s foreign policy — often perceived as unpredictable — ultimately follows a consistent logic: prioritising strategic advantage over ideological commitments. This broader context helps explain why what some interpret as a “pivot” to Russia may, in fact, be part of a larger recalibration aimed at preserving US dominance in an increasingly multipolar world.

The declining utility of the territorialist logic

For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, US global power was maintained through extensive military commitments, permanent alliances, and a vast security infrastructure spanning Europe, Asia and the Middle East. This territorialist logic, as conceptualised by Giovanni Arrighi, required substantial investment in military bases, overseas troop deployments and the upkeep of alliances like NATO. However, this approach has become increasingly costly and, in many cases, strategically inefficient. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of military interventionism, consuming trillions of dollars with little to show in terms of lasting influence. Even in Europe, the expansion of NATO has imposed additional security commitments on the US without necessarily yielding proportional strategic advantages.

David Harvey argues imperial strategies have shifted from direct territorial domination toward more flexible forms of economic and geopolitical control, where coercion, financial leverage and market mechanisms replace the need for physical occupation. The US is increasingly relying on cost-effective instruments of influence, such as sanctions, trade policies and financial restrictions, rather than direct military engagement. This shift reflects not only the economic burden of territorial control but also the changing nature of global power competition, where economic and technological supremacy matter more than the sheer number of military bases or troop deployments.

Recognising these constraints, US policymakers — especially under the Trump and Joe Biden administrations — have sought to reduce direct military obligations and instead pursue influence through economic pressure, targeted diplomacy and the strategic use of threats and incentives. This approach is evident in Washington’s recalibration of its stance toward Russia: rather than attempting to contain Russia purely through military deterrence, there is an emerging interest in selective engagement that could serve US economic and geopolitical interests while reducing long-term costs.

Economic pragmatism: A key driver of US policy

Economic considerations play a central role in the US reassessment of its stance toward Russia. Several key factors contribute to this shift.

Access to strategic resources. Russia remains one of the world’s largest producers of oil, natural gas and critical minerals (including rare earth elements essential for high-tech industries). Russia holds the largest world reserves of gas and about 10% of the world’s total reserves of rare earth elements (twice as much as Ukraine). While the US has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian energy exports, there are indications that US businesses could benefit from selective economic engagement. For instance, recent statements by President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials suggest that US companies are welcome to participate in Russian aluminum production, the energy sector and rare earths extraction — sectors that are crucial for advanced manufacturing and military applications.

Beyond its resource wealth, Russia’s economic structure itself presents potential opportunities for US capital. Unlike China, Russia is not a direct competitor to the US economy but rather a peripheral economy structurally dependent on integration into the global system.

Boris Kagarlitsky (2008) describes how Russia’s capitalist development has been shaped by its role as a raw material exporter, with wealth concentrated in powerful business clans or oligarchs, who control resource exports. During the 1990s economic crisis, Russia paradoxically became a financial “donor” to the global economy, as vast amounts of capital were converted into Western currencies, primarily US dollars, and moved abroad. This trend of capital outflows persisted even during Russia’s relative economic recovery in the early 2000s, highlighting the structural dependency of Russian capitalism on external markets and financial systems.

The costs of sanctions and economic decoupling. While US-led sanctions have significantly impacted the Russian economy, their impact has not been as significant as expected as the report Russian Economy at the Time of War argues. The sanctions have also had unintended consequences for Western economies, particularly in energy markets and global commodity supply chains. Europe, in particular, has faced economic turbulence due to the loss of Russian gas supplies, leading to higher energy prices and inflationary pressures. Analysts estimate that European countries have spent between 1-7% of GDP shielding consumers and firms from rising energy costs, caused in part by building new infrastructure for energy security. But the US losses were not insignificant: according to some estimates, US companies have lost $324 billion by moving out of Russia. For the US, a more flexible approach — one that balances sanctions with selective engagement — could help stabilise global markets and prevent economic fallout.

Sanction enforcement also carries costs. Apart from the relatively small costs of monitoring and enforcement (most of which are transferred to Russian counterparties), there are geopolitical costs associated with maintaining compliance. By their nature, sanctions are only effective if they are enforced beyond the target country — that is, if third parties outside of Russia comply with them. However, as the number of sanctions grows, so does the number of foreign businesses affected, many of which operate in strategically important countries for the US, such as India, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. The imposition of secondary sanctions complicates US relations with these key partners, who may view such measures as an infringement on their sovereignty and economic autonomy. Moreover, even strategic adversaries such as China — which the US seeks to contain — become entangled in sanction enforcement, adding another layer of diplomatic and economic tension. The sanctions backfire, to borrow the title of Agatha Demarais’ book, which explains how sanctions reshape the world against US interests. The broader and more complex the sanctions regime, the more friction it generates in US global relationships, potentially undermining Washington’s ability to maintain a unified geopolitical front.

Beyond these immediate consequences, sanctions have also raised concerns about the long-term role of the US dollar in global trade. Treasury officials across various US administrations have cautioned that extensive use of financial sanctions could threaten the central role of the dollar and the US financial system. The sweeping sanctions on Russia appear to have accelerated efforts by various countries — including China — to reduce their reliance on the US dollar in international transactions, as well as on US and European cross-border payments infrastructure more generally. The US benefits economically and politically from the dollar’s status as the dominant reserve currency in the global economy. If de-dollarisation efforts gain traction on a broader scale, there could be adverse implications for US influence, financial stability, and economic leverage in global markets.

Repositioning Europe as a competitor rather than an asset. Europe has traditionally been seen as a key ally in US global strategy. However, recent policy shifts — particularly under Trump, and to a lesser extent Biden — have reframed the transatlantic relationship in more transactional terms. The US has increasingly viewed European economic power as a challenge rather than a complement to its own interests. This is reflected in Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs of 25% on European Union goods, including cars and farm products. A further indication of this transactional approach includes disputes over defence spending within NATO, and Washington’s push for Europe to take on a greater share of its own security responsibilities. Such moves signal a departure from the traditional alignment between the US and Europe, instead treating the EU as an economic rival rather than an indispensable ally.

Branko Milanovic has argued that Trump’s tariff and trade policies signify the end of neoliberal globalisation as we know it. However, what if this is not the collapse of globalisation, but rather its evolution into a new form — one where US capital benefits disproportionately by securing privileged access to foreign markets for sales while also acquiring cheap raw materials under favourable conditions? From this perspective, the Western (European) policy of global fragmentation and “friend-shoring” — where supply chains are restructured to favour geopolitical allies — represents an even more isolationist shift than Trump’s rhetoric of “America First” economic nationalism (not to mention projected real GDP losses as a result of friend-shoring). Instead of an inclusive, integrated global system, the US is curating economic dependencies to sustain its own corporate dominance. The real divergence, then, is not between Trump’s vision of US global economic supremacy and Biden’s supposed return to multilateralism, but between two competing models of controlled globalisation — one overtly nationalistic, the other veiled behind strategic economic fragmentation.

By exploring rapprochement with Russia, the US may be signalling to Europe that it is not indispensable — and that Washington has alternative diplomatic options. This realignment could serve to pressure European governments to align more closely with US priorities while simultaneously reducing European influence in global affairs.

The China factor: Strategic realignment to counter a rising rival

Perhaps the most significant driver of US interest in improving relations with Russia is the broader strategic competition with China. In the past three years, Russia and China have significantly deepened their “no limits” partnership, particularly in energy trade, military cooperation and financial transactions. In 2023, bilateral trade between Russia and China reached an unprecedented $240 billion, a substantial rise from $147 billion in 2021. Russia’s pivot to China has accelerated due to Western sanctions, making Beijing Moscow’s largest trade partner and key financial backer.

For the US, this growing alignment between Russia and China represents a major long-term threat. Washington’s goal, therefore, is to prevent a full-fledged Russia-China axis by creating incentives for Russia to maintain a degree of independence from Beijing. This approach has historical precedents. During the Cold War, the US successfully exploited tensions between the Soviet Union and China, leading to Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing. This strategy weakened the Soviet position and reshaped global power dynamics.

Some US policymakers have suggested pursuing a similar approach today — this time by engaging Russia to create distance between Moscow and Beijing. President Donald Trump explicitly stated during his election campaign, “The one thing you never want is Russia and China uniting. I’m going to have to un-unite them.”

While the economic dimension of the Russia-China partnership is concerning for the US, the geo-strategic implications are even more pressing. Although there is no formal military alliance between China and Russia, the two countries have significantly increased the frequency and scale of their joint military drills. Recent activities include coordinated naval patrols and exercises in strategic areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, signalling a robust military partnership and mutual strategic interests. This growing cooperation presents a long-term security challenge to the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia is often perceived as a military threat to Europe, but not an economic competitor on a global scale, unlike China. The prevailing view in Washington is that Europe can contain Russia with limited US involvement, allowing the US to focus its strategic resources on countering China’s economic and military expansion. 

Some analysts have celebrated Russia’s growing dependence on China, believing it weakens Moscow’s ability to act independently. However, the greatest nightmare for US strategists is a China that effectively turns Russia into its economic and military backyard, securing a stable source of raw materials, energy and strategic depth. Such a development would make China virtually invincible, granting it the economic and military resilience needed to challenge US dominance in the long term.

The US pivot toward Russia can be explained through the offshore balancing framework developed by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. In a 2016 paper, they identified three key regions of US strategic interest — Europe, the Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific — where direct military entanglements are undesirable, but preventing the rise of new hegemonic powers remains a priority.

In these regions, direct military entanglements are undesirable, but preventing the rise of new hegemonic powers is crucial. Drawing from Britain’s pre-World War I balance-of-power strategy, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that China is the current rising power that requires counterbalancing. In this framework, Russia plays a crucial role due to its long land border with China, making it a potential counterweight to Beijing.

This “continental balance” means that a conflict with Russia over Ukraine or its NATO aspirations is not in the US interest. Furthermore, Europe today has enough economic and military strength to balance Russia on its own, unlike in 1945, when direct US intervention was necessary. This suggests that the US can step back, leaving a triangular dynamic where Europe keeps Russia in check, while Russia helps contain China.

Trump’s policies align with this logic: cooling relations with Europe while warming ties with Moscow. If the US can peel Russia away from China, it could achieve a double strategic win: gaining access to Russian resources and strategic positioning while weakening China’s ability to leverage Russia as an ally in a future geopolitical confrontation.

From a security standpoint, engaging Russia could also yield cooperation (or at least understanding) on issues like arms control, counter-terrorism, and regional conflicts. That is harder to achieve if Russia is fully aligned with China against the West. So, re-establishing a working relationship might pay off by reducing global polarisation — making it not just “the West versus a Sino-Russian axis,” but a more nuanced set of relationships.

The military-geopolitical dimension: US-Russia relations and the limits of Western military pressure

While economic and strategic considerations play a crucial role in shaping US-Russia relations, the military-geopolitical dimension remains equally significant. As the war in Ukraine continues, the scope of Western military pressure on Russia appears to have reached its limits — at least without crossing thresholds that could trigger direct confrontation.

Since the early stages of the war, the US and its NATO allies have incrementally increased the quality and quantity of weapons supplied to Ukraine — from light arms and Javelin anti-tank missiles to advanced artillery systems, long-range missiles and modern Western tanks. The latest phases of military aid have included F-16 fighter jets and ATACMS long-range missiles, signalling an attempt to offset Russia’s battlefield advantages without direct NATO intervention. 

However, as these arms transfers have escalated, the West now faces a dilemma: to continue the current trajectory of military aid “as long as it takes,” further depleting Western economic and military resources or engage in further escalation, such as allowing Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with NATO-provided weapons or deploying Western troops, dramatically increasing the risk of direct military confrontation with Russia.

This escalation dynamic raises fundamental strategic questions for the US: How much further can Western support go before triggering a Russian response that escalates beyond Ukraine and what are the limits of US commitment to European security if the conflict spirals into a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation?

A key factor restraining unlimited escalation of Western military support is the risk of triggering a direct conflict between NATO and Russia. Under Article V of the NATO Treaty, an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all, necessitating a collective response. If the war were to expand — whether through direct NATO intervention, Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia using Western weapons, or Russian retaliation against NATO-linked supply lines — the US would be forced into a decision that could expose it to nuclear confrontation with Russia.

The burden of such a confrontation would overwhelmingly fall on the US, given its role as the primary provider of Europe’s security umbrella. While some European countries, notably Poland and the Baltic states, advocate for more aggressive policies toward Russia, their ability to sustain a direct military engagement with Russia without US backing is highly limited. This leaves Washington with two stark choices in the event of a major escalation: to engage in direct military confrontation with Russia, raising the risk of nuclear escalation, or recalibrate its approach, potentially negotiating de-escalation to avoid being drawn into a broader war.

How significant the risk of nuclear escalation is remains the subject of intense debate. Some analysts argue that Russia’s nuclear threats are largely rhetorical, aimed at deterring further Western involvement. Others caution that if the situation escalates beyond a certain threshold, nuclear use — whether tactical or strategic — cannot be entirely ruled out. Regardless, further military escalation and a potential direct confrontation with Russia  —a nuclear superpower possessing the world’s largest arsenal, estimated at approximately 5,889 nuclear warheads — cannot be taken lightly.

“You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people, you’re gambling with World War Three,” Trump told Zelensky during their February 28 meeting at the White House, a conversation that quickly turned tense and controversial. While this accusation may be disputed — some consider it an unfair characterisation of Ukraine’s defence efforts — it nonetheless reflects genuine US concerns about the risks of direct military confrontation with Russia. 

Trump’s remarks, regardless of political motivations, highlight a wider strategic anxiety in Washington: that continued escalation, particularly if it involves NATO’s deeper involvement or Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western weapons, could push the conflict beyond a manageable threshold.

As the US calculates the costs of its military engagement and risks of direct confrontation with Russia, its decisions are also shaped by economic considerations. The US increasingly perceives Europe not just as a strategic ally but as an economic competitor, particularly as trade tensions and protectionist measures intensify. Meanwhile, Russia, despite being a geopolitical rival, is not an economic competitor and remains an insufficiently exploited yet potentially profitable market for US corporations.

From this perspective, prolonging confrontation with Russia carries economic downsides for the US — disrupting global energy markets, blocking potential US corporate access to Russian resources, and forcing continued high military expenditures to sustain European security. In contrast, a selective rapprochement with Russia — or at least a de-escalation of direct confrontation — could allow the US to reduce its military burden, reshape its economic strategy and refocus its strategic priorities on China.

Given these risks, the US may find itself reassessing its long-term posture toward Russia. While Washington has been committed to weakening Russia through sanctions and military support for Ukraine, it also faces a broader strategic reality:

1. The US cannot afford to be drawn into a direct military conflict with Russia while simultaneously preparing for a potential future confrontation with China.
2. Europe’s security dependence on the US means that any escalation would disproportionately expose Washington to risks that European allies are reluctant or unable to bear.
3. A prolonged, high-risk confrontation with Russia undermines US strategic flexibility, forcing it to maintain a dual-front geopolitical posture against both Russia and China.

As a result, the US may ultimately seek to redefine its engagement with Russia — not as a shift toward accommodation, but as a way to manage escalation risks and refocus its strategic priorities.

This consideration further strengthens the logic behind exploring a recalibration of US-Russia relations, particularly in light of the growing challenge posed by China. Whether this shift materialises will depend on political will, strategic calculations, and the evolving situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. However, the limits of Western military pressure and the inherent risks of escalation suggest that a reassessment of US policy toward Russia is not only possible but increasingly necessary.

The constraints and risks of US-Russia rapprochement

Despite the strategic advantages that a recalibrated US-Russia relationship might offer, significant obstacles remain.

Deep-rooted distrust. Decades of confrontation, particularly since the Ukraine crisis, have left relations between Washington and Moscow highly adversarial. While pragmatic engagement is possible, there are deep institutional and ideological barriers to a true rapprochement. The US foreign policy establishment, particularly within the State Department, Pentagon and intelligence community, remains largely committed to a containment strategy toward Russia.

While Moscow publicly frames the US as hostile to its security and economic interests, its actual position is more complex. Russian capitalism has historically sought access to US financial markets, technologies, and investment opportunities (as discussed in the section on economic pragmatism). The pre-2014 US-Russia economic cooperation was relatively successful and widely accepted by both the Russian security apparatus and public opinion. What the Kremlin ultimately seeks is not a fundamental rupture but rather a restructured global order — one in which Russia and the US recognise each other’s spheres of influence, much like the post-World War II Yalta arrangements. In this sense, the depth of the US-Russia divide may at times be overstated, as Russia’s primary grievance is not with US power itself, but with Washington’s refusal to acknowledge Russia as an independent pole in the global system.

The Ukraine factor. US policy toward Russia remains heavily influenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Any attempt to improve relations with Moscow would likely face strong resistance from European allies, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, which view Russia as an existential threat. Additionally, Ukraine itself — heavily reliant on Western military and economic aid — would strongly oppose any engagement perceived as a concession to Moscow. A shift in US policy could also undermine transatlantic unity, weakening NATO cohesion at a time when Washington seeks to focus its strategic resources on China.

Domestic political opposition. Within the US, any move to ease tensions with Russia would be highly controversial. Both Republicans and Democrats have strong factions that view Russia as a hostile power and oppose any perceived concessions to the Kremlin. Additionally, the legacy of Russian election interference allegations and the broader narrative of Russia as an adversary have become deeply embedded in US political discourse. Any president advocating for engagement with Russia risks facing severe domestic backlash, particularly in an election cycle.

The risk of strategic overreach. If the US attempts to pivot toward Russia too aggressively, it risks overplaying its hand. Moscow may exploit Washington’s outreach to extract economic and political concessions without significantly distancing itself from China. Russia’s long-term economic trajectory is increasingly intertwined with China’s, particularly in energy exports and financial transactions. A poorly managed rapprochement could backfire, strengthening Moscow’s position without delivering meaningful strategic advantages to the US.

The military and nuclear dimension. As discussed, the risk of nuclear escalation remains a crucial constraint in US-Russia relations. Any shift toward engagement that appears to weaken deterrence or undermine NATO commitments could embolden Moscow, raising concerns among US allies. Additionally, if the Ukraine war escalates unpredictably — for example, through strikes deep into Russian territory or the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine — Washington could find itself trapped between escalation and retreat, undermining the feasibility of a diplomatic approach.

Conclusion: The future of US-Russia relations

The evolving US approach to Russia is not driven by idealism but by pragmatic geopolitical calculations. As the global balance of power shifts, Washington is reassessing its priorities: reducing expensive military commitments, ensuring access to critical economic resources and preparing for a long-term rivalry with China.

While deep-rooted antagonisms remain, selective engagement with Russia could serve multiple US objectives, from weakening China’s global position to reducing strategic burdens in Europe. However, the success of this approach depends on whether the US can navigate internal political resistance, European skepticism, and Russia’s own strategic calculus.

At the same time, the behaviour of the US administration, while outwardly shaped by Trump’s character, reflects deeper structural forces at play. The shifting US stance toward Russia is not just about diplomatic manoeuvering but a response to the ongoing crisis of capitalism, where the current model of accumulation in the US faces significant structural challenges. Mending bridges with Russia is not merely about geopolitical realignments — it is a strategy to expand the breathing space for US capitalism itself.

Trump claims that his “deals” with Russia and Ukraine will benefit the US, but it is clear that the primary beneficiary will be the US corporate sector. If everything King Midas touched turned to gold, then everything the US administration touches turns into more profits for US corporations. For US workers, any tangible benefits from this engagement will be minimal — if they materialise at all.

Ultimately, the future of US-Russia relations will be shaped by a complex interplay of economic incentives, geopolitical necessity, and global power realignments — with profound implications for the balance of power in the 21st century.

The Trump-Putin axis and its impact on global politics

By Peter Hudis

Published 7 March, 2025

First published at New Politics.

Donald Trump’s forging of a political alliance with Russia’s Vladimir Putin at the expense of Ukraine’s struggle for self-determination may not be totally unexpected, but its speed and extent represent a dramatic transformation of world politics.

Nothing more sharply — and crudely — signals this transformation than Trump and J.D. Vance’s public browbeating of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 28 at what was supposed to be a brief session to take questions from the press prior to a private meeting to discuss conditions for ending the war. In a breathtaking display of imperial arrogance, Trump and Vance turned the session into a shouting match as they insulted and threatened Zelensky for stating the obvious — that Putin cannot be trusted, and that any peace deal requires security guarantees for Ukraine. Trump then cancelled further talks with Zelensky and ordered him to immediately leave the country. This brazen take-down and humiliation of a democratically elected head of state for not totally submitting to U.S. dictates is unprecedented. It is as ominous as Trump’s inauguration five weeks earlier. Ukraine will be left to feel the full wrath of Putin’s murderous war machine just as Palestine is being left to face Netanyahu’s fascistic effort to annihilate its very existence.

This is hardly the first time a major imperialist power has suddenly forged an alliance with a longstanding adversary. One can recall war criminal Richard Nixon’s sudden opening to China in the early 1970s, which led to a rapprochement that ended up extending the Vietnam War by several years (Mao reduced aid to North Vietnam to curry favor with the U.S. and Nixon used his entente with him to demand greater concessions from Hanoi). But an even more striking antecedent is the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. This may sound like an exaggeration — after all, the alliance between fascist Germany and Stalinist Russia gave the green light to World War II, and no one is suggesting a third world war is imminent — although the risks of it are ever-present. Nonetheless, the 1939 Pact is worth recalling since it produced a shift in world politics that had crucial ideological ramifications, as many leftists supported it in the name of opposing Western imperialism while others denounced it as a betrayal of the principles of socialism. Today’s U.S.-Putin alliance likewise has profound ideological ramifications, as seen in how leftists opposed to Ukraine’s struggle for self-determination now find their position being shared by MAGA Republicans, while others on the Left are searching for revolutionary new beginnings opposed to all forms of occupation and colonialism, from Gaza to Ukraine.

The betrayal of Ukraine

The Trump-Putin alliance was forged with the convening of direct talks on February 18 between representatives of U.S. and Russian imperialism in Saudi Arabia, a meeting that excluded both the Ukrainians and the U.S.’s European allies, some of whom were not even informed of it beforehand. These were not negotiations: Trump simply adopted virtually all of the Kremlin’s talking points without so much as suggesting a single concession from Putin. The Russian delegates could hardly conceal their shock and glee at what Trump gave away at zero cost to themselves.

On February 24, following the talks in Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration voted against a Resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine — the first time it did so, joining Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea, and Israel, as well as 12 other Moscow-friendly countries (93 other countries voted yes, 65 abstained). Brandishing the lie that Ukraine, not Russia, started the war, Trump clearly allied the U.S. with Putin.

Not a peep of opposition to this was heard from a single Republican member of Congress — even though many of them spent years bashing Russia and voting aid to Ukraine. Many Democrats expressed outrage but seem lost as to what to do next. So much for the claim that the U.S. ruling class has a vested interest in helping Ukraine!

Trump insists that Ukraine cannot recover twenty percent of the country that Russia occupied since 2014 and 2022, and that no U.S. troops will be used to patrol a ceasefire which is to be imposed largely on Russian terms. Nor can it join NATO, until now the inter-imperialist alliance of the U.S. and Western Europe.

Most revealing, Trump demanded that the Ukrainian government repay $500 billion to the U.S. (at least four times as much as the value of all the military and economic aid it received under Biden) by surrendering 50% of the proceeds from its sale of national resources, such as minerals, oil and gas, and port fees. Ukraine was moreover expected to repay the U.S. twice the value of any future U.S. aid (it does not indicate whether this would include any military assistance). This amounts to paying 100 percent interest on top of the total principle of a “loan.” Taken as a whole, this would entail that a higher percentage of Ukraine’s GDP become turned over to the U.S. than the allies demanded in the form of reparations from defeated Germany after World War I.

That would clearly amount to turning what is left of Ukraine (Putin is demanding annexation of parts of it he does not now control) into an outright economic colony of U.S. imperialism. If this mis-named “peace plan” were to go forward, the U.S. would reap profits at Ukraine’s expense and Russia could secure the conquest of parts of its territory while building up its diminished military apparatus (Russian forces are nearing exhaustion due to heavy losses, especially in soldiers and heavy weapons like tanks and artillery) in order to ready itself to launch a renewed assault in a few years.

Not surprisingly, Zelensky initially balked at Trump’s demands, insisting that any concessions to the U.S. contain security guarantees that could prevent the overthrow of the government or a renewal of the war. It remains to be seen if the Europeans will provide them. They too were taken aback by the recent turn of events and are unsure how to respond: most of the leaders of the European states have lived so long under the protective umbrella of the U.S. that they cannot imagine how to exist otherwise.

Zelensky has been under tremendous pressure to capitulate to U.S. demands. On February 26 a tentative agreement between Trump and Zelensky was announced that placed slightly less onerous conditions on the amount the U.S. would get from the sale of Ukraine’s natural resources. Zelensky reluctantly agreed, even though the proposal provided no security guarantees for Ukraine. Trump ruled out sending any U.S. peacekeeping forces and says the burden for providing them would fall to the Europeans — which Russia insists it will never accept. On February 26, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to any deployment of such peacekeepers as “empty talk.”

Trump claimed that the presence of U.S. companies on the ground in Ukraine to extract its mineral resources would “provide automatic security” (Ukraine does not currently have the ability to extract more than a small amount of its mineral wealth). But as many in Ukraine have pointed out, the presence of U.S. companies in eastern Ukraine did nothing to stop Putin from invading and occupying those areas. Moreover, over half of Ukraine’s mineral resources are located in the eastern part of the country which is currently occupied by Russia. Trump is surely eyeing those resources as well — which Putin would be glad to provide him with so long as Ukraine is severely weakened and demilitarized.

Meanwhile, discussions among European members of NATO about increasing military aid to Ukraine are hardly reassuring. It could take years for them to make up for Ukraine’s loss of U.S. military assistance. For example, the entire British army currently has fewer artillery pieces than one brigade possessed in the 1990s. Russia could rest and rebuild for a few years (or less) and then renew its longstanding aim to take over all of Ukraine.

Setting the record straight

The ideological fallout from the Trump-Putin alliance is already evident from the way Putin’s false claims about Ukraine are being normalized — and not alone by Trump.

Foremost among these is the claim that Ukraine started the war by provoking Russia through its repression of Russian-language speakers in eastern Ukraine and its desire to join NATO. This overlooks the fact that the war actually began in 2014, when Russia invaded eastern Ukraine and Crimea in response to a mass democratic movement on the streets of Kiev which ousted its pro-Moscow leader, Viktor Yanukovych. As he had done earlier in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and elsewhere, Putin sent in troops (often in the guise of residents) to stoke separatist sentiment. The response of the U.S. and NATO at the time was meek: it slapped limited sanctions on Russia but did little else. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the U.S. initially told Zelensky to flee the country on the grounds that there was no chance of holding off the Russian military. The Ukrainians then succeeded in doing so to the shock and surprise of both the U.S. and Putin. Only then did the pipeline of military and economic aid begin to flow from the U.S./NATO to Ukraine.

As I stated at the time of Russia’s 2022 invasion, the claim that the U.S./NATO were itching for a fight with Russia and jumped at the chance when Putin invaded gets it all wrong. Intra-imperialist conflicts are often driven by economic factors, such as the drive to accumulate capital on an ever-expanding scale at the expense of rivals. But this does not apply to the conflict between the U.S. and Russia, since the latter’s economy is too weak to pose a threat to U.S. economic dominance. As Russian sociologist Ilya Matveev puts it, “Post-Soviet Russia’s economic clout has always been far too limited to threaten the centers of capital accumulation in the Global North… In fact, the Kremlin’s decisions in 2014 and 2022 were the product of a specific ideological vision that overemphasizes Russia’s vulnerabilities and calls for preventive military action under the slogan of ‘offense is the best defense.’ Russia’s conflict with the West, unlike the U.S.-China rivalry, is rooted less in structural, particularly economic, causes and more in ideological (mis)perceptions.”

This explains why the U.S. and NATO provided enough support for Ukraine to hold off Russia but not enough to enable it to inflict a major victory. I wrote in July 2024, “That the U.S.’s conflict with Russia is not structurally rooted in the dynamics of global capital accumulation does not make it less dangerous. But it does suggest that a change of government in the U.S. in the coming months can easily lead to a rapprochement between Western imperialism and Putin’s Russia.” That has now occurred, capped off by Trump’s claim that Ukraine is responsible for starting the war.

Putin also claimed that Zelensky is an illegitimate leader of a regime stocked with “Nazis.” In fact, he was voted in through a democratic election with over 70% of the votes while the neo-fascist far-Right (which surely exists in Ukraine, as it does in virtually every European country as well as the U.S.) got 2%. Trump responded to Zelensky’s objection to being excluded from the discussions over the future of Ukraine by denouncing him as a “dictator” who has the support of only 4% of the populace. In fact, as of the end of 2024 his support was 52%, but following Trump’s reversal of U.S. policy in favor of Russia, it shot up to 63%. Many of his most prominent critics, such as Valery Zaluzhny, former Commander-in-Chief of the Army who was dismissed by Zelensky one year ago, now say they intend to vote for him once the war is over (Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits an election from being held during wartime).

Meanwhile, Putin’s effort to break apart the Western alliance, which has long been his goal, is being codified by Trump as he treats his NATO allies as an after-thought — except when it comes to prodding them to ramp up military spending so as to free the U.S. from being responsible for Europe’s security. The U.S.’s European allies are completely flummoxed by Trump’s threat to cut off military aid to Ukraine and lift sanctions on Russia: they have been thrown into a new world that their neoliberal mindset never prepared them for.

Redrawing the political map

What we are witnessing today is a redrawing of the political map, as the U.S. is now transitioning from its decades-long pursuit of single world dominance under the illusory claim of supporting democracy to forging a united front of reactionary and neo-fascist powers intent on pursuing national and regional interests.

This is not isolationism — neither Trump, Putin, nor Xi Jinping fit into that category. It is rather an effort to respond to the U.S.’s failure to secure single world domination (as seen from its defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan) by reverting to a twenty-first-century form of annexationist territorial imperialism. This was initiated by Putin’s imperialist invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and it is now embraced by Trump as he threatens to annex Greenland, Panama, Canada, and even Gaza as he promotes Israel’s effort to expel its entire Palestinian populace. This is why Trump finds so much in common with Putin — they share a similar view of the world, in which even the pretense of international law and norms must be cast aside. This should not be written off as a mere quirk of his personality or reduced solely to his business interests (though they both play a big part): they are a reflection of a world gradually being divided up into regional power blocs based on naked national self-interest. As Peter McLaren put it, “Trump and Putin do not seek peace — they seek a pact. A deal that cements Russia’s aggression as legitimate and Ukraine’s sovereignty as expendable. A deal that undermines not only Ukraine but the very idea that nations have the right to exist beyond the will of imperial masters.”

Of course, it is not alone foreign affairs that binds Trump to Putin — at least for now (one thing about neo-fascists is that they rarely have an easy time getting along with their co-conspirators). What most of all connects them is their disdain for the advances made by women, workers, national minorities, and LGBTQ people over the past decades. The far Right sees in Putin the exemplar of the white-racist attack on democracy that they adore. As Putin stated a few years ago, “The U.S. continues to receive more and more immigrants, and, as far as I understand, the white, Christian population is already outnumbered…. We have to preserve [white Christians] to remain a significant center in the world.”

This is why those who concede even the slightest ground to Trump’s narrative on Ukraine make a big mistake when they presume it can be somehow separated from his attacks on immigrants, women, workers, and people of color in the U.S. — or separated from his unwavering support for Israel’s genocide against the Palestinians. One example is Medea Benjamin of Code Pink, who in a recent article entitled “Trump Gives Peace a Chance in Ukraine,” wrote: “On both sides of the Atlantic, Trump’s initiative [on Ukraine] is a game changer. Those of us anxious to see peace in Ukraine should applaud Trump’s initiative…. If Trump can reject the political arguments that have fueled three years of war in Ukraine and apply compassion and common sense to end that war, then he can surely do the same in the Middle East.” But the last thing that motivates Trump is compassion and common sense when it comes to Ukraine (or anywhere else) — which is why to expect him to “do the same in the Middle East” is an invitation for ethnic cleansing and genocide. He cares not a whit about the Ukrainians, and even less about “peace.” He is concerned with extracting as many resources from as many places as he can while forging a united front with like-minded authoritarians to crush what is left of democratic norms and institutions.

This is why Ukraine remains a touchstone of global politics. If Trump and Putin can succeed in curtailing its fight for self-determination, it will make it all the harder to advance freedom struggles elsewhere. Stating that fact does not entail supporting Zelensky or the current Ukrainian government, which clearly governs under a neoliberal agenda, any more than it entails supporting NATO (whose very existence we have long opposed). But as Trotsky noted in his writings on fascism, the truth is concrete: and the concrete truth is that to remain neutral in the face of occupation and colonial domination is to become its accomplice.

Oleg Shein argues, “While Putin is President — and he will be a president as long as he lives — this war will continue. The reason lies within Russia: Putin does not have a positive program, for the country. External conflict is the basis of his power. It is a way to consolidate the elite and govern the people. Perhaps the war against Ukraine will enter a phase of smoldering. But as long as Putin rules in Russia, the history of external conflict will continue.”

Solidarizing with Ukraine — and the larger struggle

Ukraine is facing a difficult situation. The ground war has not been going well for it over the last year, and a cut-off of U.S. aid is sure to make the problem worse. So far, it has received half of its armaments and aid from the EU, and a number of states (such as France and Poland) promise to contribute more. It is unclear how much of a difference that will make. But what cannot be denied is the tenacity of the Ukrainians: despite some Russian advances over the past six months, they have taken far less territory than what most analysts anticipated. Zelensky will be under continuous pressure to agree to some kind of rotten compromise, but while the Ukrainian people desperately want peace, the vast majority do not want what they call “a peace of the grave,” that would deny their right to exist as a nation and a culture. It is thus likely the struggle will go on, perhaps in the form of guerilla warfare, even if a dishonorable “peace” is imposed by the great powers behind their backs.

This too carries risks: it is possible that the far Right will grow in power in Ukraine the more desperate the situation becomes. The Ukrainian Marxist writer Hanna Perekhoda addresses this as follows: “The argument that the presence of the far right in Ukraine justifies a refusal to send arms is based on a rather blatant error of logic…. There are far-right movements in France and Germany that are infinitely more influential than in Ukraine, yet no one would dispute their right to self-defense in the event of aggression…. This argument is all the more hypocritical given that many of these same voices on the left do not hesitate to support resistance movements that include actors who are more than problematic. Why demand a purity from Ukraine that no other society is required to show when it has to defend itself? What is undeniable is that the war, which has lasted for more than ten years, has already helped to strengthen and trivialize nationalist symbols and discourse that were previously marginal. Wars do not make any society better. However, the relationship between the delivery of arms and the strengthening of the far right in Ukraine is inversely proportional. The weapons sent to Ukraine are used first and foremost to defend society as a whole against an invading army. Ukraine’s victory guarantees the very existence of a state in which citizens can freely and democratically choose their future. Conversely, nothing strengthens extreme right-wing movements or terrorist organizations more than military occupation and the systematic oppression that goes with it.”

This is not the time to refrain from solidarizing with Ukraine — it is more important than ever. It is vital not just for their sake but for ours, as we become increasingly subjected to fascistic repression inside the U.S., the extent of which has only just begun to be seen.

Peter Hudis is the coeditor (with Kevin Anderson) of The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx by Raya Dunayevskaya (Lexington Books, 2001) and author of Marx's Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism (Haymarket Books, 2013) and Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades (Pluto Press, 2015).