Leninism versus Stalinism: The debate in the Communist Party of the Philippines

By Sonny Melencio

Published 23 April, 2025

[Editor’s note: This article was originally published under the headline “Leninism versus Stalinism: Current debate in the Communist Party of the Philippines” in Issue 1 of LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, April-June 1994 (pp. 29-42). It is only now appearing for the first time online. LINKS is uploading this article. with the help of a reader, as it provides some important history and background to the Philippine left today. Filipino socialist activist Merck Maguddayao, from the Partido Lakas ng Masa, will be speaking at Ecosocialism 2025, September 5-7, Naarm/Melbourne, Australia. For more information on the conference visit ecosocialism.org.au.]

Several units of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) declared independence from its national leadership over the last half of 1993. The Manila-Rizal Regional Committee (MRRC) declared autonomy from the CPP centre on July 10, 1993. A number of regional units and national bureaus of the CPP, including its provincial commission in the Visayas; the regional committees in Negros, Panay, Central Visayas, Central Mindanao, and Western Mindanao; the national peasant secretariat; and the national united front commission followed suit between September and December last year.

These opposition units have collectively denounced the CPP centre headed by Armando Liwanag, alleged pseudonym of Jose Maria Sison, as both “illegal” and “absolutist”. Previous to this, they rejected the Liwanag/Sison document Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the Errors.

Reaffirm claimed that the erroneous line of quick military victory and insurrectionism was the main cause of the party’s decline over the last decade. It called for a “rectification movement” to reaffirm so-called basic principles of the party which included: the class analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the theory of people’s war, the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, the repudiation of modern revisionism, among others.

Those opposing the Reaffirm document came to be called the “Rejectionists” and those who conform to the Liwanag prognosis of the party’s errors and shortcomings, the “Reaffirmists”.

This political disagreement within the party could have been settled through an ideological debate focusing on the merits and demerits of the Liwanag document. Instead, the national leadership pushed through with a punitive rectification movement that led to the expulsion of some opposition leaders and the dissolution of various opposition units within the CPP.

In order to maintain their ranks, the opposition units — from here on referred to collectively as the Opposition — tenaciously fought back by declaring independence from the CPP centre. They called for the convening of a unity congress (which would be the second ever held in 25 years of CPP existence) in order to prevent a total split and to resolve the party disputes within democratic processes. The leadership replied that they were not going “to deliver the congress to the dogs” and would only convene a congress after the rectification process has been concluded.

Central to the Opposition’s call for a unity congress is the need to elect a new CPP leadership. The Opposition have pointed to the illegal nature of the party leadership since 1973, that is, after the lapse of the five-year term of the elected leadership at the CPP’s founding congress in 1968. Since the party’s foundation, all changes in the leadership have been through cooption, that is, in total violation of the electoral mandate stipulated in the CPP constitution. The present leadership itself, headed by Liwanag/Sison, has just been reconstituted by a so-called 10th Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) held early last year. The Opposition calls this a “bogus” plenum since only eight regular members of the 30-odd CC members of the previous plenum participated in the assembly. This bogus plenum also adopted the Reaffirm document.

The Opposition describes the illegal and authoritarian character of the CPP leadership as “Stalinist”.1 The MRRC has referred to it as the “absolutist” and “ultra-centralist” system of leadership that has transformed the CPP into a monolithic party engaged in a fanatical defence of bankrupt views and strategy, and the cultism of a few leaders who dictate the party’s ideological and political line. The MRRC’s indictment of the central leadership’s “Stalinism” encompasses not just the authoritarian system of rule practiced by the CPP leadership but also its methodological distortion of the Marxist-Leninist character and spirit of the party. This article expresses some of the arguments of the Opposition, especially the MRRC, although the overall argument expresses the author’s personal point of view. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate in the Philippines. It seeks to open up areas of further study and debate on the question of organisational principles. In a future article, the author intends to take up the programmatic and strategic debates in the CPP.

A Leninist or a Stalinist party?

The debate on the CPP’s organisational principles has been described by the MRRC as a fundamental struggle between the Leninist concept of the party and the Stalinist distortions of it, as propagated and practiced by its national leadership. This explains why in its declaration paper, the MRRC calls itself the “Leninist Opposition” to the “Stalinist Centre” of the CPP.

The debate revolves around the theory and practice of democratic centralism. Officially, the CPP, through its constitution and by-laws, upholds the organisational principle of democratic centralism, which is defined as a “centralism based on democracy and democracy under centralised leadership”.

The CPP constitution states that the basic conditions for the functioning of democratic centralism within the organisation consist of the following:

• election of all leading organs at all levels;

• paying attention to the reports of the lower organs;

• regular and special reporting by the lower organs;

• principle of collective leadership at all levels; and

• after “free and thorough discussion”, implementation of party decisions shall be done through the following mode of subordination: the individual is subordinated to the organisation, the minority to the majority, the lower to the higher, and the entire membership to the Central Committee.

It has to be stated at once that these basic conditions do not represent the entirety of the Leninist conception of democratic centralism. The CPP constitution is a copy of the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution which is in turn a copy of the rules of the Stalinised Soviet Communist Party. The basic conditions omit the question of the rights of minorities within the party and do not provide for any mechanism that would allow an individual to present contrary views or to put up alternative proposals for the party’s deliberation. This has been replaced by a “collective rule” where the individual is restricted even more, operating within a highly compartmentalised organisation of the party.

All the stated basic conditions, except the one which provides for the election of the leading bodies of the party, refer more to the “centralist” aspect of the party rather than its democratic aspect. But even that democratic condition has been repeatedly violated all through the years of the party’s existence. There has never been an election within the CPP hierarchy since its founding congress in 1968. Hence, it is the height of hypocrisy for the Liwanag/Sison leadership to claim that it represents the party’s “collective wisdom” when it does not even enjoy the collective consent and confidence of the membership as shown through elections.

In reality, it is only the centralist aspect of democratic centralism that has been practiced by the CPP leadership. It mainly revolves around the absolute authority of the centre, which is in turn imposed through the rules of subordination of the individual, the minority, the lower organ, and the entire membership to the CPP leadership. These four rules of subordination have become matters of principles rather than guides to effective implementation of a decision which has gone through “free and thorough discussion” within the party.

This has been the case in the past, including the political debacle in 1986 when the executive committee decided against participating in the snap presidential election, thereby isolating the CPP and its mass organisations in the February uprising against the Marcos dictatorship. This has also been the case recently, when the Reaffirm document and the rectification movement were foisted on the party through a bogus plenum without the benefit of free and thorough-going discussion.

Passing off democratic centralism as mere adherence to the four rules of subordination is itself traceable to Stalin’s distorted definition of Leninism on the organisational question. In Foundations of Leninism, a catechism which has transformed Leninism into a set of absolute dogmas, Stalin reduced the Leninist principle of democratic centralism into an “unswerving application” of “the principle of the minority submitting to the majority” and “the principle of directing work from the centre”.

Stalin himself elevated the famous “four rules of subordination” as the organisational principle of a Leninist party. These rules actually refer to the norms of hierarchy that the party follows in order to ensure discipline, unity, solidity and security of the organisation in waging revolutionary struggle. But in elevating these rules to the level of principles, party discipline which should be a conscious one becomes blind obedience, and party unity which should be forged at a higher level of understanding becomes superficial.

The Liwanag/Sison faction within the CPP propagates and implements the same reductionist line. In his latest pronouncement about the debate in the CPP, Critical and Creative Tasks of the Rectification Movement, Sison explains the meaning of democratic centralism in the way the CPP “rectification documents have been arrived at, how they are being implemented and how they are being further enriched”.

Sison surely knows that the appearance, implementation, and enrichment of the rectification documents, which contain the most draconian measures against those allegedly opposing the “basic principles” of the party, point to the handiwork of a centre which did not bother to conduct deliberations and consultation with the party membership. They are clearly impositions coming from above!

In the same speech, Sison had the gall to twist facts in his favor. He railed against those opposing the rectification documents for trying to replace democratic centralism with “democratic pluralism”. He charged that all those criticising the authoritarian rule of the CPP centre are operating “beyond the ambit of party discipline”, which for him simply means the obligation to blindly obey what the party centre decrees.

In the same vein, Sison boasted that “all lower party organs and organisations are encouraged to make further summings-up and criticism and self-criticism”, and that all cadres and members are “encouraged to participate in decision-making and to engage in criticism and self-criticism”. He hides the fact that according to the rectification documents, this can be possible only if the party member accepts hook, line and sinker the basic principles laid down in Reaffirm, that is, all that is allowed is summing-up within the framework of kowtowing to all these principles, and a criticism and self-criticism for sins of omissions and deviations to the basic line of Reaffirm.

The CPP leadership, under Sison, has been misrepresenting democratic centralism as a bureaucratic and ultra-centralist system of rule. The chief architect of democratic centralism himself — Lenin — had always stressed that democratic centralism runs counter to bureaucratic centralism, which is a centralism maintained not through the democratic process but through the absolute authority of a party centre, or the bureaucratic authority in general.

Fundamentals of Leninist democratic centralism

Democratic centralism evolved through the practice of the Bolshevik Party during the time of Lenin. From the Third Congress in 1905 to the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in 1906, Lenin had written extensively about the major organisational principles that should guide a revolutionary working-class party. This came to represent “democratic centralism,” which was adopted and put into practice by his party.

During the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921, Lenin called for the adoption of democratic centralism in the organisational principle of Communist parties around the world. The Comintern Theses stated that this should be a “real synthesis” or “fusion” of “centralism and proletarian democracy”. By this, it meant that the party’s centralisation “does not mean formal, mechanical centralisation, but the centralisation of Communist activity, that is, the creation of a leadership that is strong and effective and at the same time flexible.”

Hence, the fusion of centralism and proletarian democracy entails that the party “must develop and maintain an effective network of contacts and links both, on the one hand, within the party itself between the leading bodies and the rank and file of the membership and, on the other hand, between the party and the proletarian masses outside the part.”

This is why democratic centralism should be seen as the organisational principle serving the functioning of a proletarian revolutionary party. The fundamental aspect of this principle revolves around the need for concrete unity of action that positively strengthens the party’s work and its capacity to fight. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the party’s unity in words should always be transformed into unity in action.

The centralist spirit of this principle evolved in opposition to the “autonomism, nihilism and localism” of party organisations which existed during the initial formation of the RSDLP. This was also opposed to “ultrademocracy,” “circle spirit,” and “anarchism” in the organisation, which were prevalent at that time. Lenin’s centralism proceeds from the interests of party unity and, in that sense, upholds the principle of hierarchy in the organisation.

At the same time, Lenin stressed that the party’s centralism, which requires utmost discipline and a higher level of unity of action, should be one that is democratic: a centralism that is based on and affirmed through the dynamic processes of democracy within the organisation. As to what this democratic centralism entails, Lenin said during the Unity Congress of the RSDLP in 1906:

We were all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on guarantee for the rights of all minorities and for all loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every party organisation, on recognising that all party functionaries must be elected, accountable to the party and subject to recall. (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 314.)

Lenin sees the observance in practice of these principles of organisation “as a guarantee against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the party can and must prove fully consistent with strict organisational unity, with the submission of all to the decisions of the Unity Congress.”

These organisational principles comprising democratic centralism were concretised in the RSDLP rules, which enabled the party to function “centrally” and yet “democratically”. Lenin’s writings all throughout this period provide us with the following major organisational principles that came to comprise the fundamentals of Leninist democratic centralism. It is elaborated at length here to contrast with Liwanag/ Sison’s distortion of democratic centralism.

1. Principle of election, accountability and recall of the elected leadership of the party

Lenin stressed the democratic functioning of the party where “all party members take part in the election of officials ... discuss and decide questions concerning the political campaigns of the proletariat, and ... determine the line of tactics of the party organisations”. He advocated not only the principle of election but the principle of accountability and recall of the leadership where “all officials, all leading bodies, and all institutions of the party are subject to election, are responsible to their constituents, and are subject to recall”.

Even in the condition of autocracy during his time, Lenin consistently battled for congress election:

Although the full assertion of the elective principle ... is unfeasible under the autocracy, nevertheless, even under the autocracy, this principle could be applied to a much larger extent than it is today. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 8, p. 409.)

Contrast this now with the CPP’s repeated violation of the electoral principle and the electoral mandate as stipulated in its very own rules. The leadership justifies this by harping on the “emergency situation” (for 20 years!) and the lack of summing-up reports (now the problem is passed on to the lower units!). These excuses fly in the face of a recent pronouncement by the CPP centre that it intends to call a congress only after the conclusion of the “rectification movement”. Meaning that they can call a congress anytime, except that they want not a genuine congress but a rubber-stamp one!

2. Right to exist and freedom of expression of party minorities

Contrary to Sison’s tirade against factions, caucuses and platforms within the party, Leninist democratic centralism upholds the right of minorities to exist and to express themselves within the party. This includes the right to present minority views to the entire membership of the party, and the right to defend and maintain these views as long as these “do not lead to disorganisation... split our forces, or hinder the concerted struggle against the autocracy and the capitalists.”

Reflecting on the imminent split within the RSDLP (after its Second Congress in 1903) due to the maneuverings of the Menshevik “centre”, Lenin said:

... the entire experience of the post-Congress struggle compels us to give thought to the juridical position of the minority (any minority) in our party. That experience shows ... that it is necessary to include in the party rules guarantees of minority rights, so that the dissatisfactions, irritations and conflicts that will constantly and unavoidably arise may be diverted from the accustomed philistine channels of rows and squabbling into the still unaccustomed channels of a constitutional and dignified struggle for one’s convictions ... (Lenin, CW, Vol. 7, p. 452.)

Contrast this now to the CPP leadership’s punitive measures against the “factionalist” Opposition which, at this stage, has led to the expulsion from the CPP of some of its cadres, the dissolution of entire opposition organs, and the trial under a so-called people’s court of five opposition leaders.

Recently, the CPP centre has been misrepresenting the Opposition’s demand for the convening of a unity congress by playing a non-existent demand for “federalism” or the principle of “equal status for all trends” within the party. It has cited the RSDLP’s total split between a Bolshevik Party and a Menshevik one in 1912 where Lenin ruled out “federalism” within the organisation. The CPP centre could have argued too that Lenin had banned factions in a resolution adopted by the 10th Congress of Communist Party of Russia in 1921.

In the first instance (the 1912 split), Lenin said that although “the principle of federation” shall be rejected, and that the only principle to be recognised shall be the submission of the minority to the majority, he clarified that the right of the minority shall remain, although it shall be subject to certain restriction. “Certain restriction” here means that the opposition can only publish their views in a discussion journal intended for this purpose, and not in any “rival newspaper.” Nowhere did Lenin advocate the complete rejection of opposite trends within the party (for him, the point was to wage a “constitutional and dignified” struggle around these trends).

In the second instance, the 1921 ban on factions was a result of a congress decision deliberated by several trends and factions themselves. It was also an “emergency and temporary measure” designed to secure the solidity of the party in the face of an on-going civil war in Russia. In fact, when one delegate proposed that the resolution be turned into a permanent ban on factions, Lenin criticised it as both “excessive” and “impracticable”. He argued that if there were “fundamental disagreements” during the next congress, “the elections may have to be based [too] on platforms”.

The entire dynamics of the Bolshevik Party, its never-ending polemics and ideological struggles between different trends and platforms that are continually being formed within the party — even after the 10th RCP Congress — belie the allegation that Lenin wanted a total ban on factions. It was Stalin who stamped out the dynamism of the party, and outlawed factions as an unchallengeable rule of “Leninist” party organisation, in order to build a thoroughly bureaucratic apparat that several Communist parties now blindly copy.

The existence of factions has clearly become a dirty word in Stalinist parties, but the Leninist conception of it is an extension of, or even synonymous with, the right of the minority. The right of the minority to exist and defend its own ideas allows the formation of factions, though they are also subject to certain restrictions. Factions here are not permanent groupings with their own organisational discipline competing against a duly constituted party centre (the meaning of “factionalism”). They are temporary minority groupings, sometimes in the form of caucuses and platforms drawn together by shared convictions. In Lenin’s time, these groupings held open meetings, published their ideas, and put them to a vote in party congresses and meetings.

3. Principle of broad autonomy for organisations that comprise the party, including local (and regional) party committees

Autonomy of party units is affirmed under the spirit of democratic centralism. The RSDLP rules stated that “all party organisations are autonomous with respect to their internal activities”. The basic assumption is that the whole organisation is built “from below upwards” on an elective basis. Hence, Lenin clarified this to mean that:

... The party rules declare that the local organisations are independent (autonomous) in their local activities. According to the rules, the Central Committee coordinates and directs all the work of the party. Hence it is clear that it has no right to interfere in determining the composition of local organisations. Since the organisation is built from below upwards, interference in its composition from above would be a flagrant breach of democracy and of the party rules. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 11, p. 441–442.)

Autonomy here exists in two spheres: in the local activity and in the composition of the local organisation. The CC could not intervene in local activities that are consistent with the basic decisions of the party congress. In the second sphere, the autonomy of local organisations takes the form of party conferences which elect their own local committees. As in the party congress, the party conferences group together elected delegates of the entire local organisation. Through local party elections, each member is assured the right to send their chosen delegate to the congress or conference.

In the system adopted by the RSDLP, local conferences were convened twice a month, with the election of their local committees every six months. The central organ did not have the right to meddle in the composition of the local organisation (by appointing the members of the committee for example), nor the authority to unilaterally dissolve an elected body.

Contrast this now to the CPP Executive Committee’s dissolution of entire regional organs without even the benefit of prior consultation with them! The CPP centre may argue that these organs were never elected by a conference in the first place. But this is blaming the car for a crash, instead of the driver. The entire party central leadership was never elected and therefore has no mandate to rule the organisation. The whole thing actually boils down to the absence of any democratic system of election within the organisation.

4. Universal and full freedom to criticise and debate

This has been one of the hallmarks of a Leninist party. For Lenin, the principle of democratic centralism implies “universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action”. He said that it is the duty of every party member “to ensure that the ideological struggle within the party on questions of theory and tactics is conducted as openly, widely and freely as possible”, although on no account must it “disturb or hamper the unity of revolutionary action of the Social-Democratic proletariat.”

For Lenin, the freedom to criticise decisions of a party congress could be done not just at party meetings but at public meetings as well, and this freedom even includes agitation in public meetings:

Criticism within the limits of the principles of the party Program must be quite free ... not only at party meetings, but also at public meetings. Such criticism, or such “agitation” (for criticism is inseparable from agitation) cannot be prohibited. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 442-443.)

He added:

If we have really and seriously decided to introduce democratic centralism in our party, and if we have resolved to draw the masses of the workers into intelligent discussion of party questions, we must have these questions discussed in the press, at meetings, in circles and at group meetings. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 380.)

In 1921, however, Lenin reconsidered the criticism of party decisions “in public”. The theses adopted by the Comintern’s Third Congress cautioned that when appearing in public, all party members should act at all times “as disciplined members of a militant organisation”:

If there are disagreements on the correct method of action on this or that question, these should, as far as possible, be settled in the party organisation before any public activity is embarked upon and the members should then act in accordance with the decision made. (Comintern Theses, p.257.)

While Lenin’s writings in 1906 may have stretched too far the freedom of criticising party decisions by allowing public debates, these should be put in the context of the Menshevik centre’s continued refusal around that time to undertake an ideological struggle over party disputes within the organisation. Lenin’s “reconsideration” in 1921 does not at all restrict the freedom to criticise and debate within the party organisation. The Comintern Theses even argued that “in order that every party decision is carried out fully by all party organisations and party members, the largest possible number of party members should be involved in discussing and deciding every issue”. Criticising party decisions in public may well have been the “last resort” to a failed functioning of democratic centralism in the party.

This leads us now to Sison’s denunciation of the Opposition’s demand for criticism and debate as “ultrademocratic” or “the freedom to do whatever they please without going through the proper channels.” “Proper channel” here means “one’s own collective” and not the rudiments of a constitutional and dignified process that resolves party disputes through the mandate of the entire membership in a congress. By rejecting a congress, the Sison/Liwanag leadership has actually lorded it over the party and has practically compartmentalised freedom of criticism and debate within the bounds of “coopted” collectives. The entire process becomes an exercise of bureaucratism, with the criticism bound to get lost in the maze of the CPP’s compartmentalised system.

5. Principle of unity of action

What could then be the limit to the widest and freest exercise of criticism and debate within the party? Lenin answered categorically that only those which hamper the party’s unity towards concrete political action constitute the limits to it. He said, “The party’s political action must be united. No ‘calls’ that violate the unity of definite actions can be tolerated either at public meetings, or at party meetings, or in the party press.”

Lenin gave two examples of definite actions which may not be violated by calls for contrary action. One was the call for participation sounded out by the RSDLP in the Duma election in 1906. Lenin said that every member is free to criticise the call “even in public” before the period of the election campaign. But during the period of the campaign, when everything has been deliberated on, criticism or call of another nature shall not be allowed as it will run counter to the agreed-upon action.

Another example is the call for an uprising or an insurrection. Lenin said: “Here unity of action in the midst of the struggle is absolutely essential. In the heat of battle, when the proletarian army is straining every nerve, no criticism whatsoever can be permitted in its ranks. But before the call for action is issued, there should be the broadest and freest discussion and appraisal of the resolution, of its arguments and its various propositions.”

Sison and the CPP leadership misrepresent this to mean that the party centre wields absolute power at all times. They harp on the so-called life-and-death situation of the party (if not on its perpetual state of war) to justify the absence of criticism and debate within the organisation. They spread the malicious lie that the Opposition wants to turn the party into a “debating type of organisation” or a “marketplace of ideas” that completely paralyse unity of action. They confuse ideological struggle, and decisiveness and firmness to the proletarian line, with authoritarian rule that brooks no opposition.

But unity of action does not run counter to the need for criticism and debate within the organisation. On the contrary, Lenin always argued that the widest and freest climate for criticism and debate even on questions of theory and tactics of the party are essential to attain the clearest unity of action. While no attempt to paralyse the political unity and action of the party is admissible at all times, the broadest and freest discussion within the organisation should be upheld at all cost.

Finally, it should be pointed out that it is precisely the bureaucratic functioning of the CPP — with its illegal centre and ultra-centralist rule — that gets in the way of the party’s united action. It is the irony of bureaucratic organisations that much as it aims for centralism, discipline and united action, it breeds discontent, hypocrisy, and unprincipled unity within the organisation.

Discontent has manifested itself in the CPP in a number of “samizdat” writings deluging the party since the last half of the 1980s when the members started to question the “wisdom” of the centre given the political blunders of the organisation. Due to the absence of a democratically centralised structure, criticism of party policies could only be outside “official channels”; hence, the perceived situation likened to a “marketplace of ideas” within the party.

Hypocrisy manifests itself in the CPP’s denunciation only today of the Kampanyang Ahos, where as many as a hundred party members were ordered killed in the party’s campaign to flush out deep penetration agents, when any penetration could have been exposed a long time ago had the CPP leadership been open enough to discuss it with the membership. It also manifests itself in a number of regional units of the CPP having not discussed the Reaffirm documents nor carried out its major decisions, like the dismantling of NPA’s [New People’s Army] company units into squads and platoons.

Unprincipled unity manifests itself in the argument of some party cadres and units that although they have criticisms too against the Reaffirm document and they believe that the CPP centre has been violating the organisational principles of the party, they must uphold the “unity” of the party at all costs.

The question posed is not whether the party needs more democracy than centralism. The question is whether it needs a bureaucratically centralist organisation or a democratically centralist one. This is the gist of the CPP’s debate between a Stalinist party and a Leninist one.

Sonny Melencio was the vice-president of Makabayan, a mass socialist organisation in the Philippines, when this article was first published. Today he is chairperson of the Partido Lakas ng Masa (Party of the Labouring Masses, PLM).

References

Lenin Collected Works (1972 edition), Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (1983), Pluto Press, London, second edition.

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  The Liwanag/Sison leadership of the CPP expressly supports Joseph Stalin. Stalin, says Liwanag/Sison, had a historical record of 70 per cent “greatness” and 30 per cent “excesses” and the collapse of the Soviet Union was the result of “revisionism” introduced after Stalin’s death.

Communist Party of the Philippines: Background to the 1993 Split

By Max Lane

Published 23 April, 2025

[Editor’s note: This article was originally published under the headline “Communist Party of the Philippines: Background to the 1993 Split” in Issue 1 of LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, April-June 1994 (pp. 43-56). It is only now appearing for the first time online. LINKS is uploading this article. with the help of a reader, as it provides some important history and background to the Philippine left today. Filipino socialist activist Merck Maguddayao, from the Partido Lakas ng Masa, will be speaking at Ecosocialism 2025, September 5-7, Naarm/Melbourne, Australia. For more information on the conference visit ecosocialism.org.au.]

After 25 years of struggle and growth, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has entered a period of major internal upheaval. So great is this upheaval that it seems likely to lead to the formation of one or more new left parties. In July 1993 the Manila branch of the CPP, known as the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee (MRRC), declared its autonomy from the central leadership. In the months following, several other regional committees and party units also declared their autonomy. According to these opposition groups, they represent just under half of the CPP’s national membership and the majority of its working class and urban poor membership. To date none of these committees or units have fully broken from the CPP and most still call for a “unity congress” to resolve the differences and elect a democratic leadership.

However, the formal standing of most of these committees and units has been revoked by the central leadership of the CPP. Further, in a series of press releases and public statements, the central leadership of the CPP has denounced the leaders of the party units which have declared autonomy as “traitors,” “psychological war agents of the US-Ramos dictatorship” and “gangsters”. Their identities have been exposed and they have been tried in abstentia by secret “people’s courts” organised by the central leadership. There have even been threats to use armed units against the opposition. The Philippines military has moved to exploit these threats, assassinating one well-known oppositionist and arresting the main leader of the CPP’s Visayas territorial commission, which had declared autonomy.

While a struggle still continues throughout the country as each grouping works to consolidate its support among rank and file cadre, in Manila, the forces of the MRRC have been able to support a number of new initiatives by their sympathisers who organise and mobilise on the legal level, (the CPP operates as an underground organisation). A new left trade union political centre (BMP), a new legal socialist propaganda organisation (Makabayan), several new youth and student organisations and a new federation of mass organisations (SANLAKAS) have been formed.

These new legal organisations were able to organise a number of street mobilisations in Manila, involving between 35,000–70,000 people. On November 30, 1993 (Bonifacio Day — commemorating national hero Andres Bonifacio) they contributed 70,000 people to a joint left mobilisation of over 100,000 people. These Manila-based forces also played an important role in the formation of a wage increase campaign coalition (LAWIN 35), which involved left unions as well as more moderate and even conservative trade unions. They played a similar role in January-February 1994 in the establishment of a broad coalition to campaign against oil price rises, involving left forces, social democrats as well as sections of the capitalist class.

The ability of the MRRC and its sympathising forces to launch these initiatives and organise these mobilisations has confirmed its position as the CPP force with the strongest on the ground mass support. Since the split, mobilisations by forces still loyal to the existing central leadership of the CPP have been relatively small. The battle of words continues between MRRC and the central leadership to influence rank and file cadre. However the MRRC leadership’s support seems at the moment to be quite solid.

The foundations of the split

The view of the MRRC and its supporters is that the struggle between the MRRC and the central CPP leadership is essentially a Leninist versus Stalinist struggle. The issues of the nature of democratic centralism, absolutist deviations, and militarist thinking are very central to the case put forward by the MRRC leadership. Also important are the rejection of the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare, which envisages both the political and military struggle, that is, the progress of the revolution, unfolding in stages reflecting a change in the balance of military forces and the gradual surrounding of the cities by the guerrilla army in the countryside.

It is worth examining some of the recent history of the Filipino left in order to put the current stage of this struggle into context and to help us understand where it might lead. At this point in time (March 1994) the ultimate outcome of these developments is still not clear. Will there be a new party? Will there be more than one new party? Will there be a unity congress? What would be the political basis of any new party(ies)? What left united fronts may be possible? Will this lead to a sustained resurgence of the revolutionary left in the Philippines?

The CPP was founded in 1968 by leaders of the youth of the old Communist Party (PKP), which had declined in its authority and status following a series of military and political defeats. The break was led by Jose Maria Sison, a student leader in the PKP, and the new party was founded on the programmatic basis of a series of documents espousing orthodox Maoist strategy and tactics and Maoist philosophy. It grew slowly but steadily during its early years but then leapt in size in 1970 when student rebellion broke out in Manila in response to the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Marcos government and the Philippines support for American intervention against the Vietnamese revolution.

By the time Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, the CPP was a well-organised party, operating underground, with branches in most provinces. It was also further strengthened by its establishment of a network of guerilla bases and units, the New People’s Army (NPA). As the level of repression under the Marcos dictatorship (1972- 86) worsened, the CPP forces developed as the backbone of the popular resistance to Marcos.

There was a major political dispute within the CPP in 1978 when the Manila branch of the party, under the leadership of Filemon Lagman, insisted on participating in congressional elections through an alliance with the anti-Marcos section of the big bourgeoisie, led by Senator Benigno Aquino. The central leadership at the time opposed participation in the elections. The Manila leadership was later disciplined and reassigned to the countryside. This dispute did not disrupt the general operations of the CPP.

1983 events

While the CPP had always provided the backbone and the organised forces for protest activity against Marcos, many other sections of Filipino society were also hostile to the dictator. The CPP’s main base was among sections of the peasantry desperate for land and aid, workers at the mercy of foreign and local corporations taking advantage of the high levels of repression to keep wages and conditions from improving, and students moved by the plight of the masses.

But Marcos’ corruption and nepotism had also alienated big sections of the so-called “middle forces”, comprising professionals, small and middle business people and the large numbers of well-educated white collar workers employed in foreign and local banks and corporations. Furthermore, Marcos had also waged a campaign against the country’s established big bourgeoisie, even imprisoning some big bourgeois. Some had also had their corporations taken from them. At the same time, Marcos used his power to facilitate the business expansion of his cronies. The twin phenomenon of corruption and “crony capitalism,” as it became called, alienated sections of the big bourgeoisie as well.

Until 1983, the various streams of opposition against the dictatorship remained more separate from each other than united. This was a major weakness of the anti-dictatorship movement. While it was true that the CPP’s forces were the best organised among the masses, it was also true that the political leaders of the big bourgeoisie, such as Senator Aquino, also wielded enormous authority among the masses. Several decades of operation of a more-or-less liberal political party system, a congress, and a media system financed by the big bourgeoisie and backed by the very influential Catholic church meant that the political leaderships of the established bourgeois parties continued to be able to influence mass opinion. The separation of the CPP’s mass following and the bourgeois leaders’ mass following always worked in Marcos’ favour.

This situation dramatically changed in 1983 when Senator Aquino returned from exile in the United States only to be assassinated at Manila airport. This assassination sparked off mass demonstrations peaking in the early stages with two million people attending Senator Aquino’s funeral. The assassination and the mass protests that followed brought into being a range of new organisations, which combined with the CPP forces (known as the national democrats or Natdems1) to form the basis of an anti-dictatorship movement that continued to surge forward during the coming three years. A number of formal alliances were formed with middle forces and bourgeois political groupings during those years, the first alliance being the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA).

The level of mass mobilisations after 1983 continued to increase greatly, drawing in not only peasants and factory and transport workers but also white collar workers. The Makati business district became famous for its demonstrations of office workers and middle management personnel. In Manila, as well as in other areas, especially Mindanao, the tactic of the welgang bayan (peoples’ strike) emerged. The welgang bayan, organised by the Natdem forces, would combine transport strikes, factory strikes and mass demonstrations. The rallies, welgang bayan, and mass congresses of opposition forces became known as the “parliament of the streets”.

As this “parliament of the streets” became more and more powerful, a new discussion emerged on the left. The essence of this debate revolved around the issue of whether or not the Marcos dictatorship could be overthrown through anything short of a full-blown revolution led by the CPP/NPA, that is, short of a situation where the NPA was ready to enter the city and the whole ruling class was in disarray. A symptom of this difference among the anti-dictatorship movement was the use by the CPP/Natdem forces and the rest of the anti-dictatorship movement of different anti-Marcos slogans. The CPP/Natdems’ main slogan was “Dismantle the US-Marcos Dictatorship!”. The rest of the anti-Marcos dictatorship force’s rallying cry was “Marcos resign!”

This difference did, of course, reflect the fact that the non-Natdem forces included some elements that were supportive of a continuing US role in the Philippines. However, underlying this difference was the assessment of the non-Natdem forces that it was indeed possible for the “parliament of the streets” to dislodge Marcos by simply making it impossible for him to govern. The escalation of the “parliament of the streets”, more mobilisations, etc, was to be the key strategy. The CPP viewed the Marcos dictatorship as an integral part of US imperialism’s hold over the Philippines. The CPP, therefore, entered into the last stages of the battle with Marcos handicapped by the conviction that he could not be dislodged. Only the defeat of US imperialism would enable that, went the argument, and the NPA’s armed struggle was not yet at that stage, that is, at the stage of the “strategic offensive” (the strategic offensive is characterised by the revolutionary forces’ ability to initiate major military offensives against the opposing army).

A fundamental assumption behind the CPP’s approach was that urban mass mobilisations can only be secondary means of political offensives, incapable of inflicting any serious defeats on a reactionary government, except in the propaganda field. Urban mass mobilisation only becomes a force capable of delivering real blows against the enemy during the last stages of the “strategic offensive” of the rural based NPA.

Boycott campaign

By the end of 1985, the Philippines was approaching crisis point. It was becoming more and more impossible for Marcos to govern. The Armed Forces were also becoming factionalised as concern spread about the extent of the breakdown of order and as Marcos himself moved to increase the control of his cronies within the Armed Forces. Finally, Marcos succumbed to pressure, including from the United States, to hold early elections. The majority of the opposition immediately seized on this opportunity to announce a campaign against Marcos. Cory Aquino, the wife of assassinated Benigno Aquino was to be the anti-dictatorship movement’s presidential candidate. Given the general level of political mobilisation, and the political weight and activism of the “parliament of the streets”, the elections meant that the “parliament of the streets” would now face Marcos directly in the electoral arena.

The Natdem forces, however, decided to abstain from this confrontation between the parliament of the streets and the dictatorship. Indeed, they decided to launch a campaign actively calling on people to boycott participation in this confrontation in the electoral arena.

The parliament of the streets campaign against Marcos, under the banner of Aquino’s candidacy and the call for an end to dictatorship and a return to democracy, ultimately culminated in over two million people occupying key main streets of Manila in defiance of Marcos’ own declaration of victory after massive cheating in the vote counting. The militancy of the voters in their active defence of ballot boxes, walkouts by computer operators in the vote counting centre and continuing demonstrations made it abundantly clear that Marcos could continue to rule only at the price of continuing chaos. At this point sections of the military leadership broke with Marcos. Over two million of the Filipino masses stood between these military and those sent by Marcos to crush them.

The boycott campaign of the Natdem forces collapsed, resulting in the serious marginalisation of precisely those forces that had previously been the organisational backbone of the anti-dictatorship movement. Indeed, until the boycott decision the Natdem forces were an extremely important part of the vanguard of the anti-dictatorship movement.

There was, in fact, considerable debate inside the Natdem forces about the decision to boycott the 1986 elections. A part of their reasoning was that Aquino’s electoral platform fell far short of what was needed to start to solve the country’s problems. But the underlying reason was that the CPP and Natdems were sure that the elections could not possibly lead to the ouster of Marcos. They argued that the elections would not be free and fair — which was true — and the US would still back Marcos, which turned out to be true only up until a certain point. Their view was that a “truly fair, free and clean election” would allow the ouster of Marcos but that these elections would be none of these. In other words, they saw the elections only as a voting exercise and not a chance for the “parliament of the streets” to further exercise its power to undermine the Marcos regime. Because the elections would not be fair, the voting exercise was useless and the elections would only be a “noisy and empty political battle.”

Indeed the main legal Natdem organisation, BAYAN, summarised its views on the likely outcome of the elections as:

There is no sense believing, therefore, that the snap election shall lead to the ouster of Marcos from power. In truth it shall only fortify the US-backed Marcos dictatorship.

Marcos, however, was unable to respond effectively to the last wave of mass mobilisations, and with US help, had to flee from the Philippines to Hawaii.

It is interesting to note that the only factors considered in the argumentation against participating in the struggle in the electoral arena were the conditions under which the vote would operate and the attitude of the US. There was no consideration of the impact of participating in the electoral struggle on the advancing of the organisation, activism or militancy of the masses themselves or of the strength of the mass movement itself. This position is also another reflection of the assumption of the general impotence of mass struggle before the achievement of the “strategic offensive”.

The CPP after the boycott

The CPP went from being a key player in the leadership of the anti-dictatorship movement, to a force alienated from the broad range of anti-dictatorship forces and their mass followings. At the same time, the CPP was able to maintain the cohesion of the majority of its own forces. Its misreading of the situation — after all it had predicted that the elections would “fortify” the dictatorship — and its alienation from so much of the mass base of the anti-dictatorship movement provoked an intense debate within the CPP about the boycott decision. In May 1986 in the CPP Bulletin Ang Bayan, the Central Committee of the CPP issued a statement entitled Party Conducts Assessment, Says Boycott Was Wrong.2

It is worth quoting key sections of this statement:

[The boycott decision] failed to grasp the essence of the whole situation that was in flux at the time...

Specifically, the assessment:

1. Did not correctly understand the character and operation of US policy towards the Marcos regime... It failed to appreciate the possible effects on US policy of local developments over which the US did not have full control.

2. Underestimated the bourgeois reformists’ capabilities and determination to engage the Marcos regime in a decisive contest for state power.

3. Ignored the fact that the Marcos clique had become extremely isolated ... It failed to look more deeply into the contradictions developing within the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

4. Above all these, [it] misread the people’s deep anti-fascist sentiment and readiness to go beyond the confines of the electoral process in their determination to end the fascist dictatorship.

In hindsight, the CPP now made the assessment that:

The snap election became the main channel of large-scale mobilisation and deployment of the masses for the decisive battle to overthrow the dictatorship.

The party now recognised that:

The anti-fascist struggle united the various levels of revolutionary, democratic and anti-Marcos sentiments during and after the election, and created a mass force capable of toppling the regime.

At one level the party’s critique of its previous assessment was very comprehensive. In essence it stated that it incorrectly analysed the position of the US, the position of the bourgeois opposition, the position of the Armed Forces, the position of the Marcos regime and the position of the Filipino masses — in fact, the position, situation and capabilities of every single important political force involved in Filipino politics.

What the self-criticism did not do, however, was analyse the reasons that these mistakes were made. How, for example, did a party with obviously very close contact with the masses, the largest organised mass political formation, the organised backbone of the mass movement, “misread the people’s deep anti-fascist sentiment and readiness”.

A further insight into a possible explanation of the reasons for this misanalysis can, perhaps, be gained by looking at the general attitude taken by the CPP towards the new situation under President Aquino. Among the CPP and Natdem forces a view slowly emerged that the levels of repression under Aquino were worse than under the Marcos regime. Justification for this view included reference to the series of assassinations of Natdem leaders, culminating in the murder of Lean Alejandro, the secretary-general of BAYAN, in 1987. At the same time, statistics kept by human rights organisations indicated that the murder of grass-roots activists also increased. There were no arrests or detentions of anybody responsible for these killings and neither was there any progress made in bringing violators of human rights under Marcos to trial. No torturers or assassins from the Marcos period were ever charged, with the exception of those accused of the Aquino assassination.

After peace talks failed between the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Aquino government, Aquino delivered a speech declaring “Total War” against the NPA. Military offensives against the NPA and the rural populations supporting them increased. Aquino also declared for a harsher policy against industrial unrest.

By 1987, the Natdem forces were using the formula of the “US- Aquino regime”, mirroring the old term of the US-Marcos dictatorship. Although falling short of calling Aquino a dictator, the general impression being given by the Natdem forces was that the situation was as bad or worse than it was under Marcos. When the ultra-rightist forces in the military, led by anti-Communist Colonel Honasan launched a coup, BAYAN issued a statement virtually declaring that it would make no difference whether Honasan and his proposed junta would rule or Aquino ruled.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Aquino government was a government of big capital. However, this government did withdraw many of the formal restrictions on political activity that existed under Marcos. The writ of habeas corpus was reintroduced, large numbers of political prisoners were released (including key CPP leaders), restrictions on the media virtually disappeared. Moreover, the ruling class showed itself to be divided. There were several failed coup attempts by different factions of the ruling class against Aquino. The political party system kept realigning itself as the factions fought in the congress and in the electoral arena. Meanwhile, there appeared to be no solutions in sight for the massive economic and social problems facing the country and generating more misery and suffering for the mass of the people.

In many ways, in fact, the new objective conditions favoured the revolutionary movement: relative political freedom, fractured ruling class unable to provide any real solutions to a rapidly worsening socioeconomic situation. Much of the harassment by the state and the assassinations by the ultra-right during the 1980s were possible, not because of a coordinated and conscious policy of repression by the government, but because of the vulnerability of the Natdem forces due to their alienation from all their major allies on the left, the middle forces and the more liberal elements of the bourgeoisie. This alienation was one of the products of the boycott campaign of 1986.

There was one break in this isolation. This was in 1986 during a period of ceasefire negotiations between the NDF (under whose umbrella the NPA operates) and the government. As a part of the ceasefire arrangements, the NDF leadership was able to establish legal national and regional offices in a number of cities. From these offices, the NDF was able to conduct public campaigns through the media and on the streets. These campaigns were very successful and were paving the way for rebuilding a mass movement under Natdem leadership. However, following the assassination of the head of the KMU trade unions, the NDF withdrew from the negotiations.

The withdrawal, which was generally unpopular, resulted in the end of the major campaigns to build a mass movement. With a reversion to a position of relative political isolation, the Natdems were again more vulnerable to harassment and assassination than they would otherwise have been (even though an end to this isolation would not, of course, completely end assassination attempts). In the meantime, the NDF had exposed the identity of many of its underground activists.

It is probable that this withdrawal was premature. Not so much because the NDF needed more time to test out the extent to which the government was willing to make concessions but because the NDF needed more time to test out the extent to which the ceasefire opening would have enabled them.to rebuild and indeed expand the mass movement. The official reasons given by the NDF for the withdrawal were that the Aquino government was not serious in achieving a political solution. This was no doubt true, at least insofar as such a solution would mean advancing the interests of the Filipino workers and peasants. However the premature withdrawal again reflected the unwillingness of the CPP leadership to enter new arenas of struggle.

Strategy debate

An indirect reflection of some cadres’ concerns about the CPP’s rigid Maoist strategy surfaced in a number of circulated papers canvassing an “insurrectionist” oriented strategy for the revolution. Such papers discussed the examples of Nicaragua and Vietnam where, they argued, urban insurrection was the main form of revolutionary offensive. Later papers advocated the concept of “political-military” struggle, where military action by guerillas or urban partisans were aimed at helping efforts to escalate urban mass action. These papers circulated unofficially, although some were published in the theoretical journal of the CPP National Urban Commission.

The focus of the discussion was on mass action at the moment of revolutionary upsurge: would the victory of the revolution take the form of a guerilla army entering the cities or would it take the form of an urban uprising? The debate raised no concerns about existing party building strategies but concentrated the dispute on the form of the final revolutionary upsurge.

It would be wrong to give the impression that the left generally and the largest forces, the Natdems in particular, have been inactive or in total decline during the late 1980s and 1990s. The MRRC claims a cadre force of 5000 today and in other provinces the CPP count their cadre in the thousands. It would not have been possible to maintain such numbers of cadres if there had been a total collapse of the party. The Natdem forces had also been involved in major campaigns against the US air force and naval bases in the Philippines. They had held successful May Day mobilisations. They had carried out electoral interventions in support of more progressive candidates and so on.

Despite remaining a strong organisation, there were also many cadre who felt that the political impact of the Natdems was not as great as it could be given the socioeconomic crisis in the country, the splits in the ruling class, and the relatively open political situation. Even disappearances began to slow down in the late 1980s. In the 1992 elections the presidential candidate supported by the Natdems scored an extremely low vote. An attempt at a bugso (political upsurge) during the election period also met with only limited success.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s the government was able to capture several CPP leaders. Many of these were not integrated back into the party and began to operate as independent political actors, after their release. At the same time, some key single issue coalitions, such as the Congress for Peoples Agrarian Reform, had become inactive and levels of collaboration between Natdem forces and the smaller non-Natdem left forces had dropped off. There had also been temporary but significant setbacks in the military struggle in the countryside.

By the early 1990s, there was a general sense of frustration and a desire to find a way to revive the momentum of the revolutionary movement.

‘Reaffirm Our Basic Principles’

It was in this context that Armando Liwanag (Jose Maria Sison) prepared his paper Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors. His paper, adopted by a meeting of the CPP3, canvasses a number of policies and actions which he considers to have been in error or representing deviations. These include neglect of theoretical education (in particular as regards the writings of Mao Zedong), purging and execution of suspected cadre without due process, bureaucratism and “urban-basing” and a number of other issues. Sison’s central critique is, however, summed up in the opening pages of his document:

The worst deviations and errors arise from petty-bourgeois impetuosity and subjectivism characterised by flights from the concrete conditions and the current strength of the revolutionary forces. It combines wishful thinking for the armed urban insurrection with army “regularisation”. This takes away cadres and resources from mass work in order to build prematurely higher and unsustainable military formations (companies and battalions) and top-heavy staff structures... Now we are confronted with an unprecedented loss of mass base and other related problems.

Sison identifies two central errors: “wishful thinking for the armed urban insurrection” and for “army regularisation”, that is, the formation of companies and battalions, rather than platoon size units. He calls for a rectification whose main thrust would involve a reorientation of the party’s energies back to political organising in the countryside to be carried out by the cadre of the NPA through small armed propaganda units. The general views he presents on the ceasefire negotiations and elections do not canvass the possibility of using such opportunities for rebuilding the open mass movement.

Reaffirm, while pointing to a number of real problems, articulated criticisms of the party’s practice during the last ten years and proposed solutions which ran totally counter to the ideas that had emerged within sections of the party, especially since 1986, which questioned the rural based protracted peoples’ war strategy. Reaffirm was also adopted by the CC without any extensive discussion of contrary views among the membership and broad leadership of the party. Among significant sections of the party who were already questioning the Maoist strategy, the adoption of the Reaffirm document without such debate in the party led them to accuse Sison of “absolutist” leadership. Supporters of Sison’s line have been called “Reaffirmists” and those opposing it “Rejectionists”.

The adoption of Reaffirm in this manner ultimately provoked the series of declarations of autonomy by various regional committees and party units. In some cases these declarations of autonomy preceded a decision by the central leadership to disband the committees or units, in some cases they followed such decisions by the central leadership.

The fact that the actual split in the CPP has been in response to the manner of the adoption of Reaffirm has concentrated debate at this point of time on the issue of the nature of democratic centralism. The Leninism versus Stalinism polemics between the MRRC and Sison, for example, has tended to concentrate on this issue.

It should also be noted here that not all of the sections of the party that have declared their autonomy have polemicised against Sison in the Leninist versus Stalinist framework. In fact, most other sections of the party are tending to describe themselves as the “democratic opposition” rather than a “Leninist” opposition. Discussion among these groups on the organisational questions include a tendency of rethinking Leninist organisation principles. The outcome of the debates and discussions among these groups is not yet clear. What is clear is that these discussions are proceeding from a different starting point to that taken by the MRRC, which leads a highly disciplined and effective cadre force. While this is also true of the regional committees, it is not necessarily the case for other party units or individual leaders.

As of February 1994, however, the autonomous forces were still formulating their overall counter views to the Reaffirm document. It is already clear from various interviews and statements of MRRC leaders and supporters which issues are being discussed apart from the issue of the character of democratic centralism. These include:

• the nature of the mode of production in the Philippines — whether the Philippines is a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial society” as CPP doctrine asserts;

• the role of the struggle for reforms — whether the role of such struggles goes beyond propaganda aimed at recruiting members for the underground;

• the role of the armed struggle, in the city as well as the countryside; and

• the stages which the revolutionary struggle will have to pass through.

Max Lane is the author of Urban Mass Movements in the Philippines 1983–87 (Australian National University) and was a National Executive member of the Democratic Socialist Party in Australia at the time this article was published.

• 1

  The CPP formed several other underground organisations covering the different sectors, such as workers, peasants, women etc. These included CPP members as well as non-communist activists. These organisations were then united in the National Democratic Front (NDF). Legal organisations which adopted similar positions to the NDF 10 point program for the national democratic revolution are referred to as the national democrats or “Natdems”.

• 2

  See “Call for Boycott” by BAYAN in Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Shalom, The Philippines Reader, Quezon City, 1988, pp. 343–346.

• 3

  There is dispute as to whether this meeting of the CPP CC had a quorum or was sufficiently representative to adopt such a major document.