The Bolivarian Hypothesis
Latin America is a flashpoint for the major conflicts of the twenty-first century: the clash between Great Powers, the struggle over energy resources, the resurgence of reactionary nationalism and the popular resistance to it. The region has also become a testing ground for new forms of imperial intervention, as the Trump administration has radicalized its approach to the so-called western hemisphere, escalating its attacks on both Cuba and Venezuela. Yet Washington’s most dramatic act of aggression, kidnapping President Nicolás Maduro and rendering him to New York, has not led to regime change in Caracas. Three months later the country’s state apparatus remains in place, and one of its foremost cadres, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, has now taken the reins — negotiating sanctions relief and new commercial ties with the US from a highly asymmetrical position.
For an analysis of the Bolivarian revolution’s onward trajectory — the economic, financial, and military pressures to which the country has been subjected, and how domestic policymaking has tried to cope with them — Phenomenal World spoke to Roy Daza, a deputy for the ruling PSUV in Venezuela’s National Assembly. Daza is vice-chair of the National Assembly’s Foreign Policy Committee and chair of the Parliamentary Friendship Group with Brazil. He is also a member of the newly established Special Committee for Monitoring the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence — a reform which pardons those accused of political violence as a means of restoring social peace.
While there is much to criticize in Maduro’s record, and while the nature of the historical relationship between Chavismo and Madurismo remains fiercely contested, most international media coverage of the Venezuelan crisis has impeded our understanding of such issues by systematically excluding Bolivarians like Daza who are aligned with the current administration. Whether or not one agrees with their perspective, one cannot map the prospects for this besieged nation without giving it careful consideration.
Let’s begin by discussing the diplomatic strategy adopted following the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores. What are the main pillars of Venezuela’s foreign policy today? What objectives is it pursuing with allied countries and multilateral organizations?
Over two hundred years of republican history, Venezuela had never before been bombed, nor has it ever waged war against another country. Even its most serious conflicts have always been resolved by political means. Peace is a fundamental pillar of the humanist thought of Commander Hugo Chávez and President Nicolás Maduro. The implementation of what Acting President Delcy Rodríguez calls Bolivarian Peace Diplomacy is in this sense the expression of a much longer historical legacy. This policy, as outlined in Rodríguez’s address to the National Assembly on January 15, is based on the recognition of the fundamental clash between the Monroe Doctrine and the doctrine of Simón Bolívar. It defines three major objectives for the Republic at this stage: to demand the immediate release of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, to maintain peace and stability within the nation, and to continue the development of the government program known as the Plan of the Seven Transformations.
The Bolivarian government is using all its diplomatic capacity to get the truth out, despite the intensity and persistence of the media campaign that has been waged against Venezuela for years. There needs to be coordinated action by international institutions to put an end to the blockade; we Bolivarians want to see them comply with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Vienna Conventions. We also maintain that the majority of the world’s nations agree with us in condemning the armed assault and kidnapping of President Maduro. That said, we also know that the Venezuelan people must ultimately rely on their own strength. Hence the relevance of Maduro’s teaching: “In the face of adversity — calm and composure, nerves of steel, and intense popular mobilization.”
The background to the abominable events of January 3 — the kidnapping of the President and First Lady, the deaths of 106 heroes, and the wounding of more than 200, amid the bombing of the city of Caracas and the states of Miranda and La Guaira — is important here. Barack Obama’s decision in 2015 to declare Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the security of the United States served as the basis for adopting unilateral coercive measures whose express purpose, as made clear by US government spokespeople, was to suffocate the Venezuelan economy. This resulted in international financial transactions being blocked, which caused a dramatic drop in imports and affected the domestic market, the investment landscape, and the replenishment of capital for private and state-owned companies. In short, it led to a situation of profound economic paralysis, which was exacerbated by a sharp drop in oil prices.
On the political front, meanwhile, right-wing forces across the continent imposed a diplomatic siege in 2017 and fascist groups launched a campaign of street violence, resulting in more than a hundred deaths, dozens of injuries, and damage to infrastructure. All this was accompanied by an intense media campaign, driven by the domestic far right, which combined with the sanctions-induced economic crisis to cause mass outward migration — a phenomenon unprecedented in the country’s history. Finally, in 2019, during Donald Trump’s first administration, direct sanctions were placed on the state-owned company Petróleos de Venezuela, further deepening the economic hardship.
The far right called for foreign powers to intervene militarily in Venezuela, promoting mercenary operations and supporting invasion attempts, while pushing for the establishment of a spurious “interim government” in 2019. Yet this caused a split within the opposition, as one sector distanced itself from the fascist wing and came to agreements with the Bolivarian government. That made it possible to call for the 2020 legislative elections and reclaim the National Assembly, an institution that had previously been in the hands of extremists. During the pandemic, patriotic forces and the democratic opposition moved forward through dialogue, which ultimately contributed to a certain stabilization of the institutional situation and a gradual economic recovery.
The Plan of the Seven Transformations is the government’s program for the 2025-31 presidential term. Could you explain its main points?
The Plan of the Seven Transformations is the product of lengthy discussions within party and government structures, as well as a broad public consultation with different communities and social movements. This deliberative process is not a mere detail; it is a political formula without which one cannot understand what I would call Venezuela’s social cohesion — a concept that transcends mere political agreement. The government could only withstand ten years of economic, commercial, and financial blockade because the Bolivarian Revolution is a historical process that has created a certain degree of social and cultural consensus. It is not simply a conjunctural project but a continuous, long-term one.
The 7-T initiatives are based on a simple fact: the historical exhaustion of rentier capitalism — the moment when rent ceased to be the driving force of the economy and became a drain on it, an obstacle to development. Rentier capitalism is a model that relies on land rents, and in which imperialist forces seek not only control over hydrocarbon deposits but also dominance over “oil rents” more generally.
As I mentioned, by the time the pandemic reached Venezuela we were facing a fall in oil prices, a suspension of foreign debt payments, a drastic reduction in foreign exchange earnings that caused shortages, a campaign to provoke migration, and direct sanctions against PDVSA. By 2025, sound economic policy, plus the efforts of our workers in agriculture and industry, and the active participation of the national business community which stood by Venezuela, had produced a recovery with growth nearing 9 percent. The 7-T is designed to extend these gains.
The First Transformation, or 1/T, is aimed at deepening a new productive economic model for small, medium, and large-scale industry, as well as consolidating agricultural sovereignty. The 2/T focuses on public services, infrastructure, and building humane cities. The 3/T centers on citizen security — through the “peace quadrants” — and the defense of the nation.
The 4/T sets out a comprehensive social protection program linked to the system of social missions and the guarantee of free education and healthcare. The 5/T seeks political transformation, particularly the active participation of citizens in national, state, and municipal government plans through new management methods.
The 6/T focuses on the development of science and technology in articulation with Bolivarian humanist thought. This is one of the great challenges facing the people, on which we are making vigorous progress — training our attention on the climate crisis, the use of artificial intelligence, and the application of scientific knowledge in production, education, and health. And finally, the 7/T concerns our peace policy, Latin American and Caribbean integration, and humanity’s march toward a multipolar and multicentric world.
In the wake of the US military intervention, what kinds of alliances — both new and existing ones, such as CELAC and ALBA — are necessary to defend the sovereignty of Venezuela and other Latin American countries? What role can they play given the limitations of the UN system?
The political landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean has changed in recent years, and the current balance of power is unfavorable to the integration process. Yet we Bolivarians see this as a temporary situation. Latin American and Caribbean unity has solid economic and political foundations and represents a viable alternative for our peoples. In this regard, we hope that CELAC will play a significant role, as will ALBA, and we are convinced that the UNASUR flag will fly freely once again.
Integration is not a pipedream; it is grounded in a number of concrete factors. First, the global economy remains interdependent and globalized. Humanity’s major problems — climate breakdown, economic crises, migration, widening social inequalities — were not resolved during the unipolar era; on the contrary, they were aggravated. Issues related to international security can only be effectively addressed if different actors make shared commitments. Building a new global consensus is thus a task for all democratic forces. The choice is not between a new order and an old order, but between order and barbarism.
The world is changing at an unprecedented pace. Multipolarity is a complex and multifaceted process, and understanding the general trends that are giving rise to it — social, economic, cultural, political — requires a continuous and collective effort. Our analysis must be based on the philosophical principles of dialectics and historical materialism, without neglecting the noble craft of diplomacy. It’s essential to reach firm and lasting agreements through dialogue rather than allowing wars to determine relations between states, which is why we need to renew the United Nations Charter, a document that emerged from two world wars with the aim of eradicating armed conflicts and their causes.
What is the current internal situation in Venezuela? Can we speak of an anti-interventionist coalition, with some level of cooperation between the PSUV and sectors of the democratic opposition? The passage of the Amnesty Law seems to have been an important step toward stabilization, but what comes next?
In Venezuela, there is broad consensus on a key issue: we are now in a new political moment; it is time to overcome polarization. The fascist elements within the opposition — the sectors who only promote violence, which has no place in a democratic Republic — have been weakened and discredited. There is a far-reaching agreement between Chavismo and the democratic opposition. The implementation of the Amnesty Law has been a decisive step toward achieving the kind of democratic coexistence to which we all aspire, while the Presidential Commission for Peace and Coexistence is in full swing throughout the country. Added to this is the successful National Popular Consultation of March 8, which reflects the deepening of our participatory and citizen-led democracy and the creation of a political climate conducive to consensus.
Anyone who wishes to understand the Venezuelan political process must study its radical, communal democracy and grasp that the massive popular demonstrations — from January 4 to the present — are the foundation of the current political and social stability. The people mobilized in the streets are the social force that is driving democratic coexistence forward.
Could you elaborate on the country’s model of communal democracy? How does it differ from other models of indirect representation, and how does it relate to the branches of government? What role do popular referendums play in this framework, especially when it comes to decision-making at the community level and the management of public policies?
The collapse of the political system that governed Venezuela for forty years, known as the Punto Fijo Pact, had many causes. The most important, in my view, was the marginalization of the vast majority of the people. The two hegemonic parties, Acción Democrática and the Social Christian Party, ended up functioning as one: the political elite joined forces with the economic elite — a power bloc linked to the major media — and shoved most of the population to the sidelines. When the people rose up in the rebellion of February 1989, they revealed the fact that the Punto Fijo Pact was never fully democratic, despite its elections and certain political freedoms.
Then, when the economic crisis struck, something happened that was by no means alien to our national history: what Poulantzas called the “hard core” of the system broke apart. What exactly was the hard core? The Armed Forces. The rebellion of the young military officers on February 4, 1992, was a direct consequence of the popular uprising of 1989. The massacre of more than three thousand citizens from working-class neighborhoods shocked the entire society, including the patriotic military as well — and this movement produced a historic leader: Commander Hugo Chávez.
In other words, the Bolivarian Revolution was a profoundly democratic phenomenon, based on the fundamental principle that sovereignty resides in the people, who exercise it directly or indirectly through universal suffrage. The Revolution broke up the elite power structure and used the 1999 Constitution to define a new political system, which involved communes and the referendums as peculiar features of the Venezuelan process.
Here Chávez took up the foundational ideas of Simón Rodríguez, a socialist philosopher and teacher of Bolívar, who argued that we should not look to other parts of the world for models of new republics and instead strive for originality. He insisted time and again that to build republics, you have to educate the citizens: “either we invent or we fail.” His theses — which he calls “topoarchy” — include theoretical and practical education, with indigenous languages taught alongside Spanish; equal rights for women and men; and the cultivation of a community that works and educates itself as one.
Like any social phenomenon, community councils and communes are a complex and evolving process, with advances and setbacks. The idea gradually took hold despite strong opposition from the right, which — in contrast to the great national poet Aquiles Nazoa, who famously praised the “creative powers of the people” — has an elitist conception of politics in which the idea that popular forces hold political power is unacceptable.
As part of this process, communities, organized into various circuits, have the ability to propose projects, use elections to decide which ones are pursued and prioritized, and then oversee their autonomous implementation. Society can thus reclaim functions that it had previously delegated to the state. The resources for these projects are provided by a constitutional body, the Federal Council of Government, with the support of provincial and municipal governments. Each community circuit has a self-governance chamber, a needs assessment, and an action plan for each commune. This is a comprehensive approach that now also incorporates the election of justices of the peace throughout the country and the restructuring of community parliaments.
President Maduro later contributed to the process of building a new relationship between the state and society by proposing and implementing nationwide consultations, held simultaneously, with the participation of all citizens aged fifteen and older. In this way, universal suffrage was incorporated into the community process, and the consultation, which had been limited to the local level, was scaled up to the nation as a whole. This was a qualitative leap. Since April 2024, seven National Popular Consultations have been held; the last one took place on March 8 of this year and saw the highest turnout, which is no coincidence considering the circumstances.
Popular power is also decisively expressed in elections. In 26 years, 32 electoral processes — regional, municipal, and national — have been held. There is a democratic institutional framework both in the five branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial, electoral, and citizen) and in the 335 mayor’s offices and municipal councils, plus the 24 governor’s offices and legislative councils.
The fascist faction of the opposition, which has the backing of the international media, never recognizes the election results, except for when it won a majority in the National Assembly in 2015, or when it triumphs in mayoral or gubernatorial races. They reject the 1999 Constitution and state institutions because their central aim is to use force to overthrow the Bolivarian Government, destroy democracy, and establish a dictatorship. The democratic opposition, on the other hand, participates in elections, promotes cross-party agreements, and distances itself from the fascists. We Chavistas affirm, “Everything within the Constitution, nothing outside the Constitution.”
Let’s talk about the reform of the Hydrocarbons Law approved shortly after Delcy Rodríguez took office. This reform loosens restrictions on private-sector participation — including foreign capital — in oil exploitation in Venezuela, opening the sector to new investments and altering PDVSA’s traditional role. Its approval prompted the United States to suspend some economic sanctions and allow certain transactions in the energy sector. But key restrictions on PDVSA and the Venezuelan financial system remain in place, and so do control mechanisms over international payments.
What changes can we therefore expect in the Venezuelan economy? What room for maneuver does the country have to revive oil production and accelerate the recovery? And, from a broader perspective, how does Venezuela plan to transition from an oil-based rentier model to a more diversified one?
The reform of the Hydrocarbons Law is a reaffirmation of key elements of the 2002 Organic Law, adapting the legislation to the new market reality and the global balance of power. It is well known that the Bolivarian Revolution’s oil policy has long been aimed at achieving market stability. It is also well known that oil prices are an essentially political issue, and must be treated as such. Oil production currently exceeds one million barrels per day; the decline we saw in January has been overcome. The partial lifting of some coercive measures against the oil industry confirms what we have long maintained: that sanctions are the primary cause of Venezuela’s economic problems. The recent agreements with Shell, Chevron, ENI, and Repsol, as well as the understandings with Colombia regarding gas, demonstrate that Venezuela is — and will continue to be — an important player in the international energy market.
The current phase of the Venezuelan economy is the result of a convergence of internal and external factors. President Maduro moved forward with the formulation of a new economic policy on August 16, 2018, twelve days after the assassination attempt against him. His government laid the foundations for the recovery of the productive apparatus with the support of the working class and the participation of the national business community, particularly in the area of food production. For example, we now produce 29 of the 37 items in our essential food basket; we reduced nutritional vulnerability from 37.5 percent to just 3 percent by the end of 2023, and this year we will reach 2 percent.
Currently, Venezuela produces more than ninety percent of the food it consumes, a ratio inversely proportional to what existed before the shift in economic policy initiated in 2018. The participation of domestic private capital is fundamental, as is the fact that our working class, with its high level of education and political awareness, has been able to keep the productive engines spinning. Some analysts, who rely not on science but on speculation, fail to grasp how an economy is managed under adverse conditions or how a progressive income distribution policy is implemented. The problem with the Venezuelan economy at this time is not whether it is diversified or not, but the application of coercive measures that stifle its functioning.
What role did the new economic policy implemented in 2018 play in stabilizing the country during the pandemic? Despite the global economic shock and the tightening of the US economic blockade in 2019, Venezuela managed to reverse a prolonged decline in GDP — which reached -30 percent in 2020 — to return to positive territory in 2021, with growth of nearly 1 percent. To what extent did these policies contribute to that turning point and the start of the economic recovery process?
Economic growth is closely linked to the failure of the plan by the fascist right, which announced an “interim government” in 2019 and tried to foment a coup d’état. The far right thereby exposed itself as anti-national and corrupt, yet the economic damage it inflicted remains incalculable, as it promoted economic sanctions and appropriated resources that Venezuela holds abroad. In September 2019, an agreement was reached between Chavismo and the democratic opposition. Elections for the National Assembly were called in 2020; the democratic forces regained control of parliament, and the fascist right lost its institutional position.
Oil production also partially recovered with the participation of a US company during Joe Biden’s administration, and this provided resources to restore social programs. However, the most important factor is twofold: on the one hand, the working class in basic industries is unifying and rebuilding production in services and gas and oil extraction; on the other, the national business sector is coming into play, alongside domestic capital and some foreign companies operating across various sectors. Cooperation with allied countries is also becoming highly significant. In 2025, Venezuela closed the year with nearly 9 percent growth, and ECLAC’s predictions for 2026 are that we will continue to lead economic growth in Latin America.
Despite the partial suspension of some sanctions, the US has maintained explicit restrictions limiting Venezuela’s transactions with countries such as Russia and China. In this context, what is the status of bilateral agreements with these two powers? To what extent can they be sustained under these conditions?
Venezuela has a very clear stance regarding its relations with all countries. The sudden shifts in the international situation are at the center of our analysis. In this time of uncertainty, the country is advancing its ties with all governments with which it maintains diplomatic, commercial, and political relations, without engaging in zero-sum games. The Bolivarian government has reaffirmed its strategic alliance with the Russian Federation, as well as its “all-weather, all-purpose” relationship with the People’s Republic of China.
The fact that Trump and the US government negotiated directly with Rodríguez — and subsequently officially recognized her authority as head of state — reflects an acknowledgment of her role in leading the country in the absence of Maduro. But this recognition has occurred in complex political context and initially outside traditional diplomatic channels. What is your interpretation of this strange political situation?
First of all, it must be said that President Nicolás Maduro is the head of state of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and as such he has the immunity that belongs to all heads of state. The court trying him has no jurisdiction to do so and must release him immediately.
President Maduro and Cilia Flores were forcibly removed from their home through a military operation by the US Army in a country with which Venezuela is not at war. President Maduro is a prisoner of war and a decent man, a defender of his people and of the legacy of Commander Hugo Chávez. On March 6, 2026, the US government officially announced its recognition of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and diplomatic relations are in the process of being fully restored. It must be remembered that the severing of relations in 2019 was a unilateral decision by the U.S. government. At this time, both the U.S. Embassy in Caracas and the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington are open.
What are the next steps for the country then? Is Venezuela in a position to regain access to its assets deposited in the US, given the ongoing legal disputes and control mechanisms still in place?
Talks with President Trump’s administration are ongoing. The immediate demand of Acting President Rodríguez is the total and definitive lifting of economic sanctions. As long as these remain in place, foreign private investment slows down and transactions are interrupted. Venezuela’s assets — including, among others, the Citgo company — must be returned to our country; they are the property of the Republic.
Why does the US perceive the Bolivarian Revolution as such a significant threat?
At no point in history has Venezuela been a threat to the security of the United States or to any other country. A narrative has been spun about our nation which is false, absurd, and grotesque, with the aim of undermining the achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution. This is because the Venezuelan democratic process represents a challenge to other worn-out and plutocratic political systems. It is also because promoting integration and unity in Latin America and the Caribbean is, in our case, a real and concrete project. We don’t just talk about integration; we have put it into practice.
Beyond that, it is obvious that the 303 billion barrels of oil beneath our soil are the real reason for the attacks. Everyone knows that our immense natural resources give us enviable economic potential. Our message to other nations is to join forces to restore international law and the United Nations Charter. Overcoming events as grave as those of January 3 demands great moral fortitude. Chavismo is the main political force in Venezuela and the pillar of its democracy; yet the current situation requires the cooperation of all democratic forces on the continent.
How does the Bolivarian strategy need to be updated or reformulated in light of the so-called Donroe Doctrine?
The strategy of the Bolivarian Revolution is the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is a constitutional mandate and the most genuine expression of the thought of the liberator Bolívar. Our region possesses natural resources with great strategic importance for the world and also has extensive political experience in integration frameworks such as CARICOM, MERCOSUR, SICA, UNASUR, the Andean Community, ALBA, and CELAC. Its most fundamental asset, however, is peace, without which no project beneficial to humanity would be possible. The contrast with the strategy of the Monroe Doctrine could not be greater. While one promotes sovereignty and regional integration, the other aims to assert US influence and control in the hemisphere. The challenge now lies in the political capacity to manage this contradiction. The people of Venezuela have a historic project and a mandate bequeathed by Commander Hugo Chávez: Unity, Struggle, Battle, and Victory!
