THE GREATER EVIL WON

Some Thoughts on THE ELECTION

by Greg Godels / November 21st, 2024

In the wake of the election — THE ELECTION, in capital letters and with strong emphasis — I have read many insightful and thoughtful assessments of how we have arrived at the point where Donald Trump was re-elected. I highly recommend the recent scathing essay by my colleague at Marxism-Leninism Today, Chris Townsend, on the crying need for an alternative to the two-party charade and the bankruptcy of the Democratic Party as a representative for working people.

But for every good analysis, there are a dozen awful commentaries that ultimately blame the voters’ judgment or endorse their worst fears.

However, if pressed for a simple explanation of the election results, one might consider the following:

Once again, offered the odious, devil’s choice between two candidates who are rich, elitist, and completely detached from “ordinary” people, the US voter chose a candidate who was rich, elitist, and completely detached from the lives and interests of most people. 

Of course, people want to know why the voters chose this particular rich elitist at this particular time. That question calls forth both a specific, practical response and a far deeper, concerning answer.

Polls and disregarded economic data show that most voters have a profoundly negative and often painful relationship with their economic status– they are not doing well. They typically punish incumbents when under economic distress. This should come as no surprise. But the highly paid consultants of both parties– with approaching two billion dollars to spend– chose to press many other issues as well and deal with the economy only superficially.

But in the end, exit polls show that economic distress played a decisive role in shaping voters’ choices. Apparently, the pundits forgot how persistent, value-sucking inflation led to the election of Ronald Reagan forty-four years ago.

Again, like today, the 1970s were a period of realignment. The Democrats had lost the South to the Republicans over desegregation and the Civil Rights legislation. After the Nixonian scandals associated with the Watergate burglaries and other dirty tricks, the Democrats won over suburbanites disgusted with Republican chicaneries– a demographic thought by many functionaries to be the needed replacement for the lost South.

In 1976, the Democrats swept in with a squeaky-clean, untarnished candidate, James Carter. With the decade-long stagflation coming to a climax, the Carter regime was short-lived; despite a rightward turn on his part, Carter was beaten by an ultra-right movie star turned politician, Ronald Reagan. Reagan was the default choice for voters wanting change after a lost decade.

For those who like their history repeating from tragedy to farce, consider the transition from the self-righteous old red-baiter, Ronald Reagan, to the pompous, supercilious windbag, Donald Trump. History has a wicked sense of humor.

Few pundits acknowledge that Democratic Party strategists decided in the 1980s that the future of the party would be determined by the interests and concerns of metropolitan voters, especially those in the suburban upper-middle stratum who were “super voters,” economically secure, and attuned to lifestyle and identity liberalism. While they represented the legacy of “white flight,” the suburbanites contradictorily espoused the urbanity of tolerance and personal choice.

Coincident with the embrace of the suburban vote, Democratic Party strategists saw no need to attend to past central components of their coalition: the working class and multi-class Blacks. Loyal union leaders would corral the working-class vote and ascendant Black leaders would rally African Americans of all classes.

Besides, it was believed that neither had any other place to go besides the Democratic Party.

Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, revealed this thinking in 2016, when he said: “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin.” Even before that careless remark, both Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama– in moments of candor– revealed their contempt for working people outside of the metropolis.

This election stamped “paid” on this program, with nearly all the assumed components of the Democratic coalition drifting towards the Republicans.

The always insightful Adam Tooze, writing in The London Review of Books, concludes that the Democratic Party failings demonstrate “the high-achieving, insincere, vacuous incoherence that thrives at the top of the American political class.”

There is, however, a far deeper explanation of the Trump phenomenon seldom mentioned by mainstream commentators. Those who cite the specific issues of abortion rights, immigration, trans rights, crime, racism, etc.– issues that indeed played a role in the November election– neglect the fact that Trumpism is part of an international trend that infects the politics of such far-flung countries as India, Japan, and Argentina, as well as many European countries for often vastly different reasons. The rise of right populism in virtually all European countries– Orban’s Hungary, Meloni’s Italy, RN in France, AfD in Germany, Vox in Spain, Chega in Portugal, and similar parties in virtually every other European country– share one defining feature with the politics of India’s Modi and Argentina’s Milei: a rejection of centrist, traditional parties. 

Right populism rises as a response to the ineffectiveness of the politics of normality. It reflects the dissatisfaction with business as usual.

For hundreds of millions throughout the world, the twenty-first century has brought a series of crises eroding, even destroying their quality of life. Ruling classes have stubbornly refused to address these crises through the indifference of traditional bourgeois political parties. Voters have punished these parties by turning to opportunist right-populist formations that promise to give voice to their anger. Of course, this often takes the form of ugly, reprehensible claims and slogans– appealing to the basest of motives.

But it is not enough to denounce these backward policies without addressing the desperation that unfortunately popularizes those policies. It is not helpful to righteously raise the alarm of “fascism” if we fail to offer an alternative that will answer the hopelessness and misery that serves as the fertile soil for reaction.

From the tragedy of the Reagan election to the farce of the Trump re-election, we have suffered from two sham parties taking turns representing the “people,” while neither did. Isn’t it time for an independent people’s party– a party of the working class majority– that addresses the twenty-first century economic crises and their aftermath, the acute environmental crisis, the broken public health and health care systems, the insidious impoverishment of inflation, the crumbling infrastructure, and a host of other urgent demands, a party dedicated to serving the working people of the US and not its wealthy and powerful?

Greg Godels writes on current events, political economy, and the Communist movement from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Read other articles by Greg, or visit Greg's website.

 

Boris Kagarlitsky on the Soviet Union, one-party states and the need for a new left bloc in Russia

By Boris Kagarlitsky

Published 8 November, 2024MastodonFacebookTwitter

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First published in Russian at Rabkor. Translation and footnotes by Dmitry Pozhidaev for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Marxist sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky is currently in a Russian prison for speaking out against the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The following interview with Kagarlitsky was conducted by a Rabkor viewer. This is the first part of the interview which deals with questions relating to socialist democracy, one-party systems and the need to adapt party forms to the realities of today's working class.

Why did a one-party system develop in the Soviet Union?

The inevitability of establishing a one-party system was never theoretically justified, even within the framework of Soviet official ideology. But it was implicitly understood: if we have the most advanced party, armed with the most advanced ideology and theory, and supported by the entire people, why would we need other parties?

Although, interestingly, in the so-called “people’s democracies” (German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia), a semblance of multi-party systems was maintained. There were a few decorative parties formally in coalition with the Communists. This unexpectedly played a role in 1979 when leaders of these fictitious parties suddenly left the coalition and went into opposition. This led to a peaceful change of government in Poland by creating a new majority in the Sejm [parliament], including Solidarity.

But one way or another, by the 1920s, a one-party system had already taken shape in the Soviet Union, becoming the institutional foundation of the state. Meanwhile, the system also evolved. Throughout the 1920s, the Communist Party [of the Soviet Union, CPSU] gradually lost the characteristics of a political party, merging with the state administrative apparatus and then replacing it. In a literal sense, Soviet power was eliminated. Regional first secretaries essentially became provincial governors. CPSU regional committees had departments for industry, agriculture, and so on. The party dealt with everything from improving cow yields to stocking stores, handling almost everything except helping people.

Some believe the one-party system in the Soviet Union was a historical accident and that, if relations with the left Social Revolutionaries and other parties had developed differently, the political system might have been different. Do you think a two-party or multi-party system could have developed in Soviet Russia?

Certainly, in 1917 and even in 1918-19, [Vladimir] Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no plan to establish a one-party system. The Mensheviks, for instance, were at times persecuted, then allowed to work legally and elect their representatives to the Soviets.1 But I would not call it an accident.

If we look at other great revolutions — the English Revolution of the 17th century and the French Revolution of the 18th century — we see the same pattern: power concentrates in the hands of the most radical, consistent party, which establishes its own dictatorship. In England, it was the Independents; in France, the Jacobins; in Russia, the Bolsheviks. There is a clear process of logic here, moving through certain predictable phases. Then comes a conservative transformation of the regime (the Thermidorian and Bonapartist phases). Accordingly, we see the [Oliver] Cromwell regime in Britain, Napoleon [Bonaparte] in France, and [Josef] Stalin in the Soviet Union. This is followed by a period of restoration.

But here we see interesting differences. First, the Soviet system survived Stalin. Secondly, if we consider Perestroika and [Boris] Yeltsin’s rule as a Russian version of restoration (and I argued this back in the 1990s), then this phase occurred with a significant delay. The Soviet Union lasted more than 70 years, while the English and French revolutions took about a quarter of a century.

Recently, I have hypothesised that with the development of modern technologies (including communication technologies), historical processes are not accelerating but slowing down. But this requires further thought. For now, returning to our question, it is worth noting that the Soviet Union managed to create a solid institutional order in the 1930s that was not simply tied to Stalin’s personal power. Part of this process was transforming the Bolshevik dictatorship into a one-party system, as discussed earlier.

What role did Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky play in establishing a one-party dictatorship?

As mentioned, there was no plan in advance. But in 1921, amid the shift to the New Economic Policy [NEP], Lenin deliberately achieved a complete ban and elimination of opposition parties.2 His reasoning was simple: we are retreating on the economic front, [while] expanding freedom for the bourgeoisie, which might use this opportunity for political revenge. Therefore, economic liberalisation needed to be counterbalanced by tightening the political regime.

A paradox arises: during the Civil War and Red Terror, there was more political freedom and pluralism than during the NEP years, often considered a golden age of post-revolutionary Russia. In fact, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who were often imprisoned, were told it was temporary and that they would soon be legalised again. Lenin, in his last months, seemed to suspect something was wrong and began to ponder the threat of degeneration within the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky later defended the principle of multi-party systems in The Revolution Betrayed, but this had no effect on the Soviet system.

During the Soviet period, there were also attempts to reform political institutions. Immediately after the end of World War II, the German Communist Party adopted the so-called “Ackermann Thesis.” Ackermann was one of the party’s leaders and ideologists. He argued that the one-party system in the Soviet Union had developed under conditions of civil war, backwardness and hostile encirclement, while the situation in Germany was entirely different; therefore, socialism in Germany would be built under conditions of political freedom and a multi-party system. Essentially, the “Ackermann Thesis” anticipated what would later be known as Eurocommunism.

But in this case, what is important to us is that Ackermann’s statement was coordinated with Moscow, and Stalin was well aware of it. There was apparently a willingness, at least regarding Eastern Europe, to experiment with political regimes. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the countries within the Soviet sphere of influence were reorganised following the Soviet model. Ackermann was moved to a secondary position, and the fictitious multi-party system in East Germany (GDR) became the only outcome of those democratisation efforts.

In [Nikita] Khrushchev’s era, an unusual division emerged within CPSU district committees into urban and rural ones. Some saw this as preparation for creating a second party in the country — a peasant party. However, first, this conclusion is not obvious, and second, after Khrushchev’s removal in 1964, everything was returned to its original state.3

Finally, in 1968, the “Prague Spring” unfolded in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party carried out reforms and adopted a “Program of Action”. This document was published in Russian at that time in the journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, published in Prague. It significantly influenced the programs of leftist parties in Europe and Latin America. During the 1970–73 revolution in Chile, the parties of the Popular Unity coalition proclaimed the same principles. The “Prague Spring” envisaged a transition to a multi-party system (political pluralism), and the Communists were expected to return to being a political party that defended its right to leadership through free elections.

In The Long Retreat, you argue that no party can represent the interests of all workers today. Does this mean that different segments of the working class may have different parties?

The mass of wage labourers in today’s world is heterogeneous. Different groups may have conflicting interests (for example, wildlife reserve workers may not welcome mining developments in their area, even if it creates jobs). Workers should ideally be united based on their broader class interests. However, this process cannot be mechanical, imposed from above; it ultimately divides workers, creating new contradictions between the leadership and grassroots.

Reconciliation of interests is a complex, dynamic process. This embodies [Antonio] Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, where movement participants consciously follow a common line, even at personal sacrifice. Such a compromise is best expressed in a broad social coalition. And even if it takes the form of one common party, it will be a coalition-type party with different currents working together.

Can the heterogeneity of the working class be overcome within a common coalition or a single party? Different parts of the working class have different interests. Consequently, both now and during the construction of socialism, is it impossible to have a single political party that represents the interests of all workers? Does this mean that, under capitalism, the left needs a coalition of parties rather than a single party, and a multi-party system under socialism?

The question of optimal political organisation cannot be resolved once and for all. It is not only about the different social layers whose interests we aim to defend, but also about the history of the left movement, the political culture of each country, and its political system and legislation.4 In France, for instance, there is a long history of coalitions, while in Britain the left has to fight for influence within the Labour Party, known for being a “broad church” (though the right wing systematically reduces internal democracy to block leftist success).

In post-Putin Russia, I believe there is a need to build a broad leftist party from scratch. Not a mechanical coalition of different groups, many of which will bring with them their old sectarian habits and squabbles but a grassroots party-movement involving local activists and leaders. Currently, such a party-movement form looks more attractive than the bureaucratic structures typical of former democratic and Communist parties of the 20th century (and, to a large extent, of Trotskyists).

Here, oddly enough, ideological pluralism is less important than grassroots autonomy and local activism. Yes, we are talking about an organisation for struggle within the conditions of capitalism, but the very form of organisation we are creating to a large extent anticipates the socio-political forms that may develop — on this basis — under socialism. We are building new social relationships, including among ourselves.

But what should be done if certain groups, especially those with some influence, do not wish or are unable to work within such a party-movement, but are nevertheless willing to contribute to the common struggle? It makes sense that we would still need to establish relations with them as external partners, agreeing on some matters and engaging in principled debate on others.

Is a multi-party system preferable to a one-party system under socialism? Can bourgeois parties participate in governing the state under socialism? What problems might arise from a multi-party system under socialism?

If the fundamental principles of political freedom involve party competition, then a socialist society should preserve and develop the gains of bourgeois revolutions. Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg argued this in their critiques of the Bolsheviks. Even Stalin, in his last public speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, spoke positively about the legacy of bourgeois democracy.

Through party competition, people can express their will. But is the self-determination of the people truly reducible to a choice between parties? By limiting democracy to elections and the political sphere, we remain within the framework of a bourgeois understanding of freedom.5

In the future, we are likely to see new mechanisms allowing people to participate in decision-making in both political and non-political areas, with technology providing ample opportunities for this. It seems to me that as self-governance and economic democracy develop, the role and influence of parties will diminish. When choosing a representative to participate in the management of a company, will you primarily consider their party affiliation or their competence and ability to connect with colleagues?

As for bourgeois parties, the question boils down to how successfully new socio-economic relations develop. If society, its structure, and culture undergo deep changes, old parties will only have two options: they will either wither away or find a new social base and transform. There are many such examples in history. For instance, the British Tories (Conservatives) were once a party of landowning aristocrats opposing the commercial bourgeois Whigs (Liberals). The modern Tories are a party of big capital, while the descendants of the Whigs, the Liberal Democrats in England, represent the “progressive” middle class.

Clearly, we cannot and should not predict everything in advance. Utopianism is precisely the attempt to first paint a beautiful picture and then try to force reality to fit it.

If [Karl] Marx was right about the eventual withering away of the state, then parties would wither away with it. But for now, we can only guess. It would be nice to see something like the society described by the Strugatsky brothers — a “noon” free community of people oriented towards rational humanism. But that was, after all, science fiction. For now, let us stick to the prophecies of the young Strugatskys and Ivan Yefremov, and we will work on it and see what happens.6

Are there alternatives to political parties? Should something different from the conventional understanding of a party be intentionally created?

As mentioned above, various forms of self-governance and economic democracy can develop outside a party-based structure. Naturally, today we see the emergence of various public initiatives, non-governmental organisations, civil associations, and so forth. Moreover, broad social movements focused on specific issues (such as ecology, urban preservation, animal protection, etc.) play an important role.

But it is clear that, within the political system, parties are still the main actors for now. The left needs to engage with social movements, and we ourselves should aim to create a party-movement that avoids excessive centralisation. However, let us be honest: much will depend on conditions and circumstances. At certain stages, they may even require increased centralisation. The main thing is not to confuse tactics with strategy. Unfortunately, on a tactical level, various zigzags are possible. The question is — where will we steer?

Can you recommend any reading on how political parties represent the interests of different segments of wage labourers? And on forms of worker organisation relevant to the present day?

Back in the 1970s, there was a discussion in the journal Latin America about Latin American leftists, where these very questions were raised (albeit with adjustments for Soviet censorship, of course). There is also Maurice Duverger's classic work on political parties, which has been translated into Russian. In the Soviet Union, there was the Institute of World Labor Movement (later renamed the Institute of Comparative Politics), which published many works on Western leftist parties, analysing their social bases and, for instance, the divisions and shifts within social reformism.7

Of course, there are more recent works, but being in prison without access to the internet or my library, I am unlikely to be able to add anything further.

• 1

  After the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks formed a coalition with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs), who shared some revolutionary goals but differed on issues such as land distribution and peace terms with Germany. The Left SRs held significant influence, especially among the rural peasantry.

  The Soviets (local councils) initially included representatives from various socialist factions, including the Left SRs, Mensheviks, and some anarchists. These factions often debated policies in the Soviets, reflecting a brief phase of pluralistic socialist governance. By mid-1918, as the Civil War intensified, the Bolsheviks began suppressing other political parties systematically. The Mensheviks and Right SRs were marginalised, and many were imprisoned or exiled as the civil war intensified. 

• 2

  In 1921, the Bolshevik Party formally banned all internal factions within the party through the Tenth Party Congress' decree, which effectively centralised decision-making within the party and eliminated remaining political opposition, both within and outside the party.

• 3

  The decision to divide CPSU district committees into urban and rural branches was made in 1962 as part of Khrushchev’s broader administrative reforms aimed at improving economic management by aligning party structures more closely with agricultural and industrial sectors. The official justification emphasised the need to address the specific concerns of rural development separately from urban industrial issues, particularly given the emphasis on agricultural production in Khrushchev’s policy agenda. However, opponents within the CPSU argued that the division undermined party cohesion and ideological unity. When Khrushchev was dismissed in October 1964, this separation of committees was cited among the criticisms against him.

• 4

  This is a theme Kagarlitsky explores more thoroughly in The Long Retreat: “In the 21st century.., modern politics and society simply do not permit the construction of a united, ideologically motivated vanguard party able to formulate and put into practice the collective will of the entire movement… Political unity under the conditions of a heterogeneous society inevitably takes on the form of a coalition, even if in technical terms the representatives of various social groups and currents can be kept within the framework of a single party. More often, however, several organisations are formed simultaneously and in parallel.”

• 5

  This is another theme Kagarlitsky develops in The Long Retreat where he argues that Western bourgeois democracy has been hollowed out: “The problem faced by the Western corporate elite in the late twentieth century lay in its need to curtail, and if possible to end altogether, the participation of the masses in politics while preserving the formal institutions of parliamentarism, free elections and other conquests of liberal democracy. This task was achieved through combining market reforms with the technocratic adoption of decisions supposedly too complex to be understood by ordinary voters.”

• 6

  Boris Strugatsky and Arkady Strugatsky, along with Ivan Yefremov, were prominent Soviet science fiction writers who depicted utopian visions of a future communist society. In Noon: 22nd Century (1962) (this explains the reference to the “noon” community in the interview) and Far Rainbow (1963), the Strugatsky brothers envisioned a world where humanity has overcome poverty, exploitation, and social inequalities through technological progress and cooperative living. Their fictional world reflects principles of collective welfare, scientific exploration, and rational humanism, aiming for a harmonious society free from material need and oppression. Yefremov’s Andromeda: A Space-Age Tale (1957) is another iconic work in this genre, portraying a future Earth that has achieved communism and is now part of a peaceful, interstellar society. Yefremov’s vision is deeply rooted in Soviet ideals of human progress, presenting a world of intellectual freedom, scientific discovery, and cooperation across cultures. Both authors’ works serve as aspirational visions of a socialist future, emphasising the transformative power of a society committed to rational and humane values.

• 7

  Some notable works include: 

  1. “The Labour Movement in the Developed Capitalist Countries” (Рабочее движение в развитых капиталистических странах), published in 1975, offers a comprehensive analysis of labour movements in Western Europe and North America, focusing on their social bases and political strategies.

  2. “Social Democracy: Theory and Practice” (Социал-демократия: теория и практика), a 1980 publication, examines the evolution of social democratic parties in Western countries, analysing their ideological shifts and the social groups they represent.

  3. “The Crisis of Reformism in the West” (Кризис реформизма на Западе), published in 1985, discusses the challenges faced by Western leftist parties in the context of neoliberal policies, exploring how these parties’ social bases were affected.

 

In Russia, no one is safe from prison

By Anastasia Spartak

Published 8 November, 2024

First published at Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

In the two-and-a-half years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began, more than 1,040 Russian dissidents have been implicated in criminal cases, of whom over 300 have been convicted and sent to prison, according to calculations by the independent human rights project OVD-Info. Many of these prisoners belong to Russia’s liberal opposition, such as its iconic representative Alexei Navalny, who died under suspicious circumstances in a penal colony earlier this year. Figures like these, unsurprisingly, receive the most attention in the Western press and can create the impression that political opposition in Russia is solely organized by liberals and bourgeois democrats.

Yet repression in Russia is not limited to liberals by any means: left-wing activists have also been targeted, and indeed are increasingly attracting the attention of the Russian state’s repression. Nevertheless, despite numerous setbacks and the increasingly hostile atmosphere in the country, they continue to respond with solidarity. It is impossible to list all left-wing political prisoners in Russia in one text. One can only provide a brief description of the most typical cases, which in turn offer a glimpse into the scale and nature of repression in contemporary Russia, where denunciations, torture, provocations, lawlessness, and legal arbitrariness have grown commonplace.

The fight for intellectual freedom

The most famous left-wing political prisoner in Russia is 66-year-old Marxist sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, who was prosecuted by the Federal Security Service, or FSB, for making a joke about blowing up the Crimean Bridge during a livestream. He was placed under arrest in July 2023 and fined in December, after which authorities hinted that he should leave Russia for his own safety. Yet Kagarlitsky stuck to his principles and remained in the country, for which he was sentenced to five years in a penal colony on 13 February 2024.

An international online conference entitled “Boris Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today” was held in his honour on 8 October. The organizers presented a new initiative, the Kagarlitsky Network for Intellectual Freedom (KNIF), designed to unite intellectuals in the struggle for freedom of thought and expression in Russia and the territories it occupies. Initially, the KNIF will focus “оn the growing threat to intellectual freedom, exemplified by the repression of prominent figures such as sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, mathematician Azat Miftakhov, and other educators and researchers who have been imprisoned, branded as ‘foreign agents’, or otherwise punished for daring to think differently”.

Azat Miftakhov’s case became widely known before the war in Ukraine. On 18 January 2021, he was sentenced to six years in prison for allegedly breaking a window in the offices of the ruling party, United Russia. Miftakhov reported that he was tortured. It became quite clear that he was prosecuted not for the actual act, but for his political views — Azat openly called himself an anarchist, criticized the Russian authorities, and spoke out against the looming war with Ukraine. In prison, officials continued to harass him by distributing intimate pictures of him to inmates in an attempt to make him an outcast among his fellow inmates.

A large-scale campaign in Miftakhov’s defence was organized by the academic community, and two international committees were established in his support, the Azat Miftakhov committee and Solidarité FreeAzat. The campaign was modelled on the campaigns for Soviet mathematicians Leonid Plyushch and Yurii Shikhanovich, who were arrested in 1972, tried in absentia, and locked up in a psychiatric hospital for their “anti-Soviet acts”. One of the active campaigners for Azat’s freedom was French mathematician Michel Broué, who had previously assisted other dissident Soviet scientists.

Miftakhov was released on 4 September 2023, but detained again shortly thereafter. On 28 March 2024, he was convicted and sentenced to four years in a penal colony. According to an official investigation, Miftakhov, while watching TV with other prisoners in the colony, had expressed support for the anarchist Mikhail Zhlobitsky, who organized a suicide bombing in the Arkhangelsk FSB headquarters in 2018. One of Miftakhov’s closest friends in prison had testified against him. In neither instance, however, did he admit guilt.

The cases of Boris Kagarlitsky and Azat Miftakhov have received international coverage and high-level support due to the strong connections between left-wing intellectuals around the world. But there are dozens of other lesser-known political prisoners who also need support. Thankfully, the cases of Kagarlitsky and Miftakhov have raised the profile of left-wing political prisoners in Russia overall, and spurred the formation of solidarity networks in the country itself — something that did not occur around the cases of lesser-known activists.

Building a prisoners’ fund

These two cases became important points of mobilization for Russia’s disoriented Left, struggling under conditions of military censorship and bans on demonstrations and even organization. In June 2024, left-wing activists, journalists, friends and relatives, and members of political prisoners’ support groups established the Left Political Prisoners Support Fund. The first post in the organization’s Telegram channel stated:

The Russian oligarchic dictatorship’s machine of repression is gaining momentum against the backdrop of worsening international imperialist conflicts and the impossibility of maintaining “stability” inside the country except by tightening the screws. The total number of political prisoners is growing, and the list of people of left-wing views among the repressed is inexorably increasing. These are anarchists, communists, social democrats, these are people of internationally known and ordinary activists. Seeing this situation, realizing its bleak prospects and having the experience of supporting individual comrades, we [...] decided to unite our efforts for a more effective support of comrades and to create the initiative.

The team is currently developing a website in several languages, which will maintain a list of left-wing political prisoners in Russia. In the meantime, the fund coordinates media work, supports solidarity campaigns, and provides targeted payments to political prisoners. In September 2024, the fund collected 213,119 roubles (2,000 euro) in private donations and spent 230,900 roubles (2,200 euro), of which 200,000 went to pay off a 300,000-rouble fine for Yuri Chilikin, who was released from a pre-trial detention centre in July after six months of imprisonment.

In July 2023, Chilikin posted a photo of a mobile recruitment centre for the war in Ukraine on his personal Telegram channel with the caption, “It’s asking for a Molotov cocktail.” The post triggered a criminal case for “public calls for terrorism on the Internet”. The prosecutor requested six years in a penal colony, but the court, although finding him guilty, merely fined Chilikin and banned him from administering websites for one year.

So far, this is all the Russian Left’s fragile solidarity networks can do to counter the relentless machine of repression. But even this little help can make a difference for a political prisoner. In Russia, supporting prisoners from the outside is called grev or literally “heating”, because in a country of endless cold, everyone needs a little warmth, even behind bars. “No one should be left alone with the system”, says the motto of OVD-info.

Playing Russian roulette with prisoners’ lives

It ought to be noted that Chilikin’s case was an exception with an unusually happy ending. According to Supreme Court statistics, the Russian court system had a 0.26-percent acquittal rate in 2023, and terrorism, state treason, discrediting the military, and fake news about the military were added to the usual set of political articles.

Generally speaking, the Russian (in)justice system is characterized by three rules: haphazardness, ruthlessness, and snitching. These have become so ingrained into the fabric of Russian reality that they have become an integral part of it. “Lawlessness” or “ bespredel” is the best definition for Russia as a borderless space in which one half of the population hides and the other half seeks to catch them. The widespread use of sexualized torture adds a horrifying dimension to the existence of left-wing activists in this man-made hell. The memes “ squat on a bottle” or “ mop rape” have become part of mass culture in Russia, as they successfully play on the savage torture ingrained in Russia’s correctional system.

Punishments for political offenses are haphazardly distributed as part of an overall strategy. The boundaries of what is permissible are extremely blurry, and their violation can be interpreted differently depending on the context or, more often, the mood of the officials involved. The logic of this repression lies in its utter unpredictability: anyone can end up in prison for anything, it’s everyone's fault in advance, and whether one is already in jail or not is a matter of time and law enforcement’s persistence.

The absence of clear rules concerning which specific words or actions can lead to arrest turns the legal system into a wicked game of chance, as echoed in the Russian proverb, “no one is safe from poverty and prison”. This uncertainty serves to create an atmosphere of fear that stifles dissent in the context of a growing political and economic crisis, which in turn increases the population’s sense of vulnerability and hinders the growth of an opposition.

The case of Husyn Dzhambetov illustrates this dynamic well. In March 2022, Dzhambetov was fighting on the Ukrainian side with other Chechen volunteers under the call sign “Bandera”. In a video, he beseeched Allah to destroy “Putin, an enemy of the civilized world”, for which he was put on Russia’s wanted list. Yet after he suddenly switched sides in 2023 and published a video glorifying the “father of Chechen nation”, Ramzan Kadyrov, he suffered no consequences. Dzhambetov — who did not just brag on the Internet, but actually killed Russian soldiers — was not only forgiven, but even promoted.

The lack of a systematic approach to repression is compensated for by the extreme ruthlessness inherited from previous iterations of the Russian penitentiary system. The Russian practice of punishing political dissidents, rooted in the tsarist penal camps known as katorga, persisted into the Soviet correctional labour camps of the Gulag, and was inherited by modern Russia in the form of colonies and prisons maintained by the Federal Penitentiary Service, or FSIN. Russia’s system is now returning to its historical roots, functioning not only as an instrument of punishment, but also as a means of intimidating anyone who might be perceived as a threat to the regime. The war and the feeling of being under siege gave Russia’s repressive apparatus fresh momentum. This process has been accompanied by a growing disregard for basic human rights, with sentences becoming as brutal as possible and political prisoners increasingly subjected to torture.

A telling example is the so-called “Tyumen case”, which became famous due to the scale of the violence — affecting six young men from three Russian cities — as well as the degree of lawlessness and use of inhuman torture. In this sense, it mirrored the infamous “Network” case, in which Russian officials, relying on testimony extracted under torture, “proved” the existence of a terrorist organization of anarchists and antifascists. Under torture, the Tyumen antifascists signed confessions that they were members of a “terrorist community ‘Vanguard People's Will’”, opposed the war in Ukraine, and plotted to sabotage military offices, police stations, and railroads. Relatives of the defendants launched a campaign, but because of the war, the Tyumen case has not received as much publicity as the Network case. All defendants in the Tyumen case face 15 to 30 years in prison. For 29-year-old Nikita Oleinik, the alleged organizer, the maximum punishment could be life imprisonment.

Suppression, spies, and empty symbolism

The degradation of law enforcement standards and the decline in the rigor of evidence collection have led to the prosecution’s growing reliance on a system of informants, severely undermining the judicial process. As a result, many political cases are based on testimonies from so-called “secret witnesses” or from undercover agents acting as provocateurs. The use of anonymous witnesses, whose identities are concealed under the pretext of security, raises serious ethical and legal concerns, as it prevents defence attorneys from cross-examining these individuals and verifying the credibility of their testimonies. These practices not only compromise the rights of the accused, but also signal a fundamental erosion of judicial integrity.

This deterioration of legal institutions has become a critical tool in the suppression of political dissent, as it allows the state to fabricate charges based on unreliable, unverifiable sources. In turn, this reinforces a climate of fear and discourages civic engagement, as people know that their actions could be used against them in politically motivated trials.

The case against a Marxist circle in Ufa, for example, was based on the testimony of a person whom the defendants claim is a provocateur. Sergey Sapozhnikov, a bus driver from Ukraine, fought on the side of the Donetsk People’s Republic and was arrested in Russia in 2017 at the request of the Ukrainian side on charges of robbery and car theft, but miraculously escaped punishment. Activists believe he received his freedom in exchange for promises to work as an agent. He joined the Marxist circle in 2019 and began pushing activists to begin combat training and obtain military gear. He told the FSB that members of the circle were “waiting for an unstable situation to seize power, kill police officers, politicians”.

On 25 March 2022, law enforcement officers opened a criminal case against the circle for attempting to “forcibly change the foundations of the constitutional order of Russia”. Five members face up to 20 years in prison, while the alleged leader faces life imprisonment. Investigators equated Marxism-Leninism with extremist ideology, and interpreted the members’ call for a workers’ union to protect their rights and overthrow capitalist “slavery” as “incitement to violently alter the constitutional order of the Russian Federation through armed seizure of power”.

Paradoxically, while Putin’s government glorifies the Soviet past, those who engage seriously with that legacy are often criminalized. This duality underscores the Russian bourgeois state’s approach: celebrating the USSR as a symbol of strength, while suppressing ideologies that genuinely reflect its revolutionary heritage.

And break your heavy chains

Despite the international coverage of the Kagarlitsky and Miftakhov cases, authorities refused to release either of them, as this would have constituted a tacit acknowledgement that justice had not been done. Maintaining support for political prisoners and building a public campaign nevertheless is crucial to curbing abuses within the penitentiary system. Making the prison administration aware that political prisoners are closely monitored from the outside can significantly improve their living conditions and help prevent the use of violence. Of course, it goes without saying that the close attention devoted to Alexei Navalny was not enough to save his life.

Despite the despair gripping the Russian Left, some, like 18-year-old antifascist Yuri Mikheev, have tried to interfere directly with Putin’s war machine. On 10 November 2023, he was detained on the grounds of a military base in the Moscow region. The FSB accused the young man of planning to set fire to military equipment. Now he faces up to ten years in prison, but struggles to raise enough money to even hire a lawyer.

Numerous sincere young activists, like 18-year-old communist Darya Kozyreva, went to jail simply for speaking out against the war. On 24 February 2024, on the second anniversary of the invasion, Kozyreva laid flowers at a monument to Ukrainian artist Taras Shevchenko and attached a poster to its pedestal with an excerpt from his poem “Testament”, after which she was arrested. The poem reads:

Oh bury me, then rise ye up
And break your heavy chains
And water with the tyrants’ blood
The freedom you have gained

Anastasia Spartak is a Russian social researcher.

Repression of Russian left activists

By Ivan Petrov

EmailPublished 8 November, 2024

First published at Against The Current.

On June 5, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected the appeal of Boris Kagarlitsky, leaving this prominent sociologist behind bars for the next five years. This event once again has attracted the world’s attention to the persecution of political prisoners in Russia.

The campaign in Kagarlitsky’s defense has not subsided, but on the contrary is gaining momentum. His case, however, is the tip of the iceberg of the repressive system in our country, which is devouring yet more victims.

While Boris is a well-known figure whose fate is in plain sight, many who are convicted or under investigation in political and semi-political criminal cases are unknown not only to the general public, but sometimes also to civil activists.

At the end of last year, having been released for two months from a pre-trial detention center in the northern city of Syktyvkar, Kagarlitsky himself was determined to fight for the freedom of political prisoners and overcome the information blockade around their persecution. At the beginning of April, already in a pre-trial detention center in Zelenograd city, in Moscow region, he wrote in an open letter to left-wing activists:

“Political unity and political maturity are achieved through political activity. And in today’s conditions, when political action and self-organization in our country are extremely difficult, helping like-minded people who find themselves in prison becomes not just a humanistic activity, but also an important political gesture, a practice of solidarity. Today, when such an initiative has finally received practical implementation, it needs to be supported, we can and should unite around it. After all, the first step will be followed by other steps. In order for the future to come, we must work now.”

Who’s being persecuted?

According to circles close to Amnesty International, there are now more than 900 political prisoners in Russia. The actual number of punishments for persecuted activists is much higher. They did not include those who were actually imprisoned for politics, but, formally on trumped-up criminal cases.

Fabrication of criminal cases is a favorite method of dealing with trade union leaders. Anyone who actively opposes the current order and the current government can go to jail, and more and more leftists are among them.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, according to Vladimir Lenin, the most advanced squad of the working class in Russia were metalworkers. Nowadays, many sociologists and politicians consider healthcare workers to be the most organized and capable of defending their interests.

By virtue of their profession, they protect not only their own economic interests, but also the remnants of the public healthcare system (free for the population) that survived the neoliberal reforms of recent decades. Objectively, then, healthcare workers protect the interests of every resident of Russia.

In 2012 the trade union “Action” of healthcare workers was created. One of the most militant and capable independent trade unions in our country, present in 57 regions, Action is now part of the Confederation of Labor of Russia (CLR), the second largest trade union association in Russia.

The Action union includes workers not only of public clinics but also private ones, where the owners especially do not like any trade unions. Furthermore, there is no place for shop-level disunity of people in the healthcare system: Action brings together doctors, paramedics, nurses, orderlies and students of medical institutes and colleges on an equal basis.

It also includes representatives of other professions working in medical organizations, for example, ambulance drivers.

The Alexander Kupriyanov case

Among trade union activists, there are traditionally a high proportion of people with leftist views. One of these is Alexander Kupriyanov, a psychotherapist from the city of Bryansk, also known as Doctor Pravda (Truth) thanks to his YouTube channel of the same name.

He had tried to create an independent trade union at his work back in the mid-2000s, and after the emergence of Action he joined it. Then Alexander moved on to political struggle, holding street actions, participating in the activities of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), running for elected bodies at various levels.

In the Bryansk region Alexander Kupriyanov organized rallies and pickets, both on health issues (torture in the Trubchevsky psychoneurological boarding school, the death of children in the Bryansk perinatal center, labor problems of healthcare workers), and on other topics like the forced resettlement of a World War II veteran from supposedly “dilapidated” housing in the center of the city to the outskirts.

The angry regional authorities could not tolerate this for long. In 2018 Kupriyanov was arrested on charges of fraud. According to the materials of the “case,” he was allegedly involved in imposing loans on patients for treatment in the interregional system of “Med-Life” clinics, where he previously worked. A total of 22 people are involved in this case.

Kupriyanov was not related to the owners, administration or accounting department of the clinic, who actually solicited clients to take out loans. As the chief attending physician of the center, he dealt only with medicine. The authorities decided to use a real fraud case to get rid of their opponent. (It is characteristic that actual investigations were carried out in “Med-Life” clinics in other cities, but not in the Bryansk clinic where Alexander worked.)

Alexander Kupriyanov spent a year in the pre-trial detention center — the maximum period of pre-trial detention under this article of the criminal code — and due to lack of evidence, he was released. However, the criminal case was not closed. After leaving prison, Kupriyanov parted ways with the opportunist Communist Party of the Russian Federation on fundamental issues and was expelled from the party for criticizing its conciliatory policies.

He joined the Solidarity Action Committee (SAC), where he began supporting imprisoned leftists, labor and trade union activists. Alexander became one of the founders of the Public Council of Citizens of the city of Bryansk and the Bryansk region, and later began collaborating with the revealing newspaper “For Truth and Justice.”

On August 15, 2023, the newspaper and the Public Council held a round table of the Bryansk public against corruption. Already on August 16, Kupriyanov as one of the organizers of the round table was summoned to the investigative department of the police in Cheboksary, the capital of the Republic of Chuvashia. The still-open criminal case was reclassified it to the more serious criminal article of “organizing a criminal community.”

Now Alexander lives at home in Bryansk, but remains under investigation. According to the preventive measure (prohibition of certain actions), as an accused person he is prohibited from sending and receiving postal and telegraphic items, using the internet and other means of communication. He needs to get acquainted with the case materials (560 volumes), which involves long trips to the city of Cheboksary, located more than 1000 km from Bryansk.

The last major episode in the Kupriyanov case occurred in the second half of February 2024. On February 21, he was detained right on the street in Bryansk and taken to Cheboksary. The next day, a district court hearing was held there to change the preventive measure to detention. The investigators’ petition was based on the fact that, while free, Alexander continued to use the Internet.

Thanks to the conscientious work of lawyer L. Karama, the principled position of judge E. Egorov and a public campaign of the defense, the investigators’ petitions were rejected by the court, and the preventive measure for A. Kupriyanov remained the same. But the danger hanging over Kupriyanov remains. He has yet to prove his innocence when the case comes to trial.

Anton Orlov imprisoned

Another example of repression against trade unionists is the case of Anton Orlov, coordinator of the Action trade union in the Republic of Bashkortostan. A member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and a small interregional organization, the Union of Marxists, Orlov is currently in prison on charges of large-scale fraud.

Anton is not a doctor by education but joined with medical teams at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, when the Republic’s medical staff worked to the limit of their physical capabilities, often without additional salary. Seeing such injustice, Orlov as a young communist, joined the “Action” trade union and soon became its Republican coordinator on a voluntary unsalaried basis.

During the two years (2020-2022) of Orlov’s work in the trade union, membership of the Republican organization increased fourfold; the salaries of ambulance crews increased; double pay on weekends was established, and pregnant employees were released from work while maintaining their average earnings.

The most successful trade union campaign was the “Italian strike” (working to rule) of February 2022 in Ishimbay, where ambulance doctors demanded payments for working in incomplete teams.

The strike led to the intervention of the labor inspectorate and the prosecutor’s office, as well as the resignation of the head physician of the district hospital, leading to a noticeable response in the press and on television. The strikers’ basic demands were met.

The accusation against Anton was brought in the midst of the Ishimbay strike, which clearly indicates the political background of the fabricated “case,” in which he was considered a witness, involving two episodes of fuel supplies that weren’t delivered by the companies Nefte-Service and Hermes after payments had been made.

Orlov had once worked as a commercial director at “Nefte-Service,” but had no access to the company’s accounts. Relations between two commercial organizations should be settled by an arbitration court, but the Republican Prosecutor’s Office, without factual evidence, saw in this story the theft of 11 million rubles.

Representatives of trade union structures, one of whom, Chairman of the CLR, Boris Kravchenko, is a member of the Presidium of the Council for Human Rights and Civil Society Development under the President of Russia, were not allowed to appear at the trial as defense witnesses.

On September 23, 2022, Anton was sentenced to six-and-a-half years in a general regime colony and a fine of 250,000 rubles. It is curious that other defendants in the case testifying against him, whose guilt was actually proven, received shorter sentences. In February 2023, the appeal court mockingly reduced the prison term by three months.

This was not enough for the authorities, and after the official bankruptcy of Nefte-Serv­ice LLC and the payment of debt to the victims, another criminal case was opened against Anton Orlov under the article “fraud committed by an organized group on an especially large scale.”

Thanks to the efforts of lawyer Larisa Isaeva, the second case was repeatedly returned for further investigation due to numerous procedural violations. Finally, on June 26, a new trial began. Anton Orlov again found himself in the dock, as the only accused member of a supposed “organized group.”

Under the “strong state” cult

Among left-wing political prisoners there are even more politicians than trade union activists. For example, just for participating in a street action that is not coordinated with the authorities, you can easily end up in prison.

In Putin’s Russia, with its cult of a “strong state” and a “steady hand,” not only every branch of the military, but also every law enforcement agency received its own professional holiday, which the entire Russian people were ordered to celebrate. December 20 is a holiday for the ubiquitous Federal Security Service (FSB).

On December 20, 2021, members of the radical leftist youth association “Left Bloc” celebrated this day in their own way. They decided to congratulate the gendarmerie in a grotesque form: they stretched out a banner at the entrance to the FSB Directorate for the South-Western Administrative District of Moscow and lit smoke bombs, something that security forces are especially afraid of on the streets of large cities.

The state security officers did not appreciate the congratulations, and it was not difficult to identify those congratulating them, because a video of the action was posted on the Left Bloc channel. A few days later, the congratulators began to be detained, and a criminal case was opened against two of them, the anarchist Lev Skoryakin and the communist Ruslan Abasov.

In the interpretation of the investigation, the innocent joke of the young people was interpreted as follows: a group of people, by prior conspiracy, committed an attack on a government institution using weapons, and even motivated by political hatred, which is considered an aggravating circumstance.

Based on the testimony of an intimidated minor participant in the action and fabricated evidence, Lev and Ruslan were sent to a pre-trial detention center, where they spent nine months. Then the court replaced their preventive measure with a “prohibition of certain actions.”

After leaving prison, the defendants hastened to hide, thereby violating the order not to leave the region of permanent registration. Ruslan Abasov went to Bosnia and then to Croatia, where he currently lives. Lev Skoryakin, whose passport was confiscated during the search, went to the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, where a foreign passport was not required, and began applying for a visa to Germany.

In Bishkek, Lev was arrested several times by Kyrgyz security forces. He spent more than three months in prison, awaiting extradition to Russia. Then the General Prosecutor’s Office of Kyrgyzstan refused the Russian side’s request for his extradition; in September 2023, Lev Skoryakin was released.

However, he did not have to rejoice for long; already in October he was detained again, and this time handed over to the Russian side. Lev was transported to Moscow in handcuffs. Upon arrival at the capital’s Domodedovo airport, he was beaten and tortured.

During the many-hour interrogation, FSB officers tried to extract information from him about left-wing organizations in Russia and about human rights structures that help political activists escape persecution. However, the interrogators never received the information they needed, and the exhausted Lev was taken to a pre-trial detention center.

For several weeks, the Left Bloc and human rights activists searched for the missing Skoryakin and eventually found him through a lawyer.

In December, a trial was held at which the prosecutor requested a sentence of five and a half years in prison for the defendant. On December 13, 2023, he was found guilty under the article “hooliganism involving violence against government officials” and sentenced to a fine of 500,000 rubles, from which he was released due to his long stay in prison.

Fearing a prosecution appeal against the relatively lenient sentence, Lev hastened to leave for the Armenian capital Yerevan, and in March 2024 he moved to Germany on a humanitarian visa.

Criminal offense: Studying Marxism

It is quite possible to become a criminal in modern Russia without going to street protests or lighting smoke bombs, but simply by reading and discussing the classics of Marxism. And here even the mandates of regional authorities will not protect us.

In Ufa, the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, there was a Marxist circle, in which many have participated in the last decade. The creator of this particular circle, Alexey Dmitriev, is a young intellectual and, by the way, also a doctor (pediatrician-otolaryngologist), a person with incredibly broad interests from mathematics to political science.

No less prominent in the circle is Dmitry Chuvilin, until March 2022 an opposition deputy of the Kurultai (Parliament of Bashkortostan). The circle took upon itself the task of educating people. Priority was given to the study of philosophy, especially logic and critical thinking.

In the warm season, the circle organized gatherings in nature, with members of the Union of Marxists, the Left Front and other left-wing organizations from different regions of Russia. In addition to education and scientific discussions, many members of the circle worked in trade unions, participated in elections at various levels, wrote articles, blogged and tried to cooperate with the media.

The emerging connection between theory and practice, the ethos of self-organization of the working people, relatively wide popularity by the standards of unofficial politics, and attempts to create an interregional structure distinguished the Ufa circle from many others.

The state perceived this as a threat, especially with the start of the war against Ukraine, modestly called the “special military operation.” A month after the outbreak of hostilities, early in the morning of March 25, 2022, FSB officers broke into the homes of 15 members of the Marxist circle.

Many were beaten during arrest. Searches in apartments were carried out with particular passion, with everything turned upside down in search of the material basis for bringing charges under the monstrous article of “terrorism.”

FSB officers confiscated all media, camping equipment, philosophical, political and historical literature of the left, which appears in the case materials as “extremist.” The operatives were particularly intrigued with the camping equipment: walkie-talkies as a means of communication, entrenching tools to dig around tents, camouflage-style tourist clothing, including one for a 10-year-old boy, and even children’s binoculars.

Subsequently, these items began to appear in the case materials among the evidence of the criminal activities of the circle. During the search, two grenades were planted on one of the Marxists — he allegedly hid them in the wood stove, which was heated daily.

On that day, 14 people were detained and taken to district police departments. Five members of the circle were taken into custody, the rest were left as witnesses and released. Doctor Alexey Dmitriev, former deputy Dmitry Chuvilin, entrepreneur Pavel Matisov, odd-job worker Rinat Burkeev and pensioner Yuri Efimov have been in pre-trial detention for more than two years.

Since Dmitry Chuvilin was a parliamentary representative, the decision to initiate a case was made personally by the head of the Russian Investigative Committee for Bashkortostan, Denis Chernyatyev. Immediately after the court decision on the arrest was announced, Chuvilin declared the political nature of their persecution and went on a hunger strike.

Though a member of the Kurultai parliamentary faction in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, he did not support Chuvilin, issuing the standard philistine formulation: “We do not know all the facts. We are not completely sure of his innocence.”

The main points of the charge were preparation for a violent seizure of power, creation of a terrorist community, calls for terrorist activities, public justification of terrorism and its propaganda on the internet, and preparation for the theft of weapons. It is curious that the indictment accused the defendants of reading the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin, which have not yet disappeared from the shelves of almost any Russian library.

Moreover, studying the articles of the famous Soviet teacher Anton Makarenko and performing songs from the most popular Soviet films about the Civil War also appear as evidence of the criminal activities of the circle. From all this it is concluded that the accused were preparing an attack on law enforcement officers and military units, the seizure of military weapons, the commission of terrorist acts and even the seizure of power.

Funny? In such a sacred matter as the persecution of dissidents, the Russian government is not afraid to appear funny, because it is confident in its impunity, as well as in the passive indifference of the people, who have supposedly lost their sense of humor.

The main “evidence” of the accusation is two grenades. At the same time, the case contains an unanswered petition from defendant Pavel Matisov to conduct an investigation into the origin of the grenades and how they got into his wood stove.

The informant, the trial, the war

The entire basis of the indictment was taken from the testimony of one informant — Sergei Sapozhnikov, who joined the circle in the spring of 2020.

In 2014-2015, Sapozhnikov fought in the militia of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic as a squad commander. At the end of 2017, Ukraine put him on the international wanted list in a criminal case initiated in July 2014 in Dnepropetrovsk. The Security Service of Ukraine accused Sergei of robbery with injury leading to death.

Sapozhnikov was detained in Ufa in November 2017 and sent to a pre-trial detention center, from where he was released in April 2018. Why he was released remains a mystery. After the investigation began, members of the Ufa circle began to suspect that Sapozhnikov was recruited by the FSB and in 2020 specially introduced into the organization as a provocateur.

The investigation’s pressure on the remaining members of the circle was aimed at neutralizing those who could resist the official version of the prosecution. But one of the circle members was on vacation in Turkey in March 2022. After news came from Ufa about a search of his house and the arrest of his comrades, he and his family were forced to make the difficult decision to emigrate.

Already in the USA, he wrote several articles to reveal the case from the inside, in which he gave an alternative version of what was happening and exposed the provocateur.

On January 30, 2024, hearings of the so-called “case of Ufa Marxist circle” began in the Central District Military Court in Yekaterinburg. At the very first hearing, one of the defendants, Yuri Efimov, stated that the accusation was fabricated, and the main witness was a provocateur.

It is obvious that a case of 30 volumes will take a long time to be considered. Only a few meetings took place over six months. It seems that even the court is embarrassed by the absurdity of the situation and does not yet know how to behave.

In the first days of Russia’s imperialist aggression in Ukraine, when it became clear that a “blitzkrieg” would not work and a protracted war would sooner or later cause discontent among the workers, the State Duma, obedient to Vladimir Putin, hastened to adopt additions to the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation.

The most famous innovation was the so-called “article on discrediting the Russian army,” under which several thousand people were convicted in administrative cases (Administrative Code of the Russian Federation 20.3.3) and several dozen for repeated violations in criminal cases (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation 280.3 — up to three years in prison).

In fact, anyone who actively expresses their non-acceptance of a “special military operation” can be charged under this article. And this is not always required!

A young hero

On the night of February 24, 2024, on the second anniversary of the beginning of the aggression, a very young communist Daria Kozyreva was arrested in St. Petersburg for pasting a piece of paper with lines in Ukrainian from his poem “Testament” to the monument to the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko:

Oh bury me, then rise ye up
And break your heavy chains
And water with the tyrants’ blood
The freedom you have gained.

Daria became imbued with communist ideas as a teenager; she read Capital at the age of 12. Before her arrest, she participated in the work of two left-wing organizations and circles associated with them. As she grew up, Daria moved from Stalinism-Hoxhaism to authentic Leninism.

From the beginning of the “special operation,” Daria, assessing it as an imperialist war, did not limit herself to routine condemnation of what was happening — she acted. In January of this year, she was expelled from St. Peters­burg State University for a post on social networks against new articles of the criminal code, where Daria ridiculed Russian claims to “denazify Ukraine.”

Even before reaching adulthood at 18, she came to the attention of law enforcement officers because of an anti-war inscription on Palace Square in St. Petersburg. She and her friend received the first report for discrediting the army in August 2022 for tearing down a poster in Patriot Park, calling for service in the active army under a contract.

At that time, the punishment was administrative. A secondary offense of this kind implies criminal liability, and Daria was imprisoned in a pre-trial detention center for the leaflet on the monument.

Eighteen-year-old Daria Kozyreva perceives repressions against herself as proof of a completed duty, as recognition by her enemies of the importance of her struggle. It is characterized by a sacrificial principle in the best traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement. This helps the resilient young woman endure the hardships of imprisonment.

Comrades who correspond with her and saw her at the trials note that Daria is in a great mood and is determined to fight to the end. In all the photographs from the courtroom, Daria smiles widely. In an open letter to the opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta, which has been published only in electronic format for more than two years, she writes:

“On the evening of the 25th, I learned about the criminal case — and was in some kind of desperate delight. I smiled and joked during the search, and continued to smile when they brought me to the temporary detention facility. And there, on the night from the 25th to the 26th, I realized: that’s it, now my conscience will calm down. It tormented me for two damn years. I felt like I wasn’t doing enough; and even though I had anti-war actions on my record, my conscience told me: if you remain free, it means you haven’t done enough.

“Sometimes I didn’t understand what right I had to walk free, while brave and honest Russians were locked in prison. I understood that if the ‘Putin regime’ lasted any longer, then my chance of getting to prison was quite high. Essentially, what was supposed to happen, happened. I didn’t expect that they would decide to put me for Taras Shevchenko — oh my God, this is absurd! Well, the merrier! Shevchenko is my favorite poet and it is a special pleasure to suffer for him.

“… I’m not afraid of getting sentenced. If necessary, I would give my life for my beliefs, but here they will only take me away for a few years. I gladly accept this bitter cup and drink it to the dregs with pride.”

A regime in fear of solidarity

The fate of several leftwing activists we’ve discussed here — different in views, type of activity, and temperament — clearly indicates that in today’s Russia the efforts of the state as the repressive apparatus of the ruling class are aimed at eliminating, uprooting all resistance to the established regime, at eliminating any alternative, no matter how harmless at first glance it may seem, at settling scores with those who think and live “not according to ours.

The regime sees, and rightly so, a threat in any manifestation of freedom, and dissent. Therefore, not only the radical left, but anyone who raises a voice against the established order, in defense of the oppressed, is at risk.

Democratic procedures like elections have long turned into a fiction, and this is not really hidden from anyone. An active and radically thinking citizen cannot count on the opportunity to act in the legal political field. But this is not enough.

It is not enough for the state to drive all consistent and energetic oppositionists into the “ghetto.” It needs them to not even pose a potential threat.

There is still enough space in prisons and penal colonies, and it will always find a suitable law to send anyone we don’t like there — and if suddenly there are not enough laws, it will adopt new ones. What does it cost, with such a parliament!

As the repressive policies of the authorities increase, opposition from the left and democratic forces increases. In addition to campaigns to protect specific political prisoners, structures are emerging that aim to unite efforts and politically formalize the struggle for the release of those who suffered for freedom, for the ideals of equality and social justice.

One such structure is the Solidarity Action Committee. This organization already existed in the second half of the 2000s, when it sought to coordinate the activity of trade unions, strike committees and left-wing organizations, establishing information exchange and mutual assistance between them, and contributed to the development of a common position.

In less than five years of its existence, the Committee carried out dozens of actions and solidarity campaigns, the largest of which were a 28-day strike at the Ford plant in Vsevolozhsk and a two-month “Italian strike” in the Seaport of St. Petersburg. At that time there was a rise in the class struggle, weak of course but, by the standards of post-Soviet Russia, quite worthy of attention.

Now, unfortunately, the realities have changed: the labor movement is in a rut, and the problem of political persecution has come to the fore.

The committee resumed its work in the spring of 2022, with the outbreak of war and an attack on people’s social and political rights. Without refusing in principle to work with centers of self-organization of workers, the new SAC in its practical activities is primarily engaged in helping repressed leftists, workers and trade union activists.

We took the cases and are directly involved in the protection and support of many of the above-mentioned activists: Boris Kagarlitsky, Alexander Kupriyanov, Anton Orlov, Lev Skoryakin, Daria Kozyreva. Members of the SAC from Bashkortostan provide assistance to the “Ufa Five,” monitor the progress of the trial, disseminate information about the views and fate of comrades in trouble, and support them with letters and parcels.

While defending specific activists, we do not forget about the political and economic struggle for the liberation of labor and humanity as a whole from the dictatorship of capital. Every action we take is aimed at making wage workers aware of their class interests and organizing to fight for these interests.

We consider it extremely important to strengthen ties of international solidarity. The current moment requires all the progressive left forces of the planet to unite and organize to fight for a future in which there is no war, exploitation, poverty and injustice.

The world should belong to those who shed their blood, sweat and tears for its benefits. We are confident that our foreign comrades will provide us with all possible support. We express the same readiness!

Ivan Petrov is a collective pseudonym of the Solidarity Action Committee (SAC). You can contribute to supporting the activities of SAC, including support to political prisoners, via https://boosty.to/komitetsd.