The Afghan women farmers keeping their village alive

Eshtiwi (Afghanistan) (AFP) – In a remote province of northeastern Afghanistan, women farmers are playing a vital role in their community's survival among the snow-capped mountains.


Issued on: 05/07/2026 - RFI

In northeastern Afghanistan women farmers are playing a vital role in the survival of their communities. © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

The fields of Eshtiwi show only the first faint signs of growth in June, with small green sprouts emerging around the village.

Habiba, who spoke to AFP while busy weeding, is proud to have been farming in Nuristan province for decades.

"Since I was eight years old, I've been going to the field with my mother," said the 46-year-old, who only has one name.

"When we harvest wheat, beans, potatoes and corn in the fields in autumn and bring them back home, we feel happy," she added.

In Afghanistan, women are generally allowed to farm despite being banned by the Taliban government from most employment.

The river Parun flowing along a hillside on the outskirts of Parun district in Afghanistan's Nuristan province © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

Mohammad Yahya Faizi, a 34-year-old agriculture graduate, said he respects the women's work.

"We would not have food anymore in the middle of the winter" without their work, he said.

Eshtiwi in summertime is only reachable by a dirt track and, before AFP's visit, it had been years since international media had reached the village.

Faizi said "tasks have been divided between men and women" for generations in the Parun Valley, where residents speak their own dialect.

"Women are busy with agriculture, planting, watering and cooking at home," said Faizi, a village farmer who volunteers with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations.

Men help with animal-drawn ploughs, handle livestock, and gather firewood for winter, when snow cuts the village off from the outside world for almost six months.

Habiba's day starts at around 4am, when she gets up to pray before preparing breakfast with her daughters on a wood-fired stove.

Habiba preparing breakfast before going to work at a wheat field in Eshtiwi village © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

She makes bread using flour from her wheat, together with red beans from her fields, to eat alongside butter and dried yoghurt made by her husband.

The room, which doubles as a kitchen and bedroom, was decorated with flowers drawn by Habiba's 11-year-old daughter, Nahida, who was practising English that she had learnt at the village school.

While her mother never had the chance to go to school, Nahida's education will soon stop as girls nationwide are banned from education beyond the age of 12.

'Unrecognised'

FAO has declared 2026 the International Year of the Woman Farmer, with the agency highlighting how "unrecognised" their vital role is in supporting food security.

This is particularly true in Afghanistan, where almost a third of the population needs emergency food aid according to the UN.

one local woman farmers said under the condition of anonymity that they need more tools as well as opportunities to trade © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

Bibi Jan, a 70-year-old who grows beans and potatoes, said farming can be gruelling.

"We have to work hard, our hands peel... but there are children to feed," she said.

Habiba dreams of having a tractor, but it is too expensive; there is only one in the village that a family rents out to those who can afford it.

"I'm not that strong; my back and my legs hurt," she said.

Najia, who requested her surname not be used for privacy reasons, agreed local farmers need more tools as well as opportunities to trade.

"Farming is a great profession; it's not just for men," said the 28-year-old, who went to university in Pakistan.
Being in such a remote area makes it impossible to sell direct to customers © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

The farmers often have surplus crops, she said, but "there is no structured market to sell our produce."

Being in such a remote area makes it impossible to sell direct to customers, and there are only limited options to meet traders who pass through.

"I sell my potatoes for 70 afghanis ($1.10) for seven kilos (15 pounds), but I would need 150 afghanis" to earn a decent income, Najia said.

'Help each other'

Storage units have been financed by the UN, to allow harvests to be kept and sold when the market improves, and some of the women have received better seeds.

FAO has also introduced agroforestry – the combination of trees and crops on the same plot – to diversify their income.

In Afghanistan, women are generally allowed to farm but have been banned by the Taliban government from most jobs © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

Faizi said that the village, which once produced only apples and walnuts, now has cherry, pear, and peach trees, among others.

But climate change is a big concern, with less predictable snow and rain, or bringing floods that destroy the crops.

The UN Development Programme has found that Afghanistan is among a group of countries that "have contributed the least to global warming yet bear its heaviest costs".

For Najia, the weather was a further challenge: "We can't predict it; it just hits us."

Climate change poses challenges, with less predictable snow and rain, or by bringing floods that destroy crops © Wakil KOHSAR / AFP

But despite the difficulties, she said women love working outdoors together.

"We can help each other," she said, while also providing the village with nutritious food.

"What we grow with our own hands is very healthy."

GENDER APARTHEID OK

Russia’s Warming Relations With The Taliban Pose New Challenges For US Strategy – Analysis


June 30, 2026 
Hudson Institute
By Luke Coffey

Key Takeaways

Russia is now the Taliban’s strongest international backer, becoming the only country to formally recognize its government and signing a military cooperation agreement in 2026.

Moscow’s strategy is to use the Taliban to counter ISKP, exploit the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and build an anti-Western axis with Iran, China, and North Korea.

This partnership harms U.S. interests by legitimizing the Taliban, potentially aiding Russia in Ukraine, and strengthening an authoritarian bloc against the West.

Analysis

Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Moscow has pursued increasingly close ties with the extremist Islamist organization. Russia is now the only country that formally recognizes the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Even neighboring countries such as China, Iran, India, and Pakistan have refused to do so. Earlier this year, Moscow signed a military and security cooperation agreement with the Taliban.

Russia is motivated by several factors. First, Moscow naively believes that closer cooperation with the Taliban can serve as a counterweight to other terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Second, after the Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Moscow saw an opportunity to compound Washington’s political and reputational damage: by engaging with Kabul at the expense of Western influence, it could undermine US interests. Finally, just as the Taliban is seeking legitimacy outside Afghanistan, Russia is seeking greater legitimacy outside Europe. The Kremlin’s closer ties with the Taliban government are consistent with its deeper relationships with China, North Korea, and Iran following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Timeline of Russia-Taliban Relations

2003: Russia proscribes the Taliban as a terrorist organization.

2015–16: Russia begins quiet contacts with the Taliban in response to ISKP.
Moscow started seeing the Taliban as a possible counterweight to ISKP rather than only as a terrorist enemy.

November 2018: Russia hosts the Moscow Format talks with Taliban participation.
Russian diplomacy shifted from quiet contacts to engaging with the Taliban publicly.

August 2021: The Taliban seizes Kabul.
Russia kept its embassy open and maintained channels with the Taliban, positioning itself for engagement rather than isolation.

September 2022: The Taliban signs a provisional trade deal with Russia for fuel, gas, and wheat.
This deal was one of the Taliban government’s first major international economic agreements and moved the relationship from diplomacy to practical trade.

April 2025: Russia removes the Taliban from its banned terrorist list.

July 2025: Russia formally recognizes the Taliban government.
Russia became the first (and, so far, only) country to recognize Taliban rule after 2021, giving Kabul its biggest diplomatic victory since taking power.

May 2026: Russia and the Taliban sign a military-technical cooperation agreement.
This agreement marked the deepest security cooperation yet, moving the relationship beyond diplomacy, trade, and recognition to formal defense-related engagement.

Military-Technical Agreement Explained

In May 2026, Russia and the Taliban formally signed a military-technical cooperation agreement on the sidelines of the International Security Forum, held near Moscow. Former Russian Defense Minister and current Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council Sergei Shoigu signed the agreement with Mohammad Yaqoob, who serves as the Taliban’s de facto defense minister and is the son of the late Mullah Omar, the former Taliban leader who refused to hand over Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks.

Neither side has made the details of the agreement public. Reporting and analysis, however, suggest that it could include Russian technical and military assistance to Taliban security forces, joint training, military education opportunities, and the supply of spare parts to help the Taliban maintain Soviet- and Russian-era military equipment still in its possession. This is especially important because many of the higher-end American military systems left behind in Afghanistan have become difficult, if not impossible, for the Taliban to maintain since it lacks proper spare parts and technical expertise.

The agreement formally links a Moscow-Kabul axis against Western interests and takes Russia’s formal diplomatic recognition of the Taliban to a new level of defense cooperation. While no public reporting indicates that the Taliban has agreed to support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, especially in terms of manpower, the agreement likely marks the starting point for deeper security cooperation. Russia has already relied on foreign manpower during the war, ranging from North Korean troops reportedly deployed under state-to-state arrangements to foreign nationals from countries such as Cuba, India, and Nepal recruited or otherwise drawn into Russian military service. Therefore, Taliban or other Afghanistan-based fighters could eventually serve alongside Russia against Ukraine.

Recent reports also suggest that Russia may directly finance, train, and equip a special 8,000-strong force under the direct command of Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s supreme leader. This unit would reportedly sit outside the Taliban government’s usual security structures and chain of command.

Implications for US Policy

The growing ties between Russia and the Taliban should alarm US policymakers for several reasons:

Russia’s support for the Taliban undermines US interests in Afghanistan and the broader region. Anything that legitimizes or strengthens the Taliban—whether financially, economically, diplomatically, or militarily—undermines America’s broader interests in Central and South Asia.

Russia-Taliban military cooperation could impact Ukraine. The military-technical cooperation agreement could become the starting point for deeper military ties between Moscow and Kabul. Over time, this could affect Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and further internationalize its aggression against Kyiv.

Kremlin-Taliban cooperation reinforces the wider anti-Western axis involving Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. Moscow’s engagement with the Taliban is consistent with its broader effort to build relationships with actors that can help undermine US interests around the world.

Russian military or security assistance would strengthen the Taliban’s capacity for repression. Any such assistance could help the Taliban continue its oppression of the Afghan people and suppress groups carrying out legitimate armed resistance to Taliban rule, including the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.

About the author: 

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute


About Hudson Institute
Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom.
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UN Chief Says Civilians ‘Must Be Protected’ as Pakistani Strikes Kill Dozens of Afghans

Women and children were reportedly among the at least 28 civilians killed and 49 others wounded on Sunday by airstrikes targeting Pakistani Taliban fighters in Afghanistan’s Paktia, Paktika, and Kunar provinces.


Afghan mourners offer funeral prayers for Pakistani airstrike victims at a village in Tsamkani district of Afghanistan’s Paktia province on June 29, 2026.
(Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

Brett Wilkins
Jun 29, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on Monday called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians” after Pakistani airstrikes killed and wounded scores of Afghans, including women and children.

Pakistani forces bombed targets in Afghanistan’s Paktia, Paktika, and Kunar provinces and launched a ground invasion of the neighboring nation.

The attacks—which Afghanistan’s Taliban government called “cowardly” and an “atrocity”—reportedly killed at least 28 civilians and wounded 49 others.

“We call on all parties to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and continue to stress that civilians and civilian infrastructure must be protected at all times,” Guterres said in a statement read in New York by his spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric.

Dujarric also said that the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) “just confirmed that many civilians were killed and injured in these airstrikes carried out by Pakistan,” and that “humanitarian colleagues tell us that the latest attacks have also reportedly triggered displacement, and humanitarian partners on the ground are assessing needs and preparing to provide emergency assistance.”

Paktia elder Adam Khan told Agence France-Presse that those killed in one of the strikes “were innocent civilians, including children, elderly people, and women” sleeping in a house.

Pakistani officials say the military operations are aimed at militant groups that it says operate from Afghan territory and launch attacks into Pakistan, not at Afghanistan’s government. Islamabad accuses Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan—also known as the Pakistani Taliban—and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar of having recently attacked Pakistani security forces and civilians.

Last October, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a now-imploded ceasefire after weeks of border clashes that killed dozens of civilians and wounded hundreds more.

WTF 

EU gambles on Taliban talks to fast-track Afghan deportations

A Taliban delegation is due to fly into Brussels on Tuesday, having been granted a one-day visa to hold talks with the EU on returning failed asylum seekers to Afghanistan. However, human rights groups have warned that the scheme runs counter to the bloc's values.


Issued on: 23/06/2026 - RFI

Migrants line up at a registration centre for asylum seekers in Berlin, Germany. AP - Markus Schreiber

The European Commission has invited the officials for discussions under a push to crack down on irregular migration and boost deportations – despite it not formally recognising the Taliban administration.

The EU outreach to the Taliban authorities has drawn fierce pushback, with rights groups urging the commission to back out of the planned meeting.

A spokeswoman for the foreign minister of Belgium, which issued the documents in its capacity as host country to the European institutions, told AFP the five requested visas were granted Monday afternoon "after a security assessment".

They were just valid for Belgium and not the broader free-movement Schengen area and for one day only, she said.

Belgium declined to disclose the date of the delegation's arrival, citing security reasons, but multiple sources as well as Afghan media reports suggested the talks should take place Tuesday.

The delegation was understood to be flying in and out of the country via Turkey.

EU's push to deport Afghan refugees brings the Taliban back to the table

Brussels and EU countries have denied that hosting Taliban officials is tantamount to recognising the government in Kabul, but critics including leading rights groups say it would renege on the bloc's values.

"EU countries are undermining their credibility by condemning Taliban abuses and pursuing accountability on one hand, while cooperating with the Taliban to forcibly return Afghans on the other," said Fereshta Abbasi of Human Rights Watch.

European governments shut their embassies in Kabul when the Taliban authorities returned to power in 2021 and imposed their strict interpretation of Islamic law.

Women must be almost entirely covered when they leave home and are banned from a host of public places, including parks and gyms, while girls' education stops at age 12.

‘All they dream of is leaving’: the reality of life for women under the Taliban

Right-wing push

This month the European Union's migration chief Magnus Brunner defended the outreach, saying Brussels had no other option than to talk to the Taliban government about returning irregular migrants from Afghanistan.

European governments have sought a tougher stance on migration as public opinion has hardened, fuelling far-right electoral gains across the continent.

EU countries received about a million asylum applications filed by Afghans between 2013 and 2024, according to the bloc's data agency. About half as many were approved over the period.

Thousands of Afghan refugees return from Pakistan as border tensions boil over

Around 20 of the EU's 27 member states expressed interest in returning some migrants without a right to stay, particularly those with criminal convictions, to Afghanistan in a letter last year.

"The focus for member states is very much on persons who have committed serious crimes or who pose a security threat," commission spokesman Markus Lammert told journalists Monday.

Rights groups have questioned the legality and ethics of returning migrants to a country that is in the midst of a severe humanitarian crisis, with millions facing hunger and economic hardship, according to the United Nations.

(with AFP)

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Climate Change And The Future Of Central Asia-South Asia Connectivity – Analysis

The Middle Corridor -- or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route -- is a network of roads, railroads, and ports that connect China to Europe. It offers an alternative to a northern route which largely passes through Russia, and to maritime routes. Credit: RFE/RL

June 12, 2026 
By Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza

At the 64th session of the U.N. climate framework (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies (SB64) in Bonn, Germany, which is running June 8-18, India – alongside a host of international groupings spanning the ideological spectrum – has called for direct action on a widening gap in climate-relevant funding. Whether any concrete outcomes will emerge from the ongoing meeting is so far unclear. Nevertheless, thousands of kilometers to the east, in Central as well as South Asia, the consequences of inaction are significant, not just for climate mitigation and adaptation goals of the regions’ countries, but also for the ambitious regional connectivity projects between the two.

The Hindu Kush Himalaya region, which stretches across Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan, is arguably the epicenter of the climate emergency confronting both Central and South Asia. According to estimates, glaciers across the 3,500-kilometer arc, also known as the Third Pole, are retreating 65 percent faster than in the previous decade. Ten major river basins originate from the region. The glacier melt can potentially threaten the water supply for nearly 2 billion people across all eight countries. The region has already recorded a 23-year low in snow persistence for the third consecutive year. In 2025, for instance, the Indus river basin ran 16 percent below normal and some eastern river basins are facing deficits of up to 50 percent.

In Central Asia, there is a different crisis, involving a dearth of water. Over the past 70 years, the region has already warmed by 1.2 degrees C, which has led to a 20 percent decline in snow depth. Projected temperature rise of 2-6 degrees C by century’s end threatens to intensify droughts and land degradation. Already, 2024 saw the region’s worst flooding in over 70 years, even as the Western Himalayas, eastern Iran, and parts of Afghanistan experienced below-normal precipitation. This pattern of extremes can become more frequent.

Against this backdrop, I participated in the second Termez Dialogue, held on June 4-6 in Uzbekistan. The primary theme of the event was connectivity between Central and South Asia, with an additional focus on climate change and environmental resilience related to the ambitious regional connectivity projects. The dialogue also highlighted a growing recognition that connectivity and climate adaptation must be seen as intertwined agendas. The discussion emphasized that Afghanistan plays a crucial role as a strategic link between Central and South Asia. Therefore, it is essential to integrate Afghanistan into regional climate adaptation frameworks and conversations to ensure both environmental security and physical connectivity.


The dialogue is part of Uzbekistan’s urgent exploration of the possibilities for implementing several major infrastructure projects linking Central and South Asia, most of which run through Afghanistan. Apart from the bottlenecks posed by regional rivalries, there is also a realization that projects such as CASA-1000, the INSTC, and the TAPI pipeline, all still in their incipient stages of implementation despite being under discussion for decades, were conceptualized on environmental assumptions that climate change seems on the verge of now to be undermining.

Take, for instance, the curious case of the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) project, originally conceptualized as far back as 2008. The logic of this $1.2 billion power transmission effort, designed to carry surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, rests on the existence of surplus glacial and snowmelt-fed hydropower in the summer months. If projections of continuing glacial retreat, as well as consequent peaking river flows followed by declines after 2050, hold, those surpluses could disappear entirely. Unless climate resilience is inbuilt into the project, as the World Bank clearly underlines, hydropower generation can undergo significant disruption, driving the project into a no-show. Therefore, hydropower projections for the project need to be stress-tested against climate scenarios, not just current hydrology.

While one can argue that the involved countries will still derive benefit from the project for more than two decades, Afghanistan’s incapacity to generate finances for its share of the project has introduced a roadblock. There seems to be no way around this, unless the Taliban generate revenue or convince international donors to unfreeze financing. Both seem to be a herculean task but a necessary condition to break the current impasse.


The $10 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, the initial concept for which dates to the 1990s, is set to traverse some of the most climate-vulnerable and politically fragile terrain in the world. A desertifying and drought-prone Afghanistan is not the most ideal terrain to build and operate the infrastructure needed for the project. Therefore, the pipeline routes for the project need to account for changing precipitation and temperature profiles across Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to managing the acrimonious relationships between these two countries and the associated funding challenges.

In contrast, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer multi-modal network connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia, which originated in 2002, is somewhat less directly exposed to glacial dynamics. The project is of immense importance to India. Still, extreme weather events along its overland and maritime routes face scenarios of shifting precipitation patterns, which have cast a shadow over the integration of road and rail networks. The INSTC, without significant climate resilience modifications, may not prove viable in the long run. It needs to factor in the increased frequency of extreme weather events that will test road, rail, and port infrastructure over their operational lifetimes.

Uzbekistan’s climate adaptation funding deficit is estimated at $7.2 billion through 2030. The country is actively seeking international climate finance to close the gap, experimenting with green investments and agricultural water-saving technologies, and attempting to shift from state-led fossil fuel dependence toward renewable energy and climate resilience.

As could perhaps be expected, the countries most exposed to these climate risks are also among those least equipped to manage them without external assistance. Climate negotiations in the past years have become all about forceful articulation of positions and a bit of grand bargaining. U.S. President Donald Trump’s exit from the global climate treaty puts enormous pressure even on the wealthy and willing countries to provide finances for the adaptation and mitigation funds. It is for this reason that India has been insisting that climate financing is at the core of adaptation. But the gnawing gap between the ambitions being expressed in Bonn and the institutional architecture available to channel resources toward projects such as CASA-1000 or TAPI remains wide.

The climate crisis unfolding across the Hindu Kush Himalaya and Central Asia can reshape the viability of these ambitious connectivity projects. While these were conceived in a different climatic reality, and did not include deliberate climate-proofing, they now risk becoming stranded investments. Forums such as the Termez Dialogue signal a growing awareness and interest in binding connectivity and climate resilience together. An institutional bridge between climate finance negotiations and on-the-ground infrastructure planning in South and Central Asia could be the next target for these two regions if they intend to implement these much-delayed projects and derive economic benefits along with environmental safety for the region.

This article was published at The Diplomat


About Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza
Dr. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is President & Founder of Mantraya; Consultant/ Security and Political Analyst; Expert and Contributor to the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) at the Middle East Institute, Washington DC; Senior Analyst, South Asia desk, Wikistrat Analytic Community, New York; Associate Editor, Journal of Asian Security & International Affairs, Sage Publications; Strategic Studies Network (SSN) Fellow, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC; Advisor, Independent Conflict Research & Analysis (ICRA), London. Shanthie has previously been Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS).
View all posts by Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza →

Pakistan renews air strikes on Afghanistan, killing dozens


Pakistan on Wednesday launched deadly air strikes on Afghanistan after a period of relative calm following months of fighting at the beginning of the year. Pakistan's government said 26 "militants" were killed while Afghan authorities said at least 12 people, including children, died in provinces near the border.


Issued on: 10/06/2026 - 
By: FRANCE 24

An armed Taliban security personnel walks through a marketplace in Asadabad, Kunar province, Afghanistan, on June 10, 2026. © Wakil Kohsar, AFP

Pakistan has renewed deadly air strikes on neighbouring Afghanistan, officials in both countries said Wednesday, in the worst violence in weeks following a period of relative calm.

Pakistan's government said on Wednesday that 26 "militants" linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group were killed in the attacks.

"In the aftermath of recent terrorist incidents in Pakistan .... precise and calibrated Strikes were carried out along Pakistan Afghanistan border areas on hideouts and safe havens," Pakistan's information minister Attaullah Tarar posted on X.

He did not comment on any civilian casualties after Afghan authorities, who have denied Afghanistan is used for militancy, said at least 12 people, including children, were left dead in the strikes.

An AFP journalist saw a house completely destroyed in the southeastern province of Khost, where residents were digging graves to bury those killed in the overnight attack.

Afghanistan's government spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said "11 children, one woman, and one elderly man were killed" in strikes on Khost, Kunar and Paktika provinces.

Islamabad said the strikes came in response to "recent terrorist incidents in Pakistan" and killed 26 militants linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group.

"Precise and calibrated Strikes were carried out along Pakistan Afghanistan border areas on hideouts and safe havens," information minister Attaullah Tarar wrote on X, without commenting on civilian casualties.

The attack in Khost's Spera district killed nine people and wounded 10 others, including children, a provincial official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

In neighbouring Paktika, two residents said a separate attack killed three civilians in Barmal district.

The strike hit a home, and those killed were children, one of the residents said.

The strikes are the deadliest in weeks and follow a period of relative calm at the border after conflict between the two countries erupted in late February.

Residents pay the price as Afghanistan-Pakistan border remains closed

An escalation saw fierce fighting along the frontier and unprecedented Pakistani air strikes on Afghan cities – including the capital Kabul and southern Kandahar, where the supreme leader is based.

At least 372 Afghan civilians were killed and 397 others wounded in that conflict in the first three months of this year, a United Nations report published last month said.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been fraught since the Taliban took power for a second time in 2021.

Security issues have proved a sticking point, especially Pakistan's demand that Afghanistan curb the TTP militant group.

Islamabad accuses the Taliban government of sheltering militants behind a surge in attacks, particularly the TTP, which has waged a violent campaign against Pakistan for years.

Afghan officials deny the charge and counter that Pakistan harbours hostile groups and does not respect its sovereignty.

The border between the neighbours has remained largely closed since a flare-up in violence in October, freezing bilateral trade.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

The Strategic Logic Driving Russia’s Taliban Engagement – Analysis

GENDER APARTHEID IS NOT PART OF IT

Taliban Defense Minister Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid shakes hands with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu during the signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow region, May 27, 2026. (Photo: Taliban Defense Ministry)

June 9, 2026 

Observer Research Foundation
By Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash and Shivam Shekhawat

On 21 May, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, Sergey Shoigu, reiterated Moscow’s concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the potential sources of destabilisation in the region. Speaking at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) security meeting, he highlighted the presence of 18,000 to 23,000 militants from more than 20 groups within Afghanistan, the gradual return of militants from Syria to the country, and the production and trade of synthetic drugs in and around Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Even as he acknowledged the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate’s efforts in countering these challenges — particularly the presence of militants — he also underscored the limits on the group’s ability to address these threats effectively, necessitating cooperation with the regime.

The Taliban’s removal from Russia’s terrorist list, and its subsequent recognition in July 2025, was an inflexion point for strategic stability in Eurasia, reflecting regional actors’ growing receptiveness to engaging with the Taliban. While there is considerable impetus to progressively strengthen the partnership, Moscow has had to tread cautiously in announcing large-scale infrastructure development projects, owing to the security factors outlined above and the deteriorating relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could potentially alter the threat calculus in the region.

Drivers of the Taliban-Russia Relationship

Moscow’s Taliban strategy is driven by a framework of pragmatic realism. The Taliban’s arrival in 2021 signalled an American retrenchment from the region, and Russia was quick to capitalise on this vacuum by establishing official contacts with the Taliban. Its embassy in Kabul remained operational, and it was the first country to open a business representative office in Kabul after the Taliban’s return. The Taliban’s swift consolidation of power reflected a new reality that states in the region would inevitably have to reckon with. The risk of proliferation of different terror groups inside Afghanistan — now that the US and its allies’ security umbrella had disappeared — raised the prospect of terror threats percolating into Central Asia and eventually making their way into Russia. The bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, for which the ISKP claimed responsibility, was the first sign of this fast-developing risk.


In 2024, the ISKP attacked Crocus City Hall, resulting in more than 140 fatalities. The attack highlighted the group’s ability to undertake transnational strikes. The perpetrators were from Central Asia, which further underscored Russia’s fears about the spillover. In the past year, there has been an uptick in armed incidentsat the Afghan-Tajikistan border, with more than 17 incidents reported in 2025 alone. At a security conference hosted by Moscow (26-29 May), the country’s security chief reiterated concerns about ISKP’s recruitment from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, its preparation for attacks, and its attempts to destabilise Taliban rule within the country, particularly in the north. Furthermore, in 2025, around 2,742 kilograms of drugs were confiscated; the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation has led to an increase in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, increasingly concentrated in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Without the Taliban pursuing a proactive policy of eliminating the terror threat and demonstrating its ability to police its borders, the risks of instability percolating into Central Asia remain high.

Against this backdrop, removing the Taliban from Russia’s terror list emerged as a priority. In 2025, the Russian Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its terror list, suspending the ban on its activities. In the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban an “ally” in the fight against terror. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government and subsequently accepted the credentials of Afghanistan’s new ambassador to Russia, Gul Hassan Hassan. This pivot towards a “full-fledged partnership” indicated the solidification of Moscow’s policy shift vis-à-vis Afghanistan. While there were reports of Russia’s possible interest in supplying weapons to the Taliban in the fight against ISKP, the two sides recently signed a military-technical agreement on the sidelines of a conference in Moscow, reflecting a shared commitment to containing the potential spillover from the regional security situation.


Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged in a crisis since February 2026, with attacks on each other’s military and border infrastructure. The rift is a double-edged sword for Moscow. On one hand, the persisting hostilities have implications for the regional balance of power; on the other, any resolution of fundamental differences — contingent on the Taliban outlawing the TTP — could result in the further fragmentation of the Taliban and the creation of a “new Taliban”. Moreover, this situation would inevitably lead to Afghan and Pakistani cadres defecting to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, which is banned in Russia. The possibility of this seems remote, as the Taliban have refrained from taking any major action against the group even under immense pressure. Amid Islamabad’s coercive attempts — reflected in strikes and sanctions — Moscow’s interest lies in the cessation of hostilities, and it has also offered to mediate in resolving the crisis. However, its leverage remains limited. The persisting instability across the Durand Line reduces the impetus for implementing transport corridors and critical connectivity linking Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

The Taliban’s Calculus

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate will complete half a decade in power in 2026. In the past five years, Russia has been the only country to grant de jure recognition to the regime. Notwithstanding the absence of formal recognition, other regional countries, including India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran, have opened channels of communication with the Taliban and expanded pragmatic cooperation.

The rationale for engagement hovers between concerns about the proliferation of militant groups within Afghanistan and doubts about the Taliban’s capability and willingness to control them. For the Islamic Emirate, a major source of legitimacy has been its engagement with other countries. Russia’s support thus lends a veneer of legitimacy to the Taliban, which uses Moscow’s position against sanctions as a counter to the persistence of Western sanctions. The Emirate emphasises the principles of a balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy, with a focus on developing practical cooperation in trade and transit infrastructure, and positions itself as a crucial vector in facilitating regional connectivity. While Moscow is advancing the relationship to fulfil its objectives of ensuring regional security and furthering economic development, Russia’s support lends credence to the Emirate’s legitimisation process.

Economic Engagement as a Pillar of Regional Stability

For Moscow, the rationale for engagement transcends the underlying security threats and carries a degree of urgency around integrating Afghanistan into Eurasian supply chains by strengthening regional connectivity. For the latter to be possible, a stable Afghanistan remains critical. In this context, Russia has called upon regional states to formally recognise the regime. Strategic stability in the region remains a critical discussion point in platforms such as the SCO and the Moscow Format talks. In November 2025, Gul Hassan Hassan met Russia’s representative to the SCO to discuss the prospect of granting Afghanistan observer status in the grouping, with the understanding that Afghanistan’s integration into institutional regional agreements could pave the way for a new regionalism in Eurasia.

During the Russia-Afghanistan business forum last year, five MoUs were concluded in the areas of trade, transportation, and energy exploration, indicative of an appetite for enhanced engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Trade between the two countries currently stands at somewhere between US$300-400 million. Between April and May 2026, delegations from both sides held multiple engagements at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and business-to-business levels. Talks on expanding banking and economic cooperation are also underway.

Much of Russia’s economic engagement with Afghanistan has been routed through Tatarstan, with the region’s trade with Afghanistan reaching US$51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, accounting for ten percent of overall trade between the two countries. Investors from Tatarstan have shown interest in Afghanistan, while the Russian Chamber of Commerce has been exploring opportunities for cooperation in the agriculture, fertilisers, and oil extraction sectors. Projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway (connecting Termez to the Arabian Sea), the Torgundi-Herat-Spin Boldak railway network, the Khaf-Herat railway network, and the Wakhan Corridor highways offer an alternative to Central Asian states’ dependence on Iranian ports for maritime transit.

With growing exasperation over the slow progress on China’s Mes Aynak mine, the Emirate is also looking to diversify its investments. The Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum has invited Russian firms to invest in Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon projects, with talks of Russian investment in water transfer projects as well. However, despite growing interest, no large-scale projects have been concluded between the two countries.

The Way Forward

The Taliban’s official position refuses to acknowledge the presence of any terror group within the country, with the Emirate’s leaders doubling down on their claimed success in eviscerating the ISKP’s presence inside Afghanistan — asserting that this has compelled the group to regroup in neighbouring Pakistan. While the ISKP has expanded its presence in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, it continues to remain active within Afghanistan. The attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul in January this year is a case in point. Russia’s posture towards the Taliban has shifted in light of the evolving regional security environment, prompting a strategic recalibration across Eurasia. As the Taliban’s consolidation of power exacerbated security risks in the region — with the threat of terror percolating into Central Asia and Russia — a stable Afghanistan came to be seen as being in the interest of all regional actors, as reflected in Moscow’s recent actions. Moving forward, while the two countries will continue to cooperate economically at a moderate level, the focus of the relationship will be on counterterrorism and security-related cooperation, keeping in mind the broader regional security situation.

About the authors:

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


About Observer Research Foundation
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Trump Is Trying to Shoot His Way Out of US Decline—It Won’t Work

The president wants a 50% increase over last year’s Pentagon budget, to $1.5 trillion; a wiser policy would be to rethink how the US is to co-exist with other nations in what is emerging as a multipolar world.


US President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on March 3, 2026.
(Photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/ AFP via Getty Images)

Robert Freeman
Jun 08, 2026

Common Dreams

The US empire is in decline. Compare it today to where it was only 30 years ago, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a “hyperpower,” then, almost inconceivably dominant with no challengers on Earth.

Since then, China has surpassed the US economically. Russia is rated No.1 militarily. The US has to borrow close to $2+ trillion per year (the annual federal budget deficit) just to keep the lights on. Its government based on checks and balances is under assault by a sleazy felon who wants to be king. It is wracked by social divisions that presage civil war.

President Donald Trump’s proposed solution to these problems is to shoot our way out. He wants a 50% increase over last year’s Pentagon budget, to $1.5 trillion. It is stupid in the measure to which it is excessive. It is suicidal to the extent it will degrade our security and our chances of improving national prosperity.

A wiser policy would be to rethink how the US is to co-exist with other nations in what is emerging as a multipolar world. That’s a big rethink. There’s another rethink coming as well: how we run the economy and what it is that actually accounts for national well-being.

The era when the US could dominate, intimidate, and expropriate the rest of the world is over. If it continues to push military power as its primary path forward it will continue to produce catastrophe.

Neither of these “rethinkings”—neither security nor the economy—will be easy. Both will go against existing failed doctrines and the powerful interests that back them. But, without doing this, we face the certainty of continuing national decline.

The highest-level rationale for rejecting a 50% increase in the Pentagon’s budget is that the military simply doesn’t win wars. Sure, it can knock off defenseless, pipsqueak principalities like Grenada, or Serbia, or Libya. But whenever it goes up against a committed adversary, especially one that fights back, it loses.

It lost in Vietnam to a nation of rice farmers that hadn’t even entered the industrial age. It killed more than 3 million Vietnamese, 4 million Southeast Asians when you count Laos and Cambodia. Yet, it lost.

It lost in Iraq, despite Iraq having been bombed for the prior decade, since the first Gulf War in 1991. Even in losing, the US killed more than a million Iraqis and spawned ISIS, one of the most virulent terrorist organizations ever let loose on the world.

It lost in Afghanistan, despite 20 years of trying to win. Afghanistan was a fourth-world country, with the Taliban literally living in caves. The Taliban had only hand-held firearms. No air force. No artillery. No satellite intelligence. The US still managed to lose.

Ukraine isn’t over, yet, but it is lost. Russia has crushed every one of the fabled “wonder weapons” the US has thrown at it. Remember when Trump was going to end the Ukraine war “on Day One”? We’re now past Day 500. It hasn’t ended because Trump is too weak to take the Loss on his watch. But it is lost.

Iran is the most recent—and damaging—case of catastrophic US military failure. It has a military budget one-one hundredth that of the US. Yet, Iran has “humiliated” the US, at least in the words of German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Neocon heavyweight Robert Kagan recently wrote, “It’s hard to think of a time when the United States suffered a total defeat in a conflict, a setback so decisive that the strategic loss could be neither repaired nor ignored.”

None of these outcomes are equivocal. None are ambiguous. Is that the kind of outfit we want to give a 50% raise to when it can never come close to accomplishing its essential mission? And when it never learns from its repeated failures?

This is one of the major rethinks that will have to be conducted before any thought can be given to giving even one extra dollar to the Pentagon. We need to hear from the leadership what, exactly, is going to change. And we don’t mean fiddling at the margins. We mean at the core of the institution. For example…

US weapons systems are not made to be able to win in battle. They are made to deliver maximum profits to the weapons makers. Consider…

The Patriot missile system is easily baited with low-cost drones into giving away its location and radar signature. “Here I am! Here I am!” It is then a sitting duck for cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, even swarms of the same low-cost drones.

The HIMARS rocket launcher uses common GPS as part of its guidance system. This is easily jammed resulting in missiles sometimes landing kilometers away from their intended targets. Its greatest value might be that every battery reliably drains $20 million from US taxpayers.

The M-1 Abrams tank wears a gigantic “shoot me” sign as soon as it’s spotted by one of the Russian drones that saturate the skies over Ukraine. The phrase “Fish in a barrel” comes to mind.

The bigger problem—bigger than weapons that don’t work—is that the US economy is not set up to support sustained, high intensity warfare. It gave up that capability decades ago, when it decided to de-industrialize so its companies could make more money building their stuff in China.

This is one of the reasons the US, via its proxy, Ukraine, has not been able to defeat Russia: it simply cannot supply the amount of ammunition Ukraine would need to prevail. Russia is firing 5-10 times the amount of artillery Ukraine is, and there’s literally nothing the US can do about it.

It would take decades to rebuild the weapons-focused industrial capacity the US possessed in the 1960s. Given the failure of the larger military enterprise in the US, there is no certainty that, once delivered, it would not be ill-conceived, misdirected, or already obsolete. In fact, given the Pentagon’s track record, the likelihood is that it would be all three.

The deepest problem for the US in grappling with increased Pentagon funding is rooted in its world view.

That was formed in the aftermath of World War II and reinforced following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991. After both events, the US stood astride the world like a colossus, unchallenged in its ability to destroy any other country. Heady stuff but the world doesn’t sit still.

Countries do not acquiesce in their own destruction. They organize themselves to fight back; they collaborate with other countries for collective self-defense; and they employ asymmetric strategies to defeat predators, as Vietnam and Afghanistan did, and as Iran has just done. The US military hasn’t gotten the memo.

The unprovoked Iran debacle has boosted the fortunes of Russia and China, the US’ principal rivals. It has elevated Iran to being the hegemon in the Persian Gulf. That rise is abetted by a quartet of Islamic powers that are tired of US and Israeli bullying: Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. They are forming an “Islamic NATO” to keep the US and Israel out of the Gulf. This is super important.

Since World War II, the Middle East has been one of the most important regions in the world because of its vast oil wealth. A 1945 US State Department memo stated that “Arab oil resources constitute a stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.”

It is the Trump Pentagon, the Pete Hegseth Pentagon, that has destroyed the US’ control of that “greatest material prize in world history.” Actually, it’s even worse than that. By forcing 50% higher oil prices on the rest of the world, the US is draining wealth from every country on Earth. Many of those countries were already economically tenuous. There’s not a one that doesn’t despise the US for the extortion.

Is that an organization to which we want to grant an additional half a trillion dollars a year? Every year? So it can wreak more destruction on US fortunes? Before it rethinks itself and how it can contribute responsibly to US well-being in the world? It’s not even fatuous. It’s insane.

So, if a $1.5 trillion budget for the military is not the solution to the US woes, what is?

The US could more plausibly revive its fortunes in the world by investing the would-be increase in Pentagon spending into the civilian economy, instead.

It should invest in the nation’s people—education—so as to improve the economy’s productivity. It should invest in the nation’s infrastructure to increase the economy’s efficiency. It should invest in scientific research and development to boost innovation. And, it should re-invest in alternative energy to build resilience.

Productivity. Efficiency. Innovation. Resilience. Those are what built the US in the 20th century. They are the real foundations of national well-being. None of them are mysteries as far as how they lead to a better economy and a stronger state. None are conceptually hard to carry out.

Donald Trump is doing exactly the opposite.

He is gutting education, rescinding major infrastructure projects, savaging scientific research, and in all ways possible dismantling alternative energy. Those avenues all go against the essence of Trumpism, which is looting, shifting national resources and wealth to the already wealthy—Trump’s base.

Looting is what Trump’s proposed increase in the Pentagon budget is really all about. It is the Mother of All Trump Grifts. It is 277 times larger than his laughable $1.8 billion Slush Fund. It wants to hide the grift under the quasi-sacrosanct cover of military spending.

But it doesn’t begin to even acknowledge, to say nothing of fix, the deep failings in the military. It actively damages the economy by diverting scarce resources to parasitic looting that inflicts more harm than it heals.

Trump’s proposal improves the fortunes of the already very wealthy, as all things from Trump do. It lards them with $500 billion of unaccountable giveaways every year. It is a payoff to his rich backers and to the military Trump thinks he’s going to need to finish his overthrow of the government when the time comes, in 2028.

The era when the US could dominate, intimidate, and expropriate the rest of the world is over. If it continues to push military power as its primary path forward it will continue to produce catastrophes like Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Iran, all of which have degraded US power, influence, and standing in the world.

Alternatively, it can invest in the economy, in the American people, to create higher growth, income, equality, resilience, and prosperity. Instead of trying to shoot our way out of our self-inflicted decline, we can try to think our way out, earn our way out, work our way out. It’s not certain. Nothing ever is. But it has so much more dignity and likelihood of success about it.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Robert Freeman

Robert Freeman is the Founder and Executive Director of The Global Uplift Project, a leading provider of educational infrastructure for the developing world. He is the author of The Best One Hour History series whose titles include World War I, The Cold War, The Vietnam War, and many others.
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Scholar Says Trump Disaster in Iran Helps Prove That Era of ‘American Empire Is Over’

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, said US military retrenchment is needed on a global scale.

Brad Reed
Jun 08, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

President Donald Trump’s illegal war with Iran has gone so poorly that it portends the end of the American-led global order, foreign policy scholar Jennifer Kavanagh wrote in an analysis published Monday by The American Conservative.

Despite Trump’s repeated declarations of a total US victory over Iran, Kavanagh wrote that the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed the limits of the American military, which in 2025 had a budget of nearly $1 trillion.

Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, argued that the Iran war has been particularly damaging to US power because it has drained US munitions supplies and has still achieved none of the major objectives Trump outlined at the start of the conflict.

“Some estimates suggest the United States has burned through 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, nearly 50% of its Patriot and THAAD stockpiles, and significant portions of advanced stand-off weapons like PRSM and JASSM missiles,” Kavanagh wrote. “The constraints on US military power created by these shortages will be consequential and enduring.”

In practical terms, Kavanagh said, this means the US simply cannot meet key commitments for the foreseeable future, such as supporting the defense of Taiwan in the case of an attack by China.

Kavanagh emphasized that American policymakers should reduce US military commitments around the world and not cling to a global order that is no longer sustainable.

“The period of US military dominance—and of American empire—is over,” Kavanagh wrote. “The resulting future will be less comfortable for the United States, but its changes are overdue and its challenges manageable. With the right moves today, American retrenchment can leave the United States, and the world, better off.”

This retrenchment, wrote Kavanagh, would refocus American defense strategy solely on defending US territory and “ensuring access to key economic markets.” In practice, this would mean closing military bases and ending deployments in Europe and the Middle East, a “narrowing” of security guarantees to NATO allies, and explicitly stating that it would not defend Taiwan in the face of an attack from China, which Kavanagh said would “reduce the risk of a war with China that at this point the United States is unprepared to fight.”

“These changes in posture and alliance commitments would amount to a massive transformation of American foreign policy,” Kavanagh acknowledged, “but the result would be a sustainable military position, consistent with US capabilities and resources and tailored to protecting US interests.”

There Is No Military Solution to the Middle East’s Political Issues

As difficult as it may be to imagine it now, what will be required is to work toward a regional security framework built on non-aggression, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of all states, and an end to the Israeli occupation and denial of Palestinian rights.


A flag of Iran hangs from a damaged residential building that, according to Iranian authorities, was hit by a strike on March 4 during the US-Israeli military campaign on April 14, 2026 in southeastern Tehran, Iran.
(Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images)

James Zogby
Jun 08, 2026

Common Dreams


Back when the Obama administration was negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran, I asked National Security Council officials, “Why are you expending all of your economic leverage, and political and diplomatic resources on stopping Iran from developing a bomb they don’t have (and even if they did, could never use), while these same resources could be mobilized to pressure Iran to end its meddlesome behaviors that are destabilizing countries across the region?”

Despite this reservation, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was announced, I supported it for three reasons. First, “the nuclear deal” was a negotiated settlement, which is always better than conflict. And despite White House spokespeople saying otherwise, Catherine Ashton, a top British diplomat involved in the negotiations, offered assurances that the deal was only a first step and that Iran’s behaviors would be next on the agenda. My hope was that sane minds would prevail and the initiated process might lead to a regional security compact and framework for peace.

The second reason was the way Republicans were working overtime to sabotage the agreement. It was unconscionable that they invited a foreign leader, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to address a joint session of Congress to urge members of Congress to vote against their own president. That was unacceptable interference in US politics.

The third (and maybe most unexpected) reason was the reaction to the JCPOA inside Iran. In a poll we conducted months after the deal was announced, we found a significant change in Iranian public opinion. Our earlier polls had demonstrated Iranians largely in favor of the regime’s spending money on allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. With the hint of peace, Iranians turned their priorities inward, with declining support for the regime’s foreign involvements. Instead of resources going abroad, Iranians wanted them to be used at home to create employment and opportunity. They also elevated their demands for greater personal freedom and political rights.

A decade after the JCPOA, the Middle East and the Gulf region are in a more precarious place than ever.

When, after Donald Trump’s election, he cancelled the Iran deal and began threatening the regime, we repeated the poll. The results had reverted. When citizens feel their country is being threatened, they tend to be less critical or to “rally around the flag.”

In the ensuing years, amid continuing signs of hostility from all sides—US, Israel, and Iran—the situation has shown no promise of improvement. Despite promising a better agreement, Trump did nothing more than deepen the animosity. The Biden administration was handed the thankless task of bringing a dead deal back to life—a task to which they never appeared to be fully committed. For its part, Iran continued to behave as a bad regional actor, all the while making threats and building its military capabilities.

Left on their own, the Arab Gulf states sought to create stability out of the possibility of chaos with which they were forced to contend. Unlike Iran, which had decided to use its wealth to export its influence and its anti-Western ideology, the Arab Gulf states had taken a different path, focusing on development, tourism, and trade. Their continued prosperity required a stable regional environment. And so, amid the tensions between the US and Israel and Iran, these Arab states made diplomatic and economic overtures to Iran, hoping for a more secure environment in the Gulf. They even hoped that the lure of joint prosperity and security might move the Iranians to join them in pursuing a more stable and prosperous future and convince the Israelis to resolve the longstanding wound of Palestinian dispossession and occupation, fostering conditions for regional peace. There was to be no such luck!

Israel wanted the economic benefits of regional peace but was unwilling to play its part. It intensified its occupation and the repression and strangulation of Palestinians. Then came October 7, and the region exploded. In short order, as Israel was pursuing a genocidal war in Gaza, Iran’s ally in Lebanon became engaged in a fateful and costly exchange with Israel in the north, a miscalculation with devastating consequences. The Israelis launched a deadly bombing campaign killing thousands of Lebanese, including Hezbollah’s leader. Months later, Israel and the US attacked Iran and killed Iran’s spiritual leader. Iran returned fire setting off a broader confrontation.

Negotiations produced what were called “cease fires” during which Palestinian and Lebanese death tolls continued to mount. When, egged on by Israel and Republican neocons, President Trump decided to “finish the job” by defeating the Iranian regime, the conflict took on a new character. Iran intensified its attacks on neighboring Arab Gulf states that housed US bases and closed the Straits of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil and gas supplies and negatively impacting the Gulf region’s economies.

Reading some of the Israeli, Arab, and US press is enough to make one pull out one’s hair. Some Israeli commentators from the far-right (and their American neocon acolytes) remain convinced that all that’s needed is another massive bombing campaign, coupled with yet a few more “targeted assassinations”—as if those tactics, which Israel has used repeatedly, will be any more successful than they’ve been in the past.

Meanwhile, hard-line Arab opinion writers celebrate the “brilliance” of Iranian tactics. It’s hard to see how incurring the enmity of their neighbors and putting their own and the region’s economic futures at risk can be construed as anything but reckless.

The US media is even more confounding, with its apparent addiction to breathlessly and uncritically following the barrage of confusing and contradictory posts coming from the president.

And so, a decade after the JCPOA, the Middle East and the Gulf region are in a more precarious place than ever. Although the situation is far more complicated than a decade ago, and the enmity on all sides so much deeper, the way forward is recognition that piecemeal approaches to the region, playing whack-a-mole, have only made the region less secure.

As difficult as it may be to imagine it now, what will be required is to work toward a regional security framework built on non-aggression, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of all states, and an end to the Israeli occupation and denial of Palestinian rights. This entails the recognition that there are no military solutions to the region’s political issues. In fact, each round of violence only exacerbates existing problems. It’s a tall order requiring leadership that is smart, courageous, and visionary. That may not exist today, but it’s necessary—and it’s the goal toward which we must direct our efforts.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


James Zogby
Dr. James J. Zogby is the author of Arab Voices (2010) and the founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a Washington, D.C.-based organization which serves as the political and policy research arm of the Arab American community. Since 1985, Dr. Zogby and AAI have led Arab American efforts to secure political empowerment in the U.S. Through voter registration, education and mobilization, AAI has moved Arab Americans into the political mainstream. Dr. Zogby has also been personally active in U.S. politics for many years; in 1984 and 1988 he served as Deputy Campaign manager and Senior Advisor to the Jesse Jackson Presidential campaign. In 1988, he led the first ever debate on Palestinian statehood at that year's Democratic convention in Atlanta, GA. In 2000, 2008, and 2016 he served as an advisor to the Gore, Obama, and Sanders presidential campaigns.
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