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Friday, August 14, 2026

Israeli settlers seize Palestinian water source in occupied West Bank to create recreational pool


Israeli settlers have taken control of a freshwater spring that Palestinian farmers in the occupied West Bank have relied on for generations, diverting its water to create a pool at an archaeological site advertised as a tourist attraction and leaving crops to wither. It is estimated that Israeli settlers have now seized control of 95 percent of the northern Jordan Valley's springs, pushing Palestinian communities off their land.


Issued on: 14/08/2026
By: FRANCE 24


A drone view shows Israelis visiting an ancient water reservoir in the Jordan Valley in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. © Ilan Rosenberg, Reuters


On a searing summer day, Israeli settlers splashed in a West Bank pool created ​by siphoning off water that had irrigated Palestinian crops, one of many seizures of water resources across the occupied territory.

The spring served as a lifeline for the nearby village of Fasayil in the fertile Jordan Valley, where Palestinians have relied on it for generations for food, employment and to supplement irregular Israeli supplies to their domestic taps.

“Our water supply remains cut off to this day, depriving us of the water we depend on for our homes, our livelihoods, ​and our agricultural land,” said Saad ‌Nemer, who farms the land.

Saad Nemer, a Palestinian landowner who says that Israeli settlers diverted water from his land making it impossible to plant crops, visits his arid farm in Fasayil, a village in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. © Mohamad Torokman, Reuters

Israeli settlers seized his irrigation pipeline in June, channeling the water to an ancient pool in an archaeological site. Soon after, settlers advertised it as ⁠an Israeli tourist attraction and Israel’s far-right finance minister pledged financial support.

“They are now in the process of developing a recreational park around the pool,” Nemer said.
Settlers stop Palestinian villagers approaching

The seizure of the spring at Fasayil is part of a pattern that Palestinians say is designed to make their lives in the West Bank ‌untenable. Israeli settlers have attacked at least 160 water and sanitation sites across the Palestinian territory this year, United Nations data shows.

Nemer’s greenhouses and fields would normally be full ⁠of eggplant, zucchini and watermelons, but without water he has not been able to plant in the scorched land.

“The settlers cutting off our water has caused us losses and has meant that many families will lose their work and their livelihoods,” he said.

Nemer said that an employee had been beaten up by settlers and he himself had faced threats for attempting to approach the spring as far ​back as two years ago.

Yishai Shreiber, 21, an Israeli settler who had come to swim in the pool near Fasayil on an August afternoon, said Palestinians would not now ‌dare approach.

“Now that they see this entire mass of people, all these large groups of Jews coming here to bathe, they are afraid to come here,” said Shreiber.

Israelis visit an ancient water reservoir in the Jordan Valley in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. © Ronen Zvulun, Reuters

Shreiber said the West Bank belonged to the Jewish people, and that if Palestinians don’t want to accept Jewish authority, they should leave.

Nemer showed Reuters a 2025 land ownership document from COGAT, the Israeli military agency which enforces civilian policy in the occupied territories. He also presented a map drawn for the pre-occupation 1957 registration of his ‌title deeds showing that his land included both the spring and the pool.

COGAT and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich did not respond to requests for comment.
'Water war' is part of Israeli West Bank takeover, Palestinians say

Israel’s far-right coalition government has overseen massive settlement construction that Smotrich says is aimed at burying the idea of a Palestinian ​state, which has been recognised by more than 150 of 193 UN member states as encompassing the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

The United Nations and most governments consider the settlements to be illegal under international law related to military occupation. Israel seized the West Bank in the 1967 war, but argues the territory is disputed rather than occupied.

Water flows from a hose in the Palestinian village Fasayil, where residents say that Israeli settlers diverted water from its natural spring causing crops to die. © Mohamad Torokman, Reuters

Palestinians have experienced a sharp rise in settler violence, and Palestinian field researcher ​Fares Foqahaa estimated that settlers had now seized control of 95 percent of the springs in the northern Jordan Valley, displacing communities

In another West Bank village, Qusra, settlers still besieging three homes on Thursday had also cut off their water and ​electricity.

Adel Yassin, an official with the Palestinian Authority’s water authority, said that settlers target water resources as part of a systematic campaign to force Palestinians off ​their land.

“I see this as a water war. It is the silent bullet that kills Palestinians without a sound,” he said, referring to the process of making their livelihoods unsustainable.

Israeli archaeologist says settlers are damaging the site

In early June, Eliav Libi, a settler leader targeted with sanctions by Canada and other countries, posted a video ​showing the pool beginning to fill with water.

He and other settlers say the pool belonged to the biblical-era Jewish king Herod. Alon Arad, an archaeologist with the Israeli rights group Emek Shaveh, said the pool’s provenance is unclear.

“We see in many cases the use of archaeology ... to create this feeling that the West Bank is exclusively Jewish,” Arad said, adding that the settlers were damaging an archaeological site by filling it with water.

A drone view of Israelis visiting an ancient water reservoir in the Jordan Valley, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. © Ilan Rosenberg, Reuters

Outside the pool, a billboard advertised a 3 million shekel ($1 million) investment from Smotrich, an architect of settler expansion, who said in a Telegram post the money was for the restoration and development of “Herod’s Pools”.

The pool and the nearby spring were packed with Israeli families swimming and wading in ⁠the water. No Palestinians were present.

One of the few natural springs still available to Palestinians is near the city of Nablus at Wadi al-Badhan. In July, families sat at plastic tables placed in shallow streams picnicking with their feet in the running water.

The springs are located close ⁠to Nablus’s urban centre and had until this ​year rarely faced incursions from settlers.

Palestinian children play in a natural spring in Wadi al-Badhan, near Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. © Ammar Awad, Reuters

Hundreds of settlers descended into the springs earlier this summer, sitting at the plastic tables and walking through the pools, five Palestinians said.

Nizam Fares, the owner of a natural spring park in al-Badhan, said people could no longer enjoy visiting the area.

“People have become scared and jumpy. They come and ask if the settlers are coming or not,” he said.

(FRANCE 24 with Reuters)


Israeli troops fail to oust settlers blockading Palestinian homes in the West Bank


The Israeli military failed to evict settlers blockading Palestinian homes in the occupied West Bank on Wednesday in a ⁠rare confrontation between settlers and the military. The settlers have been blocking essential supplies from entering the Palestinian village of Qusra since the weekend.


Issued on 13/08/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

Israeli settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank is soaring. © Zain Jaafar, AFP


The Israeli military failed in an attempt on Wednesday to remove occupied West Bank settlers who for days have blockaded Palestinian homes, an eyewitness and an AFP photographer reported.

The siege began on Sunday, when a group of settlers set up a makeshift tent near houses in the Palestinian village of Qusra, just south of Nablus, blocking essential supplies from entering.


"We have received no food and no medicine," Qusai Abu Rida, a Palestinian trapped inside one of the houses, told AFP by telephone, adding that he had only managed to secure electricity thanks to solar panels.

The Israeli military condemned the settlers' actions and declared the area a "closed military zone", before on Wednesday morning removing the tent where the settlers had been staying.

Security forces "are working to evacuate the civilians who were staying there", the military said in a statement.

By mid-afternoon, an AFP photographer at the scene said the military had left and the tent had been removed, but that the settlers were still at the site.

Abu Rida confirmed the situation remained unchanged, with the settlers still in possession of chairs and blankets.

West Bank: Settler violence hits 'all-time high'
Cover image: © France 24
01:26


"The army has withdrawn, and so far we are still besieged, with the settlers at our doorstep," he told AFP.

Violence by Israeli settlers towards Palestinians in the West Bank has persisted for years, often with little or no legal consequence, but recent months have seen a surge in attacks.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967.

More than 500,000 Israelis live in settlements in the Palestinian territory, which are illegal under international law, among some 3 million Palestinians.

The Israeli military said Tuesday it had received several reports of settlers entering and taking control of Palestinian homes and land in the area.

"This is illegal, reprehensible and unacceptable activity that harms the residents of the areas and disrupts their daily lives," it said.

It also said that disciplinary action would be taken against security personnel who had been filmed at the site days earlier.

According to an AFP tally based on data from the Palestinian health ministry, Israeli soldiers or settlers have killed at least 1,097 Palestinians, including both militants and civilians, since the start of the Gaza war in October 2023.

Israeli figures show at least 48 Israelis, including civilians and security personnel, have been killed in Palestinian attacks or during Israeli military operations during the same period.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)


US ambassador to Israel slams settler siege of West Bank Palestinians as ‘terror’


US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee on Thursday denounced a siege by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank village of Qusra as a "horrific act of terror". Huckabee, an evangelical Christian pastor who in the past has embraced Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, said the Israeli army intervened on Wednesday after a US request, but the soldiers failed to remove the settlers.


Issued on: 13/08/2026 
By:  FRANCE 24
Video by:  Noga TARNOPOLSKY

Cover image: Israeli settlers gather in front of Palestinian houses in the village of Qusra, south of Nablus, in the West Bank, August 12, 2026. © Zain Jaafar, AFP
05:05




The US ambassador to Israel, a staunch supporter of West Bank settlements, on Thursday denounced as "terror" a siege by settlers against Palestinians that drew an unsuccessful intervention by the army.

Settlers near Nablus since Sunday have blockaded Palestinian homes, including one owned by a US citizen, with residents saying they have been cut off from food and other supplies.

"Actions by those who carried out this horrific act of terror meant to intimidate and harass this family are disgusting," Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador in Jerusalem, wrote on X in response to criticism of the US response.

"No excuse for such thuggish behaviour," he wrote.

Huckabee said Israel had intervened at the request of the United States, its crucial ally.


The remarks are especially striking from Huckabee, an evangelical Christian pastor who in the past has embraced Jewish settlement in the West Bank, which Israel has occupied since 1967, and rejected the idea of a Palestinian state.

The Israeli military on Wednesday sent in forces who took away a tent, but witnesses said settlers defiantly remained at the site with blankets.

READ MOREIsraeli troops fail to remove settlers besieging Palestinian homes in West Bank village

The army announced later Wednesday that it would send a new battalion to try to impose order.

Violence against Palestinians by Israeli settlers in the West Bank has increased dramatically since the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas from the Gaza Strip.


Cover image: © France 24
02:30



More than 500,000 Israelis live in settlements in the West Bank, which are illegal under international law, among some three million Palestinians in the territory.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

Palestinians still trapped as Israeli settlers besiege West Bank homes

14.08.2026, DPA

Photo: Salman Mohsen Alkhatib/JNA via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

Radical Israeli settlers continued to besiege Palestinian homes in the northern West Bank village of Qusra on Friday, despite the presence of Israeli soldiers, village head Abdul Asim al-Wadi told dpa.

According to the Palestinian news agency WAFA, some 15 Palestinians, including two children aged 4 and 10, remain trapped inside their homes.

Israeli soldiers were deployed to the village on Thursday "to protect the residents and maintain security," the military said. The settlers have been besieging the Palestinian homes since Sunday.

Israeli media reported that the settlers returned to the area on Friday morning.

The Israeli army did not immediately respond to a request for comment, confirming only that soldiers had been deployed in the area since Thursday to maintain security.  

The Times of Israel reported on Thursday that the soldiers intended to persuade the settlers to leave the area.

Al-Wadi and several media outlets said Israeli and international activists arrived in the area with food and drink for the Palestinians but were prevented by Israeli security forces from reaching the besieged homes. 

Asked about the reports, the military said all Israeli citizens were prohibited from entering Qusra. It also released a video showing a Palestinian resident collecting some of the supplies left in the area.

On Thursday, Palestinian sources said Israeli soldiers had forced the residents to evacuate. The military later issued a statement saying the Palestinian residents should remain in their homes. 

Citing residents, Israeli and Palestinian media reported that the soldiers had meanwhile damaged the houses and taken money from people living there. When asked about the allegations, the Israeli army said it was looking into the matter.



China's lead in orbital data centres risks leaving Europe behind

A satellite orbits Earth, showcasing a stunning blue ocean and continents from space.
Copyright Zelch Csaba/Pexels

By Indrabati Lahiri
Published on

China is racing ahead on orbital data centres while Europe still debates the concept, a new policy brief warns, and the gap is starting to widen.

China's push into orbital data centres risks leaving Europe behind, according to a new policy brief from the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI).

Orbital data centres are increasingly seen as key strategic assets for processing the vast amounts of data generated by AI and satellite systems.

The brief, titled "Constellating Compute: China's Domestic Policy Towards Orbital Data Centre Leadership," warns that if the technological gap widens significantly, Europe risks having to compute its own space data through third-party actors and losing access to orbital information.

European efforts are under way but remain limited in scale.

The EU-funded research project ASCEND, backed under Horizon Europe since 2023, found that orbital data centres could strengthen European digital sovereignty.

The European Space Agency (ESA) has also worked with UK firm Open Cosmos on the Φ-sat-2 satellite, which carries AI capabilities for Earth observation.

French start-up ALATYR has also announced plans to manufacture robotically assembled orbital data centres. Even so, compared with developments in China and the US, the gap in Europe is starting to widen.

Why is China ahead in the orbital data centre race?

China has treated space-based computing as a national strategic priority, giving rise to a wave of state-backed initiatives and policies to support the goal.

Central to this effort is the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which first formalised orbital data centres in a new strategy, alongside the Beijing Municipal Government and the Zhongguancun Science Park.

China has combined top-down policy drafting, private and state-owned industry adaptation, municipal and provincial government incentives, and support for non-state actors and working groups, according to the brief.

High-profile prototype constellations have driven early implementation. The Three-Body Constellation, launched by start-up ADAspace in May 2025, marked the first operational example of space-based computing.

In a joint laboratory with Shanghai Jiao Tong University, ADAspace has since used the constellation's in-orbit computing power to control a robot on the ground, one of several technical trials the company has run since the satellites reached orbit.

Other companies have followed. Beijing Orbital Twilight Technology Co., Ltd. (Orbital Chenguang) announced an undisclosed equity round alongside €7.4bn worth of debt financing in April 2026.

Nayuta Space unveiled its ALAYA supercompute constellation, planned to deploy 12,500 computing satellites. Shanghai Xingshu Tiansuan Space Technology Co. unveiled its Xingshu Plan at the World AI Conference in July 2026, envisioned to grow to 1,000 satellites.

China Mobile, Zhejiang Lab, Bailing Aerospace, Zhongke Tiansuan Technology and Interstellar Glory Space-Based Computing Technology (iSpace) have also announced their own constellations.

Beijing's municipal government has moved to incubate the sector further, issuing a call for orbital data centre project proposals in June 2026 alongside the Zhongguancun Science Park, and launching a space computing innovation centre bringing together rival companies including GalaxySpace and Landspace under a company-plus-alliance model.

According to state broadcaster CGTN, the centre's priority areas include space-based computing chip design, high-performance computing payloads and integrated space-ground cloud computing technologies.

CASC has also outlined a five-year plan for the sector, agreed with the Chinese Society of Astronautics in January 2026 under the guidance of state bodies including the China National Space Administration.

According to CGTN's reporting on the plan, it includes building gigawatt-level space digital infrastructure combining cloud, edge and terminal technologies, though the underlying policy documents do not appear to have been formally published, and Euronews could not independently verify the claims.

The brief recommends that the EU establish coordinated political guidance, investment support and a regulatory framework for orbital data centre development, that a flagship initiative be included in the Horizon Europe Moonshot Projects under the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, and that European space actors convene working groups with international counterparts on standards and data sovereignty.

In Malaysia, wave of hate speech threatens Rohingya refugees


Malaysia – The spread of hostile content on social media in Malaysia has intensified tensions towards the Rohingya refugee community, leading to the eviction of more than 100 people from their village and the temporary closure of schools attended by refugee children.


Issued on: 10/08/2026 - 
By: The FRANCE 24 ObserversMarguerite MARAMICI


Rohingya refugees camp near the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, after being expelled from the village of Kuala Muda in the state of Penang on July 27, 2026. © SinarOnline/ X

Malaysia has long been considered a safe haven for Rohingya Muslims fleeing persecution in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar. As of the end of February 2026, 126,000 Rohingyas were registered with the UN refugee agency in Malaysia, out of a total of around 215,600 refugees and asylum seekers.

However, they have faced growing hostility since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, culminating in a wave of online hate and disinformation that began in April 2026. On July 27, around 1 hundred Rohingya refugees were forced to leave their homes in a fishing village after their neighbours put up signs urging them to leave.
#SaveMalaysiaFromRohingya

Maryam* works for the NGO Article 19, which defends freedom of expression in Malaysia and combats hate speech.



"The latest wave of anti-Rohingya rhetoric has undoubtedly been one of the most intense in terms of both scale and duration. It began towards the end of April and is still continuing today.

It all started with a disinformation campaign claiming that Rohingya refugees were demanding land and special rights. In May, an online petition was launched calling on the Malaysian prime minister to expel Rohingya refugees from Malaysia. Organisations such as UNHCR, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), and NGOs came under pressure and received threats on social media."

This Facebook message posted on July 22, 2026 by anti-Rohingya influencer Abang Koroy reads: “The Rohingyas get rich from begging and doing business without paying taxes; they go to private hospitals—government clinics are beneath them.”

Some Malaysian influencers regularly post anti-Rohingya content and contribute to the spread of hostile hashtags such as #SaveMalaysiaFromRohingya.

Maryam* explains :

"We reported some of the problematic content to Meta so that action could be taken immediately. However, Meta's content moderation, complaint handling, and reporting mechanisms remain far too slow to deal with harmful content."

She adds that the situation is particularly alarming because refugees are neither officially recognised nor protected under Malaysian law, as the country is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Although they are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), they have no legal protection and are not allowed to work, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.
'Rohingyas Are Banned from Kuala Muda'

This wave of online hatred has had dramatic consequences. On July 27, more than 1 hundred Rohingyas were forced to leave their homes in the village of Kuala Muda, in the state of Penang.


This Facebook post from July 28, 2026 celebrates the departure of a group of Rohingya people from the village of Kuala Muda, showing photos of signs displayed by residents with hostile messages, such as: “Rohingya people are banned from Kuala Muda.”

According to the local newspaper Sinar Harian, the Rohingya population in this village has almost quadrupled, rising from 108 people in 2018 to around 400 in 2026. A non-Rohingya resident told the media outlet Bharian: “The locals feel disadvantaged, particularly economically, because many Rohingya have taken up fishing, creating competition with local residents who depend on fishing for their livelihoods."

The refugee families were reportedly escorted to buses bound for Kuala Lumpur. On arrival in the capital, they went to the office of the UNHCR to seek assistance. They then set up tents outside the organisation’s offices while awaiting a response. The Malaysian police then intervened and detained them for a day to check their documents and legal status. They were eventually released and placed in the care of local NGOs.
'Many children were chased and harassed on their way to school'

Children are also being targeted. At least nine community schools for refugees have temporarily closed to protect their students. The exact number of affected schools remains difficult to determine.

Amira* is the founder of an NGO that provides education for refugees in Malaysia. She describes the climate of fear that has forced many refugee schools to shut their doors.


"Many children have been chased and harassed on their way to school. Some of these incidents have been shared on social media. Youth teams from several NGOs are now afraid to go in the field. The content being posted online is extremely radical. It is highly aggressive, using dehumanizing and threatening language. There is a real sense of fear within the Rohingya community."

Ahmad* is a Rohingya teacher and activist in Kuala Lumpur. He teaches at two schools in the capital that decided to close.


"One school remained closed for a month, the other for two weeks because of all this chaos. We have only just reopened. Despite the risks, the staff felt it was essential to resume classes so that the children could continue their education. We advised students not to wear their school uniforms so that they would not attract attention on their way to school."

He also points out that his students come from different refugee communities, but many Malaysians assume they are all Rohingya. According to him, this misconception is reinforced by media coverage that often labels all refugees as Rohingya.

This Facebook post, published on 28 July 2026 in a group that regularly shares content hostile to the Rohingya, questions the legitimacy of a community school.

Amira* explains that refugees have no legal right to formal education in Malaysia, as the country is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.


"Schools like ours operate in a grey area. If someone were to ask, ‘Is this school legal? Do you have the right to be here?’ Of course, the answer is no. Some schools have been closed down by the authorities because they did not have the necessary authorisations.

The lack of the right to work and access to education marginalises the Rohingya and limits their integration in Malaysia. At the same time, disinformation campaigns wrongly portray them as economic migrants or invaders. On social media, many ask why the UNHCR does not send them to other countries, but they are unaware that its ability to organise resettlement depends on the willingness of states to offer places to refugees."
'We cannot trust the Myanmar government to guarantee our safety'

On 23 July, the deputy foreign minister informed Parliament that 5,000 Myanmar nationals currently held in immigration detention centres would be repatriated to Myanmar.

On 28 July, Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan said that the presence of the UNHCR office had made Malaysia "a magnet" for refugees and warned that the government could reconsider the agency's presence in the country if it refused to resettle more refugees.

Despite allegations of genocide against the Rohingya in Myanamar, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced on 30 July that Myanmar had agreed to take back 5,000 Rohingya asylum seekers currently living in Malaysia.

The Myanmar Ethnic Rohingya Human Rights Organization Malaysia (MERHROM) expressed serious concern over the announcement:

"We cannot trust the Myanmar government to guarantee our safety while the massacres continue. Rohingyas will be forced to join the Myanmar military without any training and used as human shields in the army's war against various ethnic armed groups. That is the only reason the Myanmar military has agreed to take the Rohingyas back."

However, the Malaysian government later appeared to reverse its position. On 5 August, Communications Minister Fahmi Fadzil announced that the government would not deport refugees if they faced a risk of persecution.

Denied citizenship under Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya fled the country in large numbers in 2017 following a military campaign marked by massacres, sexual violence, and the systematic destruction of villages. The International Court of Justice is currently examining allegations of genocide against Myanmar over those events, following hearings held in January 2026.

* For security reasons, the people interviewed for this article asked to speak anonymously and their names have been changed.
Japan summons Russian ambassador after Putin visits disputed Kuril islands


Japan’s foreign minister summoned the Russian ambassador in Tokyo to lodge a “strong protest” against President Vladimir Putin’s surprise visit to the Kuril islands on Thursday. Tokyo maintains its claim to the disputed islands near Japan's northernmost Hokkaido island since they were seized by the Soviet Union in 1945.


Issued on: 13/08/2026 
By: FRACE 24

Cover image: Pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, President Vladimir Putin greets officers onboard the Russian Navy's guided missile cruiser Varyag on far eastern Sakhalin Island on August 13, 2026. © Gavriil Grigorov, AFP (Pool)
01:45



President Vladimir Putin visited Russia's far-eastern Kuril islands for the first time on Thursday, prompting protests by Japan, which also claims the territory.

Russian-Japanese relations have long been dogged by the contested islands, known in Japan as the Northern Territories and seized by the Soviet Union in 1945.

The Kremlin posted a video of Putin on one of the Kurils' four main islands, with Russian media saying he visited a fish-processing plant and was given caviar.

It was the first visit by a Russian president since Dmitry Medvedev in 2010.


"The Northern Territories are an inherent part of Japan's territory, both historically and under international law," Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told reporters.

Putin's visit "offends the sentiments of the Japanese people and is absolutely unacceptable", she said, adding that it "made it more difficult to restore relations in the medium to long term".

Putin travelled to the Kurils after visiting the nearby Russian island of Sakhalin on Wednesday, where Russia's navy was conducting drills.

In Sakhalin, Putin, 73, held a meeting "on ensuring the security of Russia's eastern borders", RIA Novosti said.

Also on Thursday, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi summoned Russian ambassador to Japan Nikolai Nozdrev to lodge a "strong protest" against Putin's surprise move.

Motegi told the ambassador in the meeting that Putin's visit would "have an extremely negative impact on Japan-Russia relations" already complicated by Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, according to the ministry's statement.
Ukraine sanctions

Ties between Japan and Russia – which fought a war in 1904-5 – have worsened since the full-scale conflict in Ukraine began in 2022.

Japan has joined other G7 countries in sanctioning Russia and giving money and non-lethal defence aid to Kyiv.

Putin on Wednesday called Japan's sanctions "unprovoked".

"Japan has identified Russia as a main source of threats. I would like to point out that we are not threatening Japan... On the contrary it has territorial claims against our country," Putin said.

Russia and China have also moved closer, with their navies and air forces conducting joint exercises in areas around Japan, promoting frequent scrambles by Japanese jets.

North Korea, which this month termed Japan's military build-up a "transformation into a war state", has also sent troops and artillery shells to help Russia's war against Ukraine.

READ MOREZelensky accuses Russia of using North Korean missiles in deadly attack

Japan's latest defence white paper issued this month again highlighted growing risks from all three countries.

The New York Times reported in July that Russia had turned Japan into a "den of spies" and a key source of dual-use technology needed for its war in Ukraine.
Harsh climate, few people

The Soviet Union took the strategically located volcanic archipelago north of Hokkaido in the final days of World War II, and has maintained a military presence there ever since.

The contested isles are part of the volcanic Kuril archipelago, which runs in a broad arc from Russia's Kamchatka peninsula down to Japan's main northern island Hokkaido.

Their population of about 20,000 Russian citizens lives in a harsh climate, but the islands have mineral deposits including gold and silver, and rich fishing grounds.

After the islands were occupied in 1945, Moscow deported their Japanese population of about 17,000 people.

The islands then acquired strategic importance, providing air and sea bases during the Cold War as the Soviet Union confronted the United States and Japan.

"The Kurils have been fortified with Bastion coastal defence missile systems and SU-35 fighter aircraft. These provide Russia with instruments of control over sea lanes in the region, as well as leverage against Japan's claim to the islands," said Yee Kuang Heng, a professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo.

"Putin's visit may be a reminder of the cards he holds and also his displeasure with Japan's continuing sanctions on Russia imposed after the invasion of Ukraine," Heng told AFP.






Cuba's ex-president Raul Castro makes rare public appearance after US indictment


Cuba's Raul Castro made a rare public appearance Thursday at a celebration marking the centenary of his brother Fidel's birth. The 95-year-old former president, who was indicted by the US in May over an incident during his tenure as defence minister, received a standing ovation at the secure event in Havana amid a deepening economic crisis and frequent energy blackouts.


Issued on: 14/08/2026 
By: FRANCE 24


Cuba's former president Raul Castro, 95, attends a gala marking the 100th anniversary of the birth of his late brother and revolutionary leader Fidel Castro on August 13, 2026. © Yamil Lage, AFP


US-indicted Cuban leader Raul Castro received a standing ovation as he appeared in public for the first time in months on Thursday, attending an event in Havana to mark the centenary of his brother Fidel's birth.

The 95-year-old head of the Cuban armed forces and former president entered the Karl Marx Theatre for a celebration rally amid the island's worst crisis in living memory.

READ MORECuba plunges into darkness as state energy firm reports new nationwide blackout

He appeared at the event dressed in his trademark olive-green military uniform, AFP reporters witnessed, amid tight security.


Cellphones were banned from the ceremony, bags were closely screened and delegates put through a metal detector by a sizeable security force.

Castro is the last surviving leader of Cuba's 1959 revolution and is seen as still wielding power on the island, despite stepping down as president in 2018.

In May, he was indicted by a court in the US state of Florida on four counts of murder.

The charges related to the downing of US civilian planes by Cuban forces on February 24, 1996, when Castro was defence minister.

He last appeared in public at a May 1 event in front of the US embassy in Havana, where he appeared frail, and was shown on state television at events in June.

The United States has set up an energy embargo on the communist-ruled island, demanding a change in government and deep economic and political reform.


Cover image: © France 24
03:26


In recent months President Donald Trump and other senior US officials have openly hinted at a military intervention or takeover of Cuba.

"All options are on the table, to include military options," Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said on Wednesday.

"I think Cuba would be wise to pay attention to the willingness of President Trump to assert American strategic prerogatives."



Rallying the party faithful

The crisis and years of poor maintenance have fuelled rolling blackouts and shortages of basic goods.

In June, Cuba's presidency said on social media that the former president had approved a package of economic reforms aimed at addressing the crisis facing the island, which is under heavy pressure from Washington.


Cuba's Communist Party has used the 100 years since late president Fidel Castro's birth to rally the party faithful and the armed forces through a week-long series of exhibitions, concerts and conferences.

On Thursday they shouted "I am Fidel" and applauded throughout the performances and speeches.

But the anniversary has passed largely unnoticed by ordinary Cubans, who are more concerned with finding water, getting supplies and keeping cool in the intense summer heat.

For many, today's hardships only serve to highlight the absence of a leader who died a decade ago and is still seen as the wily strategist who outwitted his American foes.

Thursday's event featured La Colmenita, a Cuban children's theatre company that was a favourite of Fidel's.

Towards the end of the performance, Raul stood and gestured to the crowd that they should stand and applaud.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

China’s Belt And Road Initiative: Key Economic Issues – Analysis



China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China in Red, the members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in orange. Credit: Lommes, Wikipedia Commons

August 14, 2026
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
By Karen M. Sutter and Michael D. Sutherland


Key Takeaways

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (originally One Belt, One Road), launched in 2013 and later elevated in Party documents, seeks to build PRC-centered global infrastructure, trade, technology and production networks through land, maritime, digital, green and polar corridors.

Financing and project delivery are dominated by state banks, funds and national-champion firms using often opaque, collateralized loans and integrated packages that expand Chinese standards, secure resources and create long-term economic and strategic dependencies, raising concerns about debt sustainability, lack of reciprocity and potential dual-use applications.

The United States and partners have responded with alternative financing tools (such as the DFC and EXIM programs), quality-infrastructure initiatives and greater scrutiny of Chinese deals, while Congress continues to debate further measures to monitor and counter BRI’s economic and geopolitical effects.


The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) in 2013 launched an ambitious and multifaceted foreign economic policy initiative—One Belt, One Road—to expand China’s global economic reach and influence. In 2015, China’s leaders changed the English name to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (while keeping the Chinese name),possibly to deflect attention from the initiative’s focus on developing China-controlled and -centered global ties in a hub-and-spoke format. The Communist Party of China (CPC) incorporated the initiative into its Charter in 2017. It reaffirmed the efforts’ significance at its 20th Party Congress in 2022 and in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development (2026-2030). Some in Congress assess that One Belt, One Road projects advance PRC economic and geopolitical goals while undercutting U.S. global influence and interests. In response, some Members have sought to develop alternative U.S. and multilateral financing programs.

Scope and Objectives

One Belt, One Road has evolved into a global effort that aims to develop PRC-centered and -controlled global production, trade, infrastructure, and transportation networks. It includes a land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” Sub-initiatives include a “Polar Silk Road” focused on Arctic shipping routes and a “Digital Silk Road” to promote PRC information and communications technology (ICT) exports and satellite networks. A “Green Silk Road” promotes PRC renewable energy products and services. Other efforts seek to promote health and science and technology (S&T) ties and the use of PRC technical standards among partner countries. The effort emphasizes policy coordination, trade and investment, dispute settlement, tourism, and student/personnel exchanges.


One Belt, One Road projects in energy, ICT, manufacturing, and transportation infrastructure look to vertically integrate PRC production supply chains, technology infrastructure, and transportation networks. The effort involves technology and financial integration that expands the use of China’s digital platforms and currency. It seeks to expand PRC firms’ presence overseas, create markets for China’s goods and services, and secure access to foreign sources of agriculture, energy, and strategic commodities, such as critical minerals. Projects also aim to develop China’s interior regions, employ PRC workers, and offload PRC excess industrial capacity.

At the One Belt, One Road forum in 2023, PRC leader Xi Jinping prioritized “high quality development”; intermodal and green infrastructure; digital trade zones; S&T cooperation; a “compliance evaluation system” to address corruption; and cooperation in energy, tax, finance, think tanks, media, and culture. In 2021, Xi presented at the United Nations (UN) a Global Development Initiative to complement One Belt, One Road with projects for poverty alleviation and food security and in areas to advance PRC firms globally in infrastructure, manufacturing, and digital technologies. See CRS In Focus IF13099, China Primer: China’s Global Development Initiative.

China’s Investment and Financing

China’s use of onshore financing and special-purpose vehicles for foreign investment complicates analysts’ ability to track PRC global economic activity. One Belt, One Road is an umbrella initiative, and projects may be specifically or loosely tied to the effort. As a result, many groups track PRC cross-border financing, investment, and overseas projects generally. China’s stock of global outward foreign direct investment (ODI)—investment made into a business or real asset in another country—stood at $3.6 trillion (7.8% of world total) in 2025, up from $34.7 billion (0.5% of world total) in 2001. In comparison, the United States accounted for $6.6 trillion, or 14.4%, of global ODI stock in 2025 (down from 32% in 2001), according to official country data compiled by the UN. PRC ODI flows have picked up since 2021 and were $174 billion in 2025, accounting for about 9% of global ODI flows. (U.S. ODI flows were $263 billion, or about 14% of global ODI flows in 2025.) Additionally, PRC cross-border contracts—a corporate structure used for overseas construction and infrastructure projects—have been stable and reached an all-time high of $289 billion in 2025. The PRC also operates cross-border projects in agriculture, energy, minerals, finance, technology, and shipping (Figure 1).

AidData, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, estimates that, as of 2023, China’s overseas lending portfolio was $2.1 trillion. (In comparison, the World Bank’s portfolio in 2025 was about $400 billion.) It assessed that even as One Belt, One Road focused on developing countries, since 2000, PRC lending has been shifting toward high-income countries (e.g., the United States) and financing for technology deals and the purchase of foreign firms in strategic sectors. AidData reports that, as of 2023, 24% of PRC lending was for low- and lower-middle-income countries, and that infrastructure accounted for about 20% of China’s overseas lending portfolio.

Figure 1. China’s ODI Flows and Overseas Contracts. Source: CRS, with data from China’s Ministry of Commerce.

PRC state banks (e.g., CHEXIM and CDB), firms, and funds (e.g., Silk Road Fund) undertake a large share of PRC overseas lending and investment. The PRC government often pays firms in China for projects they implement, while host governments pay the PRC government for the projects. Projects are neither assistance—PRC loans are typically not interest-free and issued at market terms—nor truly commercial, because repayments are often backed by collateral commitments (e.g., lease rights, minerals, or commodities) made to the PRC government, which in turn absorbs much of the commercial risk for PRC firms. Recipients of collateral may include state firms not party to the original transaction that are designated by the PRC government.

Role of China’s State Firms


PRC strategic investments are typically state-sponsored and aim to advance national economic and foreign policy goals. A handful of state firms operate most projects. These firms are funded by and report directly to the central government, and include China Harbor, CRRC, State Grid, China Three Gorges, and COSCO. China’s projects strategically position national champions—such as Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba—by creating technology infrastructure and systems built to PRC standards. Alibaba’s internet project in Malaysia, for example, provides a foundation for PRC data/cloud, e-commerce, and financial services. Projects may offer the PRC visibility and touchpoints into sensitive infrastructure and services via interconnection and interoperability in communications, energy, and transportation. Projects in critical minerals support PRC industrial policies.
U.S. Concerns

Some observers note the economic benefits of China’s investments in developing countries while others argue that China is introducing unsustainable debt obligations and opportunities to gain economic concessions and influence. China tends to extend the duration of its loans, rather than forgive debt repayment, which can create long-term financial dependencies. For example, in 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was unable to repay PRC loans, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. acquired a majority stake in the firm that operates Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port and the right to operate the port for 99 years. Credit and loan terms are generally opaque and China tends to settle agreements bilaterally. China’s opacity in lending came to a head in 2019 when U.S. officials questioned whether International Monetary Fund relief for Pakistan might also be used to repay Pakistan’s debts to China.


The PRC government insists that most PRC state banks and state firms are not subject to sovereign lending terms adopted by the United States and other major creditors in the Paris Club. PRC loans often forbid multilateral debt restructuring (e.g., under Paris Club auspices). China joined two G20 debt relief initiatives that accept Paris Club disciplines, but these apply only to CHEXIM and the China International Development Cooperation Agency. The PRC claims it has provided more deferments under G20 schemes than Paris Club members, but many countries indebted to China do not appear to qualify or have not applied—likely due to PRC pressure—for G20 debt relief. Some experts say One Belt, One Road undermines the role and principles of multilateral financial institutions, which work with China on projects, and argue China should not have a leadership role in these institutions. Such collaboration may set better terms for host countries while also advancing PRC goals.

PRC entities are expanding overseas in sectors that the PRC restricts to foreign investors in China (e.g., construction, transportation, finance, and communications). The PRC does not offer reciprocal market access for the rights it secures in other countries, challenging a core trade tenet and advantaging PRC firms over their competitors. It has opened foreign markets with “deal-ready” financing and integrated project delivery.

PRC investments in strategic sectors and infrastructure have prompted some governments to increase scrutiny of these deals. Some analysts assess that certain PRC projects have military uses. Under its military-civil fusion program and China Standards 2035 initiative, China is developing standards that promote civilian-military interoperability, including in various technologies and infrastructure (e.g., ports). Commercial land deals may facilitate a military presence. China Merchants Bank, for example, signed the lease for property in Djibouti on which China developed a military base. Sam Enterprise Group, a firm reportedly tied to China’s military, bought land in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. PRC projects offer alternatives to U.S.-led networks and standards. PRC-built BeiDou satellite and rail networks offer substitutes to U.S.-controlled GPS navigation technology and sea lanes where the U.S. military operates. PRC digital platforms support use of the PRC’s digital currency.

U.S. Government Response

PRC overseas financing practices are prompting the United States with its allies and partners to adjust approaches to global financing to compete with China. Congress enacted the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act; P.L. 115-254) to create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and increase support for quality market-oriented and financially sustainable projects with environmental and social safeguards. The DFC has sought to compete with PRC consortia on projects and in markets in which the PRC has a major presence. In 2019, Congress created a China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States with new financing tools and flexibilities to counter PRC financing. The G-7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and Blue Dot Network seek to promote quality infrastructure financing. In 2020, the U.S. government sanctioned PRC state firms that built One Belt, One Road military infrastructure in the South China Sea.


The 119th Congress is debating the effects of dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development on competition with the PRC. S. 1011 would require the State Department to monitor and counter PRC projects. H.R. 9093 would require a report on the PRC’s use of One Belt, One Road to undermine the U.S.-led global order, and a strategy to counter it. Congress may examinethe PRC government’s role in directing and financing investments in the United States and acquisition of U.S. firms in strategic sectors, and U.S. policy on such investments;

PRC entities’ presence in U.S. production, energy, transportation, and communications networks and investments in the Western Hemisphere; and
whether to allow U.S. development or export financing for global projects that use PRC components or services.

About the authors:
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
Michael D. Sutherland, Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).


About CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
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A New Axis In Middle East: Reading The New Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Defence Pact – Analysis


Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meet during the signing of the trilateral defense agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 7. MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/TURKEY'S PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE




Key Takeaways

On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, establishing that an attack on any one signatory would be treated as an attack on all and committing the three countries to deeper defence cooperation, interoperability and collective responses decided by consensus.

For Pakistan the pact extends its earlier bilateral mutual-defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia, reinforces long-standing military ties with both Riyadh and Ankara, and elevates Islamabad’s role as a security partner and
 mediator amid doubts about the reliability of the U.S. security umbrella in West Asia.

The agreement is presented as defensive and open to potential new members, yet it reflects a broader regional search for alternative security frameworks; India is watching closely given its strained relations with Türkiye and concerns over Pakistan’s growing integration into West Asian security architectures.

On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the ‘Mecca Joint Defense Agreement’, also referred to as the Mecca Defence Accord, at the Makkah Al-Mukarrama summit in Saudi Arabia. The pact aims to build collective deterrence and enhance regional stability, while further consolidating defence cooperation among the three countries. Coming against the backdrop of the war between the United States and Iran and its regional fallout, the timing of the signing is widely read as a response by these states to the faltering US security umbrella in West Asia — even as all three signatories have stressed that talks on the pact had been under way for some time.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, described the agreement as an ‘extension’ of the ‘Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement’ signed with Saudi Arabia on 17 September 2025, which also included a collective security clause. The agreement’s significance for Pakistan is thus twofold: it positions the country as a beneficiary of the shifting regional order, embedding Islamabad further within the West Asian security architecture, while also giving it room to elevate its external standing.

The Contours of the Agreement

The agreement lays out two specific objectives. First, in what is seen as an echo of NATO’s Article 5 clause, the trilateral agreement calls for an attack on any one of the three signatories to be treated as an attack on all of them, inviting a collective response in line with the principles of collective deterrence set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The important aspect here is not the clause for collective security — which was also a key element of the 2025 pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — but the subsequent response, based on discussion and consensus among all the signatories. The type of support offered would thus vary depending on the needs of the aggrieved partner, as the pact provides for general commitments rather than fixed obligations. This support could take the form of a military response, logistical support, intelligence sharing, or the provision of arms and ammunition.

Second is the pursuit of increased defence cooperation among the three countries, building on the long-standing defence partnership among them. The defence pact with Saudi Arabia has already solidified Islamabad’s partnership with the kingdom. Pakistan’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, and its training of Saudi troops and personnel, has continued since the 1980s. In April, it deployed close to 8,000 troops, fighter jets and air defence systems to the Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has also been a major source of aid and assistance to Pakistan: in April 2026, it rolled over a US$3 billion deposit to the country, and in July 2026, it extended a separate US$5 billion facility for another three years.


Pakistan also enjoys a strong defence partnership with Ankara, which was Islamabad’s third-largest arms supplier between 2020 and 2024, providing Bayraktar TB-2 drones and aircraft electro-optical sensors, while also looking to expand the relationship through joint production of Turkey’s fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet programme. Pakistan also used Turkish drones during hostilities with India last year.

The agreement is also seen as creating new opportunities to improve integration between the armed forces of the three countries, with a focus on military interoperability, joint training, threat assessment, and the synergising of weapons and communications systems.

Following the signing, all three countries issued additional statements clarifying the pact’s terms and scope, with the emphasis falling on its defensive nature and the assurance that no country was being targeted. Saudi Arabia further clarified that the pact had no nuclear dimension, nor was it aimed at starting an arms race in the region. This addressed lingering echoes of the controversy that had followed the earlier defence pact with Riyadh, when a statement by Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif, on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being made available to the kingdom, prompted Saudi officials to clarify that the agreement was purely a comprehensive military one. Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state, however, continues to invite such assumptions. While Pakistan describes the new pact as an extension of the Saudi agreement, all three countries have stressed that it does not override any pre-existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements they hold with each other or with others.

Membership, too, was framed as flexible: Türkiye signalled the possible inclusion of Egypt, while Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, clarified that any country aligning with the pact’s ‘fundamental principles’ could join. Though this leaves the actual criteria for admitting new members vague, it serves a clear purpose — to counter concerns that the pact might replace the US security umbrella with an alternative, or that the grouping is a closed one with no room for others.

While the modalities of how the pact would take shape have remained out of public view, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan highlighted that its institutionalisation will be through the establishment of a political and military committee, which would include representation from the foreign and defence ministries of all signatories as well as their chiefs of staff.


Pakistan’s Balancing Act

Consistent with the fanfare that typically accompanies Pakistan’s signing of international agreements, both the symbolism of this pact and the context in which it took shape are seen to have given fresh momentum to Pakistan’s external standing. During the visit, Prime Minister Sharif was accompanied by Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Defence Minister Khawaja Asif. In its statement celebrating the agreement, the civilian government credited the CDF’s role in bringing it to fruition, alongside the coordinated decision-making that led to its signing. Islamabad’s inclusion was also seen as a testament to its defence capabilities, with FM Dar reiterating that it aligns with the country’s foreign policy.

This foreign policy has played out in myriad ways over the past year. Following the crisis with India, and the military’s consolidation of control over the civilian government, Pakistan has leaned on the post-crisis victory narrative — raising its expectations of how it wants to be perceived in the world. Even as the country continues to grapple internally with acute security and economic challenges, with political stability also under scrutiny, both the warm reception given by US President Donald Trump to Munir and the subsequent thaw in bilateral ties appear aimed at seeking legitimacy.

Since 28 February, when the war between Iran and the United States broke out, Pakistan has assumed the role of mediator, positioning itself as a stabiliser and security provider. Its inclusion in the Trump administration’s Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza in January 2026, and its subsequent hosting of talks in April between Tehran and Washington, are both seen as examples of its growing mediatory role. It is also one of thirteen countries that are part of the Saudi-proposed multinational maritime defence coalition to protect shipping and energy routes in the Red Sea. While the US-Pakistan relationship has seen its regular ups and downs since Pakistan’s founding, it was the signing of the defence pact with Saudi Arabia that reignited conversations about Pakistan’s strategic importance to the region.

The Gulf countries’ growing exasperation with Washington’s inability to protect their interests in the region, coupled with the closely coordinated US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, has dented their confidence in American security guarantees. While this is also the gradual culmination of grievances accumulated over the last few decades, the most recent crises to have upended the region have made the search for alternative safety valves far more urgent. It is in this context that Pakistan’s importance to the region’s countries comes into sharper focus.

If the Saudi-Pakistan pact offers any insight into how this new agreement will pan out, it has more to do with institutionalising what already existed and signalling intent, rather than creating something entirely new. The coming together of these countries reflects a reshaping of the region’s security architecture, with countries exploring ways to supplement US security support with alternative frameworks that give them greater agency over outcomes. While officials downplayed the pact as a response to the US-Iran war, the fallout of the war — particularly its toll on the interests and assets of Washington’s Gulf partners — nonetheless accelerated its signing.

New Delhi is closely watching these developments, mindful of its national interests. While ties between New Delhi and Riyadh remain strong, its bilateral relationship with Ankara has deteriorated. The latest round of hostilities between India and Pakistan in May 2025, coupled with the Pakistani military’s increasing hold over the country’s security and foreign policy, shows that India will need to stay attentive to developments in its western neighbourhood. In that context, Pakistan’s growing inclusion in West Asia’s regional architectures will be a cause for concern for India.

About the author: Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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