Showing posts sorted by date for query VELES. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query VELES. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Wednesday, November 04, 2026

ANALYSIS

Ukraine and Russia are taking the war underground as drones saturate the battlefield

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last week heralded the success of Operation Veles, during which Kyiv sent troops deep into a disused gas pipeline in the Kupiansk region to confront Russian troops. These underground tactics, which Russian forces have been using for more than two years to slip past Ukrainian lines, are giving Kyiv a new strategy on the battlefield.


Issued on: 03/11/2026 
FRANCE24
By: Sébastian SEIBT

Images taken from a video published by Ukraine showing Operation Veles
 in a gas pipeline in Kupiansk region. © France Médias Monde Graphic Studio


After years of fighting raged across the fields and forests of Ukraine and up into the skies above them, a new front has opened up in the war: beneath the earth. The Ukrainian army has now taken the fight to the Russians in the network of disused underground gas pipelines and tunnels around the town of Kupiansk in Ukraine’s east, the New York Times reported at the end of October.

For almost two weeks, the Ukrainian army has been showing Western media outlets the grim reality of its efforts to seize control of a gas pipeline that passes beneath the Oskil River and into this frontline city that the Russians have been fighting to capture.

Kyiv in October launched Operation Veles, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last week described as a “great success”. Throughout the campaign, specially trained and equipped Ukrainian soldiers advanced 15 kilometres along a gas pipeline with a diameter of just 1.2 meters to secure the tunnel’s entry.

The president said that troops had also managed to “eliminate” around a hundred Russian soldiers and take more than 30 more prisoners during the fierce fighting that raged unseen in this underground battlefield.

Huseyn Aliyev, a specialist on the war in Ukraine at the University of Glasgow, said that the operation marked Ukraine’s adoption of tactics long practiced by Moscow.

“It is becoming very widespread, but it's not a new thing – Russians were the ones who started using it,” he said. “This is the first time I know when Ukrainians have started using the same methods.”
A winning tactic

While Ukraine was not the first side to take the fight into the industrial pipelines criss-crossing much of the country, Zelensky said that Kyiv had now made it their own.

“Ukrainian warriors have successfully transformed this tactic, modernised it, and made it much more sophisticated and technologically advanced," he said.

Will Kingston-Cox, a specialist in Russia and the Ukraine war at the International Team for the Study of Security (ITSS) Verona, said that Moscow had previously used these tunnels to slip past Ukraine’s defences.

“One early example that I was thinking about was Avdiivka in January of 2024, where we saw Russian troops reaching the rear of the Ukrainian fortified position through what appears to have been a drainage conduit,” he said.

The Russian army has subsequently used this new tactic to retake Kursk from Ukrainian control, then in the Kupiansk region, where Ukrainians soldiers fought them for each foot of the pipeline tunneling through the earth.

Ryhor Nizhnikau, a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, said that these tactics were only made possible by the network of Soviet-era gas pipelines and other tunnels that once brought Russian natural gas across Ukraine into Europe.

“This is a new battlefield, but it’s much smaller in scale,” he said. “You can only operate in the network of pipelines that exists. But the fact is that we do see this network being used much more intensively over the past year.”
The map and the territory

Nizhnikau said that these underground networks were also found in the Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as well as in parts of Zaporizhzhia.

Gustav Gressel, a military analyst at Austria’s National Defence Academy, said that sewage and drainage pipes could also serve the same purpose in Ukraine’s cities.

“In urban conglomerations, the wastewater system becomes another battlefield,” he said.

Largely built when eastern Ukraine was one of the industrial heartlands of the Soviet Union, these networks of pipelines are no secret to military planners in Kyiv and Moscow.

“Everyone knows how these pipelines were built in Soviet times,” Nizhnikau said. “So you have the map, and the Russians have the map.”

Cover image: SPOTLIGHT © FRANCE 24
10:00



Aliyev said that Ukrainian forces had initially tried to wait for Russian soldiers to surface from the tunnels in a grim game of whack-a-mole rather than take the fight underground.

“For a very long time they were actually making fun of Russians using pipelines, saying that it is so dangerous, so ineffective, and it never works,” he said.

But the Russian victories in Avdiivka and Kursk forced Kyiv to reconsider. In September 2025, Russian independent investigative media outlet iStories hammered the point home further, revealing how Moscow was stockpiling ammunition and supplies to use the gas pipeline in the Kupiansk region for a larger-scale offensive.
Out of sight

Kingston-Cox said that the new underground front gave both sides ways to launch attacks and counter-attacks at a time where the mass proliferation of drones made above-ground assaults fraught.

“On open ground, a group can obviously be spotted well before it reaches its objective,” he said. “And we've seen countless cases where this has been the case with ... reconnaissance drones and also attack drones."

Nizhnikau said that the constant threat of drones for tens of kilometres on either side of the front made even the narrow, potentially gas-choked tunnels a more compelling prospect.

“It's more predictable for people. I understand it's really horrible, but then, it’s better than being killed by a drone,” he said. “At least a foot soldier knows that his enemy is just ahead of him in the tunnel – and there is nothing coming from the skies when you don’t expect it.”


While potentially perilous, Gressel stressed that the tunnels afforded soldiers rare protection from the drones that had become responsible for the bulk of the human casualties of the four-year war.

“Radio-controlled drones lose their signal at the entrance, and for fiber-optic drones the cable often snags in corners,” he said. “Nets, small wire or fishing lines can be spun around the entrance to prematurely detonate a drone.”

But while the saturation of reconnaissance and attack drones was driving both sides to invest more into the fight for the tunnels criss-crossing Ukraine, Nizhnikau stressed that these tactics should be understood as “a support measure” to the broader fight.

Aliyez agreed that this kind of tunnel warfare could not be replicated across the whole front.

“In a lot of places along the front line, there's just no such infrastructure to use in the first place,” he said.

The claustrophobic nature of these pipelines also makes it near impossible to use them to launch larger-scale offensives.

“A narrow pipe, for example, can deliver infantry past an obstacle – but then it would also have very limited capacity to support a larger force under pressure,” Kingston-Cox said. “If the defender is watching the opening and people are coming out a few at a time, this could become extremely vulnerable."

Despite its limitations, he said, these high-risk tactics could be used to help “break local deadlocks”.

And until now, these disused pipelines have largely been used by Russian forces to push deeper into Ukraine. Through operations such as Veles, the Ukrainians are showing that they’re ready to take the fight to Moscow on any battlefield.

This article has been adapted from the original in French.


Star Wars: Has Russia's war with Ukraine gone intergalactic?

Russian made an unprecedented combative move this month as one of its military satellites, the Cosmos-2612, encroached upon the orbit of Ukrainian commercial satellite, Iceye-X36, in behaviour deemed "threatening" by the US State Department. Norbert Pouzin, an orbital analyst at French space tech firm, Aldoria, described the mercenary manoeuvre as the first of its kind.


Issued on: 30/10/2026 
The FRANCE 24 Observers/Quang Pham


Between October 15 and 18, 2026, the Russian satellite Cosmos-2612 positioned itself at a short distance from the commercial satellite Iceye-X36. The number "59103" is the identifier assigned to Iceye-X36 by the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). © KeepTrack.space


Has space become a new frontier in Russia's war with Ukraine?

Russian military satellite Cosmos-2612 carried out a manoeuvre between October 15 and 18 that brought it “dangerously close” to Ukrainian commercial satellite, Iceye-X36. The move was described by US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security as "threatening".

Operated by Finnish company Iceye, Iceye-X36 is a Finnish-American civilian satellite equipped with Synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) to provide satellite images to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The US State Department said Russia's tactic was consistent with “in-orbit military operations”.

Analysts specialising in space surveillance have been following Cosmos-2612 since its launch in April.

"Cosmos-2612 was one of six satellites launched in total. It was immediately apparent that this wasn't a classic deployment. As soon as they took off, the satellites started changing orbit to pursue Iceye satellites,” said Norbert Pouzin, an orbital analyst at Aldoria, a French space surveillance firm.

Cosmos-2612 took off on April 6, 2026 alongside Cosmos-2609, Cosmos-2610, Cosmos-2611, Cosmos-2613 and Cosmos-2614. KeepTrack, a site specialising in satellite navigation, enables viewers to track their paths.

This map shows the orbit carried out by Cosmos-2612 (identified by its Norad number 68762 in the screengrab) and other Cosmos satellites launched at the same time. © KeepTrack.space

Orbit re-routing – as has been the case of the Cosmos satellites – is a move that consumes a lot of fuel. It’s also the first step in approaching another satellite, Pouzin explains:

"If two satellites are travelling in the same orbit, then they don’t need as much fuel to approach one another. Changing directions in space uses a lot of fuel. But once in the same orbit as another satellite, you’ve already executed the most costly move fuel-wise, if you then want to carry out an approach.”
From a kilometre to within just a few hundred metres

As the imaging data via site, Satellite Tracker, corroborates, Cosmos-2612 diverted from its original position – around 400-500 km from Iceye-X36 – to get closer to the Finnish-American satellite.

"On October 15, Cosmos-2612 was within 5 kilometres of Iceye-X36. Its position continued to narrow in on the satellite on October 16 and 17, before finally getting to within a few hundred metres and a kilometre of Iceye-X36 ,” Pouzin said.

This chat shows the Cosmos-2612’s altitude (68762, shown in red) and Iceye-X36 (59103, shown in blue). You can see that Cosmos-2612 changed its position, moving to an altitude similar to Iceye-X36. © Satellite Tracker

Satellite imaging company Vantor published a photo of the two satellites on October 22, depicting their orbits withing just 1.02 kilometres of one another.
This photo of COSMOS-2612 and ICEYE-X36 was taken on October 17, 2026. Source: Vantor.

Data from KeepTrack also revealed that Cosmos-2612 and Iceye-X36 later embarked on the same orbit, meaning the Russian satellite was “following” the Finnish-American satellite.

Above is a map showing the positions of Cosmos-2612 (number Norad 68762 ) and Iceye-X36 (number Norad 59103). Below is a 3D view of a trajectory of the two satellites © KeepTrack.space


A bold move

So why did Cosmos-2612 carry out this “threatening” manoeuvre?

Given the lack of debris, it doesn’t appear that Iceye-X36 was the target of a “kinetic” attack – that is, a physical strike involving a collision or the launch of a projectile. But according to Pouzin, the manoeuvre by Cosmos-2612 could be interpreted as a form of exerting pressure on Ukraine, as it is the direct recipient of the data gathered by the Iceye satellite:


"SAR satellites have unique observation plans [Editor’s note: a schedule that coordinates how radar satellites can scan specific parts of the planet.] If an operator knows about these, then he could – for a short time – disrupt the satellite’s mission, potentially causing repercussions for ground-based or maritime operations, for example."

Cosmos-2612’s move seemed to shock Western commentators, he added:


"While Russia regularly launches military satellites in the same orbital planes as classified American military satellites; carrying out this particular kind of approach on a commercial satellite while in a low orbit is something new. Furthermore it seemed to be non-cooperative in nature: we are dealing with two actors who are not on the same side and these are satellites not operated by the same entity."

The initiative also revealed something about Russia’s capabilities, Pouzin concluded:


"The move demonstrated a certain agility by the Russian operator, a skilled knowledge of the space domain, and a very high level of mastery in this type of navigation.”



Sunday, August 03, 2025

Inside the Lavish Lifestyles of Putin's Inner Circle




  • Sergei Chemezov, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin and head of the sanctioned Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, and other Rostec subsidiary heads, spend time at luxury villas in the XXII Carat complex in Dubai.

  • While not always formal owners, these individuals use elaborate, multimillion-dollar villas, with some properties formally owned by associated firms or relatives, suggesting efforts to obscure ownership.

  • The article details the opulent lifestyle of these individuals, including private beachfronts, million-dollar bathtubs, and gatherings with Russian pop stars, highlighting how Dubai serves as a haven for wealthy Russians, including those under sanctions.

Private beachfronts, million-dollar bathtubs, evenings of wine, whiskey, cigars, and karaoke – or performances by Russian pop stars whose fame stretches back to the 1990s.

Those are some of the trappings of an “ultraluxe” villa complex in Dubai where Sergei Chemezov – the Western-sanctioned head of the massive Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec and a close ally of President Vladimir Putin since they were KGB officers in communist East Germany – spends time with family, friends, and associates.

While they are not the formal owners of the mansions, Chemezov and at least two heads of Rostec subsidiaries are neighbors at XXII Carat, a gated complex of elaborate, multimillion-dollar villas on the Palm Jumeirah, an artificial island on the Persian Gulf coast, Systema, RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit, has found.

Chemezov, 72, became friends with Putin when they lived in the same apartment building in Dresden in the 1980s, when Chemezov was a KGB general and Putin a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet spy agency. In 1996, when Putin became President Boris Yeltsin’s deputy chief of staff, he made Chemezov head of the Kremlin’s foreign economic relations department.

Rostec and its sprawling web of units and subsidiaries manufacture many of the weapons and components Russia uses in its war against Ukraine, now in its fourth year since Putin launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Chemezov has supported the invasion and echoed Putin’s narratives in public comments, accusing the United States and its Western allies of provoking the war and saying they risked triggering a global war. The Rostec CEO since 2007, Chemezov was hit with US, UK, and EU sanctions following the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

Sapphire, Emerald, Ruby

Since 2015, he has been visiting the United Arab Emirates at least once a year, according to leaked border crossing data. A source who is familiar with Chemezov’s inner circle said that the villa Chemezov uses was purchased a few years before the complex was finished late in 2018, and that Chemezov and his wife “put a lot into it, like a second home,” personally choosing the interior and closely monitoring the construction.

The villa they built is the costliest of the three styles at the complex, Sapphire, each of which has beach access and some of which are fitted with a $1 million bathtub made crystal or quartz – rose or green. In 2020, Sapphire villas cost $25.8 million, and the current asking price is about $31 million.

The other styles are Emerald and Ruby; all of them have at least seven bedrooms, a hammam bath, a climate-controlled wine cellar, a landscaped garden, and a swimming pool.

Hidden Ownership?

Formally, the two-story, 2,170 square meter home Chemezov uses is owned by a firm called Neve Limited, according to data published by C4ADS, a US-based nonprofit data-analysis and global-research organization. Systema was unable to track down information about Neve Limited, but the C4ADS data shows an e-mail address and phone number that leaked documents suggest are those of Natalya Agapova, a lawyer who has longstanding financial ties to Chemezov and his family.

Agapova declined to comment on property at XXII Carat, and Rostec did not respond to a request for comment.

One and two doors down from the Chemezov villa are slightly smaller homes used by the heads of two Rostec subsidiaries: Nikolai Kolesov, the director of Russian Helicopters; and Aleksandr Mikheyev, the director of Rosoboronexport, the main Russian arms sales company.

The villa Mikheyev uses is registered to his son, Aleksei, according to C4ADS data and Dubai land records. The formal owner of the one Kolesov uses is a local UAE company, Veles Electronics, which the late Putin foe and anti-corruption crusader Aleksei Navalny’s associates linked to the Russian Helicopters chief in a recent report.

Aleksei Mikheyev declined to comment. Rosoboronexport and Russian Helicopters did not respond to requests for comment.

Chemezov often spends time with Mikheyev and Kolesov when he stays in Dubai, sources with knowledge of the Rostec leadership told Systema, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

Their gatherings typically involve drinking alcohol, smoking cigars, and singing karaoke, sources said – though sometimes it was patriotic Russian pop stars such as Oleg Gazmanov and Grigory Leps, both under EU sanctions since 2022 over their support for the war, doing the crooning.

Russian Roots

The sources of wealth that enable state-owned company chiefs like Chemezov, Mikheyev, and Kolesov to afford such property are murky, though the latter also controls a lucrative network of private military industry companies.

A haven for rich Russians, particularly for those hit by sanctions over the war in Ukraine, Dubai is on the Persian Gulf -- but the roots of XXII Carat are deep in Russia. The developer was a company called Forum Group, based in Yekaterinburg and founded by Oleg Cherepanov, a prominent businessman who was known in the Ural Mountains city as Cherep – “the Skull.”

Cherepanov has lived in Dubai since 2014 and heads Forum Group Dubai. He has distanced himself from the Russian-based Forum Group, which is now 80 percent owned by Tamara Cherepanova, 77.

In Yekaterinburg, Forum Group built an ice arena for UGMK, a metals giant whose co-owner, US and UK-sanctioned billionaire Andrei Bokarev, is reportedly a friend of Chemezov’s and purportedly owns real estate at XXII Carat.

The C4ADS database indicates that two Ruby-class villas belonged to Diana Madzhitova, 29, who has flown to the U.A.E. with Bokarev more than 20 times in the last five years, according to leaked border crossing data. One of those houses was apparently later acquired by relatives of a more prominent billionaire: Alisher Usmanov.

Usmanov, a metals-to-media tycoon with a fortune of more than $16 billion, according to Forbes, is under US, UK, EU, and other sanctions.

Usmanov’s niece Gulnoz Kocharova and her husband are beneficiary owners of two Ruby-class villas at XXII Carat, including the one that had been registered to Madzhitova, according to Dubai land records.

"We categorically reject the implications and assumptions embedded in your questions. There is no cause or obligation to address them further," a lawyer for Usmanov, Joachim Steinhoefel, wrote in a response to a query from Systema.

Kocharova hung up on a journalist who called for comment, and she and her husband did not respond to queries sent by messaging app. Bokarev and Madzhitova did not respond to attempts to contact them.

By RFE/RL 

Friday, August 01, 2025

Russia’s Bankers Fight Inflation and the Kremlin’s War Addiction


After two years of fiscally-fueled growth and double-digit inflation, the Russian central bank is claiming a victory over galloping prices. But it’s come at a price.

By Alexander Kolyandr
July 31, 2025
CEPA

The Bank of Russia cut its base rate by a substantial 200 basis points to 18% on July 25, following a 100-point reduction the previous month. It also lowered its inflation outlook for 2025 and signaled a possible further cut to bring rates to 15% by the end of the year.

Inflation has been the primary challenge for Elvira Nabiullina, the outspoken and conservative Bank of Russia governor. Despite months of pressure from politicians and industrialists, she maintained interest rates at a prohibitive 21% after the Russian government responded to Western sanctions, war needs, and labor shortages with unprecedented fiscal spending — a striking departure from its traditionally conservative budgetary policy.

This state spending, supported in part by oil revenues and higher taxes, kept the economy afloat and delivered 4.3% GDP growth in both 2023 and 2024. The downside was double-digit inflation driven by labor shortages, rising salaries, and the domestic industry’s inability to expand production.

After a protracted uphill battle, the central bank now appears to be winning its struggle against rising prices and an overheated economy. Earlier in July, it recorded inflation close to its 4% target — the first time in months the figure had been so low.

In the week leading up to the rate cut, inflation even turned negative. Average annual inflation in the second quarter fell to 4.8%, compared with 8.2% in the first quarter. This represented a significant improvement on the bank’s April prediction of 7% to 8% inflation for this year, and it updated its forecast to between 6% and 7%.

The decline was attributed to a strong ruble, which makes imports cheaper, though the labor market remains overheated. Unemployment is at a historic low of 2.2%, with demand for workers unchanged since late last year.

This labor shortage has driven rising salaries — a key factor behind high inflation. However, real wages rose just 0.1% in May, a stark contrast to 3.2% in February and 6.5% in January, and the lower growth — alongside stricter borrowing conditions — is cooling demand and dampening inflation.

“Current inflationary pressures, including underlying ones, are declining faster than previously forecast,” the Bank said after its July 25 meeting. “Domestic demand growth is slowing. The economy continues to return to a balanced growth path.”
Get the Latest

This “balanced growth path” is a euphemism for anemic growth. The regulator expects Russia’s economy to grow between 1% and 2% in 2025, while the IMF forecasts even lower levels of 0.9% to 1.5%.

For the Kremlin, a brief period of low growth is tolerable, though combined with lower oil prices, it would reduce fiscal revenues. The main gamble is that the cooling of the economy won’t trigger a prolonged recession.

So far, the government can maintain defense and social spending, but may need to cut elsewhere, which would put it on a dangerous path.

Reduced spending or austerity measures would further slow economic growth and wage increases at a time when sanctions, low oil prices, and challenges to property rights discourage private capital investment. Growth might not recover, even with low inflation, and military production would claim a growing share of the Russian economy.

On the other hand, if the government doesn’t reduce fiscal support, there’s a risk high inflation will return.

The Bank has made clear it still sees risks to pursuing a softer monetary policy. These include falling oil prices, geopolitical factors (specifically additional Western sanctions), and political decisions to increase spending. It said that if next year’s budget parameters differ from current agreements, it might have to reconsider its easing approach.

The Bank of Russia’s policy of high interest rates and stringent regulations, combined with external factors and economic exhaustion, has accelerated inflation’s decline, but Russia is not out of the woods.

And the Kremlin’s preference for continued spending to finance the war and support growth continues to create tension between Russia’s monetary and fiscal policy goals.



Alexander Kolyandr is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) specializing in the Russian economy and politics. Previously, he was a journalist for the Wall Street Journal and a banker for Credit Suisse. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and lives in London. 

More on this and other aspects of the Russian economy in a weekly summary produced by the independent publication, The Bell.


Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.


A Putin Ally, Russia’s War Machine, And Luxury Villas In Dubai – Analysis



By 

By Sergei Titov and Systema


(RFE/RL) — Private beachfronts, million-dollar bathtubs, evenings of wine, whiskey, cigars, and karaoke – or performances by Russian pop stars whose fame stretches back to the 1990s.

Those are some of the trappings of an “ultraluxe” villa complex in Dubai where Sergei Chemezov – the Western-sanctioned head of the massive Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec and a close ally of President Vladimir Putin since they were KGB officers in communist East Germany – spends time with family, friends, and associates.

While they are not the formal owners of the mansions, Chemezov and at least two heads of Rostec subsidiaries are neighbors at XXII Carat, a gated complex of elaborate, multimillion-dollar villas on the Palm Jumeirah, an artificial island on the Persian Gulf coast, Systema, RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit, has found.

Chemezov, 72, became friends with Putin when they lived in the same apartment building in Dresden in the 1980s, when Chemezov was a KGB general and Putin a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet spy agency. In 1996, when Putin became President Boris Yeltsin’s deputy chief of staff, he made Chemezov head of the Kremlin’s foreign economic relations department.

Rostec and its sprawling web of units and subsidiaries manufacture many of the weapons and components Russia uses in its war against Ukraine, now in its fourth year since Putin launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022.


Chemezov has supported the invasion and echoed Putin’s narratives in public comments, accusing the United States and its Western allies of provoking the war and saying they risked triggering a global war. The Rostec CEO since 2007, Chemezov was hit with US, UK, and EU sanctions following the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

Sapphire, Emerald, Ruby

Since 2015, he has been visiting the United Arab Emirates at least once a year, according to leaked border crossing data. A source who is familiar with Chemezov’s inner circle said that the villa Chemezov uses was purchased a few years before the complex was finished late in 2018, and that Chemezov and his wife “put a lot into it, like a second home,” personally choosing the interior and closely monitoring the construction.

The villa they built is the costliest of the three styles at the complex, Sapphire, each of which has beach access and some of which are fitted with a $1 million bathtub made crystal or quartz – rose or green. In 2020, Sapphire villas cost $25.8 million, and the current asking price is about $31 million.

The other styles are Emerald and Ruby; all of them have at least seven bedrooms, a hammam bath, a climate-controlled wine cellar, a landscaped garden, and a swimming pool.

Hidden Ownership?

Formally, the two-story, 2,170 square meter home Chemezov uses is owned by a firm called Neve Limited, according to data published by C4ADS, a US-based nonprofit data-analysis and global-research organization. Systema was unable to track down information about Neve Limited, but the C4ADS data shows an e-mail address and phone number that leaked documents suggest are those of Natalya Agapova, a lawyer who has longstanding financial ties to Chemezov and his family.

Agapova declined to comment on property at XXII Carat, and Rostec did not respond to a request for comment.

One and two doors down from the Chemezov villa are slightly smaller homes used by the heads of two Rostec subsidiaries: Nikolai Kolesov, the director of Russian Helicopters; and Aleksandr Mikheyev, the director of Rosoboronexport, the main Russian arms sales company.

The villa Mikheyev uses is registered to his son, Aleksei, according to C4ADS data and Dubai land records. The formal owner of the one Kolesov uses is a local UAE company, Veles Electronics, which the late Putin foe and anti-corruption crusader Aleksei Navalny’s associates linked to the Russian Helicopters chief in a recent report.

Aleksei Mikheyev declined to comment. Rosoboronexport and Russian Helicopters did not respond to requests for comment.

Chemezov often spends time with Mikheyev and Kolesov when he stays in Dubai, sources with knowledge of the Rostec leadership told Systema, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

Their gatherings typically involve drinking alcohol, smoking cigars, and singing karaoke, sources said – though sometimes it was patriotic Russian pop stars such as Oleg Gazmanov and Grigory Leps, both under EU sanctions since 2022 over their support for the war, doing the crooning.

Russian Roots

The sources of wealth that enable state-owned company chiefs like Chemezov, Mikheyev, and Kolesov to afford such property are murky, though the latter also controls a lucrative network of private military industry companies.

A haven for rich Russians, particularly for those hit by sanctions over the war in Ukraine, Dubai is on the Persian Gulf — but the roots of XXII Carat are deep in Russia. The developer was a company called Forum Group, based in Yekaterinburg and founded by Oleg Cherepanov, a prominent businessman who was known in the Ural Mountains city as Cherep – “the Skull.”

Cherepanov has lived in Dubai since 2014 and heads Forum Group Dubai. He has distanced himself from the Russian-based Forum Group, which is now 80 percent owned Tamara Cherepanova, 77.

In Yekaterinburg, Forum Group built an ice arena for UGMK,a metals giant whose co-owner, US and UK-sanctioned billionaire Andrei Bokarev, is reportedly a friend of Chemezov’s and purportedly owns real estate at XXII Carat.

The C4ADS database indicates that two Ruby-class villas belonged to Diana Madzhitova, 29, who has flown to the U.A.E. with Bokarev more than 20 times in the last five years, according to leaked border crossing data. One of them was apparently later acquired by another buyer.

Bokarev and Madzhitova did not respond to attempts to contact them.

(Written by Steve Gutterman based on reporting by Sergei Titov of Systema)

  • Sergei Titov is an investigative journalist with RFE/RL’s Russian Investigative Unit, also known as Systema. He focuses on such topics as Russian oligarchs and their dark money, offshore networks and corruption. Previously, he worked as an observer at Forbes Russia and as a special correspondent at the Russian media holding RBC.
  • Systema is RFE/RL’s Russian-language investigative unit, launched in 2023. The team conducts in-depth investigative journalism, producing high-profile reports and videos in Russian.

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.

Saturday, October 21, 2023

‘Embrace discomfort’ to save planet says N Macedonia pioneer

By AFP
October 21, 2023

Going back to the land: Dimche Ackov inside his circular home 
made from clay - Copyright AFP Hector RETAMAL

Darko DURIDANSKI

One day Dimche Ackov had enough of the stress and pollution of urban life and chucked in his job and headed out into the North Macedonia countryside for a fresh start.

Nearly 10 years later, Ackov has channelled his burnout into a fully-fledged mission to educate people about living closer to nature.

His home, constructed entirely from locally-sourced, natural materials, is now a kind of workshop and school, where hundreds visit every year to learn the ways of sustainable living.

“When I came here to live this way, I didn’t have any knowledge. I started to research natural building and I saw that those workshops for natural building were very expensive,” said Ackov, who lives near the former industrial town of Veles, once branded one of the most polluted in the world.

“I promised myself that if I ever learn to build those houses, I will share that knowledge for free.”

The journey has not been without its pitfalls, with a steep learning curve.

“I didn’t even know what a hoe was,” the dreadlocked Ackov said of his tentative attempts to live off the land.

But the effort paid off, and Ackov built himself a beehive-shaped home from bags of soil that is cosy in winter and cool in summer. It has its own well, solar panels, vegetable garden and a fridge made from clay.



– ‘Make one small change’ –




To share the knowledge he has accumulated along the way, Ackov has hosted more than 40 workshops in the last eight years.

After the workshops many people “see the environment with different eyes”, he told AFP. “Then you can’t destroy it anymore. You feel a part of it.”

Ackov believes in embracing the “discomfort” of living in nature.

The goal is “tо give up something harmful, to make one small change. If today, millions of people don’t take a plastic bag, a huge change will be made,” he said.

Tiny North Macedonia, with a population of only 1.8 million people, is facing some steep environmental challenges.

Air pollution, inadequate waste treatment and illegal logging are major problems.

A recent international study found it had some of the worst air pollution in Europe, with almost two-thirds of people living in areas with more than four times the World Health Organization guidelines for dangerous air particles.

Despite the hurdles, Ackov believes “now is the time to fix what was damaged before”.

“We are now small streams, but we will all get together in one river and make huge changes. I am a big optimist, otherwise I wouldn’t live this way.”

Sunday, October 15, 2023

Combating disinformation

Asad Baig 
Published October 14, 2023


VELES, a small town in Macedonia, came into the global spotlight in the context of the 2016 US presidential elections, albeit for all the wrong reasons. This small factory town appeared to be an epicentre of political disinformation targeting the American population ahead of the polls.

At times, the hoax news stories emanating from Veles even trumped those from credible journalism outlets. From ‘Pope Francis Endorses Trump’ to ‘ISIS Calls for Muslim Voters to Vote for Hillary’, the imaginative Macedonian ‘content writers’ apparently gave the 19 leading American journalism outlets a run for their money.

Studies suggest in the months leading up to the elections, 20 top-performing hoax election stories generated more engagement on Facebook than the 20 top-performing credible stories from the top news outlets combined, including the New York Times and Washington Post. Many came from Veles.

Political disinformation isn’t merely for political gains. Hoax stories from Veles were created to garner traffic by triggering emotions and generate click-based-revenue. The revenue was in the millions.

Mirko Ceselkoski, the ‘mentor’ of the youth behind this operation, proudly claimed that more than 1,200 of his ‘students’ were earning upwards of $10m a month. One can only imagine the profits that social media companies had made from the traffic generated by these hoax stories.

The influx of organised disinformation in the 2016 election amply demonstrates the potential impact of MDM (misinformation, disinformation, mal-information) on elections in general. MDM can be massively profitable for most parties involved. Similar trends have been noted in Pakistan.

The revelations of the former ‘troll-in-chief’ and investigations published by various journalists and researchers unpacking hate campaigns and identifying the political actors behind them, indicate a heavy potential influx of organised political MDM in the run-up to the elections in 2024, especially considering the factors that make Pakistan’s population susceptible to hateful MDM.

The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found that “influencers” are overtaking credible journalists as news sources, and fewer people trust traditional media, whereas more people are turning to TikTok for news.

Recent studies by Media Matters for Democracy have made similar findings — 64 per cent of surveyed news consumers indicated they use ‘social media platforms’ as their go-to ‘trusted medium’ for news. This shift towards influencer-based content could substantially contribute to creating a conducive environment for political MDM.

There is ample evidence to prove that ‘hate sells’ in online spaces.

Firstly, in the context of journalism, a vast majority of influencer-based content in Pakistan is, at best, political commentary. However, this distinction between commentary/ opinion-making and journalism is often conveniently blurred, making it harder for consumers to identify MDM, especially if it comes from their trusted ‘influencer’.

Secondly, the practice of engaging social media influencers and engaging troll networks for social media campaigns, unlike political ads, has zero transparency.

‘Paid influencers’ masquerade as political supporters, creating a classic echo-chamber effect, furthering polarisation, regurgitating political MDM, and presenting a distorted worldview to consumers. Add our existing cultural, religious and political prejudices to this mix and we have a recipe for disaster.

To top all this, whistleblowers and researchers have produced ample evidence to prove that ‘hate sells’ in online spaces. The Facebook Papers, a trove of Facebook’s internal documents made public by whistleblower Frances Haugen, reveal that the platform has been failing in dealing with hate and incitement, and the results are most harmful in countries with pronounced fault lines and conflicts.

In India, for instance, “Facebook has been selective in curbing hate speech, misinformation and inflammatory posts, particularly anti-Muslim content”. Failure to act aside, serving personalised content on timelines based on individual consumption patterns, an intrinsic characteristic of AI-based algorithms, even if the content in question comprises credible journalism stories, could create a distorted worldview.

Among potential responses to counter MDM, the worst idea is “regulating or criminalising fake news”. A ‘law’ to deal with misinformation and associated harm is touted as a one-stop-shop solution to curb all forms of MDM.

A similar thought process is reflected in the Prevention of Election Crimes Act (Peca) Ordinance, 2022, a law promulgated to curb free speech under the garb of ‘combating fake news’ by the PTI, and the Pakistan Media Development Authority, a legal framework proposed to centrally regulate all forms of media.

Any law enacted specifically to make information practitioners accountable cannot function without substantially harming free speech. More importantly, Pakistan currently has many legal provisions to deal with the harms associated with MDM. Most also have a history of being abused, including criminal defamation under the Pakistan Penal Code, and Section 20 of Peca.

A potential response that could work is ‘inoculating’ masses for misinformation, and community-based ‘proactive’ fact-checking. The inoculation theory “explains how an attitude or belief can be made resistant to persuasion or influence”, similar to how a biological body becomes resistant to a viral contagion.

The concept can be used to inoculate the population against a certain kind of MDM — such as gendered disinformation — by pre-exposing them to ‘weakened doses’ of misinformation and techniques that go into its production and distribution. Researchers have also been experimenting with a ‘broad-spectrum’ vaccine for MDM through gamification of this process, putting users in the shoes of misinformation producers and encouraging a critical reflection on the tactics used, such as impersonation and the use of fake imagery to trigger emotions.

The inoculation approach has had a high success rate. Well-designed, targeted media and information literacy campaigns in all major local languages, and the translation and distribution of existing gamified tools — such as ‘Fake It To Make It’ or ‘Bad News’ — and their mass distribution through popular platforms, including TikTok, could make a substantial difference.

However, an intervention on this scale would require substantial resources that perhaps only governments can pull together. CSOs, while they can help in the effective design and distribution of such content, can only play a supporting role. This might sound clichéd, but the responsibility for inoculating masses for electoral disinformation ahead of election 2024 lies on the ECP and the caretaker governments. Are they doing enough?

The writer is a media strategist and trainer, and founder of Media Matters for Democracy, a media development organisation.

Published in Dawn, October 14th, 2023