Russia’s share of foreign influence in Africa has grown by more than a quarter in a decade to 2.8%, Vedomosti reported on November 2, but still trails China, France and the US.
The measure is the Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) index compiled by the Pardee Institute at the University of Denver, which scores every pair of countries on trade, diplomatic and arms ties and on how dependent one is on the other. Russia’s share of the influence foreign states exert over Africa rose from 2.2% in 2015 to a peak of 3% in 2021 before slipping back to 2.8% in 2024, lifting it from 12th to ninth place among Africa’s partners. China leads with 11%, ahead of France and the US on 7% each, with South Africa and the UAE on 5%, according to the paper’s calculations.
The numbers put a size on a relationship the Kremlin presents as one of its biggest foreign-policy wins. Military governments across the Sahel have sent French and US troops home and turned to Moscow, and delegations from 48 African countries came to Moscow for the third Russia-Africa summit on October 28-29. Yet on every hard economic measure Russia remains a minor partner: it accounts for about 1.5% of Africa’s foreign trade, at most 2% of its foreign direct investment and 0.4% of its external debt. Its expanding pull on the continent rests on guns, grain and reactors, not money.

Trade stuck at $30bn
Trade between Russia and Africa reached $30.4bn in 2025, including $3.3bn of services, according to IMF, UNCTAD and Federal Customs Service data compiled by Vedomosti. That is double the $14.7bn of 2015, and 53% higher in real terms.
Merchandise trade came to $27.1bn on customs figures, close to the “more than $27bn” Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said on the eve of the summit, and up more than 60% from $16.8bn at the time of the first summit in Sochi in 2019.
Merchandise trade rose just 1.4% in January-August 2026 and is on course for about $27.5bn this year, while total trade has hovered around $30bn for three years as Africa’s overall foreign trade grows by 8-12% a year.
Russia’s share of the continent’s trade has fallen for two years in a row, from 1.6% in 2024 to 1.45% in 2025 and an estimated 1.31% in 2026, and Africa’s share of Russia’s own trade fell from 3.9% to 3.4% over the same period. President Vladimir Putin told the summit that trade should at least double, to more than $50bn, by 2030.
China’s trade with Africa reached a record $348bn in 2025, according to Chinese customs data, more than 12 times Russia’s merchandise total.
Africa sold Russia goods worth $4.6bn in 2025 and bought $22.9bn, and 62% of the total goes through North Africa, with Egypt alone accounting for 36% and Tunisia for 14%. Putin said Russia-Egypt trade had passed $10bn for the first time, with growth of 14% in January-August 2026. Food made up 32% of Russian exports to the continent, mineral fuels and raw materials 23% and machinery 14%, up from 8% in 2019.
Russia supplies 31% of Africa’s wheat imports, 33% of its pig iron, 18% of its fertilisers and 13% of its coal, but only 0.2% of its machinery and equipment. Putin said Russia shipped more than 18mn tonnes of grain to Africa in 2025 and 13mn tonnes in the first nine months of 2026, and fertiliser deliveries have passed 2.2mn tonnes this year. That role is now under strain: Ukrainian drone attacks on Black Sea and Azov port infrastructure are expected to cut Russian wheat exports by about 40% year on year in July-October, according to the Rusagrotrans analytical centre, feeding a food price shock that lands hardest on import-dependent North African states.
More than 90% of export settlements are already made in national currencies, but they go through indirect channels that raise costs, according to Mikhail Margelov, vice president of the Russian International Affairs Council. Putin used the summit to pitch Russia’s digital-currency payment system to African governments as one immune to Western sanctions, part of a wider push for a BRICS Pay alternative to SWIFT.

Debt, investment and megaprojects
Africa’s external debt reached $1.17 trillion at the end of 2024, according to the World Bank, of which $4.5bn, mostly owed by Egypt, is owed to Russia – 0.4% of the total, or 2.3% counting debts Moscow has already forgiven. Russia had written off $23bn of African debt by 2023, Putin said at that year’s summit, including $4.8bn owed by Ethiopia, $4.6bn by Libya, $4.7bn by Algeria and $3.5bn by Angola.
Africa’s inward foreign direct investment stock stood at about $1.07 trillion in 2024, according to UNCTAD. The Central Bank of Russia recorded just $138mn of Russian FDI on the continent at the start of 2022, though it withheld data for Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and much Russian money arrives through Cyprus and other intermediaries. Estimates that count the largest projects put Russian investment at $8bn-$20bn, or roughly 1-2% of that stock.
The biggest single item is Rosatom’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt, valued at about $29bn, 85% of it financed by a $25bn Russian loan. Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi discussed the plant at the Kremlin on October 28. Russia’s nuclear exports are booming and Rosatom is using them to bind clients in for decades through fuel supply – uranium is the new gas.
Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev said on October 30 that more large projects were being reviewed with Uganda and Ghana and surveys would start shortly in Ethiopia, while nine countries have shown interest in small floating nuclear plants. Ghana opened talks with Rosatom at the summit and Mali pressed Moscow to speed up its own planned plant.
Ghana’s foreign minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa said on October 31 that Russia would work with Accra on a 2,000 MW nuclear plant and had agreed a defence pact covering military equipment for Ghana’s armed forces.
Most of the rest of the pipeline is in resources. Rosneft holds 30% of Egypt’s Zohr gas field, a stake worth $2.15bn in 2026 prices, Nordgold has invested about $1.5bn in Guinea’s Lefa gold mine since 2010, Lukoil’s oil stakes in Ghana and Congo exceed $2.4bn, though the sanctioned company has agreed to sell most of its foreign assets, and Rosatom is preparing the $1.2bn Mkuju River uranium project in Tanzania. Rusal agreed at the summit to mine Ghana’s bauxite and build Ghana’s first alumina refinery, South Sudan offered Zarubezhneft Petronas’ former oil stakes, Sudan offered Russia a Red Sea free zone and Mozambique began talks on a north-south railway.
Guns for gold
The Soviet Union supplied 58% of Africa’s arms imports in 1985, $3.2bn out of $5.5bn, according to a US arms control agency report, and Russia’s cumulative share since 1991 is 36%.
In 2021-2025 the US supplied 19% of Africa’s imports of major arms, China 17%, Russia 15% and France 8.3%, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Vedomosti values Russia’s deliveries at more than $4.3bn out of $29bn. African arms imports dropped 41% from the previous five years and Algeria’s fell 78%, though SIPRI says unverified reports of Algerian deals with Russia suggest its estimates may be low. In sub-Saharan Africa China leads with 22%, ahead of Russia on 12% and Turkey on 11%. Rosoboronexport has signed about 150 contracts with African states worth more than $20bn since 2023, its director general Alexander Mikheev said in May, though signed contracts are not the same as deliveries.
Russian troops and instructors from the Defence Ministry’s Africa Corps - the successor to the PMC Wagner Group - and associated units are in Mali, the Central African Republic, Libya, Niger and Burkina Faso.
The Africa Corps helped Niger’s junta put down a mutiny in Niamey in August, Moscow is upgrading six Libyan airbases to support its Sahel operations, and in 2025 it pressed the Central African Republic to swap Wagner for the Africa Corps and pay in cash. Malian refugees have accused Russian fighters of torture and killings.
Security work has not turned into commercial gains: in Mali, Western companies control most gold mining while Russia carries much of the cost of keeping order, according to Andrei Fedorov of the Institute for African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Where Moscow counts
Russia accounts for 12% of the foreign influence on Rwanda, 11% on Algeria, 10% on Uganda, 9% on Egypt, 8% on Togo, 7% on Sudan and 6% on Ethiopia, Mali and Angola, on the FBIC measure. Moscow’s closest security partners register less: IntelliNews calculations from the index put Russia’s 2024 share at 4.3% in the Central African Republic, 3.8% in Burkina Faso and 2.2% in Niger, because the index counts formal trade, diplomacy and arms transfers rather than mercenaries and security contracts.

Share of foreign influence capacity over African states by partner, 1995-2024. Source: Pardee Institute, University of Denver, FBIC index; IntelliNews calculations.
France held 15.5% of foreign influence in Africa in 1995 and the US almost 10%, against 2.8% for China, according to IntelliNews calculations from the same dataset. China overtook both by 2007. The UAE has climbed from under 1% to 4.8% and Turkey from 0.3% to 1.5%. BRICS members together now account for 33% of the foreign influence on African states, Europe for 28% and other African states for 27%, according to Vedomosti.
The Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) expects Russia’s weight in Africa to keep rising to 2050, but more slowly than China’s, held back by its weak economic levers, sanctions and uncertainty over its future.
The Soviet inheritance
Those “accustomed to thinking in terms of their colonial past” are trying to drive Africans back into “debt bondage”, Putin told the summit’s plenary session on October 28, quoting Burkina Faso’s revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara: “Debt is neocolonialism.”
By 1989 the Soviet Union had built or begun some 350 industrial plants in Africa, including the Aswan Dam in Egypt, steelworks in Algeria and Nigeria and hydroelectric stations in Angola, trained 450,000 specialists and lent $50bn at 2-3%, half of which was later written off. Its 1985 trade with key African partners came to $4.1bn, 2.6% of the continent’s $159bn total, with Libya, Egypt and Algeria the main partners. Broader estimates put the Soviet share of Africa’s total foreign interaction at 10-15%, according to Ekaterina Novikova of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.
“The Soviet project was very progressive. We helped develop entire industries on a turnkey basis – what’s called sovereign industrialisation,” said Denis Degterev of the Institute for African Studies.
The collapse was steep: Russia’s share of Africa’s trade fell to 0.5% in 1995 and was still only 0.7% in 2010, before recovering to 1.1% in 2015, 1.5% in 2019 and a post-Soviet high of 1.6% in 2024. Russia now has diplomatic relations with all 54 African states and embassies in more than 45, and the number of African students in Russia has risen by half since 2020 to 40,000, according to Putin.
“Russia’s policy in Africa has shed Soviet altruism and has a pronounced commercial character,” Novikova told Vedomosti. The lack of a strategy and of systematic coordination is the central weakness of Russian policy on the continent, according to Margelov, who argues that Moscow needs a dedicated development-finance vehicle on the model of China’s state policy banks. Fedorov wants to revive the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which ran the USSR’s aid and construction projects abroad.
The summit gave Moscow its headline deals – a Ghanaian alumina refinery, South Sudanese oil, a possible Red Sea foothold and a queue of reactor customers – and a promise to move Russian production to the continent to escape sanctions. The numbers say the gap between that ambition and Russia’s economic weight remains wide: a 2.8% share of influence, a share of trade below 1.5% and falling, and a security presence that has yet to pay its way.