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Friday, November 06, 2026

 

Idaho National Laboratory receives ARPA-E award to advance next-generation nuclear fuel




DOE/Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory receives ARPA-E award to advance next-generation nuclear fuel

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From left to right: Idaho National Laboratory Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and Technology Jess Gehin, nuclear reactor experiment design engineer Calvin Downey, industrial relationship manager Toni Karlsson, and experiment manager Matthew Arrowood.

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Credit: Idaho National Laboratory






Researchers will test new fuel in the lab’s Advanced Test Reactor

(IDAHO FALLS, Idaho) – The Idaho National Laboratory will lead a team of researchers and industry partners to create a new type of nuclear fuel from recycled nuclear materials. Researchers will then test the novel fuel in INL’s Advanced Test Reactor, the only facility in the country with the capabilities and available expertise to perform this work.

The project — Irradiation of Molten Plutonium Actinide Chloride fuels and Testing, or IMPACT — will bring together national laboratory scientists and private-sector innovators to create and test the first transuranic-based (TRU-based) liquid salt fuel in a reactor. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) selected IMPACT as part of the High Performance Optimized Recycled Nuclear Isotopes for Gen IV Reactors (HORNIG) program. The award was announced Oct. 29 and advances President Trump’s 2025 Executive Orders by recycling used fuel, turning surplus transuranic elements into reactor fuel and building a domestic fuel supply that doesn’t depend on foreign suppliers.

“Idaho National Laboratory is already playing a leading role in America’s nuclear renaissance, and there’s no better place to advance the next generation of nuclear energy technologies,” said Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Brandon Williams. “This project brings together the expertise of our national laboratories and the innovation of the private sector to develop and test new types of nuclear fuel. It’s exactly the kind of partnership we need to strengthen America’s energy security, accelerate advanced nuclear deployment, and deliver on President Trump’s vision for American energy independence and energy dominance.”

HORNIG supports the design, fabrication, testing and qualification of TRU-based fuels for use in advanced reactors, leveraging materials recovered from the nation’s reserves of used nuclear fuel and other strategic materials. The program challenges project teams to design and test TRU-based fuel systems for the next generation of nuclear reactors.

INL will lead IMPACT, perform all nuclear material handling and conduct the hands-on efforts: fabricating the fuel from transuranic materials already located at the lab, testing the fuel properties and irradiating the fuel in the Advanced Test Reactor. Argonne National Laboratory, Moltex Energy USA LLC and Southern Company will provide modeling support, reactor design input and a utility perspective, with Moltex and Southern providing cost share support.

“Very few places on Earth can handle plutonium, make it into fuel, and test it in a reactor — all in one place,” said INL Director John Wagner. “IMPACT puts that capability to work on a fuel that’s never been irradiated in this form: a chloride salt carrying recycled plutonium and other transuranics for molten salt reactors. The data this team generates is what will help move a fuel from a promising idea to one a developer can actually license and deploy.”

Tuesday, November 03, 2026

Russia’s Economic Decay Undercuts Putin’s Global Ambition – Analysis


Key Takeaways:

Putin’s third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow on 28–29 October drew 48 delegations and roughly 20 bilaterals yet produced scant practical results and muted coverage.

Russian security aid has not curbed Mali’s violence, arms sales prioritize profits, and the Africa Corps shift plus a deepening budget deficit limit Moscow’s investment and operational flexibility.

The event was meant to boost Putin’s profile before APEC in Shenzhen, but neither a trilateral with Trump and Xi nor a bilateral is confirmed, while maximalist Ukraine aims continue to erode Russia’s leverage.


Russian President Vladimir Putin held the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow on October 28–29. Amid a surge of high-level diplomatic activity throughout last week, Putin increased the scale of this event compared to the summits in St. Petersburg in July 2023 and in Sochi in October 2019. Besides the extra-long plenary sessions with delegations from 48 countries, Putin held about 20 bilateral meetings with heads of African states, emphasizing Russia’s supposedly anti-colonial stance (Kommersant, October 28).

This effort has yielded scant practical results, and the international resonance of the gathering was far below the Kremlin’s expectations (The Moscow Times, October 30). Even some mainstream pro-Kremlin media, such as Nezavisimaya Gazeta, opted to ignore the event, while others, like Fontanka, provided minimal coverage. Kommersant stood out with extensive features laced with a heavy dose of irony about the practical benefit of these meetings (Kommersant, October 30).


Russian involvement in Africa in recent years has yielded few benefits. Mali, whose military government has relied on Russian security assistance, has faced escalating violence despite Moscow’s support. During his October 30 meeting with Malian transitional president Assimi Goïta, Putin chose to highlight the growing popularity of Russian-language education and the expansion of scholarships for Malian students in Russia instead of addressing security concerns (Vedomosti, October 20; RBC, October 30).

Russia’s arms exports have increased in 2026, but Rosoboronexport seeks to maximize profits rather than provide credits or donations to African partners (Novye Izvestiya, October 5). The transformation of the privately owned Wagner Group into the Africa Corps, controlled by the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), has curtailed Russia’s capacity for conflict manipulation as Moscow now tries to recruit mercenaries from African states such as Burundi and Zimbabwe for its war against Ukraine rather than increase the ranks of its armed “advisers” inside of Africa (The Insider, October 26).

Pavel Prigozhin, the son of the late Wagner Group leader, has sought to preserve and expand his father’s security and commercial empire in the Central African Republic, including its lucrative gold-mining and trafficking operations. His influence within Russia’s military establishment remains limited, however, as he has reportedly cultivated closer ties with the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) than with the GRU, which oversees Moscow’s Africa Corps (The Moscow Times, October 19).


Russia has little investment capacity to offer African countries as its own financial crisis keeps deepening (Vedomosti, October 30). The 2027 state budget, which has been formally submitted to the newly formed State Duma, projects a substantial deficit of 5.44 trillion rubles, alongside cuts to numerous investment programmes (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 28). Even the banks channeling funds to the defense-industrial complex, such as Promsvyazbank, report big losses and demand re-capitalization from the federal government (The Moscow Times, October 30).

Contraction in most civilian sectors is set to continue. Even agriculture, which used to benefit from grain exports to Africa, suffers from the Ukrainian blockade of the ports in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, and shipping from Murmansk adds heavily to the costs (The Bell; ProFinance.ru, October 29). State finances are under such pressure that the Defense Ministry has proposed postponing December salary payments for most military personnel until January, exempting those serving in the joint group of forces fighting in Ukraine (Verstka Media; Radio Svoboda, October 30).

High hopes in Moscow for a windfall of profits from the “diesel deal” announced by U.S. President Donald Trump on October 9 have evaporated as no significant relaxation of U.S. sanctions has yet occurred (Lenta.ru, October 28). Three tankers loaded with diesel in the Primorsk terminal have changed course from the United States to Brazil, where the fuel will likely fetch a lower price (Neftegaz.ru, October 30).

Ukraine has ended the unofficial pause in long-distance strikes on Russian refineries, reportedly taken on Trump’s request, which Russia ignored. The last days of October were marked by huge fires in Ufa in the Republic of Bashkortostan, Novokuybyshevsk in Samara oblast, and Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod oblast, sparing Moscow, where African leaders formed long lines for audiences with Putin (Novaya Gazeta Evropa; TopWar.ru, October 31).

Russia’s inability to organize minimally effective air defense for its energy infrastructure provides the best explanation for its failure to build a naval base in Sudan, which was supposed to support the deployment of Russia’s Mediterranean squadron—now effectively canceled—into the Red Sea (Carnegie Politika, October 26).


Putin’s entertainment of African leaders was likely meant to strengthen his international profile before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China (PRC) on November 18–19, where he hopes to partake in a trilateral meeting with Trump and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping (Kommersant, October 28). Neither this meeting nor Putin’s bilateral meeting with Trump is confirmed or guaranteed (Forbes.ru, October 24; Gazeta.ru, October 25).

Putin also expects a follow-up to the conversations in Shenzhen at the G20 Miami summit on December 14–15, but the frosty reception of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov—particularly by European officials—at the G20 ministerial meeting on October 30–31 bodes ill for this trip, and Trump’s intention to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also adds to doubt in the Kremlin (Radio Svoboda, October 30; RBC.ru, November 1).

Putin reportedly prefers bilateral meetings with Trump to any multilateral format. Europe’s key role in supporting Ukraine has nonetheless engendered understanding among Russian pundits that engagement of Europeans is necessary for advancing a real peace process (RIAC, October 28). Russian opinions on the initiative of Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to set up a channel of communication with Putin are mixed, but Putin expressed satisfaction with their call (Nezavisimaya Gazeta; TopWar.ru, October 28). For the Nordic politicians, a key question is about the beginning of shifts in Russia’s position on ending its unwinnable war against Ukraine, but the huge costs and mounting casualties have apparently not altered Putin’s aims yet (Re: Russia, October 13).

Putin has ostensibly not wavered from his goal to capture all of Donbas. The Kremlin is still searching for the limits of Ukraine’s resilience and Europe’s resolve, but may find the bottom of the barrel of Russia’s passive acceptance of Putin’s senseless war first. The delusion of Russia’s pivotal global role is fast evaporating, and each summit adds to this depreciation.

About the author: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation


About The Jamestown Foundation
The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism.
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Monday, November 02, 2026

 

Russia's influence in Africa grows by a third in a decade but stays a quarter of China's

Russia's influence in Africa grows by a third in a decade but stays a quarter of China's
Trade of $30.4bn and a 15% share of the arms market make Moscow a security partner for the Sahel, but an economic minnow on a continent where China trades 12 times as much. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook
By Ben Aris in Berlin November 2, 2026

Russia’s share of foreign influence in Africa has grown by more than a quarter in a decade to 2.8%, Vedomosti reported on November 2, but still trails China, France and the US.

The measure is the Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) index compiled by the Pardee Institute at the University of Denver, which scores every pair of countries on trade, diplomatic and arms ties and on how dependent one is on the other. Russia’s share of the influence foreign states exert over Africa rose from 2.2% in 2015 to a peak of 3% in 2021 before slipping back to 2.8% in 2024, lifting it from 12th to ninth place among Africa’s partners. China leads with 11%, ahead of France and the US on 7% each, with South Africa and the UAE on 5%, according to the paper’s calculations.

The numbers put a size on a relationship the Kremlin presents as one of its biggest foreign-policy wins. Military governments across the Sahel have sent French and US troops home and turned to Moscow, and delegations from 48 African countries came to Moscow for the third Russia-Africa summit on October 28-29. Yet on every hard economic measure Russia remains a minor partner: it accounts for about 1.5% of Africa’s foreign trade, at most 2% of its foreign direct investment and 0.4% of its external debt. Its expanding pull on the continent rests on guns, grain and reactors, not money.

Trade stuck at $30bn

Trade between Russia and Africa reached $30.4bn in 2025, including $3.3bn of services, according to IMF, UNCTAD and Federal Customs Service data compiled by Vedomosti. That is double the $14.7bn of 2015, and 53% higher in real terms.

Merchandise trade came to $27.1bn on customs figures, close to the “more than $27bn” Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said on the eve of the summit, and up more than 60% from $16.8bn at the time of the first summit in Sochi in 2019.

Merchandise trade rose just 1.4% in January-August 2026 and is on course for about $27.5bn this year, while total trade has hovered around $30bn for three years as Africa’s overall foreign trade grows by 8-12% a year.

Russia’s share of the continent’s trade has fallen for two years in a row, from 1.6% in 2024 to 1.45% in 2025 and an estimated 1.31% in 2026, and Africa’s share of Russia’s own trade fell from 3.9% to 3.4% over the same period. President Vladimir Putin told the summit that trade should at least double, to more than $50bn, by 2030.

China’s trade with Africa reached a record $348bn in 2025, according to Chinese customs data, more than 12 times Russia’s merchandise total.

Africa sold Russia goods worth $4.6bn in 2025 and bought $22.9bn, and 62% of the total goes through North Africa, with Egypt alone accounting for 36% and Tunisia for 14%. Putin said Russia-Egypt trade had passed $10bn for the first time, with growth of 14% in January-August 2026. Food made up 32% of Russian exports to the continent, mineral fuels and raw materials 23% and machinery 14%, up from 8% in 2019.

Russia supplies 31% of Africa’s wheat imports, 33% of its pig iron, 18% of its fertilisers and 13% of its coal, but only 0.2% of its machinery and equipment. Putin said Russia shipped more than 18mn tonnes of grain to Africa in 2025 and 13mn tonnes in the first nine months of 2026, and fertiliser deliveries have passed 2.2mn tonnes this year. That role is now under strain: Ukrainian drone attacks on Black Sea and Azov port infrastructure are expected to cut Russian wheat exports by about 40% year on year in July-October, according to the Rusagrotrans analytical centre, feeding a food price shock that lands hardest on import-dependent North African states.

More than 90% of export settlements are already made in national currencies, but they go through indirect channels that raise costs, according to Mikhail Margelov, vice president of the Russian International Affairs Council. Putin used the summit to pitch Russia’s digital-currency payment system to African governments as one immune to Western sanctions, part of a wider push for a BRICS Pay alternative to SWIFT.

Debt, investment and megaprojects

Africa’s external debt reached $1.17 trillion at the end of 2024, according to the World Bank, of which $4.5bn, mostly owed by Egypt, is owed to Russia – 0.4% of the total, or 2.3% counting debts Moscow has already forgiven. Russia had written off $23bn of African debt by 2023, Putin said at that year’s summit, including $4.8bn owed by Ethiopia, $4.6bn by Libya, $4.7bn by Algeria and $3.5bn by Angola.

Africa’s inward foreign direct investment stock stood at about $1.07 trillion in 2024, according to UNCTAD. The Central Bank of Russia recorded just $138mn of Russian FDI on the continent at the start of 2022, though it withheld data for Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and much Russian money arrives through Cyprus and other intermediaries. Estimates that count the largest projects put Russian investment at $8bn-$20bn, or roughly 1-2% of that stock.

The biggest single item is Rosatom’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt, valued at about $29bn, 85% of it financed by a $25bn Russian loan. Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi discussed the plant at the Kremlin on October 28. Russia’s nuclear exports are booming and Rosatom is using them to bind clients in for decades through fuel supply – uranium is the new gas.

Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev said on October 30 that more large projects were being reviewed with Uganda and Ghana and surveys would start shortly in Ethiopia, while nine countries have shown interest in small floating nuclear plants. Ghana opened talks with Rosatom at the summit and Mali pressed Moscow to speed up its own planned plant.

Ghana’s foreign minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa said on October 31 that Russia would work with Accra on a 2,000 MW nuclear plant and had agreed a defence pact covering military equipment for Ghana’s armed forces.

Most of the rest of the pipeline is in resources. Rosneft holds 30% of Egypt’s Zohr gas field, a stake worth $2.15bn in 2026 prices, Nordgold has invested about $1.5bn in Guinea’s Lefa gold mine since 2010, Lukoil’s oil stakes in Ghana and Congo exceed $2.4bn, though the sanctioned company has agreed to sell most of its foreign assets, and Rosatom is preparing the $1.2bn Mkuju River uranium project in Tanzania. Rusal agreed at the summit to mine Ghana’s bauxite and build Ghana’s first alumina refinery, South Sudan offered Zarubezhneft Petronas’ former oil stakes, Sudan offered Russia a Red Sea free zone and Mozambique began talks on a north-south railway.

Guns for gold

The Soviet Union supplied 58% of Africa’s arms imports in 1985, $3.2bn out of $5.5bn, according to a US arms control agency report, and Russia’s cumulative share since 1991 is 36%.

In 2021-2025 the US supplied 19% of Africa’s imports of major arms, China 17%, Russia 15% and France 8.3%, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Vedomosti values Russia’s deliveries at more than $4.3bn out of $29bn. African arms imports dropped 41% from the previous five years and Algeria’s fell 78%, though SIPRI says unverified reports of Algerian deals with Russia suggest its estimates may be low. In sub-Saharan Africa China leads with 22%, ahead of Russia on 12% and Turkey on 11%. Rosoboronexport has signed about 150 contracts with African states worth more than $20bn since 2023, its director general Alexander Mikheev said in May, though signed contracts are not the same as deliveries.

Russian troops and instructors from the Defence Ministry’s Africa Corps - the successor to the PMC Wagner Group - and associated units are in Mali, the Central African Republic, Libya, Niger and Burkina Faso.

The Africa Corps helped Niger’s junta put down a mutiny in Niamey in August, Moscow is upgrading six Libyan airbases to support its Sahel operations, and in 2025 it pressed the Central African Republic to swap Wagner for the Africa Corps and pay in cash. Malian refugees have accused Russian fighters of torture and killings.

Security work has not turned into commercial gains: in Mali, Western companies control most gold mining while Russia carries much of the cost of keeping order, according to Andrei Fedorov of the Institute for African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Where Moscow counts

Russia accounts for 12% of the foreign influence on Rwanda, 11% on Algeria, 10% on Uganda, 9% on Egypt, 8% on Togo, 7% on Sudan and 6% on Ethiopia, Mali and Angola, on the FBIC measure. Moscow’s closest security partners register less: IntelliNews calculations from the index put Russia’s 2024 share at 4.3% in the Central African Republic, 3.8% in Burkina Faso and 2.2% in Niger, because the index counts formal trade, diplomacy and arms transfers rather than mercenaries and security contracts.

Share of foreign influence capacity over African states by partner, 1995-2024. Source: Pardee Institute, University of Denver, FBIC index; IntelliNews calculations.

France held 15.5% of foreign influence in Africa in 1995 and the US almost 10%, against 2.8% for China, according to IntelliNews calculations from the same dataset. China overtook both by 2007. The UAE has climbed from under 1% to 4.8% and Turkey from 0.3% to 1.5%. BRICS members together now account for 33% of the foreign influence on African states, Europe for 28% and other African states for 27%, according to Vedomosti.

The Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) expects Russia’s weight in Africa to keep rising to 2050, but more slowly than China’s, held back by its weak economic levers, sanctions and uncertainty over its future.

The Soviet inheritance

Those “accustomed to thinking in terms of their colonial past” are trying to drive Africans back into “debt bondage”, Putin told the summit’s plenary session on October 28, quoting Burkina Faso’s revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara: “Debt is neocolonialism.”

By 1989 the Soviet Union had built or begun some 350 industrial plants in Africa, including the Aswan Dam in Egypt, steelworks in Algeria and Nigeria and hydroelectric stations in Angola, trained 450,000 specialists and lent $50bn at 2-3%, half of which was later written off. Its 1985 trade with key African partners came to $4.1bn, 2.6% of the continent’s $159bn total, with Libya, Egypt and Algeria the main partners. Broader estimates put the Soviet share of Africa’s total foreign interaction at 10-15%, according to Ekaterina Novikova of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.

“The Soviet project was very progressive. We helped develop entire industries on a turnkey basis – what’s called sovereign industrialisation,” said Denis Degterev of the Institute for African Studies.

The collapse was steep: Russia’s share of Africa’s trade fell to 0.5% in 1995 and was still only 0.7% in 2010, before recovering to 1.1% in 2015, 1.5% in 2019 and a post-Soviet high of 1.6% in 2024. Russia now has diplomatic relations with all 54 African states and embassies in more than 45, and the number of African students in Russia has risen by half since 2020 to 40,000, according to Putin.

“Russia’s policy in Africa has shed Soviet altruism and has a pronounced commercial character,” Novikova told Vedomosti. The lack of a strategy and of systematic coordination is the central weakness of Russian policy on the continent, according to Margelov, who argues that Moscow needs a dedicated development-finance vehicle on the model of China’s state policy banks. Fedorov wants to revive the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which ran the USSR’s aid and construction projects abroad.

The summit gave Moscow its headline deals – a Ghanaian alumina refinery, South Sudanese oil, a possible Red Sea foothold and a queue of reactor customers – and a promise to move Russian production to the continent to escape sanctions. The numbers say the gap between that ambition and Russia’s economic weight remains wide: a 2.8% share of influence, a share of trade below 1.5% and falling, and a security presence that has yet to pay its way.

Thursday, October 29, 2026

 

An enormous 'Cat's Tail' tells of cosmic collision 63 light-years away




Known as the "Cat's Tail," a vast cloud of dust wafting across a young star system could be the aftermath of a collision between two or more Pluto-sized bodies annihilated to microscopically small dust grains.





University of Arizona

Artist's illustration of the Beta Pictoris debris disk

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In this artist's illustration of the Beta Pictoris debris disk – seen edge-on as it appears from Earth – the swirling gas and dust are depicted in orange. A secondary disk, discovered previously, appears as a whitish feature below the plane of the main disk. On the right, the "Cat's Tail" feature is visible, reaching far into space.

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Credit: NASA, ESA, CSA, STScI, Ralf Crawford (STScI)






Sixty-three light-years from Earth, in the small, faint constellation known as Pictor (which is Latin for "painter"), there lies a strange structure that has puzzled astronomers for the last two years. Nicknamed the "Cat's Tail," this dark feature stretches across along an abyss of space about a thousand times the average distance between the Earth and the sun.

The Cat's Tail was discovered in a so-called debris disk known as Beta Pictoris – another solar system not unlike ours, but much younger, having formed only a few million years ago. Now for the first time, astronomers have captured previously unseen details of the Cat's Tail in visible light, using the Hubble Space Telescope.

Led by University of Arizona planetary scientist Arin Avsar, the team reports its findings in a paper published in The Astrophysical Journal Letters. The combination of new and previous imaging going back over 14 years provide new insights on the location and nature of the substructure and further evidence for its likely violent origin.

"The Cat's Tail is thought to be the aftermath of a collision between large bodies – think something like Pluto," said Avsar, a doctoral student who works with Daniel Apai's and Kevin Wagner's research group in U of A's Lunar and Planetary Laboratory and Steward Observatory. "Oddly, this feature had previously only been seen with the James Webb Space Telescope, which detects infrared light, but remained invisible at shorter wavelengths, which has puzzled the community for a while."

With its planets neatly organized into a set of nestled orbits around the sun and leftover space rocks relegated to "designated" asteroid belts, the solar system as we know it today belies its chaotic and violent birth 4.6 billion years ago: a disk of gas and dust swirling around the infant sun, with space rocks smashing into each other and blowing each other apart, while only a few survived the cosmic jostling, accreted more mass and eventually grew into planets. To gather clues about what the young solar system would have looked like, astronomers turn to other star systems such as Beta Pictoris, a debris disk thought to be in the final stages of planet formation.

"We think the Cat's Tail has eluded our observations in visible light until now because of what it's made of," Avsar explained. "It consists almost entirely of we call organic refractory material, which is heavily carbon-based. These long chains of carbon atoms absorb visible light, so they're quite black."

"We think the Cat's Tail has eluded our observations in visible light until now because of what it's made of," Avsar explained. "It consists almost entirely of we call organic refractory material, which is heavily carbon-based. These long chains of carbon atoms absorb visible light, so they're quite black."

Not only that, but the new observations also supported that the vast cloud – whose length could be as long as 200 trillion house cats lined up tail to snout – consists of micron-sized dust grains that are also extremely porous or "fluffy." In more astronomical terms, the structure is potentially 1,000 astronomical units long, with one AU being the average distance between the Earth and the sun.

"How you can get dust grains that small that are as porous as we see here, no one really understands, and that's part of why we study this feature," Avsar said. 

As to what turned a nascent planetary body into micron-sized, surprisingly fluffy dust grains, Avsar said it's up to speculation, and further research could help bringing the picture into focus.

"It's possible that the velocities involved in the collisions were so high that the carbon grains vaporized, turned into gas, and then recondensed as they cooled, and that's how they became so porous," said co-author Wagner, a NASA Sagan Postdoctoral Fellow at the U of A Steward Observatory.

Combining Hubble's image data with JWST's infrared data and applying clever computer modeling, his team was able to tease out information about the Cat's Tail's three-dimensional structure. Based on previous observations, astronomers believed that the feature emanated from Beta Pictoris, the star at the center of the debris disk, which appears edge-on when viewed from Earth, and billows out far into space from the observer, fading into the space beyond the disk. 

"We find that instead of extending for 1,000 astronomical units behind the star, the Cat's Tail may extend straight sideways relative to us, and there is no third dimension to it," Avsar said. "It's essentially in the same plane of the sky as the star and possibly extends a little bit behind it."

By using Hubble in a new configuration, Avsar's team also identified a new feature of the dust halo surrounding Beta Pictoris: a strange warp that the researchers believe is likely caused by the disk interacting with one of the three planets in the system: Beta Pic b, a gas giant about 10 times the mass of Jupiter.

"This gives us another line of evidence into how giant planets influence comets through their immense gravitational force," Avsar said. "It's a testament of how much these massive planets really influence their surrounding dust and icy bodies out to hundreds of astronomical units." 

According to Avsar, this offers another clue to the processes that likely shaped the early solar system. When the Kuiper Belt was a mere 20 million years old, it is believed to have had a much higher density of bodies, potentially hundreds of Pluto-sized objects. In a way, the outer giant planets "cleared out" many of those former bodies by perturbing their orbits or ejecting them from the system altogether.


Zoomed-in image of the "Cat's Tail" feature

This study's observations, made with the Hubble Space Telescope, revealed the "Cat's Tail" structure for the first time in the visible light spectrum (white arrow). Unlike the original discovery observations made with the James Webb Space Telescope, which detected the dust grain's heat emissions using infrared radiation, the tail appears shorter in the new images, because the further the trail of dust grains extends from the star, the less light they reflect.

Credit

Avsar et al.



Tuesday, October 27, 2026

Why Ukraine may be aiding Mali rebels against Russia
DW
October 26, 2026

Allegations that Ukrainian specialists are supporting Tuareg rebels in Mali highlight Kyiv's effort to challenge Russian influence far beyond the battlefield in Europe.


There are growing indications that Ukraine is providing military support to Tuareg rebels and jihadists in Mali
Image: Souleymane Ag Anara/AFP


Ukraine is fighting Russia — and the conflict may extend into Africa's Sahel region.

According to an investigation published by US media outlet CNN in September, around 15 Ukrainian drone specialists are reportedly supporting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. Their common enemy: the military government in Bamako and its Russian allies.

But how reliable is the information? And what price could Kyiv pay for engaging in Africa?

Marta Oliynyk-D'omochko, coordinator of the African Studies Program at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, sees a strategic motive. "Ukraine's main interest is to weaken Russia's influence around the world," she told DW. If Russia's military influence were rolled back, she added, the economic opportunities arising from it would also diminish.

Russian historian Irina Filatova, professor emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, also considers Ukrainian support for the Tuareg movement plausible. However, she said she has no independent evidence to confirm such involvement.

Kyiv's alleged partners are controversial. The Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) cooperates with the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a jihadist group affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Ukraine's suspected role in Mali dates back to 2024

In July 2024, DW reported on possible involvement by the Ukrainian military intelligence service (HUR) in an ambush on Russian Wagner fighters near Tinzaouaten in northern Mali.

At the time, HUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov said the Tuareg rebels had received information they needed to carry out the attack. Ukraine denied direct involvement.

Paramilitaries from Russia's Wagner Group and Malian troops suffered heavy losses in the July 2024 attack.

CNN's investigation has reignited the question of whether the Russia-Ukraine war is also being fought on African soil.

Signals from Kyiv, but no confirmation

The suspicions were renewed by a post on X by Kyrylo Budanov. The former head of Ukraine's military intelligence, now chief of staff to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, wrote on September 7 that Ukrainian intelligence protects the country's interests worldwide — "from Russia to Africa … in the burning desert sands and in the snows of icy Antarctica...".

Budanov did not explicitly mention Mali and his post does not confirm any specific operation. CNN reported that the Ukrainians provided drone training, operational planning and remote support for drone missions. DW has not independently verified those claims.

DW reached out to the HUR for comment. Among other things, DW wanted to know whether personnel had been deployed to Mali, whether the political leadership had approved such a mission, and what measures were in place to ensure that the JNIM — which cooperates with the FLA — does not indirectly benefit from Ukrainian support.

DW did not receive a specific response. An HUR spokesperson said the agency might provide information at a later date. The extent of any potential Ukrainian involvement therefore remains unclear.

Why Mali matters to Kyiv

Following military coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali increasingly turned away from Western partners and toward Russia. The Wagner Group was subsequently replaced by the Africa Corps in 2025 as Moscow reorganized its military presence.

Russia has sought to consolidate its influence in the Sahel region and present itself as a reliable security partner.

Ulf Laessing, former head of the Sahel program of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali and now head of its Syria and Iraq program, said Russia is continuing to expand its activities in Africa.

"I have received information that the Africa Corps still uses Syria and Libya as transit points for flights from Russia, including for refueling and loading, to support its operations on the continent," Laessing told DW.



From Ukraine's perspective, it could be attractive to exert pressure on Russian forces in Africa.

Filatova sees a strategic logic to this: "The Ukrainians regard Russian troops anywhere in the world as legitimate targets." Setbacks in Mali could tie up Russian resources and undermine Moscow's reputation as a security partner, she argued.

However, Oliynyk-D'omochko stressed that the relationship with the Tuareg is not a comprehensive alliance. The FLA is not seeking to replace the government in Bamako. Instead, it is focused on northern Mali and is pursuing self-determination or extensive autonomy.

Oliynyk-D'omochko describes the relationship as a tactical arrangement: "It is more of a situational alliance against a common enemy than a comprehensive partnership."

Are Mali's Tuareg rebels cooperating with jihadists?

The FLA is fighting for an independent state in the north of Mali, a region predominantly inhabited by Tuaregs. JNIM, by contrast, aims to impose strict Islamic rule. Both groups oppose the military government and its Russian allies, but their objectives differ.

Any potential Ukrainian support for the FLA would not, in itself, prove that Kyiv is directly supporting JNIM. However, jihadists could benefit indirectly if they conduct joint operations with FLA or gain access to knowledge and equipment.

Cooperation between Tuareg and Islamist groups dates back more than a decade.

After the ousting and killing of Libya's longtime dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi during the Arab Spring in October 2011, heavily armed Tuareg fighters returned to Mali and took up the struggle for an independent state.

In the process, separatist ambitions became intertwined with Islamist movements. Iyad Ag Ghaly, the current leader of JNIM, was himself involved in the Tuareg rebellion before turning to jihadism.

According to Oliynyk-D'omochko, the cooperation is primarily tactical in nature. The two sides have collaborated during past uprisings but later fell out. It remains unclear how long the current alliance will last.

For Kyiv, this also poses a political risk. In many African countries, the Tuaregs are viewed as separatists. Cooperation with them could therefore create the impression that Ukraine is interfering in another country's internal affairs.

Mali and its neighbours accuse Ukraine of aiding rebels

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso accuse Ukraine of supporting armed groups and threatening their territorial integrity. The three Sahel nations, all ruled by military governments, have severed diplomatic relations with Kyiv and deepened their cooperation with Russia.

In September, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop accused Ukraine at the United Nations of "providing clear and open support to terrorist groups and other mafia-like groups to undermine our country's territorial integrity," reported Agence France-Presse. Diop did not provide evidence for his claim.

The three nations' governments have may have an interest in legitimizing their partnership with Moscow and portraying Kyiv as a destabilizing actor.

Oliynyk-D'omochko has found no definitive proof of the allegations, yet warned of the potential consequences for Ukraine's Africa policy. Kyiv advocates equal partnerships with African countries. Any alleged cooperation with separatists could undermine that message and affect how potential partners view Ukraine.

What price could Ukraine pay?

Engagement in Mali could offer Ukraine a relatively low-cost way to weaken Russian interests beyond Europe. A small team of specialists could train local fighters and improve their capabilities in the use of drones.

But a potential partnership with the FLA carries political risks. Because the Tuareg separatists cooperate with the JNIM, Kyiv could face accusations of indirectly supporting jihadist fighters. That could undermine Ukraine's efforts to strengthen its relations with African countries.




This article has been translated from German

Correction, October 26, 2026: An earlier version of this article stated that the CNN investigation was published in October 2026; the report was published in September. DW apologizes for the error.


Antonio Cascais Award-winning documentary filmmaker and investigative journalisttwitter.com/antoniocascais

Igor Burdyga DW correspondent in Ukraine.