Armenia at a crossroads: will the country leave Russia's sphere of influence

Arthur KhachatryanYerevan

Crisis in relations between Armenia and Russia

“If Armenia de jure decides to withdraw from the CSTO, then this will happen after Yerevan records that the CSTO has left Armenia.” Similar statements by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been heard since May 2021, when Armenia turned to Russia with a request to protect the borders of Armenia and received no assistance.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Armenian authorities did not wait not only for military assistance to protect their territory, but also for a political statement from Russia and the CSTO allies. They still did not state that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces had invaded the sovereign territory of the country. Moreover, they refused to assist allied Armenia under the pretext that the delimitation and demarcation of the border had not been carried out.

“Over the past two years, Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times. It is depressing that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions and that, in fact, until today we have not been able to reach a decision on the CSTO’s reaction to this aggression. These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both inside and outside our country,” Pashinyan said.

The prime minister does not rule out that Armenia may leave the military bloc operating under the leadership of Russia. If this really happens, Yerevan will actually break allied relations with Moscow and take a course towards integration with the West. At the same time, the rating of Armenia’s strategic ally is already at the lowest positions in the last 30 years.

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What started the crisis?

The fact that relations between Armenia and Russia are going through hard times, to put it mildly, is already openly stated. The Armenian authorities have never directly criticized Moscow and the CSTO in this way. People in Armenia are watching with surprise Pashinyan’s string of statements critical of Russia, including the inaction of Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In particular, the Prime Minister of Armenia criticized RMK, commenting on the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road linking the unrecognized republic with Armenia:

“Of course, this is due to the actions of Azerbaijan, but this does not change the meaning. This is the key meaning of the presence of Russian peacekeepers – not to allow illegal actions and to keep the Lachin corridor under control.”

Yerevan’s dissatisfaction with the position of Moscow and the countries belonging to the Collective Security Treaty Organization grew like a snowball. It all started with incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border after the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The country’s authorities say that over the past two years, Azerbaijan has several times launched large-scale military operations, simultaneously conducting creeping expansion and deepening deep into the territory of Armenia. Weakened after the defeat in the second Karabakh war, Armenia counted heavily on the support of the allies.

“The aggression against the sovereign territory of Armenia from May 2021 to September 13, 2022 was doubly painful because our security allies left us alone, preferring to remain in the status of a passive observer or offering the status of an active observer as an alternative,” Pashinyan said.

Instead of military assistance, the CSTO sent a mission to Armenia to study “the situation in certain areas on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” In the photo – the meeting of the members of the mission with the Minister of Defense of Armenia following the results of the work. 

Photo from the CSTO website

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The Armenian authorities say that the same issues are being discussed on all platforms, but experts say that the approaches and emphasis on them are different. Commentary by political scientist Stepan Grigoryan

Was this the only reason for the crisis?

Talk that pro-European forces might come to power in Armenia intensified during the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Then everyone remembered that the leader of the movement, opposition politician Pashinyan, made statements about the need to leave the Eurasian Economic Union, operating under the auspices of Russia.

But when he got to power, Pashinyan changed his rhetoric and first of all declared that Yerevan was not going to leave any integration structures, and even more so, he was not striving for a political reverse. But these were only words, the political observer Arman Abovyan believes:

“It is enough just to study the composition of the so-called youth wing of the revolutionaries in 2018. They were quite active in the public arena. These are the same people who once organized anti-Russian actions in front of the Russian embassy. Even in the current government there are such people.”

In the top leadership of the country, there are indeed so-called “pronounced Westerners” who, until 2018, harshly criticized Moscow’s policy towards Armenia. The most prominent figure among them is Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.Pashinyan and his team on the main square of Yerevan after the victory of the revolution. Photo JAMnews

At the same time, having come to power, Nikol Pashinyan and the team constantly declared their desire to bring relations with Moscow to a qualitatively new level. The leaders of the two countries met regularly, and it seemed that Armenia and Russia were satisfied with each other’s relations.

At the initial stage of his premiership, Pashinyan really did not think about changing his foreign policy course, political scientist Ruben Mehrabyan is sure:

“In 2018, there was an illusion that there was even an opportunity to build qualitatively new relations, to deepen ties with Russia. And the new democratic authorities of Armenia are able to do this. But life has shown that it was not only an illusion. It was a dangerous illusion. And now there is no stone left unturned from this illusion.”

An interview with the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia on relations with Russia

Novaya Gazeta Europe published Armen Grigoryan’s opinion on issues of acute public concern

Is Armenia really taking a direction to the West?

After the 2020 war, Russia appeared to have established “one-man hegemony in the South Caucasus region” that was only marginally disturbed by Turkey’s presence. But after the Ukrainian events, Moscow began to rapidly lose ground.

On September 13, 2022, the largest escalation since the war took place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. A few days later, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi arrived in Armenia, and world media reported that it was thanks to Washington that the September clashes were stopped. This, perhaps, was a turning point in the post-war cycle of the Karabakh settlement.

The situation worsened every time Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed at the border, and Russia remained silent. All this has led to Washington and Brussels becoming the main moderators in the negotiation process.Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington, during talks mediated by US Secretary of State Blinken

“At the behest of circumstances, Armenia is still reconsidering its relations with Russia. This is first. Secondly, Armenia has fixed its commonality with the interests, values and goals of the European Union and considers the EU as a promising partner. However, Armenia does not have a final solution to generalize this picture. Because Armenia continues to be a member of structures that are contrary to the state interests and security of Armenia,” political scientist Ruben Mehrabyan describes the current state of affairs.

In parallel with this, the realities were changing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, Azerbaijanis who called themselves environmental activists blocked the Lachin corridor. And Russia actually did not take any effective measures to unblock it. Then Baku went further and, with the tacit consent of the Russian peacekeepers, established a checkpoint in the Lachin corridor. Thus, the road is now effectively not controlled by Russia, as the 2020 tripartite statement suggests.

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Frank answers from the Prime Minister of Armenia in the Prima News program about the geographical and geopolitical problems of the country, relations with neighbors and even personal questions

Rejection of Karabakh

The further Azerbaijan went and the longer Moscow was silent, the weaker became Yerevan’s negotiating positions. Military escalations on the border have become a way of putting pressure on the Armenian authorities. All this led to the fact that Nikol Pashinyan publicly stated and then confirmed Yerevan’s official position in the negotiations – Armenia is ready to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan:

“A peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan will become real if both countries clearly, without ambiguity, recognize each other’s territorial integrity and undertake not to present territorial claims to each other today and ever. Now I want to confirm that the Republic of Armenia fully recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and we expect Azerbaijan to do the same by recognizing the entire territory of the Armenian SSR as the Republic of Armenia.”

A superficial analysis of the situation may give the impression that Armenia is forced to take such a step. But this is a more thoughtful and long-term policy, Arman Abovyan believes. Its goal is to change the vector in foreign policy:

“This government is the executor for those geopolitical centers whose main goal is to oust the eastern vector from the region of the South Caucasus: Russia, Iran and partly China.”

Experts voice the version that the end result of this process should be the opening of the border with Turkey through concessions on the Karabakh issue. If this happens, Armenia will receive the shortest communication to Europe, which can significantly expand the possibilities for cooperation between Yerevan and Brussels.

Is Washington threatening a counter-terrorist operation in Karabakh? Comments from Yerevan and Baku

Russian media, citing a “diplomatic source”, reported that Washington is forcing representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh to agree to a meeting with the Azerbaijani side.

Does this correspond to the national interests of Armenia?

In what direction should Armenia move in foreign policy. This is perhaps one of the most significant discourses on the Armenian political agenda. If a few years ago the vast majority of the country’s population approved of the policy of the authorities to deepen cooperation with Moscow, the war of 2020 and subsequent events have changed the opinion of society. Now only 35 percent of the population considers Russia a friendly country, while before the war this figure was over 50 percent. For comparison, France is considered friendly by 45 percent.

Another important question that the Armenian analytical community is trying to answer is why Russia is pursuing such a policy towards Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. And experts associate the main answer to this question with the Ukrainian crisis.

After the closure of borders with European countries and Western sanctions, Russia became heavily dependent on Turkey and even Azerbaijan for communications and hydrocarbon exports. It is Türkiye that is now the main and main route of export and import for Russia. In such a situation, Moscow simply cannot afford to “offend” Ankara and Baku and not yield to them on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Pashinyan interrupts Putin: what was his objection? Analyst comments

Yerevan is discussing the visit of the Armenian Prime Minister to Moscow, in particular, the moment when the Armenian Prime Minister interrupted the Russian President to react to Aliyev’s speech


Understanding these realities should lead to a renewal of Armenia’s foreign policy, political scientist Gurgen Simonyan is sure:

“It is time to express a clear position and leave the military-political union of the CSTO. As a result of the military aggression in 2020, the expectations that we had from Russia in the context of bilateral agreements, and not only from Russia, but also from the CSTO, to put it mildly, did not satisfy us. If not to say that they dealt a serious blow to our national security.”

Armenia is also dissatisfied with the fact that Russia does not supply weapons purchased from it earlier, for which, by the way, it was paid. In this situation, Yerevan significantly intensified contacts with India, as well as France. That is, the country intends to change, at least diversify, the vector of military-technical cooperation.

Will Yerevan be able to build a new security architecture in conditions of severe turbulence? And, most importantly, what are the consequences of this process? Questions that are still open. One thing is clear – Yerevan has already begun to review relations with Moscow for the first time since independence.

Another meeting between Pashinyan and Putin. 

Photo by the press service of the Armenian government

With the support of Russian language news exchange “Mediaset”

Fears of a Second War in Europe as Azerbaijan Launches Military Attack

Allison Quinn
Tue, September 19, 2023 

Reuters


Azerbaijan carried out strikes on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region on Tuesday as it announced the launch of an “anti-terror” operation, a move that threatens to trigger another war in the region.

The country’s Defense Ministry said it was using “high-precision weapons” to “incapacitate” Armenian-backed forces and target Armenian military positions in a push to force out “formations of Armenia’s armed forces.”

Footage purportedly filmed in Stepanakert, the capital of Karabakh, which is called Khankendi by Azerbaijan, captured the sounds of loud shelling and artillery fire.

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“At this moment, the capital Stepanakert and other cities and villages are under intensive fire,” an Armenia-based separatist group warned on social media, calling it a “large-scale military offensive.”

Officials in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, said civilians were free to leave the area via humanitarian corridors and insisted that “the civilian population and civilian infrastructure are not targets.”

Azerbaijan and Armenia have feuded for decades over Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but has a predominantly ethnic Armenian population.

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A bloody 2020 war between the two former Soviet rivals ended with Azerbaijan recapturing land of historical significance to Armenians. A Russian-brokered ceasefire deal to end that war did little to ease tensions in the region, with the two sides continuing to hurl allegations and periodic reports of shelling.

Armenia has said it does not have any armed forces in Karabakh, and on Tuesday said the “situation on the borders of the Republic of #Armenia is relatively stable.”

Azerbaijan launches military action in Karabakh 'to disarm' Armenians
Reuters
Updated Tue, September 19, 2023 



Gunfire and explosions heard in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh

BAKU (Reuters) -Azerbaijan launched military action in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a step that could presage a new war in the volatile area but which Baku said was necessary to restore constitutional order and drive out Armenian military formations.

Karabakh is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory but part of it is run by breakaway ethnic Armenian authorities who say the area is their ancestral homeland. It has been at the centre of two wars - the latest in 2020 - since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union.

It was not clear whether Baku's actions would trigger a full-scale conflict dragging in neighbouring Armenia or be a more limited military operation. But there were already signs of political fallout in Yerevan where Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke of calls for a coup against him.

The fighting could alter the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus region, which is crisscrossed with oil and gas pipelines, and where Russia - distracted by its own war in Ukraine - is seeking to preserve its influence in the face of greater interest from Turkey, which backs Azerbaijan.

Loud and repeated shelling was audible from social media footage filmed in Stepanakert, the capital of Karabakh, called Khankendi by Azerbaijan, on Tuesday.

The Karabakh separatist human rights ombudsman, Gegham Stepanyan, said that two civilians had been killed and 11 people injured as a result of strikes by Azerbaijan's military. Reuters could not immediately verify his assertion.

In a statement announcing its operation, Azerbaijan's defence ministry spoke of its intention to "disarm and secure the withdrawal of formations of Armenia’s armed forces from our territories, (and) neutralise their military infrastructure".

It said it was only targeting legitimate military targets using "high-precision weapons" and not civilians as part of what it called a drive to "restore the constitutional order of the Republic of Azerbaijan".

Civilians were free to leave by humanitarian corridors, it added, including one to Armenia, whose prime minister, Pashinyan, said the offer looked like another attempt by Baku to get ethnic Armenians to leave Karabakh as part of a campaign of what he called "ethnic cleansing", an accusation Baku denies.

Ethnic Armenian forces in Karabakh said Azerbaijani forces were trying to break through their defences after heavy shelling, but that they were holding the line for now.

Armenia, which had been holding peace talks with Azerbaijan, including on questions about Karabakh's future, condemned what it called Baku's "full-scale aggression" against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and accused Azerbaijan of shelling towns and villages.

"Driven by a sense of impunity, Azerbaijan has openly claimed responsibility for the aggression," Armenia's foreign ministry said in a statement.

Reuters could not immediately verify battlefield assertions from either side.

APPEAL FOR HELP

Armenia, which says its armed forces are not in Karabakh and that the situation on its own border with Azerbaijan is stable, called on members of the U.N. Security Council to help and for Russian peacekeepers on the ground to intervene.

Russia, which brokered a fragile ceasefire after the war in 2020 which saw Azerbaijan recapture swathes of land in and around Karabakh that it had lost in an earlier conflict in the 1990s, called for all sides to stop fighting.

Russia is in touch with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and has urged negotiations to resolve the Karabakh conflict, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Tuesday, adding that Moscow considered ensuring civilian safety the most important issue.

Armenia has accused Moscow of being too distracted by its own war in Ukraine to protect its own security and has accused Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh of failing to do their job.

Speaking inside Karabakh with artillery rumbling in the background, Ruben Vardanyan, a banker who was a top official in Karabakh's ethnic Armenian administration until February, appealed for Armenia to recognise Karabakh's self-declared independence from Azerbaijan.

He also called on the international community to impose sanctions on Baku.

"A really serious situation has unfolded here," Vardanyan said on Telegram. "Azerbaijan has started a full-scale military operation against 120,000 inhabitants, of which 30,000 are children, pregnant women and old people," he said.

The Armenian government held a security council meeting to discuss the situation as people gathered in the government district in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, to demand the authorities take action.

Baku announced its operation after complaining that six of its citizens had been killed by land mines in two separate incidents, something it blamed on "illegal Armenian armed groups." Armenia said the claims were false.

The escalation occurred a day after badly needed food and medicine was delivered to Karabakh along two roads simultaneously, a step that looked like it could help defuse mounting tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Until the last few days, Baku had imposed sweeping restrictions on the Lachin corridor - the only road linking Armenia with Karabakh - and had blocked aid on the grounds that the route was purportedly being used for arms smuggling.

Yerevan had said that Baku's actions had caused a humanitarian catastrophe, something Azerbaijan denied, and were illegal.

Armenia's foreign ministry had said on Monday that Azerbaijan's diplomatic stance looked like it was preparing the ground for some kind of military action.

(Reporting by ReutersWriting by Andrew OsbornEditing by)
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Azerbaijan strikes targets in Nagorno-Karabakh, launches military operation
Elsa Court
Tue, September 19, 2023 



Azerbaijan has launched a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh with the claimed "goal of restoring the constitutional order," the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced on Sept. 19.

Azerbaijan has called it "local anti-terrorist measures." Baku also claimed that Yerevan has been attacking Azerbaijan's soldiers and building additional fortifications in the region.

The news comes after Azerbaijan claimed on Sept. 18 that Armenian forces fired on Azerbaijani outposts on the border between the two countries.

There's no evidence backing these claims at this time.

Armenian Defense Ministry said that the claims do not correspond to reality.

In Stepanakert or Khankendi, the de-facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, air raid sounded and there are reports of gunfire and explosions.

Attacks on communications infrastructure have led to a lack of internet and telephone connectivity in the territory, Andranik Shirinyan, Armenia Representative to Freedom House, said on X, formerly known as Twitter.

Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as Azerbaijan's territory under international law, but its population of 120,000 is predominantly Armenian.

The territory declared independence in 1991 with Yerevan's military support. Until 2020, Armenia de facto controlled Nagorno-Karabakh together with the surrounding regions.

In 2020, Azerbaijan launched a military operation establishing control over parts of Nagorno Karabakh.

In November 2020, Russia brokered an armistice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow sent forces to patrol the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.

In 2022, Yerevan accused Russia of failing its peacekeeping mission when Moscow began withdrawing its troops in 2022 and allowed Azerbaijan blockade Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing basic supplies from reaching the population.

The U.S. and EU have called on Azerbaijan to end the blockade.

In February 2023, he International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Yerevan's appeal to lift the blockade Nagorno-Karabakh.

Baku denied imposing a blockade.

Commenting on the issue, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev said that "Armenians living in the Karabakh must either accept Azerbaijani citizenship or look for another place to live."

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Why Armenia may be the next target for Russian aggression

Team Mighty
Mon, September 18, 2023 

Armenian opposition supporters march with torches during an anti-Russian rally against Russia's policy in the Karabakh conflict and its military action in Ukraine, in Yerevan on November 9, 2022. (Photo by KAREN MINASYAN/AFP via Getty Images)

The small but mighty nation of Armenia is in an interesting geopolitical neighborhood. On its western border is Turkey, a NATO ally but longtime enemy. To its east is another enemy, Azerbaijan, with which Armenia just fought over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, claimed by both countries.

In the north is Georgia which is in a never ending war of words and spies (and sometimes actual wars) with Russia. Both Georgia and Armenia were part of the Soviet Union, but even when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, support for Russia in Armenia was high.

To Armenia south is Iran, which, for the moment, is friendly to Russia-aligned Armenia. But in late September 2023, Armenia will host the United States for a joint military exercise. The move is far more threatening to Russia, which hosts Russian military forces as part of its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) membership. The exercises are the latest in a split between Russia and Armenia, which could permanently break their relations – or worse.

Armenia and Russia have retained close relations since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Armenia joined Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and joined the economic military and mutual aid collaboration of the CSTO in 1997. But since Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was elected to lead Armenia in 2018, the country has been slowly breaking away from Russia’s sphere of influence.

When fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out over the Nagorno-Karabakh region once again in 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t immediately intervene, cooling relations between the two even more. Pashinyan went further in September 2023.

“Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region," Pashinyan said. "The Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake."

The Prime Minister’s words come after Armenia announced it sent the first lady of the country to deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine. It has also begun to further distance itself from the Russia-led CSTO. The military drills are just Armenia’s latest effort at realigning itself with the West.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the drills are “cause for concern” and Moscow will “monitor the situation.”

Armenia now finds itself in a Ukraine-like situation. Tired of dealing with Russian hegemony, which has caused a lot of economic hardships in Armenia, the Armenian government is beginning to look further and further West toward the U.S. and EU.

But Russia has built up a lot of armed forces inside Armenia. Even worse, Russians fleeing the war in Ukraine have moved to Armenia in droves, meaning Moscow has the ability to hide its own people among the refugees there, a potential hidden “fifth column” like the tactic used to seize Crimea.

Enemies on three borders, a country potentially filled with pro-Russian sympathizers and an ever-worsening lack of external will to keep Armenia independent could mean Armenia loses its independence entirely. It could be one more former Soviet republic absorbed by Putin’s dream of rebuilding the USSR.

Blinken likely to get involved in Armenia-Azerbaijan diplomatic engagement -US official

Humeyra Pamuk
Tue, September 19, 2023

U.S. Secretary of State Blinken chairs U.N. Security Council meeting on famine, food insecurity

By Humeyra Pamuk

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The United States is engaging in diplomatic outreach after Azerbaijan launched "anti-terrorist activities" in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on Tuesday, U.S. officials said, adding that the incident was particularly dangerous.

A senior U.S. State Department official said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was likely to get involved in the next 24 hours in the diplomatic engagement already under way on the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Blinken discussed the situation and stated the need for de-escalation, Interfax reported, citing the Armenian government.

Azerbaijan launched military action in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a step that could presage a new war in the volatile area but which Baku said was necessary to restore constitutional order and drive out Armenian military formations.

A second senior State Department official said the incident overnight was "particularly egregious and particularly dangerous, so we'll obviously be in touch with all sides."

Karabakh is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but part of it is run by breakaway ethnic Armenian authorities who say the area is their ancestral homeland. It has been at the center of two wars - the latest in 2020 - since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union.

This week, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to make simultaneous aid deliveries via the Lachin corridor and a separate road linking Karabakh to the Azerbaijani city of Aghdam.

Despite that, tensions have risen sharply this month, with Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing each other of building up troops.

"It's concerning that this happened overnight, especially because we did see some progress yesterday with shipments moving through the Lachin corridor," the first official said.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have already fought two wars over Karabakh in the three decades since the Soviet Union collapsed. Both had been part of the Soviet Union.

Analysts say successive rounds of talks, mediated variously by the European Union, the United States and Russia, have brought the two sides closer to a permanent peace treaty than they have been for years, but a final settlement remains elusive.

(Reporting by Doina Chiacu and Humeyra Pamuk; Writing by Daphne Psaledakis; Editing by Howard Goller)

Key Democrat chafes at US response to Armenia-Azerbaijan crisis
Lydia McFarlane
Fri, September 15, 2023



Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) expressed frustration Thursday with the Biden administration’s lack of urgency in addressing what the United States has described as a “rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation” in Nagorno-Karabakh, a hotly disputed region at the center of rising tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Menendez, while chairing of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the crisis, said he was “amazed” by the responses from Yuri Kim, the acting assistant secretary for the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.

“I have been doing this for 31 years. I am amazed sometimes at what the department comes before this committee and says,” he said at the end of the hearing.

The senator’s frustration centered on the administration’s application of Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act, which bans direct support to the Azerbaijani government. However, Kim listed various reasons that ban has been waived, mainly to bolster Azerbaijan’s anti-terror efforts and secure its border with Iran.

Menendez argued that the U.S. was only helping the regime of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian President Ilham Aliyev, whom the senator blamed for a blockade that has cut off Karabakh in apparent violation of a 2020 truce between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

“I have repeatedly expressed my deep opposition about waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, allowing the United States to send assistance to his regime,” he said. “This clearly alters the balance of military power between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Aliyev’s favor. I think Azerbaijan’s actions over the past three years have vindicated my skepticism.”

Earlier this year, Azerbaijani troops began a blockade of the Lachin corridor, which has reportedly led to the starvation of indigenous Armenians in the semi-autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh.

The U.S. State Department released a statement Sept. 10 warning of the “urgent need” for humanitarian supplies in the region, but it avoided assigning direct blame.

“The United States is deeply concerned about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,” the statement reads. “We note that humanitarian supplies are positioned near both the Lachin and Aghdam routes, and we repeat our call for the immediate and simultaneous opening of both corridors to allow passage of desperately needed humanitarian supplies to the men, women, and children in Nagorno-Karabakh. We also urge leaders against taking any actions that raise tensions or distract from this goal. The use of force to resolve disputes is unacceptable.”

When Menendez asked Kim why Aliyev refused to open to corridor despite numerous promises to do so, Kim responded, “We can have that conversation in a different setting, sir.”

Menendez shook his head before saying, “What would be classified?”

“I’ll give you an unclassified answer: He won’t open the corridor because he is trying to subjugate these people by starvation or by the threat of starvation and subject them to his will,” the senator continued.

In renewing the Section 907 waiver, the Biden administration has argued that targeted U.S. assistance is not undermining broader efforts to broker lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, who fought a 44-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

Yet the Armenian American community sees the extension of the waiver as a betrayal following Biden’s historic decision in 2021 to recognize, for the first time, the Armenian Genocide.

Menendez has been a consistent opponent of the waiver, and while the waiver is up for renewal, Menendez said he is doubtful the administration will change its stance.

Menendez delivered remarks on the Senate floor Tuesday urging the Biden administration to take immediate action in holding Aliyev accountable for the blockade, which has the characteristics of genocide, according to Article II of the U.N. Genocide Convention.

So far, there is one reported death amid severe food shortages in Nagorno-Karabakh, with many more expected to follow without immediate assistance. Kim noted that with U.S. pressure, one truck has made it through the blockade with humanitarian aid.

“One truck is not mercy,” Menendez said.

That truck was also Russian, which was cause for concern for members of the committee. Moscow mediated the 2020 ceasefire, but Kim said it was proving to be an unreliable broker.

Russia is Armenia’s sole provider of energy and has a military presence in the country. Kim said the crisis offered the U.S. an opportunity to rebalance Armenia’s geopolitical relationships in America’s favor, as Armenians become disillusioned with Russia as an ally amid the Ukraine war.

“[Armenians] are beginning to have second thoughts about having invited Russian troops onto their territory, relying on Russia as their sole source of energy, [and] hosting Russian military installations in their lands,” Kim said.

While Kim repeatedly reassured the committee that the State Department is working hard to reopen the corridor and avoid impending genocide, Menendez was unconvinced.

“I just hope you’ll tell the secretary [of State] on my behalf: I would hate to see this administration stand by and allow ethnic cleansing to take place on their watch and under their eye,” Menendez said.

Azerbaijani forces using Russian-style symbols are massing on the border of Armenia

James Kilner
Fri, September 15, 2023 

The ∀ symbol on military vehicle of the Azerbaijani army, which is moving to the border with Armenia

Azerbaijan’s military is building up its forces near Armenia and has painted its vehicles with “war markings” similar to ones used by the Russian army before it invaded Ukraine.

Open-source intelligence shared with the Telegraph by The Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) appears to back up Armenian claims that Azerbaijan is preparing for war.

Alongside intensified activity at Azerbaijani bases, CIR said that it had also detected an increase in flights between Azerbaijan and a military airfield in Israel, one of its allies, and opposing military manoeuvres by Iran, which is allied to Armenia.

“It is possible these are routine movements but analysis of other open-source data available may further indicate military build-up,” said Kyle Glen, a CIR investigator.

The Azerbaijani military symbols are an inverted “A” and stylised “F” and have been painted mainly on army infantry trucks and armoured personnel carriers.

Azerbaijan has not explained the symbols but the Russian military used “V” and “Z” symbols as battle group identifiers before it invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and, as in Russia, Azerbaijani nationalists have also adopted these military markings as avatars and logos.

For the Armenian government, Azerbaijan’s intentions are clear.

“We are concerned that a new war could start, or at least a large-scale build-up of aggression,” said Vahan Kostanyan, Armenia’s deputy foreign minister.

Azerbaijan has previously denied this. Its foreign ministry did not respond to the Telegraph’s requests for comment.

Armenia claims it is possible that Azerbaijan is preparing for an invasion

The focus of the force build-up is the border area around Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous parcel of land roughly the size of Somerset that Azerbaijan and Armenia have disputed and fought over since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In a five-week war in 2020, roughly 7,000 people were killed. Azerbaijan defeated Armenia in the war, using Turkish drones for the first time, before the Kremlin stepped in to impose a ceasefire.

But analysts said that with the Kremlin distracted by its invasion of Ukraine and Western influence limited in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev is now looking to finish his lifetime ambition of driving all ethnic Armenians out of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

“We’re at a dangerous point and we are only a couple of steps away from a new conflict,” said Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Europe think tank.

The war in Ukraine has also ripped up traditional alliances, fracturing the inherently unstable South Caucasus.

Armenia’s most important ally and business partner has been Russia and the Kremlin had been seen as a guarantor of Armenian independence. Under the 2020 peace deal that stopped the war, Russian soldiers were given a peacekeeping role and the Kremlin keeps one of its biggest overseas military bases outside Gyumri, Armenia’s second city.

But Armenia has accused the Kremlin of ignoring Azerbaijani aggression because it didn’t back its invasion of Ukraine and it has shifted its diplomatic focus towards the West. Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian prime minister, sent his wife to Kyiv this month with humanitarian aid and has hosted American soldiers for a military exercise, infuriating the Kremlin.

Mr de Waal said that Armenia’s diplomatic shift was understandable. “If Russia doesn’t protect you, what is the utility of the relationship?” he said.

If the war in Ukraine has been a disaster for Armenia’s relations with Russia, it has been a major boon for Azerbaijan, which has increased its gas supplies to Europe.

EU leaders have flown to Baku to shake hands with Mr Aliyev and have welcomed Azerbaijani diplomats in Brussels, making it far harder for them to constrain him. Azerbaijan has also rebuilt its damaged links with Russia, buying extra Russian gas to supplement its supplies to the EU.

Another major headache, analysts have said, is that any potential new war around Nagorno-Karabakh could have wider implications and make it more explosive than the 2020 war. As well as Israel, Turkey is an ally of Azerbaijan and Pakistan is an arms supplier. Armenia has developed an alliance with Iran, although it has insisted that this is not a military alliance, and it buys weapons from India.

Azerbaijan’s has painted its vehicles with 'war markings' similar to ones used by the Russian army

Pressure has been building around Nagorno-Karabakh over the past couple of years. There are regular deadly skirmishes along the border, but it is now firmly focused on a single stretch of road 20 miles long called the Lachin Corridor that links mainland Armenia with a mountain plateau.

Since December, Azerbaijan has blocked the Lachin corridor, first using civilian environmental protesters and then installing a blockade that stops even aid convoys from reaching the city of Stepanakert, all overseen by watching and impassive Russian soldiers.

Roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenians live on this mountain plateau, in and around Stepanakert, which is now cut off.

Luisine, who lives in Stepanakert, said that bread, meat and medical supplies are tightly rationed and that people have reverted to a form of mediaeval subsistence existence.

“There hasn’t been bread for three days,” she said by telephone. “When I walk through the streets I hear children begging their mothers for food and their mothers crying because they have no answers.”

Stepanakert’s stores are bare and there is no coffee, tea or tobacco. Farmers carry basic produce to market on foot or by donkey and cart.

When Luisine visited the town’s main market this week, she said that only fresh mulberries and mulberry juice were on sale. “It’s terrifying right now,” she said.

The Armenian government has accused Azerbaijan of “genocide”. Azerbaijan has said that it installed the roadblock to stop arms smuggling and has offered an alternative route to reach the town.

For Anjelika it is clear that another war is imminent. She said that Azerbaijan wants to drive her from her village, a few miles from Stepanakert, and her son has been drafted into the local ethnic Armenian army.

“Things are terrible. Very bad,” she said, insisting that she won’t leave. “There is nothing left, no butter, salt, cereals, vegetables or hygiene products. Nothing.”

Armenia Elections: Geopolitical Choice Takes Center Stage – Analysis

June 6, 2026 
By Geopolitical Monitor
By Saleh Salehov

As Armenia prepares for parliamentary elections on June 7, many observers view the vote as a potential turning point not only for the country’s domestic politics but also for its foreign policy trajectory. The elections could also prove decisive for the fate of the prospective peace treaty with Azerbaijan. The military and political consequences of the 2020 war, the subsequent peace process, and the deep-seated sense of security anxiety within Armenian society have increasingly linked Yerevan’s diplomatic maneuvering to domestic political dynamics and electoral calculations.

The impact of Armenia’s electoral climate on peace negotiations, border delimitation, and the unblocking of regional transport routes with its long-time adversary, Azerbaijan, demonstrates how internal political competition can shape broader regional stability. In the run-up to the elections, political debate has largely revolved around a contrast between the incumbent government’s self-proclaimed peace agenda and what its supporters describe as the revanchist rhetoric and populist discourse of the opposition.

In this context, the ballot box may ultimately determine the outcome of several critical questions: whether Armenia continues its gradual turn toward the West or reorients itself toward Russia, and whether the peace process with Azerbaijan advances or faces renewed uncertainty.

Geopolitical Choices at the Ballot Box: The West–Russia Divide

Electoral politics in Armenia have increasingly moved beyond conventional socio-economic debates, turning the domestic political arena into a contest over the country’s geopolitical future. At the heart of this struggle lies the growing polarization between advocates of closer ties with the West—the United States and the European Union—and supporters of maintaining Armenia’s traditional strategic partnership with Russia.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling team have pursued a policy of closer engagement with Western actors, presenting it as an effort to diversify Armenia’s security architecture. The suspension of Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the deployment of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) along the border with Azerbaijan, and the expansion of cooperation with Western institutions are frequently cited as evidence of this course. For government supporters, deeper engagement with the West is portrayed as the most viable path toward strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Yet Yerevan has shown no intention of withdrawing from other Russia-led structures, most notably the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), highlighting the pragmatic limits of its geopolitical reorientation.


On the other side of the political spectrum stand the principal opposition forces, including representatives of the former political establishment associated with former president Robert Kocharyan, influential figures within the Armenian Apostolic Church, business elites with strong ties to Russia, and nationalist groups. Separately, they advocate preserving Armenia’s close strategic relationship with Moscow and argue that distancing the country from Russia would have severe security consequences. Opposition leaders accuse Pashinyan of transforming Armenia into a vehicle for Western geopolitical interests and of weakening the country’s traditional security partnerships.

Public opinion surveys reveal a deeply divided society, with significant differences in attitudes toward Russia and the West. As a result, Armenian elections are increasingly becoming contests not merely between competing policy platforms but between rival geopolitical visions of the country’s future.

Ideological Polarization and the Peace Process

Under the banner of a “Real Armenia”—one that abandons aspirations tied to historical territorial claims—Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are campaigning in support of a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Their objective is to bring an end to decades of conflict through the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the normalization of regional relations. Such an outcome could pave the way for the opening of borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, while facilitating Armenia’s integration into emerging regional connectivity initiatives like the Middle Corridor.

Pashinyan’s vision may be described as a model of “pragmatic peace.” It is based on acknowledging existing geopolitical and military realities, recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, and unblocking regional transport and communication links, including through Armenia’s proposed “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Presented domestically under the concept of “Real Armenia,” this approach seeks to redefine Armenian statehood within its internationally recognized borders and move beyond longstanding territorial disputes with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.


Accordingly, the ruling party portrays the peace process as a strategic opportunity to secure stability, economic development, and regional integration. At the same time, government representatives warn that a victory by opposition forces could undermine ongoing negotiations and increase the risk of renewed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The opposition advances a markedly different understanding of peace. The predominantly pro-Russian opposition argues that any agreement reached with Azerbaijan and Turkey without a robust Russian security presence would jeopardize Armenia’s long-term security and sovereignty. In this view, stability is achieved not primarily through reconciliation and cooperation, but through the preservation of a favorable balance of power.

Yet despite sharply criticizing Pashinyan’s negotiations with Azerbaijan and accusing his government of making excessive concessions, opposition forces have struggled to articulate a coherent alternative strategy. While advocating what may be termed an “honorable peace,” they have provided few concrete details regarding the terms of such a settlement or the mechanisms through which it could realistically be achieved under current regional conditions.

Three Election Scenarios in Armenia

Against this backdrop, three broad scenarios can be envisioned regarding the impact of Armenia’s election outcome on the future of the peace process and regional stability:

Scenario 1: Pashinyan Secures a Constitutional Majority

A decisive victory by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party, resulting in a two-thirds parliamentary majority, would provide the government with the political capital necessary to advance its peace agenda. Most importantly, it could enable the authorities to initiate a constitutional referendum—an issue closely watched by Azerbaijan. Baku expects the removal or revision of constitutional provisions that it interprets as containing territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Widely regarded as one of the final major obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement, successful constitutional reform could significantly accelerate the normalization process and create more favorable conditions for lasting peace.

Scenario 2: Pashinyan Wins a Simple Majority

A second scenario would see the incumbent government retain power but without a constitutional majority. While such an outcome would preserve the current political course, it would leave the government with fewer instruments to address constitutional issues that have become central to negotiations with Azerbaijan. As a result, the future trajectory of the peace process, border delimitation, transport connectivity, and broader regional normalization would remain uncertain. Negotiations could continue, but progress might become slower and more politically contested.

Scenario 3: Opposition Victory and a Shift in Strategic Orientation

A victory by a coalition of the principal pro-Russian opposition forces could significantly alter the current trajectory of the peace process. Such a government might seek to reassess or suspend aspects of the existing negotiations while prioritizing closer security cooperation with Moscow. This could deepen mutual distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan and increase tensions along the border. Efforts to restore a more traditional Russia-centered security framework could also lead to a prolonged stagnation of peace talks, raising the risk of periodic crises and localized confrontations.

The Risk of Post-Election Instability

Beyond these electoral outcomes, another possibility deserves consideration: a period of prolonged domestic instability. A fragmented election result, disputed outcomes, or dissatisfaction among political actors could trigger mass protests and political paralysis. Radical groups on the political margins may attempt to exploit uncertainty and social tensions. Reports and speculation regarding the possible mobilization of Armenian citizens residing abroad, particularly in Russia, have further contributed to concerns about potential post-election turbulence. While such scenarios remain speculative, they underscore the extent to which domestic political developments may influence not only Armenia’s internal stability but also the broader regional security environment.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Russia goes on the offensive against Armenian PM Pashinyan

Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract is expected to win the June 7 general election. / primeminister.amFacebook

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By Robert Ananyan in Yerevan June 4, 2026

Days before Armenia’s parliamentary elections on June 7, Russia is carrying out a full-scale offensive and campaign of pressure against the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which has the strongest chances of winning. 

Not only President Vladimir Putin, but also the leaders of the other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states have jointly demanded that Pashinyan hold a referendum on whether Armenia should join the European Union or remain in the EAEU. Pashinyan rejected the demand, arguing that such a referendum is currently impossible because Armenia has not submitted an application for EU membership. Simultaneously, Russia’s deputy prime minister warned Yerevan about the possibility of higher gas prices should Armenia leave the EAEU.

Russia has imposed restrictions on imports of several Armenian products, including at least five types of vegetables, fresh flowers and ornamental plants, fish and fish products, as well as Armenian brandy and wine. In addition, the sale of 64.5mn bottles of Jermuk mineral water has been banned.

Russia justifies these measures by citing product quality concerns. However, the political dimension is evident, particularly as pro-Russian political forces have actively accused Pashinyan of provoking an economic conflict with Russia. The core of their criticism is the adoption of legislation envisaging a process toward EU accession and the gradual transition of the country’s economic and state standards from Eurasian to European norms. In essence, pro-Russian forces are using the Kremlin’s sanctions and threats to argue that rapprochement with the EU is another mistake by Pashinyan following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The leader of the main opposition force, Strong Armenia, Samvel Karapetyan, has warned of a possible economic war with Russia should Pashinyan be re-elected. Another pro-Russian figure, Robert Kocharyan, who heads the second-largest opposition bloc, has stated that a rupture in relations with Moscow would be nothing short of a disaster for Yerevan. “The stakes are much higher than parliamentary elections alone. The issue is Armenia’s foreign policy course: is Armenia moving away from Russia, or is it maintaining a certain balanced policy?” Kocharyan said.

For its part, the European Union has stated: “As a sovereign, democratic and independent state, Armenia has the full right to choose its own path of development and its partners.” The EU further noted that Russia is attempting to damage Armenia’s economy and influence the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections, adding that “Brussels will continue supporting Armenia in overcoming such attempts at coercion.”

Government sources indicate that Armenia, together with the EU and the United States, has already developed contingency plans addressing the economic, energy, security and other risks that Russia could activate. Concrete solutions exist regarding alternative gas supplies in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic and energy war, mechanisms for subsidising higher gas prices, and support programs for exporters seeking access to new markets. In Moldova’s case, the EU allocated billions of euros to help counter similar Russian sanctions, and those efforts proved successful.

In Armenia’s case, however, the Kremlin has effectively delivered an ultimatum. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the declaration adopted by four EAEU member states — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — implies that all legal and economic details concerning a possible suspension of Armenia’s participation must be thoroughly prepared and discussed by December. In other words, EAEU countries, under Russia’s leadership, are threatening to suspend Armenia’s participation in the economic bloc. Simultaneously, Putin is demanding a referendum requiring Armenians to choose between the EU and the EAEU.

Clearly, this combination of Kremlin-organised threats is intended to steer Armenian voters away from supporting parties advocating closer integration with the EU and a pro-European political course. The leading force in this camp is Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.

In recent weeks, Armenian officials have repeatedly revisited potential countermeasures against Russian sanctions and reviewed the steps Armenia would need to take in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic offensive and import restrictions.

Pro-Russian political forces are attempting to monetise Russian threats as political dividends. However, this coordinated campaign is not translating into an effective anti-Pashinyan political technology. According to polling by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party improved its standing in May compared to February. In February, approximately 24-29% of respondents were prepared to vote for the party; by May, that figure had reached 38%, representing an increase of roughly 9-14 percentage points. Political parties must surpass a 4% electoral threshold, while alliances must secure 7-8%.

Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia has experienced a decline. In February, the alliance enjoyed support from approximately 9-11% of respondents, but by May this had fallen to 7%, a decrease of around 2-4 percentage points.

The rating of Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance has remained largely unchanged or has seen only marginal growth. It stood at approximately 3-4% in February and reached 4% in May. Another pro-Russian force, Prosperous Armenia, also recorded a slight decline, from around 3% in February to 2% in May.

The pro-European Meritocratic Party of Armenia has a small chance of entering parliament, making it unlikely that pro-Russian forces could come to power through such a scenario. Even if the votes of the 20% undecided respondents and the additional 23% who declined to answer are distributed proportionally, the pro-Russian opposition would still lack the numbers needed to remove Pashinyan. Nor are they likely to capture those votes disproportionately. Moreover, Russian threats may produce the opposite effect and mobilise support around Pashinyan.

According to the same survey, the proportion of citizens who perceive Russia as a threat increased by three percentage points — from 29% to 32% — compared to February. This rise coincided with the intensification of Russian threats and hybrid pressure. It is therefore reasonable to assume that roughly one-third of Armenia’s population is prepared to actively support efforts to resist Russian pressure, representing a potentially significant electoral resource for Pashinyan.

If credible polling is accurate, Pashinyan’s party will win the June 7 election, while the pro-Russian opposition will secure roughly 30% of parliamentary seats. Under Armenia’s constitution, one-third of parliament must consist of opposition forces, meaning that even opposition groups failing to cross the electoral threshold may ultimately gain representation.

Could these Russian-related risks evolve into post-election unrest?

It is unlikely that Russian sanctions will halt Armenia’s process of integration with the European Union. With support from Western partners, Yerevan is likely to receive assistance in mitigating the consequences of such measures. The Kremlin is also likely to lose in the political arena. Consequently, provoking unrest in Yerevan could theoretically be considered as a tool for regime change. The question is whether the Kremlin and Armenia’s pro-Russian political forces possess sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy.

Armenia’s political history demonstrates that citizens have taken to the streets to defend electoral rights when governments in power prior to 2018 manipulated presidential and parliamentary elections. By contrast, Pashinyan’s government is not visibly pursuing election fraud. There have been allegations regarding the use of administrative resources to bring citizens to campaign rallies, but even if proven, such actions would not necessarily amount to election falsification.

Therefore, large-scale unrest triggered by allegations of election fraud appears unlikely. Moreover, Armenia’s law enforcement institutions are operating quite effectively. Hardly a day passes without authorities releasing recordings or evidence of alleged attempts by supporters of Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, or the Armenia Alliance to distribute vote-buying incentives or violate restrictions on charitable activities during the campaign. The decline in support for Karapetyan’s political force between February and May may partly be linked to the almost daily publication of alleged evidence concerning electoral violations. Searches have been conducted at regional offices of the main opposition force, dozens of individuals have been detained, and numerous others have been charged.

The opposition is not only unable to mobilise citizens over alleged electoral violations; it is itself accused of engaging in such practices. Consequently, the likelihood that the pro-Russian opposition could organise mass demonstrations demanding a halt to Armenia’s EU accession process — the very outcome Russia seeks — is low.

Supporters of EU membership outnumber opponents by at least three to one. According to the IRI survey, when respondents were asked, “If a referendum on Armenia’s accession to the European Union were held next Sunday, how would you vote?”, 52% said they would vote in favour, while only 13% said they would vote against. This suggests that the country’s pro-EU potential constitutes a stronger political resource for Pashinyan than for the opposition.

Furthermore, since the 2020 war, Armenia’s opposition has launched several major protest movements aimed at removing Pashinyan from power. Even Kocharyan, one of the initiators of these campaigns, has acknowledged that repeated unsuccessful protest efforts have “worn down” the opposition’s popularity. Opposition-minded segments of Armenian society have become disillusioned with ineffective street movements. This is reflected in the decline of the opposition’s combined vote share compared to the 2021 elections.

Nevertheless, Strong Armenia leader Karapetyan has explicitly stated that the opposition is prepared for street action and any other form of struggle. He declared: “I am not prepared for the status of opposition leader; we are going to take power.” His political force cites its own internal polling, claiming that it is poised to win the elections. However, polls published by political parties often face serious credibility concerns.

If this force loses in elections widely regarded as credible, attempting to seize power through unconstitutional means would not be a rational course of action, given that law enforcement institutions appear capable of managing risks associated with domestic unrest. Such movements would likely lack broad public support. Pashinyan’s government would possess legitimate grounds for preventing street violence. Indeed, unlawful behaviour by the opposition may even benefit the authorities, as it provides opportunities to weaken political rivals through legal mechanisms and damage their public standing.

The June 7 parliamentary elections have ceased to be merely a contest among domestic political actors. They have evolved into a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and sovereignty. In our assessment, Russia’s hybrid pressure and economic coercion, intended to strengthen pro-Russian forces, are in fact producing the opposite effect by consolidating support for a Western-oriented course and the incumbent government. This is reflected both in the rise of support for Pashinyan’s party and in growing public backing for EU membership.

Absent extraordinary developments, the election results and the resilience of Armenia’s state institutions are likely to neutralise the risk of post-election turbulence and enable the country to continue what increasingly appears to be an irreversible path toward European integration and economic diversification.

Armenia walking ‘tightrope’ as it shifts away from Russia, think-tank says

/ bne IntelliNews

By Clare Nuttall in Glasgow July 16, 2025


Armenia is stepping up efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia, deepening ties with Europe and the United States after Moscow failed to protect it in recent conflicts with Azerbaijan, according to a new analysis by Dutch think-tank Clingendael.

But Yerevan’s path to independence is constrained by geography, security threats and deep economic ties to Moscow, forcing the small South Caucasus nation to walk what the report calls a “tightrope balancing act”.

“While Armenia’s disappointment in Russia is deepfelt and the effort to distance from it genuine, the long-standing dependencies on Russia in terms of energy, economics and trade, coupled with Armenia’s geographic isolation, make it difficult for Yerevan to make zero-sum geopolitical ‘either-or’ choices,” wrote the report’s author Marina Ohanjanyan, a senior research fellow at Clingendael.

The report says Armenia’s drift began after its 2018 “Velvet Revolution”, which ushered in a government focused on democratic reforms and anti-corruption measures that “clashed with the Russian model”. Frustrations boiled over after Russia’s failure to help Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the 2021-22 Azerbaijani incursions into Armenian territory.

The 2023 fall of Nagorno-Karabakh further shook confidence in Moscow as a security guarantor, with the word “betrayal” now common in Armenian public discourse, the report says.

In a major shift, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in February 2024 that Armenia had frozen its membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), halting participation in military exercises and financial contributions.

“Once seen as the primary ally and security guarantor, Russia is now increasingly viewed in Armenia as a threat and a constraint on Armenian sovereignty,” Ohanjanyan wrote.

Armenia has moved to strengthen ties with the EU and the US, signing a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Washington in January 2025 covering economic and security cooperation, and expressing interest in eventual EU membership.

Yet the report cautions that “any idea of completely replacing Russia or effectively ignoring its presence in the region is considered utterly unrealistic and potentially dangerous.”

The study notes that Russia’s military alliance with Armenia “on paper still remains”, but its reliability has collapsed, prompting Yerevan to diversify arms imports away from Moscow. India and France have emerged as Armenia’s main weapons suppliers.

Prime Minister Pashinyan has accused Moscow of waging a “hybrid war” against Armenia, citing propaganda and cyberattacks targeting the government and civil society.

“Russia’s leverage as a security provider has evaporated,” the report says, but warns that Moscow could retaliate if Armenia crosses red lines, such as demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops or formally quitting the CSTO.

Despite political tensions, Armenia’s trade with Russia has surged since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, partly due to re-exports of goods banned in Western markets.

“Despite Yerevan’s intent to reduce dependence on Russia, economy and energy remain the most challenging areas, due to geographic and geopolitical limitations,” Ohanjanyan noted, adding that Russian fossil fuels still dominate Armenia’s energy supply.

Plans to diversify Armenia’s energy mix, including boosting renewables, “will take time and a major effort”.

Clingendael’s report also points to a profound change in societal attitudes toward Russia, with public perceptions shifting “from trusted ally to a (potential) threat.” Moscow’s once-strong soft power in Armenia has weakened, and the Kremlin lacks credible political allies ahead of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless, the report warns that Russia may attempt to influence those elections through “propaganda, disinformation or other hybrid means.”

The report argues the EU can help Yerevan reduce its reliance on Moscow by deepening cooperation in trade, energy, and governance. However, Armenia’s officials are keen to avoid provoking Russia while seeking diversification.

“Changes in Armenia’s approach to its relationship with Russia are based not on exchanging one global power (Russia) for another (the West), but rather on a diversification policy,” Ohanjanyan concluded, noting that while the West can help, Armenia’s geographic isolation and security threats from Azerbaijan complicate its options.

For now, Armenia’s shift Westward is real but cautious, reflecting a country seeking new partners while watching over its shoulder as it redefines ties with its old patron.

WW3.0 THE BALKANS

Azerbaijan Preparing New Attack on Armenia: PM Pashinyan Tells France 24



MassisPost

YEREVAN — Azerbaijan is preparing a new attack on Armenia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in a Thursday interview with France 24.

“Analyzing … statements made from official Baku, we come to the conclusion that yes, an attack on Armenia is very likely,” he told the TV channel.

Pashinyan complained that the Azerbaijani leadership is still reluctant to recognize Armenia’s border “without ambiguity” and continues to refer to much of Armenian territory as “Western Azerbaijan.”

He said Azerbaijan and Armenia had agreed in Prague and Brussels (with the suport of EU) that the peace treaty between them is to be based on three major principles – Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity within 29.800 and 86.600 square kilometers respectively, the delimitation and demarcation of their borders, are to be carried out on the basis of the Alma-Ata Declaration and all regional transport links are to be reopened.

He said Baku is not honoring understandings on the key parameters of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty reached by him and Aliyev during their meetings in 2022 and 2023 mediated by the European Union.

‘Our problem is to reflect these principles in the peace treaty. If they are observed, we will achieve peace. But if we look into the latest statements coming from Baku, we can assume that it is actually preparing a new attack on Armenia,” Pashinyan aid.

As an example, Pashinyan referred to Azerbaijani statements about ‘Western Azerbaijan.’ He said by these statements Azerbaijan makes claims to a significant part of Armenia’s territory.

“If the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders are not recognized by Azerbaijan, it means that the

France Ready to Supply Short to Long-Range Missiles to Armenia



Published on 23 February 2024
MassisPost


YEREVAN — France will provide more weapons and other military assistance to Armenia to help the country defend its territory, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said during a first-ever visit to Yerevan on Friday.

“Threats hanging over Armenia force us to move forward faster,” he told Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. “It is very important for us to react and take necessary steps quickly.”

Speaking after talks with his Armenian counterpart Suren Papikyan held earlier in the day, Lecornu confirmed that Armenia took delivery the previous night of the first batch of French night-vision devices commissioned by it last year. The Armenian military will also receive soon air-defense radar systems and more armored personnel carriers from French manufacturers, he said.

The French defense group Thales signed with the Armenian Defense Ministry a contract for the supply of three GM200 radars during Papikyan’s visit to Paris last October. Papikyan and Lecornu signed at the time a “letter of intent” on Armenia’s future acquisition of short-range surface-to-air missiles manufactured by another French company.





Lecornu indicated that the supply of the Mistral air-defense systems is a matter of time. What is more, he expressed France’s readiness to also sell more long-range systems to Armenia. He further announced that a French military adviser specializing in air defense will be deployed in Armenia to help it neutralize “possible strikes by potential aggressors.”

“Nobody can reproach the Armenian army for boosting its defense capacity,” Lecornu told a joint news conference with Papikyan, clearly alluding to Azerbaijan’s strong criticism of French-Armenian military cooperation.

The Armenian minister emphasized, for his part, that Yerevan is acquiring these and other weapons for solely defensive purposes. In an apparent reference to Azerbaijan, he spoke of a “visible threat” to Armenia’s territorial integrity.

Neither minister shed light on a number of documents that were signed by them after their talks. The AFP news agency reported that the Armenian side also signed on Friday a supply contract with the French company PGM manufacturing sniper rifles. It said no details of the deal were made public.

The defense cooperation is part of a broader deepening of French-Armenian relations cemented by the existence of an influential Armenian community in France. It comes amid Armenia’s mounting tensions with Russia, its longtime ally. Neighboring Iran has also signaled unease over the pro-Western tilt in Armenian foreign policy.

“Our Iranian partners respect our cooperation with other partners, and I think our Russian and other partners should do the same because Armenia has no taboos when it comes to cooperation to the benefit of Armenia,” Papikian said in this regard.

Armenia is “turning to partners that are truly providers of security,” Lecornu said when asked to comment on the tensions between Yerevan and Moscow.

French Defense Minister visits Armenian Genocide Memorial


On February 23, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Suren Papikyan, and the Minister for the Armed Forces of the French Republic, Sébastien Lecornu visited the Armenian Genocide Memorial and paid tribute to the memory of the victims.

The Ministers laid a wreath at the memorial and flowers at the Eternal Flame in memory of the innocent martyrs of the Armenian Genocide.