Israel’s Drone Swarm Over Gaza Should Worry Everyone

It’s time global leaders set new rules for these future weapons already being using to kill.


A drone views of the ruins of buildings in Gaza city that was levelled by an Israeli air strike during the recent military conflict between Israel and Palestinian ruled by Hamas on June 11, 2021. 

MAJDI FATHI/NURPHOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES


BY ZAK KALLENBORN
JULY 7, 2021 
DEFENSEONE.COM


In a world first, Israel used a true drone swarm in combat during the conflict in May with Hamas in Gaza. It was a significant new benchmark in drone technology, and it should be a wakeup call for the United States and its allies to mitigate the risk these weapons create for national defense and global stability.

Israel’s use of them is just the beginning. Reporting does not suggest the Israeli Defense Forces deployed any particularly sophisticated capability. It seems a small number of drones manufactured by Elbit Systems coordinated searches, but they were used in coordination with mortars and ground-based missiles to strike “dozens” of targets miles away from the border, reportedly. The drones helped expose enemy hiding spots, relayed information back to an app, which processed the data along with other intelligence information. Future swarms will not be so simple.

Often the phrase “drone swarm” means multiple drones being used at once. But in a true drone swarm, the drones communicate and collaborate, making collective decisions about where to go and what to do. In a militarized drone swarm, instead of 10 or 100 distinct drones, the swarm forms a single, integrated weapon system guided by some form of artificial intelligence.

So, drone swarms are here, and we should be worried. But how best to reduce the risk these weapons pose?

The United States should lead the global community in a new conversation to discuss and debate whether new norms or international treaties are needed specifically to govern and limit the use of drone swarms. Current proposals to ban autonomous weapons outright would cover autonomous drone swarms; however, such a treaty would not likely cover the drone swarm Israel used. Despite some media reports to the contrary, there is no indication the swarm made autonomous decisions on who to kill (whether a small, human-controlled swarm like this should be banned is a different issue). And it’s unlikely the great powers will agree to a broad prohibition autonomous weapons. Narrow restrictions on high-risk autonomous weapons like anti-personnel drone swarms may have more appeal, particularly if they create asymmetric effects that threaten, but not help, great powers.

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Global militaries should expand work to develop, test, and share counter-swarm technology. Effective counter-drone systems need to be low cost, quick recharging, and able to hit multiple targets at once. Such systems should be deployed around high-risk target areas, like airports, critical infrastructure, and heads of state. As the threat is fundamentally international, states should also provide their cutting-edge counter-swarm capabilities to partners and allies who are at risk.

Keeping drone swarms from the hands of terrorists will require a separate effort. States may adopt measures akin to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on preventing terrorist acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons that apply to drone swarms (or just expand UNSCR 1540). Local, national, and international law enforcement agencies should also search for indicators of terrorists seeking drone swarm capabilities, such as large drone purchases and known extremist work to develop or modify drone control systems.

In recent years, the threat of drone swarms has grown alongside their increasing sophistication. In 2016, the Department of Defense launched 103 Perdix drones out of three F/A-18 Super Hornets. The drones operated using a “collective brain,” gathering into various formations, flying across a test battlefield, and reforming into new configurations. Notably, the system was designed by students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. If drone swarms are simple enough students can make them, conflict zones across the world can expect to see them soon. In the past year, China, France, India, Spain, South Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all unveiled or tested new drone swarm programs.

Global proliferation of drone swarms creates risks of instability. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year, Azeri use of drones contributed significantly to a rapid Armenian surrender (other factors no doubt helped too). A swarm amplifies such effects with more drones, using more complex tactics that can overwhelm existing defenses. It’s a concern the U.S. military has studied for a decade already. A 2012 study by the Naval Postgraduate School simulated eight drones attacking a U.S. Navy destroyer, finding four drones would hit the ship. Terrorists may also see great appeal in drone swarms as a more accessible air force to overcome ground-based defenses, and carry out attacks on critical infrastructure and VIPs.

Drone swarms create risks akin to traditional weapons of mass destruction. As drone swarms scale into super-swarms of 1,000 or even up to a million drones, no human could plausibly have meaningful control. That’s a problem, autonomous weapons can only make limited judgments on the civilian or military nature of their targets. The difference of a single pixel can change a stealth bomber into a dog. Errors may mean dead civilians or friendly soldiers, and accidental conflict escalation.

The reality is that virtually no current counter-drone systems are designed for counter-swarm operations. Current detections systems cannot necessarily accommodate multiple drones. They could overwhelm interdiction systems, which contain limited or slow-to-shoot interceptors. And the drone swarm may simply be too spread out. Of course, new counter-drone systems like the Air Force’s microwave-based THOR system, low cost per shot defenses like lasers, and counter-swarm swarms may eventually prove effective. While these defenses may protect great powers, smaller states and civilians are likely to be more vulnerable.

The increased autonomy of a drone swarm allows states to use many more drones at once. Human cognition limits simultaneous drone operation, because it is difficult to monitor operations of many drones, ensure they do not collide, and still achieve mission objectives. But the military is working to overcome human limitations. In one 2008 study, a single operator could handle only four drones without significant losses to mission effectiveness. By 2018, the U.S. military’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, confirmed a human could control an entire drone swarm telepathically, using a single microchip implanted in their brain.

The military value of drone swarms stems from enabling complexity and flexibility. Current swarms use typically small, homogenous drones. Future swarms may be of different sizes, equipped with an array of different interchangeable sensors, weapons, and other payloads. That enables combined armed tactics, where drones strike with multiple weapons from multiple angles: one may spray bullets, while another sprays a chemical weapons agent. Swarms may also have adaptive properties such as self-healing, where the swarm modifies itself to accommodate the loss of some members, or self-destruction, to complete one-way missions. Drone swarms will also likely be increasingly integrated into some form of drone mothership (and perhaps integrated into an even larger mothership in a “turducken of lethality.”)

Drone swarms are not science fiction. The technology is here, and spreading fast.

Zachary Kallenborn is a national / homeland security consultant, specializing in unmanned systems, drone swarms, homeland security, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and WMD terrorism.

 

From Ukraine To Myanmar, Drone Warfare Marks A Paradigm Shift – Analysis

Ukrainian soldiers pose with a drone. Photo Credit: Anton Sheveliov, Ukraine Ministry of Defence

 September 16, 2024

By Geopolitical Monitor

By Antonio Graceffo

On September 10, Ukrainian forces launched the largest drone attack of the war to date, targeting Moscow with 144 drones. The assault resulted in 20 drones being shot down, while several multi-story residential buildings near Moscow were set ablaze. Flights from Russia’s most important airports were temporarily suspended. In response, Russia launched a retaliatory strike using 46 drones.

The strikes from both sides highlight a now indisputable fact: drone warfare is playing a determining role in the Ukraine war.

Armed drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are pilotless aircraft used to locate, monitor, and strike targets, including individuals and equipment. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has significantly expanded its use of UAVs for global counterterrorism missions. Drones have key advantages over manned weapons. They can stay airborne for over 14 hours, compared to under four hours for manned aircraft like the F-16, allowing for continuous surveillance without risking pilot safety. Additionally, drones offer near-instant responsiveness, with missiles striking targets within seconds, unlike slower manned systems, such as the 1998 cruise missile strike on Osama bin Laden, which relied on hours-old intelligence.

There is much discussion in the US defense establishment regarding the use of drones, drone policy and how they should be incorporated into military strategy. According to the Marine Corps University, in order to calculate the effectiveness of a drone strike, several factors must be considered, including Tactical Military Effectiveness (TME), Operational Military Effectiveness (OME), and Strategic Military Effectiveness (SME). TME assesses how well the drone strike achieves its immediate objective, such as neutralizing a specific target. OME evaluates the broader impact on military operations, such as troop movements or operational coordination. Lastly, SME considers the long-term consequences of drone warfare, including the effects of drone strikes on enemy leadership, public opinion, and international relations. All three factors are critical in ensuring that drone strikes align with both short-term and long-term military objectives.

Drones are being deployed in large numbers in the Ukraine war, having already played a major role in the battles between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. They are also becoming an increasingly key platform in the Myanmar civil war and conflicts across the Middle East. Advanced militaries, including the Pentagon, are closely monitoring these theaters to refine their own drone strategies. For example, recently the U.S. released a ‘drone hellscape strategy’ for the defense of Taiwan, while China has been conducting simulations of a drone-only attack on the island. Yet even the world’s most advanced militaries seem to lack a definitive approach to drone warfare. And, ironically, they continue to learn valuable lessons from underfunded and undertrained rebels in other far-flung global conflicts.

Drone warfare in the Myanmar civil war

The Free Burma Rangers, a frontline aid group in the Myanmar civil war, has been reporting on the increasing incidence of drone warfare in the conflict. On September 6, 2024, a Tatmadaw drone strike resulted in the deaths of four civilians—two men and two women, and one person was also wounded in the attack. Another drone dropped a handmade bomb on a civilian home in Loi Lem Lay Village, Karenni State. During the same incident, a Tatmadaw drone with six propellers experienced mechanical issues while flying over the battlefield and was subsequently captured by the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), a pro-democracy ethnic army. Taken together, these incidents underscore how drone warfare is still in its tactical infancy, with numerous failed deployments, and how payloads and weaponization are often being improvised by soldiers on the ground.

Other rebel armies in the Myanmar civil war, particularly the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), have developed their own drone units. For instance, a PDF unit reportedly carried out 125 drone strikes during the Battle of Loikaw in Kayah State. Another unit claims responsibility for around 80 drone strikes last year, resulting in the deaths of 80 to 100 junta troops. These forces are either manufacturing their own drones or repurposing civilian models by adding deployable explosives. The drones are inexpensive, widely available, and highly effective. Even the junta, supported by China and Russia, has adopted similar tactics by attaching mortar shells to their drones, while ethnic armiesoften use homemade explosives based on mortar shells captured from the Tatmadaw. These devices can range from 40 to 60mm, carry up to 2.5 kg of explosives and shrapnel, and are capable of killing or injuring anyone within a 100-meter radius in open terrain.

FPV drones a game-changer in the Ukraine war

In addition to homemade and modified drones, first-person view (FPV) drones can cost around $500 USD each, while reconnaissance drones equipped with advanced cameras can run into the thousands. Ukraine is deploying these drones at a rate of 100,000 per month, with plans to produce one million FPV drones in 2024. For a sense of just how important drones have become in the Ukraine war, consider the fact that this figure far exceeds the number of artillery shells supplied by the entire European Union over the past year.

FPV drones, launched from improvised platforms, can fly between 5 and 20 kilometers depending on their size, battery, and payload. Controlled by a soldier using a headset for a first-person view, with another providing guidance via maps on a tablet, these drones are often used to target vulnerable points such as tank hatches or engines. Their real-time video feed, transmitted through goggles or a headset similar to VR gaming, gives the operator precise control, especially in complex environments like urban warfare or dense terrain. FPV drones are effective for reconnaissance, targeted strikes, and even suicide missions, where they carry explosives and fly directly into a target. Unlike planes or helicopters, they are not hindered by anti-aircraft systems near the front lines. In fact, a $500 FPV drone can target the open hatch of a Russian tank worth millions of dollars, demonstrating their cost-effectiveness in modern warfare.

The rise of counter-drone and jamming technologies

As drone warfare becomes increasingly common on the battlefield, a need arises for effective drone jamming technologies. While Russian, Ukrainian, and other armies have access to jammers, ethnic armies in Myanmar lack them almost entirely. Jammers start at $2,400, but many cheap, commercially available models are essentially useless due to significant design flaws. Some have fixed antennae that point upward, despite attacks coming from the side, and many generate excessive heat without proper cooling. This raises concerns about their effectiveness in harsh environments, such as the deserts of the Middle East or the humid jungles of Myanmar.

Moreover, electronic jamming devices work on specific frequencies and drone pilots are adapting by switching to less commonly used ones. To counter this, new technologies like pocket-sized “tenchies” and backpack electronic warfare (EW) systems have emerged, jamming signals across a broader 720-1,050 MHz range, making them more effective against Russian drones. Despite Ukraine’s deployment of these newer jammers, Russia’s use of hunter-killer drone systems like the Orlan-10 for spotting and the Lancet for strikes, along with missile-equipped Orion drones, continue to challenge Ukraine’s drone defenses.

In response, Ukraine has created the Unmanned Systems Force (USF), a military branch dedicated to drone warfare. Additionally, semi-autonomous drones using AI are being developed to bypass jamming altogether. We remain in the nascent stages of drone warfare, where evolution is playing out in real time via innovations on the battlefield. In this sense, US defense spending in Ukraine is serving as an investment in research and development for the drone wars of tomorrow.

• This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

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Geopolitical Monitor

Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.

Mass drone warfare is Europe’s rising security threat

Copyright Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

By Leticia Batista Cabanas & Elisabeth Heinz

Published on 14/04/2026 - EURONEWS

France has just announced an €8.5 billion investment to increase drone and missile stocks by 400 per cent before 2030. The move joins Germany’s decision to invest €10 billion in military drones and Poland’s recent “drone revolution” initiative.

Modern wars consume drones at a much higher rate than traditional ammunition. Ukraine uses approximately 9.000 drones per day, roughly 270.000 units monthly. Estimates suggest that Iran can produce approximately 400 Shahed drones per day, for a monthly capacity of up to 12.000 units.

This staggering churn is pushing the EU towards mass-scale industrial production, as existing drone stockpiles and manual manufacturing cannot keep pace with battlefield losses.

The bloc’s inability to scale production is creating a strategic dependency on external suppliers like the US or China, leaving its borders vulnerable to disposable, "cheap" warfare that the current industrial pace cannot sustain.

To counter this vulnerability, the EU has launched the 2026 European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI), to build a multi-layered, 360-degree shield of interoperable counter-drone systems by 2027.

Complementing the EDDI is the Drone Alliance with Ukraine, which leverages battlefield-tested expertise to co-produce millions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Utmost strategic importance

Drones went from niche tools to key war instruments because of three advantages: low cost, constant surveillance, and precision strike capability.

In Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both sides rely on drones for reconnaissance and targeting. Commercial quadcopters, which can cost just a few hundred euros, spot enemy positions and guide artillery in real time. This shortens the time between detection and destruction from hours to minutes. Larger systems, such as Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2, were used to destroy supply convoys and air defence systems early in the conflict, which set a new international war standard.

“Drones evolve technologically every three to six months. So, it's also challenging to buy millions of drones that will be obsolete in 12 months from now”, shared Nikolaus Lang, Global Leader at BCG Henderson Institute.

Drones are cheap to produce, but expensive to defend against. In traditional wars, destroying a target required expensive aircraft or missiles, until Ukraine showed that today, a cheap “kamikaze” drone can destroy equipment worth millions.

Russia used many Iranian Shahed drones, each relatively inexpensive, to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. But defending against them requires pricey air-defence missiles or fighter jets, which creates a strategic imbalance where the defender spends far more than the attacker.

“Europe needs cheaper and quicker solutions”, said Jamie Shea, former NATO official, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and Senior Advisor at the European Policy Centre in Brussels. “The EU uses very expensive means to neutralise drones. You've seen in Iran, where $3 million missiles are used to shoot down drones of just a couple of thousand dollars”, he said.

European drone investment over the last decade

Military analysts from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies describe drones as one of the most disruptive economic shifts in warfare in decades.

Drones also democratise air power. In earlier conflicts, only advanced dominated the air, but this changed during the Nagorno-Karabakh War as Azerbaijani forces used drones to systematically destroy Armenian tanks and artillery.

In the Gaza Strip, both state forces and non-state actors use modified commercial drones for surveillance and attacks. Now even relatively small or poorly equipped groups can carry out aerial operations, which lowers the barrier for effective military force.

Europe falls behind

For Europe, urgency stems from external threats and internal weaknesses. Drone incidents near critical infrastructure quadrupled between 2024 and 2025. In September, Copenhagen and Oslo closed airports after “several large drones” caused 109 cancellations and 51 reroutes. A month later, Munich Airport closed twice in 24 hours for the same reason.

The strategic concern is that the EU is not yet structured for a “drone-saturated” battlefield or security environment. Recent incidents forced costly responses: for example, in September of 2025, approximately 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, so NATO deployed F-35 fighter jets to neutralize the threat, which cost at least €1.2 million.

To avoid this, Shea explained that the EU should develop advanced sensor technology, including a 360-degree sensor aperture that shoots down malicious drones.

Ramping up production

The EU supplies less than 30 per cent of its own military drone needs. By comparison, China and Ukraine produce millions of units annually, while the US is scaling up to hundreds of thousands.

To address this, the Commission launched an industrial push to fundamentally restructure drone design, production, and deployment. The goal is scale: faster production cycles, higher volumes, and lower costs, because modern drone warfare is less about sophistication and more about quick, adaptable mass production.

Traditional European defence procurement is slow, often taking years from concept to deployment. This approach seeks to shorten timelines through modular designs, faster testing, and continuous upgrades, enabling rapid drone adaptation. So, the Commission introduced AGILE (fast-track funding), the EU Defence Innovation Scheme, and BraveTech EU.

Estimated percentage distribution of EU drone investments

Low-cost production is another pillar, with initiatives focused on affordability, scalability, and dual-use manufacturing. The EU is engaging civilian industries (e.g., automotive, electronics) and SMEs, which are more agile than large contractors and better suited to rapid prototyping and innovation. Funding tools will support efforts across member states.

Europe has massively levelled up its defence R&D investments, but it's still not enough, according to Lang. He pointed out that the “US invested more than $900 billion, Europe only $450 billion altogether”.

The EU will also rely on the Drone Alliance with Ukraine; a 2024 multinational military partnership created to secure Ukraine's UAV supply through constant deliveries of drones tailored to frontline requirements.

The Alliance allowed the EU to establish a network of factories for Ukrainian-designed drones on European soil. So European firms can bypass traditional bureaucracy by testing new prototypes on the front lines in weeks rather than years.

The alliance is boosted by billions from frozen Russian assets, specifically set to scale up production of low-cost autonomous systems. This collaboration wants to deliver over two million drones annually by 2030.

These initiatives should reduce dependence on non-European suppliers, alongside efforts to secure supply chains for critical drone components (like semiconductors, sensors, and communication systems) within EU borders and among trusted partners.

A key tool is the planned “EU trusted drone” label, to certify systems that meet security and reliability standards. It’s designed to guide procurement decisions, encourage the use of European-made technologies, and ultimately create a more self-sufficient and resilient drone ecosystem.

EU policy meets military drones

Russia’s violation of NATO airspace (37 times since 2022) and the war in Iran pushed the EU to start redefining its defence strategy, shifting from civil drone regulation to security measures and funding initiatives.

The Commission’s 2026 Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security addresses the use of drones in conflicts that target critical infrastructure, borders, and airspace. It targets the EU’s real-time detection capacities and develops a unified defence approach against malicious operations.

It also boosts member states’ industrial cooperation and drone markets to reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers. Investing in the small niche companies, where innovation lies, is key. “Europe needs to create greater risk, expand our venture capital market, and simplify procurement regulatory barriers”, Shea argued.

The roadmap focuses on four priorities: boosting resilience through industrial ramp-up, improving threat detection through stronger surveillance, responding and defending with a coordinated strategy, and strengthening the EU’s defence readiness.

Estimated annual drone production (EU versus Russia)

Detecting and tracking threats requires advanced AI-powered technological infrastructure. The Commission foresees accelerating technological development by using 5G networks to improve real-time threat detection.

The action plan is strong as “it identifies the problem and mobilises resources”, Shea said. Yet the EU needs to learn from Ukraine’s drone strategy: “Ukraine is doing 50 per cent of the work for us. It's developing the intelligence and offering to share sensitive data. It's also showing Europe how AI should be integrated into counter-drone technology”.

The EDDI is a key part of the action plan, and it acts as a shield for the bloc’s airspace. Through its multi-layered, interoperable system, the initiative detects, tracks and defends the EU from hybrid threats and drone incursions.

Running on AI-powered sensing and counter-drone technologies, the EDDI supports the Eastern Flank Watch, which is also part of the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. It is an EU-NATO initiative to protect the EU's border with Russia and Belarus, using specialised counter-drone technologies and boosting air defence, surveillance, and rapid threat response while improving cooperation with NATO operations, such as Eastern Sentry and Baltic Air Policing.

Security and defence remain national

Though the EU is shifting towards scalable, networked, AI-driven, and mass-produced warfare equipment, defence and security remain national, meaning that member states have individual defence priorities and budgets. Fragmented national procurement practices, critical infrastructure protection, and different rules governing drone and counter-drone systems obstruct Europe’s new defence strategy.

Shea warned that Europe should establish a common legal framework so that all member states can develop and test drone technology equally.

“European states need to monitor the same airspace all the time, so that somebody in France is looking at the same air picture as somebody in Poland or Estonia”, he underlined.

Another issue? Fragmented national investments in drone innovation. “Some countries, like Denmark or Germany, have been much more upfront than others, also in forming joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers”, Shea said.

Likewise, 80 per cent of EU procurement is at national level. “We need many more of these initiatives to overcome the fragmentation of defence procurement”, warned Lang.

According to Shea, the EU should also eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to enable sensitive information sharing, such as drone threat intelligence and airspace monitoring, between member states.

“Drones are getting faster and sharing information is fundamental, but the EU needs to ensure safe security protocols to encourage countries to share data”.

 

Drone warfare: Europe’s new security threat

Copyright Euronews

By Evi Kiorri & Mert Can Yilmaz

Updated 16/04/2026 - 

Paris will quadruple its kamikaze drone arsenal by 2030, as the EU accelerates restocking efforts amid rapid advancements in drone technology. Watch the video

Ukraine forced a rewrite of Europe's defence. Drones costing a few hundred euros wiped out tanks worth millions. Iranian loitering munitions, piloted remotely and programmed to strike, broke through air defences. Missile reserves that seemed robust on paper evaporated in months.

France saw the warning signs up close. After launching air-defence missiles in the Gulf to counter Iranian drones, Paris discovered its own arsenal running critically low. In response, €8.5 billion is ringfenced for drones and missiles by 2030.

Under the Readiness 2030 plan, the European Drone Defence Initiative is deploying counter-drone systems, including electronic warfare, lasers, and mass interceptors, to neutralise low-cost threats without depleting expensive munitions.

A layered missile shield is under development to provide coverage across all ranges. MBDA has committed to increasing output by 40 percent this year. The EU's SAFE mechanism is co-financing production lines and joint procurement, with France eligible for €15 billion under the scheme.

'Bayraktar!': Ukrainian army shares song celebrating Turkish-made drone fighting back at Russian invasion

The New Arab Staff
02 March, 2022
#BayraktarTB2 trends on social media platforms as the official page of the Ukrainian army shared a song celebrating the Turkish-made drone in their fight against the Russian invasion.


The Bayraktar TB2 drone is produced by Turkish defence company Baykar [Anadolu via Getty]

Ukraine’s armed forces have shared a song dedicated to the Bayraktar TB2, a Turkish-made armed drone that has been a key weapon in Ukraine's fight against the invading Russian army.

The catchy song was shared on the official Facebook page of the "Land Forces of Ukraine".

The lyrics include the promise of “Bayraktar's punishment in the name of Ukrainian children, Georgians, Syrians, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars”. This likely refers to Russia's long list of military invasions and operations against various countries and communities in recent years.

The song is going viral on social media, with dozens of users sharing the song alongside the hashtag #BayraktarTB2.

Many of the tweets include footage of the drones purportedly destroying Russian targets as Moscow tries to take the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.

Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 armed drones at work. The Russian BUK was destroyed in the area of Malina Zhytomyr region. — Ukrainian military

Bayraktar TB2 were supplied by Turkey. And they are working very smoothly against the Russian weaponry
pic.twitter.com/n5uzsyJGbK — Ragıp Soylu (@ragipsoylu) February 27, 2022

Ukraine and Turkey have been close defence partners over the past few years. Baykar, the company that produces the TB2 drones, has close ties to the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and was meant to build a plant to produce these weapons within Ukraine.

The Ukrainian defence ministry said Wednesday that it had received and deployed a new batch of the drones but did not say how many it had received.

Ukrainian drone enthusiasts sign up to repel Russian forces

By MATT O'BRIEN

In better times, Ukrainian drone enthusiasts flew their gadgets into the sky to photograph weddings, fertilize soybean fields or race other drones for fun. Now some are risking their lives by forming a volunteer drone force to help their country repel the Russian invasion.

“Kyiv needs you and your drone at this moment of fury!” read a Facebook post late last week from the Ukrainian military, calling for citizens to donate hobby drones and to volunteer as experienced pilots to operate them.

One entrepreneur who runs a retail store selling consumer drones in the capital said its entire stock of some 300 drones made by Chinese company DJI has been dispersed for the cause. Others are working to get more drones across the border from friends and colleagues in Poland and elsewhere in Europe.

“Why are we doing this? We have no other choice. This is our land, our home,” said Denys Sushko, head of operations at Kyiv-based industrial drone technology company DroneUA, which before the war was helping to provide drone services to farmers and energy companies.

Sushko fled his home late last week after his family had to take cover from a nearby explosion. He spoke to The Associated Press by phone and text message Friday after climbing up a tree for better reception.

“We try to use absolutely everything that can help protect our country and drones are a great tool for getting real-time data,” said Sushko, who doesn’t have a drone with him but is providing expertise. “Now in Ukraine no one remains indifferent. Everyone does what they can.”

Unlike the much larger Turkish-built combat drones that Ukraine has in its arsenal, off-the-shelf consumer drones aren’t much use as weapons — but they can be powerful reconnaissance tools. Civilians have been using the aerial cameras to track Russian convoys and then relay the images and GPS coordinates to Ukrainian troops. Some of the machines have night vision and heat sensors.

But there’s a downside: DJI, the leading provider of consumer drones in Ukraine and around the world, provides a tool that can easily pinpoint the location of an inexperienced drone operator, and no one really knows what the Chinese firm or its customers might do with that data. That makes some volunteers uneasy. DJI declined to discuss specifics about how it has responded to the war.

Taras Troiak, a dealer of DJI drones who started the Kyiv retail store, said DJI has been sending mixed signals about whether it’s providing preferential access to — or disabling — its drone detection platform AeroScope, which both sides of the conflict can potentially use to monitor the other’s flight paths and the communication links between a drone and the device that’s controlling it.

DJI spokesperson Adam Lisberg said wartime uses were “never anticipated” when the company created AeroScope to give policing and aviation authorities — including clients in both Russia and Ukraine — a window into detecting drones flying in their immediate airspace. He said some users in Ukraine have reported technical problems but DJI has not disabled the tool or given preferential access.

In the meantime, Ukrainian drone experts said they’ve been doing whatever they can to teach operators how to protect their whereabouts.

“There are a number of tricks that allow you to increase the level of security when using them,” Sushko said.

This 2022 aerial image provided by Ukrainian security forces, taken by a drone and shown on a screen, shows a blown-up building near the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine. The exact date and time of the image are unknown. In better times, Ukrainian drone enthusiasts flew their gadgets into the sky to photograph weddings, fertilize soybean fields or race other drones for fun. Now some are risking their lives by forming a volunteer drone force to help their country repel the Russian invasion. 

(Ukrainian Security Forces via AP)

Sushko said many in the industry are now trying to get more small drones — including DJI alternatives — transported into Ukraine from neighboring European countries. They can also be used to assist search-and-rescue operations.

Ukraine has a thriving community of drone experts, some of whom were educated at the National Aviation University or the nearby Kyiv Polytechnic University and went on to found local drone and robotics startups.

“They’ve got this homebuilt industry and all these smart people who build drones,” said Faine Greenwood, a U.S.-based consultant on drones for civic uses such as disaster response.

Troiak’s DJI-branded store in Kyiv, which is now shuttered as city residents take shelter, was a hub for that community because it runs a maintenance center and hosts training sessions and a hobby club. Even the country’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, once paid a visit to the store to buy a drone for one of his children, Troiak said.

A public drone-focused Facebook group administered by Troiak counts more than 15,000 members who have been trading tips about how to assist Ukrainian troops. One drone photographer who belongs to the Ukrainian Association of Drone Racing team told The Associated Press he decided to donate his DJI Mavic drone to the military rather than try to fly it himself. He and others asked not to be named out of fear for their safety.

“The risk to civilian drone operators inside Ukraine is still great,” said Australian drone security expert Mike Monnik. “Locating the operator’s location could result in directed missile fire, given what we’ve seen in the fighting so far. It’s no longer rules of engagement as we have had in previous conflicts.” In recent days, Russian-language channels on the messaging app Telegram have featured discussions on ways to find Ukrainian drones, Monnik said.

Some in Ukraine’s drone community already have experience deploying their expertise in conflict zones because of the country’s long-running conflict with Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. Monnik’s firm, DroneSec, has tracked multiple instances just in the past year of both sides of that conflict arming small drones with explosives. One thing that Ukrainians said they’ve learned is that small quadcopter drones, such as those sold at stores, are rarely effective at hitting a target with explosive payloads.

“It would seem somewhat short-sighted to waste one,” said Greenwood, the consultant based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “I assume the chief goal would be recon. But if things are getting desperate, who knows.”

DJI also has experience in responding to warfighters trying to weaponize its drones and used so-called “geofencing” technology to block drone movements during conflicts in Syria and Iraq. It’s not clear yet if it will do the same in Ukraine; even if it does, there are ways to work around it.

Small civilian drones are no match against Russian combat power but will likely become increasingly important in a protracted war, leaving drone-makers no option to be completely neutral. Any action they take or avoid is “indirectly taking a side,” said P.W. Singer, a New America fellow who wrote a book about war robots.

“We will see ad-hoc arming of these small civilian drones much the way we’ve seen that done in conflicts around the world from Syria to Iraq and Yemen and Afghanistan,” Singer said. “Just like an IED or a Molotov cocktail, they won’t change the tide of battle but they will definitely make it difficult for Russian soldiers.”

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AP video journalist Nathan Ellgren contributed to this report.