The Political Economy Of One China Policy In Conundrum: Philippines’ Stake In Taiwan-China Geopolitical Controversy – Analysis


Flags of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China. CC BY-SA 4.0

September 21, 2025 

By Jumel Gabilan Estrañero, Latrell Andre C. Manguera, Chelsy Dianne Giban, Fordy Tic-ing Ancajas and Keith Justine Michael G. Banda


On August 29, 2025, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)[1] released its independent yet quite intriguing stance on the geopolitical controversy of Taiwan and China. Accordingly, the DFA emphasized that the 1975 Joint Communiqué between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China remains a cornerstone of our longstanding bilateral relationship.

Added to that, “in line with the One China Policy, which the Philippines has consistently upheld, the Government of the Philippines does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. This policy is clear and unwavering.

At the same time, the Philippines maintains economic and people-to-people engagements with Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and tourism. These interactions are conducted within the bounds of our One China Policy.

Consistent with the Philippines’ One China Policy, no official from Taiwan is recognized as a member of the business delegation that recently visited the Philippines.

Given our geographical proximity and the presence of approximately 200,000 Filipinos working and residing in Taiwan, the Philippines has a direct interest in peace and stability in the region. We therefore continue to call for restraint and dialogue. We leave it to the Chinese people to resolve Cross-Strait matters.”

A day before DFA released the diplomatic communique, a Senate hearing[2] was conducted. Presided Sen. Imee Marcos, she then asked officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)[3] to clarify the Philippines’ position on the One China policy during a public hearing. Sen. Marcos noted that a lot of people are confused on the issue. “As they say… we all know that if there is a confrontation over Taiwan between China and the United States, there is no way that the Philippines can stay out of it simply because of our physical geographical situation. If there is an all-out war, we will be drawn to it. The situation is confusing and above all, its scary. Just to put it on record, as far as the committee is concerned, the Philippines and the U.S. both still recognize the One-China policy, is that correct?” Marcos inquired.

In retort, Foreign Affairs Sec. Ma. Theresa Lazaro said that based on the 1087 Joint Communique of the Philippines and China, the Philippines does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. “We leave it to the Chinese people to resolve cross-strait matters. Conflict will have an impact on geographically proximate territories and the President did not deviate from our principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, a principle of the joint communique,” Lazaro clarified. The One China policy is the acknowledgment by a country that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland being its sole legitimate government, and that Taiwan is a part of China.

In a political economy analysis by Mr. Manguerra, he laid down the foundation of China’s claim. The fall of the Qing Empire in 1912–which ended imperial China–paved the way for the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC). This era saw the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists, which led to the later division of China. Following this are as follows:

• Partition of China. After the civil war, Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) took over the Chinese mainland, while Chiang Kai-Shek’s ROC retreated to Taiwan, creating competing claims of legitimate sovereignty internationally.1

• Prologue & Formalization of Relations. Diplomatic engagement between the Philippines and the PRC began in 1974, which resulted in the signing of the PRC-Philippines joint communiqué in 1975, which officially recognized the PRC under the One China Principle.

• Pragmatic Balance of Ties. Since 1975, the Philippines has walked a pragmatic fine line. The Philippines has vibrant economic relations with the PRC, while keeping the boiling tensions at bay in the West Philippine Sea. At the same time, Manila has informal relations with Taipei in the areas of culture, labor, trade, and technology.

• Political Economy in the 21st Century. The “One China Principle” remains a core component of the diplomatic relations of the Philippines. China is among the top trading partners of the Philippines while there is continuous interaction not only in the unofficial economic and cultural sectors but also in the people-to-people contacts with Taiwan. When a diplomat from the ROC visited Manila in 2025, it incited anger from Beijing which prompted the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs to reaffirm that it does not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan.

The relationship between the Philippines and China can be traced back through its historical and economic roots. On June 9, 1975, a diplomatic relationship between China and the Philippines was formally established, and nearly 100 bilateral agreements that cover different political aspects: trade, infrastructure, etc, were created. However, tension arises between them, particularly the territorial dispute over the West Philippine Sea, also known as the South China Sea. And with recent remarks of President Bongbong Marcos Jr. regarding the China and Taiwan dispute, stressing “There is no way that the Philippines can stay out of it simply because of our geographic location“, and if there will be one, he would ally with the United States to defend Taiwan from China. In which the Chinese foreign ministry responds that it is contradictory to the 1975 agreement between Philippines and China to respect one’s sovereignty, which includes the “One China” Policy.

Meanwhile in most recent assertion, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)[4] has been strong on pushing for the narrative since last year that Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times. They claim that from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan had been occupied and colonized by Japan. In 1945, the Chinese people won the great victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, ending Taiwan’s half-century of humiliation under Japanese slavery.

To beef up its claim, China is legally cited the Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1943; stating that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to China (an expressed claim by PRC). Another pre-owned basis is culled from the Potsdam Proclamation, signed by China, the United States and the United Kingdom in July 1945 and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union, reiterates, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” On October 25, 1945 the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan’s surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taipei. The return of Taiwan to China constitutes an important component of the post-World War II international order.

What is interesting is that China also used Philippines for its narrative when it cited Pres. Marcos’ statement. It said that in January 2024, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. publicly reiterated that the Philippines adheres to the one-China policy, and that the Taiwan is a province of China but the manner in which they will be brought together again is an internal matter.

Analysis

1. The US and China contestation

Internal calls for debates have emerged regarding this underlying issue with some even leveraging the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States to strengthen strategic ties.

At the backdrop of this, the U.S. establishment of the “One China” policy is an act to maintain a balance in relations with both China and Taiwan. One of the aims of this policy is to maintain peace in the Taiwan Straits to insist on a peaceful resolution being done by both countries without interference from any third parties. However, looking at a different lens, although not specifically mentioned, the policy also functions as an instrument for political economy, ensuring continued access to markets, resources, and investments. This allowed the U.S. to open trade and invest with China, while still maintaining unofficial economic ties with Taiwan. This is the same as the Philippines, with economic and diplomatic relations with China, as well as unofficially with Taiwan. The Philippines benefits from stability, trade, and investment under this policy, but places itself in the middle, especially with the tensions arising in the West Philippine Sea.

If we consider the broader context, we can observe that the United States’ interpretation of the “One-China Policy” afforded them a strategic position to balance their relationship with China while simultaneouslyexerting influence over Taiwan. Given the ambiguity and open-ended nature of the “One-China Policy,” the United States can maintain economic relations with Taiwan while simultaneously acknowledging China’sjurisdiction over Taiwan. This is because the United States has its own business and interests in Taiwan,just as China does. Both nations recognize Taiwan’s geographical and economic potential to contribute to theUnited States’ economic agenda. Consequently, they have chosen to ignore the disputed status of thecountry. Both China and the United States are engaged in a global competition for hegemony, which has ledthem to become the “Modern Colonialists”, they do not engage in physical war but an economic wat. Their objective is to seize control of any potential resources or territories they perceive as advantageous throughassertive dominance or strategic economic maneuvers.

2. Precarious Exchange: Philippines in the Middle of Modern Cold War

Even with increased regional tensions, the Philippines continue economic exchanges with Taiwan but strictly within the framework of One China Policy.

Meanwhile, keeping the One China Policy avoids the Philippines from being antagonistic towards the PRC, an emerging regional hegemon, and maintains Philippine access to trade, investment, and strategic leverage. While informal ties with Taiwan permit Philippines to hedge strategically, it also indicates to China that Philippines has room for flexibility with diplomatic relations and has an independent diplomatic cerebrum. This strategic yet pragmatic actions allow the Philippines to extract benefits and engage selectively with both sides – all with the Philippine national interest in mind.

Perhaps the better question to ask here is “Given that China already possesses everything it needs, whatdoes China want from Taiwan?” and “What Taiwanese possession or ownership does the Chinesegovernment seek to assert its dominance over?” The answer lies within the landscape of Taiwan — they are the largest global manufacturer of chips or semi-conductors, has become a dominant force in the technological market, captivating the attention of the “power-hungry” Chinese government. They aim to seize control of the global chip market due to the increasing demands of globalization. China could have just abandoned Taiwan and allows to exercise their own sovereignty a long time ago, but they could not, given the fact that they see the potential in Taiwan to be their economic resource and to further boost their end goal by take over the global market free from the West.

3. Assertive Response yet Calculated

Evidently, the Philippines strengthened ties with countries such as Australia and Canada through joint drills to counteract China’s ever-growing presence, marking a show of force by rising middle-power countries.

Incidentally and strategically, President Marcos Jr. has acknowledged that the Philippines cannot avoid the conflict between Taiwan and China due to its geographic proximity and the presence of over 200,000 OFWs in Taiwan. This vulnerability is heightened by China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its warnings over Philippine engagement with Taiwan, underscoring how the issues are interconnected.

From a political economy perspective, the Philippines is caught in a “tug-of-war,” as any escalation regarding Taiwan could draw it into regional conflict while threatening economic stability. The Department of Foreign Affairs’ affirmation of the “One China” Policy reflects the country’s attempt to balance security commitments with the U.S. and economic ties with China and Taiwan.

Furthermore, when it comes to the Philippines and the “One-China Policy,” the government’s stance isa smart move, but it is also risky. Throughout history, the Philippines has been caught between the two hegemons: China and the U.S., and it has been playing tug-of-war with them. It is better to choose one or the other than to be a puppet on their strings. The stance of the administration is understandable as it gears towards preserving the territory of the Philippines and its right to self-determination. But then again, Filipinos must be vigilant of the ongoing tension between the two superpowers.

4. Balancing Development and Defense

Economic revitalization is something the Philippines need. Engaging with the PRC establishes essential investments, trade, and infrastructure flows that could result in domestic growth, industrialization, and job creation. Informal ties with Taiwan also supplement economic and technological growth, while OFWs in China and Taiwan send remittances and establish human capital that support the overall national development. If Manila were to spur Chinese anger by overexposing itself to Taiwan, bilateral economic coercion, trade gap measures, or capital flight could threaten Philippine growth.

Financial software

The boiling tensions between the PRC and Taiwan (ROC for China mainland’s self-assertion) is not a foreign reality for the Philippines. Like Taiwan, the Philippines is also experiencing Chinese bullying in the West Philippine Sea. In the Cross-Strait context, Pres. Marcos Jr. is realistically correct that if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines would be drawn inevitably because of its association with the U.S. through the Mutual Defense Treaty, as the U.S. commits to defend ROC. This challenging reality explains why retaining the One China Policy is primordial, because it allows the country to respond to regional pressures in a pragmatic way that protects the nation’s economic and security interests.

Implications and Some Recommendations

1. We recommend maintaining the adherence of the Philippines to the “One China” Policy to maintain a peaceful and stable relationship with China.[5] Any diplomatic fallout would backfire on the Philippines, as the reality is that the country is weak in terms of military and economic aspects, still depending on outside nations. Adding to this is the ongoing tension regarding the West Philippine Sea. The Philippines’ adherence to the “One China” policy is, therefore, a necessary form of strategic. By maintaining this policy, the Philippines will avoid being directly involved in the cross-strait politicaldispute[6]. And if the latter happens in the future, the Philippines will act as a neutral party. Focused its resources on protecting its people and securing its territory.

2. To mitigate any significant risks of a potential conflict between China and Taiwan. First, deepened the ties with Taiwan. Although acting as a de facto, the key role that Taiwanese companies hold in the manufacturing of electronics and technology should continue to benefit the Philippines in both ways. Also, it is recommended to diversifying economically and strengthening further trade partnerships to reduce dependence on China. One way is to deepen the connection to intra-ASEAN trade to leverage regional supply chains. Relevant today is to explore new market trends, especially those that are known for their renewed technology (Japan) and financing.

3. It is recommended to take an active neutral stance and strengthen thesecurity of these forces under the defense and security department: Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO), the National Defense College of thePhilippines (NDCP), the Government Arsenal (GA), and Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) with supports from National Security Council (NSC), DTI, and the DEPDEV (formerly NEDA). The Philippines must innovate and invest in new and effective dynamics that will safeguard the Philippines from any threats (whether internal or external actors).

To wit, the Philippine Government strikes a balance between economic and political interactions with conflicted countries like Taiwan, China, and the United States. By establishing a balanced economic partnership with these nations, we can minimize the risk of potential conflicts. Additionally, we should strengthen our connections with our allies within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as they are crucial in enhancing our economic security reducing the reliance on the two hegemons.

Conclusion and Way Ahead

In a nutshell, the Philippines’ commitment to the One-China Policy is evident in its long-standing diplomatic stance, as demonstrated since 1975. Indeed, the ‘August 2025 communique’ recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory but in a calculated move from Philippine’s fence.

Successive Philippine administrations have consistently upheld this stance, emphasizing respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Executive Department also supports the peaceful resolution of Cross-Strait matters, believing that the Chinese people themselves should resolve them and to avoid escalated and unintended spillovers in Southeast Asian conundrum, yet the Philippines[7] must be prepared in any probable war beyond peacetime. Preparation has always been a key in any grey zone tactics of China.

Despite the recent official diplomatic position, the Philippines maintains robust economic tie-up and people-to-people engagements with Taiwan, particularly in areas such as trade, investment, and tourism. These interactions are carefully conducted within the established bounds of the One-China Policy, reflecting a complex balancing act on its foreign policy. Given its geographical proximity to Taiwan and the significant presence of approximately 200,000 Filipino workers there, the Philippines has indeed a direct interest in regional peace and stability. Consequently, it frequently urges restraint and dialogue in the Taiwan Strait yet here we are, in strategic zen mode of political economy while maintaining peace and security at larger extent in global context.

*Ideas and/or views expressed here are entirely independent and not in any form represent author’s organization and affiliation.

About the authors:

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense. He is currently teaching in De La Salle University Philippines while in the government and formerly taught at Lyceum of the Philippines as part-time lecturer. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). He is an alumnus of National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), ASEAN Law Academy Advanced Program in Center for International Law, National University Singapore and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland. He is also a Juris Doctor student and specializing in geopolitics, SCS/WPS disputes, international law, strategic intelligence, public policy, and AI impacts.
Latrell Andre C. Manguera is an International Development Studies major in De La Salle University, and forerunner of organizational plans & programs in the IDS Council and Christian church (Christ Commission Fellowship / CCF). He is specializing in international relations, sustainable development, and pragmatism in contemporary politics.
Chelsy Dianne Giban is a Political Science major in in De La Salle University, University Student Government Asst. Secretary (Internal), and specializing in cyber-politics, gender and development, public policy, and the emerging sports politics.
Fordy Tic-ing Ancajas is Political Science major in De La Salle University, Deputy Executive Secretary in University Student Government (7th Congress), international law debater, and specializing in Southeast Asian politics, indigenous people’s rights, and human rights.
Keith Justine Michael G. Banda is Political Science major in in De La Salle University specializing in political dynamics and American & European political economy.

[1]DFA Statement on One China Policy, DFA, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/37090-dfa-statement-on-one-china-policy

[2]Senate Public Relations and Information Bureau, https://web.senate.gov.ph/photo_release/2025/0828_01.asp

[3] Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro said they have several mechanisms to address the harassment such as the bilateral consultative mechanism, but Committee Chairman Senator Imee Marcos pointed out that the protests do not seem to work. (ABS-CBN, August 28, 2025)

[4] The one-China principle is clear cut. There is but one China in the world. Taiwan is part of China. The Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. UNGA Resolution 2758 fully reflects and reaffirms the one-China principle. On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 with an overwhelming majority. It states in black and white that the General Assembly “decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.” (Embassy of the Republic of China in the Philippines, October 8, 2024)

[5] In other words, a good and sedate relationship with China. This is because our stance on “One-China Policy” can be a tool to navigate the dynamics about the ongoing territorial dispute over the West Philippine Sea. Though recently, the Marcos Administration’s actions leaned towards the west, it is still critical to maintain a good relationship with our neighboring country.

This might be a hard pill to swallow that the Philippines is weaker in terms of economy and military compared to what China has, and any misunderstanding of China could lead to unpleasant outcomes as far as the Philippines is concerned. Therefore, the adherence of the Philippines to “One-China Policy” is pivotal in achieving its national interest which is to protect and preserve our territory free from international violence.

[6] For example, Philippines to keep the people-to-people exchanges between China and Taiwan going. Even though the government-to-government relations are on hold, we should still encourage cultural, educational, and tourist exchanges whenever we can. These interactions help us get to know each other better and build a solid foundation of understanding. That could be helpful if we ever need to talk about anything important in the future.

[7] That is why there is big deal on the enhancement of maritime, aerial, and surveillance assets so that the country can effectively deter threats in the West Philippine Sea. The country must use its alliances with like-minded partners responsibly while maintaining a diplomatic equilibrium with China, to keep national security in focus as it tactically seek other ways to deter strategic threats.

[8] He has participated in various NADI Track II dialogues. His articles have appeared in Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, Global Politics and Social Science Research Network.

Jumel Gabilan Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He has completed the Executive Course in National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines and has participated in NADI Track II discussions in Singapore (an ASEAN-led security forum on terrorism). His articles have appeared in Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, and Global Politics and Social Science Research Network. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense. He is currently teaching lectures in De La Salle University Philippines while in the government and formerly taught at Lyceum of the Philippines as part-time lecturer. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). He is an alumnus of ASEAN Law Academy Advanced Program in Center for International Law, National University Singapore and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland. He is also a Juris Doctor student.

The US Foreign Policy Debacle In The Philippines – Analysis



Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

Photo courtesy of the Presidential Communications Office

February 18, 2020 By Mark J. Valencia

The decision by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte to terminate its Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with its U.S. ally has elicited a cacophony of wailing and gnashing of teeth in the US foreign policy community. This initial reaction may soon be followed by recriminations regarding “who lost the Philippines’. But Duterte’s move to officially distance the Philippines from the US militarily was long in coming and should have been foreseen. Indeed, this particular US foreign policy failure is the inevitable result of blinkered diplomatic ignorance and arrogance.

The context is important. The US military has had a presence in the Philippines at least since the transfer of colonial rule from Spain in 1898. The Philippines was an American colony from 1898 to its independence in 1946. Since 1951 the Philippines and the U.S. have had a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) which under certain conditions provides that each would support the other if one were attacked by a third party. Under this arrangement the U.S. had large bases in the Philippines of strategic importance to its continued regional dominance– Subic naval base and Clark air force base. But many Filipinos considered them evidence of US imperialism and wanted them closed. https://quizlet.com/64789103/wh-chapter-342-the-colonies-become-new-nations-section-2-southeast-asian-nations-gain-independence-flash-cards/

In 1992, the Philippines evicted the troops. In 1999 the VFA was negotiated to provide the framework for deployment of US forces in the country. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visiting_Forces_Agreement_(Philippines_%E2%80%93_United_States) In 2016, a supplement to the VFA was negotiated –the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement–to allow the U.S. to rotate troops into the Philippines and to build and operate facilities on Philippine bases. It has been slow in its implementation and anyway the abrogation of the VFA may make it moot.

The reactions of US Asia policy wonks to this current development ranges from panicky predictions of a serious blow to the U.S. hub and spoke alliance system in Asia- as well as its war against terror https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/shunning-the-us-who-will-the-philippines-turn-to-next-33725 – to ‘don’t worry, this – and the Duterte administration – will pass. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/lets-keep-our-nerve-us-philippines-relations

Brad Glosserman writing in the Japan Times asserts that the 1999 VFA is essential to the implementation of the MDT. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/02/12/commentary/japan-commentary/duterte-poised-shake-regional-security-order/#.XkdQtShKiAQ This was corroborated by Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. who indicated that ‘without the VFA, the MDT would be “hollow” and the EDCA “practically useless”. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/185263/us-wrong-move-to-end-vfa-amid-china-buildup

Derek Grossman of Rand thinks the collapse of the alliance would send the “message to Washington’s remaining allies and partners that you simply shouldn’t trust that the US will defend or assist you against China. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3050833/ending-philippines-us-military-pact-will-affect-south-china-sea


James Holmes of the Naval War College thinks terminating the VFA “could ripple throughout Southeast Asia to the detriment of _ _ US maritime strategy toward China”. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-philippines-alliance-dying-123841 But he also thinks both sides are bluffing and that they need each other enough that a deal will be struck.

When the possibility of a downturn in US-Philippines military relations first arose, Satu Limaye, the director of the East-West Center in Washington did not think the alliance was in danger of unraveling. He dismissed the possibility saying “US-Philippines relations have weathered far worse than the current tempest.” https://www.philstar.com/other-sections/news-feature/2019/03/01/1897753/commentary-renegotiated-mutual-defense-treaty-neither-simple-nor-panacea-bilateral-ties#jFfgBvXZhzk6vrsV.99

Nevertheless some in the US government are worried. According to Mark Esper the Secretary of Defense “I do think it would be a move in the wrong direction as we both_ _are trying to say to the Chinese: ‘You must obey the international rules of order.”
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/185263/us-wrong-move-to-end-vfa-amid-china-buildup#ixzz6DzoSL9wZ

Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Phil Davidson fears that ending the defence relationship would undermine the counter terrorism campaign in the Philippines south. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3050435/china-threatens-pacific-stability-us-commander-warns-citing The US embassy in Manila said that the withdrawal is “a serious step with significant implications.” https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-02-11/philippines-notifies-us-of-intent-to-end-major-security-pact

On the other hand, US President Donald Trump’s response was to welcome it. He said nonchalantly “I don’t really mind if they would like to do that, it will save a lot of money.” https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/02/12/world/asia/12reuters-philippines-usa-defense-trump.html But Amy Searight, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for South and Southeast Asia said “Trumps’ willingness to let it end certainly hurts US credibility”.

Supposedly, the proximate cause of Duterte making good on his standing threat to disengage militarily from the U.S. was the US denial of a visa for his ex police chief because he had been in charge of Duterte’s war against drugs. But if so, this was just the straw that broke the camel’s back. This foreign policy disaster was long in the making and involved generations of US foreign policy makers and ‘experts’. Not only did they just not ‘get it’–that is, the underlying cause and depth of Duterte’s personal angst– but they failed to recognize that the roots of the problem were — American cultural hubris and diplomatic heavy handedness. They all blindly –and some even enthusiastically– supported and implemented the US policy of advancing US interests as if they all were the same as those of the Filipino people. They are not and never were.

As a recent example of this misconception, in response to some of Duterte’s early anti-US rhetoric, then US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Denial Russel said “there’s lots of noise, a lot of stray voltage coming from Manila. We’ve been through a lot worse in our 70-year history”. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/10/30/commentary/world-commentary/behind-manilas-pivot-china/#.XkdTRyhKiAQ

He added that “the benefits the Philippines gets from U.S. assistance and protection under the1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the strong public support in that country for America “make it improbable any Philippine leader would distance himself from the United States.”

People and cultures have long memories especially when they have been badly treated by another nation. American colonialism in the Philippines tried to Americanize Filipino culture. To America, Filipinos were “our little brown brothers”. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_brown_brother The legacy of American colonialism is still very apparent in the Philippines. Its Constitution’s recognizes English as an official language and its education system is modeled on and oriented toward the U.S. Particularly galling is the continuing condescending treatment of Filipinos and especially Filipinas by the US military and American ‘tourists’ as well as by the U.S. diplomatic approach. There is a dormant volcano of resentment that has built up over decades of Americans taking advantage of Filipino warmth and tolerance. It last erupted against the VFA in 2009 when—against a Philippines court’s orders– the US Embassy harbored a US Marine convicted of rape until his conviction was controversially overturned. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subic_rape_case

Duterte’s attitude towards America may be based in part on personal experience. As a college student he was supposedly denied a visa to visit the U.S. In May 2002 when he was mayor of Davao, the U.S. embarrassed him by facilitating the surreptitious departure of an American charged with causing an explosion in a hotel there. Duterte did not forget what he considered this arrogance and deceit. In 2013, he refused an American request to base drones at Davao’s old airport.

When Duterte was elected, the U.S. began to reap what it had sowed. His then Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay Jr. explained the view of the current leadership thus “The United States held on to invisible chains that reined us in towards dependence and submission as little brown brothers not capable of true independence and freedom.” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-obama.html

As Duterte has put it, he is the democratically elected “President of a sovereign state and we have long-ceased to be a colony.” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/world/asia/philippines-duterte-obama.html The current approach of the U.S. towards the Philippines has rekindled this anti-American angst.

Duterte remains hugely popular with his people—he has an 87% approval rating. scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3050972/has-rodrigo-duterte-squandered-his-one-chance-transform. Whatever happens now, he has stood up to the U.S. and it will be very difficult if not impossible to put the genie of nationalism back in the bottle. He believes he is freeing his country and people from the ideological and political shackles of America’s neocolonialism.

But there are also solid contemporary reasons why Duterte is doing what he is doing. He thinks American power in the region is waning and that China’s is rising. He is unsure if America will back up the Philippines in a conflict with China. He also believes that the Philippines will have to live with and get along with China for the long term. Becoming more neutral militarily is more compatible with this view.

What Duterte is doing is risky. He may only be switching one hegemon for another. Or he may wind up losing both as friends and supporters.

Worse there is the possibility of a US-supported military coup. Any such US involvement in regime change would only compound this foreign policy disaster. It would just restart the cycle of resistance and rebellion against the U.S. and its supporters and ultimately splinter the country to the advantage of global Muslim jihadist movements—and to China because it will neutralize an American asset.

The political context in the region and the Philippines has changed dramatically and the U.S. must adjust to it. The only way to rebuild the integrity and robustness of the US-Philippines alliance is for the U.S. to shed its neocolonial approach and focus on truly common interests – as defined by—not for– the Philippines.

A much shorter version of this piece appeared in the South China Morning Post https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3050861/us-policy-failure-philippines-has-deep-roots-decades-american



Mark J. Valencia, is an internationally known maritime policy analyst, political commentator and consultant focused on Asia. He is the author or editor of some 15 books and more than 100 peer-reviewed journal articles and Adjunct Senior Scholar, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China


Ending Philippines-US military pact will affect South China Sea disputes: analysts

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte wants to end the agreement governing US forces in the Philippines and US leader Donald Trump doesn’t mind

Experts say it will have an impact on calculations by Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea dispute and be a ‘huge win for China’

Meaghan Tobin Published16 Feb, 2020

The Visiting Forces Agreement is a key part of one of 

Southeast Asia’s major security partnerships. Photo: DPA

After years of threatening to abandon the Philippines’ military alliance with the United States, President Rodrigo Duterte  last week confirmed plans to terminate the agreement governing the presence of American troops, a key part of one of Southeast Asia’s major security partnerships.

The announcement was widely interpreted as an attempt by Duterte to extract concessions from Washington, which regards military cooperation with Manila as crucial to
countering Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea. US President Donald Trump, however,  told reporters he had no concerns about the treaty being scrapped.

“I really don’t mind, if they would like to do that,” Trump said on Wednesday. “We’ll save a lot of money.”

PUS resident Donald Trump with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte

 at an Asean Summit in 2017. Photo: AP

Between 2016 and 2019, the US spent US$550 million on
military assistance to the Philippines, which is also a top recipient of US aid – second only to Indonesia in Asia – receiving nearly US$280 million in 2018, according to the US aid agency.

TO BUY WEAPONS FROM THE USA AND RENT FOR THE SUBIC BASE


The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is one of three pacts governing the US-Philippines defence relationship. Experts warn that without it, the other two – a mutual defence agreement and the 2014 enhanced defence cooperation agreement, known as EDCA – will be substantially less effective. The agreements provide for training and assistance to the Philippines’ military modernisation effort as well as annual joint military exercises

US Defence Secretary Mark Esper last week described the termination of the VFA as “unfortunate” and “a move in the wrong direction”.

“We have to digest it. We have to work through the policy angles, the military angles,” Esper told reporters.

Trump has also pressured US allies Korea and Japan to pay more for their defence partnerships, and experts warn the deterioration of the partnership with Manila,
although initiated by Duterte, could undermine Washington’s status as a security guarantor in the region.

“Trump’s willingness to let the agreement end certainly hurts US credibility,” said Amy Searight, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for South and Southeast Asia who is now senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Being so dismissive of alliance relationships hurts our image in Southeast Asia.”

After Philippines scraps US defence pact, Rodrigo Duterte eyes Russian arms
13 Feb 2020

The Philippines was a US territory before independence in 1946, and the US has remained its primary defence partner. However, Duterte has regularly complained about Manila’s relationship with Washington and sought to realign his foreign policy towards Beijing and Moscow since he took office in 2016. Last month, he repeated his threat to end the pact after the US denied a visa to one of his allies,
Ronald Dela Rosa, who oversaw the controversial war on drugs while he was police chief.

Those complaints notwithstanding, Washington was a key ally in Manila’s fight against Isis-linked insurgents in 2017 after they laid siege to Marawi on Duterte’s home island of Mindanao.

Has the US already lost the battle for the South China Sea?
17 Feb 2020

The US has also been a critical ally to the Philippines in countering China’s claims in the disputed South China Sea. Before Duterte confirmed he wanted to terminate the agreement, the Philippines Foreign Secretary Tedoro Locsin Jnr told a televised Senate hearing that: “While the Philippines has the prerogative to terminate the VFA anytime, the continuance of the agreement is deemed to be more beneficial to the Philippines compared to any predicates were it to be terminated.”

Maritime expert Jay Batongbacal told the Philippines media that without the VFA, Beijing could continue building military bases in contested waters.

For Washington, the treaty’s collapse could leave it without a key outpost for force projection in the South China Sea.

Although the US has outposts in Darwin, Guam and Okinawa, its presence in the Philippines is described by the defence establishment as an “immediate footprint”in the South China Sea and a critical part of Washington’s strategy to pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific.


Trump’s comments could also call into question the mutual defence agreement with the Philippines, according to Derek Grossman, senior defence analyst at the Rand Corporation, a Washington think tank.

Trump’s willingness to let the agreement end certainly hurts US credibility Amy Searight, defence analyst

“If the mutual defence treaty collapses, it would be a huge win for China,” Grossman said. “This would send exactly the wrong message to Washington’s remaining allies and partners – that is, you simply shouldn’t trust that the US will defend or assist you against China, and it is therefore right to question the value of the American presence in the Indo-Pacific in the years to come.”

In a commentary for the Chinese state-run tabloid Global Times, Li Kaisheng, the deputy director at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of International Relations said he did not believe the scrapping of the pact would see Manila “gravitate towards Beijing” as China was only one of several countries it was pursuing closer ties with.

Instead, there would be an impact on the South China Sea, he added.

"Washington has repeatedly meddled in regional affairs through various means, such as sending its warships to conduct so-called freedom of navigation operations, and joint military exercises with other claimants, including Vietnam. Without the VFA, US interference with the South China Sea will be constrained,” Li wrote.

The US continuously deploys between 500 and 600 troops in the Philippines, according to Rand. The US presence was dramatically reduced in the early 1990s when lawmakers in Manila moved to shut down two bases in the 1990s which were at the time the largest US military outposts in the western Pacific.

Philippines Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana on Thursday said the
annual joint military exercises – called Balikatan, meaning “shoulder to shoulder” in Tagalog – planned for May would take place during the agreement’s remaining 180 days.

“Once the termination is final, we will cease to have exercises with them,” Lorenzana said.

Are Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia about to get tough on Beijing’s South China Sea claims? 17 Feb 2020

More distant relations between Washington and Manila could also lead to a
recalculation by other countries in Southeast Asia, especially those whose South China Sea claims overlap with Beijing’s.

Collin Koh, research fellow at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said Indonesia and Vietnam could seek closer military cooperation with the US.
Singapore has also been a key defence partner of the US and could expand military cooperation, Koh said.
“On the cusp of the closure of the US military bases in the Philippines in the 1990s, Singapore offered the US access to Changi naval base,” he said. “Singapore has been an ardent supporter of the US military presence in the region.”

Australia also maintains a visiting forces agreement with the Philippines and has in the past, along with Japan, taken part in the annual joint military exercises with the US and the Philippines. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Felimon Santos Junior said the nation will increase military engagements with these neighbours after the agreement with the US ends, local media reported.

On the other hand, some experts regard the back-and-forth between Trump and Duterte as typical of two leaders known for conducting foreign affairs via dramatic statements on social media, which is ultimately unlikely to result in the dissolution of one of Asia’s longest-standing military partnerships.

China’s ‘great friendship’ with Micronesia grows warmer, leaving US with strategic headache in Pacific 23 Dec 2019

Koh suggested domestic stakeholders in
Manila’s security establishment would not support Duterte scrapping the
Philippines’ military relationship with the US altogether, and that the relationship would endure.

“This defence relationship is a long-standing, proven and deeply entrenched one that has over the decades survived the ups and downs of different administrations,” Koh said. “It’s difficult to imagine the loss of the visiting forces agreement will unravel such close bilateral military ties.”

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Warning over move to end pact on Defence


Meaghan Tobin has nearly a decade of experience spanning journalism and public policy in Washington, Taipei and Beijing. For the Post, she covers geopolitics, diplomacy and policy trends in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Strategies of the Philippines, China, and the US in the South China Sea in 2025 and Future U.S. Policies on Alliances and the Indo-Pacific Region

2025 FEB24
Expert :
Lee Jaehyon / Center for Regional Studies ; 

Publication and Communications Department

The year 2024 was a violent and dangerous year as far as disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) are concerned. This pattern of disputes will continue in 2025, with potential variations. The Philippines and China will remain constants in the dispute while U.S. involvement in the dispute will have two options under Donald Trump’s leadership: continued engagement or significant disengagement. The U.S. stance on this matter is crucial, as it affects the unfolding of the SCS conflict and the regional balance of power.

Through the U.S.’s commitment to the dispute, one can gauge the second Trump administration’s alliance policy and strategy toward China, which, in turn, sheds some light on how to negotiate with the new U.S. administration and what regional countries should do to maintain peace and stability in the region. Regardless of the direction of U.S. policy toward the disputes in the SCS and the broader region, South Korea must strengthen its role in regional strategic issues and move beyond its image as a passive actor in the regional strategic theater.

To that end, Korea should invest more in maritime security cooperation with ASEAN countries, particularly the Philippines. This should be reflected in the Plan of Action (PoA) for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) with ASEAN, which will be drafted in 2025. Additionally, strategic cooperation among regional middle powers is recommended to reinforce the regional rules-based order and offset potential U.S. disengagement in the region.


The Philippines: Resistance Will Continue


There is no ground for one to believe that the Philippines will back down in the South China Sea (SCS) in 2025. In 2024, the Philippines took significant initiatives to enhance its maritime capabilities. First, the Marcos administration announced the Re-Horizon 3 initiative, a $35 billion program aimed at improving its defense capabilities. This initiative is the third and final stage of the Philippines’ recent defense modernization program, which began in 2013 and is scheduled to acquire new patrol boats, corvettes, missile systems, and radar technology, and to improve maritime domain awareness (MDA) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Alongside these upgrades, the Philippines, jointly with the United States, launched “Task Force Ayungin” in 2024 to assist ISR activities in the Spratly Islands. Additionally, in April, the Philippines signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan, and in May, a new security cooperation framework, “S-Quad” consisting of the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia, was launched.

As far as the Philippines is concerned these efforts will continue for several reasons. First, the SCS issue is fundamentally a matter of inalienable national sovereignty for the Philippines. Especially in 2024, China took offensive actions at Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal, preventing the Philippines from exercising its sovereign rights, such as resupplying the BRP Sierra Madre, a ship wrecked near Second Thomas Shoal to indicate Philippine sovereignty.

Second, domestic politics matters. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. tries to fan up his political popularity by taking an uncompromising stance on the SCS dispute. His predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte was more reconciliatory towards China in the SCS, and Marcos attempted to differentiate himself from his predecessor and to accumulate support. More importantly, he will face a political showdown in May—the midterm elections. Given the ongoing political dispute between him and Vice President Sara Duterte, the daughter of former President Duterte, Marcos has a good reason to take a firmer stance on the SCS issue as a political tactic to outmaneuver his vice president.


China: Proactive Assertiveness Will Persist


China has no appetite to temper its stance in the South China Sea (SCS), at least as long as President Xi Jinping is in power. As was the case for the Philippines, the SCS dispute is also a matter of national sovereignty for China. Xi himself has made this clear on multiple occasions. For instance, just before his visit to the UK in 2015, he stated, “The islands and reefs in the South China Sea are Chinese territory since ancient times. They are left to us by our ancestors. The Chinese people will not allow anyone to infringe on China’s sovereignty and related rights and interests in the South China Sea.” Any concession to the Philippines in the SCS under Xi’s leadership would undermine his domestic political base.

Second, China seems to view that its salami-slicing tactic works, and that time is on its side. Despite all the criticisms, there has been virtually no real and physical resistance towards China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea for over a decade since 2013. Between 2013 and 2016, China reclaimed 13 km² (3,200 acres) across 20 islands in the Paracels and seven islands in the Spratlys. Three of these—Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef—now host Chinese military facilities, including barracks, runways, aircraft hangars, and weapons systems such as anti-submarine missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and radar systems. Additionally, China has deployed Y-8 maritime patrol aircrafts and Y-9 airborne early warning aircraft to these islands.

Third, and related to the second point, those opposing China in the SCS lack effective ways to respond to its activities. China’s gray zone tactics conducted by maritime militia forces presumably backed by the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard, make it difficult for Southeast Asian navies and coast guards to respond effectively. The huge gap between China’s naval and air force capabilities and those of Southeast Asian nations further discourages successful countermeasures.

While the United States and its allies may extend helping hands to Southeast Asian countries. The US-led Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) is an example, but the operation has no concrete evidence that it contributed to stopping the Chinese activities in the SCS. Furthermore, with the notable exception of the Philippines, other Southeast Asian countries try to keep tensions low-profile or use diplomatic channels such as the Vietnam-China 3+3 meetings to manage disputes.


The United States: At a Crossroads Between Engagement and Disengagement


The South China Sea is an important battleground in the strategic competition between China, a power that wishes to include the SCS under its wing and to expand its influence beyond, and the US, a power that hopes to contain China within the continent. Nevertheless, Trump’s return to the White House introduces a major twist in this broad strategic direction and prevents an easy projection of how the US actions in the SCS dispute will unfold in 2025.

Option 1: Engaging the Philippines and the SCS Disputes

The first option for the second Trump administration is of course extending helping hands to the Philippines and maintaining strong engagement in the region, including the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. Given Trump’s long-held criticism of China, the new U.S. administration may view the issue as a way to put pressure on China. On top of this, there is said to be broad bipartisan consensus on the threats China poses to U.S. global supremacy, a concern that has persisted for quite some time. It was during Trump’s first administration that the Indo-Pacific Strategy was first announced in 2017. Also, there were more frequent Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) conducted under Trump’s first term than during the Biden administration.

If the United States under Trump extends assistance to the Philippines, it will not necessarily be because the country is strategically important or because the administration has a strong commitment to making its presence in the region felt, but rather because it is a good way to counter Chinese influence and its challenge to the US. The first Trump administration announced the “30-Year Shipbuilding Plan,” which earmarked $167 billion to increase the number of navy ships to 355, which had fallen to a lowest of 271 ships in 2015, down from 565 in 1988. Defense Secretary-designate Pete Hegseth confirmed during a congressional hearing that he would reintroduce the plan. Naval assets mean more means for the US to extend assistance to the Philippines to counter China in the SCS.

If the second Trump administration maintains assistance to the Philippines, it will keep the existing schemes and add some additional measures. However, a key question for other regional middle powers, including South Korea, is that a large portion of these additional contributions would have to come from regional countries. South Korea is likely required to continue and expand its recent military and maritime cooperation with the Philippines which will be a financial and strategic burden for the country.

Option 2: America-First Isolationist Posture or Deal-Making

The second option is pulling the US out of the region, including the SCS. Trump may not find the merit of engaging in the SCS dispute and assisting the Philippines in the SCS especially if he perceives that this contribution by the US would not repay for the benefits of his middle-class supporters. This would not necessarily mean a clear-cut, total U.S. retreat from the SCS. The US is likely to issue diplomatic rhetoric regarding the SCS and maintain a certain level of bilateral military and defense cooperation with the Philippines. However, this approach will fall short of the moves made under Biden’s leadership and will fall far short of the Philippines’ expectations. Alternatively, the US could ask the Philippines to pay the bill for extending assistance to the Philippines in the SCS by pulling economic strings attached.

As emphasized numerous times, Trump’s isolationist predisposition earns support from the domestic audience especially the economically downtrodden middle class in the Rust Belt. The U.S. global supremacy and hegemony buttressed by the maintenance of global military alliances and curbing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific theatre is, in Trump’s political calculation, hard to relate to the real benefits of the U.S. middle class. If that is the case, the Trump administration will retreat from the Southeast and SCS theatre as was the case in his first term.

Instead, the region is more likely to face trade and tariff pressures from the US rather than assistance given that some Southeast Asian nations maintain large trade surpluses with the United States.

One remaining option is deal-making. The United States has invested substantial financial and military resources in the Philippines, including $128 million in military infrastructure at U.S. bases in the Philippines (2024); $500 million annually for training, education, and asset transfer programs; The cost of bilateral military exercises such as Balikatan, Sama Sama, and Kamandag, which mobilized 15,000 U.S. troops in 2024.

Additionally, the Philippines has increased its trade surplus with the United States over the past 10 years, now reaching $10 billion. In 2021, there were more than 2 million overseas Filipino workers in the US, sending $37.2 billion back home which accounts for 2% of the Philippines’ GDP. All these can be Trump’s leverage in deal-making against the Philippines.


Options for South Korea: Turning Threats into Opportunities with Proactive Initiatives


The dispute and tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) will persist in 2025. Both the Philippines and China have no reason to change their course. The big question mark is on the US’s policy. If the Trump administration views U.S. engagement in the dispute as an effective way to curb China, then the United States will likely maintain its current posture or even increase its engagement. If Trump views U.S. engagement in the dispute does not bring real (domestic) political benefits to him, then the US is likely to scale down its assistance to the Philippines or produce a bill to offset the U.S. burden to the Philippines. In the former case, the U.S. commitment to the region, its promises to regional allies, and its Indo-Pacific strategy will continue. In the latter case, there will be a substantial shift in U.S. commitments to regional allies and its Indo-Pacific strategy which in turn have fundamental impacts on regional rules-based order and the balance of power.

In both cases, the burden on regional countries, including South Korea, will increase. If the United States maintains its commitments to the Philippines in confronting China, regional middle powers will be asked or requested to make more contributions. If the United States retreats from the region and from the SCS dispute, regional middle powers countries may need to fill the vacuum left behind by the US to sustain the region’s peace and stability, particularly in assisting the Philippines against China. Already, some regional middle powers, such as Japan and Australia, have expressed the view that regional middle powers need to consolidate strategic cooperation to support regional order should the United States pull back.

South Korea needs to double down its efforts to build strategic cooperation on the one hand with regional middle powers and on the other hand with Southeast Asian countries where South Korea has lots of economic and sociocultural stakes. South Korea should be more proactive in engaging with regional middle powers in the discussion of the future of the regional order. In 2025, South Korea and ASEAN are set to draft the Plan of Action (PoA) for the ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This document must include strong emphasis and concrete initiatives for maritime security cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN.

Finally, one big concern remains when South Korea upgrades such strategic commitment¾China. The first step should be improving bilateral relations with China, including expanding and consolidating communication channels. No mutual understanding can be reached without bilateral dialogue. In the long term, South Korea must work to change China’s perception. Korea’s new activism in the regional security issues is not to target a certain country, but to make a due contribution of Korea as a middle power for peace and stability including protecting individual country’s national sovereignty, which corresponds to China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as outlined in the concept of a “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind.” Avoiding China’s or any other major powers’ backlash is not a solution. South Korea has its own strategic position, and it must make it clear that this apply equally to all countries


This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2025-06).
(‘2025년 필리핀, 중국, 미국의 남중국해 분쟁 전략과 미국의 동맹 및 지역 정책의 향배’, https://www.asaninst.org/?p=98065)


About Experts

Lee Jaehyon
Center for Regional Studies ; Publication and Communications Department

Dr. LEE Jaehyon is a principal fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He is a member of the advisory group for the Korean Coast Guard. Dr Lee is also a Vice President of the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies. Dr Lee’s research focuses on ASEAN, Southeast Asian politics, regionalism, and non-traditional and human security issues. Recently, he has been expanding research to include Indo-Pacific and superpower rivalry in the region. His publications include “South Korea and the South China Sea: A Domestic and International Balancing Act” (2016), “What Asia Wants from the US: Voices from the Region” (2018), “Southeast Asian Perspectives of the United States and China: A SWOT Analysis” (2022). He translated “The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia” by Kurt Campbell into Korean. Dr Lee received a B.A. and M.A. from Yonsei University and his PhD in politics from Murdoch University, Australia.

THE ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES

 WWIII

Video: Third Collision Incident Between Chinese and Philippine Coast Guards

The Philippines asserts a Chinese vessel collided three or four times today with its Coast Guard cutter (PCG)

Published Aug 31, 2024 3:38 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

For the third time over the last two weeks, Chinese and Philippine forces have faced down each other’s vessels resulting in a collision and accusations from both sides. The Chinese Coast Guard vessel 5205 and the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Teresa Magbunua were involved in today’s altercations. No injuries were reported to personnel, but the Philippines released pictures of a hole in its coast guard vessel and several dents they said were caused by the deliberate actions of the Chinese vessel.

Tensions continue to be high between China and the Philippines focusing on the region around Sabina Shoal, a small rock outcrop in the Spratly Islands approximately 85 miles west of the Philippine province of Palawan. Internationally, it is recognized as in the Philippine EEZ while China also lays claim to the area rejecting international declarations.

Since April 2024, the Philippines has been maintaining a presence in the area which is east of Second Thomas Shoal which has been the previous area of contention. The Philippines asserts that China was planning on building an outpost on Sabina Shoal while the Chinese assert the Philippines does not have a right to be in the area. Last week, China filed an international protest citing approximately five months of Philippine presence in the region.

According to the reports, today’s incident began after the Philippine Coast Guard cutter Teresa Magbanua, a 320-foot cutter which is also the largest in the Philippine fleet, raised anchor and began maneuvering in the disputed region. The vessel has been anchored in the area since April. The Chinese Coast Guard detected the movement of the Philippine vessel and placed its vessels in the area to block the Philippines.

 

 

China issued a statement after the incident saying it had made repeated warnings to Teresa Magbanua. The Chinese said the vessel was maneuvering and acted “in an unprofessional and dangerous manner.” They assert the Philippines vessel “deliberately collided” with the Chinese Coast Guard vessel 5205.

The Philippines released a series of videos to back up its accusations that it was the Chinese who were the aggressors. In a briefing, the Philippines presented its case asserting the Chinese vessel approached Teresa Magbanua and carried out a series of dangerous maneuvers. They claim the Chinese Coast Guard was crowding the vessel resulting in the first collision. They assert the Chinese vessel 5205 turned around and reached the other side of the Philippine vessel again colliding and then maneuvered and deliberately rammed the Philippine vessel. The Philippines seems to be asserting there were three or four collisions during today’s altercation before both sides withdrew.

 

 

The incident took place at midday local time and was followed by the statements and accusations from both sides. The U.S. Ambassador quickly issued a new statement of support for the Philippines and condemned the actions of the Chinese Coast Guard vessel.

It was the third altercation in August with the Philippines also accusing the Chinese of ramming their vessel on August 19. Last week they asserted the Chinese rammed a Philippine vessel, used a siren and horn, and water cannons. The Philippines contends it was conducting humanitarian missions to bring supplies to its fishermen in the waters of Sabina Shoal. Last week, the Philippine Coast Guard vessels withdrew and the resupply was conducted days later with a helicopter.

The Philippines and China came to an agreement for the resupply of the Coast Guard vessel at Second Thomas Shoal. However, the Chinese have repeatedly demanded that the Philippines immediately withdraw BRP Teresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal. Last week, the Philippines said it has no intention of removing its vessel.

Today‘s altercation between the Chinese and the Philippines came as Japan was also protesting Chinese incursions. Japan filed a formal protest saying Chinese vessels had entered Japan’s territorial waters and that a Chinese aircraft also entered Japan’s airspace. The Chinese denied the Japanese claims saying it has no intention to violate any country’s airspace

The Philippines Disrupts China’s Scientific Research in Xianbin Jiao

by Global Times / August 31st, 2024

The video obtained by GT shows how the Philippine side dangerously disrupted and intervened in China’s scientific research in waters off China’s Xianbin Jiao in the #SouthChinaSea. Similar actions occurred when China conducted marine ecosystem research in Ren’ai Jiao.

 

Philippines as a Warring Nation

Not a day goes by in the Philippines without reports about new friction and arms sales. Elevated military spending is now undermining economic development, while fostering economic uncertainty and political volatility.

by Dan Steinbock Posted onJune 11, 2025

Last week, Philippine and US Marines demonstrated “lethal firepower in two separate live fire exercises” the Philippine Marine Corps portrayed as “defense partnership.” It went hand in hand with high-profile, high-cost military deals.

These follow Manila’s flirting with US Army Typhon missile systems. The deployment is part of US military’s strategic repositioning in the Pacific and a money-maker to the world’s largest weapons manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. In April, US also approved the potential sale of 20 F-16 fighter jets to the Philippines in a $5.6 billion deal.

The Marcos Jr government has also been busy negotiating a variety of military access deals not just with the US, but with Japan and European powers.

To defense contractors, Manila is now a prime weapons theater in Southeast Asia.

Deals heralding the showdown

In parallel, the Marcos Jr government, which is still licking its wounds after its weak performance in the recent mid-term elections, signed a $700-million contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) to acquire an additional batch of 12 FA-50PH light combat aircraft.

Days before, the government inked a $460-million deal with French shipbuilder OCEA for 40 fast patrol boats for the Philippine Coast Guard. In mid-2020, at the eve of the proxy war in Ukraine, the French OCEA also signed a $186 million deal with Ukraine to provide 20 fast patrol boats. It’s great business to France, which is today the world’s second-largest arms exporter.

Manila purchased four similar FPB-72 gun-boats already in 2018, quickly renamed as Boracay-class patrol vessels. In the past few years, these have played a key role in the Philippine-China incidents in South China Sea, thanks to Project Myoushu, a derivative of the US Naval Institute’s Maritime Counterinsurgency Project, and an initiative by a Stanford University think-tank.

Ever since President Marcos Jr agreed to a number of new rotating military bases for the US in the Philippines, Manila has become a model of militarization in the region – as verified by military spending and arms transfers.

Philippines as ASEAN’s fastest rising military spender   

The ASEAN community features 10 nations. Today, only three of them are included in the Top-40 list of military spenders: Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Unlike the first two that have fallen in rank, the Philippines is on the rise and made the list for the first time in 2025. It is right behind Iraq.

Source: SIPRI

The Philippines is investing increasingly in military spending. On per capita basis, it spends more in arms than Indonesia, which has a population of over 280 million as opposed to 115 million Filipinos.

Furthermore, the Philippines increase of military spending is on average twice as fast in comparison to Singapore and Indonesia. In the tiny city state, the share of military spending of GDP is 2.8%; and in Indonesia, 0.8%. But in the Philippines, it is 1.3% – in relative terms more than 50 percentage points higher than in Indonesia.

In the Duterte era, the Philippines was an aspiring BRIC-like economy. Today, it is an assertive military spender that is cannibalizing its economic futures.

Philippines as a major global arms importer            

The Philippines is one of the world’s largest importer of arms. In a gross mis-allocation of resources, Manila is boosting its arms imports faster than any other major ASEAN arms importer.

In the global top-40 list of the world’s largest arms importers, there are just four ASEAN countries: Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Although the tiny city-state has the largest share of global arms imports, the Philippines is second, ahead of both Indonesia and Thailand.

Source: SIPRI

In the past half a decade, these other ASEAN states have cut their arms imports by 20% (Singapore) to almost 50% (Indonesia, Thailand). They have tried to prepare for the economic headwinds that now drastically penalize global economic prospects. Unlike them, the Philippines has dramatically increased its share of global arms imports by more than 50 percentage points.

The ongoing militarization is dragging the Philippines into twisted alignments, which are undermining its foreign policy and diplomacy.

Atrocious alignments                  

Manila imports more than 80% of its arms from just three countries: South Korea (33%), Israel (27%) and the US (20%), which is also Ukraine’s main supplier (45%) and provides most arms imports to South Korea (86%) and Taiwan (98%).

The Philippines’ military suppliers are arms exporters cashing on mass atrocities. Gaza is the prime example. After 1.5 years of abject obliteration, some Western countries are stopping arming Israel. By contrast, South Korea raked in $6 million in arms exports to Israel in eight months of 2024 alone.

Despite some chill in bilateral ties, Manila has been a big client of the Israeli military exports (over 8% of Israel’s total exports), including Spyder air defense systems from Rafael, Sabra 2 light tanks from Elbit Systems, Shaldag boats from Israel Shipyards, and Hermes-type drones. As Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer, Elbit produces killer drones for Gaza, while its MPR 500 multi-purpose bombs contain 26,000 controlled fragments for “high kill probability.”

In the Philippines, Shaldag patrol gunboats are known as Nestor Acero-class. Off the coast of Gaza, they ensure nobody can escape the living hell in Gaza, while keeping aid flotillas away.

The failing economic promise

In the Philippines, self-rated poverty exceeds 55% of the population while 30% see themselves in the borderline of abject poverty. Militarization represents a massive misallocation of resources away from desperately-needed social spending.

Not so long ago, the Marcos Jr government boldly projected the country had potential for 7% economic growth in annual terms. Thanks to costly militarization, misallocated spending and the consequent political divides and volatility, the real growth rate in 2025 is likely to be slightly above 5.0%.

But when and if these weapons replace diplomacy in Southeast Asia, the worst is still ahead.

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized strategist of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (USA), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net