Is Afghanistan Once Again Becoming A Battleground For Major Powers? – OpEd

Why is Afghanistan always in trouble?

 July 6, 2024  

By Sher Khan Bazai

The sufferings of Afghanistan in the distant past and current difficulties are in large measure the product of its geographical location combined with its mines and minimal wealth, water resources, and mostly due to their constant internal conflicts. These factors have resulted in a troubled history since the beginning and produced a venerable state Afghanistan open to meddling from a range of external powers. 

Neville Teller, a graduate of Oxford University has rightly summed up Afghanistan. According to him, certain areas of the world, simply on account of their geographical location, seem destined to be perpetual trouble spots. One such unhappy country is Afghanistan. Because of its position plumb in the middle of central Asia, Afghanistan is a prize that has been fought over and won by foreign occupiers many times in its long history. Its domestic story is equally turbulent, with warring tribes battling it out over the centuries for power and control. 

Recorded history tells us that Afghans have been engaged with external enemies to protect themselves and their land for the last five thousand years. The Afghans have faced more invasions on their land than any other people in the world. Whether they were Greeks, Kushans, Mongols, Turks, white Huns, Persians, Mughals, and especially the British imperial forces in the nineteenth century after Afghans achieved unity first under the command of Mirwais Hotak, who successfully revolted against the Safavids in the city of Kandahar in 1707, and later on by the young Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. The geography of Afghanistan at that time extended up to Isfahan present-day Iran including most of present-day Pakistan and emerged on the world map as an independent nation in the early 18th century.

Geo-strategic location and importance of Afghanistan 

Afghanistan has been at the heart of networks: a roundabout, a place of meetings, civilizations, religions, cultures, and of course, armies’ traders and pilgrims. Centuries on, Afghanistan enjoys the same status as the principal connector of the North and South and the East and West.   It sits at the heart of Central Asia, at the meeting point of ancient trade routes – known together as “The Silk Road” – that goes out to all parts of Asia.

Due to its geostrategic importance, Afghanistan faced the outrage of British imperialism when the First Anglo-Afghan War was fought between them in the year 1838 to 1842. The second Anglo-Afghan War from 1878 to 1880 resulted in the division of Afghanistan for the first time in history and the Durand Line was drawn which is now the 2,640-kilometer border between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947.

The famous great game was too played on Afghan land earlier by Great Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century and reached its climax when two superpowers Former Soviet Union and America in the twentieth century fought there. 

The strategic importance of its water resources

The strategic potential of Afghanistan’s water assets are five noteworthy river basins – Kabul, Helmand, and western flowing rivers, Hari Rod and Murghab, northern flowing rivers, and Amu Darya (Oxus river) – make up the surface water assets of Afghanistan, all of which are flowing to the neighboring countries. Afghanistan is the upstream riparian to these river basins which flow into Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Together, these river basins contribute a total of 57 BCM (billion cubic meters) of water, which will make Afghanistan the epicenter of external powers to influence their internal situation and external relations.

The strategic importance of mine and mineral resources

According to Christopher Wnuk, an American geologist, “I have never seen anything like Afghanistan. It may very well have the most mineralized place on Earth. 

Further, the United States Pentagon Task Force on Business and Stability Operations dubbed the country the “Saudi Arabia of lithium”. A year later, the US Geological Survey said in a study that Afghanistan “could be considered as the world’s recognized future principal source of lithium”. By 2040, the demand for lithium could rise 40-fold as the world’s use of electric vehicles increases.

Afghanistan’s huge and largely untapped mineral wealth is also a huge attraction for international and regional players. Furthermore, the global electrification drive through the electric vehicle (EV) industry, has intensified the race between China and the US, to secure lithium, a vital component in EV batteries. Afghanistan’s estimated lithium reserves are pegged at around 2.3 million tons, making it a highly coveted prospect for countries vying for dominance in the clean energy sector. 

China’s growing presence in Afghanistan’s mining sector has generated geopolitical concerns for the US and other European countries. The United States, another major player in the EV market, views China’s involvement as a strategic threat, potentially leading to heightened competition for Afghan resources. This scenario has led both countries to influence the Taliban regime, aggravating the existing tensions and realignments of inter state relations in the region. The neighboring countries like Pakistan, Iran, and Russia have therefore been drawn into the troubled waters. The exacerbating regional tensions along with several other factors could influence the future trajectory of this geopolitical landscape in the region.

The Wakhan Corridor has great Geo-strategic and geo-economic significance for Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan. The opening of this corridor has resulted in serious implications for regional and global players involved in Afghanistan, especially India and the US on the one hand, China Pakistan Iran, and Russia on the other hand. 

Such competition of the major players to increase their presence and influence through their proxies and client states is turning Afghanistan again into a battlefield and the fallout of such a situation definitely will be on Pakistan including other neighboring countries.

Taliban-2 versus regional and international powers 

After over four decades of unrest and turmoil in the war-ravaged Afghanistan, international and regional powers, which in the past competed for influence in Afghanistan, developed minimum consensus on the future of Afghanistan when the US-led foreign forces left the region soon after the US-Taliban Doha Agreement.

The US, China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and other key stakeholders pledged that the Afghan Taliban government would get recognition only after they met some conditions, of the formation of an inclusive government, respecting human and women rights and denying use of Afghan soil by terrorist groups.

For this purpose, a lot of diplomatic activity about Afghanistan — internationally and at regional level — has been underway. After the Taliban re-entered Afghanistan all those efforts have not been fruitful to make the Taliban to remove the international concerns. 

Present situation in Afghanistan 

Though Taliban 2.0 has brought peace to Afghanistan but the country is facing socio-economic, political military, and diplomatic chaos and uncertainty. On the internal front, there is a trust deficit between the Kabul-based Taliban leadership led by Haqqani and the Taliban leadership based in Kandahar. Hardliner factions vie for a conservative and introverted model of governance of the 1990s while moderates aspire for an inclusive approach as per the expectations of the rest of the world. The control over resource-rich regions is another reason for the internal strife of the Taliban! which has provided an opportunity to the major players to intervene in the country’s internal affairs.

Therefore, the US and Pakistan blame Afghanistan that despite Taliban commitment to the Doha agreement, it has become a hotbed of terrorist organizations like (TTP), Al-Qaeda in Subcontinent (AQIS), Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K). Both claim that these terrorist outfits are posing a serious threat to Pakistan, and US interests in the region. Pakistan blames TTP for carrying out cross-border attacks into Pakistan from their safe havens in Afghanistan. 

A US State Department strategy paper released earlier this year cautioned US policymakers about the growing influence of its rivals — China, Russia, and Iran — in Afghanistan. The strategy paper advocated preserving the US interests and not letting its adversaries take a foothold in Afghanistan. This shows the growing tension between the two rivals pushing Afghanistan into another war theatre.

Recently, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United Nations, conveyed to the UN Security Council: the Taliban government in Afghanistan has failed to fulfill its promises to curb cross-border terrorism by (TTP), followed by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif in an interview with Voice of America said Islamabad could strike terror havens in Afghanistan and it would not be against international law since Kabul had been “exporting” terrorism to Pakistan and the “exporters” were being harbored there by the Taliban government.

Furthermore, soon after announcement of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam against the terrorist outfits within and out side the country, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, told Washington that “we need sophisticated small arms and communication equipment to oppose and dismantle terrorist networks.” 

On the other hand, most recently the Russian president Vladimir Putin in an interview referred to the Taliban which governs Afghanistan, as an, “ally” in fight against terrorism.

Further, the impact of India, China, and Russia on Afghanistan depends on their strategic, economic, and security objectives. The trajectory of their bilateral relationship with Afghanistan will significantly shape the geopolitical dynamics in the region leading to Afghanistan toward another battlefield for the major players in the region.

How can the grime situation in the region be addressed to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a battleground again?

One thing must be clear to everyone particularly to Pakistan that Auckland manifest never worked in the distant past nor will work in the future. Afghanistan is a sovereign state that cannot be anybody’s backyard. Pakistan being an immediate neighbour must let Afghanistan be. The Afghans can decide to befriend whomever they want. Pakistan should not dictate Afghanistan in their internal and external relations, particularly about India. In case Pakistan feels threatened by TTP, it safeguards its interests from our side of the border, not through proxies. Pakistan must tell Afghanistan clearly that it will not become a frontline state again.

Major players should be competitors rather than rivals in Afghanistan. They can harvest the dividends of Afghanistan’s geo-strategic, and geo-economic resources once all of them agree to accept the sovereignty of and non interferences in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Otherwise, as proven by the last two countries’ history, no one can take benefit of and can’t dream to serve or save their interests in the region, particularly in Afghanistan. Afghan security must be secure in an indigenous recipe to reap the benefits of economic development and regional connectivity.

Since the Taliban for the moment is now a reality in Afghanistan and no alternative is in hand, their alienation will be counterproductive, therefore, the international community, and its neighbors, particularly Pakistan should find a political settlement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Engagement with the Taliban rather than pushing them to the wall will pave the way toward amicable settlements of the ongoing controversies with them. 

On the other hand, the ball is in the Taliban court, they must address international concerns by improving human rights credentials, particularly concerning women’s rights particularly education and health and respect for and implementing the Doha agreement in its entirety. 

Take immediate practical and sincere steps to engage Afghan leadership and civil society living within and abroad for intra-Afghan dialogue to settle constitutional, political economic reforms, institution reorganization and to provide a level playing field to Afghans for their representation in the governance system. In the Afghan context- calling a true representative Grand Jirga to decide the future course of action for a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. Otherwise Taliban single-handedly will not cater to internal and external challenges and the ultimate results definitely will be plunging Afghanistan into another battlefield leading to uncertainty and destruction of the country.

Sher Khan Bazai is a retired civil servant, and a former Secretary of Education in Balochistan, Pakistan. He can be reached at skbazai@hotmail.com.

US humiliated in Afghanistan

 

By: Mohsen Pakaeen

TEHRAN, Jul. 23 (MNA) – In his message to the world’s Muslims during the time of Hajj, Imam Khamenei referred to America’s ignorance in its presence in Afghanistan.

He stating that “This ignorance led America to be humiliated in Afghanistan. After that raucous invasion 20 years ago and after having used weapons and bombs against defenseless people and civilians, it felt it had become stuck in a quagmire and eventually withdrew its forces from that country.”

This is a certain reality that America was humiliated in Afghanistan many times. The peak of this humiliation was when Joe Biden confessed that he no longer wanted to see American soldiers being killed there after twenty years of occupying Afghanistan. Being ashamed of more than 2,400 soldiers being killed and approximately 21,000 being wounded, Biden withdrew all American forces from Afghanistan in such a way that the American people witnessed the greatest failure of their country in contemporary times after the Vietnam War. Biden said, “I am now the fourth United States president to preside over an American troop presence in Afghanistan: two Republicans, two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility on to a fifth.”

The Afghans’ fight to free their country from the occupation of the arrogant NATO forces and particularly their continuous resistance to the White House occupation was another factor that led America to be humiliated.

The US deployed its army to Afghanistan like other superpowers would and left Afghanistan when its power was waning. American politicians realized quite well that the willpower of nations is much stronger than their torturers, killers, planes and missiles targeting the innocent people of Afghanistan.

America was also humiliated when they sat across from the Taliban leaders in Doha. They sat humbly before the Taliban asking them for their own soldiers’ security while they had come to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban terrorists and provide security for Afghanistan! Even though they had come to Afghanistan under the slogan of defending women’s rights, in Doha they approved of and accepted the Taliban as a supporter of women’s rights. In referring to the Islamic laws that support women’s rights, they expressed hope that the Taliban movement would fulfill its commitment to women.

America was also humiliated by the Taliban after announcing the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban accused the US of violating the Doha agreement and said, “The US has violated the Doha peace agreement by postponing the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. Based on the Doha peace agreement, American forces should have left Afghanistan by May.”

The US’s humiliation of being accused by the Taliban terrorist group of breaking their agreement will remain in the history of that country.

The US was also humiliated in its own country. The occupation of Afghanistan cost the American taxpayers two billion dollars. Now a fundamental question that remains for the American people and particularly its intellectuals is, “If Taliban was a terrorist group, which was the reason for the US and NATO forces occupation of Afghanistan for twenty years, then why did you enter into negotiations with this group and why did you agree to withdraw your military forces?” Another question raised by intellectuals is, “How is it that after spending two trillion dollars in Afghanistan, not only terrorism was not defeated, but the terrorist group ISIS entered Afghanistan too?” One Afghan official said that if the Americans had given 20 cents of each dollar (they spent in Afghanistan) to us, we would have been able to build our country and train our forces. Indeed, if America had spent that two trillion dollars on building hospitals, schools, and universities, funding development projects and fighting narcotics and the farming of narcotics, would it have withdrawn from Afghanistan “humiliated”?

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan proved that this country is no longer the superpower of the world and cannot impose its will on nations. During the twenty years of its occupation of Afghanistan, the Americans were continuously exposed to humiliation. The US’s inhumane measures, which led to the destruction of Afghanistan, and the shameless actions of their soldiers in the Afghan prisons that were in opposition to human rights, not only led to the humiliation of the White House internationally, it also incited the endless hatred of the Afghan people toward the occupiers.

The Afghan people’s resistance shattered the US’s grandeur and the same will happen in the case of the US crimes against the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, because the resistance forces in the region have found the courage to defend their rights against the aggression of the US and its allies.

In his message on the occasion of Hajj 2021, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution referred to the US’s continuing plots against regional countries. He advised that the vigilant Afghan nation remain watchful concerning America’s tools for gathering intelligence, its soft-war weapons in this country and to vigilantly fight them.

One of the soft-war weapons used by NATO and the US in Muslim countries is transforming the culture of these countries. The West plans to spread the Western lifestyle in Afghanistan by promoting the culture of liberalism. At the same time, they wish to surreptitiously, slowly, quietly alienate the Muslim people of this country from their Islamic culture. These goals have been proposed by the Foreign Ministers of Western countries in international summits under the title of creating a civil society in Afghanistan. In claiming to defend women’s rights, they imply that not wearing the Islamic covering is a factor for women’s development in Afghanistan. The strategic plan of the NATO policy makers in Afghanistan, which will continue in Afghanistan even after the withdrawal of the military forces, is to use modern communication tools for institutionalizing the cultural superiority of the West in this country. Due to their strong religious roots, the people of Afghanistan will never accept the spread of the secular culture of the West or its promiscuity and unrestraint. In this area, the religious scholars and intellectuals should enter the field to protect the Islamic culture and identity of their country.  

On the other hand, America does not want the Afghan crisis to be solved and they want the withdrawal of US forces from this country to create a new round of crisis and insecurity. Following the US withdrawal, its mission in Afghanistan is likely to be taken over by third party countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey and terrorist groups such as ISIS or the military branch of Taliban. The US forces will be replaced by intelligence services in Afghanistan and the Pentagon is interested in continuing its political presence and role as an advisor in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan should restore the national unity they had when fighting in the way of God. The government and ethnic groups, particularly the Taliban, should realize that the crisis in Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means. The best action to be taken is to declare a ceasefire and to continue internal negotiations. In this way, the legal structures may be kept and based on the people and the influence of different ethnicities and groups, a Government of National Reconciliation can be established.

This article has been first published on Khamenei.ir

MAH

News Code 176454

How Many Troops In Afghanistan?

The Afghanistan assignment, which involves 16,000 NATO-led soldiers now and a projected 25,000 by the end of the year

Forgot to to mention that did we Mr. Harper.

And that will replace the Americans who are withdrawing. As they need more troops in Iraq they will reduce troop deployments to Afghanistan while NATO takes up the slack.

Even if the US left 15, 000 troops along with the 25,000 NATO forces this would be exactly how many troops the Soviet Union initially used in 1979 when it invaded Afghanistan. However this will stil not be enough to neutralize the Taliban threat.

Afghanistan

The Soviet armed forces that invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 consisted of about 40,000 officers and men and their equipment. The fierce resistance by Afghan guerrilla forces mujahidiin, literally meaning warriors engaged in a holy war. forced the Soviets to increase the size and sophistication of their military units, and in late 1985 a United States government official estimated that Soviet units in Afghanistan comprised about 118,000 men, of which about 10,000 were reported to be in the Soviet secret police and other special units.

It is errie to read this...which is oft repeated these days in the media refering to NATO operations moving from Peacekeeping to combat.


The Soviet Army also quickly realized the inadequacy of its preparation and planning for the mission in Afghanistan. The initial mission—to guard cities and installations—was soon expanded to combat, and kept growing over time. The Soviet reservists, who comprised the majority of the troops initially sent in, were pulled into full-scale combat operations against the rebels, while the regular Afghan army was often unreliable because of the desertions and lack of discipline.
The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 57
Edited by John Prados and Svetlana Savranskaya
October 9, 2001


The irony is that the U.S. which funded the collapse of Afghanistan in order to force a Cold War defeat on the USSR now has to clean up its historic mistake. What began with Jimmy Carter was expanded by Reagan and later Bush I and II.


According to this 1998 interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the CIA's intervention in Afghanistan preceded the 1979 Soviet invasion. This decision of the Carter Administration in 1979 to intervene and destabilise Afghanistan is the root cause of Afghanistan's destruction as a nation.

The Bush White house adopted the neo-con limited engagement strategy when it invaded Afghanistan and later Iraq. With the same success that the Russians had with it in Afghanistan.

The limited contingent in Afghanistan

In 1979, however, the Soviet Army intervened in a civil war raging in Afghanistan. The Soviet Army came to back a Soviet-friendly secular government threatened by Muslim fundamentalist guerillas equipped and financed by the United States. Technically superior, the Soviets did not have enough troops to establish control over the countryside and to secure the border. This resulted from hesitancy in the Politburo, which allowed only a "limited contingent", averaging between 80,000 and 100,000 troops. Consequently, local insurgents could effectively employ hit-and-run tactics, using easy escape-routes and good supply-channels. This made the Soviet situation hopeless from the military point of view (short of using "scorched earth" tactics, which the Soviets did not practise except in World War II in their own territory). The understanding of this made the war highly unpopular within the Army. With the coming of glasnost, Soviet media started to report heavy losses, which made the war very unpopular in the USSR in general, even though actual losses remained modest, averaging 1670 per year. The war also became a sensitive issue internationally, which finally led Gorbachev to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The "Afghan Syndrome" suffered by the Army parallels the American Vietnam Syndrome trauma over their own lost war in Vietnam.

And lets not forget that it was in the Post Soviet internecine civil war period; 1990-1999 that lead the Taliben to take power. Because the Americans cut and ran, leaving the country to the Mujahedin, War Lords, and Drug Lords. Not our problem said the CIA who conducted the anti-Soviet war.

One long-term effect of the Soviet invasion and pull-out was the establishment of a weak state full of religious hatred and hatred of richer nations: a breeding ground for terrorism. Though supplying the Afghan resistance with American guns and anti-aircraft missiles seemed like a good idea for the US in the 1980s, and was the reason for the Soviets’ defeat, now as the US invades, they are met with their own guns. The significance of the sophisticated guns has yet to be determined. In light of the US involvement today in Afghanistan after the September 11th terrorist attacks, it is especially important to understand the history of the Soviet's involvement there so we can avoid making the same mistakes.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: Failure
of Intelligence or of the Policy Process?

1989–1991, after the official Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
when both the Soviets and the US nevertheless continued to support their
proxies in the Afghan conflict. The group also considered the consequences
of American policy decisions to withdraw from engagement in Afghanistan;
consequences which not only gave free license to years of internal Afghan
turmoil, but profoundly impacted US strategic and security interests as well.



And it makes for a great movie too. Not like all these 9/11 Memorial TV and Movie shows but the real reason for 9/11; the CIA failure in Afghanistan. All else is conspiracy theories. Osama bin Laden could not have attacked America if America had not destabilized Afghanistan in the first place. And five years after ousting the Taliban we are still no better off.

Also See:

9/11

CIA

Afghanistan






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FROM THE ARCHIVES; WHO WON

Slowly but surely, China is moving into Afghanistan



RUPERT STONE

2013

As the war in Afghanistan winds down, China looks to make Afghanistan a bigger part of its regional ambitions.

In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping inaugurated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast network of infrastructure projects spanning more than 60 countries. But the BRI largely excludes Afghanistan, moving through Central Asia and Pakistan instead.

That may now be changing. China has steadily increased its involvement in Afghanistan in recent years, and a nascent peace process offers some hope that stability might return to the country, bringing with it the possibility of greater trade and investment.

This shift is reflected in a major new report on the BRI’s expansion into Afghanistan by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), a Kabul-based think tank.

The 15-month research project has amassed a vast amount of material gleaned from multiple sources, including previously undisclosed government documents and interviews with high-ranking Afghan officials, making it by far the most comprehensive treatment of Afghanistan’s potential role in the BRI to date.

“Looking at the BRI map, it seemed that it was bypassing Afghanistan,” said Mariam Safi, Director of DROPS and one of the report’s co-authors. “So, we wanted to know if there is any thinking in the Afghan government and stakeholders here on the BRI when it comes to Afghanistan’s potential linkage”.

Afghanistan should fit well into the BRI. It has a serious infrastructure deficit, making it an ideal candidate for Chinese investment. It is also the shortest route between Central Asia and South Asia, and between China and the Middle East, while also serving as a gateway to the Arabian Sea.

But China’s role in Afghanistan in the past two decades has been limited. It did not contribute troops to the US-led war that began in 2001, and Beijing has so far refrained from the sorts of big-ticket investments planned for other neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan and Kazakhstan.

But its economic footprint has expanded. China is now Afghanistan’s largest business investor, it has pledged increasing amounts of aid to the country, and Chinese companies have been involved in construction projects.

Beijing has also shown some interest in Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources, which includes vast deposits of essential minerals such as lithium (used in mobile phone batteries).

The country’s weak logistics and security situation make it difficult to extract and transport these resources. But China has got its foot in the door, winning rights to Amu Darya Basin oil in the north and the massive Mes Aynak copper mine near Kabul.

Moreover, Beijing has taken modest steps to include Afghanistan in the BRI. In 2016 Beijing and Kabul signed a Memorandum of Understanding. China has reportedly pledged at least $100 million in funding. However, this is a tiny amount compared to the vast sums proposed for other countries, like Pakistan. And, according to Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “We still don’t see large projects going forward that quickly on the ground.”

But there has been some progress. In September 2016, for example, the first direct freight train from China reached the Afghan border town of Hairatan. An air corridor linking Kabul and the Chinese city of Urumqi has also been launched under the BRI. Then, in May 2017, Afghan officials attended the massive Belt and Road Forum in China, and in October Afghanistan joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which funds BRI projects.

Kabul has made connectivity a key pillar of its foreign policy, launching various infrastructure projects that could eventually be “brought under the BRI fold,” Mariam Safi tells TRT World.

Reluctant bedfellows

One such initiative is the Five Nations Railway running from China to Iran via Afghanistan, which is still at the feasibility study stage but aligns well with Beijing’s priorities in the Belt and Road. Another is a planned north-south railway corridor that would connect Kunduz with Torkham on the Pakistani border.

Afghanistan has bold plans to expand its almost non-existent railway network. According to internal Afghan government documents reviewed by DROPS, China has pledged “huge support” for these efforts. The north-south railway could facilitate the transport of natural resources while also connecting to Pakistan.

Furthermore, there are various energy projects which could fit well into the Belt and Road vision, such as CASA-1000 and TAP-500 that would export surplus electricity from Central Asia to energy-starved South Asia via Afghanistan, or the TAPI gas pipeline, whose Afghan segment began construction last year (although there is reason to doubt its progress).

Another project that could be included in BRI is the Digital Silk Road fibre optic cable network, funded by China, the US and other partners, which has already connected at least 25 provinces in Afghanistan while aiming to link to China, South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, according to DROPS.

China has generally eschewed a leadership role in Afghanistan, preferring to work with foreign partners. Some projects, including the Five Nations Railway and Lapis Lazuli Corridor, are jointly financed by China and multilateral lending institutions such as the ADB.

“There has been a lot of cooperative activity on the ground,” Raffaello Pantucci told TRT World, and Beijing seems to view Afghanistan as a place where it can “test out” difficult relationships. China has collaborated with the US there, despite tensions between the two countries, and recently agreed to cooperate with its rival, India.

Sino-Indian efforts in Afghanistan face a hurdle, though, in the form of Beijing’s close relationship with Delhi’s nemesis, Pakistan. 2015 saw the inauguration of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a vast energy and infrastructure project involving more than $60 billion of potential investment. CPEC was intended to be the Belt and Road’s “flagship” corridor, and, as such, it is already more advanced than other components of the BRI.

According to the report, CPEC is “one of the most feasible options” for integrating Afghanistan into the BRI. There are some cross-border rail and road links at varying stages of development. While none of these is near completion, China clearly wants to move forward.

In 2017 Beijing convened a trilateral dialogue with Pakistan and Afghanistan partly to discuss extending CPEC, but also to ameliorate the rocky relationship between its two neighbours, which has seen border closures and skirmishes. These efforts paid off, as Afghan-Pakistani relations improved in 2018, with a new cooperation agreement in May.

Afghan officials interviewed by DROPS were generally “positive” about CPEC, the report says, but some were wary of excessive dependence on Pakistan. Indeed, as relations with Islamabad soured in recent years, Kabul has diversified its trade away from Pakistan to Iran.

However, the officials were clear “across the board” that Afghanistan still needs Pakistan because it provides the quickest route to the sea, according to Mariam Safi. And, vice versa, Pakistan hopes that Afghanistan may eventually provide access to Central Asian markets.

“At the end of the day there was the realisation that both countries need each other,” Safi told TRT World.

Neither the Afghan nor Pakistani governments responded to requests for comment.

Increasing Chinese footprint

While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has increased, its security presence has grown even more. As the US started withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in 2011, the country became increasingly unstable, raising the risk that insecurity would spill out into Central Asia and Pakistan, potentially disrupting China’s Belt and Road projects there.

Beijing has also been concerned about what they call the threat posed by Uighur and other terrorists using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against the Chinese mainland. In response, China has intensified security on its border, reportedly engaging in joint patrols with Afghan forces and building a base in Badakhshan province, while also launching the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism (QCCM) with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

To counter instability in Afghanistan, China has also stepped up its involvement in peace talks to end the war. Since 2015, it has been involved in a number of multilateral initiatives, including the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and, more recently, the Moscow Format. Beijing has cultivated good ties with the Taliban, meeting them several times in 2018 alone.

Peace may now be on the horizon. The Trump administration has made unprecedented progress in its efforts to negotiate with the Taliban, reaching a provisional agreement in January. The Afghan government still needs to join the talks, however, and there is a long road ahead.

For Beijing, peace would not only reduce the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, but it could also boost Chinese economic activity.

“Afghanistan has been peripheral to the Belt and Road because it simply hasn’t been possible to pursue a serious economic agenda there,” said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics.

“If there is a political settlement, that could change – though China will still tread very carefully until it’s clear that any settlement holds.”

At the launch of the DROPS report in January, Beijing’s new ambassador to Kabul, Liu Jinsong, said that China was facilitating peace talks to enable Afghanistan’s integration into the BRI, describing the country as a “vital partner” in the initiative.

The appointment of Mr Jinsong, a former director of the Silk Road Fund, “shows that Beijing now considers Afghanistan a priority and wants to include it firmly in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” according to the Berlin-based thinktank, MERICS.

While there is still a long way to go, Beijing is entering a new phase of engagement with its neighbour. “It is certainly true that China is playing a much greater (and higher profile) role in Afghanistan,” said Peter Frankopan, professor of global history at the University of Oxford, whose latest book, The New Silk Roads, examines emerging forms of connectivity in Asia.

“My best guess is that this really is a case of a new page being turned,” Frankopan told TRT World.

The Chinese embassy in Kabul could not be reached for comment. Asked to comment on CPEC’s possible extension to Afghanistan, China’s deputy chief of mission in Islamabad, Zhao Lijian, referred TRT World to a recent interview in which he described Chinese plans to facilitate trade and ease tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The odd couple: China's deepening relationship with the Taliban


RUPERT STONE

2 AUG 2019

China's first engaged the Taliban to protect its interests in Afghanistan in the 90s. Decades later, history repeats itself.

One is a communist state wary of the threat posed by Islamic extremism, the other a group of religious hardliners with alleged links to Al Qaeda. But, despite their differences, relations between China and the Afghan Taliban go back decades and appear to be strengthening.

Beijing was initially concerned when the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The group had ties to the anti-Chinese terrorist organisation, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was to allowed to operate camps in the country. China, therefore, happily supported the first round of UN sanctions against the Taliban regime.

But, driven by a mix of security concerns and economic factors, Beijing eventually sought to improve its ties with the movement.

In the late 1990s, China came to believe that the best way to manage the potential terrorist threat from Afghanistan was to engage with the Taliban and strike a deal. Diplomatic relations would also open the potential for trade.

In 1999, Chinese officials broke the ice and flew to Kabul, where they opened economic ties and launched flights between Kabul and Urumqi. China’s ambassador in Pakistan sought a meeting with Mullah Omar. A group of Chinese think tank analysts travelled to Kandahar to make preparations.

According to Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, the Chinese ambassador was the only foreign diplomat to maintain good relations with their mission in Islamabad at this time. Indeed, Zaeef’s comments about China in his memoir are far less vitriolic than his frequent denunciations of long-time backer Pakistan, which detained Zaeef after 9/11.

The Chinese envoy eventually met Mullah Omar in Kandahar in late 2000. Beijing wanted the Taliban to stop harbouring ethnic Uyghur militants allegedly operating in Afghanistan with ETIM. In return, the Taliban hoped that China would recognise their government and oppose further UN sanctions.

But this deal did not materialise. While Omar did restrain ETIM, he did not expel them. And Beijing did not oppose new UN sanctions against the Taliban; it only abstained.

However, Chinese companies expanded their activities in Afghanistan, and, on September 11, 2001, the two sides signed an MoU to enhance economic ties further.

After 9/11 Beijing gave its backing to Washington’s ‘war on terror’ and supported Hamid Karzai’s new government in Kabul. However, it did not commit troops to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, and its economic footprint remained small. China was wary of a long-term American military presence in its backyard.

Beijing, therefore, hedged, supporting the Afghan government while maintaining informal contacts with the Taliban. It may have used the Chinese-run Saindak mine in Pakistan for clandestine meetings with the group, according to Andrew Small in The China-Pakistan Axis.

China and Pakistan were the only states to maintain their ties with the Taliban after 9/11.

The group may even have received Chinese weapons, according to Small, and there were also suspicions that the Taliban intentionally avoided attacking Chinese infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. The copper mine at Aynak, near Kabul, had been untouched by the Haqqani Network since China secured extraction rights in 2007.

Hedge your bets

China’s ambivalent foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan is analogous to its approach in the Middle East, where it also courts opposing sides in regional disputes. As Jonathan Fulton has shown, Beijing has relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and maintains partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, a strategy Fulton describes as “fence-sitting”.

For the first decade of the US war in Afghanistan, China’s involvement with the country was minimal. Economic opportunities were dogged by corruption, insecurity and political instability. However, when the Obama administration announced its intention to withdraw US forces by 2014, Beijing grew concerned by the prospect of instability on its border.

The risk of terrorist violence haemorrhaging out of Afghanistan encouraged China to engage more deeply with its neighbour. Chinese diplomats became involved in several multilateral initiatives to seek a political settlement with the Taliban, first at Murree in 2015, then via the Quadrilateral Coordination Group with the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

China was part of the Kabul Process convened by President Ghani in 2017 and sent its diplomats to attend talks with the Taliban and other Afghan politicians in Moscow in 2018. That year President Xi Jinping resuscitated the Afghanistan Contact Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which met again this summer.

There have also been multiple bilateral meetings between Chinese officials and the Taliban in recent years. These discussions were secret and unconfirmed by the Chinese government. But, in June, Beijing publicly announced that it had received a Taliban delegation led by deputy Mullah Baradar (who served eight years in prison in Pakistan before his release in 2018).

China participated in two trilateral events with Russia and the US this year, and in 2017 convened another trilateral forum with long-time foes, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to promote ongoing reconciliation efforts and discuss the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.

Beijing is concerned that an unstable Afghanistan could provide a safe haven for Uyghur militants, including those currently fighting in Syria. And China is more exposed now due to its massive infrastructure projects in Pakistan and Central Asia, areas especially vulnerable to terrorist spillover from Afghanistan.

Moreover, China’s economic role in Afghanistan has been growing. It is now the country’s biggest foreign investor and appears keen to extend the Belt and Road Initiative there. True, Beijing’s investments in Afghanistan pale in comparison to those in Pakistan, for example, but an end to the war could pave the way for deeper involvement.

A hard bargain

China is well-placed to act as a mediator in Afghanistan. It has decent relations with both sides in the conflict. It is perhaps even better placed to influence the Taliban than Pakistan, which has harassed and detained members of the group since 9/11. Moreover, it has substantial economic incentives to offer.

The Taliban are keen to avoid the isolation they experienced in the 1990s when only three governments (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) recognised their regime. Furthermore, they are alert to the need for foreign investment. They have discussed infrastructure with the Uzbek government, for example, and gave their backing to the TAPI gas pipeline project.

But the Taliban’s interest in exploiting the country’s natural resources goes well beyond gas. The group also profits from the mining of Afghanistan’s vast mineral deposits.

“The Taliban has realised that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth offers opportunities to get rich,” writes Peter Frankopan in his new book, The New Silk Roads.

During a trip to Beijing, Taliban delegates were “visibly moved by technology that they told their hosts was inconceivable in Afghanistan because of war,” the New York Times reported. And economic issues were again discussed on the group’s recent visit to China, according to Rahimullah Yusufzai.

Caution is warranted, though. Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban could fail as it did in the 1990s. Then, as now, the group gave assurances that it would not allow terror groups to use Afghan soil for plots against foreign countries. Then, as now, it wanted better trade with the outside world and an end to international isolation.

That all came crashing down in the carnage of 9/11. If the US leaves Afghanistan without a proper deal, history could repeat itself.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World

AUTHOR
Rupert Stone
@RupertStone83
Rupert Stone is an Istanbul-based freelance journalist working on South Asia and the Middle East.