Showing posts sorted by relevance for query WAR ON THE SUFI. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query WAR ON THE SUFI. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, June 15, 2022

ISIS WAR ON SUFIS
Afghanistan’s Sufis Are Under Attack

Recent bombing of a mosque in Kabul shows the growing security problems facing the Taliban government
Afghan followers of Sufism recite poetic verses from the Koran at the Pahlawan Mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan / Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images

As I passed through my final years of high school in Kabul, it did not cross my mind that I might be able to go on and study at university. My father had just died from a long illness and, like so many Afghan teenagers, I was already thinking about how I might be able to support my family. We were poor enough that I had only one set of shirt and trousers to wear to my last two years of classes, so I knew I would have to find a job sooner rather than later.

I graduated from school in 2006 and, although times were tough on a personal level, there was a sense of optimism in much of the country back then. It’s true that security was starting to deteriorate, but memories of the 1990s civil war were still fresh in everyone’s minds, and there was a widespread belief that the international community would not abandon Afghanistan again.

After trying and failing to find a job with various NGOs for reasons none of them cared to explain, I was persuaded by one of my younger brothers to visit a local Sufi — “tasawwuf” — mosque in the hope that it might change my luck. I must admit that I initially laughed at his suggestion, not because I disliked Sufis but because I was skeptical of any practices that went against my belief in the more traditional tenets of Islam. I regard myself as a socially progressive Muslim who shows his devotion to God in conventional ways. I could not see how a visit to this particular mosque might be any better for me than praying in my usual mosque or at home. In the end, however, I agreed to go there to boost the morale of my brother and mother.

We cycled to the Khalifa Sahib mosque in Aladdin, a neighborhood in west Kabul near Parliament and the American University, and sat down to talk to one of its scholarly custodians. I remember him being a kind man who listened quietly from under his flat white turban as I explained about my futile search for a job. He then took out some paper talismans and told my brother to burn or smoke one at night. Another one he gave us was to be put in a glass of water, dissolved and drunk the next morning.

We obeyed his instructions and, while my luck didn’t change in the short term, it did eventually. I later found work as a journalist and graduated with a degree in Islamic law from Kabul University. I do not attribute this change in fortune to the Sufi mosque, but I have always looked back on that visit with fondness. I was a young man — a boy, really — going through a hard time, and it meant a lot to me to receive the kindness of a stranger, however eccentric his advice might have been.

Unfortunately, this memory of a more innocent time has taken on a melancholy hue in recent weeks. On April 29 an explosion ripped through that same Sufi mosque after Friday prayers. At least 10 people, and perhaps more than 50, were killed. There is confusion about whether the blast was a suicide attack or the result of a bomb planted at the scene, but it was not an isolated incident. A week earlier, on April 22, the Mawlawi Sekander Sufi mosque in the northern city of Kunduz was hit by a similar attack that killed at least 33 people and wounded dozens more. The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for that blast and is also believed to have been behind the bloodshed in Kabul. With Shia Muslims as well as Sufis being increasingly targeted, it is clear that attempts are underway to ignite a sectarian war in Afghanistan. History suggests this will not work, but nothing is certain anymore.

Sufism has roots in this country that are far older than the kind of ideology practiced by the Islamic State. While Afghans are often wary of its more esoteric aspects — such as the way worshipers engage in “dhikr” (chanting) to show their devotion to God — its mysticism has traditionally been a source of comfort for many people here. The sick visit Sufi shrines in search of cures for cancer or depression; infertile women go to them looking for the miracle they need to have a child. This has started to change in recent years and of course it would be better if everyone trusted in science, but it seems churlish to rebuke Afghans for finding hope wherever they can. During times of darkness we occasionally need artificial light.

Sufism is not a sect or a type of jurisprudence but a form of Islamic belief that emphasizes the mystical, peaceful aspects of our religion and prioritizes inner contemplation. As far as the Islamic State is concerned, this is enough to make Sufis idolators. But attacks such as the one on April 29 in Kabul are attacks on the heritage and culture of all Afghans. We do not have to be Sufis to understand and appreciate the role that Sufism has played in our history.

There are four main Sufi orders in Afghanistan and the wider region: the Chishti, the Qadiriyya, the Suhrawardiyya and the Naqshbandi. The Chishti originated near Herat in western Afghanistan, and some of our greatest poets were Sufis. The most famous of them, Jalaluddin Rumi, was born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan in the early 13th century. The United Nations cultural agency (UNESCO) celebrated his work in 2007, the same year I went to the Sufi mosque in Kabul. The U.N. secretary-general at the time, Ban Ki-moon, described Rumi’s work as “timeless” and praised his “humanist philosophy.” We Afghans also claim Abdur Rahman Baba, a 15th- and 16th-century Sufi poet from Peshawar, as one of our own and continue to draw inspiration from his writing.

Afghan Sufis fought against the Soviet occupation of our country in the 1980s, just like more hardline jihadists. Three of the seven Sunni mujahedeen parties during that time were led by Sufis. They may not have been as militarily effective as their rivals, but their followers still made enormous sacrifices in the name of defending Afghanistan and Islam.

Although the Taliban’s relationship with the Sufi community is complex, it is certainly not openly hostile. Afghan Sufi scholars have been vocal in their support for the current government and often refer to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the minister of interior, using the honorific “Khalifa” — a title traditionally given to Sufi disciples who reach scholarly levels of enlightenment. The respect seems both genuine and mutual, and it is arguably a good example of the compromises we Afghans need to make if we want our country to move forward. The shamans who always used to roam around Kabul collecting alms are no longer visible on the streets and seem to have been discouraged from carrying out their rituals in public since the Taliban’s takeover, but that is the only sign I have noticed of the Islamic Emirate possibly acting against Sufism.

This cordial relationship between the government and the Sufi community may be only a small cause for optimism, but it is worth noting. Given the increased activity of the Islamic State of late and the criticisms that have rightly been leveled at some of the Taliban’s more repressive social policies, we need to recognize that there is still some cause for hope. Whether this can be built on may well depend on whether security gets significantly worse.

A month after the attack on the Sufi mosque in Kabul, the Taliban marked the sixth anniversary of the death of their former leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in 2016. To honor his memory, several senior officials attended a commemorative event on May 22 in a wedding hall in Kabul, the kind of place that would once have been the scene of raucous late-night parties. Although the atmosphere was measured, the meeting was revolutionary in its own way. The former head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha and current deputy foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, used the occasion to call for girls’ schools to be reopened and for women’s rights to be respected. Even that meeting, however, was not allowed to pass peacefully. An explosion hit several vehicles parked outside, causing unknown numbers of casualties. This time a group calling itself the National Liberation Front claimed responsibility. Exactly who they are and what they want is unclear.

These kinds of mysterious attacks took place regularly under the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and the Taliban will be keen to ensure they do not get out of hand. This spring we have often been without electricity in Kabul because the pylons in the north of the country that supply the city are being routinely targeted in sabotage operations. On the streets here no one is quite sure whether to blame rebel groups linked to the old Northern Alliance or hostile states — or, perhaps, both. Even as I write these lines at home now, I have just heard an explosion in the near distance. I will wait for the sound of ambulance sirens or a call from a friend or relative to find out if anyone was hurt.


Fazelminallah Qazizai is the Afghanistan correspondent at New Lines
June 1, 2022
“Letter from Kabul” is a newsletter in which our contributors provide their own unique glimpses into life on the ground in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan

SEE



Friday, December 06, 2024

Kurds' dream of self-rule under threat as Turkish-backed forces sweep across Syria


Analysis


Islamist rebels and armed groups backed by Ankara swept across Syria this past week, seizing Aleppo and putting President Bashar al-Assad’s soldiers to flight. Having achieved a hard-won autonomy in the turmoil of the Syrian Civil War, the country’s Kurds now find themselves once again cornered between the Damascus regime, Islamist insurgents and Turkish-backed troops eager to put an end to Kurdish self-rule.



Issued on: 05/12/2024 
By: Paul MILLAR
A Syrian Kurdish woman, fleeing from north of Aleppo, stands leaning on a bullet-riddled wall upon arriving in Tabqa, on the western outskirts of Raqa, on December 4, 2024. © Delil Souleiman, AFP


As Israel and Hezbollah settled into an uneasy ceasefire last week, armed Islamist opposition forces stormed out of Syria’s northwest, seizing the nation’s second city Aleppo over the weekend before advancing south on the road to Damascus.

While the forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an offshoot of al Qaeda’s former Syria branch Jabhat al-Nusra – surged inwards from Idlib, another assault came pouring down from the northern borderlands with Turkey. These groups – backed by Ankara and calling themselves the Syrian National Army – began to seize territory northeast of Aleppo, including the town of Tal Rifaat and surrounding villages on December 1.

But Tal Rifaat was not being held by Assad’s loyalists. Instead, the Syrian National Army has once again set its sights on territory held by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the iron core of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a key Western ally in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) group.

The fighting has been fierce. Already, tens of thousands of Kurds have begun the long winter march east across the Euphrates River, where the Kurdish-led SDF still holds sway. In Aleppo, where SDF troops have held the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud throughout the civil war, the triumphant HTS negotiated the Kurdish troops' withdrawal from the city, weapons still in hand. Hours after Aleppo fell, footage emerged of convoys of Kurdish fighters filing out of the city under the watchful gaze of HTS troops.

Worse may await them beyond the city limits. Having seized a hard-won autonomy in the early days of the Syrian Civil War, the country’s Kurds have for the past few years come under heavy assault by Turkey and the Syrian armed groups that it backs. Ankara views the autonomous Kurdish regions in Syria as a creation and extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a group that has for years fought for Kurdish self-rule and is banned in Turkey as a terrorist organisation.

Now, with Assad's global allies exhausted by wars of attrition in Ukraine and Lebanon, Ankara seems once again set on strangling the Kurdish dream of self-governance in the crib.

Surrender or die


Fawaz Gerges, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, said that the militants' lightning assault could cost the Kurds dearly.

“The Kurds stand to lose the most,” he said. “Their very autonomy, the security of their communities. I think Turkey has been biding its time and waiting for the right moment to strike, and the pro-Turkish opposition forces have really launched a shock attack, not only against the Assad government, but even against the Kurds. In Aleppo, the Kurds were told either to surrender or to die – and they decided to surrender.”

While HTS appears to be trying to avoid direct clashes with Kurdish forces, Kurdish civilians now living under the banners of the SNA have reported having their homes seized by Turkish-backed troops. As many as half a million Kurds are believed to live in Aleppo and surrounding towns and villages west of the Euphrates. Just what their lives are likely to be like under the new dispensation remains a question that few are keen to learn the answer to.

Dara Salam, a teaching fellow at SOAS University of London's department of politics and international studies, said that Kurdish communities in Syria's northwest were now once again at the mercy of Ankara's ambitions.

“The sole aim of Turkey-backed SNA is to implement Turkey's Syria policy, that is, destroying the Kurdish entity and having the upper hand over Assad's regime in Syria,” he said. “As the conflict in the past days unravels, Kurds once again face displacement, massacres and persecution at the hands of these jihadi-Islamist groups in many places like Aleppo, Tal Rifaat and Shahba.”

For years now, that policy has been put into increasingly bloody practice. In 2018, Turkish air strikes heralded the seizure of Afrin, the western-most canton of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria – more commonly known as Rojava. The occupying SNA has been accused of leading campaigns of mass violence against the Kurdish civilian population.

Dastan Jasim, a research fellow at the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, said Syria's Kurds had good reason to be fearful given what she described as years of abuses against Kurdish communities in parts of the country's northwest held by the SNA and Islamist opposition groups.

"The only basis on which Kurds can judge that question is their own experience," she said. "We’re heading towards six years of occupation of Afrin, for example, and Kurdish life in Afrin is a living hell – it’s basically impossible. Sexual violence is rampant, there have been kidnappings of people – just ordinary Kurdish people that are accused out of the blue of being PKK sympathisers are being abducted and killed."
‘In the eye of the storm’

Jasim said that the country's Kurdish communities had long struggled to find a place within the broader array of opposition forces that rose up against Assad more than a decade ago.

“In 2011 when the opposition came up, let’s remember that especially in Aleppo the Kurdish neighbourhoods were very active when it was about protesting against Assad,” she said. “People were obviously not happy with the situation – there have been many Kurdish uprisings that were attacked very violently. But at the same time, the Kurds saw there was no space for them, there was no space for a discussion of Kurdish autonomy, Kurdish self-rule. A lot of the elements are very nationalist, and that’s what we’re seeing right now.”


42:45

Having proved themselves to be a fierce and disciplined force against the emerging Islamic State group, the Kurds soon found themselves leading the US-backed SDF. Despite frictions between Washington and Ankara over US support for what Turkey considered to be violent separatist groups, the SDF played a crucial role in reclaiming territory from the Islamic State group.

Since then, though, the Kurds have been increasingly isolated. In 2019, then US president Donald Trump announced his plans to pull the last remaining American troops from Syria, leaving the Kurds undefended in the face of Turkey's advance.

Although Trump's generals managed to convince the president to keep a contingent of troops in the region to secure oil fields, guard against Islamic State group remnants and maintain pressure on Iran, it was a bitter blow for a community already under assault by a US ally and NATO member. Now, with Israel hammering Iran-backed groups across Syria and Trump set to return to the White House in January, Gerges said that forces across the Middle East were anxious to strengthen their hands before inauguration day.

“This is just the beginning – I think what Turkey and its Syrian allies are trying to do is to really basically change the current balance of power on the Turkish-Syrian borders before Trump enters the White House,” he said. “They’re using the retreat of the Assad forces as a means to weaken and degrade the pro-American Kurdish forces. All in all it’s not just that the Assad government is losing territories, but I think the Kurds are also in the eye of the storm. And I think by the end of the current round, their areas will shrink, their power will be degraded and they will be facing bitter choices.”

Gerges said that the next days and weeks of fighting could determine the very survival of the Kurds' long-held dream of self-governance.

“This is what’s going on in the Kurds’ minds – that’s why they called a general mobilisation,” he said. “This is one of the few times that they’re facing in their view a threat of this dimension. It’s no longer really a military threat, it goes to the very heart of what they’ve been trying to achieve since 2011 – full autonomy and a pathway to statehood.”

Syria rebel leader says goal is to overthrow Assad

By AFP
December 6, 2024

A Syrian rebel fighter cheers as he enters the central city of Hama 
- Copyright AFP Bakr ALKASEM


Layal Abou Rahal

Rebel forces pressing a lightning offensive in Syria aim to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, their Islamist leader said in an interview published on Friday.

The Islamist-led rebels were at the gates of Syria’s Homs, a war monitor said, after wresting other key cities from government control.

In little over a week, the offensive has seen Syria’s second city Aleppo and strategically located Hama fall from President Bashar al-Assad’s control for the first time since the civil war began in 2011.

Should the rebels capture Homs, that would cut the seat of power in the capital Damascus from the Mediterranean coast, a key bastion of the Assad clan.

By Friday morning, the rebels were just five kilometres (three miles) from the edge of Homs, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitor.

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel alliance, said the goal of the offensive was to overthrow Assad’s rule.

“When we talk about objectives, the goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime. It is our right to use all available means to achieve that goal,” Jolani told CNN in an interview.

The rebel alliance conducting the offensive that began on November 27 is led by HTS, which is rooted in the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda but has sought to moderate its image in recent years.

Fearing the rebels’ advance, tens of thousands of members of Assad’s Alawite minority were fleeing Homs on Thursday, residents and the Observatory said.

Khaled, who lives on the city’s outskirts, told AFP that “the road leading to (coastal) Tartus province was glowing… due to the lights of hundreds of cars on their way out”.

Homs was the scene of a months-long government siege of opposition areas and deadly sectarian attacks in the early years of the civil war.

Early in the war, which began with Assad’s brutal crackdown on democracy protests, activists referred to the city as “the capital of the revolution” against the government.

– ‘Extremely afraid’ –


Haidar, 37, who lives in an Alawite-majority neighbourhood, told AFP by telephone that “fear is the umbrella that covers Homs now”.

“I’ve never seen this scene in my life. We are extremely afraid, we don’t know what is happening.”

After the government lost control of Aleppo and Hama, air strikes targeted a bridge on the highway linking Hama and Homs, the Observatory said.

But on Friday, the rebel alliance “entered the cities of Rastan and Talbisseh” on the main road between Hama and Homs, the monitor added, saying that the factions were faced with “a total absence” of government forces.

The Syrian defence ministry said the army launched strikes against “terrorist” fighters in Hama province.

The Observatory, which relies on a network of sources in Syria, said 826 people, mostly combatants but also including 111 civilians, have been killed since the offensive began last week.

The United Nations said that the violence has displaced 280,000 people, warning that numbers could swell to 1.5 million.

Many of the scenes witnessed in recent days would have been unimaginable earlier in the war.

The rebels announced on Telegram their capture of Hama following street battles with government forces, describing it as “the complete liberation of the city”.

Rebel fighters kissed the ground and let off volleys of celebratory gunfire as they entered the city on Thursday.

Many residents turned out to welcome the rebel fighters. An AFP photographer saw some residents set fire to a giant poster of Assad on the facade of city hall.

The army admitted losing control of the city, though Defence Minister Ali Abbas insisted that the army’s withdrawal was a “temporary tactical measure”.

– ‘Massive blow’ –

In a video posted online, HTS leader Jolani said his fighters had entered Hama to “cleanse the wound that has endured in Syria for 40 years”.

He was referring to an army massacre in Hama in the 1980s that targeted people accused of belonging to the banned Muslim Brotherhood.

In another message on Telegram congratulating “the people of Hama on their victory,” he used his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, instead of his nom de guerre for the first time.

Aron Lund, a fellow of the Century International think tank, called the loss of Hama “a massive, massive blow to the Syrian government”.

Should Assad lose Homs, it wouldn’t mean the end of his rule, Lund said.

“But at that point, without Aleppo, Hama or Homs, and with no secure route from Damascus to the coast, I’d say it’s over as a credible state entity,” he added.

UN chief Antonio Guterres said Thursday that the escalation in Syria is the result of a “chronic collective failure” of diplomacy.

The rebels launched their offensive in northern Syria the same day a ceasefire took effect in the war between Israel and Hezbollah in neighbouring Lebanon.

Both Hezbollah and Russia have been crucial backers of Assad’s government, but have been mired in their own conflicts in recent years.

Israel’s army said Friday it had conducted air strikes on Hezbollah “weapon-smuggling routes” on the Syria-Lebanon border, just over a week into the fragile ceasefire in their war.

Damascus gripped by anxiety in face of rebel offensive


By AFP
December 6, 2024

Syrians chat at a cafe in the historic Old City of Damascus. 
- Copyright AFP Eitan ABRAMOVICH

Like many others in the Syrian capital Damascus, student Shadi chose to stay home so he could keep up with the pace of events since rebels launched a shock offensive last week.

“I had no wish to go out and everyone chose to stay in to follow the news surrounded by their loved ones,” said Shadi, who did not wish to give his full name.

As the rebels have taken city after city in quick succession, many Syrians have been wracked by uncertainty, fearing a revival of the worst days of Syria’s grinding civil war now in its 14th year.

“We don’t understand anything anymore. In just one week, the twists and turns have been so overwhelming that they are beyond all comprehension,” the young man said.

“The worry is contagious but we have to keep our cool,” he said, never once taking his eyes off the alerts on his mobile phone.

Syrian rebels, led by Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched the shock offensive on November 27, sweeping from their stronghold in the northwest to capture swathes of northern and central Syria including the major cities of Aleppo and Hama.

Government forces have launched a counteroffensive seeking to repel the rebels but at the cost of relaxing their grip on other parts of the country, notably the east where Kurdish-led forces have taken over.

“Whenever rumours spread, people rush to buy various products, bread, rice, sugar and detergents,” said Amine, 56, who runs a grocery store in the Sheikh Saad neighbourhood of the capital.

“Today, I bought twice from my wholesaler to keep up with demand.”



– Exams delayed –



The offensive has already sent food prices skyrocketing by 30 percent in Damascus, according to residents.

The Syrian pound is trading at an all-time low of 19,000 to the dollar, down from 15,000 before the rebels launched their offensive on Wednesday of last week.

Security measures — already strict before the offensive — have been beefed up, with extra car searches, particularly on vehicles coming from outside the capital, according to residents.

Concerns have been further driven by the spread of disinformation and rumours.

The Syrian defence ministry has denounced “fabricated” videos, including of explosions at the headquarters of the general staff, calling on citizens not to fall prey to “lies” that “aim to sow chaos and panic among civilians”.

In the usually lively neighbourhood of Bab Sharqi, restaurants and cafes are near-deserted in the evening, with some even closing up early due to the absence of customers.

Damascus University has delayed end-of-term exams and the Syrian football federation has postponed matches until further notice.

State news agency SANA reported that at Friday prayers, imams called on the faithful “not to panic… and to stand as one behind the Syrian Arab Army to defend the homeland”.

Georgina, 32, said she had “heard a lot of rumours”.

“I went to Old Damascus and saw a normal situation,” she said, adding that nonetheless “everyone was keeping an eye on the news”.

Meanwhile, some radio stations have switched from variety programming to non-stop news segments.

On state television, programmes host analysts and witnesses on the ground, including those denying “rumours” of fresh territorial losses to the advancing rebels.



HTS rebel group sweeping Syria tries to shed its jihadist image


Analysis

Unexpected alliances, seeing strength in "diversity" – Syria's Islamist insurgent group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former branch of al Qaeda, is trying to soften its public image in a bid to become one of Syria’s key political players. After seizing Aleppo in a lightning offensive, the armed group on Thursday broke Damascus’s hold on the crucial city of Hama.


Issued on: 05/12/2024 - 
By: Bahar MAKOOI
Abu Mohamed al-Golani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist insurgent group led by Al-Qaeda's former Syria branch, poses for a selfie during a press conference near the Bab al Hawa border crossing in northern Syria, March 12, 2024.
 © Omar Haj Kadour, AFP


They took Aleppo in less than three days. Now, the city of Hama, a crucial point on the road to Damascus – and the regime of President Bashar al-Assad – has also fallen. Who are the Islamist rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the driving force behind a lightning offensive that has caught the Syrian regime so utterly off guard?

The "Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant", more commonly known by its initials HTS, was the Syrian branch of al Qaeda before disassociating itself in 2016. The group owes much to its strategically minded leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani. This Syrian fighter, a former member of the Islamic State in Iraq – which later expanded into the Islamic State group – founded al-Nusra Front in 2012 before pledging allegiance to al Qaeda in 2013. The two groups reportedly severed ties by mutual agreement three years later.

An image grab taken from a video broadcast on July 28, 2016 by Dubai-based Orient News satellite television shows the head of Al-Nusra Front in Syria, Abu Mohammad al-Golani, giving a speech from an undisclosed location, in the first-ever video showing his face to be released. © AFP, HO

In January 2017, the former Nusra Front began trying to remake its image, declaring it had undergone an ideological transformation and adopting a new name – Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The group also began to rid itself of some of its most radical figures – willingly or not.

‘A rigid, conservative Islamist group’

In the beginning of 2019, HTS fighters took control of most of Idlib province in Syria’s northwest – to the detriment of other rebel groups active in the area. In a 2023 interview with FRANCE 24’s Wassim Nasr in Idlib, the group’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani said that he was working to ensure that the areas under his control would not be used as rear bases for preparing attacks against the West.

Abu Maria al-Qahtani, one of the group’s leading figures also interviewed in Idlib, said that the group was doing “all [that they could] to stop the youngest men from joining al-Qaeda or IS by showing them that another path was possible with what had been put in place in Idlib”.

"Not only has the HTS group broken ties with al Qaeda, but it’s been fighting al Qaeda and Islamic State group on an equal footing for years,” Nasr said, describing HTS as a “rigid, conservative Islamist group”.

“It was even their fighters that killed the Islamic State group’s fourth caliph [Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi] in August 2023,” he said.

Watch more  Domino effect? Assad's allies stretched thin as Syrian rebels pounce

Speaking on FRANCE 24, Arthur Quesnay, PhD candidate in political science at Paris’s Pantheon-Sorbonne University, said that HTS – now almost entirely made up of Syrian fighters – had become “a revolutionary Syrian group that is fighting a war in Syria and has stopped trying to wage a global jihad and strike at overseas targets, but is just here to take Damascus”.

According to Nasr, al-Golani maintains that he has put global jihad and international terror behind him, believing “that these things ‘bring nothing but destruction and failure’”. For the Islamist leader, his group “has no problem with the West, his problem is with the Syrian regime as well as the Iranians and Russians that support it”.

HTS and its leader are still designated as terrorist organisations by the United Nations, the US and a number of European countries – a fact that has put something of a crimp in al-Golani’s political ambitions.

“One of his objectives is to be taken off the international list of terrorist organisations so he can travel and become a leading Syrian political player,” Quesnay said.
The new normal

The rebel leader has not been idle. Al-Golani set up the so-called Salvation Government in Idlib, a local administration that serves as a kind of laboratory for what his rule could bring if extended over the whole country.

Nasr, who visited Idlib in 2023, said he had witnessed a limited freedom of religion, with Christian masses tolerated but no displays of crosses or ringing of church-bells allowed. He also described a policy of returning land occupied by foreign jihadists to their Syrian owners, even if they were Christians or Druze.

Ever pragmatic, al-Golani tried to win the support of those living in the territories his group had conquered, Quesnay said.

“In Idlib, the population is mostly Sufi – a popular and more classic form of Syrian Islam,” he said. “We’ve seen HTS evolve little by little, abandoning its original Salafist line to better adapt itself to those it was supposed to be governing. Other experts have noted that minorities such as the Druze and the Kurds also enjoyed some protection.



11:54© FRANCE 24

“It’s the first time that a group with jihadist roots – that is to say radical Islam – has shown itself to be open to other forms of Islam or other religions,” Quesnay said. “Certainly there has been localised repression against activists, but there have also been regular demonstrations against HTS, and in those cases, al-Golani engaged in the kinds of negotiations that we have usually seen elsewhere.”

“We need to be cautious in how we look at it, but it’s what they’ve been doing in Idlib for five years,” Nasr said. “HTS is far from espousing democratic values or those of a liberal society, but they have taken something of a turn – or found an unexpected third way.”
Charm offensive

Applying the same strategy after the conquest of Aleppo, al-Golani tried to reassure the population of his group’s goodwill – in particular towards the city’s religious and ethnic minorities. In a publicised statement, he called on his fighters not to mistreat the Christian community in Syria’s second city. “Treat them well,” he said, going on to tell local believers that HTS “had treated the Christians of Idlib and Aleppo well – you have nothing to fear”.

Speaking to the city’s large Kurdish minority, HTS offered a message of unity that would have been unimaginable just a few short years ago.


“You have the right to live freely … Diversity is a strength of which we are proud,” the group said in a statement verified by Nasr. “We denounce the actions of the Islamic State group against the Kurds, including the enslavement of women … We are with the Kurds to build the Syria of tomorrow.”

The Islamist rebel group also offered Kurdish fighters the possibility to leave the city with their families.

“They’re working on a corridor to evacuate those who now find themselves in [HTS] territory towards the Kurdish bastions in the northeast, and in good agreement with the YPG – the main Kurdish militia in Syria – which is not necessarily to Turkey’s liking,” Nasr said.

The apparent agreement with the Kurds could irritate the other rebel groups that took part in the seizure of Aleppo. Although HTS may have been the driving force behind the shock assault this past week, it’s not the only one that has been fighting to claim territory.


Partners of convenience

As Aleppo fell, HTS was supported on the northern front by the Syrian National Army (SNA) a coalition of a dozen rebel groups largely financed, equipped and trained by Turkey. Based across a long stretch of the Turkish border, these groups are united by a fierce anti-Kurdish sentiment.



“Ankara was surprised by HTS’s lightning offensive against Aleppo,” Nasr said. Faced with the new facts on the ground, Turkey launched the SNA into the fray “to cut any possible link between the Kurdish bastions of Syria’s northeast and those remaining in Aleppo”, as well as to prevent al-Golani from setting himself up as the sole master of the rebel-held area.

Although HTS and these Turkish-backed armed groups are often referred to as allies, Nasr said, they should more accurately be seen as being in a “balance of power that we can’t call friendly relations”. It’s a relationship marked by much friction – particularly on the Kurdish question.

Al-Golani has not been shy about publicly criticising the SNA’s armed groups – over the reported looting of a factory in Aleppo on December 3, for example.

For Ankara, returning the 3 million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey to their homeland is the main priority. A larger and more secure area under rebel control would certainly be a welcome step towards this goal. But it remains to be seen just how much Turkey is prepared to tolerate the fragile entente struck between HTS and the Kurds, who Ankara continues to see as its sworn enemies.

This piece has been adapted from the original in French by Paul Millar.

As Syrian rebels advance, what can Iran and its tired allies do for Assad?


Firas Makdesi/Reuters
People walk near a poster depicting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after last week's rebel seizure of Aleppo marked the rebels' biggest offensive for years, in Damascus, Syria, Dec. 5, 2024.


By Scott Peterson Staff writer
@peterson__scott
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Dec. 05, 2024|LONDON


Iran and its alliance of regional militias are seeking once again to defend the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as Sunni Islamist rebels make swift territorial gains in a surprise offensive.

But the array of forces, supported by Russian air power, that prevailed over anti-Assad insurgents and preserved his rule a decade ago during the first phase of Syria’s devastating civil war, is weaker today, and not focused on Syria.

Iran and its regional “Axis of Resistance” fighters, chief among them Lebanese Hezbollah, are all degraded and distracted after more than a year of war with Israel.

Why We Wrote This story focused on  Resilience

What can Iran do to help Syrian President Bashar al-Assad defeat newly energized rebel forces? Its anti-Israel “Axis of Resistance” has been overworked and diminished. Yet even as Iran searches for solutions, there are some suggestions that it is not panicking.

Syrian government troops melted away in the face of the offensive launched last week from the rebel-held northwest province of Idlib. Within days, Islamist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was once affiliated with Al Qaeda, had captured Syria’s second city of Aleppo.

By Thursday, rebels had taken control of Hama, 80 miles to the south. HTS, designated a terrorist group by the United States, sent messages to Syrian minority groups to reassure them of freedom and protection, prompting Aleppo Christians to put up Christmas decorations.

Nevertheless, there has been consternation but not panic in Iran about the investment of billions of dollars over many years, both to defend Mr. Assad and to create the Axis, which aims to counter Israeli and American influence in the Mideast.


Ghaith Alsayed/AP
Syrian opposition fighters stand atop a seized tank on the outskirts of Hama, Syria, Dec. 3, 2024.

Iran-backed Shiite militias from Iraq reportedly have sent hundreds of fighters to Syria, to help defend an Axis ally that serves as a critical weapons route between Iran and Lebanon. Hezbollah is also trying to mobilize for Syria, but its leadership has been decimated and its units degraded by 14 months of escalating conflict with Israel.

That fight culminated in a ceasefire coming into effect Nov. 27 – the day the Syrian rebels launched their offensive.

“This whole thing is coming at the worst moment for Iran and the Axis, and I think also explains the timing on the side of the rebels,” to take advantage of the relative weakness of Mr. Assad’s allies, says Hamidreza Azizi, an expert on Iran’s role in Syria at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

“Compared to a decade ago, Iran has fewer resources to invest in the Axis. ... So I can see why they are quite concerned,” he says.

Two pivotal events have changed the safety net dynamic for Mr. Assad and for Iran, Mr. Azizi says. The first was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which diverted Moscow’s focus and prompted it to withdraw some troops and hand over some bases to the Syrian army even as it kept an air capability in the country.

The second was the October 2023 attack by Axis-member Hamas on Israel. That triggered Hezbollah’s first rocket strikes on Israel in solidarity, as well as attacks from Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen, ostensibly to stop Israel’s onslaught in Gaza.

“Obviously everybody in the Axis started to get distracted, and focused on the Gaza front, especially those actors whose presence was significant in the Syrian war,” Mr. Azizi says.

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei complained on X this week that the Sunni extremists were "good news for enemies" of Islam by drawing the world’s attention away from the “issue of Palestine.”

“The current moment [in Syria] shows how significant the Iranian and Iran-backed manpower was, because they were able to prevent further advances by the rebels. But when there is nobody on the ground over those areas, they [the rebels] come again,” says Mr. Azizi. “That’s the problem: Airpower alone can’t secure victory.”

Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/AP/File
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, right, speaks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran, Iran, May 30, 2024.

To be sure, Israel has used airstrikes to kill several senior Iranian commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Qods Force, who were responsible for operations in Syria and Lebanon.

“What is Iran capable of doing, and not capable of doing? Clearly its command structure in Syria is damaged,” says Mohammad Ali Shabani, editor of the London-based news website Amwaj.media, which focuses on Iran, Iraq, and Arabian Peninsula countries.

Those networks, steeped in long-standing personal relationships, will take time to reestablish. But Iran can afford its military work in Syria, he says, and does not have an overall manpower problem, considering its past advisory role and the deployment of relatively few of its own troops.

“These are personal relationships that are hard to reconstitute,” says Mr. Shabani, noting for example Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike in April on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus.

General Zahedi was in charge of all the Levant and of funneling weapons to Lebanon and Syria. He was reportedly the only non-Lebanese person to sit on Hezbollah’s top Shura Council, while also exercising “veto power” over its subordinate military Jihad Council. His death triggered an unprecedented direct Iranian retaliation against Israel, with 300 missiles and drones.


Hassan Ammar/AP
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaks via a video link during a ceremony to commemorate the death of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who was among those killed by an Israeli airstrike that demolished an Iranian consular building in Damascus, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, April 8, 2024.

“Many other, if not all, members of the Jihad Council are [also] dead. So they are all in a state of reconstituting these structures,” says Mr. Shabani, whose website first reported the significance of General Zahedi.

Nevertheless, Mr. Shabani explains why, practically and politically, Iran may not be more urgently coming to Mr. Assad’s aid.

“Do I believe [pro-Assad forces] can seize back all of Syria? No. They couldn’t even do that last year, or last month,” he says. “But is it enough to keep Assad in power? Pick up a map, and look at what Iran’s objectives are in Syria.”

Those objectives include ensuring cross-country routes for Iranian weapons to reach Lebanon and key destinations in Syria, including Damascus, areas close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and Qusayr, where Hezbollah had a significant victory in 2012.

“[Rebels] have taken Aleppo. It’s a loss, for sure. But is this integral to Assad maintaining power? No. Is it integral to Iran’s core interests in Syria? No,” says Mr. Shabani. “I don’t see Iran rushing to Assad’s aid. Not because they don’t want to keep him in power … but because they want him to better appreciate their role.”

Four days after the rebel offensive erupted, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi flew to Damascus to reassure Mr. Assad. According to news reports, the two detailed the support that needs to be provided for Syria.

In a show of calm, Mr. Araghchi was later filmed eating at a fast-food restaurant in Damascus. But in a diplomatic push, he then flew to Ankara to meet his counterpart from Turkey, which has backed factions of the Syrian opposition.


Maxim Shemetov/Reuters
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024.

Iranian media reported Monday that Iranian Qods Force Gen. Javad Ghaffari arrived in Damascus to lead Iranian “military advisers” and help the Syrian army battle the advancing rebels. He has often been lauded in Iran for safeguarding Aleppo in 2016, but earned the title “Butcher of Aleppo” by opponents of Iran who recall brutal tactics there.

In Parliament Dec. 1, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian called on Muslim nations to “intervene and not allow America and Israel to take advantage” in Syria. Yet when asked on state television the next day about the chances of a direct Iranian military engagement in Syria, Mr. Pezeshkian twice dodged the question, and noted instead his government’s diplomatic efforts.

It is not yet clear if several hundred Iran-backed fighters from Iraq have made it to Syria, as reported, or if orders to fight have been given to those members of the Axis already on the ground in Syria, who are mostly Shiite Afghans.

As rebels advanced Thursday, the HTS commander, Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, issued a request to Iraqi politicians to “do their duty” to prevent Iran-aligned militias from intervening “in what is happening in Syria.”

Wednesday, January 12, 2022


Why Kazakhstan's Crisis Matters to China


Giulia Sciorati
11 January 2022
https://www.ispionline.it/en

Scarcely two years after protesters redefined the political landscape in Kyrgyzstan, the country’s giant northern neighbour – Kazakhstan – has witnessed a series of uprisings that started in the Western city of Zhanaozen and soon spread to other Southern cities and, most importantly, the former capital of Almaty. Other scholars and journalists have written on the complexities of the protests’ motivations and their potential impact on the country’s President Kasym-Jomart Tokaev, now in his third year in power. Kazakhstan’s 2019 political transition, once lauded internationally in terms of stability vis-à-vis Uzbekistan’s, is now under scrutiny. China, in particular, looks with concern at the protests in Kazakhstan – even more so than it did the 2020 coup in Bishkek – in light of the close relationship the two countries have shared since the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt in 2013 and the proximity of protesters to the border with Xinjiang.

China’s Understanding of the Kazakh Protests


Two frames can be primarily detected in China’s reaction to the Kazakh protests. On the one hand, Beijing has accepted the Kazakh leadership’s framing of protesters as terrorists (e.g., 恐怖分子 kongbu fenzi). On the other, the protests have been understood as an attempt at a colour revolution (颜色革命 yanse geming).


Others will open debates on the conceptual validity of using these terms to define the Kazakh protests. At this point, what is interesting to discuss is the context within which the terms have emerged, as they both display a substantial Chinese imprint.

Linking protests to terrorism is an established practice in China. Recent examples include the 2019 Hong Kong protests and the 2021 Myanmar coup, which Beijing formally identified as terrorist events. Finding a comprehensive application after the launch of the Global War on Terror, China’s protest-terrorism nexus has primarily been transposed to Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). At the same time, the term “colour revolution” had a similar development process, as China has habitually interpreted Central Asian affairs through this prism,[1] especially since the 2005 Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, which has remained at the centre of China’s concerns for future spillovers in other Central Asian countries. Such conceptualisation has actually been shared by China and Russia at the international level on numerous occasions.

China’s Attitude to Russia-led Peacekeepers in Kazakhstan

Tokayev’s decision to ask for Vladimir Putin’s support in handling protesters and the deployment of Russia-led peacekeepers from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) have inspired inflated reactions from Western media, especially in terms of drawing connections with the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Some observers have asked for China to be galled by Russia’s intervention and, more generally, Kazakhstan’s decision to rely on Moscow to be evidence of a Russian sphere of influence, capable of trumping China’s engagement with its western neighbours. Although there might be some truth to these interpretations, an oversimplification of the China-Russia-Kazakhstan relation is risky because it does not consider the extensive concessions Beijing made in its dogmatic foreign policy since pursuing a more active role in the international system.

One should first take into account the regional context in which Kazakhstan’s protests unfolded, which still reflects China’s non-intervention in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops. Despite expectations from Central Asian countries that Beijing (and potentially the SCO) would assume a more active role in regional security, China made its non-interventionist position crystal-clear. The military outpost financed in Tajikistan, for instance, is managed by China’s military police and not the army, signalling Beijing’s interest in internal rather than regional security. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s quest for support has been rationally directed elsewhere.

Second, despite China’s limited ability to compromise on its core foreign policy principles, the country has been known for making concessions on peacekeeping. Therefore, the government could easily tolerate the involvement of Kazakhstan-requested CSTO peacekeepers in the country. For example, Beijing’s government-related media reiterated the use of the term “peacekeeping” (维和 weihe), justifying China’s recent offer to support Kazakhstan in terms of law enforcement and security as the situation in Kazakhstan stabilises.

In Support of China-Russia’s Economy-Security Division of Labour in Central Asia

China’s approach to the Kazakh protests and Russia’s CSTO peacekeeping intervention confirms a trend in Beijing’s relations with Central Asia: a preference for limited military presence, especially outside formal UN peacekeeping missions. This attitude also bolsters the case for a functioning Russia-China division of labour in Central Asia, successfully perpetuating a model originally designed to ensure that China’s regional activities would not be perceived as conflictual by Russia. A model that – at least from Beijing’s perspective – is still valid and worthy of being pursued.

[1] This tendency is clearly detectable in the documents released after China’s annual academic conference on the relations with Central Asia.

Was the Kazakhstan uprising an attempted Jihadi takeover?

11 January 2022
THE SPECTATOR
Francis Pike

The Kazakh uprising is over. The stench of burnt-out vehicles and bombed out buildings in Kazakhstan’s most populous city and former capital, Almaty, has begun to dissipate. Life is returning to normal. Banks have reopened. Salaries and pensions are being paid. The internet is up and running again. Almaty airport is expected to reopen today.

As the fog of war lifts some clarity about these events is beginning to emerge. Officials have reported that 100 businesses and banks were destroyed along with 400 vehicles. Seven policemen died and hundreds more were wounded; 8,000 people have been arrested. Some 164 civilians were killed.

The government of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has survived and with some ease as it turns out. There will be no Maidan or Orange Revolution of the sort that overthrew the pro-Russian government of Ukraine. President Putin has made clear that he would not let anyone ‘destabilise the situation in our home and… allow the so-called colour revolution scenario to play out.’ Note the words ‘our home’, which is how he sees a country in which 20 per cent of the population is Russian — a not dissimilar proportion to Ukraine.

On the eve of US-Russian talks over Ukraine, the Kazakh uprising has been a gift to Russia’s leader. Putin grabbed the PR opportunity with alacrity. By sending 2,500 troops to help defend Kazakhstan, at a stroke Putin has validated his Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Central Asia’s equivalent of Nato. The other CSTO rulers of Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are likely to be impressed. If Russian troops return home as expected, former members such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan may consider re-joining. Even Turkmenistan’s isolationist and deeply unpopular ruling family may also consider the attractions of Russia’s protective embrace.

Apart from Putin, the other clear winner from recent events is President Tokayev himself. Although he took over the presidency in March 2019, his power was deeply circumscribed.

The Kremlin and Tokayev have accused ‘terrorists’ of acting with unspecified foreign agents

His predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, had held the post for 29 years since the break-up of the Soviet Union and was not intending to give up power. On the day that Tokayev assumed the presidency Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga, already a major political figure, was elected to Tokayev’s former position as chairman of the Senate. Throughout Central Asia the rumour was that new President Tokayev was simply keeping the seat warm for Dariga.

The predecessor Nazarbayev retained control of the Kazakh army through his chairmanship of the National Security Council. He continued to lead the ruling Nur Otan party and remained a member of the Constitutional Council, an Athenian-style council of elders which, in theory at least, retains guardianship over Kazakhstan’s government.

However, Tokayev refused to follow the prescribed playbook. He kicked against the traces and tried to assert his independence. Dariga was sacked as chairman of the Senate. Rival presidential courts began to grow. A brief truce was observed when Nazarbayev, Dariga and President Tokayev made a show of unity at Nur Otan’s party conference in November 2019, two months before parliamentary elections in January 2020.

The uneasy truce remained until last week. As recently as Christmas, in an informal conference of regional leaders hosted by Putin in Moscow, both Tokayev and Nazarbayev were invited.

But last week, with popular protest on the streets calling for the ‘old man out’ (meaning Nazarbayev), Tokayev pounced. The Kazakhstan cabinet, hand-picked by Nazarbayev, was sacked. Meanwhile the former president was removed from the chairmanship of the Security Council. A purge of Nazarbayev loyalists was begun. The head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence services was sacked on 6 January. He has now been arrested for treason.

Nazarbayev and Dariga have disappeared into the ether, though rumour has it that they are still in Kazakhstan. If evidence were needed as to who now runs the country, the fact that Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping have only addressed their congratulations to President Tokayev is conclusive proof that an internal transition of power has taken place. Xi praised him for being strong and decisive and for ‘being highly responsible for your country and your people’.

Other issues are less clear. Who was doing the fighting in the streets? Some have suggested that the fighting was related to Tokayev’s ‘palace coup’. Unlikely. A palace coup would happen around the government buildings, which is in the new capital city, Astana. In Kazakhstan the riots started in the remote south west, more than 1,500 miles away. In any case, how credible is it that fuel-price protestors reached immediately for guns and bombs?

The Kremlin and Tokayev have accused ‘terrorists’ of acting with unspecified foreign agents. The US has largely assumed that the finger of blame is being pointed at them. Rather defensively, White House press secretary Jen Psaki complained that rumours of US involvement were ‘crazy’.

What has largely been overlooked is the possibility that violence in Kazakhstan, on the back of popular protests about the rising price of petrol, was indeed orchestrated by ‘foreign terrorist’ groups — Jihadi groups. There is significant circumstantial evidence.


There was violence in 19 of Kazakhstan’s 31 cities; 15 of these cities were close to foreign borders, notably Kyrgistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and China’s Uighur populated Xinjian Autonomous Region. About 1.5 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population is Uighur and there is growing resentment throughout Central Asia that their governments have yielded to Chinese pressure to render Uighur dissidents.


Muslim terrorist groups that operate throughout Central Asia include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islam (party of Islamic Liberation), the Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahidin and the Uighur Islamic party of eastern Turkestan. Foreign based groups such as the Taliban are also allegedly present in the region. Along with Isis and the Muslim Brotherhood, there are estimated to be 19 Jihadi groups operating in Central Asia.

The fall of Isis in Syria has brought trained ‘talent’ back to Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan officials alone reported 863 returnees from conflicts in Syria and Iraq between 2010 and June 2016. All Central Asian governments, which are secular but with majority Muslim populations, have been reporting increased jihadi activity in recent years.

Although Kazakh Muslims are historically moderate, Sufi and apolitical with only around 10 per cent believing in Sharia law (compared to 43 per cent in the UK), nevertheless the Kazakh government has become increasingly alive to the threat posed by Jihadis. In 2013 Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee established an anti-terror centre. As far back as 2014, the Central Asian Caucasus Institute concluded that ‘Kazakhstan’s problem of radicalization is no longer limited to in-country malcontents.’

More than 60 Jihadi attacks have been thwarted in Kazakhstan over the last decade. For Europeans, Jihadi attacks such as that on the Bataclan in Paris are global events and the perpetrators are roundly abused. Double standards abound. Similar attacks in Central Asia and China go unreported and the response, if any, from the West is normally concerned with the ‘human rights’ of the perpetrators.

In his virtual address to fellow CSTO leaders yesterday President Tokayev made it clear that he was blaming ‘foreign militants from Afghanistan and the Mideast countries’. Thus far this is not the narrative being given by a sceptical western media. The problem is that we tend to assume, for good reason, that President Putin and all his Central Asian stooges always tell lies. Jihadi involvement in the Kazakh uprising is as yet still unproven — but Tokayev’s laying the blame on radical Islamic groups is credible. Astonishing as it may seem, a Central Asian despot may actually be telling the truth.

WRITTEN BY
Francis Pike
Francis Pike is a historian and author of Hirohito’s War, The Pacific War 1941-1945 and Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II.

THE SPECTATOR IS A UK RIGHT WING PUBLICATION

Saturday, July 11, 2020




FAIZ, INDIA AND PROTEST



Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ has continued to inspire activists for decades. Why do the leftist poet’s words continue to resonate today?
Published Jul 05, 2020
From Iqbal Bano singing it to a charged crowd in Lahore in 1986, to students reciting its verses on campus protests across India late last year, Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ has continued to inspire activists for decades. Why do the leftist poet’s words continue to resonate beyond their original context?


Header illustration by Samiah Bilal


On December 17, 2019, a student protest at the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (IIT-K) was held in solidarity with students at Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia who had been brutally attacked by police on December 15. The protest included a recitation of an Urdu poem, commonly known as Hum Dekhenge (literally, ‘We Shall See’), by leftist poet and revolutionary Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911-1984). In a video posted on Twitter, a student recites the poem, which he reads from his cell phone, to a crowd of listeners, some of whom mill about and some of whom listen attentively, with the crowd applauding at certain lines. This recitation of the poem soon became the centre of a controversy, when a post-doctoral faculty member at IIT lodged a complaint against the poem and its performance, claiming that its lines aroused communal sentiment. IIT-K responded by establishing a committee to investigate the complaint. A public debate in the media ensued, as prominent poets, a former Indian Supreme Court judge, and journalists and intellectuals discussed the poem and its meaning.
The use of Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ in the anti-CAA protests also illuminates the direct link between Urdu poetry and the idea of art as action, which became a clarion call in the 1930s.
First composed in 1979, Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ has become a rallying cry for protests both throughout India and around the world against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed by India’s Parliament on December 19, 2019. The CAA proposes a religious basis for citizenship for refugees who have entered India from the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Under the new amendment, refugees who are Hindu, Jain, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi, even if they do not possess identification papers, may receive Indian citizenship within six years. Notably missing from this list are Muslims, who, according to the 2011 Census of India, make up 14.2 percent of the population, for a total of 172 million people. According to a more recent estimate, India’s Muslims, at 195 million people in 2020, comprise the third-largest Muslim population in the world, after Indonesia and Pakistan.

Protesters at an anti-CAA demonstration in India | Siasat Daily
Protesters at an anti-CAA demonstration in India | Siasat Daily

The spectre of citizenship being granted on the basis of identification papers — which are notoriously difficult to obtain in South Asia, especially for the poor — is particularly scary. It elides the history of mass migration and the large-scale passage of refugees across the border during the 1947 Partition and the 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. The CAA represents a fundamental reworking of the citizen’s relationship to the nation-state in South Asia. It moves from citizenship based on residence within India to citizenship based on religion.
While the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s move has roots in the last 70 years, particularly in Assam — where the idea of a National Register of Citizens (NRC) was formed — the CAA and the threat of a nation-wide NRC, which has been promised by the government, alongside the recent annexation of Kashmir (with the abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019) and other policies and Supreme Court verdicts, make this a turning-point.

URDU AND PROTEST POETRY

Urdu poetry has been central to the protests. The use of ‘Hum Dekhenge,’ as rallying cry, song, visual art, and internet meme, speaks to the widespread citation and circulation of certain Urdu or Hindi/Urdu poems during the anti-CAA protests. ‘Hum Dekhenge’ has been extensively recited or sung during the protests.
In a rendition posted on YouTube on December 29, 2019, the poem is sung on the steps of the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) campus, which on January 5 saw violence against students and faculty by an armed mob. In an anti-CAA protest in Cape Town, South Africa, a woman named Kathyayini Dash stood outside the Indian consulate, microphone in hand, passionately singing the poem. The poem has also inspired visual artists.
On January 13, 2020, a group of art students installed an artists’ protest at Shaheen Bagh in Delhi, the site of a 24-hour-a-day sit-in that lasted from January to March 2020 and celebrated as a women-led protest. The artists wrote lines from ‘Hum Dekhenge’ on to sheets of paper, folded them into boats, and laid them out in the shape of a heart, with the text of the poem placed at the base. The text is accompanied by a toy tank, whose size, an artist explained in an interview given to The Quint, was meant to show the military’s small power when compared to that of poetry.
Other poems popular among protesters are Habib Jalib’s (1928-1993) ‘Dastur’ (The Constitution), originally composed in opposition to Pakistan’s 1962 Constitution instituted by General Ayub Khan, and Faiz’s ‘Bol’, published in his 1942 collection Naqsh-i-Faryadi, which exhorts the listener to “Speak, for your lips are still free.” Thus poetry transcends its original time and contexts.
The connection between Hindi/Urdu poetry and Bollywood cinema, begun in the 1940s and 1950s, is evidenced by two widely-cited poems by Bollywood lyricists Rahat Indori and Varun Grover. ‘Hum Dekhenge’ has also been translated into other languages including Bhojpuri and Kannada, and sung in demonstrations. The circulation of these poems illustrates the nexus between Hindi/Urdu poetry, cinema, song, and protest in South Asia.
The use of Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ in the anti-CAA protests also illuminates the direct link between Urdu poetry and the idea of art as action, which became a clarion call in the 1930s. As the Hindi-Urdu writer Premchand (1880-1936) declared in the inaugural address to the first Progressive Writers’ Conference in 1936, “As long as the aim of literature was only to provide entertainment, to put us to sleep … it had no need of action. … The only literature that will pass our test is that … which instils in us dynamism and restlessness, not sleep” (cited in Orsini, The Oxford India Premchand, 2004).
The formation of the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association (Aipwa) in 1936, with which Faiz was affiliated, marked a turning-point for modern art and literature in the Indian subcontinent. Premised on the rejection of cultural conservatism and tradition, as well as on the idea of art as awakening the masses toward political action, the Progressive Writers’ Movement rewrote the relationship of art to politics. Among Hindi/Urdu writers, it harnessed the production of poetry and prose to political and social revolution. Faiz himself was imprisoned twice (1951-1955, then for over 5 months in 1958-1959) for his support of leftist politics in Pakistan, while other writers associated with the movement were charged with obscenity and forced to defend themselves in court in both India and Pakistan.

TEXTUAL AND PERFORMANCE HISTORY

Despite the poem’s wide circulation, ‘Hum Dekhenge’’s textual and performance history is not well known. ‘Hum Dekhenge’ was first published in Faiz’s 1980 collection of poems, Mere Dil Mere Musafir (My Heart, My Traveller), composed toward the end of his life. This collection illustrates Faiz’s leftist internationalist stance, informed by his experiences with both the Progressive Writers’ Movement and the political turmoil of Pakistan’s early years. After the military dictator Ziaul Haq’s rise to power, Faiz was targeted and put under surveillance for his support of the Pakistan Peoples Party, which led him to leave Pakistan. He spent several years outside Pakistan, living mostly in Beirut, where he worked on a small salary as the editor of Lotus, the journal of the Afro-Asian Writers Association (active from 1958 to 1979). During his time in Beirut, Faiz witnessed the suffering of Palestinians in Lebanon and abroad.
Mere Dil Mere Musafir includes poems on the suffering of Palestinians, as does his next collection Ghubar-i-Ayyam, which his grandson Ali Madeeh Hashmi argues should be considered as an appendix to Mere Dil Mere Musafir (Hashmi, Love and Revolution: Faiz Ahmed Faiz, The Authorized Biography, 2016: 255).
During this time, Faiz also visited London, Moscow, and the United States. ‘Hum Dekhenge’ is labelled, “America, January 1979,” though it is not clear where in America he composed the poem.
After first being published, the poem suffered an unusual textual history. Faiz removed ‘Hum Dekhenge’ from his collected works, Nuskha Haye Vafa published in 1984 by Maktaba-i-Karvan in Lahore. The reasons for this omission are unclear. According to one source, Maktaba-i-Karvan asked for the poem to be removed because of its religious imagery (Andy McCord, “Re: URDULIST: Faiz – hum dekhenge,” Email to Urdulist, January 9, 2020).
Another possible explanation is that the poem is too similar to another tarana in the collection. That poem, titled “A Song for the Mujahideen of Palestine,” remains in Nuskha Haye Vafa. Its first two lines, “Hum jeetengey/Haqqa hum ik din jeetengey,” mirror very closely the first two lines of ‘Hum Dekhenge,’ and so it is possible that because of the poems’ similarity Faiz removed ‘Hum Dekhenge.’
How, then, did the poem survive? Its popularity is in large part the result of a famous performance by the Pakistani singer Iqbal Bano. Bano sang ‘Hum Dekhenge’ on February 13, 1986, at the annual Faiz Mela. This festival is held in February on Faiz’s birthday to commemorate his life and work. The day’s festivities would be followed in the evening by a concert at the Alhamra Arts Council, on Lahore’s Mall Road.

An artist installation at Shaheen Bagh, featuring *Hum Dekhenge* | Photo by @delhi6wala, posted on Instagram, January 30, 2020
An artist installation at Shaheen Bagh, featuring Hum Dekhenge | Photo by @delhi6wala, posted on Instagram, January 30, 2020

Bano was a well-known interpreter of Faiz’s poetry, and that year’s concert had attracted an unusually large crowd. According to Hashmi, “a large number of political activists and workers” had gathered outside the auditorium, demanding to be let in. Hashmi’s mother Moneeza “told the assembled audience that she was going to open the doors and people could sit wherever they could find a seat.” Soon people were sitting “on the stairs, the floors, wherever they could find some space.” As Hashmi recalls, of Faiz’s poems “the loudest cheers were reserved for ‘Hum Dekhenge’,” and within that poem, for the verses “sab taaj uchhalay jaaengey/sab takht giraaey jaaengey.” Bano was begged to perform the song again as an encore, and this performance was recorded by a technician at Alhamra. The performance’s subversive nature was immediately recognised by the authorities, who, “raided the homes of the organisers and many of the participants looking for any audio copies of the concert, especially ‘Hum Dekhenge.’ Many copies were confiscated and destroyed but my uncle Shoaib Hashmi had managed to get a hold of one copy, and anticipating the crackdown, handed it over to some friends who promptly smuggled it out to Dubai, where it was copied and widely distributed.”
Fortunately, this recording has survived and is available on YouTube. The audience’s reaction to the performance is raucous, with the crowd bursting into applause as soon as Bano starts singing the poem. The audience members clap along with the rhythm, applaud certain lines, and at some points, totally erupt. When Bano reaches the poem’s most directly anti-authoritarian lines, the crowd goes wild, crying out and yelling, and then breaking into rhythmic applause, which the tabla player echoes for a few measures. When Bano begins to resume, the audience breaks into cheers of “Inquilaab Zindabad” (Long Live the Revolution) — a leftist slogan now used broadly across protest groups in South Asia — which they continue to chant as she sings several more lines. This reaction is a testament to the power of this poem to incite revolutionary emotion. We can probably credit Bano’s performance with ‘Hum Dekhenge’’s enshrinement in the corpus of protest poetry.

RELATIONSHIP TO SUFI AND QURANIC IMAGERY

‘Hum Dekhenge’’s use of religious imagery has been at the centre of India’s controversy around the poem. What is not well known about the poem is that, despite Faiz’s leftist credentials, ‘Hum Dekhenge’ draws on Quranic imagery and hinges on a core Sufi belief. While known popularly by its refrain ‘Hum Dekhenge,’ the poem as originally published in Mere Dil Mere Musafir carries three words from the Quran as its title. These are: “Va Yabqā Vajhu Rabbika,” from Verse 27 of the 55th surah of the Quran, Ar-Rahmān. Translated as “the face of your Lord” in the Al-Azhar University-approved translation by Majid Fakhry (An Interpretation of the Qur’an: English Translation of the Meanings, A Bilingual Edition, 2004), these three words present a central image in Sufi thought. The verse presents the face as all that remains after everything on earth is destroyed. As has been pointed out by others, this is an eschatological image, but it uses an established dichotomy in Sufi thought: between baqā, that which remains, and fanā, the effacement of the ego in the divine. The previous verse (Verse 26) states, “Everything upon her [the earth, or the soul, both feminine nouns] is effaced,” followed by Verse 27, “But the Face of your Lord, full of majesty and nobility, shall remain.” Verse 26 is eschatological, pointing to the final day of judgment, but Verse 27 presents the destruction of all in a Sufi context, where it is only the face of God that remains.
Other images are best understood through reference to Quranic imagery. The poem’s third and fourth lines refer to “That day that was promised/that was written on the tablet of eternity (lauh-i-azal).” The lauh-i-azal refers to the celestial eternal table (al-lauh al-mahfūz) from which all knowledge is derived, including the Quran (Wensinck and Bosworth, “Law,” Encyclopaedia of Islam; Alexander, “The Guarded Tablet,” Metropolitan Museum Journal, 1989: 199-207; Halepota, “The Holy Qur’ān as the Book ‘Umm-ul-Kītāb,’” Islamic Studies, 1983: 1-15).
The next two lines also reference a Quranic image: “Jab zulm o sitam ke koh-i-giraan/Ru’i ki tarha urr jaaengey” (When heavy mountains of tyranny and oppression/Will float away like cotton). The image of mountains becoming as light and fluffy as cotton is found in Surah 101, Al-Qari’ah, which describes the day of judgment as: “The Day that men shall be like scattered butterflies;/And the mountains like tufted wool,”(trans. Fakhry, An Interpretation of the Qur’an: English Translation of the Meanings, A Bilingual Edition, 2004) where the last words of Verse 5 can be translated more literally as “wool that has been fluffed up” (I am grateful to Prof Hamza Zafer for help with this translation). Faiz’s verse draws on this central opposition, where solid mountains suddenly become light and ephemeral like wool or cotton.
‘Hum Dekhenge’’s use of religious imagery has been at the centre of India’s controversy around the poem. What is not well known about the poem is that, despite Faiz’s leftist credentials, ‘Hum Dekhenge’ draws on Quranic imagery and hinges on a core Sufi belief.
Most notably, the poem invokes the Persian Sufi Mansur Al-Hallaj’s famous exclamation, “An ul-Haq,” translatable as “I am God” but also “I am Truth”, by which Hallaj expressed the obliteration of man’s ego in the divine. This radical stance, which led to al-Hallaj’s execution in the 9th century, has led to confusion in the media and even among protestors themselves. As reported by Harish Trivedi, Professor of English at the University of Delhi, “there’s a joke going round that a student singing the song in a protest procession was stopped and asked by a reporter if he knew what he was singing. ‘So what is An ul-Haq?’ asked the reporter. The student said, ‘An ul-Haq … An ul-Haq?… Brother of Zia ul Haq?’” By citing this phrase, Faiz’s poem both references the Sufi critique of religious (and other) authority and invokes a fundamentally mystical way of perceiving and understanding God. This was meant as a criticism of Ziaul Haq’s government, which imposed Sharia-inspired religious laws (known as Hudood) on the country, but the critique can easily be transposed on to any human or political authority that takes away or threatens humanity’s fundamental relationship with God.

TRANSLATING FAIZ


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The difficulties of translating Faiz — and Urdu poetry in general — have been noted by scholars and translators. In particular, Faiz’s poetry’s deep imbrication within a web of established images and metaphors, drawn from the Urdu and Indo-Persian poetic traditions, presents challenges. According to Victor Kiernan, Faiz’s major translator, “Of all elements in foreign poetry, imagery is the easiest to appreciate, except when, as often in the Persian-Urdu tradition, it has symbolic and shifting meanings” (cited in Ali, “Introduction—The Rebel’s Silhouette: Translating Faiz Ahmed Faiz,” Daybreak: Writings on Faiz, 2013: 177-178). As Naomi Lazard, an American poet who worked with Faiz on her transcreations of his poems, noted about her process: “I asked him questions regarding the text. Why did he choose just that phrase, that word, that image, that metaphor? What did it mean to him? … What was crystal clear to an Urdu-speaking reader meant nothing at all to an American” (Ibid., 178). As I have argued elsewhere, Faiz’s poetry draws on the resources of tradition to invert them to new, and sometimes political, purposes. Part of what makes his poetry so fresh and quotable — and well-suited to political protest — is its multi-valence; its deep debt to, and reimagining of, the Urdu poetic topos.
To bring the impact of ‘Hum Dekhenge’ to an English-speaking audience, I had to consider these various factors. How is one to transmit the dense networks of meaning underlying Faiz’s poem, and to render them in a form that communicates the poem’s rousing effect, its quotability, its rhetorical impact on the listener? I have made my best attempt below. I chose to substitute ‘Hum Dekhenge,’ which means “We shall see,” with “On that day” or similar phrases, because the finality of the future tense in the Urdu is what makes that line so powerful. This grammatical distinction is not clear in English. But what the Urdu phrase points to is the certainty that the day that has been promised will, indeed, arrive. I do not believe that sense is rendered in “We shall see”, but other translators are welcome to make their own decisions.
On That Day
That day will come
Yes, that day will come
That day we have been promised
When mountains of tyranny and oppression
will float away like cotton
And the earth will tremble and shake
under the feet of the oppressed
The sky will thunder and roar
on the heads of the arbitrators
False idols will be uprooted
from the Ka’ba of God’s earth
And we, the pure-hearted, those banished from the sanctuary, will be seated in places of honour
Thrones will be smashed
And crowns overthrown
On that day
Only the name of God shall remain
Who is both present and unseen
Who is both the observer and the perceived
On that day
The cry of “I am God!” will resound
The God that is in you and me
And the earth shall be ruled by those whom God created
The people, who are you and me
— America, January 1979

***

On February 23, 2020, mob violence broke out in parts of northeast Delhi, sparked by a speech in which a BJP leader, Kapil Mishra, issued an ultimatum to Delhi police to clear the road of Chand Bagh, in northeast Delhi, of anti-CAA protesters within three days, or risk violence. Violence ensued, as armed mobs barged into neighbourhoods, attacking Muslim men and shops, setting cars and e-rickshaws ablaze, throwing stones and, according to a recent estimate by the Delhi Police, vandalising eight mosques, two temples, one madrassah and one shrine (dargah). Police reportedly stood by, or joined in.
On my Twitter feed, someone cited another Faiz poem, this time his 1974 ‘Dhaka Se Vaapsi Par,’ composed as he returned from Dhaka with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as part of his work with the Pakistan National Council for the Arts. The poem becomes a kind of shorthand: a way of extending sympathy and solidarity not only to the residents of northeast Delhi, where Hindu and Muslim neighbourhoods are being torn apart, but also to the estranged neighbours from the formerly East and West Pakistan.
“We have become strangers,” the poem begins, “after so many meetings/When will we become confidants again?” And so, threads of intimacy and estrangement, trauma and longing, across local neighbourhoods and national borders, are woven together into a web of suffering and loss. It is not surprising that this poem by Faiz who, along with his progressive contemporaries, imagined alternative futures for the peoples of both India and Pakistan, can serve as metonym for the pain and suffering of the present day.
Faiz and his fellow members of the Progressive Writers’ Movement stressed the universality of the human condition, as against the divisions of caste, class, language, region, religion and nation. Faiz’s third-world internationalist stance, evident in the poems in Mere Dil Mere Musafir, envisions a global community organised around shared solidarities. In ‘Hum Dekhenge,’ Faiz draws on the resources of Urdu poetry, including its Sufi and Quranic imageries, to invoke and create this common sense of suffering and hope.

A version of this piece was originally published in Positions: Asia critique

The writer is Associate Professor of Urdu at the University of Washington, and the author of Cosmopolitan Dreams: The Making of Modern Urdu Literary Culture in Colonial South Asia
Published in Dawn, EOS, July 5th, 2020