Cyclone clusters in the Arctic reduce sea ice and threaten coastlines

Rapid series of low-pressure systems can cause weather conditions under which the ice can only hardly recover. This affects Arctic coastlines and the global climate system

Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research

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Arctic Sea Ice Floes

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Credit: Alfred-Wegener-Institut

In the Arctic, the weather plays a key role in determining how much ice covers the ocean. One weather phenomenon that has a significant influence on this is Arctic cyclones: they cause unusually warm and stormy conditions, which typically lead to a significant loss of ice. These conditions last for a particularly long time when several cyclones rapidly follow one another. An international research team led by the Alfred Wegener Institute has now, for the first time, systematically investigated the effects of these accumulating cyclones, using weather data from recent decades. In the journal Nature Communications, they have described this ‘cyclone clustering’ and its specific consequences for the future of sea ice and, by extension, the Arctic coastline.

‘Cyclone clustering’ occurs when several low-pressure systems rapidly pass through a particular area one after another, causing storms that are more severe and last longer than ‘normal’ storms. “In Europe, such events have frequently led to significant damage in the past due to high winds, heavy rainfall or high tide levels along the coast,” says Dr Lars Aue, lead author of the study from the Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research (AWI). 

To find out whether cyclone clustering also occurs in the Arctic and how these intense weather events affect Arctic sea ice, an international research team led by the AWI systematically analyzed and compared satellite and weather data from 1979 to 2024. “We adapted an algorithm for tracking weather systems so that it could detect rapidly consecutive cyclones in the Arctic,” explains Lars Aue. “We were then able to compare the state of the sea ice on satellite images before and after a cluster had passed through.”

The results show that, where cyclones coincide with Arctic sea ice, they break up the ice cover and cause ice floes to drift and collide. During the cold Arctic winter, the gaps that emerge as a result, normally refreeze within a few days. However, when a cluster of cyclones hits the sea ice, the persistent stormy conditions delay and hinder the gaps from closing again. During the warmer months, Arctic cyclone clusters are less intense, however, they can still have a significant local impact on the sea ice: they drive ice floes northwards and push them into the existing ice. This reduces the area over which the sea ice is spread. The storms also carry warm air with them, which thaws the ice from above, furthermore, they can also transport warmer seawater from deeper layers to the surface, causing the upper water masses to warm up. Over the last two decades, cyclones have thus contributed to ice loss, particularly towards the end of the melting season. 

The number of storms that accumulate in a cyclone cluster varies depending on the region and the season, but averages 2.5 cyclones. Similarly, their impact also depends on when and where they occur. There are regions where the effect on sea ice is amplified by up to 1.5 times, and regions where the effect is amplified by up to 7 times. “On average across the entire Arctic, cyclone clusters reduce Arctic sea ice cover by about twice as much as conventional, isolated low-pressure systems. This condition also lasts about two and a half times longer,” says Lars Aue. 

Another worrying finding of the study is that the loss of Arctic sea ice caused by cyclone clusters has increased significantly over recent decades. One reason for this is that the ice is losing its resilience to storms caused by cyclones, as it is becoming thinner and more mobile due to ongoing global warming. In summer, this could be further amplified by the increasingly warmer Arctic Ocean. “We could be entering a self-enforcing feedback loop: the weaker the sea ice becomes, the more cyclone clusters can reduce its extent, which in turn weakens the sea ice,” says Lars Aue. “Currently, we are using climate projections to investigate whether the intensification of the effects of cyclone clusters that we have seen in recent decades could continue in the future.”

The study highlights just how strongly weather events influence sea ice and how important it is that we understand the causes and effects of cyclone clusters in the Arctic. This is crucial, as coastal communities in the Arctic are increasingly exposed to dangerous weather events due to increasing cyclone activity: sea ice acts as a buffer against waves. Its retreat, combined with the increasing thawing of permafrost, is making coasts more vulnerable to storms. “Until now, there has been no systematic analysis of the impacts of cyclone clusters in the Arctic. With our work, we are filling a knowledge gap and lay an important foundation for projections that can depict the future of the Arctic sea ice - a central component of the global climate system - as accurate as possible.”

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Journal

Nature Communications

DOI

10.1038/s41467-026-76245-5 

Article Title

On the relevance of serial cyclone clustering for Arctic sea ice

Article Publication Date

15-Aug-2026

 

Ancient warming event hints at potential climate 'tipping point'

Melting permafrost 304 million years ago might have released vast amounts of carbon into atmosphere

University of Cincinnati

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University of Cincinnati Professor Thomas Algeo stands in front of rock cores in his geosciences lab.

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Credit: Andrew Higley

Researchers say a spike in temperatures during an ice age 304 million years ago could inform what climate scientists are learning about rapidly changing conditions today.

University of Cincinnati Professor Thomas Algeo worked with a team of international researchers, including lead author Le Yao from the Nanjing Institute of Geology and Paleontology, to examine a period of rapid warming that occurred during the Late Paleozoic Ice Age, the second most recent ice age on Earth.

They found that a small spike in global sea surface temperatures led to a far bigger one fed by the release of methane into the atmosphere from melting permafrost. Global sea surface temperatures climbed by more than 7 degrees Celsius or 12 degrees Fahrenheit.

The study was published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. It was supported with grants from Peking University and the National Natural Science Foundation of China.

Algeo noted that the change occurred over tens of thousands of years at a rate of about a tenth of a degree Celsius increase every 1,000 years. By comparison, researchers today have observed a nearly 1 degree Celsius increase of sea surface temperature in just the past 100 years.

Possibly triggered by volcanic activity and aided by a cyclical variation in the shape of Earth’s orbit that influences the distribution of solar radiation, a modest release of carbon crossed a “climatic tipping point that led to massive carbon release and transient global warming.”

Researchers said an increase in temperatures today could speed melting of permafrost, releasing trapped carbon that could create a positive feedback loop that contributes to more warming.

Rapid warming on Earth more typically happens under what scientists call “greenhouse conditions” when the atmosphere has high amounts of methane and carbon dioxide that trap heat.

Algeo said some people are surprised to learn that all of recorded human history has taken place in the midst of the most recent ice age. Its peak called a glacial maximum occurred about 20,000 years ago when woolly mammoths, cave bears and giant ground sloths roamed the Earth.

“We’re technically in an ice age because there are two continent-scale ice masses in Greenland and Antarctica,” he said. “What makes this warming event 304 million years ago unique is that it occurred during an ice age. That’s what makes this event important as an analog for modern-day climate warming.”

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Journal

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

DOI

10.1073/pnas.2601643123 

Article Title

A transient global warming event during Earth’s penultimate icehouse

Article Publication Date

10-Aug-2026

University of Cincinnati Professor Thomas Algeo pulls out rock cores to examine in his geosciences lab.

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Andrew Higley

An iceberg off Antarctica.

A tabular iceberg off Antarctica.

An iceberg melts on the Southern Ocean.

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Michael Miller

The Arctic In A Changing World: Climate, Security And Ethics Of Global Governance – Analysis

August 6, 2026

By K.M. Seethi

Key Takeaways:

Climate change is transforming the Arctic into a new arena of geopolitical competition by opening shipping routes, exposing resources and increasing military activity among the US, Russia, NATO, the EU and China.

The region is shifting from post-Cold War cooperation (Arctic Council) to strategic rivalry, creating a security dilemma that raises risks of miscalculation, including in the nuclear domain.

Sustainable Arctic governance requires balancing security interests with environmental protection, scientific cooperation and the rights of the nearly four million people—especially Indigenous communities—who live there.

The Arctic is rapidly becoming one of the principal arenas of twenty-first century geopolitical competition. The retreat of sea ice, driven by accelerating climate change, is opening new maritime routes, exposing vast reserves of hydrocarbons and critical minerals, and expanding access to strategic waters that were once locked beneath permanent ice. What was long regarded as a region of scientific inquiry and environmental conservation has become an area where military strategy, economic interests and great-power rivalry increasingly have assumed considerable importance.

The United States, Russia, NATO and the European Union are expanding their strategic presence across the High North through military deployments, naval exercises, surveillance systems, icebreaker fleets and critical infrastructure projects. China, although not an Arctic state, is steadily broadening its scientific, commercial and technological engagement, viewing the region as an important component of its long-term global strategy. The Arctic has consequently become an arena where geopolitical ambitions increasingly interconnect one of the world’s fastest-changing environments.

This growing competition could be seen against a backdrop of profound ecological transformation. Rising temperatures, thawing permafrost, disappearing sea ice and changing marine ecosystems are changing the physical geography of the Arctic at an unprecedented pace. These environmental changes are creating new economic opportunities while simultaneously increasing ecological vulnerability. As strategic competition intensifies, concerns over environmental protection, Indigenous rights and international cooperation have been overshadowed by military calculations and resource politics.

Climate Change is Transforming the Arctic

Few regions demonstrate the consequences of climate change more clearly than the Arctic. Scientific observations show that the region is warming nearly four times faster than the global average. Rising temperatures have accelerated the melting of sea ice, thawing of permafrost and erosion of Arctic coastlines. These changes are transforming landscapes that have remained relatively stable for thousands of years.

The consequences go beyond the Arctic itself. Melting sea ice is opening new shipping routes that were once inaccessible for much of the year. Areas previously locked beneath permanent ice are attracting growing interest because of their reserves of oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals and other critical resources. Fisheries are also shifting as marine ecosystems respond to warming waters. What was once largely inaccessible has become increasingly reachable, drawing governments, industries and military planners into a region that was previously regarded as geographically remote.

Climate change is also exposing hidden environmental risks. Arctic permafrost contains approximately 1,300 gigatonnes of organic carbon, while marine sediments and river deltas store another 400 gigatonnes. As frozen ground thaws, increasing quantities of this ancient carbon enter Arctic rivers and coastal waters. Recent research from the Alfred Wegener Institute and the University of Bremen offers a more nuanced understanding of this process. Scientists found that although large amounts of carbon are released into the Arctic Ocean, much of it becomes buried in seabed sediments rather than immediately returning to the atmosphere. Microorganisms consume only about 10 per cent of the carbon deposited in marine sediments, while the remainder is stored beneath the seafloor. These findings may improve climate models, although researchers caution that thawing permafrost continues to alter Arctic ecosystems in complex ways that remain poorly understood.


The movement of sediments and organic material is already affecting marine biodiversity. Increased sediment loads reduce the amount of sunlight reaching underwater ecosystems, influencing algae that support fish, crustaceans and marine mammals. The Arctic’s ecological changes therefore extend from microscopic organisms to entire food webs upon which Indigenous communities have depended for generations. Climate change is transforming economic opportunities, transportation networks, ecological systems and political calculations simultaneously.

Climate Change and the Return of Geopolitics

Environmental transformation has coincided with a profound turn in global politics. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, major powers increasingly regard the region as strategically indispensable. The United States has substantially elevated the Arctic within its national security agenda. A striking illustration is President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a programme to construct 11 heavy polar icebreakers through a partnership with Finland, valued at approximately US$7 billion. Trump has long argued that the United States has lagged behind Russia in Arctic capabilities. He frequently contrasts America’s small operational icebreaker fleet with Russia’s 56 polar icebreakers and China’s growing Arctic presence.


The administration argues that expanded icebreaking capacity is essential for protecting American interests as shipping routes expand and strategic competition intensifies. Critics, however, question both the scale of the programme and the procurement process. The United States Coast Guard’s own assessment had concluded that four or five heavy icebreakers would adequately meet operational requirements. Independent analysts have also questioned whether sufficient long-term funding exists to maintain such a large fleet after construction.

The renewed American interest goes beyond ships. President Trump has repeatedly expressed interest in Greenland, arguing that its location gives it exceptional strategic value for North American security. These remarks have generated unease in Greenland, Denmark and among several European allies, who fear that the Arctic is increasingly being viewed primarily through the prism of strategic competition rather than partnership.

The European Union has also reassessed its Arctic outlook. A recent policy brief argues that the Union’s 2021 Arctic Strategy recommends treating the Arctic, North Atlantic and Baltic Sea as a single strategic theatre. It calls for greater investment in surveillance systems, satellites, underwater autonomous technologies, critical infrastructure and Arctic communications, while also reducing European dependence on imported critical minerals. The report further argues that climate change should be understood as a security multiplier because it increases military activity, exposes critical infrastructure and opens new navigation routes. At the same time, it emphasises that Europe must continue supporting Indigenous communities and sustainable regional development alongside its expanding security agenda.

A Changing Security Landscape

The transformation of the Arctic is equally evident in military planning. NATO has significantly expanded its presence following the accession of Finland and Sweden, bringing seven of the eight Arctic states within the Alliance. New initiatives such as Arctic Sentry, Forward Land Forces Finland, expanded Iceland Air Policing and the establishment of a Combined Air Operations Centre in northern Norway illustrate an effort to improve surveillance, interoperability and operational readiness across the High North.

Military cooperation has also become increasingly sophisticated. The United States and Norway have intensified joint coast guard operations, naval exercises and the testing of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles capable of operating in Arctic conditions. Maritime exercises now routinely involve multiple Arctic partners, reflecting a growing emphasis on coordinated responses across the North Atlantic and Arctic waters.

For NATO, these measures respond primarily to Russia’s expanding military infrastructure, renewed activity on the Kola Peninsula and increasing cooperation between Russia and China. From Moscow’s perspective, however, NATO’s enlargement and expanding military presence represent a direct challenge to Russian security. The result is a classic security dilemma in which each side justifies its own military expansion as defensive while interpreting the other’s actions as threatening.

The Arctic is consequently becoming an arena where climate change and strategic rivalry reinforce one another. Melting sea ice opens new opportunities for navigation and resource extraction. Those opportunities encourage greater military presence. Increased military activity, in turn, raises the risk of miscalculation in a region where communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms have weakened considerably.

The Arctic’s Emerging Nuclear Dimension

The Arctic has long occupied a central place in the strategic calculations of nuclear powers. Much of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is concentrated in the High North, including strategic submarines, missile early-warning systems and major military installations. During the Cold War, the region formed one of the principal frontiers of nuclear competition. Today, climate change is altering the physical environment in which these strategic systems operate.

The retreat of sea ice is making Arctic waters more accessible to naval forces while simultaneously changing submarine operating conditions. Military vessels from several countries are likely to encounter one another more frequently in increasingly navigable waters. Such encounters increase the possibility of misunderstanding, accidents or escalation between nuclear-armed states. The Arctic is therefore becoming an area where environmental change and strategic instability intersect.

Another concern lies beneath the thawing ground itself. Large quantities of radioactive waste remain buried in former Soviet military sites, including areas around Novaya Zemlya and locations where decommissioned nuclear submarines were disposed of during the Cold War. Rising temperatures and thawing permafrost may expose or destabilise these contaminated sites, creating environmental hazards whose long-term consequences remain uncertain.

The enlargement of NATO has further altered the Arctic security system. With Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance, almost the entire Arctic now falls within NATO’s collective defence framework, while Russia continues to strengthen its military infrastructure across its northern territories. Some European policymakers have also reopened discussions on strengthening independent nuclear deterrence in response to growing uncertainty about long-term American security commitments. These developments suggest that climate change, conventional military competition and nuclear security increasingly reinforce one another, demanding new approaches to governance and risk reduction.

From Cooperation to Strategic Competition

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, the Arctic was widely regarded as an example of constructive international cooperation. The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 created a forum where the eight Arctic states worked together on scientific research, environmental protection and sustainable development despite wider political differences. Indigenous organisations also gained an unprecedented institutional voice through their participation as Permanent Participants.

That cooperative spirit has weakened considerably. Relations deteriorated after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and reached a new low following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ministerial cooperation within the Arctic Council has largely stalled, while scientific collaboration has become increasingly difficult. Institutions that once encouraged dialogue now struggle to function amid growing geopolitical tensions.

At the same time, security concerns have moved to the forefront of Arctic policy. NATO has expanded its operational presence, while Arctic governments have strengthened surveillance systems, military exercises and maritime coordination. The European Union has proposed integrating Arctic security more closely with defence planning, critical infrastructure protection and industrial policy. Hybrid threats—including repeated damage to submarine communication cables and other critical infrastructure—have reinforced the perception that the Arctic is inevitably a part of the geopolitical confrontations.

The danger is that military preparedness, while understandable in an uncertain security environment, may gradually replace dialogue as the dominant language of Arctic governance. Without sustained diplomatic engagement, confidence-building measures and scientific cooperation, the region has become another arena where rivalry overshadows shared responsibility.

Listening to the People of the Arctic

Amid discussions of military strategy, shipping routes and critical minerals, one reality is often overlooked: the Arctic is home to nearly four million people. For Indigenous communities, including the Sámi, Inuit and many others, the Arctic is neither a strategic frontier nor an economic opportunity. It is home, history and identity.

Finnish Arctic scholar Markku Heikkilä argues that the future of the North cannot be decided solely by governments, military planners or corporations. Decisions about infrastructure, mining and resource development must also reflect the knowledge and aspirations of the people who have lived in the Arctic for generations. The debate surrounding the proposed Sakatti copper-nickel mine in Finnish Lapland illustrates these tensions. While the project could contribute to Europe’s demand for critical minerals, it also threatens ecologically sensitive wetlands protected under the Natura 2000 network and raises concerns among reindeer-herding communities. Similar dilemmas are emerging across the Arctic as governments seek greater access to minerals considered essential for the global energy transition.

These debates remind us that sustainable development must be evaluated by its effects on ecosystems, cultural continuity and community well-being. Indigenous knowledge, accumulated over centuries of living in demanding Arctic environments, remains indispensable for understanding ecological change and promoting sustainable governance. The Arctic therefore requires a model of development that places local communities alongside governments and scientists in shaping public policy.

Towards an Ethics of Stewardship

The Arctic raises questions that are more significant unlike geopolitical concerns. It challenges humanity to reconsider its relationship with nature at a time when environmental change is unfolding faster than political institutions can respond. Climate change has demonstrated that ecological systems do not recognise political boundaries. Carbon released from thawing permafrost, rising sea levels and changing ocean currents affect societies far beyond the Arctic Circle.

An ethical approach begins by recognising that security goes beyond military capability. Genuine security also depends on ecological stability, scientific cooperation, respect for Indigenous rights and responsible stewardship of natural resources. Policies that treat the Arctic merely as a theatre for strategic competition would accelerate the very instability they seek to prevent.

Even during periods of political disagreement, scientific cooperation has often remained one of the few channels through which trust can be sustained. Collaborative research on climate change, biodiversity, marine ecosystems and environmental monitoring should therefore be strengthened rather than weakened by geopolitical tensions.

There is also a compelling case for renewing multilateral dialogue. Several scholars have proposed complementary mechanisms involving governments, military officials, coast guards, scientists and Indigenous representatives to address practical concerns such as maritime safety, environmental emergencies, nuclear risk reduction and search-and-rescue cooperation. Such initiatives will not eliminate strategic competition, but they can reduce the risk of misunderstanding and encourage confidence-building where formal diplomacy has become difficult.

The upshot is that the we cannot allow Arctic to become another arena where environmental change is viewed primarily as an opportunity for strategic gain. We should, instead, remind the international community that ecological responsibility and peaceful cooperation remain indispensable foundations of global security.


About K.M. Seethi

K.M. Seethi is Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU), Kerala. He also served as ICSSR Senior Fellow, Senior Professor of International Relations and Dean of Social Sciences at MGU. One of his latest works is "ENDURING DILEMMA Flashpoints in Kashmir and India-Pakistan Relations."
View all posts by K.M. Seethi →

Fish over Trump: Economy will determine Iceland's vote on the EU

Copyright AP Photo

By Vincenzo Genovese

Published on 07/08/2026 - EURONEWS

While Arctic security and US claims over Greenland dominate international headlines, Icelanders are set to decide their European future on far more familiar grounds such as fish and farming. The 29 August referendum is less about geopolitics than sovereignty and identity.

Blue whiting, mackerel and golden redfish could prove more decisive at the ballot box than US President Donald Trump's expansionist ambitions, Russia's looming threats or European politicians' sweet nothings.

In Iceland, where the sea shapes the economy, livelihoods and national identity, the most significant crossroads of the last decade ultimately comes down to one thing: fish.

On 29 August, Icelanders will vote on whether to resume negotiations to join the European Union, restarting a process that was frozen in 2013. If voters approve, negotiations with Brussels will kick off again – with the prospect of joining the EU sooner than other countries on the waiting list.

At first glance, the geopolitical timing seems obvious. The United States' renewed interest in Greenland, combined with the long war in Ukraine, has pushed the Arctic higher on Europe's strategic agenda, while Icelanders appear increasingly caught between two great powers.

Yet beneath the headlines, the campaign tells a different story. This referendum is being fought over economics, sovereignty and, above all, control of Iceland's fishing grounds, according to Eirikur Bergmann, politics professor at Bifröst University and one of the country's best-known political writers.

“Icelanders are split in half,” he said, arguing that public debate still centres, as it always has, on the benefits of adopting the euro and the risks facing the fishing industry.

Fishermen's concerns are Iceland's concerns

While fishing's share of Iceland's GDP is declining, it still accounted for about 8% in 2024. It remains one of the country's largest export industries and the backbone of many coastal communities.

This isn't the first time Icelanders have fought over the sea: during the three “Cod Wars” between 1958 and 1976, Reykjavík successfully defended its maritime claims against the United Kingdom.

Today, the threat comes from the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which manages fishing resources among member states. The “shared fish stocks” that fall under the jurisdiction of more than one state, with a division of catch quotas, are the biggest concern for the Icelandic fishing industry, prompting exemptions or special arrangements if the country joins the EU.

Iceland's fishing industry is indeed built around one of the world's most sophisticated quota systems. It sets scientifically based catch limits and allocates fishing rights to each vessel, with quotas that can also be traded.

For fishermen in coastal towns such as Ísafjörður or Vestmannaeyjar, local media report that the question is not only how much fish Iceland can catch, but also who should have the right to decide who catches it.

As Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir said in a recent interview, fisheries and agriculture are likely to become the toughest chapters in any renewed accession talks.

Like fishermen, Iceland's farmers also operate under one of Europe's most protected agricultural systems, supported by public subsidies designed to compensate for the country's harsh climate and small domestic market.

For them, the feared acronym is CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), the EU agriculture overhaul which distributes subsidies according to common rules and could disrupt the entire domestic system.

Supporters of EU integration are also betting on economic advantages for their campaign.

The biggest is the eventual adoption of the euro. This would eliminate exchange-rate volatility caused by the Icelandic krona, bringing down inflation, interest rates and the cost of international trade, as highlighted in a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A referendum born by chance

This renewed interest in Europe is not a response to Trump's repeated statements about Greenland and expansion ambitions in the Arctic region.

While the United States has long been Iceland's principal security guarantor through NATO and cooperation with the EU becomes more attractive if Washington becomes less predictable, the security issue has neither shaped domestic politics nor is it dominating the discussion on the referendum.

“I wouldn't say that has properly filtered into the debate yet,” Bergmann said, arguing that the country decided to hold the referendum after the 2024 election.

“This is prior to the second term of Donald Trump and prior to these geopolitical changes. The security defence issue was not a part of that decision,” he said.

The referendum is the consequence of a change in government rather than a dramatic shift in public opinion.

A Eurosceptic coalition came to power in 2013, suspending negotiations and later withdrawing Iceland's application altogether, without consulting the electorate. The pendulum swung back in 2024, and a coalition of pro-European parties pledged to let Icelanders decide whether negotiations should resume.

“The only reason Iceland is moving ahead now is that we have a change in government. But the EU question had nothing to do with these parties coming to power,” Bergmann said.

He believes this explains why opinion polls remain finely balanced, with Icelanders revisiting a question that has divided the country since the early 2000s.

Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin may have reminded Iceland that the international order is changing, but voters entering polling stations are likely to think less about Greenland or Russia's ambitions in the Arctic than about domestic economic concerns.

Related

• Iceland wary of Brexit-like 'lies' ahead of EU referendum, says foreign minister

A clear path to the EU

While Icelanders remain divided over whether negotiations should even resume, Iceland would probably face a smoother accession process than many candidate countries in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe.

Iceland is already deeply integrated into Europe: it's a member of the single market through the European Economic Area (EEA), and enjoys free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the Schengen area.

Negotiations would not start from scratch, but would be built on the results of the previous agreements.

By the time Iceland withdrew its application in 2013, 27 negotiating chapters had been opened, 11 of which had been provisionally closed.

If negotiations resume, the European Commission will first need to assess the legislative changes that have taken place in Iceland over the past decade before discussions can formally restart.

“Beyond the technicalities, it is clear that Iceland would be going into the negotiations one step ahead, compared to another candidate country,” an EU official told Euronews.

The Nordic country is also largely aligned with the EU on democratic standards, according to Valérie Hayer, leader of the liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament and one of the staunchest supporters of Iceland’s accession.

“It is already a highly capable democratic partner (which) shares common values and (which) already plays a pivotal role in North Atlantic security,” she said, claiming that adding Reykjavík would reinforce the EU’s geopolitical reach.

European politicians and EU officials stressed that Iceland has nothing to lose in EU membership talks and that joining the Union poses no threat to the Icelandic language: it would enjoy the same official status as other EU languages, despite being spoken by fewer than 400,000 people.

Even so, for many Icelanders, the referendum on Europe raises deeper questions of identity. Some fear joining a supranational institution would result in a gradual erosion of Iceland's political autonomy, a particularly sensitive issue for a country that achieved full independence from Denmark in the 20th century.

The future of Iceland's relationship with Europe may ultimately depend on emotional considerations, another EU official familiar with the matter told Euronews.

“Voting will take place on the mainland, but people will vote looking at the sea.”

 

The Russia, Ukraine drone war shifts to crippling ports

The escalating drone war between Russia and Ukraine has shifted to crippling ports and as the missile gap between the two adversiries narrows, both sides are feeling the pain. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 1, 2026

Ukraine's long-range drone campaign has entered a new phase, shifting from attacks on Russia's military infrastructure to systematic strikes on the commercial ports, grain terminals and oil export facilities that underpin both Moscow's wartime economy and Kazakhstan's energy exports.

Russia has countered by targeting Ukraine’s six commercial ports of which Odesa is the key transport asset that accounts for two thirds of Ukraine’s seaborne exports by volume and half by value.

Both Ukraine’s and Russia’s ports have already been brought to standstills that will hurt export revenues and has already caused Ferrexpo, a leading Ukrainian metallurgical plant, to shut down production as its warehouses are full to bursting. Russian exports of oil are likely to be impacted as well, although it has several alternative export channels to ease the pressure.

Attacks are escalating as part of the unfolding brutal tit-for-tat missile war and have simultaneously disrupted Russia's two most important Black Sea export businesses: agricultural exports and crude oil shipments.

On July 30, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) again suspended tanker loadings at its marine terminal near Novorossiysk after Ukrainian drones struck two oil tankers waiting to load crude. Hours earlier, Ukrainian analyst Kyrylo Shevchenko reported that Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and Ukraine's own strikes on Russian grain terminals had left both sides' Black Sea trade under increasing pressure.

Kyiv is widening its economic warfare strategy beyond refineries to target the logistics network that moves Russia's most valuable exports. As IntelliNews reported, Ukraine's strategy of attacking Russia’s oil refineries has settled into a routine of damage, repair and restart that make for spectacular headlines, but after having reduced the throughput by an estimated 45%, according to the Financial Times, has seen the fuel crisis abate in the last weeks as Russia imports petrol from friendly states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and India. As oil analyst Sergey Vakulenko put it in a recent paper: Russia oil refinery sector is battered but not broken.

Vakhtang Partsvania argued in a comment for Riddle Russia that Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, has become dissatisfied with its previous strategy of hitting oil refineries is working terminals, such as the week-long attacks on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, which temporarily reduce traffic, but the damage can be quickly repaired and the port soon goes back to work, as tank farms are designed to lose individual tanks rather than whole facilities, and loadings usually resume once pipeline and rail links survive, says Partsvania.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has refined its strategy, using new and more accurate long-range “sanctions”, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has taken to calling them: Ukraine has been aiming at the more sophisticated and difficult to replace equipment in the refineries that is starting to put them out of action completely. For example, the Moscow refinery was hit in May and will not come back online until the start of next year, Reuters reports.

Economic costs mount

With its limited access to the sea, the Russian counteroffensive is hurting Ukraine more than the pain Ukraine is inflicting on Russia. Every day that Greater Odesa's ports remain idle costs an estimated $70mn in delayed exports, according to Shevchenko. In June alone the three ports handled $2.1bn of exports out of Ukraine's total monthly exports of $3.5bn.

During the first half of 2026, 34mn tonnes of cargo—roughly two-thirds of Ukraine's total exports of 50.7mn tonnes—passed through Greater Odesa, which also handles around 60% of Ukraine's cross-border cargo traffic. Russian attacks have already eliminated roughly one-third of Ukraine's Black Sea grain export capacity. That comes at a time where the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) already says there is a $20bn hole in the budget thanks to inflated defence costs.

Still, the pain to Russia is also significant, at a time when its economy has slowed sharply and the budget deficit is swelling alarmingly. Three of the country's largest Black Sea grain terminals—NZT and KSK in Novorossiysk and ZTKT at Taman, together capable of handling more than 20mn tonnes annually—have restricted truck deliveries following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks. According to Shevchenko, operations at Taman have effectively stopped, while shipping through the Sea of Azov has largely frozen.

The impact is now starting to show up in the export statistics. Russian wheat exports in July fell to just 1.5mn tonnes, their lowest monthly level since 2017 and roughly one-third below the same month last year. The decline threatens between $10bn and $15bn of annual grain trade if disruptions continue. Moscow is exploring alternative export routes through the Baltic and Caspian Seas, but Shevchenko says there is so far little evidence that those corridors are absorbing the lost Black Sea volumes.

CPC in the firing line

The innocent bystander in this slugfest is Kazakhstan which sends 80% of its oil to international markets via the CPC pipeline and the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

The CPC said drones struck the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Nissos Sifnos, which was loading Tengiz crude from the consortium's Single Point Mooring-3 at the weekend. The attack ignited a fire near the vessel's cargo manifolds before being extinguished by the crew with assistance from three CPC support vessels.

A second tanker, the Isle of Man-flagged Marathi, was attacked around six nautical miles from the terminal while approaching to load. CPC said neither vessel suffered casualties or oil spills and both remained afloat, but loading operations were suspended once again while inspections continue.

The consortium made an unusually pointed political statement, noting that the attacks had occurred despite repeated appeals from Astana and other international shareholders—including approaches made through the US State Department—calling for international energy infrastructure not to be targeted.

The terminal occupies a unique position in Eurasian energy markets. Although located on Russia's Black Sea coast, the 1,511km CPC pipeline primarily exports crude from western Kazakhstan. Its shareholders include Transneft, KazMunayGas, and subsidiaries of Chevron (NYSE: CVX), ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM), Lukoil and a Rosneft-Shell joint venture. Every disruption therefore affects Kazakhstan's export revenues as much as Russia's, highlighting the increasingly international economic consequences of the conflict.

Taken together, the Black Sea has become one of the war's principal economic battlefields on a par with the twin closure of the global chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab at the end of the Red Sea.

For much of the conflict, Ukraine focused on breaking Russia's naval blockade and reopening its own export corridor from Odesa. Russia, meanwhile, repeatedly attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure in an effort to choke Kyiv's agricultural and metal exports and the Ukrainian economy is already beginning to shut down as a result. Ukraine continues to lose export revenue every day its ports are disrupted, while Russia's own grain terminals, oil export infrastructure and shipping are increasingly exposed to Zelenskiy’s long-range “sanctions” after the formal EU and US sanctions have delivered little to pressure Putin into talks.

Despite Russia’s clear advantage in the drones vs missiles arms race and Kyiv’s nearly exhausted supply of PAC-3 interceptor missiles, neither side appears capable of protecting its commercial maritime infrastructure completely. Both now face the same difficult choice: absorb the economic cost of interrupted trade or reroute exports through longer, more expensive overland and alternative maritime corridors.

The result is that the economic war in the Black Sea is becoming increasingly symmetrical. At the same time Ukraine’s missile development programme is also rapidly closing the gap with Russia as new classes of long-range and more powerful missiles appear such as the famed Flamingo cruise missile, which is already in service, and the F-9, Ukraine’s first true cruise missile, that is expected to appear at the end of this year.

What began as an attempt to blockade Ukraine's exports has evolved into a contest in which ports, grain terminals, oil tankers and shipping lanes on both sides of the sea have become legitimate military targets, raising the cost of trade for Moscow and Kyiv alike.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks On Refineries Far From Only Threat To Russia’s Oil Industry – Analysis


An oil refinery in Kstovo, in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod region, is seen burning after a Ukrainian strike. Photo Credit: Generalstaff.ua, RFE/RL

July 31, 2026
By Paul Goble

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry. Other, less dramatic threats are likely to prove more significant.

Much of Russia’s pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks, reducing the flow of oil to refineries and export markets on which the Kremlin relies while fueling growing anger among Russians.

As older fields are exhausted, Russia is being forced to develop new ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure and collapse and requires money Moscow lacks or refuses to spend to prevent new disasters.

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry and even to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s standing (see EDM, December 22, 2025, July10, 14). Other underlying threats, while less dramatic so far, may prove more significant, as they could reduce Russia’s production and earnings over time (see EDM, June 25).

Much of Russia’s domestic pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating largely from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks that reduce the flow of oil over the longer term to refineries as well as to export markets on which the Kremlin relies, while sparking ever more domestic anger among Russians (Window on Eurasia, April 14, 2024, July 24; Novye Izvestia, June 24, 2025; Meduza, September 3, 2025; Arctida, July 14). As Russia’s older fields are exhausted, it is being forced to develop new and more distant ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure collapse and requires money Moscow does not have or is unwilling to spend to prevent new disasters (Window on Eurasia, August 18, 2021, May 17, December 6, 2025; see EDM, March 4, 2025; Nasha Versia, February 10).

To keep public alarm over the current crisis from spreading to these deeper, longer-term problems, the Russian government has played down these risks, blocking coverage of many of these developments in the central media and even ending the release of data that could allow others to track and report on what is happening (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, March 22, 2023; IStories, July 14, 2025).


Environmental activists, both in Russia and internationally, have been sounding the alarm and documenting their concerns with evidence drawn from government sources, where leaks of another kind are also a problem for the Kremlin. The most prominent coverage of the oil industry’s problems has come from the Bellona organization in Norway, which gained fame for reporting on Soviet-era dumping of nuclear waste in the Arctic, and from Arctida, a Russian émigré group that tracks developments in the northern regions of the Russian Federation (The Moscow Times, March 31; Arctida, July 14). Arctida’s coverage is significant for tracking problems in the Russian oil industry that extend beyond the refineries Ukrainian drones have destroyed.

In the wake of those attacks, Raya Levashova, climate and environment analyst at Arсtida, has drawn particular attention to these broader problems. More than half of Russia’s 250,000-kilometer (155,342-mile) oil pipeline network is worn out, she notes, and should be repaired or replaced because leaks are now a significant problem. In some places, as much as 80 percent of the oil-carrying infrastructure needs to be replaced now (Arctida, July 14). She adds that, in 2023, the last year Moscow released such data, there were 14,716 major pipeline ruptures, spilling oil into the surrounding environment, contaminating it and limiting the flow of oil to refineries. That figure, already alarming, has almost certainly grown since then, which explains why Moscow has worked so hard to keep such information under wraps.


The Arctida analyst says worse is yet to come as the number of such leaks will skyrocket in the coming years as Rosneft builds a new 9,000-kilometer (5,592-mile) network in the Russian Far North, where it is developing new fields. This pipeline system will be new and thus avoid the problems of aging infrastructure, yet global warming, melting permafrost, and the company’s unwillingness or inability to spend the money needed to ensure its stability could certainly increase the risk of leaks. Rosneft is upbeat about the new routes, saying shipments from the Taymyr Peninsula will begin this September. Levashova sees little reason to accept those claims. Only 700 kilometers (435 miles) of the projected 9,000 kilometers (5,592 miles) have been laid as of June, and the company faces serious problems coping with global warming’s impact on pipeline stability (Arctida, July 14).

Levashova says environmentalists such as her are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will rise dramatically and harm the fragile ecosystems of the High North. Rosneft’s approach, she argues, is based on the assumption that environmental conditions will remain stable rather than deteriorate, despite scientific projections. Even pipeline segments that are stable today will be at risk as temperatures rise and the permafrost melts further. Specifically, the relatively inexpensive but low-capacity thermosyphons (passive heat exchange systems that allow for the circulation of air in the ground) that the company is installing will no longer work effectively since they rely on larger differences between air and ground temperatures than those already present in many places in the Russian North and expected across the entire region in only a few years (Arctida, July 14).

Even “at current rates of warming,” she concludes, “localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. In addition, this crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.” She points out that the Russian government has failed to impose fines stiff enough to discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners, thereby allowing the companies to build in ways that make accidents more likely. Moscow has instead reduced rather than strengthened environmental protections and enforcement (Novaya Gazeta, June 24). As Levashova puts it, “It is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters (Arctida, July 14).


Taken together, these trends mean the oil crisis in the Russian Federation will not end even if Ukrainian attacks on refineries do, unless Moscow redirects spending to ensure its pipelines and tankers are safe. The Putin regime is unlikely to take those steps, even with prices remaining high due to the U.S. conflict with Iran. The consequences for the Russian economy and for people across the Russian Federation—first in the Far North, then more broadly—could be enormous and, over time, exceed those of the current Ukrainian drone attacks (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, September 22, 2023; Arctida, March 25, 2025; East Russia, May 13, 2025; Caspy.Land, July 9).

This article was published by the Jamestown Foundation

About Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
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Fire reported at another Wildberries warehouse in Russia

Copyright AP photo

By Nathan Rennolds

Published on 02/08/2026 EURONEWS

Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.

A fire broke out at a Wildberries warehouse in Russia's Samara region on Sunday following an attack, the company's press service has said.

In a post on Telegram, the Russian online retailer said there were currently no reported casualties and that "logistics chains have been reorganised."

"The receipt of deliveries and dispatch of orders are now being handled at other facilities," it added.

Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.

In July, Ukrainian forces targeted multiple Wildberries logistics facilities across Russia as part of Kyiv's "long-range sanctions" against Moscow, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy saying the warehouses were involved in supplying drone parts and navigation equipment for the Russian military.

Wildberries was founded in 2004 by Russian billionaire Tatyana Kim and has gone on to become the country's largest online marketplace. Products offered on its website now include items such as knives, helmets, camouflage, and night-vision devices.

Russian strikes on Ukraine

In a social media post on Sunday, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched around 1,900 drones, roughly 1,600 aerial bombs, and 144 missiles against 16 regions of Ukraine this week.

"Today, Sumy was struck by aerial bombs. In Brovary, one person was killed in a drone strike, and six people were injured," he wrote.

The Ukrainian air force said Russia attacked Ukraine with 133 drones and loitering munitions overnight.

Firefighters put out a fire at a major book warehouse following Russian drone strikes in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Saturday, Aug. 1, 2026. Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved

"According to preliminary data, as of 8:00 am, air defences had shot down or neutralised 109 enemy UAVs of the Shahed, Gerber, and Italmas types, ‘Banderole’ loitering munitions and other types of drones in the north, south and east of the country," the air force said in a statement.

Ukrainian forces targeted Russia's Saratov oil refinery and Engels military air base overnight, per Zelenskyy. An oil depot in the Kaluga region and a facility involved in the storage of attack drones in Brysansk were also hit, he added.

Zelenskyy renews calls for Patriot missiles

It comes as the Ukrainian leader made a fresh plea for more Patriot interceptors.

The US-made Patriot is one of the world's most advanced air defence systems and can be used to defend against ballistic and cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and aircraft. The coveted system is expensive and limited in supply, but it is seen by Kyiv as crucial to success in its fight against Russian President Vladimir Putin's invading forces.

"The world has Patriot missiles," Zelenskyy said on Saturday evening. "What matters now is for our partners to make the political decision to provide the necessary packages. The United States knows what we need. Europe knows what we need. Anti-ballistic missiles must protect people – not sit in stockpiles."

On Friday, US President Donald Trump appeared to go back on a promise to let Kyiv build its own Patriot missiles.

"We have not agreed to that. We're talking about it. But it's a hard thing to give away that kind of technology," Trump said during a cabinet meeting - despite having told Zelenskyy at the 2026 NATO summit in Turkey that Washington would give Ukraine a license to build Patriots.

"We'll show them how to do it," Trump said at the summit in July, adding: "This way you can't complain that we're not giving them enough."