NORTH KOREA NUKE FREE 

White House: Military Preparations 'Underway' for North Korea 

Which means TRUMP is bullying HIS way again 

into a Masculine Show of Force for Poll Ratings 

ITS A GOOD THING THAT NORTH KOREA 

HAS NEITHER NUKES NOR EFFECTIVE MISSILES 

                              Do They Even Work? The Sad Saga of North Korea's 

                                  SERIOUSLY BECAUSE IF THE ATM'S DON'T WORK 

WHY WOULD YOU THINK THEIR NUKES OR MISSILES

                     

PYONGYANG, North Korea — No modern airport terminal is complete without an ATM, and Pyongyang's now has two. But they don't work — because of new Chinese sanctions, according to bank employees — and it's not clear when they will.
ATMs are an alien enough concept in North Korea that those in the capital's shiny new Sunan International Airport have a video screen near the top showing how they work and how to set up an account to use them. The explanatory video is in Korean, but the machines, which are meant primarily for Chinese businesspeople and tourists, don't give out cash in the North Korean currency.
ATMs are not entirely new to the North.
Years ago, the Ryugyong Commercial Bank installed one in a midrange tourist hotel in central Pyongyang frequented by Chinese. Another ATM was spotted at the airport last year, but it never appeared to be turned on.

Since North Korea set off its second alleged nuclear test over a decade ago I have asked a simple question, where is the radiation signature identifying it as a nuclear blast.  I first brought it up here , and have continued to post my thesis that North Korea is Nuke Free on my Facebook News page.

Simply put no nuclear test done by North Korea over the past decade and a half, 
has emitted any significant detectable radiation associated with a nuclear blast.
There is no detection of radiation immediately after the blast, nor for days nor weeks later. In fact only trace amounts have been found no more so than would occur after a volcanic eruption for instance. I GOOGLE it on a regular basis and still have found no significant report on radiation detected. YOU SHOULD GOOGLE IT TOO

When is an earthquake not an earthquake? How we'll find out when North Korea conducts its next nuclear test

 Nuclear weapons are so powerful that when North Korea has tested them previously, it initially produced what appeared to be an "earthquake" measuring around magnitude 5.0.In September last year, a 5.3 magnitude tremor was recorded not far from North Korea's testing facility in Punggye-ri, in the country's mountainous north-east.That "earthquake" was quickly deemed to have been the rogue state's fifth nuclear test, another step towards its stated goal of building a nuclear weapon that could reach the US.It followed an earlier test in January, of what North Korea claimed was a "miniature hydrogen bomb". That exercise triggered what initially appeared to be a 5.1 magnitude earthquake.

North Korea has conducted its recent nuclear tests by placing the nuclear device hundreds of metres below ground in a narrow hole and detonating it.

While most of the radiation generated stays below ground, some can escape or is deliberately released.
Two weeks after the September test, a monitoring station in Canada, more than 7000km downwind of North Korea's test site, detected elevated airborne levels of a radioactive isotope produced by nuclear fission.

A tell-tail sign it's a nuclear explosion and not a natural earthquake is by observing the depth of the, "shake". Natural quakes originate from far under the ground. The epicenter of a nuclear bomb's localized quake is right at the surface.
For comparison, a natural quake today near Fuji registered 5.8 magnitude at 285 miles deep. A September 9, 2016 nuclear bomb test in North Korea registered a 5.3 on the Richter scale at 0.0 km (0.0 miles) deep.

Making WavesBut whether there’s fury behind the sound is still in question. Whatever North Korea blew up, it did so underground. Which is why the specific characteristics of seismic energy are among the most important analytical factors in finding out exactly what made the earth move. “When you squeeze or stretch a rock, it propagates just like sound does,” says Terry Wallace, a Principal Associate Director for Global Security. Practically speaking, Wallace is a forensic seismologist, solving geopolitical mysteries by looking at signatures in the earth.Explosions, volcanic eruptions, and underground collapses predominantly compress rock, creating what’s called a P-wave. Earthquakes, which usually happen when two pieces of rock slip past each other, cause shearing and twisting that create S-waves. “Imagine you have a slinky. If you hit just one end of it, the slinky compresses, then releases in a wave from source to receiver,” says Wallace, describing a P-wave. “In an S-wave, you are actually going to shake the slinky from side to side.” Seismograph wiggles record shaking in three dimensions, which give telltale signs of what kind of waves come out.

North Korea conducted yet another nuclear test on Sept. 8, and it was seemingly the country's most powerful Registering some 10 kilotons, according to reports from South Korea, the blast was apparently twice as powerful as the last test in January. Both are significant increases in explosive power from the first North Korean test in October 2006, which U.S. intelligence officials estimated to be around 1 kiloton.

Again we have reports early on of peoples worries about radiation but none is reported 

Japan confirms North Korea carried out its fifth and largest nuclear test yet 

  N Korean nuclear test raises fallout fears on China’s border, emergency monitoring activated 

Even when radiation is claimed to be found indicating a potential use of nuclear material, 

these are inconclusive because the testing for underground blasts is difficult and the technology is still being worked on.

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications Jonathan Medalia Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy November 24, 2010

There are several uncertainties regarding the use of argon-37 for long-range detection of nuclear explosions. First, what is the background level of that isotope from natural and human sources? While the background appears to be low, a definitive conclusion would require further study. Second, can an automated system for detecting this isotope be designed and fielded? While it can be detected in the laboratory, or in the field using manual equipment, an automated system would be needed if detectors are to be placed at remote locations, such as IMS radionuclide stations. Carrigan notes a third uncertainty: the detectability of argon-37 would depend on the rate at which it reaches the surface. If a nuclear test released a large quantity promptly, the isotope would be much easier to detect at long range than if it were released over days or weeks. Radioactive isotopes of xenon (“radioxenons”) are of great value for long-range detection, and the noble gas detection equipment deployed at some IMS radionuclide stations monitors only for them.51 They are produced by nuclear explosions and nuclear reactors. Nuclear explosions also generate iodine-133 (half-life, 20.8 hours) and iodine-135 (half-life, 6.6 hours), which decay into xenon-133 and xenon-135, respectively. Radioxenons can be detected in minute quantities at great distances, but such detection must be accomplished soon after a nuclear test because of short half-lives. The half-life of xenon-133, an isotope of particular value for identifying nuclear explosions, is 5.24 days, so long-range detection can only be done within about 3 weeks of a test.52 The other radioxenons of use for monitoring nuclear tests are xenon-135 (half-life, 9.14 hours), xenon-133m (half-life, 2.19 days), and xenon-131m (half-life, 11.84 days).53 53 Half-life data are from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, “Exploring the Table of Isotopes: Isotopes of Xenon (Z=54),” http://ie.lbl.gov/education/parent/Xe_iso.htm. Xenon-131m is of limited value for detecting nuclear explosions because they generate very little of it, and because, given its longer half-life, it is often in the background, at least regionally, generated by nuclear reactors or medical isotope production reactors. Lars-Erik De Geer, “Radioxenon signatures from underground nuclear explosions,” poster for the International Scientific Studies Project, Vienna, Austria, June 10-12, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISS_2009/Poster/RN-22D%20%28Sweden%29%20-%20LarsErik_DeGeer.pdf. The “m” in xenon-131m and 

North Korea nuclear test: No radiation detected
14 February 2013
 South Korean experts say they have not detected any radioactive isotopes from North Korea's nuclear test, hampering efforts to assess the device.Eight samples had been analysed but nothing found, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission said.
Finding certain isotopes - xenon gases in particular - would help experts determine whether a plutonium or uranium-based device was used.
But a well-contained test could yield no radioactive isotopes, experts say.
 

 And again we have a blast, this time claimed to be the much more powerful hydrogen bomb
and yet we have no proof.

North Korea later announced it had conducted its first successful test of a hydrogen bomb.H-bombs, also known as thermonuclear warheads, are massively more powerful than atomic bombs, using fusion - the merging of atoms - rather than fission to unleash enormous amounts of energy.
Though again it has never been confirmed,

a similar blast and quake reaction as a small kilo-tonne nuke.  So far all the tests have been of very small bombs, between .5 KT and 1 KT similar to the nuke tests before the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans.

This kiloton blast can be produced using what is called Ultra High Explosives, and in fact these are as secret as nuclear weapons are in the international market place,

you in fact saw one go off in Afghanistan last week it was called the Mother of All Bombs MOAB or GBU-GB43  George Bush 43, and it was an Ultra High Explosive; GBU.

Such a bomb is what the North Koreans could be using to imitate a Nuclear blast, 
and why would they go to all the trouble to do that?

Well for one its far easier to sell undetected and North Korea is a major illegal arms dealer who sells missiles, and explosive ordinances for them. 

And two its all about face. Each generation of North Korean Great Leader, carries on the threat of Nuclear war against the West, encouraged as they were by General MacArthur who recommended using nukes against them during the Korean War. After that they knew

directly, so close after the bombing of civilians in Japan with US atomic bombs. the fear 

of the power of the idea of nuclear weapons and the resulting nuclear war.

Granddad and Dad worked on it during the Seventies, then Dad occasionally would

threaten the West, usually when they needed help for famines, which in true Stalinist fashion they spent inordinate amounts of time denying. 

Grandson Kim Jong Un becomes New Glorious Leader and Great Helmsman

and he discovers that under his dads rule the family dominated the regimes politics.

Then he discovered the horrible secret, they had no nukes it was all a fient, while

they tried to develop them and the delivery systems for them.

Outraged Un did what all Stalinist leaders do and he Purged and purged, and purged

all those inner circle family members responsible for the big Lie.

The use of Ultra High Explosive bomb underground blasts gave the impression of

Un rapidly trying to develop weapons of mass destruction to threaten the West with

to keep them at bay.

He increased the development and testing of missiles, and he tested out new forms of dry propellants and explosives on his family using anti aircraft guns to execute them.

It works for the Americans and their allies, because it gives them another enemy to

fight that is stand in for China and Russia.

This US policy “North Korea Policy: Failure is the Only Option ” however, stems from several unique circumstances. By all indications, the North Koreans plan to keep their nuclear weapons and are not open to bargaining them away. Acquiring nuclear weapons was perhaps the only major accomplishment of the late “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il (father of current leader Kim Jong-un), under whom the country suffered severe economic austerity. Pyongyang seems to believe that entering the nuclear club will bring military security and transform relations with the United States. Pyongyang’s ability to defy the much more powerful United States is a consequence of the North Koreans holding Seoul hostage. The South Korean capital is within range of a massive collection of North Korean artillery and rocket batteries poised to rain down destruction in retaliation for any possible military action by the United States or South Korea. Finally, a rapprochement with North Korea may well be simply impossible no matter what America says or does, because Pyongyang sees peace as a mortal danger to the regime.

Analysis: Are we seeing the Madman Theory in action?

North Korea has drawn the ire of United Nations member states because it initially joined the Non-Proliferations Treaty but broke its obligations with nuclear weapons testing before withdrawing entirely in 2003.
Other nations believed to have nuclear weapons – including India, Pakistan and Israel – never accepted the treaty at all.
Prof Siracusa said much of what Kim Jong-un has done on the global stage, like his father and grandfather before him, has been to bolster their own position in North Korean society.
"I don't think Shakespeare would have any trouble with North Korea, because it is a hereditary communist rule," he said.
"One family has run the place since the late 1940s. They see these weapons as something that prevents other people from approaching them.
"In other words, these weapons are not only designed to hold off the larger powers but also to show their own people that there is some fear here.
"They have become an organising principle in North Korean politics."

Much Ado About Nothing: DPRK’s Latest Missile Test Reveals  No New Capabilities

How to Hack and Not Hack a Missile 

An attack on the manufacturing process will most likely result in defective components that fail even in ground testing. We would likely never know about this, except to wonder why the ground test phase is taking so long. Interestingly, North Korea’s KN-08 ICBM was first seen in mock-up form in 2012, but there was not a single successful ground test until last year. That may not be the result of a cyberattack, but it is at least what a cyberattack would look like. It would be preferable if the failures occurred in flight, and ideally late in flight, leaving the defective hardware out of reach of North Korean investigators. But this cannot be accomplished reliably—defects subtle enough to survive ground testing would cause some missiles to fail but leave others to complete their mission successfully. And, with properly realistic testing, some failures will still occur on the ground, leaving the North Korean engineers to connect the failed parts with the machines that built them. Such an attack can delay North Korea’s acquisition of advanced ballistic missiles, but will not prevent it in the long run.
This is literally rocket science. It is the epitome of a hard problem. And it becomes even harder when political pressure demands more than the hardware can yet deliver, then tries to wash away the embarrassment of failure by demanding an immediate retest without allowing time to investigate the original failure. We didn’t need cyberattacks to cause North Korea’s Musudan missile to fail in seven out of eight tests last year, and we don’t need cyberattacks for two conspicuous failures this year. Kim Jong Un will happily deliver those failures for us, just like we did for ourselves with Vanguard and Atlas and Titan, by imagining successful rocket tests can be conjured out of political dictates rather than tedious engineering. The young Kim’s father was generally more patient about this sort of thing.

A Paradigm Shift in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Development?In Kim Jong Un’s 2017 New Year’s speech, he announced that North Korea is in the final stage of preparations to test launch an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). Since then, North Korean media has repeatedly threatened that the launch will occur at a time and place of the North Korean leader’s choosing. On February 12, following multiple failures of the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), North Korea conducted a test launch of a new type of IRBM, the “Pukguksong-2.” Although not quite a mobile ICBM, this test suggests that Pyongyang has made greater-than-expected progress toward the test launch of a solid-fuel ICBM. North Korea also unveiled what appears to be its new solid propellant ICBM, presumed to be the Pukguksong-3, enclosed in a canister in the massive military parade on April 15.

Limitations of the Musudan MissileThroughout 2016, North Korea test launched Musudan missiles employing high-energy liquid propellants eight times, with only one successful attempt. These tests used a lofted, high-angle trajectory, presumably to reduce the range of the missiles and avoid any escalated tensions that might occur from flying over Japan. However, from an operational perspective, a lofted launch can also make the reentry vehicle (RV) descend more quickly during the terminal phase, allowing missile defenses less time to intercept them. It seems that these consecutive test failures exposed the limitations of its engine, which was developed by reverse engineering the Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The one successful flight test of the Musudan, conducted in June 2016, was likely aimed at simulating the velocity and environment of ICBM reentry by reaching a higher peak altitude of more than 1,400 km with a decreased range of 400 km.

North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear StrategyWhile North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and threats have grown, little attention has been paid to its emerging nuclear strategy for three reasons. First, there is a common caricature of North Korea as backward, unserious and incompetent that has led some to dismiss and downplay its nuclear efforts over the years. Only after its third nuclear test, in 2013, have many analysts begun to take North Korea’s nuclear capabilities seriously. Second, there is a tendency for nuclear scholars to bypass North Korea because, as one suggests, “almost nothing is known about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or the doctrine by which those weapons might be employed.”5 North Korea and its nuclear program are far from transparent, but this is not a unique problem. US scholars struggled for two generations to understand nuclear thinking in the Soviet Union based on sketchy evidence. It would be a mistake now, just as it would have been then, to throw our hands into the air. Moreover, a surprising amount of evidence about North Korea’s nuclear program actually exists from its past nuclear and missile tests, policy pronouncements and military parades as well as from commercially available satellite imagery                     

The third reason North Korea’s nuclear strategy receives scant scholarly attention is that many analysts assume that non-military goals drive its nuclear decision making. Some argue that its program is primarily aimed at garnering international prestige or rallying domestic support around a leadership with few other claims of success.6 Others see financial motivations; a North Korea bent on trading its technologies to countries like Iran and Syria.7 Still others believe that its nuclear program is a bargaining chip or blackmailing tool to gain diplomatic concessions.8 Such motivations do not lend themselves easily to rational-actor-based strategic analyses that explore connections between means and ends.9 Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that North Korea’s nuclear program is not guided by strategic logic. Its leaders must certainly weigh the costs and benefits of its nuclear investments and actions over time, given their resource limitations and the security risks they run by driving up military tensions.

Its in everybody interests to play the game of saying North Korea has nukes, they say it for prestige, self defense, (the US never attacks a state with WMD) and to mobilize the masses as a militarized forces.

The US says it because it makes them a go to threat when world
crisis slow down. They claim Kim Jung Un is a madman like their other old go to threat Qaddafi, but he is gone now, like Idi Amin before him.
Currently there is no difference between the Madman in the White House and those he accuses of being mad men.

China uses North Korea as a southern bulwark against the US.
They know North Korea does not have nukes, and they play along
to keep the US and South Korea off balance and staying on their
side of the DMZ.

Japan suspects that North Korea has no nukes, but it is reachable by missiles assault using standard explosives or ultra high explosives like MOAB. So whenever the US saber rattles, its Japan that get the shakes.

FIRST STEP; PROVE NK HAS NUKES
New Approaches to Verifying and Monitoring North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal

ANKIT PANDA, TOBY DALTON, THOMAS MACDONALD, MEGAN DUBOIS

JULY 27, 2021

Summary: While hopes remain for a reboot of nuclear talks with North Korea, a crucial but oft-overlooked question is how compliance with any negotiated agreement would be monitored and verified.

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FULL TEXT (PDF)


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Designing a Verifiable Freeze on North Korea’s Missile Programs
JOSHUA H. POLLACK

Designing Gradual, Successive Safeguards for North Korea’s Nuclear Program
MARC-GÉRARD ALBERT

Monitoring North Korean Nuclear Warheads
ALEX GLASER

The Merits of Probabilistic Verification in Complex Cases Like North Korea
THOMAS MACDONALD


Using Open-Source Intelligence to Verify a Future Agreement With North Korea
MELISSA HANHAM


A Nodal Monitoring System for Onsite Monitoring and Verification in North Korea
PABLO GARCIA


Lessons From the Iran Deal for Nuclear Negotiations With North Korea
TOBY DALTON, ANKIT PANDA


A Point-of-Entry Approach for Monitoring North Korean Imports and Exports
VANN H. VAN DIEPEN

In May 2021, following its classified review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden announced its intention to pursue “a calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with [North Korea].” While the administration retains the long-standing objective of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it acknowledges that it seeks to “make practical progress” to increase the security of the United States, that of U.S. forces on and around the Korean Peninsula, and that of U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan. If North Korea agreed to pursue practical steps toward risk reduction, negotiators would face a range of challenges as they broke new ground, among the thorniest of which would be the need for novel methods to monitor and verify compliance with agreed-upon restraints.

THE VERIFICATION CHALLENGES NORTH KOREA POSES

In recent years, North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces have made tremendous qualitative advances. In 2018, before the country’s leader Kim Jong Un turned to international diplomacy with South Korea, the United States, China, and others, he called for North Korea to “mass produce” ballistic missile and nuclear warheads. Official assessments since then, including by the U.S. intelligence community and the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874, have suggested that Kim’s directive has been implemented and continues to remain in effect. At military parades in October 2020 and January 2021, Kim further unveiled new missile capabilities, including a new intercontinental ballistic missile possibly capable of carrying multiple warheads. In the meantime, Kim has continued to emphasize that nuclear weapons represent the cornerstone of North Korea’s national defense strategy.

Because the scope of North Korea’s nuclear complex has grown substantially since the failures of prior negotiated agreements to cap its capabilities (such as the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks in the mid-2000s), a comprehensive agreement resulting in the country’s rapid total disarmament is not a realistic near-term prospect. If Washington and Pyongyang resume either direct bilateral talks or multilateral talks on matters related to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the most realistic formula for progress would involve initial caps on parts of North Korea’s programs of concern—including its nuclear and missile programs—before a long-term move toward reductions and, eventually, elimination.

Negotiators and political decisionmakers sitting across from their North Korean counterparts would seek to maximize the verifiability of each phase of any agreement that is reached. Verification and monitoring would be critically important not only to the political viability of any potential future agreement but also to generating measurable progress toward denuclearization. As history shows, orthodox approaches to verification—with robust onsite inspections and other well-defined protocols—are anathema for Pyongyang. While North Korea at times has allowed limited, ad hoc inspections and onsite access, it has only done so after protracted and difficult negotiations—and the last time it did so was when its capabilities were considerably more limited. Notably, North Korea’s checkered history with the International Atomic Energy Agency has shown no signs of improving since agency inspectors were evicted from the country in April 2009. Further, given the near total lack of trust between the United States and North Korea, policymakers cannot expect ideal verification conditions for potential near-term agreements. Even so, they should recall that verification is not an end in itself: it is a means of assessing and ensuring compliance with any number of potential agreements while also building confidence and sustainability along the way.

NOVEL WAYS OF VERIFYING AND MONITORING NORTH KOREA

The Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with support from the Korea Foundation, convened a group of international experts over several workshops in early 2021 to study novel tools and approaches to the verification and monitoring of a range of possible nuclear and missile restraints on North Korea. Their findings and proposals are summarized in this compilation. The experts broadly addressed potential accountable items in North Korea, including missiles, fissile material stocks, and warheads; piecemeal and probabilistic approaches to general verification and nuclear safeguards; open-source intelligence techniques that might support verification and confidence-building efforts; import-export monitoring; and lessons from other monitoring regimes, including the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Given the technical focus of this volume, the included chapters do not assess the political viability of any specific potential agreements or the sorts of concessions that North Korea may seek during implementation. The fundamental objective of this volume is to facilitate policymakers’ understanding of a range of verification and monitoring approaches to facilitate practical and incremental progress on denuclearization.

While orthodox approaches to verification are unquestionably the preferred standard for any potential agreement, near-term political realities require flexibility and tempered expectations. The ideas contained in this volume are intended to fit this purpose. Over time, as agreements are implemented with these approaches and tools, broader confidence building with North Korea may facilitate a more favorable political environment that enables the application of more standard verification approaches.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Toby Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Megan DuBois is a research assistant in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Megan Dubois and Tobin Hansen for their support in editing and collecting the compilation. Additionally, Carnegie’s communications team provided substantial editorial assistance with this volume. The authors are grateful in particular to Ryan DeVries, Haley Clasen, and Sam Brase for their work in refining and editing this compilation.

AS READERS WILL KNOW I DO NOT BELIEVE NK HAS NUKES, IT HAS INSTEAD DEVELOPED VERY EFFECTIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVES THAT CAN MIMIC THE SEISMIC MEASURES OF A HALF TON OR 1-6 TON NUKE.

https://plawiuk.blogspot.com/2017/04/north-korea-nuke-free-white-house.html

North Korean hackers stole more than $300 million to pay for nuclear weapons, says confidential UN report

WE DON'T KNOW THAT AT ALL

THEY MAY HAVE HACKED 

AND THEY MAY HAVE NUKES

© Lee Jin-man/AP A woman wearing a face mask walks past in front of a TV screen showing a news program reporting about North Korea's military parade, at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, on January 15.

North Korea's army of hackers stole hundreds of millions of dollars throughout much of 2020 to fund the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of international law, according to a confidential United Nations report.

The document accused the regime of leader Kim Jong Un of conducting "operations against financial institutions and virtual currency exchange houses" to pay for weapons and keep North Korea's struggling economy afloat. One unnamed country that is a member of the UN claimed the hackers stole virtual assets worth $316.4 million dollars between 2019 and November 2020, according to the document.

The report also alleged that North Korea "produced fissile material, maintained nuclear facilities and upgraded its ballistic missile infrastructure" while continuing "to seek material and technology for these programs from overseas."

North Korea has for years sought to develop powerful nuclear weapons and advanced missiles to pair them with, despite their immense cost and the fact that such a pursuit has turned the country into an international pariah barred by the UN from conducting almost any economic activity with other countries.

The UN investigators said one unnamed country assessed that it is "highly likely" North Korea could mount a nuclear device to a ballistic missile of any range, but it was still unclear if those missiles could successfully reenter the Earth's atmosphere.

The report was authored by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, the body charged with monitoring the enforcement and efficacy of sanctions levied against the Kim regime as punishment for its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development.

Details from the report, which is currently confidential, were obtained by CNN through a diplomatic source at the United Nations Security Council, who shared portions of the document on the condition of anonymity. The Panel's report is comprised of information received from UN member countries, intelligence agencies, the media and those who flee the country -- not North Korea itself. These reports are typically released every sixth months, one in the early fall and another in early spring.

It's unclear when this report will be released. Previous leaks have infuriated China and Russia, both members of the UN Security Council, leading to diplomatic standoffs and delays.

North Korea's mission to the United Nations did not respond to CNN's request for comment, but the claims in the report are in line with recent plans laid out by Kim. At an important political meeting last month, Kim said that North Korea would work to develop new, advanced weapons for its nuclear and missile programs, like tactical nuclear weapons and advanced warheads designed to penetrate missile defense systems to deter the United States, despite the rapport he developed with former US President Donald Trump.

Trump attempted to get Kim to give up his pursuit of nuclear weapons through high-level diplomacy, betting that his negotiating skills could help him achieve where past Presidents had failed. Trump became the first sitting US president to meet a North Korean leader in 2018 and then met him two more times, but failed to convince the young North Korean dictator to stop pursuing nuclear weapons.

It is unclear how exactly US President Joe Biden will move forward, though his aides have made it clear that allies South Korea and Japan will be heavily involved. Jake Sullivan, Biden's national security adviser, said last week that the administration is conducting a policy review and that he would not "get ahead of that review" in public.

A new source of income

The UN panel found that North Korea's stringent Covid-19 border controls have affected the regime's ability to bring in much needed hard currency from overseas. Pyongyang uses complex sanctions-evading schemes to keep its economy afloat and get around the stringent UN sanctions.

Coal has historically been one of North Korea's most valuable exports -- the Panel's 2019 report found that Pyongyang collected $370 million by exporting coal, but shipments since July 2020 appear to have been suspended.

That is likely because North Korea severed almost all of its ties with the outside world in 2020 to prevent an influx of coronavirus cases, including cutting off almost all trade with Beijing, an economic lifeline the impoverished country needs to keep its people from going hungry. While that decision appears to have kept the pandemic at bay, it has brought the North Korean economy closer to the brink of collapse than it has been in decades.

Devastating storms, the punishing sanctions and the pandemic pummeled North Korea's economy in 2020, and experts. Experts believe that North Korea may be further relying on its hackers to bring in revenue during the pandemic because of the border closures.


Cooperation with Iran

The report cited multiple unnamed nations who claimed that North Korea and Iran reengaged cooperation on long-range missile development projects, including trading critical parts needed to develop these weapons. North Korea successfully test-fired three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM) in 2017 and paraded a gargantuan, new ICBM at a public event in October.

Iran's pursuit of similar technology and its current arsenal of ballistic missiles is a major flashpoint in Tehran's long-running disputes with various Arab neighbors and the United States. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries have called for the curbing of Iran's ballistic weapons, but Iran's leaders have repeatedly said the arsenal is not up for negotiation.

Tehran appeared to deny that it was working with North Korea on missile technology. The report included comment from Iran's UN Mission, which claimed in December that the UN Panel of Experts was given "false information and fabricated data may have been used in investigations and analyses of the Panel."

Thank Ex-President Moon For South Korea’s Big Military Build-Up


By Doug Bandow

K2 Black Panther. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The bitter South Korean presidential election reached its dramatic conclusion. Prosecutor Yoon Suk-yeol won a surprisingly narrow victory in a race that focused on domestic issues. However, the greatest divergence between the two candidates appeared to be on security issues.

Yoon, of the conservative People Power Party, emphasized deterring the North, strengthening South Korea’s military, and more tightly embracing the United States. Among the candidates’ sharpest disagreements were over Yoon’s support for launching a preemptive strike to prevent a North Korean missile launch and adding THAAD batteries for missile defense. The latter reflected Yoon’s willingness to criticize China; he also urged improving bilateral relations with Japan.

Yet there may be one area of broad agreement between the two parties—important after such a close election and with the National Assembly remaining in the soon-to-be opposition Democratic Party’s hands for two more years. Both parties support a more robust South Korean military.

On the Republic of Korea’s Armed Forces Day last October President Moon Jae-in expressed “trust and pride” in his nation’s military and “strong security posture.” At the end of the year he discussed even broader defense aspirations, reportedly opining that the ROK’s “defense capabilities are needed not only for deterrence against North Korea, but also for the autonomy of our country stuck between great powers.” Thus, “We should be equipped with defense capabilities befitting such a geopolitical location.”

More important, while talking of peace, his government prepared for war. For instance, last September Seoul announced that it was expanding its missile program. The Defense Ministry explained: “We will develop stronger, longer-range and more precise missiles so as to exercise deterrence and achieve security and peace on the Korean Peninsula.” These improvements became possible after the U.S. ended restrictions on South Korean missile production. Said the ministry: “Following the termination of the [missile] guidelines, we will exercise deterrence against potential threats and improve strike capabilities against main targets.”

Equally significant, Seoul tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile in September. Moon watched the launch and insisted that it was “not a response to North Korea’s provocations.” However, he noted “the reinforcement of our missile capabilities can be a clear deterrent to North Korea’s provocations.” By matching North Korea’s SLBM program and providing an essentially invulnerable deterrent, the ROK is entering an exclusive club of just eight nations that currently possess this capability.

Moreover, SLBMs could prove valuable in confronting not just the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea but other states, most obviously China. Explained the Blue House: “The possession of an SLBM has a significant meaning for the purpose of securing deterrence capabilities responding to omnidirectional threats and will play a big role in the establishment of national self-defense and peace on the Korean Peninsula in the future.”

After the North’s seven missile tests in January, Defense Minister Suh Wook visited the Army’s Central Missile Command. He said the unit was “central” in responding to the North and “gives confidence to our people through overwhelming strategic victory at times of emergency,” The political nature of the visit was clear, but it highlighted the Moon administration’s increased military effort.

The Seoul government’s current blueprint would hike military outlays by a quarter by 2026. The latest budget envisions improved defenses against missiles, long-range artillery, and submarines, enhanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities, an aircraft carrier for vertical-takeoff aircraft, and much more. Roughly a third of military outlays would go to “force enhancement,” to maintain the South’s qualitative military edge over the DPRK. Although both Tokyo and Seoul have enjoyed a cheap ride at Washington’s expense, the South faces notably greater threats. Without an ocean moat against an armed and hostile North Korea, the South must take its defense responsibilities more seriously than has Japan.

Observed the U.S. War College’s Lami Kim: “Since Moon, a member of South Korea’s Democratic Party, took office in 2017, the country’s defense budget has increased by an average of 7.4 percent annually. Under the two previous conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, the defense budget only rose by between 4 and 6 percent annually. By 2022, South Korea is expected to spend more on defense than Japan—whose gross domestic product is three times as large—and become the fifth- or sixth-biggest-spender on defense in the world.”

Yoon might accelerate that pace. After the election he said he would “establish a strong military capacity to deter any provocation completely.” Nevertheless, Japan threatens to make defense outlays into a competitive race with its new defense plans. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s latest manifesto pledged to double outlays to two percent of GDP. Although no one expects Tokyo to reach that level soon, having America’s closest Asian allies vie to spend the most on the military would be a welcome change.

Most broadly, higher South Korean military outlays would respond to broad security concerns. Last year’s Defense White Paper declared:

“Our recent security situation is extremely complex and grave, both internally and externally. Neighboring countries of the Korean Peninsula continue to reinforce their cutting-edge military capabilities, pushing their own priorities while expanding their military domains not only in the sea and air but also to space and cyber. In addition, transnational and nonmilitary threats such as COVID-19, disasters and terrorism are emerging as challenges to national security. In particular, with the spread of COVID-19 and the strategic competition between the United States and China, the fluidity and uncertainty of the regional security structure are increasing.”

Greater military strength also would reduce Seoul’s dependence on Washington, an embarrassment for a nationalistic people who effectively surrender important military decisions to the U.S. Moreover, negotiating from a position of military strength would give Moon’s successor more confidence in dealing with the DPRK. Moon termed the South’s new capabilities a “clear deterrent to North Korea’s provocations.” Yoon promised to take a tougher stand against the North. A stronger ROK also would require fewer concessions from the North to secure peace. And North Korea would have more reason to yield if Seoul enhances its defense capabilities.

Pyongyang officials unintentionally make this point when they complain vociferously about South Korean military developments. For instance, the North claims that weapons developed by the ROK, including fighters and satellites, are intended for a preventive attack. The Kim regime even criticized South Korean weapons development as an “unpardonable act of perfidy.” The North understandably prefers a weaker South.

The ROK also has been seeking to confront unique threats posed by its nuclear-armed adversary. Ian Bowers and Henrik Stålhane Hiim of the Royal Danish Defence College and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, respectively, observed: “To deter North Korea—and limit damage if a conflict breaks out—South Korea is operationalizing an independent conventional counterforce strategy, or offensive and defensive measures designed to destroy or deplete the nuclear forces of an adversary. To bolster deterrence, South Korea is also threatening countervalue strikes, seeking to hold the North Korean leadership at risk.”

Equally significant, perhaps, the ROK’s goal is to create military capabilities separate from America’s. Bowers and Hiim reported that though Seoul “is developing this strategy within the framework of its alliance with the United States, the ultimate goal is a fully independent operational capability.” They see this stance “as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment.” Yoon would be wise to continue this strategy. Although American subsidies reduce Seoul’s need to invest in the military, they increase Seoul’s vulnerability to swings in U.S. policy. And the endless stream of rising deficits facing Washington make future military cuts likely.


Improved South Korea capabilities will become more necessary if nuclear negotiations with North Korea continue to drag on without positive result. Unless an agreement is reached to at least cap the DPRK’s program, the North could soon end up as a mid-level nuclear power. The Rand Corporation and Asan Institute estimated “that, by 2027, North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea.”

Despite Yoon’s commitment to an even closer bilateral relationship, it is difficult to see how the alliance as presently organized could then survive. Although the North would face devastating retaliation if it initiated a first strike, it could threaten to use its nuclear weapons in any conventional conflict that threatened it with defeat and regime destruction. In 1950 China intervened to rescue the North after America’s entry into the war. That wouldn’t happen in another conflict, but Kim could threaten to use nukes in a similar circumstance unless Washington retreated from North Korean territory. No American president could responsibly risk U.S. cities under such circumstances. This conundrum necessarily would call the alliance into question.

South Koreans no less than Americans recognize the challenge, which was exacerbated by President Donald Trump’s reckless chest-thumping about “fire and fury” mixed with proposals to withdraw U.S. forces from the peninsula. Assessed Bowers and Hiim: “Under these conditions, South Korean military and political elites are unwilling to rely passively on extended deterrence by the United States. Instead, they are following a long-worn path of making incremental internal adjustments to their country’s military capabilities to strengthen its relative position in the alliance.”

Although with the right conventional weapons the South could wreak great harm on the North, Seoul still would feel vulnerable facing a nuclear North alone. Perhaps in fear of this future, the ROK already is considering its nuclear options. Last September Yoon advocated that the US reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons and negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement. So did conservative contenders Hong Joon-pyo and Yoo Song-min. Four years ago liberal Assemblyman Lee Jong-geol, a member of the Defense Committee, advocated choosing “tactical nuclear as the last negotiating card,” which he acknowledged “has been taboo until now.”

In April Yoon’s transition advisers visited Washington and advocated the return of “strategic assets,” such as bombers and submarines, to the peninsula. Opined Assemblyman Park Jin: “Deploying the strategic assets is an important element of reinforcing the extended deterrence, and the issue naturally came up during the discussions.”

Moreover, preparations are being laid, conveniently if perhaps inadvertently, for an ROK nuclear weapon. Bowers and Hiim contended that current policy “will bolster South Korea’s nuclear latency. Many of the capabilities South Korea is acquiring or considering—particularly advanced ballistic and cruise missiles—will shorten the time frame for development of a credible nuclear deterrent. Moreover, these conventional capabilities may function as a stopgap deterrent to protect South Korea during the dangerous window between abandonment and the attainment of deliverable nuclear weapons.”

In fact, there is notable political support for an independent nuclear deterrent. Popular backing for a nuclear capability has been increasing; it hit 69 percent, the highest over the last decade, in a September poll conducted by the Asan Institute. Hong forthrightly stated that he would consider constructing nuclear weapons, arguing that “Nukes can only be countered with nukes.” He added that “the balance of terror via nuclear weapons was achieved in Europe. The inter-Korean front is more dangerous place than Europe.”

He is not the first substantial political figure to take that position. In 2013 Chung Mong-joon suggested going nuclear, delivering a speech in Washington proposing to match the North while offering to halt nuclear activities if North Korea did so as well. Honorary chairman of the Asan Institute, he was a long-time member of the National Assembly, chairman of the ruling conservative party, and a 2002 presidential candidate. Chung declared that “The lesson of the cold war … is that against nuclear weapons, only nuclear weapons can hold the peace.’’

Yoon has yet to declare his position, and the issue remains a decided minority view among South Korea’s governing elite. However, changing circumstances could increase support. If there is reason to doubt Washington’s commitment to the ROK’s defense, Seoul would have to take over responsibility for its own defense, including against the possibility of a North Korean nuclear strike. In which case future Armed Forces Days might take on a very different character.

Yoon’s election likely presages a faster South Korean military build-up. However, Moon’s aggressive military program provides a solid basis for Yoon’s plan to increase South Korean capabilities. Although time remains to cap and even reverse the North Korean nuclear program, if the North advances as fast as some analysts fear the Korean peninsula may enter a brave new world sooner than most anyone expects. Then today’s challenges will look simple compared to those facing future policymakers.

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A 1945 Contributing Editor, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.

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