Iraq needs 100bn cubic metres of water to restore supplies, environmental monitor warns

Iraq needs 100bn cubic metres of water to restore supplies, environmental monitor warns / bne IntelliNews

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bne IntelliNews December 14, 2025

Iraq requires more than 100bn cubic metres of water to restore water resources to normal levels amid a sharp decline in the Tigris and Euphrates river levels, the Green Iraq environmental monitor warned on December 14.

Rainfall in Iraq has shifted from a predictable winter backbone of the economy to a volatile stress multiplier driving drought, crop losses and water crisis across the Tigris–Euphrates basin. Average annual precipitation remains low by global standards, with much of central and southern Iraq receiving around 100–200 millimetres a year and depending heavily on rain and upstream river inflows between November and April. But recent years have seen that the rainy season shorten, become more erratic and skew more toward intense events, deepening multi‑year drought while still exposing communities to flash floods.

Rainfall across Iraq has not reached required levels, with the country needing substantially increased amounts in the coming months to address drought impacts, the monitor said in a statement received by Al-Ssaa newspaper.

Declining water levels have degraded water quality in rivers, regulators and dams whilst raising saltwater intrusion in Basra governorate, the report noted.

Vast areas in central and southern Iraq, as well as the marshes, have dried up, with the winter agricultural plan at its lowest level, the monitor said, worsening the country's food security situation.

Recent rainfall does not constitute a real solution to the worsening water crisis, the monitor said, warning the crisis could escalate next summer to affect drinking water supplies.

Baghdad could be included amongst the affected governorates if the situation continues unchanged. Iraq faces mounting water stress as upstream neighbours Turkey and Iran have reduced flows into the Tigris and Euphrates through dam construction and river diversion projects.

Turkey's Ilisu Dam on the Tigris and multiple Iranian dams on tributaries feeding into Iraq have substantially cut cross-border water flows over the past decade.

Climate change has compounded the crisis, with Iraq experiencing lower rainfall, higher temperatures and more frequent dust storms.

The country's marshlands, once covering 15,000 to 20,000 square kilometres and designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2016, have shrunk dramatically as water supplies have dwindled.

Agricultural production has declined as farmers abandoned land due to water scarcity and increased soil salinity. The winter planting season, crucial for wheat and barley production, has seen cultivation areas slashed as irrigation water remains scarce, the report noted.

To counter the changing weather patterns, in August, the EU allocated €1.1mn in humanitarian funding to address the escalating water crisis in Basra, southern southern, targeting an estimated 500,000 people severely affected by poor water quality and limited access.

The emergency support will address urgent water, sanitation and hygiene needs over the next six months, focusing on the most vulnerable communities. Many of those impacted live in informal settlements on the outskirts of Basra, where the crisis has been particularly acute.

BRICS nations ditch dollar for gold in global finance power grab

BRICS nations ditch dollar for gold in global finance power grab. / bne IntelliNews

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bnm Gulf bureau December 14, 2025

BRICS countries led by Russia and China appear to be mounting a direct challenge to US dollar dominance by rapidly accumulating gold reserves and building an independent trading infrastructure, transforming the so-called "archaic" metal into the cornerstone of a new multipolar financial system led by Moscow and Beijing.

The subtle but increasingly noticeable shift comes despite predictions following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1976 that gold would be relegated to history, replaced by fiat and digital assets or energy currencies. Instead, according to the Russians, Chinese and Iranians, physical gold is strengthening its position as the foundation of financial sovereignty and the primary protective asset of the 21st century.

The shift to a potential gold-backed BRICS  currency unit may be coming just in time for Tehran, whose currency continues to collapse into dust as of December 14. So far, the Russians have not yet yielded to Iranian demands to move to a new unified currency, leaving them in their current predicament. 

China and Russia are leading the accumulation drive, with Beijing producing 380 tonnes of gold in 2024 whilst officially purchasing 180 tonnes. However, analysts estimate actual purchases through various channels could be two to three times higher. Russia produced 340 tonnes whilst its central bank systematically added to reserves, diversifying away from dollar assets.

Combined production from BRICS and aligned nations, including China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Iran and Uzbekistan, accounts for approximately 50% of global output, giving them unprecedented influence over the physical market.

Their share of central bank gold purchases exceeded 50% between 2020 and 2024, shifting the centre of power from traditional Western vaults towards Asia and Eurasia. Interest in gold as a protective asset today is directly linked to investors' and states' apprehensive attitude towards the US dollar and the reliability of American financial infrastructure.

Germany's prolonged inability to fully repatriate gold stored in Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bank of England vaults as undermining confidence, is one example of the West not taking the emergence of gold as a potential threat overall.   Whilst G7 nations excluding Canada hold more than 60% of reserves in gold, BRICS countries are rapidly increasing their gold holdings even as Western powers show no concerted interest in stepping up their stores.

A historic case in point is former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who authorised the sale of about 395 tonnes of the UK’s gold reserves between 1999 and 2002, roughly half of Britain’s bullion holdings at the time. Commentators and some politicians argue he sold near the bottom of the gold market, pre‑announced the auctions in a way that depressed prices further, and thereby cost the UK many billions in potential gains as gold surged in subsequent years.

Selling the same 395 tonnes of gold today would raise on the order of $53bn, compared with about $3.5bn from the original 1999–2002 auctions, a difference of roughly $49–50bn in nominal terms. 

The UK wasn't alone in its sell-off at the time; several other Western countries also followed suit. In 1999, 14 other European eurozone countries, UK,  Sweden and Switzerland signed the Washington Agreement on Gold to cap total official sales at 2,000 tonnes over five years and avoid destabilising the market.

Gold has doubled its purchasing power over the past 25 years relative to real goods, with a car that once cost 200 gold coins now costing approximately 100, whilst the dollar has lost value. This contrasts with oil and wheat, which show volatility but no dramatic long-term price growth.

According to Russian sources, the BRICS strategy includes creating an independent pricing platform with settlements in national currencies and launching a "BRICS Gold Price" benchmark in direct challenge to dollar hegemony.

The bloc is forming a joint gold pool for market stabilisation, developing shared infrastructure across Russia, China, UAE and South Africa with unified standards, and using gold as collateral in interstate clearing operations to reduce currency risks.

"For BRICS countries, gold is a tool for protection against sanctions risks, a response to the unreliability of traditional partners, and a real asset with a thousand-year history of recognition," economics expert Yevgeny Biryukov said to Russian media on December 13.

As IntelliNews previously reported, the BRICS group has launched a working prototype of a gold-backed trade currency known as the “Unit”, as the world’s leading emerging markets search for a way to ditch the dollar, the Institute for Economic Strategies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IRIAS) reported on December 4.

The Unit is a digital trade instrument backed by a reserve basket composed of 40% physical gold and 60% BRICS national currencies, equally weighted between the Brazilian real, Chinese yuan, Indian rupee, Russian ruble, and South African rand. The pilot was initiated IRIAS which issued 100 Units on October 31, each initially pegged to 1 gram of gold.

As bne IntelliNews recently reported in a deep dive into dedollarisation, the Global South have been long been unhappy with the dominance of the dollar in global trade, which gives the US a powerful geopolitical lever, but central bankers around the world were freaked out by the imposition of the SWIFT sanctions on Russia only days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February that threatens every country in the world’s ability to trade freely.

Since then, they have been hunting for an alternative. Many countries have since switched to settling their mutual trade in national currencies. Russia and China now settle nearly all their trade in yuan and rubles. India and China have also switched to national currencies.

And almost all trade in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is now done using each member’s own currency. However, while China and Russia's mutual trade balance is relatively balanced, making using national currencies easy, India runs a $60bn trade deficit with Russia, thanks to the oil trade, making the relationship more difficult.

China competing with itself in the global robot race

China has been left competing with itself in the global robot race. / bne IntelliNews

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Ben Aris in Berlin December 10, 2025

The global race to develop and deploy humanoid robots is no longer being led by nations but by cities. It’s not a question of the US against China, as there is no competition. The real competition is amongst the Chinese cities of Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hangzhou -- the new global centres of robotics innovation and commercialisation. The rest of the world is not even an also-ran in this race.

China is already home to at least 35 credible humanoid robotics companies, several of which are global leaders in terms of units sold and deployment at scale.

“By my count there's already 35 strong humanoid robot companies in China, including the global leaders in sales and volume,” Bertrand stated. “Several of these companies already have commercialised robots actually deployed at scale.” One example is Unitree Robotics, based in Hangzhou, which offers its G1 humanoid robot to consumers for $13,500, according to its official website. The robot is publicly available for purchase, unlike most of its Western counterparts.

By comparison, Bertrand noted that the United States has six notable humanoid robotics firms or products: Tesla’s Optimus, Figure AI, Agility Robotics’ Digit, Boston Dynamics’ Atlas, Apptronik’s Apollo, and Sanctuary AI’s Phoenix.

However, “zero have commercialised products that consumers can actually buy today,” he said. “Zero have achieved mass production. All are either in prototype phase, internal testing, or limited industrial pilots.”

“Which means that stunningly, the city of Shenzhen alone, with eight humanoid robot companies, probably outcompetes the entire US industry today,” Bertrand commented. “If the US can't compete with a single Chinese city, then clearly the race is between Chinese cities.”

Shenzhen, home to some of China's most advanced hardware and robotics clusters, has been rapidly scaling its capabilities in humanoid robotics. The city’s ecosystem benefits from supply chain proximity, rapid prototyping capabilities, and strong local government support for high-tech manufacturing.

Meanwhile, Europe has little presence in the sector. “Europe, meanwhile, true to form, is basically not even in the race at all,” Bertrand said.

In what could potentially be an industrial game-changing development, China unrolled the first mass deployment of robots to take the places of workers in car factories across the country in November. This army can work 24/7, will never go on strike, don’t want tea-breaks, and don’t even need to be recharged, as they can change their own batteries.

In a departure from conventional automation systems, the humanoid machines are designed to literally replace humans on production lines, rather than the robot-orientated production lines that are in wide use now. The robots are designed for flexible factory work and require minimal human supervision.

China is moving beyond being just the largest market for robots — it is becoming the core of global robot production. Chinese firms accounted for over 60% of global robot output in 2024 and 41% of the world’s operational robot stock.

The fast growth is driven by subsidies, procurement programmes, and access to vast domestic datasets for training machine learning models. According to Capital Economics, China now deploys more industrial robots annually than the next five countries combined — including Japan, the United States, South Korea and Germany. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China aims to achieve “breakthrough use of humanoid robots in key sectors” by 2027.

By contrast, Russia has been striving to establish local robot production since the international companies fled after the start of the war in Ukraine. But progress has been minimal so far.

The Russian government recognises the gravity of the situation as it gets left behind. In 2024, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announced an ambitious – albeit equally unrealistic – national project aimed at propelling Russia into the top 25 nations in terms of robotisation.

Turkey looks to expand Turkmen gas swap deal

Can Turkey get the Turkmen gas flowing again? / gov.tm

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Eurasianet December 14, 2025

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan travelled to Turkmenistan for festivities on December 12 that marked the Central Asian state’s 30th anniversary of neutrality. While in Ashgabat, Erdogan was set to hold talks with Turkmen leaders likely focused on the topic of natural gas supplies.

Speaking to reporters earlier in December, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said Ankara was working to expand gas imports via a long-time arrangement with Iran, augmented by a swap deal with Turkmenistan. A lack of clarity about sanctions currently creates a major obstacle for Turkey.

The motivation for Turkey is a need for reliable and expanded gas supplies during the winter heating season. Without Iranian imports, Turkey would likely have difficulty meeting its growing energy demands, and could suffer power cuts such as those which occurred most recently in the winter of 2022. 

Turkey began purchasing 9.6bn cubic metres (bcm) per year of Iranian gas starting in 2001. The purchase agreement is set to expire in July 2026. 

Throughout the lifespan of the agreement, Turkey has experienced import disruptions, in part because of Iran’s difficulty in maintaining ageing infrastructure due to sanctions. Interruptions also often occur during the peak mid-winter demand period, as Tehran diverts gas intended for export in order to ensure stable supplies for its domestic market.

The start in March of Turkey’s swap arrangement with Iran and Turkmenistan was seen as insurance that Turkey would meet its winter needs. The deal was also intended to help establish Ashgabat’s reputation as a reliable energy partner, thus providing a boost for efforts to revive a trans-Caspian gas pipeline project.

Turkey is a vocal advocate for building a trans-Caspian route, which has been on the drawing board since the 1990s. “We have reached the phase of taking concrete steps toward our 30-year dream of delivering natural gas to Türkiye through the [intended] Trans-Caspian Pipeline,” Bayraktar stated during a December 10 gathering of energy officials, held under the auspices of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Under the swap agreement with Ashgabat, Turkey was to receive 1.3 bcm of Turkmen gas annually from Iran via an existing Iran-Turkey gas pipeline. In exchange, Turkmenistan was to have delivered a slightly larger volume of gas via existing pipelines to northwestern Iran, with the difference in volume covering Iran’s costs for transiting gas to Turkey.

The deal had a smooth launch in March with Turkey receiving 112mn cubic metres (mcm) of Turkmen gas that month. It continued to go smoothly until June with Turkey receiving an overall total of 465 mcm of Turkmen gas.

Then, supplies suddenly stopped, even though Turkey’s state gas importer, BOTAS, made regular monthly capacity reservations for the Iran-Turkey pipeline to import Turkmen gas. 

It remains uncertain why the unexpected halt occurred. Turkmengaz CEO Maksat Babayev has blamed “technical reasons,” while Bayraktar made vague references in October to payment issues.

The source of the problem, however, may well be linked to US and European Union sanctions policy. In June, the Trump administration ramped up sanctions against Iran to include barter trades for gas. The EU imposed similar sanctions in September.

The Turkish import deal that expires in July enjoys a sanctions waiver from Washington. That waiver is expected to remain in place, if the deal is renewed beyond 2026. 

There may be problems with the Turkmen swap deal, however. The odds that Turkmenistan will receive a waiver for sending gas to Iran seem slim. Washington’s motivation for denying a waiver may be to exert pressure of Ashgabat to fully participate in the trans-Caspian pipeline project.

Since the start of the year, US policy towards Turkmenistan has sent mixed signals to Ashgabat. For example, the Turkmen leadership offered rare public praise in October for Washington’s support in launching a new phase of construction of a trans-Afghan pipeline, known as TAPI. But Turkmen officials have also been highly critical of Washington’s immigration restrictions imposed on Turkmen citizens.

Despite the lack of a functioning agreement and the uncertainty about sanctions, Bayraktar sounded a confident note that a new, expanded arrangement can be worked out.

“This year for the first time we began importing gas from Turkmenistan. As a next step we want to increase the volume,” he said at the OTS meeting. Curiously, Turkmenistan, although an OTS member, holding Observer Status, did not send a high-level delegation to the meeting.

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.

 

COMMENT: The realignment marking Bangladesh's political battlefield

/ Narendra Modi - PM of India - X

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bno Chennai Office December 15, 2025

Bangladesh’s Chief Election Commissioner has announced February 12 2026 as the date for the country’s upcoming polls. The polls will see elected representatives take over office from the interim government which has ruled the country ever since the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.

The elections are shaping up to be a contest fundamentally different from what the nation has experienced in several decades. Where once a bifurcated system pitted the now outlawed Awami League of Hasina against the Bangladesh Nationalist Party(BNP) in a predictable cycle of power, the country now confronts a transformed political ecosystem defined by three competing blocs, fractured alliances, and a population clearly signaling that familiar power arrangements are no longer acceptable.

The most consequential shift revolves around public perception of the interim government. According to a report by The Print citing an assessment by US based think tank International Republican Institute(IRI), approval ratings hovering near the 70% mark for the caretaker administration, a metric that fundamentally challenges the old political narrative in ways that should unsettle traditional power brokers.

This level of institutional confidence represents a dramatic departure from the cynicism that had calcified in foreign sponsored coup narratives spun by Awami League, suggesting that Bangladeshi voters genuinely perceive the interim arrangement as representing something distinct from the oligarchic contestation that preceded it. The approval trajectory reveals something more profound than mere satisfaction with day to day governance.

According to more granular numbers in the IRI report, 53% of respondents believe the country is functioning adequately across multiple dimensions. The trend is a reversal from the pervasive pessimism that had settled across the nation ever since the disruption in the garment industry which is a major source of employment in the country, due to the COVID 19 pandemic in 2020.

Household finances have reportedly improved for segments of the population, and access to essential goods and sources of income to afford them has become more reliable between September 2024 and December 2025. This material improvement, however modest in absolute terms, carries significant psychological weight in an electorate that had experienced years of perceived stagnation, graft by the government and deteriorating institutional performance.

The diminishment of the Awami League presents perhaps the starkest illustration of the realignment. Support for the party that governed for much of the past two decades has reportedly collapsed into single digits, with only marginal segments expressing even tentative backing. The once dominant machinery that orchestrated national politics has splintered beyond repair, and the party's leadership appears trapped in a narrative loop that increasingly disconnects from observable reality.

However, this does not mean that the Awami League has no way to make its presence felt as evident from several violent incidents, including grenade attacks and explosions, both before and after a death sentence was announced against Hasina. That sentence came in a case related to the use of excessive force during the 2024 uprising, which toppled her regime and forced her into exile in India, where she has remained ever since.

Awami League's main rival, the BNP has emerged as the primary beneficiary, with polling suggesting it commands roughly one third of the electorate's preference. The BNP's position reflects a vote block shift for most people away from Awami League, as it is the only other major non-ilsalmist political affiliation in Bangladesh traditionally.

Yet the most analytically interesting development concerns the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has accumulated support at levels that place it firmly as a genuine contender rather than a marginal player.

The Islamist party's capacity to consolidate support approaching 30% indicates that voters have genuinely fractured away from the old AL-BNP binary that had constrained political competition for decades, and that a good part of the Bangladeshi populace is now ready to endorse certain radical elements. The coalition architecture now taking shape accelerates this realignment.

The announced alliance between the National Citizens Party(NCP), a political formation that has emerged from the violent student led protests in 2024, and an offshoot of Jamaat-e-Islami signals that the boundaries between previously incompatible constituencies are becoming permeable. The NCP itself emerged from Students Against Discrimination(SAD), the main group of protesters in the uprising against Hasina's administration.

That this student-led formation is now aligning with an Islamist party represents a fascinating contradiction in ideological terms, yet it mirrors the 1979 anti-monarchy revolution in Iran.

As in Iran in 1979, more moderate and ideologically distinct groups may form temporary alliances with a theocratically inclined Islamist entity that could ultimately take power and then persecute those same moderates, despite earlier alignment under the banner of shared objectives. However the fragmentation within Jamaat compounds the dynamics further.

The emergence of a separate Jamaat-affiliated faction willing to partner with student-movement-rooted formations indicates that the traditionally monolithic Islamist bloc has internally differentiated. This internal fracturing, while not yet splitting the party apparatus formally, reveals genuine disagreement about coalition strategy and electoral partnerships.

Such divisions within what previously appeared as unified blocs will inevitably create unpredictability in final electoral outcomes and coalition negotiations in the post election period. Public sentiment regarding the electoral timeline itself merits careful attention.

According to the IRI report, 72% of respondents are calling for elections to proceed without delay, while 41% explicitly demand immediate electoral contests. This is not an electorate content with extended caretaker administration or drawn out transition timelines.

The mandate is decidedly for rapid democratic restoration, and any perceived deviation from this expectation risks undermining the institutional legitimacy that the interim government has carefully cultivated. The hierarchies of institutional trust that structure public consciousness also deserve analysis.

Citizens accord substantial confidence to the military, viewing it as a stabilising force rather than a potential authoritarian instrument. The student movement retains deep moral authority as the civic catalyst that challenged alleged despotism.

Media institutions, despite their own institutional vulnerabilities, occupy positions of relative trust. Conversely, law enforcement agencies, the formal election apparatus, and various militant formations occupy the basement levels of public confidence, burdened by reputational debts accumulated through years of perceived malfeasance and politicized operations.

Yet beneath the apparent optimism lurks a darker current. Citizens simultaneously identify corruption, personal insecurity, political instability, commodity price shocks, and employment crises as their preoccupying anxieties.

These are not ephemeral frustrations, they are structural grievances that propelled the nation toward collision with entrenched power arrangements in the first place. Unless the next government demonstrates mate

Japan's recent bear attacks blamed on food and land crises

/ Kabacchi - CC BY 2.0 - Wiki

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bno - Tokyo Office December 15, 2025

A dangerous rise in confrontations between wild bears and humans is causing widespread concern across Japan, compelling the government to call on its military for assistance. Authorities are now working alongside residents, who are employing cutting edge tools like drone surveillance and alert systems to monitor the movement of these large animals.

Aljazeera reports that the severity of the situation is clear from the casualty figures. Since April 2025, the nation has seen the highest death toll from bear attacks since record keeping began in 2006. According to an October statement from the Ministry of Environment, at least 13 individuals have lost their lives and over 100 more have been hurt.

This surge in bear attacks, which has necessitated military deployment in some areas, underscores a critical ecological and social problem in Japan: the growing conflict between expanding wildlife populations and human settlements, worsened by environmental factors and rural decline.

Japan is home to two primary bear species. The colossal Brown Bear, weighing over 450kg, is predominantly found on the northern island of Hokkaido. The smaller, more numerous Asiatic Black Bear (or Moon Bear), weighing between 80kg and 200kg, inhabits the more densely populated mainland. Both species are involved in the incidents. Encounters with Asiatic Black Bears are more frequent, but Brown Bear attacks are more dangerous. Shota Mochizuki, an associate professor at Fukushima University, told Aljazeera that Black Bears are widely distributed across Honshu and Shikoku, where many people live. He added that attacks by Brown Bears are far more severe because they are significantly stronger and larger animals.

Worst-hit regions and personal accounts

The crisis has been felt most acutely in Japan’s northern prefectures. Japan’s public broadcaster, NHK, reported that the death toll for the year includes four individuals in Akita, five in Iwate, two in Hokkaido, and one each in Nagano and Miyagi.

Bear sightings in Akita prefecture have risen sixfold this year, and bears have attacked over 50 people since May, mostly by Asiatic Black Bears encroaching upon residential districts. For instance, NHK reports that on November 9, a Black Bear assaulted a 78 year old woman in Gojome Town and subsequently attacked a 50 year old woman who came to her aid, though both survived. An elderly woman was killed after encountering a bear while working on a farm in Akita City in late October. The situation is overwhelming, with Kenta Suzuki, the governor of the mountainous region, saying in an Instagram post that the crisis has exceeded the capacity of local authorities.

The dangers have been evidenced by harrowing personal stories. Billy Halloran, a New Zealander, described being severely mauled by an adult Black Bear, estimated to be around 60 or 70kg, while jogging in the woods of Myoko in northern Japan in early October. In an interview, he told CNN that the bear seized his arm and pushed him to the ground, resulting in a broken arm and injured leg that required three surgical procedures and the insertion of metal plates. Attacks are not limited to remote areas; according to NHK, a bear entered a supermarket in Numata city in central Japan in October and injured shoppers.

The severity of the situation has prompted other nations to issue warnings. The US Department of State issued a "wildlife alert" to its citizens, noting the increased sightings near populated zones, and the UK’s Foreign Office warned in late October British travellers against venturing alone into woodland areas.

Experts point to multiple factors driving the escalation. A primary cause is a significant food deficit in the bears’ natural mountain habitats. Mochizuki told Aljazeera that the bears mainly feed on acorns and beech nuts, which have been scarce this year. He said that when natural sustenance is low, bears are more likely to venture into human settlements. According to the Ministry of Environment, a similar spike in attacks occurred in 2023 following poor acorn yields. Some experts say climate change is a reason for the low production.

Furthermore, bear populations are growing. Mochizuki noted that long-term conservation and reduced hunting pressure have contributed to this increase, resulting in more opportunities for bears to encounter humans. Government figures suggest the overall bear population exceeds 54,000. Mochizuki also highlights that rural depopulation is playing a role. He added that as young people move to cities, unmanaged fields and village edges create easy access routes for the animals.

Government response

The Japanese authorities are responding forcefully. Last week, both the country’s military (Japan Self Defence Forces) and riot police were deployed to Akita. Riot police can shoot bears, but the military is legally restricted to national defence and disaster relief. Mochizuki said the military is supporting licensed private hunters by setting traps and removing shot bear carcasses. He explained that hunters hold official licences and firearm permits to conduct nuisance control, including shooting bears when authorised by prefectural governments.

Local residents are using AI-based surveillance and drone technology to detect bears, according to Akita’s mayor. NHK reported that people are also advised to secure food waste and cut down nut-bearing trees near their homes.

Mochizuki said three key long term preventative measures can prove effective: eliminating food sources around human settlements, installing physical barriers like electric fencing, and enhancing early detection through technology and mobile alerts. He stressed the importance of addressing the shortage of hunters and wildlife staff due to the ageing population, calling for increased recruitment and better education for both residents and tourists.