Imaduddin Ahmed
Published December 22, 2024
DAWN
DAWN
The writer sits on the Liberal International Climate Justice Committee
MANY climate-vulnerable nations hoped for more at COP29. However, the text leaves an opportunity for Pakistan’s freshest minds to seize on behalf of those who have most to lose from climate change.
The final document reflects the challenges of a multilateral process fraught with competing interests, including within the 60-year-old coalition of 134 developing countries called the G77. The interests of oil-rich and prosperous nations within the Arab Group, for example, do not align with those of climate-vulnerable, developing nations such as Pakistan.
The Arab Group worried that a new formulation of the contributor base for climate finance would explicitly put them on the hook for providing and reporting on support to developing countries alongside traditional developed countries like the US, both because of their capability to provide finance and their attributable greenhouse gas emissions. Six of 10 countries with the highest per capita consumption-based CO emissions belong to the Arab Group. Four of those members have GDPs per capita higher than $30,000; two of them with higher per capita incomes than the UK, France and Japan.
At the technical level, the Arab Group negotiators with oil-producing Bolivia persuaded the G77 to lose a week of negotiation time by not engaging with the text proffered by the UN Secretariat in October. This directly undermined the interests of countries trying to survive the impacts of climate change. This loss in negotiating time meant that no time was spent discussing items in the October text: how much developed countries exclusively would be on the hook for, what proportion of climate finance should be in the form of grant equivalent terms, and what proportion of finance should be allocated to adaptation and loss and damage.
Every government can regulate to reduce default risk from climate impacts.
To prevent this from happening repeatedly, Pakistani diplomats must be alive to when the Arab Group is pushing an agenda that makes no sense for Pakistan or the majority of developed nation allies within the G77, and be ready to push back.
To the quantum: in 2009 at COP15 in Copenhagen, countries set a $100 billion/year climate finance target for developed countries to mobilise for developing countries by 2020. That target was nominally surpassed for the first time in 2022. COP29 in Baku was about deciding what the new number would be. Two key numbers entered the text.
The public-based support goal for developing countries: $300bn/year to developing countries by 2035, without inflation indexing. It is this number that is most important for Pakistan’s resilience to and recovery from future floods, droughts and heatwaves as it does not predicate financing with a promise for profit. The number could represent at best a modest rise to, and at worst, a reduction of the ambition agreed to in 2009, depending on inflation. Moreover, unlike the previous commitment, this was not exclusively to come from developed countries. In theory, Pakistan and all developing countries are now invited to contribute to the core goal.
The investment aspiration into developing countries: $1.3 trillion per year, the number promoted by the Africa Group, reflecting the developing world’s climate finance needs today for adaptation, loss and damage, as well as low-carbon pathways to prosperity. This is a new target that is not yet tracked. Coupled with reference to a “Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T” in the final text that Colombia and Kenya championed, this represents Pakistan’s best hope of receiving the quantum of climate finance it needs, but it requires a market-oriented mindset.
As previously argued, for adaptation and resilience, every government can regulate to reduce default risk from climate impacts. They can require pension funds and insurance companies to invest in an insurable world by investing into adaptation and resilience to manage disaster, as well as emissions reductions and removals to prevent disaster.
The Baku to Belem Roadmap need not begin from a tabula rasa. The UAE COP28 Global Climate Finance Framework, which has the signature of 15 developed and developing national governments, speaks of the re-channelling of inefficient subsidies and IMF Special Drawing Rights, emissions pricing, and debt-for-climate-swaps and other interventions that can help mobilise the scale of finance required.
The Pakistan government needs to enter the conversation now. We all know our ideal stated positions, but it is time to think practically. Pakistan will need to empower its most agile brains to draw up solutions with those who have shown leadership in this space: Kenya, Colombia, Barbados, France, the UK, Germany, and the troika of COP presidencies.
Published in Dawn, December 22nd, 2024
MANY climate-vulnerable nations hoped for more at COP29. However, the text leaves an opportunity for Pakistan’s freshest minds to seize on behalf of those who have most to lose from climate change.
The final document reflects the challenges of a multilateral process fraught with competing interests, including within the 60-year-old coalition of 134 developing countries called the G77. The interests of oil-rich and prosperous nations within the Arab Group, for example, do not align with those of climate-vulnerable, developing nations such as Pakistan.
The Arab Group worried that a new formulation of the contributor base for climate finance would explicitly put them on the hook for providing and reporting on support to developing countries alongside traditional developed countries like the US, both because of their capability to provide finance and their attributable greenhouse gas emissions. Six of 10 countries with the highest per capita consumption-based CO emissions belong to the Arab Group. Four of those members have GDPs per capita higher than $30,000; two of them with higher per capita incomes than the UK, France and Japan.
At the technical level, the Arab Group negotiators with oil-producing Bolivia persuaded the G77 to lose a week of negotiation time by not engaging with the text proffered by the UN Secretariat in October. This directly undermined the interests of countries trying to survive the impacts of climate change. This loss in negotiating time meant that no time was spent discussing items in the October text: how much developed countries exclusively would be on the hook for, what proportion of climate finance should be in the form of grant equivalent terms, and what proportion of finance should be allocated to adaptation and loss and damage.
Every government can regulate to reduce default risk from climate impacts.
To prevent this from happening repeatedly, Pakistani diplomats must be alive to when the Arab Group is pushing an agenda that makes no sense for Pakistan or the majority of developed nation allies within the G77, and be ready to push back.
To the quantum: in 2009 at COP15 in Copenhagen, countries set a $100 billion/year climate finance target for developed countries to mobilise for developing countries by 2020. That target was nominally surpassed for the first time in 2022. COP29 in Baku was about deciding what the new number would be. Two key numbers entered the text.
The public-based support goal for developing countries: $300bn/year to developing countries by 2035, without inflation indexing. It is this number that is most important for Pakistan’s resilience to and recovery from future floods, droughts and heatwaves as it does not predicate financing with a promise for profit. The number could represent at best a modest rise to, and at worst, a reduction of the ambition agreed to in 2009, depending on inflation. Moreover, unlike the previous commitment, this was not exclusively to come from developed countries. In theory, Pakistan and all developing countries are now invited to contribute to the core goal.
The investment aspiration into developing countries: $1.3 trillion per year, the number promoted by the Africa Group, reflecting the developing world’s climate finance needs today for adaptation, loss and damage, as well as low-carbon pathways to prosperity. This is a new target that is not yet tracked. Coupled with reference to a “Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T” in the final text that Colombia and Kenya championed, this represents Pakistan’s best hope of receiving the quantum of climate finance it needs, but it requires a market-oriented mindset.
As previously argued, for adaptation and resilience, every government can regulate to reduce default risk from climate impacts. They can require pension funds and insurance companies to invest in an insurable world by investing into adaptation and resilience to manage disaster, as well as emissions reductions and removals to prevent disaster.
The Baku to Belem Roadmap need not begin from a tabula rasa. The UAE COP28 Global Climate Finance Framework, which has the signature of 15 developed and developing national governments, speaks of the re-channelling of inefficient subsidies and IMF Special Drawing Rights, emissions pricing, and debt-for-climate-swaps and other interventions that can help mobilise the scale of finance required.
The Pakistan government needs to enter the conversation now. We all know our ideal stated positions, but it is time to think practically. Pakistan will need to empower its most agile brains to draw up solutions with those who have shown leadership in this space: Kenya, Colombia, Barbados, France, the UK, Germany, and the troika of COP presidencies.
Published in Dawn, December 22nd, 2024