PPP’s Faisal Kundi calls for dealing with ‘anti-state’ people in Balochistan strictly
Published March 24, 2025
DAWN
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Faisal Karim Kundi has called for “anti-state” protesters in Balochistan to be dealt with strictly.
His statement follows shutter-down strikes in various cities of Balochistan over the recent arrests of Baloch Yakjehti Committee’s (BYC) leadership and a crackdown on its sit-in in Quetta against alleged enforced disappearances in the province.
BYC chief organiser Dr Mahrang Baloch and 16 other activists were arrested from their protest camp at Quetta’s Sariab Road on Saturday, a day after they claimed that three protesters had died due to police action.
Speaking during DawnNewsTV programme ‘Doosra Rukh’ on Sunday night, the PPP leader — whose party is in power in Balochistan — said: “I definitely think that whoever is against Pakistan or the state should be dealt with full-fledged strictness.”
He added that the state would have make a decision now. “We will have to abandon leniency and be strict. I don’t think a person who is anti-state or resorting to injustice can be dealt with leniently,” the KP governor said.
He highlighted there were “performances every day” in Balochistan of late, to which the host asked him if he meant the protests by Mahrang, but Kundi replied that he did not wish to provide them “fame by mentioning any names”.
Asked if he would prioritise holding a dialogue, the PPP leader said, “I do not think that these beings […] the agenda they are working on [can be dealt] with dialogue.”
However, answering a query on possible talks with veteran politician MNA Akhtar Mengal, Kundi said he was in favour of such a process “if senior people believe we can work together for Pakistan’s improvement”.
“But if they want Pakistan not to prosper and their agenda to rule; this cannot happen,” the KP governor added.
To a query if he thought harsh action was the last option, Kundi highlighted attacks on security personnel, last year’s Quetta Railway Station bombing, the recent Jaffar Express attack, and incidents of labourers being targeted.
When pointed out that the Jaffar Express attack was claimed by the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) group, Kundi said “whoever doesn’t accept Pakistan’s constitution and laws, [and] wants to destabilise” the country should be dealt with harshly.
Responding to whether he considered the BYC “anti-Pakistan”, Kundi simply reiterated: “There is no need for a dialogue with anyone who does not accept Pakistan’s constitution.”
Mahrang, along with 150 others, has been booked by Quetta’s Sariab police in a terrorism case on charges of forcibly taking away bodies from a morgue and incitement to violence. Other alleged offences include murder, attempted murder, incitement to violence and rebellion, creating disorder, promoting racial hatred, and property damage.
According to police officials, Mahrang’s arrest has not been officially disclosed. She is not in the custody of Civil Lines Police and remains in Quetta District Jail under Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) provisions.
‘No military operation in KP’
Speaking about counterterrorism in his province, Kundi clarified that no plans for a military operation in KP came under discussion in the recent meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS).
The high-level security moot on March 18 — chaired by National Assembly Speaker Ayaz Sadiq — was attended by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asim Munir, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, senior political leaders, military officials and intelligence representatives.
The PCNS had emphasised the urgent need to implement counterterrorism frameworks — the National Action Plan (NAP) and Vision Azm-i-Istehkam — to curb terrorism, while COAS Munir pointed to governance gaps as a key reason behind the spike in terrorism and called for making Pakistan a “hard state”.
Following the moot, the government ruled out a fresh military offensive to rein in the surge in terrorism, according to Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry.
Speaking on the programme, Kundi said there was “no talk of a military operation” during the PCNS meeting. “No one has said of a full-fledged military operation.”
However, he noted that intelligence-based counterterrorism operations have been ongoing in the province.
Asked about the KP government’s firm opposition to a military operation in the province, Kundi claimed Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur’s reported stance might have been a “message to his friends and colluders on the other side that ‘see, I defended you’”.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Faisal Karim Kundi speaks during DawnNewsTV programme ‘Doosra Rukh’, aired on March 23, 2025. — DawnNewsTV
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Faisal Karim Kundi has called for “anti-state” protesters in Balochistan to be dealt with strictly.
His statement follows shutter-down strikes in various cities of Balochistan over the recent arrests of Baloch Yakjehti Committee’s (BYC) leadership and a crackdown on its sit-in in Quetta against alleged enforced disappearances in the province.
BYC chief organiser Dr Mahrang Baloch and 16 other activists were arrested from their protest camp at Quetta’s Sariab Road on Saturday, a day after they claimed that three protesters had died due to police action.
Speaking during DawnNewsTV programme ‘Doosra Rukh’ on Sunday night, the PPP leader — whose party is in power in Balochistan — said: “I definitely think that whoever is against Pakistan or the state should be dealt with full-fledged strictness.”
He added that the state would have make a decision now. “We will have to abandon leniency and be strict. I don’t think a person who is anti-state or resorting to injustice can be dealt with leniently,” the KP governor said.
He highlighted there were “performances every day” in Balochistan of late, to which the host asked him if he meant the protests by Mahrang, but Kundi replied that he did not wish to provide them “fame by mentioning any names”.
Asked if he would prioritise holding a dialogue, the PPP leader said, “I do not think that these beings […] the agenda they are working on [can be dealt] with dialogue.”
However, answering a query on possible talks with veteran politician MNA Akhtar Mengal, Kundi said he was in favour of such a process “if senior people believe we can work together for Pakistan’s improvement”.
“But if they want Pakistan not to prosper and their agenda to rule; this cannot happen,” the KP governor added.
To a query if he thought harsh action was the last option, Kundi highlighted attacks on security personnel, last year’s Quetta Railway Station bombing, the recent Jaffar Express attack, and incidents of labourers being targeted.
When pointed out that the Jaffar Express attack was claimed by the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) group, Kundi said “whoever doesn’t accept Pakistan’s constitution and laws, [and] wants to destabilise” the country should be dealt with harshly.
Responding to whether he considered the BYC “anti-Pakistan”, Kundi simply reiterated: “There is no need for a dialogue with anyone who does not accept Pakistan’s constitution.”
Mahrang, along with 150 others, has been booked by Quetta’s Sariab police in a terrorism case on charges of forcibly taking away bodies from a morgue and incitement to violence. Other alleged offences include murder, attempted murder, incitement to violence and rebellion, creating disorder, promoting racial hatred, and property damage.
According to police officials, Mahrang’s arrest has not been officially disclosed. She is not in the custody of Civil Lines Police and remains in Quetta District Jail under Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) provisions.
‘No military operation in KP’
Speaking about counterterrorism in his province, Kundi clarified that no plans for a military operation in KP came under discussion in the recent meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS).
The high-level security moot on March 18 — chaired by National Assembly Speaker Ayaz Sadiq — was attended by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asim Munir, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, senior political leaders, military officials and intelligence representatives.
The PCNS had emphasised the urgent need to implement counterterrorism frameworks — the National Action Plan (NAP) and Vision Azm-i-Istehkam — to curb terrorism, while COAS Munir pointed to governance gaps as a key reason behind the spike in terrorism and called for making Pakistan a “hard state”.
Following the moot, the government ruled out a fresh military offensive to rein in the surge in terrorism, according to Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry.
Speaking on the programme, Kundi said there was “no talk of a military operation” during the PCNS meeting. “No one has said of a full-fledged military operation.”
However, he noted that intelligence-based counterterrorism operations have been ongoing in the province.
Asked about the KP government’s firm opposition to a military operation in the province, Kundi claimed Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur’s reported stance might have been a “message to his friends and colluders on the other side that ‘see, I defended you’”.
Countering insurgency
Published March 23, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a security analyst.
THE growing intensity of the Baloch insurgency has led to a debate on how to tackle it. Security institutions vow to address it with force, and want to see Pakistan as a “hard state”. On the other hand, sections of the intelligentsia and the political class insist that political problems should be resolved through political means. These contrasting approaches reflect old and new evidence to bolster the respective arguments. This diversity of opinion is a healthy sign, and can lead to effective, consensus-based strategies — provided that the establishment is not averse to engaging with viewpoints that challenge its own.
In controlled polities, the power dynamics favour those voices that align with its own interests. In Pakistan, it is common for segments of the intelligentsia, academia, media, and politicians across ideological lines to distort or manipulate the facts in order to appease those in power and seek personal or institutional rewards. This needs to be acknowledged before assessing global best practices for counterinsurgency (COIN).
Too often, in their efforts to justify state policies, so-called intellectuals misrepresent research findings. One unfortunate example is the frequent misinterpretation of a RAND Corporation report titled Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies, authored by Christopher Paul, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Molly Dunigan. Anyone familiar with internal security discussions in Pakistan would know that this study is often cited to argue that crushing insurgencies is the key to victory.
Actually, the study deconstructs this argument by analysing 71 insurgencies resolved between World War II and 2010. It acknowledges that every insurgency is unique, and rigorously tests 17 out of 24 counterinsurgency strategies that emphasise brute force. The findings provide strong evidence against the ‘crush them’ approach. Instead, the 286-page report offers a multidimensional analysis of COIN, demonstrating that effective COIN strategies do not rely on a single method but rather a mix of several best practices.
Identifying common elements in successful COIN campaigns is not difficult. Three key factors emerge. The first is the reduction of tangible support — in every successful COIN campaign, governments effectively cut off material support to insurgents. The second is commitment and motivation — victorious COIN forces exhibit a genuine commitment to defeating the insurgency rather than prioritising personal wealth, prolonging the conflict for external aid, or avoiding combat. The third factor comprises flexibility and adaptability. For COIN operations to be successful, they must adjust to the evolving strategies and tactics of the insurgents.
It is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN.
For Pakistan to address the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan effectively, it is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN. Sole reliance on force is hardly effective, and contradicts the lessons of history and empirical evidence.
The study closely examines effective and ineffective COIN practices. In our context, there is greater focus on maintaining national unity, which comes from ensuring that at least one factor legitimises the government’s authority and reduces corruption. The focus of successful COIN efforts is on engaging the local people, building trust, ensuring the provision of essential services, and fostering a sense of security in controlled areas.
At the other end, ineffective COIN strategies include collective punishment, escalating repression, and corrupt, arbitrary governance. Conflicts persist when ruling elites have incentives to prolong them or insurgents receive external military support. Economic dependence on foreign backers, failure to adapt to tactics, excessive coercion, and a lack of alignment between the government and COIN forces weaken counterinsurgency efforts. Additionally, when insurgents are more skilled or motivated than COIN forces or state forces resort to looting for survival, the chances of failure increase.
A key lesson for countering operations is that counterinsurgency forces often compel insurgents to adopt guerrilla warfare on reaching the decisive phase of the conflict. While insurgents typically rely on terrorist tactics, sabotage, and the exploitation of political narratives, their strategy evolves in response to state actions.
The study also exposes the wide variation in the duration of insurgencies. The median length of the 71 cases examined was around 118 months. The shortest insurgency lasted for about nine months (Bangladesh, 1971); the longest over 35 years (Guatemala, 1960–1996). On average, insurgencies lasted around 128 months, though the median figure — less influenced by extreme cases — provides a more balanced perspective on typical conflict duration.
The study also examined the 1971 insurgency in East Pakistan, identifying two significant factors behind Pakistan’s loss: the denial of a political mandate and the excessive use of force. But despite these lessons, Pakistan applied a similar approach in Balochistan during the 1972-78 insurgency. The Baloch People’s Liberation Front (later the Baloch Liberation Front) had widespread local support and used standard guerrilla tactics, ie, targeting major supply lines and transportation routes between Balochistan and its neighbouring provinces. However, the insurgents couldn’t overcome the more extensive and better equipped COIN force, which consisted of the Pakistan Army and special forces units. By resorting to overwhelming force, Pakistan managed to suppress the insurgency.
However, the ‘crush them’ strategy did not go according to plan. After the decisive phase of the conflict, insurgents established bases in Afghanistan and continued to wage a low-level insurgency across the border. But, their cross-border presence prolonged the conflict instead of leading to a decisive victory for them. The report misses a critical factor: Iran’s military and political support for Pakistan during this period, which played a significant role in countering the insurgency. In contrast, today’s insurgents have found safe havens across the border in Iran, and Tehran’s support for Pakistan is no longer available.
Had Pakistan prioritised development and governance reforms after the counterinsurgency, matters in Balochistan might have been different. The study found that in 36 cases, COIN forces failed because they did not establish legitimacy and address grievances after military success. Additionally, democracy was a decisive factor in long-term stability: COIN forces that did not adopt democratic governance lost in 26 out of 30 cases. The study emphasises that democracy enhances legitimacy by gaining public support through good governance, which comes from fair processes. Without such measures, even militarily successful COIN campaigns risk long-term failure.
Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2025
THE growing intensity of the Baloch insurgency has led to a debate on how to tackle it. Security institutions vow to address it with force, and want to see Pakistan as a “hard state”. On the other hand, sections of the intelligentsia and the political class insist that political problems should be resolved through political means. These contrasting approaches reflect old and new evidence to bolster the respective arguments. This diversity of opinion is a healthy sign, and can lead to effective, consensus-based strategies — provided that the establishment is not averse to engaging with viewpoints that challenge its own.
In controlled polities, the power dynamics favour those voices that align with its own interests. In Pakistan, it is common for segments of the intelligentsia, academia, media, and politicians across ideological lines to distort or manipulate the facts in order to appease those in power and seek personal or institutional rewards. This needs to be acknowledged before assessing global best practices for counterinsurgency (COIN).
Too often, in their efforts to justify state policies, so-called intellectuals misrepresent research findings. One unfortunate example is the frequent misinterpretation of a RAND Corporation report titled Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies, authored by Christopher Paul, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Molly Dunigan. Anyone familiar with internal security discussions in Pakistan would know that this study is often cited to argue that crushing insurgencies is the key to victory.
Actually, the study deconstructs this argument by analysing 71 insurgencies resolved between World War II and 2010. It acknowledges that every insurgency is unique, and rigorously tests 17 out of 24 counterinsurgency strategies that emphasise brute force. The findings provide strong evidence against the ‘crush them’ approach. Instead, the 286-page report offers a multidimensional analysis of COIN, demonstrating that effective COIN strategies do not rely on a single method but rather a mix of several best practices.
Identifying common elements in successful COIN campaigns is not difficult. Three key factors emerge. The first is the reduction of tangible support — in every successful COIN campaign, governments effectively cut off material support to insurgents. The second is commitment and motivation — victorious COIN forces exhibit a genuine commitment to defeating the insurgency rather than prioritising personal wealth, prolonging the conflict for external aid, or avoiding combat. The third factor comprises flexibility and adaptability. For COIN operations to be successful, they must adjust to the evolving strategies and tactics of the insurgents.
It is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN.
For Pakistan to address the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan effectively, it is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN. Sole reliance on force is hardly effective, and contradicts the lessons of history and empirical evidence.
The study closely examines effective and ineffective COIN practices. In our context, there is greater focus on maintaining national unity, which comes from ensuring that at least one factor legitimises the government’s authority and reduces corruption. The focus of successful COIN efforts is on engaging the local people, building trust, ensuring the provision of essential services, and fostering a sense of security in controlled areas.
At the other end, ineffective COIN strategies include collective punishment, escalating repression, and corrupt, arbitrary governance. Conflicts persist when ruling elites have incentives to prolong them or insurgents receive external military support. Economic dependence on foreign backers, failure to adapt to tactics, excessive coercion, and a lack of alignment between the government and COIN forces weaken counterinsurgency efforts. Additionally, when insurgents are more skilled or motivated than COIN forces or state forces resort to looting for survival, the chances of failure increase.
A key lesson for countering operations is that counterinsurgency forces often compel insurgents to adopt guerrilla warfare on reaching the decisive phase of the conflict. While insurgents typically rely on terrorist tactics, sabotage, and the exploitation of political narratives, their strategy evolves in response to state actions.
The study also exposes the wide variation in the duration of insurgencies. The median length of the 71 cases examined was around 118 months. The shortest insurgency lasted for about nine months (Bangladesh, 1971); the longest over 35 years (Guatemala, 1960–1996). On average, insurgencies lasted around 128 months, though the median figure — less influenced by extreme cases — provides a more balanced perspective on typical conflict duration.
The study also examined the 1971 insurgency in East Pakistan, identifying two significant factors behind Pakistan’s loss: the denial of a political mandate and the excessive use of force. But despite these lessons, Pakistan applied a similar approach in Balochistan during the 1972-78 insurgency. The Baloch People’s Liberation Front (later the Baloch Liberation Front) had widespread local support and used standard guerrilla tactics, ie, targeting major supply lines and transportation routes between Balochistan and its neighbouring provinces. However, the insurgents couldn’t overcome the more extensive and better equipped COIN force, which consisted of the Pakistan Army and special forces units. By resorting to overwhelming force, Pakistan managed to suppress the insurgency.
However, the ‘crush them’ strategy did not go according to plan. After the decisive phase of the conflict, insurgents established bases in Afghanistan and continued to wage a low-level insurgency across the border. But, their cross-border presence prolonged the conflict instead of leading to a decisive victory for them. The report misses a critical factor: Iran’s military and political support for Pakistan during this period, which played a significant role in countering the insurgency. In contrast, today’s insurgents have found safe havens across the border in Iran, and Tehran’s support for Pakistan is no longer available.
Had Pakistan prioritised development and governance reforms after the counterinsurgency, matters in Balochistan might have been different. The study found that in 36 cases, COIN forces failed because they did not establish legitimacy and address grievances after military success. Additionally, democracy was a decisive factor in long-term stability: COIN forces that did not adopt democratic governance lost in 26 out of 30 cases. The study emphasises that democracy enhances legitimacy by gaining public support through good governance, which comes from fair processes. Without such measures, even militarily successful COIN campaigns risk long-term failure.
Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2025
NAP it in the bud
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
DESPITE the media focus on the reported ‘hard state’ remarks by the army chief at the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) meeting earlier this week, the huddle also saw agreement on a renewal of comprehensive counterterrorism measures such as the National Action Plan (NAP).
The NAP was developed and approved by consensus after the terror attack and massacre of students at the Army Public School in 2014 and, as Baqir Sajjad Syed recalled in his Dawn report on the PCNS meeting, was designed to combat terrorism through judicial reforms, strengthened law enforcement and measures against terror financing. It was revised in 2021.
Item No 14 in the original NAP, and No 10 in the 2021 revised version, calls for reconciliation efforts in Balochistan side by side with all necessary kinetic operations to tackle rising militancy, even terrorism targeting civilians, in the province.
The main difference between the new and old action points is that while the older version called for the provincial government to take the lead in the reconciliation, the 2021 version did not prescribe who’d lead the process (if it were ever to start).
It is important for all thinking people in the country, including Balochistan, to come up with concrete suggestions.
It is not clear whether the later version was an acknowledgement of the criticism particularly in Balochistan of the set-up seen as foisted on the province via selected rather than elected people, and that would have much to lose if a genuinely elected system were to be ushered in.
The critics’ reference is to the disenfranchisement of the Baloch, which started with the subversion of the provincial government, ahead of the crucial Senate elections in March 2018, by the same intelligence officials who are being blamed today for facilitating the return of TTP militants to the merged districts a little after PTI’s Imran Khan became prime minister in 2018.
Given the civil-military resolve to tackle militancy/ terrorism in a multi-dimensional, structured manner, it is important for all thinking people in the country including Balochistan to not just criticise and condemn but also come up with concrete suggestions.
I have been talking to many such people including Baloch friends and offer my own list of measures that may restore some sanity to the discourse and re-engage constitutionalists such as former Balochistan chief minister Sardar Akhtar Mengal, who stated he had given up hope.
Politicians such as Dr Malik Baloch, a Baloch nationalist, who remains a peaceful advocate of his province’s rights, should be listened to, not just invited to meetings and then ignored. As chief minister, he strived relentlessly to present his constituents’ legitimate concerns, within the confines of the federation, and get them addressed by the centre, the Council of Common Interests and every other institutional forum. The mild-mannered politician failed.
He’d also been tasked, along with his coalition partner PML-N’s retired Lt-Gen Qadir Baloch, to initiate a dialogue with estranged Baloch leaders in a reconciliation attempt, but was made to cut a sorry figure because, despite a positive response from the interlocutors, there was no follow-up. The state was either never interested or changed its mind.
These politicians and others like them who have placed their faith in the Constitution and federation are unpalatable to the state for one reason: they reflect and articulate the concerns of those who elect them.
As a first step, this has to change. It is time to acknowledge that their master’s voice may serve as dutiful echo chambers but can’t deliver and have zero cred.
As already mentioned in these columns, the question of the missing must be addressed. It would take courage to start our very own truth and reconciliation process. But no more courage than that being displayed by our soldiers who face a hail of bullets every day to do their duty and offer the supreme sacrifice.
One of Pakistan’s brightest minds and foremost public policy expert/ intellectual Rafiullah Kakar points out several other issues too. He told Shehzad Ghias Shaikh’s Pakistan Experience podcast that all the goodwill created by the 18th Amendment, the NFC award and Aghaz-i-Huqooq-i-Balochistan package between 2008 and 2013, which encouraged nationalists to contest the 2013 elections in droves, has evaporated due to the centre’s intransigence and mala fide political engineering.
Economic rights present a picture not dissimilar to the political rights of the province. For example, even before the passage of the 18th Amendment, the ownership of all natural resources, minerals (with the exception of gas and oil) belonged to the provinces.
Despite this, the Saindak contract signed in 2002 gave a 50 per cent share of the profit to the Chinese, 48pc to the centre and 2pc (yes, two) to the Balochistan government. The 18th Amendment (2010) awarded 50pc ownership in gas and oil production to Balochistan. This was to cover all new contracts.
In Aghaz-i-Huqooq, it was pledged that Saindak would be handed over to Balochistan in 2012 to decide the terms of contract renewal, etc, but the Balochistan government was arm-twisted into agreeing to a five-year extension, as the then chief minister Raisani wilted under pressure. The contract was extended twice again in 2017 when Dr Malik’s efforts were thwarted and, unsurprisingly, BAP also relented in 2022 for yet another extension.
Another irritant is natural gas where Balochistan produces at least seven to eight times what it consumes and the consumption is subsidised; here too there is just one loser.
The advocates of status quo say the sheer spread of the province renders unviable any infrastructure to deliver gas everywhere. Then what would they say about the remarkably sad statistics from the Benazir Income Support Programme where, as per three different criteria, Balochistan’s population makes up 9pc to 10pc of the country’s poorest but only receives 3pc to 4pc allocation under this widely acclaimed poverty alleviation scheme?
There is a lot more to say and do, but Balochistan can be brought back from the brink into the mainstream. It is not easy to cede control. It will take political will.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2025
DAWN
Published March 23, 2025
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
DESPITE the media focus on the reported ‘hard state’ remarks by the army chief at the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) meeting earlier this week, the huddle also saw agreement on a renewal of comprehensive counterterrorism measures such as the National Action Plan (NAP).
The NAP was developed and approved by consensus after the terror attack and massacre of students at the Army Public School in 2014 and, as Baqir Sajjad Syed recalled in his Dawn report on the PCNS meeting, was designed to combat terrorism through judicial reforms, strengthened law enforcement and measures against terror financing. It was revised in 2021.
Item No 14 in the original NAP, and No 10 in the 2021 revised version, calls for reconciliation efforts in Balochistan side by side with all necessary kinetic operations to tackle rising militancy, even terrorism targeting civilians, in the province.
The main difference between the new and old action points is that while the older version called for the provincial government to take the lead in the reconciliation, the 2021 version did not prescribe who’d lead the process (if it were ever to start).
It is important for all thinking people in the country, including Balochistan, to come up with concrete suggestions.
It is not clear whether the later version was an acknowledgement of the criticism particularly in Balochistan of the set-up seen as foisted on the province via selected rather than elected people, and that would have much to lose if a genuinely elected system were to be ushered in.
The critics’ reference is to the disenfranchisement of the Baloch, which started with the subversion of the provincial government, ahead of the crucial Senate elections in March 2018, by the same intelligence officials who are being blamed today for facilitating the return of TTP militants to the merged districts a little after PTI’s Imran Khan became prime minister in 2018.
Given the civil-military resolve to tackle militancy/ terrorism in a multi-dimensional, structured manner, it is important for all thinking people in the country including Balochistan to not just criticise and condemn but also come up with concrete suggestions.
I have been talking to many such people including Baloch friends and offer my own list of measures that may restore some sanity to the discourse and re-engage constitutionalists such as former Balochistan chief minister Sardar Akhtar Mengal, who stated he had given up hope.
Politicians such as Dr Malik Baloch, a Baloch nationalist, who remains a peaceful advocate of his province’s rights, should be listened to, not just invited to meetings and then ignored. As chief minister, he strived relentlessly to present his constituents’ legitimate concerns, within the confines of the federation, and get them addressed by the centre, the Council of Common Interests and every other institutional forum. The mild-mannered politician failed.
He’d also been tasked, along with his coalition partner PML-N’s retired Lt-Gen Qadir Baloch, to initiate a dialogue with estranged Baloch leaders in a reconciliation attempt, but was made to cut a sorry figure because, despite a positive response from the interlocutors, there was no follow-up. The state was either never interested or changed its mind.
These politicians and others like them who have placed their faith in the Constitution and federation are unpalatable to the state for one reason: they reflect and articulate the concerns of those who elect them.
As a first step, this has to change. It is time to acknowledge that their master’s voice may serve as dutiful echo chambers but can’t deliver and have zero cred.
As already mentioned in these columns, the question of the missing must be addressed. It would take courage to start our very own truth and reconciliation process. But no more courage than that being displayed by our soldiers who face a hail of bullets every day to do their duty and offer the supreme sacrifice.
One of Pakistan’s brightest minds and foremost public policy expert/ intellectual Rafiullah Kakar points out several other issues too. He told Shehzad Ghias Shaikh’s Pakistan Experience podcast that all the goodwill created by the 18th Amendment, the NFC award and Aghaz-i-Huqooq-i-Balochistan package between 2008 and 2013, which encouraged nationalists to contest the 2013 elections in droves, has evaporated due to the centre’s intransigence and mala fide political engineering.
Economic rights present a picture not dissimilar to the political rights of the province. For example, even before the passage of the 18th Amendment, the ownership of all natural resources, minerals (with the exception of gas and oil) belonged to the provinces.
Despite this, the Saindak contract signed in 2002 gave a 50 per cent share of the profit to the Chinese, 48pc to the centre and 2pc (yes, two) to the Balochistan government. The 18th Amendment (2010) awarded 50pc ownership in gas and oil production to Balochistan. This was to cover all new contracts.
In Aghaz-i-Huqooq, it was pledged that Saindak would be handed over to Balochistan in 2012 to decide the terms of contract renewal, etc, but the Balochistan government was arm-twisted into agreeing to a five-year extension, as the then chief minister Raisani wilted under pressure. The contract was extended twice again in 2017 when Dr Malik’s efforts were thwarted and, unsurprisingly, BAP also relented in 2022 for yet another extension.
Another irritant is natural gas where Balochistan produces at least seven to eight times what it consumes and the consumption is subsidised; here too there is just one loser.
The advocates of status quo say the sheer spread of the province renders unviable any infrastructure to deliver gas everywhere. Then what would they say about the remarkably sad statistics from the Benazir Income Support Programme where, as per three different criteria, Balochistan’s population makes up 9pc to 10pc of the country’s poorest but only receives 3pc to 4pc allocation under this widely acclaimed poverty alleviation scheme?
There is a lot more to say and do, but Balochistan can be brought back from the brink into the mainstream. It is not easy to cede control. It will take political will.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2025
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