The Bloody Price of the “Moderate Jihadism” and “Controlled Chaos” Strategies: Palmyra

By Mahir Engizek

December 15, 2025

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image courtesy of ​Mahir Engizek

Modern Western strategic thinking still likes to present itself as the child of the Enlightenment: Rationality, progress, order, and law. 

However, the practice operating in the Middle East for the past 30 years has repeatedly shown that these concepts are nothing more than a normative mask, an ideological camouflage. What is being marketed today as “moderate jihadism” is neither an exception nor a tactical mistake. On the contrary, it is one of the most consistent products of the imperial mind’s relationship with violence. 

The bloody attack in Palmyra is the inevitable outcome of this consistency. This event is not an accident but the manifestation of a systemic moral and strategic decay. 

The concept of “moderate jihadism” is theoretically an oxymoron. Jihadism is fundamentally built upon an ideology of absolute hostility towards Western modernity, secularism, women’s liberation, and pluralism. 

The only thing that makes this ideology “moderate” is the West’s temporary tolerance of it, its attempts to steer it, and its integration into its own architecture of violence for the sake of its transient interests. Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” gains a strategic context here. Evil is no longer the pathological deviation of fanatics but the byproduct of the cold, calculated assessments of bureaucratic logic. 

The policy pursued by the US and its allies in Syria is, in this context, not an exception but a continuation of a long line stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen. 

The “controlled chaos” doctrine is the name for the contradiction between the West’s fetish for order and its practice of generating chaos. Chaos here is not a failure, but a consciously produced strategic environment designed to weaken rival actors, fragment the social fabric, and prevent the flourishing of alternative political projects. However, the assumption that this chaos is “controllable” is the most dangerous delusion of imperial narcissism. 

Viewed through Michel Foucault’s lens of the power-knowledge relationship, the distinction between “moderate” and “radical” is not an analytical tool defining the reality on the ground, but a discursive construct produced by the West to legitimize its own interventions. 

Organizations like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been temporarily reframed within this discourse as “transformable,” “rational interlocutors,” or “the lesser evil.” This is not an act of ignorance but a deliberate political choice. Because for the West, the real threat is not the armed jihadist groups, but the possibility of a democratic project rooted in the people, which is secular, pro-women’s liberation, and anti capitalist. 

It is precisely at this point that the model put forth by the Kurdish Freedom Movement in Syria exposes the structural limits of the Western mind. 

This project, centered on democratic self-administration, Democratic Societal Socialism, communal economy, and gender liberation, is not merely a military success against ISIS (Daesh) but also an alternative civilizational vision for the region. This vision undermines the West’s binary schema that confines the Middle East between authoritarian nation-states and armed jihadist structures. This is why the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has never been a “fully trustworthy” partner for the Coalition. 

This seemingly paradoxical situation is, in fact, highly rational. The SDF is too consistent, too principled, too autonomous. What the West seeks is not actors who genuinely embody its values, but structures that verbally assent to those values while practically agreeing to be part of the imperial order. HTS’s performance of “moderation” was encouraged precisely because it answered this expectation. 

But ideologies do not behave like mercenaries. As Frantz Fanon warned, alliances established through violence eventually turn against their own masters. Jihadism is not domesticated as it is instrumentalized; rather, its ideological core is hardened. Every contact with the West deepens the internal contradictions of this ideology and ultimately produces a “moment of betrayal.” The attack in Palmyra is the crystallized form of this moment of betrayal. 

The reactions of US and Coalition officials following this attack have made the collapse even more visible. The reflex to quickly pin the blame on ISIS is not just a propaganda maneuver but an expression of an inability to face the truth. 

Because the attack having originated from within HTS demolishes the entire “moderate partner” narrative. This situation creates a rift in the discursive universe established by the West. The truth, which has been attempted to be suppressed, is emerging bloodily. 

The real object of scrutiny here should not be a singular attack, but the structural mindset that made this attack possible. Why has the Coalition consistently kept the SDF—the most reliable, disciplined, and ideologically consistent force on the ground—under pressure, while seeing an entity like HTS as a strategic option for “key leader engagement”? 

This question is not just military or diplomatic; it is a profound moral question. And every evasive answer to this moral question paves the way for new Palmyras. 

The myth of “moderate jihadism” has collapsed at this point, not just theoretically, but practically. Controlled chaos is now generating an uncontrollable blowback. The West has been struck from within by the ideological enemy it fed with its own hands, yet it attempts to present this blow as an “unforeseen exception.” However, this is not the exception; it is the rule itself. 

Palmyra: The Location of Betrayal, the Collapse of Controlled Chaos, and the Bloody Exposure of the “Moderation” Lie 

The Palmyra desert has historically been a geography where empires were tested by their hubris. Just as the stone columns of Rome eventually sank into the desert, today the “smart,” “finely tuned” security architecture the West thought it was building in the Middle East is dissolving among the same desert sands. The attack in Palmyra is, in this sense, not just a military incident but a symbolic breaking point where the strategic lies of an era are being buried. 

To read this attack as a mere case of “internal radicalization” is to consciously distort the truth. 

Because the attacker’s affiliation with HTS, his direct relationship with the organization’s intelligence structure, and the context in which the attack took place indicate that this was not an isolated aberration, but the product of an organizational and ideological continuity. The only “surprise” here is the Coalition’s audacity to still pretend to be surprised. 

The HTS narrative of “transformation” marketed to the West was a security theater from the start. On the stage of this theater, Ahmad al-Sharaa (Muhammad al-Jolani), while trimming his beard and posing with tie-clad diplomats, maintained the organization’s ideological backbone—the Salafi-jihadist worldview—intact. 

This dual structure was not a contradiction but a deliberate strategy. The message to the West was: “Legitimize me, and I will be functional against your enemies.” The Coalition accepted this bargain. The price was paid in Palmyra. 

The critical point here is the timing and the target of the attack. This was not a blind act of violence aimed at a randomly chosen target. It was a symbolic strike aimed precisely at the relationship the Coalition established with HTS. The message is: “I sit at the table with you, but I am not subordinate to you.” More importantly, this message is directed not only at the Coalition but also at the HTS base. Ideological discipline within the organization is re-established through such actions. Contact with the West leads not to ideological dissolution but to ideological radicalization. 

At this juncture, the reflexes displayed by Western media and official discourse are as instructive as the attack itself. The immediate finger-pointing at ISIS is not an intelligence error but a discursive defense mechanism. 

Because ISIS is encoded in the West’s mental map as the “absolute evil,” and this code is useful for externalizing responsibility. HTS, however, is an actor the West wishes to keep in the gray zone—a “transformable” entity. The fact that the truth does not fit the ISIS narrative is therefore disconcerting.

This discomfort is evident in the statements by Trump and other Western officials. Expressions such as the attacker’s leader (Ahmad al-Sharaa) being “angry” are not political analysis but psychological reduction. Linking an ideological attack to individual emotional states obscures both the responsibility and the structural flaw. This language reveals the extent to which the West avoids questioning the architecture of violence it built. 

The statement by the HTS Ministry of Interior spokesperson, admitting that the attacker had “extremist tendencies,” is the tragicomic climax of this theater. This confession reveals that the Coalition is unable to cope not only with external threats but also with the internal dynamics of the very structure it is in direct contact with. To put it more clearly: The Coalition knows who it is sitting with, but chooses to pretend otherwise. This choice is not a strategic error but a deliberate gamble. 

Behind this gamble lies the regional legitimacy collapse deepened by the Gaza crisis. The US and its allies have already suffered a severe loss of legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim world due to their stance on Gaza. In this atmosphere, the anti-Western and anti-Zionist anger rising from the base of structures like HTS is not a variable that can be controlled. On the contrary, this anger is the main fuel for ideological mobilization. The Palmyra attack is one of the first major explosions of this fuel. 

Here, Joe Kent’s description of the attack as a “terrorist act carried out from the inside” is one of the rare statements that inadvertently approaches the truth. 

Yes, this is an inside attack. But the “inside” is not just the body of HTS, but the sphere of the dirty alliance established by the Coalition itself. The betrayal did not infiltrate from the outside; it blossomed from a structure that the Coalition was in contact with, legitimized, and indirectly empowered. 

At this point, the real tragedy is that the Coalition still views this event as a “manageable crisis.” Threats of retaliation, the “we will hunt them down” rhetoric, and limited military operations are being substituted for a strategic confrontation. The problem here, however, is not a target to be hit, but a mindset that must be abandoned. Jihadism is not an external threat that can be eliminated by bombing; it is an ideological ecosystem nurtured by faulty alliances. 

And against this ecosystem, there is only one structure that has consistently stood firm for years: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). One of the most striking aspects of the Palmyra attack is that it confirms the warnings repeatedly voiced by the SDF. The warning that “there can be no tactical alliance with jihadism” is no longer a theoretical argument; it is a reality written in blood. 

The Kurdish Freedom Movement: Ethical Politics, Democratic Self-Administration Against the Architecture of Betrayal, and a Radical Call to the West 

The blood spilled in Palmyra has declared the bankruptcy not only of the Coalition’s security prowess on the ground but also of the West’s entire vision for the Middle East.

This failure stems not from a lack of military capacity, but from the loss of a moral and political compass. For too long, the West has defined security through negotiation, not through principle. 

It is precisely at this juncture that the Kurdish Freedom Movement stands not only as a resistance force but also as a historical counter-thesis developed against this corrupted understanding of security. 

The Syrian Democratic Forces’ struggle against ISIS goes far beyond the classic “counter-terrorism” paradigm. 

This struggle was waged not on behalf of a state, but on behalf of a society, a way of life. A secular, pluralistic, and communal political vision, spearheaded by women, became a tangible reality in one of the darkest periods in the Middle East. This is the only consistent practice on the ground of the values the West claims to champion (democracy, freedom, and equality). And precisely for this reason, it is disconcerting to the West. 

The fundamental contradiction in the Coalition’s approach to the SDF lies here. On the one hand, the SDF is recognized as an indispensable actor in the defeat of ISIS. On the other hand, this actor is constantly kept as a “temporary,” “tactical,” and “negotiable” element. It is left isolated in the face of Turkey’s open threats, economically strangled, and diplomatically marginalized. The reason for this is not security concerns, but the threat posed by the political project the SDF represents to the prevailing status quo in the region. 

The model of democratic self-administration is a radical alternative developed against the centralized, male-dominated, and authoritarian structure of the nation-state. This model offers a common ground for coexistence not only for Kurds but also for Arabs, Syriacs, Ezidis, and other peoples. This common ground is incompatible with the destiny the West has outlined for the Middle East. Because the West seeks stability not in the self-organization of peoples, but in controllable and supervisable elites, and armed proxies. 

General Mazloum Abdi’s prudent call following the Palmyra attack is deeply significant in this context. This call is not an expression of diplomatic courtesy but a quiet yet sharp criticism directed at the Coalition. 

It is a call to “return to a principled, institutional, and collective understanding of security.” The SDF did not use the language of revenge, did not issue threats of retaliation; instead, it recalled the basis for a common and transparent struggle. This stance demonstrates what ethical politics is, in contrast to the betrayal of HTS. 

The celebration of the attacker’s action in Damascus, who emerged from within HTS, reveals that the issue has gained an ideological base, not just an organizational one. This is the clearest proof that the “moderation” narrative has no resonance at the grassroots level.

Jihadism interprets every contact with the West as an ideological humiliation and seeks to compensate for this humiliation with violence. This dynamic has been analyzed theoretically countless times. Despite this, the West’s continued insistence on the same path can no longer be explained by ignorance. 

Trump’s rhetoric of retaliation and Hegseth’s language of “we will hunt them down” are not demonstrations of strength but expressions of strategic desperation. This language is the West’s reflex to avoid confronting the monsters it created by constantly defining itself as “under threat.” Yet, the real threat is not the person who pulled the trigger in Palmyra. It is the alliance logic that made it possible to pull that trigger. 

At this point, the Kurdish Freedom Movement makes a clear, radical, and irreversible call to the West: 

You will either choose moral and strategic clarity, or you will completely lose a permanent security presence in this geography. The illusion of “moderate jihadism” must be abandoned. Jihadism cannot be transformed. It can only be fought against. And the only reliable, consistent, and proven partner for this struggle on the ground is the SDF. 

This call is not a request for a favor. The SDF does not owe its existence to the Coalition’s approval. 

However, if the West wants to be consistent with the values it claims to uphold, it must politically and diplomatically recognize, protect, and defend the SDF’s democratic self administration project. Otherwise, every new attack, every new betrayal, every new loss will be the natural consequence of the path the West has chosen. 

Palmyra was a warning. If this warning is not taken seriously, the judgment of history will be ruthless. Security cannot be considered separately from morality. Strategy cannot be sustained by lack of principle. 

The alternative offered by the Kurdish Freedom Movement is the hope not only of the Kurds but of everyone seeking a dignified future in this geography. The West will either embrace this hope or remain under its rubble.

Why Are American Troops Still Dying in Syria?

by Alan Mosley | Dec 15, 2025 | ANTIWAR.COM

On December 13, 2025, two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed near Palmyra, Syria. According to a Pentagon statement, a lone Islamic State (ISIS) gunman disguised as a shepherd opened fire on a joint U.S.–Syrian patrol, killing three and wounding three before Syrian troops shot him dead. Donald Trump responded with characteristic fury; he promised “very serious retaliation” and said Syria’s new president Ahmed al‑Sharaa was “devastated” by the attack. Yet the promise to end America’s “forever wars” has been part of his pitch since 2016, and U.S. troops remain.

The withdrawal that never happened

Trump first told Americans he had “won against ISIS” in December 2018 and ordered U.S. troops home. In reality, Pentagon and congressional pressure kept about half of the roughly 2,000 troops in place. Less than a year later he issued another withdrawal order, but officials left 90 percent of the force to “guard oil fields.” Reports noted that the mission quickly shifted from defeating ISIS to protecting oil; roughly 500 troops stayed behind to keep oil fields from falling into jihadist hands.

Behind the scenes, U.S. officials were playing “shell games.” James Jeffrey, Trump’s envoy for Syria, later admitted they deliberately misled the president about troop numbers. “We were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there,” he confessed. Though Trump publicly agreed to keep only 200–400 troops, the actual number was “a lot more than” that. Journalists eventually learned that roughly 900 U.S. troops remained.

The Pentagon continued to slow‑roll civilian orders after Trump returned to office in 2025. In December 2024 the Defense Department quietly acknowledged there were about 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria – roughly 1,100 more than the 900 “core” personnel previously reported. Officials explained that these extra soldiers were “temporary rotational forces” deployed to meet fluid mission requirements. The new U.S. envoy, Thomas Barrack, announced plans to close most of the eight bases and consolidate operations in Hasakah province. Yet by November 2025 Reuters reported that the Pentagon intended to halve the troop presence to 1,000 and establish a new base at Damascus’ airport – a sign that numbers change on paper while the boots stay.

From jihadist to head of state

Understanding why American troops are still in Syria requires grappling with the identity of its new president. Ahmed Hussein al‑Sharaa – better known as Abu Mohammed al‑Julani – joined al‑Qaeda in Iraq and later founded the al‑Nusra Front. After splitting from al‑Qaeda the group rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS), which the United Nations and United States still classify as a terrorist organisation. In late 2024 HTS swept across Syria, toppling Bashar al‑Assad’s government and ending the thirteen‑year civil war. By January 2025 its leader proclaimed himself interim president and adopted the name Ahmed al‑Sharaa. Despite the rebranding, the Congressional Research Service notes that both HTS and Sharaa remain on U.N. sanctions lists.

Trump embraced Sharaa as an ally. In May 2025 he met the Syrian leader in Riyadh and praised him as a “tough” leader. The following November he welcomed Sharaa to the White House – the first visit by a Syrian head of state since 1946 – and told reporters he was doing “a very good job.” Commentators recalled that only a few years earlier Americans would have balked at a president welcoming a former al‑Qaeda commander. The meeting delivered what Sharaa craved: legitimacy.

Mission creep and local entanglements

While Trump lavished praise on Sharaa, the U.S. mission became ever more confused. The December 13 ambush occurred near the al‑Tanf garrison, a long‑standing U.S. base in Homs province where special forces train the Syrian Free Army (SFA). Across Deir ez‑Zor and Hasakah provinces, U.S. soldiers partner with the Kurdish‑led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and remnants of the SFA, providing intelligence, air support and training. These units have been vital in containing ISIS but also drag the U.S. deeper into Syrian politics.

Proxy attacks in 2024 prompted a temporary surge from about 900 to roughly 2,000 troops. By March 2025 the United States fielded about 2,000 troops in Syria alongside 2,500 coalition personnel in Iraq. Officials now propose reducing to 1,000 and closing most bases, yet sources say the Pentagon intends to retain an airbase in Damascus – evidence that the mission is evolving rather than ending.

Interventionists warn that Sharaa’s government cannot handle ISIS alone and argue that around 1,000–2,000 U.S. troops are needed because HTS has fought ISIS since 2013 and lacks capacity to manage detention camps and large‑scale operations. A non‑interventionist reading draws the opposite conclusion. Keeping troops in Syria has not prevented attacks on U.S. forces – it has created more targets. ISIS still fields between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq. The deadliest previous attack on U.S. troops in Syria occurred in 2019 when four Americans were killed in Manbij. The December 2025 ambush shows that ISIS cells remain capable of inflicting casualties despite years of occupation. Their ability to conduct hit‑and‑run attacks may be enhanced when American forces are stretched thin or tied down training local militias.

A destabilized country and shifting alliances

The ground realities further undermine the case for staying. After Assad’s fall, the Kurds were pushed from key areas by Turkish‑backed forces. Turkey continues to threaten new incursions and views the SDF as an extension of the PKK, which Ankara and Washington both designate a terrorist organization. Iraq wants U.S. coalition troops to remain at the Ain al‑Assad base because it distrusts the new Syrian authorities, who once fought in Iraq. Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia see Sharaa’s regime as a potential ally against Iran and are pushing for a U.S.‑brokered security pact. These overlapping agendas have little to do with American security but everything to do with regional geopolitics.

Interventionists also claim the U.S. presence denies ISIS oil revenue. Yet U.S. military officials concede that the group’s main income comes from extortion, smuggling and protection rackets; focusing on oil might even give ISIS a propaganda boon. With U.S. forces spread thin, insurgents can find targets, and militants operate in desert areas beyond Damascus’ control. Some argue American troops deter Iran or Russia, but Iranian units have largely withdrawn and Moscow is preoccupied with Ukraine. The 2024 acknowledgement of 2,000 U.S. troops came amid a budget update. Ultimately the mission persists because the foreign policy establishment cannot imagine letting go – even when Trump issued withdrawal orders, his envoys and generals thwarted them.

Why the deaths will continue

American troops remain in Syria because policymakers refuse to accept that they cannot remake the Middle East. Fifteen years after the U.S. first sent special forces to fight ISIS, the mission has mutated into an open‑ended occupation. Washington justifies its presence by pointing to terrorist remnants, protecting oil, deterring Iran or supporting Israel – interchangeable rationales that ensure there is always a reason to stay. Meanwhile, the Syrian battlefield is littered with shifting alliances, jihadist fragments and nationalist grievances. In that environment, a handful of U.S. personnel become symbolic targets, as the December 13 attack shows.

From a non‑interventionist perspective, the solution is simple. America should end its military presence in Syria and let regional actors solve their own problems. This does not mean abandoning diplomacy; Washington can support humanitarian relief and encourage negotiations without soldiers on the ground. But the current strategy – keeping a small force exposed to insurgent attacks while partnering with a former al‑Qaeda commander who remains on a terrorist sanctions list – is morally indefensible. As long as U.S. leaders cling to an ill‑defined mission in Syria, American troops will continue to die for reasons that have nothing to do with defending the United States.

Alan Mosley is a historian, jazz musician, policy researcher for the Tenth Amendment Center, and host of It’s Too Late, “The #1 Late Night Show in America (NOT hosted by a Communist)!” New episodes debut every Wednesday night at 9ET across all major platforms; just search “AlanMosleyTV” or “It’s Too Late with Alan Mosley.”

Preparations for an attack on Rojava?

Turkey met with delegations from France, the United States, Britain and Russia to attack North and East Syria, destroy its gains and force the SDF to disarm.

ZEYNEP BORAN

ANF
NEWS CENTER
Saturday, December 13, 2025 

While the Syrian crisis has become the focus of regional and Western powers again; The Turkish state is intensifying its intelligence and diplomatic activities in order to destroy the gains and military power of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. In this process, which marks the first year of Jolani's seizure of power in Damascus and the last three months of the deadline for the implementation of the March 10 agreement, we see that the diplomatic language has hardened.

While jihadist groups within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) openly threaten the Autonomous Administration, it is known that the talks between the HTS regime and the Autonomous Administration have stopped for a while. On the other hand, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan imposes that every step to be taken within the scope of the March 10 agreement should be taken according to his wishes.

There was heavy traffic, especially in the first weeks of December 2025. Meetings were held with the participation of a security delegation representing the HTS regime, as well as delegations from the UK, Turkey, France, the United States and Russia. This reflects the international understanding that Syria's future cannot be determined militarily and that the Autonomous Administration has become an important actor in the political and security environment. In all its meetings, Turkey describes the political and social activities of the Autonomous Administration as a "direct threat to Turkey's national security" and the support of the Autonomous Administration by Israel, France and the United States as "an attack on the territorial integrity of Syria." It was learned that the Turkish delegation told the French delegation that this support "allows the PKK to create a safe corridor between northern Iraq and Syria, which threatens Turkey's border security."

In the meetings, the details of which we have reached, the views of some international parties, especially the British and French delegations, on the Autonomous Administration draw attention. It is stated that the delegations said that the Kurds in Syria do not demand separation or independence, on the contrary, they want to stay within the borders of a united Syria, but that a decentralized or federal model should be applied for this. At the same time, the delegations clearly emphasized the need to guarantee the political, security, cultural and economic rights of the Kurds and ensure their fair representation in the institutions of power.

This attitude is implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Autonomous Administration and reflects a general Western tendency to see the Autonomous Administration as an important partner in stability and the fight against ISIS, especially considering the key role of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in defeating ISIS.

It was learned that the Turkish delegation tried to limit the March 10 agreement to the withdrawal of the SDF from Deir al-Zor, Reqa and Tebqa and the disarmament of the SDF. Moreover, it was stated that he asked the French delegation to put direct pressure on the SDF to force it to surrender its weapons and join HTS's institutions, which was rejected by France. It was noted that the Turkish delegation expressed its disappointment with what it described as "Europe's strict stance" and argued that Europe continues to support the Autonomous Administration within the framework of the "fight against terrorism" and that this support reflects Europe's independence from Turkish pressure to some extent.

Despite the new pragmatic relationship established between Turkey and the HTS regime after the fall of the Baath regime, HTS has not fully adopted Ankara's policy. As HTS seeks to rebuild a centralized state, it recognizes that the Autonomous Administration and the SDF are an important military, political, and social force that cannot be ignored or dismantled. However, it was stated that the Damascus delegation insisted on the individual integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian army, security, oil and natural gas, prisons where ISIS members are held, and the transfer of control of border crossings to it.

It was learned that Russia was cautious in managing its relations with all parties. Although it is a key partner for Turkey on many issues, it seems willing to maintain open channels of communication with the Autonomous Administration.

Despite Turkey's forcing HTS to launch an attack on the Autonomous Administration, Moscow has given clear messages that any attack could directly conflict with its interests and weaken its influence, especially in the coastal regions of Syria. Russia's position reflects the understanding that a possible attack would destabilize the country and revive extremist organizations. This does not align with Russia's current interests in Syria.

The sources emphasized that the US delegation firmly and unequivocally rejects any attack against the areas under the control of the Autonomous Administration. Washington believes that a large-scale war would lead to the resurgence of ISIS and threaten the security gains made by the SDF in recent years. It was stated that the US delegation conveyed these concerns directly to Turkey, emphasizing that stability in North and East Syria is a key element of the US strategy in the region and that the SDF is an indispensable partner.

Among these complex dynamics, Russian sources to the Israeli security delegation; An unexpected Israeli role emerged when Turkey announced that it had informed Moscow of its plans to establish permanent bases in southern Syria in order to limit its influence. This development reflects the multiplicity of actors involved in the Syrian crisis and shows that any radical shift in the balance of power in the north of the country will inevitably affect the south, where sensitive regional security interests intersect.

In addition, it was learned that the Turkish delegation claimed that Israel prevented the US from approving Turkey's operation against the Autonomous Administration on the grounds that Iran would be active in Syria again. This reflects Israel's strategy to maintain its influence in Syria and put pressure on Turkey.

All these developments show that the main disagreement between the Autonomous Administration and the HTS regime is not limited to security, border issues and oil, but also lies at the core of the identity of the future Syrian state. While HTS is moving towards once again imposing the centralist system that Syrians have suffered for decades, the Autonomous Administration adheres to a decentralized project based on the distribution of power according to geographical, ethnic and religious criteria, compatible with the complex realities of Syrian society.

In the new power struggle in the region, the chances of the Autonomous Administration and the SDF consolidating their positions in the Syrian geography are higher than ever. In short, it is clear that the Kurds have succeeded in positioning themselves as a key force in the future of Syria over the past decade. With the growing conviction in the regional and international arena that a decentralized model may be the most realistic option for Syria's stability, the Autonomous Administration project demonstrates the will to move forward towards becoming an integral part of Syria's future political structure, despite numerous challenges and pressures.

The Hope of the Future is Still in Rojava

By Rahila Gupta

December 11, 2025

Source: Tribune

The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are predominantly-Kurdish armed militias which have played a key role in fighting Islamic State in the Syrian civil war. KURDISHSTRUGGLE/FLICKR/CREATIVE COMMONS

Forged during the Syrian war, Rojava’s experiment in radical self-government offers a lens for examining how the left sustains hope under siege.

How should the progressive left respond to the experiment of Kurdish-led revolutionary Rojava in north-east Syria with its commitment to direct democracy, ecological sustainability, women’s rights and multi-ethnic inclusivity? It is a question that is bound to have plagued anyone who has visited Rojava, for whatever length of time, and come away humbled and impressed by a people swimming against the neoliberal current that has the world in its grips.

I too have grappled with this question. While no simple blueprint can reproduce the revolution elsewhere, I have toyed with more literal possibilities, taking a leaf out of the Kurdish diaspora’s playbook — setting up citizens’ assemblies along the lines of democratic confederalism to deal with local issues, build democratic muscle, and bring about change. Perhaps it could become as effective as the local experiment in Porto Alegre in Brazil once was. Set up in 1989, it received millions in participatory budgeting and redirected services to the most marginalised communities. That seems to be the limit of what can be achieved under neoliberal states; beyond that, political imagination falters, resorting to the idea of preparedness — like the Kurds quietly setting up citizens’ councils under the radar of Assad’s Syria until the Arab Spring in 2011 created a vacuum in the north and east and allowed them to achieve an almost bloodless revolution. Assad was too busy crushing the uprising down south.

Matt Broomfield, who spent three years in Rojava, approaches the question in his own, unique and thoughtful way. He embarks on a deep philosophical and practical engagement with the idea and reality of Rojava to tackle the defeatism of the left following the failure of the workers’ revolution in the twentieth century. He wants to engender that preparedness in what he sees as a disorganised Western anarchist movement weighed down by ‘left melancholy’. He runs through the post-Marxist philosophers who failed to identify a class of people who could be tasked with the job of transforming society, dismissing David Graeber’s ‘99 percent’, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s ‘multitude’, and John Holloway’s ‘rabble’, as too diffuse. He speculates whether this century’s political subject will be the climate migrant. However, it is Öcalan’s identification of women as the vanguard of change — a revolutionary force theorised as the first group of people to be enslaved — that drives the Rojava revolution and has set feminist imagination on fire everywhere.

At the organisational level, Broomfield considers whether the pragmatism of the Kurdish freedom struggle has any lessons to offer the Western Left, particularly the anarchist strand with its purist commitment to horizontalism. In Rojava, they have achieved a ‘novel synthesis: a militant, vertical organisation [which] empowers a communal, horizontal politics.’ The verticalist organisation is a leftover from the Kurdish movement’s Marxist-Leninist roots, which encourages discipline, even hierarchy, while paradoxically facilitating a decentralised challenge to that hierarchy. It is effective in a way that anarchists are not, leaving them open to subversion and co-optation, chaos and malaise.

When the existential battle for the city of Kobane, aggressively besieged by ISIS in 2014, looked in danger of being lost, the Kurds accepted the US coalition’s offer of air-cover, fully aware of the transactional nature of that relationship. This proved to be a decisive turning point in their fortunes. The willingness to sup with the imperialist devil in a desperate bid for survival discredited Rojava among some sections of the left. Similarly, they have engaged with Russia and played off several regional powers against each other, including conservative religious forces in the erstwhile ISIS caliphate. Broomfield commends this ‘respectful, open approach to the very culture it aims to revolutionise’ as a strategy that should be deployed in our own contexts.

Political philosophy is marshalled to buoy up the spirit of activists to stay with the grind of political work through a paean to hope, enriched and informed paradoxically by the very hopelessness of the struggle. Broomfield’s early Christian upbringing made him receptive to the dictum, ‘I believe because it is impossible’. He started the project to see if hope remained possible in the twenty-first century, after the Holocaust, the pandemic, the era of left defeat and in the middle of a climate catastrophe. With the help of mainly Western philosophical, literary and theological commentaries, Broomfield looks for hope that has been wrung out of despair — the only kind that can lend a spine to resistance, where even suicide could be interpreted as an act of hope for a better world. This is not the empty hope of neoliberal ideology, ‘an equal opportunity resource’, where each of us could have a better life if only we set our minds to it. Without wanting to diminish it, the book could even be described as a self-help manual for the aspiring revolutionary.

In an interesting neologism borrowed from the internet, he enumerates the ‘copium’ (a merger of coping and opium) strategies that activists can use to prevent burnout and fatalism and manage doubts and insecurities: a quasi-religious commitment to a revolutionary future; a secular leap of faith towards a socialist utopia; a healthy dose of self-delusion; and a transition from individual self-care to the collective self-care of the Kurdish movement, which discourages individualism.

Broomfield asks: if we can and do deceive ourselves in the service of capitalist hegemony, why not in the service of revolution? It is a striking question. Both require sacrifice and deprivation, and only one offers the prospect of radical change and a possibly glorious future, but the wiles and stratagems of capitalism can lure the best of us into the path of least resistance. Individualism, turbocharged by our neoliberal times, undermines the collective struggle that revolutionary change necessarily entails.

While Broomfield is refreshingly honest about the shortcomings of the Rojava revolution, his view that the compromises that it has had to make in the Arab-majority areas generated ‘the movement’s most revolutionary moments’ is unduly optimistic for a book about hope without hope. Many of the compromises entailed concessions on feminist commitments, including the reversal of a ban on polygamy — a chilling example of democracy trumping women’s rights.

Matt Broomfield’s Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment is published by AK Press.

Washington’s Gamble On Ahmed Al-Sharaa Could Push Syria Toward A New Authoritarian Era – Analysis

Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa with US President Donald Trump. 

Photo Credit: SANA

December 4, 2025 
Fair Observer

By Halmat Palan

On September 22, 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a man once hunted by the United States and its allies, walked onto the stage of the Concordia Annual Summit in New York City. Waiting to interview him was retired US General David Petraeus, the same commander once tasked with pursuing him as the head of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front during the height of the Iraq and Syria Jihadi insurgency. Petraeus, once CIA director, praised al-Sharaa’s vision and barely concealed the surreal nature of the moment.

Only weeks later, al-Sharaa sat in the White House with President Donald Trump, who suspended sanctions on Syria for 180 days and hailed him as a major advocate for peace. What was unimaginable a few years ago is now official US policy.

This rebranding of al-Sharaa is a dangerous gamble. He didn’t stumble into power through democratic reform or national consensus. He built his position through the Nusra Front, which later became the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). According to the United Nationsand Human Rights Watch, this group engaged in suicide bombing, massacres, torture, unlawful killings, war crimes and coercive rule during the Syrian Civil War. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center has shown that HTS’s rebranding didn’t change either its core jihadist ideology or methods.

Washington once placed a $10 million bounty on al-Sharaa and put him on the terrorist list. Today, these designations have been removed and replaced by handshakes and photo ops with jihadists in suits.

Al-Sharaa’s impact on Syria’s diverse communities

Trump’s description of al-Sharaa as a stabilizing partner sends a troubling message to the communities that suffered most under jihadist and authoritarian violence. Syria’s Kurds, Druze and Alawites see an unelected leader with a hardline past consolidating power in Damascus with Western blessing as a dangerous threat to building a decentralized and democratic Syria that enshrines in its constitution and institutions guaranteed rights and freedoms for all.

They understand the danger a man like al-Sharaa poses because they have not only lived through the reign of leaders with similar ideological and authoritarian tendencies but have also paid many lives responding to such forces of intolerance and repression, as in the case of the Al-Assad Dynasty and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The signals of alarm sent by the Kurds and Druze about al-Sharaa and the HTS should be heeded because nothing in this man’s record suggests he has abandoned his desire for centralized rule and homogenization politics cloaked in Jihadism.

His government has already made it clear that, in its desire for national unity, it will stand against demands for power-sharing or decentralized structures of governance. The interim constitution rejects federalism and strips Kurdish cultural and linguistic recognition in line with Ba’athist homogenization of the Assad era, rather than a break from it.

According to the London School of Economics, Al Monitor and North Press, there has been an active rollback of Kurdish language curricula, cultural programs and even public holidays such as Newroz since al-Sharaa took the helm in Damascus. These are not symbolic moves but evidence of the governing philosophy for Syria’s future under al-Sharaa.

The ethnic and religious groups in Syria will not accept marginalization reminiscent of the Ba’athist era. They will reject and revolt against any authority that seeks to strip them of the freedoms and autonomy they have paid for with blood.

Rising tensions and marginalization of the Druze

Similar to the Kurds, the Druze in Sweida suffer from marginalization and threats to their security as a people. Reporting by the Middle East Institute and Syria Direct suggests that the central government has supported Sunni Bedouin tribes in recent clashes, exacerbating sectarian insecurity and eroding local defence structures.

This forms part of a concerning pattern that emboldens groups loyal to the HTS-run government and furthers ethnic and religious fault lines rather than calming them. This leads to a security and political climate where groups like the Druze and Kurds, who demand autonomy or self-defense, are treated as threats to national sovereignty rather than forces crucial to the security of their regions and the broader country.

Al-Sharaa presents this tightening grip on power as necessary for defending national unity and Syria’s sovereignty. In reality, it is the same centralization that led Syria to civil war and eventual collapse under Bashar al-Assad. Concentrating authority in Damascus without meaningful inclusion of the periphery does not create stability. Instead, it alienates communities like the Kurds and Druze that proved to be the most resilient against ISIS and the most willing to build pluralistic governance, while the central state resorted to massacres, detention and torture of the populace seeking their democratic rights and freedoms.

Why decentralization is essential for Syria’s future

The strategic flaw in Washington’s embrace of al-Sharaa is deeply concerning and should be viewed with great caution. True stability in deeply divided states comes from balancing power between the center and the periphery, not from labeling the periphery as a national security threat and the central power as justified in whatever it does. This is clear both from international relations theory and the lived experience of pluralistic and multicultural societies.

When the center knows the periphery can check its excesses, incentives shift from the use of force towards negotiation. When the periphery knows it cannot be dominated, incentives shift toward cooperation rather than revolt. Thus, decentralization is the ideal model of governance for Syria since it creates a balance of power, whereas centralization seeks to destroy it through the domination and supremacy of the central power.

In Syria, the communities most committed to shared governance are the same ones being sidelined today. Kurdish forces protected Arabs, Yazidis, Assyrians and Christians during the fight against ISIS and were decisive in the destruction of the ISIS caliphate. While they held the line, al-Sharaa was pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda, expanding HTS control and jihadist governance. It is hard to justify rewarding al-Sharaa’s HTS while undercutting the Kurds and others.

It is also important to highlight the influence of regional powers like Turkey in this push for centralization. According to the Atlantic Council and the Washington Institute, Ankara sees al-Sharaa as someone who could help neutralize Kurdish autonomy and reshape northern Syria in line with Turkish interests.

A US policy that strengthens the central government under al-Sharaa effectively aligns with Turkish objectives at the expense of the Kurds, who fought ISIS and pushed back against both jihadist and regime authoritarianism in Syria. Such a policy does not bode well for US allies or the objectives of stability and democracy in the region.

Given Syria’s demographic diversity, a federal or pluralistic system that provides real cultural, linguistic and administrative autonomy for Kurds, Druze and others is the only structure that can create stability and prosperity. Security arrangements might include local forces like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and community units made up of Druze, alongside, but not subordinate to, the Syrian army.

The details would have to be worked out, but the principle is paramount to the stability and harmony of all groups in a future Syria. Stability cannot be built on the pretense that Syria is a homogeneous Arab nation with one identity, one center, and one narrative.

Lastly, Al Shara is unelected. His authority rests on military power and foreign endorsement. No leader with that profile should be allowed to reshape Syria’s political future without major constitutional guarantees, independent elections and the full participation of the country’s diverse communities to check any moves towards authoritarian and discriminatory policies.

By backing al-Sharaa without strong conditions and checks on power, Washington and its allies risk empowering a force that could create a new authoritarian and Islamist system akin to the Islamic Republic built by former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini and his successors in Iran. Syria’s stability and prosperity begin with a stronger periphery, not a reinforced central authority led by a man whose record and ideology have yet to indicate any meaningful change.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

About the author: Halmat Palani is a Kurdish human rights activist, English teacher, and freelance writer based in Vancouver, Canada. Halmat was born as a refugee, and his personal journey has fueled his determination to make a difference. With a bachelor’s degree in political science and international studies from Simon Fraser University, he channels his expertise to shed light on pressing issues.

Source: This article was published by Fair Observer


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Free leader Ocalan or peace process will grind to halt, PKK warns Turkey

Ocalan seen on a flag at a Kurdish left gathering in Paris. / UCL Photos,Partout, France, Belgique, cc-by-sa 2.0

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By bne IntelliNews November 30, 2025

A senior commander of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has told AFP that the politico-militant group will not implement any further steps in indirect talks on a peace process with Turkey as long as its founder Abdullah Ocalan remains imprisoned, France 24 reported on November 30.

The commander, Amed Malazgirt, was interviewed in a bunker in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq, where the PKK is headquartered. He urged Turkey to advance negotiations and free 76-year-old Ocalan, known to followers as Apo,

Malazgirt was reported as saying: "All the steps the leader Apo has initiated have been implemented... there will be no further actions taken.

"From now on, we will be waiting for the Turkish state and they have to be the one taking steps."

The commander of the insurgent PKK – which fought an almost continuous four-decade conflict with Turkey prior to May’s formal declaration that the fighting is over and a pledge from the PKK to disband and disarm – added that the PKK wants Ankara to agree to two demands.

"First, the freedom of leader Apo... without this, the process will not succeed. The second is the constitutional and official recognition of the Kurdish people in Turkey," he said.

Female senior commander Serda Mazlum Gabar told AFP that "as long as the leadership is inside [prison], the Kurdish people cannot be free. Nor can we, as guerrillas, feel free."

"Our path to freedom passes through the freedom of our leadership," she added.

Ocalan is imprisoned on Imrali island near Istanbul, where he has been held in solitary confinement since 1999.

Turkish lawmakers from a cross-party committee set up to advance the peace process with the Kurds paid a first visit to Ocalan last week.

Though the PKK six months ago pledged to disarm, it has so far only burnt a handful of weapons in a cauldron in a symbolic ceremony to demonstrate commitment to the peace process.

Lately, it announced it was withdrawing all of its forces from Turkish soil into northern Iraq and confirmed the withdrawal of militia from a key border area in northern Iraq.

The parliamentary party that represents the Kurds in Turkey is left-wing DEM. If Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can form a successful partnership with DEM and, de facto, with the still outlawed PKK, he could secure votes that could be decisive in an attempt to change the constitutional law in a way that would permit him unending rule.

In northeastern Syria, the Kurds still run what amounts to their own statelet, despite heavy pressure from Ankara and Damascus to move forward with an integration into the post-Assad Syrian government led by the former jihadist commander Ahmed al-Sharaa.

In July, the US Ambassador to Ankara and Donald Trump’s special envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, told Turkey’s government-run news service Anadolu Agency  “The US government has stated that it will review all their [the PKK commanders’] issues and do its best to ensure a fair and accurate decision. If they want to come to America and live with us, they can do so.”