Tuesday, November 23, 2021

 Manitoba

U of M faculty strike talks hits stalemate, mediator calls for binding arbitration

Administration accepts recommendation but union eyes counter-proposal

The University of Manitoba Faculty Association, which represents over 1,200 professors, instructors and librarians at the Winnipeg-based university, went on strike Nov. 2. (Holly Caruk/CBC)

The mediator trying to find a middle ground in the three-week-long University of Manitoba faculty strike has hit an impasse and is recommending binding arbitration to resolve the dispute.

Arne Peltz advised the two sides this weekend that he believes there is no likelihood they will reach a settlement without a protracted strike continuing.

As such, binding arbitration — in which a decision is legally binding and enforceable, similar to a court order — is the best path forward to an agreement, he suggested.

The U of M put out a news release on Monday saying it accepts the recommendation.

The University of Manitoba Faculty Association, for its part, doesn't tend to agree.

In an email to CBC News attributed to president Orvie Dingwall, the union said it is reviewing the proposal and "will make a counter-proposal regarding the specifics of an arbitration."

UMFA, which represents over 1,200 professors, instructors and librarians at the Winnipeg-based university, went on strike Nov. 2.

The association is seeking higher salaries for its members, arguing that persistently low pay is causing retention and recruitment problems. The U of M ranks second to last out of the 15 research-based institutions in terms of salary.

    The union has also cited government interference in the bargaining process as preventing successful negotiations with university administration.

    Last week, UMFA tabled an offer to the university's administration the union says would have addressed the issue of retention and recruitment of UMFA members and could have ended the strike, but the administration chose to reject it or to make a counter-offer.

    "In addition to addressing the administration's unwillingness to present a realistic offer to UMFA members, the two sides have not yet agreed on issues relating to working conditions," Dingwall said in the release from UMFA.

    "Specifically, the administration continues to refuse language that allows faculty to take their full vacation and refuses to accept language that would prevent the administration from forcing members to teach their classes online in non-pandemic times.

    "UMFA strongly believes that these outstanding issues must be addressed before the association could agree to binding arbitration to address financial compensation. UMFA will inform the university of these outstanding conditions as a pre-condition before any discussions of binding arbitration would begin."

    UMFA seeking $28 million in damages from

     province for government’s interference in

     2016 labour negotiations, court hears


    Josh Crabb
    CTV News Winnipeg Reporter/ Video journalist
    Published Nov. 22, 2021 

    WINNIPEG -

    As the University of Manitoba Faculty Association’s (UMFA) current strike entered its fourth week, lawyers for the union which represent academic staff told a Manitoba judge UMFA members should be awarded $28 million in damages due to the circumstances that preceded the 2016 strike.

    Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench Justice Joan McKelvey started hearing arguments on the matter Monday in a trial scheduled for two days.

    The case is focused on damages UMFA’s lawyers told court faculty members should be awarded because of a Charter breach which protects a right to collective bargaining.

    It surrounds the events of five years ago which resulted in a three-week strike, UMFA lawyer Garth Smorang told the court.

    In his arguments, Smorang cited previous court findings from a challenge of the province’s Public Sector Sustainability Act and a Manitoba Labour Board decision which ruled the University of Manitoba committed an unfair labour practice by failing to inform UMFA that the university received instructions from the government during contract talks. The university has since apologized and paid members the max penalty of $2,000 each for a total of $2 million.

    Smorang told the court in 2016 UMFA had received an offer from the university for a wage increase of 17.5 per cent over four years on the average member’s salary when the government got involved and ordered the university to seek a wage freeze.

    UMFA is now seeking $21.8 million, which includes interest, in damages for the wage increases Smorang told the court members would’ve received under that agreement.

    “We submit to you the facts of the case as presented to you and your findings, this loss is directly attributable to the government’s substantial interference in the 2016 round of collective bargaining,” Smorang argued.

    Smorang told the court UMFA is also seeking damages to cover $2.5 million in strike pay to members in 2016, $177,000 for benefits covered by UMFA during the 2016 strike, $74,000 for the costs of running of the strike as well as $4.1 million in lost salaries incurred by members during the strike that year.

    The details of the case are grounded in findings at trial and upheld by the Manitoba Court of Appeal, UMFA’s lawyers told McKelvey.

    The Manitoba Court of Appeal ruled last month the government had a right to impose a wage freeze on the public sector but upheld the Court of Queen’s Bench ruling that found the government violated collective bargaining rights during contract talks at the University of Manitoba in 2016.

    Smorang told the court government staff members were ordered by the Public Sector Compensation Committee—a committee court heard was made up of six members of cabinet which held meetings former Premier Brian Pallister sometimes attended—to impose the wage freeze.

    Lawyers for the province are scheduled to make arguments in the case Tuesday.

    The Manitoba government said out of respect for the legal process it won’t be commenting on the 2016 matters that are now before the court.




    IUDs appear to have systemic effects on the body, breast MRI study shows


    Intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs) appear to have systemic effects on the body like those of hormone replacement therapy, according to a breast MRI study being presented next week at the annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America (RSNA).

    It has been claimed that IUDs have a purely local effect on the uterus. Our study results suggest that this is not true."

    Luisa Huck, M.D., radiology resident, Department of Diagnostic and Interventional Radiology, RWTH Aachen University in Aachen, Germany

    Levonorgestrel-releasing IUDs (LNG-IUDs) are used by tens of millions of women worldwide. They work by releasing a small amount of hormone into the uterus. Because the hormone is released directly into the uterus, the amount in the bloodstream is lower than with other hormonal methods. In theory, this limited area of release means that any side effects would be confined to the region around the IUD. However, emerging evidence suggests that LNG-IUDs can be associated with systemic side effects similar to those of systemic hormonal medication.

    Christiane Kuhl, M.D., a leading breast cancer researcher and chief of the Department of Radiology at RWTH Aachen University noticed that women with a hormonal IUD in place often show higher background parenchymal enhancement on contrast-enhanced breast MRI. Background parenchymal enhancement -;the initial enhancement of normal breast tissue-;is a sensitive marker of hormone levels.

    The observation prompted Dr. Huck to investigate the association between LNG-IUD use and background parenchymal enhancement in breast MRI and explore possible systemic effects of LNG-IUDs.

    Using the hospital database, Dr. Huck and colleagues identified premenopausal women without a personal history of breast cancer or hormone or antihormone intake, who had undergone standardized dynamic contrast-enhanced breast MRI for screening at least twice.

    "By comparing the level of contrast enhancement in the same women with and without the IUD in place, a change in systemic hormone levels due to the IUD could be traced," Dr. Huck said.

    Half of the women in the study underwent the first breast MRI exam before IUD placement and the second with the IUD in place. The other half had their first MRI with IUD placement and the second MRI after IUD removal. This enabled the researchers to avoid age-related effects on background parenchymal enhancement that might affect interpretation of the results.

    Analysis showed that IUD use led to significant increase of enhancement in 23 of 48 patients, indicating that there are hormonal effects caused by IUD use that occur well beyond the uterus.

    "The results suggest that IUDs do not have a purely local effect on the uterus – but affect the entire body," Dr. Huck said.

    She added that is plausible that IUDs can have side effects similar to that of other hormonal treatments.

    "Use of an IUD leads to hormonal stimulation of the breast that is detectable by MRI," Dr. Huck said. "The increased enhancement also has implications for the diagnostic accuracy of breast MRI in women using hormonal IUDs."

    While the results point to a systemic hormonal effect for women with IUDs in place, it does not mean that the contraceptives are unsafe to use, Dr. Huck emphasized.

    "IUDs appear to be a very safe means of contraception and are generally well tolerated," she said. "However, if women with an IUD in place experience unexplainable side effects, they should talk to their doctor and consider using other types of contraception."

    New paper casts doubt on trusted Canadian breast cancer screening guidelines

    Co-authors question findings of seminal study, say women aged 40 or older should be given mammograms if they want them

    Author of the article: rainatoomey
    Publishing date:Nov 23, 2021 • 

    Dr. Jean Seely, head of breast imaging at The Ottawa Hospital, is a co-author of a new paper that disputes the decades-old findings of a study used to form breast cancer screening guidelines in Canada and around the world. 
    PHOTO BY WAYNE CUDDINGTON/POSTMEDIA NEWS

    A new paper published this week in the Journal of Medical Screening suggests a Canadian study used to form breast screening guidelines around the world for decades is flawed.

    The authors of the paper — co-written by researchers at Sunnybrook Research Institute in Toronto, The Ottawa Hospital, the University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta and Harvard Medical School — take issue with the randomized trials used to determine whether mammograms and breast exams helped save women’s lives, saying they were not randomized at all.

    The Canadian National Breast Screening Study (CNBSS) started with two breast screen trials in 1980, and eventually involved tens of thousands of women in 15 Canadian urban centres. Investigators concluded that an annual mammogram for women aged 40 to 49 who are at average risk of breast cancer does not reduce the mortality rate any more than a physical exam.

    A control group of women aged 40 to 49 received an initial physical exam, then nothing further. The other group received up to five annual mammograms and physical exams. By the end of the study, 38 women in the mammography group had died of breast cancer, compared to 28 women in the control group.

    As a result, Canadian researchers concluded that annual screening in women aged 40 to 49 at average risk does not reduce breast cancer mortality any more than a physical exam. Their findings were the basis for guidelines around the world that do not recommend annual screenings for women in that age group, including the most recent set put forth by the Canadian Task Force on Preventive Health Care.

    I did not expect to find such clear, clear evidence of what was going on.

    The risk of false positives and over-diagnosis is cited as a key issue in earlier screening. In such cases, even benign lumps would require a biopsy. Experts argue that radiation, chemotherapy or surgical treatment of breast cancer can be harmful, and that must be considered in treating a patient who might not even have it.

    Despite that, the authors of the new paper say women aged 40 or older should be given mammograms if they want them because there are several problems in the findings of the CNBSS.

    Dr. Jean Seely, co-author of the new paper and a professor of radiology at the University of Ottawa and head of breast imaging at The Ottawa Hospital, told CBC News there is “conclusive confirmation” the study was conducted with women — particularly in some locations — who were not randomly assigned.

    She said when the authors of the paper interviewed 28 staff members who worked on the original study, some confirmed there were multiple instances in which women with detectable lumps, who were pre-screened by a nurse, were deliberately placed in the mammography group.

    “I was astonished. I did not expect to find such clear, clear evidence of what was going on,” Seely told CBC News. “Then I think my next reaction was anger. How could this have been allowed?”

    Debate has swirled around the studies since the results of the CNBSS were published. Critics have questioned the inclusion of women with advanced cancers, the quality of the screening participants received, and the factors used to determine whether mammograms were beneficial for women in their 40s. Experts have also voiced doubt about the randomization, though an investigation conducted by external experts failed to find “credible evidence” that it was subverted. Those investigators further said that if there were acts of subversion, they were few and their impact on the study’s findings trivial.

    The authors of the paper published in the Journal of Medical Screening disagree, saying just seven cases of women with lumps removed from the mammography group would have skewed the results.

    Seely hopes the evidence she and her co-authors presented in their paper lead to change.

    “I think probably the most personal challenging moments that I have in my practice are when I see a woman in her 40s who presents with an advanced breast cancer,” she told CBC News. Most often, the patient was told by a family doctor that she didn’t need to be screened because of her age.

    “On a personal level, as a professional, I find this very, very difficult,” Seely told CBC News.

    Women aged 50 and older have higher rates of breast cancer diagnosis, according to the Canadian Cancer Society, but women between 30 and 49 with breast cancer are more likely to die from it. They represent 17 per cent of all cancer deaths in Canada, compared to eight per cent of women aged 50 to 69.

    Despite the findings published in the new paper, the CNBSS has its champions, including the study’s principal investigators.

    The study’s lead, Dr. Anthony Miller, a professor emeritus at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at the University of Toronto, told CBC News, “We had a great deal of understanding of what could go wrong with randomization and we took a great deal of care to ensure it didn’t apply in the National Breast Screening Study.”

    Miller told CBC News extensive quality-control measures maintained the integrity of the study, and he denies the possibility that any women were not placed randomly within the trials.

    Seely and her co-authors have brought their concerns about the CNBSS to the University of Toronto and the Canadian Medical Association Journal, both of which were involved in the original study.

    In a statement, the university’s office in charge of research, oversight and compliance said it is reviewing their concerns, and “places a high value on research integrity.”

    The university did not specify details or a timeline of its review.

    In her own statement to CBC News, Dr. Kirsten Patrick, interim editor-in-chief of CMAJ, said the journal “will co-operate with the university office’s process fully and will await the office’s report on the outcome of the review before deciding if any further action is needed.”

    She did not provide any further comment.
    CALGARY
    Union asks for another 56 firefighters, says department is at 'breaking point'

    'With our current staffing levels, it's safer to live in Edmonton, Vancouver and Toronto, than Calgary — Calgary is the lowest staffed metropolitan fire department in Canada'

    Author of the article: Meghan Potkins • Calgary Herald
    Publishing date:Nov 22, 2021 • 
    The moon sets behind Calgary firefighters as they deal with the aftermath of a fire that destroyed at least one and damaged several other homes on Nolanfield Lane in Nolan Hill in the early hours of Thursday, December 3, 2020. PHOTO BY GAVIN YOUNG/POSTMEDIA

    The union representing Calgary firefighters says the service is “stretched to the breaking point” and called on city council to find an additional $10 million in next year’s budget to hire 56 firefighters.

    “With the new communities and developments on the edge of the city, our resource(s) and firefighters are getting stretched to the breaking point,” Matt Osborne, president of the Calgary Firefighters Association, said Monday during the first day of debate over the 2022 municipal budget.

    “Without investment in firefighters and in facilities, it will get harder and harder to provide services to these suburban communities and communities across the city.”

    The union said the hires are necessary to bolster the service’s “relief factor”: the minimum amount of personnel required to maintain operations and cover absences due to vacation, sickness, leave or training. The union said Monday that the service is already falling short of provincially legislated training standards due to short staffing.

    “With our current staffing levels, it’s safer to live in Edmonton, Vancouver and Toronto than Calgary — Calgary is the lowest staffed metropolitan fire department in Canada,” Osborne said, pointing to data that suggest the city is not currently meeting the National Fire Protection Agency standard of four firefighters per rescue truck.

    The firefighters’ union was one of more than a dozen public presenters that addressed council Monday on topics like accessible sidewalks, transit service and cycling infrastructure.

    Council will have to decide this week whether it will approve city administration’s proposed budget increase, which would result in a small tax rate increase of 0.64 per cent in 2022.

    If city council also approves an ask from the Calgary Police Service for a $6-million budget boost to support hiring, the rate will go up by slightly less than one per cent next year. CPS leaders are set to speak to council about the request on Tuesday afternoon.

    There have been signals, however, that some council members will be pushing for additional spending in next year’s budget in areas like the arts, climate change mitigation and snow clearing on roads and sidewalks. Preliminary estimates provided by city staff suggest the cumulative impact could amount to a tax rate hike of more than three per cent.

    Also on the table is a proposal to pull another $55 million from city reserves for the incentive program designed to encourage downtown office building owners to convert them for other uses. Council opted in the spring to put $45 million toward the program, but there are currently more applications than available funding.

    Mayor Jyoti Gondek said she wasn’t surprised to hear requests for increased service from many of the people who spoke at city hall Monday, and many councillors, newly elected just a month ago, have their constituents’ concerns and desires fresh in their minds.

    “We have come off of a very long campaign period where members of council had time to engage with Calgarians and find out what’s important to them,” she said.

    “I think the questions that you’re hearing from them today reflect what they heard at the doors.”

    Many of the spending proposals before council this week are aimed at hiring more city employees across different departments.

    City manager David Duckworth said Monday that municipal staffing is at a 2014 level and there is “considerable strain” on existing employees. He said city administration’s proposed budget is the “bare bones” of what is required to retain and attract talent.

    “We’re at a point in time that if we do not invest in ourselves, I seriously fear losing good people to the private sector and other public sector agencies across Canada and I can tell you, it’s happening right now,” Duckworth said.

    With files from Madeline Smith
    China condemns ‘malicious hyping’ over Peng Shuai

    Foreign ministry takes unrepentant stance to concerns in west over wellbeing of tennis player


    Peng Shuai ceased to be seen in public shortly after accusing a former high-ranking Chinese government official of sexual assault. Photograph: Mark Schiefelbein/AP


    Vincent Ni China affairs correspondent
    Tue 23 Nov 2021

    China’s foreign ministry has accused unnamed people of “malicious hyping” in the case of the tennis star Peng Shuai, in a hardline and unrepentant response to questions in the west over her wellbeing.

    The whereabouts and wellbeing of Peng, a former doubles world number one, has become a matter of international concern over the past three weeks, after she alleged in a message on the Chinese social media site Weibo that the country’s former vice-premier, Zhang Gaoli, had sexually assaulted her. Peng ceased to be seen in public shortly after she made her allegation on 2 November.

    Some countries are weighing up a potential boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, which is due to take place in February, and assurances by Chinese authorities that Peng is safe and well have been met with scepticism, especially by the Women’s Tennis Association.

    “This is not a diplomatic matter,” the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, told a regular press briefing on Tuesday. “I believe everyone will have seen she has recently attended some public activities and also held a video call with the IOC [International Olympic Committee] president, [Thomas] Bach. I hope certain people will cease malicious hyping, let alone politicisation.”

    Mentions of the 35-year-old have been heavily censored in China since early this month. But outside the country, an online campaign under the hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai – joined by stars including Naomi Osaka and Serena Williams – has taken off, particularly after the Chinese state media published an email purportedly written by Peng that said she was “fine”.

    Peng reappeared over the weekend in Beijing and held a video call with the Bach on Sunday. The IOC reported that she was “safe and well”, but its apparent attempt to ease international concern drew it into the line of fire. The organisation was subsequently accused of staging a “publicity stunt” for Beijing.

    “That’s not a safeguarding call by any means. Tennis should have been able to have that call, it should have been a safeguarding officer having that call – not a publicity stunt,” said Nikki Dryden, a human rights lawyer and former Olympic swimmer for Canada.

    With talk of a diplomatic boycott of the Winter Games on the rise, pro-government actors in China are framing the issue as an ideological struggle with the west.

    “The ideological conflicts between China and the west will escalate before the Beijing Winter Olympics in 2022 as anti-Chinese forces will converge to make trouble for China,” the Global Times wrote in an editorial on Monday.

    “China used to care about maintaining a harmonious atmosphere with the west and the way being regarded by the rest of the world, particularly by the west. This needs to be changed.”

    Reuters contributed to this report


    China urges people to stop 'malicious hyping' of Peng Shuai's case

    Peng Shuai went missing earlier this month after posting about her relationship 
    with former Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli.PHOTO: AFP

    BEIJING (BLOOMBERG) - China has called on people to stop "hyping" the case of tennis star Peng Shuai, whose disappearance after alleging an affair with a top Communist Party official caused international outcry.

    "I hope some people stop the deliberate and malicious hype, not to mention politicising the issue," Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a regular press conference in Beijing on Tuesday (Nov 23), adding that it was not a "diplomatic issue".

    Peng went missing earlier this month after posting a 1,500-character essay on her verified Weibo account recounting a tumultuous relationship with former Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli.

    Her post was scrubbed from the internet and attempts by the media and the Women's Tennis Association (WTA) to contact her were unsuccessful.

    Zhao declined to answer a question on why Peng's account had been censored on the internet in China, where her case has not been reported by any media available in the country and international television stations have been knocked off air when they mention the star.

    When asked why previous questions and answers on Peng had not been included in the ministry's daily briefing transcripts, Zhao said: "The readout of the regular press conference is not always a word-by-word record of what is being asked and answered. My question for you is, 'Do you report every word I say?'

    After tennis greats including Serena Williams and Novak Djokovic last week joined the growing chorus of international figures demanding to know Peng's whereabouts, Chinese state media posted a series of videos and pictures of Peng on Twitter over the weekend. The images showed Peng smiling at home, eating out with friends, and at a tennis event in Beijing.

    "Can any girl fake such sunny smile under pressure?" Hu Xijin, editor in chief of the Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times, wrote on Twitter. His China-facing Weibo account made no reference to Peng, and his newspaper did not report her re-emergence.

    The International Olympic Committee, which has hundreds of millions of dollars at stake in the Beijing Winter Games starting in February, on Sunday vouched for Beijing's version of events.

    After a 30-minute video call with Peng Shuai, chair of the Athletes' Commission Emma Terho said she was "doing fine".

    That statement did not satisfy the WTA, which has threatened to pull its business in China, also worth hundreds of millions of dollars, if Peng is not allowed to speak freely.


    FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI

    ALEX VERSHININ
    NOVEMBER 23, 2021
    COMMENTARY



    Russia’s military buildup along the border with Ukraine has clearly gotten the attention of policymakers from Kiev to Washington, D.C. CIA Director Bill Burns flew to Moscow to try to avert a crisis, while U.S. intelligence officials are reportedly warning NATO allies that a Russian invasion of large parts of Ukraine can’t be ruled out.

    The possibility of Russian aggression against Ukraine would have huge consequences for European security. Perhaps even more concerning would be a Russian attack against a NATO member itself. Moscow might want to undermine security in the Baltic states or Poland, for instance, but could the Russian government successfully carry out a large-scale invasion of those countries? If recent wargames are any indication, then the answer is a resounding yes — and it could do so pretty easily. In a 2016 War on the Rocks article, David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson projected that the Russian army would overrun the Baltic states in three days.

    Most of these wargames, such as RAND’s Baltic study, focus on fait accompli, an attack by the Russian government aimed at seizing terrain — then quickly digging in. This creates a dilemma for NATO: launch a costly counter-attack and risk heavy casualties and possibly a nuclear crisis or accept a Russian fait accompli and undermine faith in the credibility of the alliance. Some analysts have argued that these seizures are much more likely to be small in size, limited to one or two towns. While that scenario should, of course, be studied, the concern about the feasibility of a fait accompli in the form of a major invasion still stands.

    While the Russian army definitely has the combat power to achieve these scenarios, does Russia have the logistics force structure to support these operations? The short answer is not in the timelines envisioned by Western wargames. In an initial offensive — depending on the fighting involved — Russian forces might reach early objectives, but logistics would impose requirements for operational pauses. As a result, a large land grab is unrealistic as a fait accompli. The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a fait accompli scenario, but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. The Russian Aerospace Forces (with a sizable tactical bomber and attack aircraft force) and attack helicopters can also pick up fire support to alleviate artillery ammunition consumption.

    NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls.

    Railroads and Russian Logistics Capabilities


    Russian army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads. Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. counterparts but almost three times as much artillery. On paper (not all brigades have a full number of battalions), Russian brigades have two artillery battalions, a rocket battalion, and two air defense battalions per brigade as opposed to one artillery battalion and an attached air defense company per U.S. brigade. As a result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts.

    Maneuver formation U.S. sustainment formation Russian sustainment formation
    Battalion Company Platoon
    Regiment Battalion/Squadron Company
    Brigade Battalion Battalion
    Division Brigade Battalion
    Corps Brigade None
    Combined Arms Army N/A Brigade

    Additionally, the Russian army doesn’t have sufficient sustainment brigades — or material-technical support brigades, as they call them — for each of their combined arms armies. A look into Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, shows 10 material-technical support brigades supporting 11 combined arms armies, one tank army, and four army corps. Russia’s Western and Southern Commands each have three armies and only two material-technical support brigades to support them. Russia’s general staff likely accepted this risk because these commands have the most developed rail infrastructure. In defensive operations, a Russian brigade can pull directly from the railhead. A trump card the Russians have are their 10 railroad brigades, which have no Western equivalents. They specialize in railroad security, construction, and repair, while rolling stock is provided by civilian state companies.

    The reason Russia is unique in having railroad brigades is that logistically, Russian forces are tied to railroad from factory to army depot and to combined arms army and, where possible, to the division/brigade level. No other European nation uses railroads to the extent that the Russian army does. Part of the reason is that Russia is so vast — over 6,000 miles from one end to the other. The rub is that Russian railroads are a wider gauge than the rest of Europe. Only former Soviet nations and Finland still use the Russian standard — this includes the Baltic states. There are several railheads prior to Baltic capitals, but it will still take several days to reach and establish railhead operations. Forward railhead operations are more than just cross-loading cargo from train onto truck. It involves receiving and sorting cargo, repackaging for specific units, and storing excess on the ground. Due to the hazardous nature of military cargo, the ground needs to be prepared so that cargo can be stored in safe, distributed environments. This process can take one to three days. The site also needs to be outside the range of enemy artillery and secured from partisans. A single lucky shell or an rocket propelled grenade can result in a major explosion and have a disproportionate effect on the tempo of an entire division. This is assuming the key bridges, such as one at Narva on the Russian-Estonian border, aren’t destroyed and have to be repaired. Poland only has one wide gauge rail line, which runs from the Krakow region to Ukraine and can’t be used by Russian forces, without capturing Ukraine first. There are no wide gauge lines running from Belarus to Warsaw. Rail traffic moving across borders usually stops to cross-load cargo or uses adjustable railroad carriages and switches engines (which cannot adjust). In times of war, it is highly unlikely that the Russian army would capture enough Western train engines to support their army, forcing them to rely on trucks. This means that Russian army rail sustainment capability ends at the borders of the former Soviet Union. Trying to resupply the Russian army beyond the Russian gauge rail network would force them to rely mostly on their truck force until railroad troops could reconfigure/repair the railroad or build a new one.

    Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles, and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.

    The Russian army does not have enough trucks to meet its logistic requirement more than 90 miles beyond supply dumps. To reach a 180-mile range, the Russian army would have to double truck allocation to 400 trucks for each of the material-technical support brigades. To gain familiarity with Russian logistic requirements and lift resources, a useful starting point is the Russian combined arms army. They all have different force structures, but on paper, each combined army is assigned a material-technical support brigade. Each material-technical support brigade has two truck battalions with a total of 150 general cargo trucks with 50 trailers and 260 specialized trucks per brigade. The Russian army makes heavy use of tube and rocket artillery fire, and rocket ammunition is very bulky. Although each army is different, there are usually 56 to 90 multiple launch rocket system launchers in an army. Replenishing each launcher takes up the entire bed of the truck. If the combined arms army fired a single volley, it would require 56 to 90 trucks just to replenish rocket ammunition. That is about a half of a dry cargo truck force in the material-technical support brigade just to replace one volley of rockets. There is also between six to nine tube artillery battalions, nine air defense artillery battalions, 12 mechanized and recon battalions, three to five tank battalions, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and small arms ammunition — not to mention, food, engineering, medical supplies, and so on. Those requirements are harder to estimate, but the potential resupply requirements are substantial. The Russian army force needs a lot of trucks just for ammunition and dry cargo replenishment.

    For fuel and water sustainment, each material-technical support brigade has a tactical pipeline battalion. These have lower throughput than their Western equivalents but can be emplaced within three to four days of occupying new terrain. Until then, fuel trucks are required for operational resupply. One might argue that the Russian army has the range to reach its objectives on their original tank of fuel, especially with auxiliary fuel drums they are designed to carry. That is not entirely correct. Tanks and armored vehicles burn through fuel when maneuvering in combat or just idling while stationary. This is the reason why the U.S. Army uses “days of supply” to plan fuel consumption, not range. If a Russian army operation lasts 36 to 72 hours as the RAND study estimates, then the Russian army would have to refuel at least once before tactical pipelines are established to support operations.

    Sustaining Logistics Is the Hard Part

    A Scenario in the Baltics


    There are serious logistic challenges with large-scale fait accompli operations in the Baltics. Small scale fait accompli operations are feasible with small forces without a logistical challenge but on a large scale are far more challenging. Fait accompli requires Russian forces to overrun Baltic states and eliminate all resistance in less than 96 hours — before NATO’s Very High Readiness Task Force can reinforce the defenders. This force won’t stop a Russian attack, but it commits NATO to a land war, negating the very purpose of fait accompli.

    Logistics are the key stumbling block in the fait accompli timeline. The railroad is wide gauge and usable, but the timeline is too short for captured railheads to be put back into operation. A dozen NATO air-launched cruise missiles fired over Germany can destroy key rail bridges at Narva, Pskov, and Velikie Lugi, shutting down rail traffic into the Baltics for days until those bridges are repaired. Logistic planners in Russian Western Command have to plan for a scenario in which Baltic states choose to fight a battle in their capital. Historically, urban combat consumes massive amounts of ammunition and takes months to conclude. During the two most prominent examples, the battles of Grozny in the Chechen wars and the Battle of Mosul in 2016, defenders tied down four to 10 times their numbers for up to four months. At Grozny, Russians were firing up to 4,000 shells a day — that’s 50 trucks a day.

    Even in a Baltic scenario, Russian planners have to consider the risk that Poland, which can muster four divisions, will launch an immediate counter-attack, trying to catch the Russian army off-balance. The Russian army would have large forces tied to sieges of Tallinn and Riga while fending off a Polish counter-attack from the south. The ammunition consumption would be massive. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, some Russian forces expended an entire basic load of ammunition in 12 hours. Assuming the same rates, the Russians would have to replace substantial amounts of ammunition every 12 to 24 hours.

    Herein lies the dilemma. Overwhelming local forces in the Baltics before NATO troops arrive does not give Russia time to establish railheads, forcing reliance on trucks. At 130 miles, they can only do one trip a day, generating a truck shortage. Russian planners could commit fewer maneuver forces and risk failing to overwhelm defenders. Alternatively, they could take a logistics pause for two to three days and give the Baltic states time to mobilize and NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force time to arrive. Meanwhile, they would be taking attrition from local partisans, NATO airstrikes, maintenance breakdowns, and loitering munition as seen in the latest Nagorno-Karabakh War. Either way, fait accompli fails, and conflict degenerates into protracted war, which Russia is likely to lose. Russian logistics can only support a large-scale fait accompli if NATO forces fight a decisive battle at the frontier. The bulk of supply consumption would take place close to Russian depots. Russian air forces can alleviate the logistic strain by taking on fire support. What’s uncertain is how long the Russian air force would provide close air support in the face of NATO airpower, given NATO’s ability to conduct standoff air-to-air engagements with long-range missiles from beyond the effective range of Russian air defense in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. A similar picture exists at sea. The combination of airpower, diesel submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missiles is likely to deny the Baltic Sea to surface fleets of both sides.

    The Russian army has ample combat power to capture the Baltic states, but it won’t be a rapid fait accompli unless the Russian government scales down the size of the territory it wishes to seize. Using Van Jackson’s 2×2 “Variations of Fait Accompli” diagram as a conceptual framework, we can fully appreciate the Russian dilemma. The logistic forces can only support a gradual fait accompli, which won’t shatter NATO unity, instead giving NATO time to mobilize and seal off the land grab. Even if NATO chooses not to reconquer the territory right away, its member states would likely impose crippling economic sanctions until Russia caves in. On the other hand, the decisive fait accompli, such as the conquest of a full member state, may achieve the objective of shattering NATO unity, but it can’t be logistically supported by the Russian army. It also runs a major risk of miscalculation by assuming that all thirty member states have to declare NATO Article 5. On paper, that’s true, but in practice, only the United States (to provide combat power), Germany, and Poland (to secure access) have to honor Article 5, and Russia would find itself in a major conflict that can escalate beyond the nuclear threshold.

    A Polish Scenario

    The Russian army’s logistic challenges are different in a Polish scenario. There are fewer time constraints but greater difficulties due to the distances involved and lack of wide gauge railroads, which end at the Belarusian border. The closest railhead to Poland is Grodno and Brest in Belarus. The first is located 130 miles and the second 177 miles from Warsaw. For an army that is stretched to sustain 90 miles, that is a long supply line to support.

    Kaliningrad could be considered as another option, but it is not practical, as it is landlocked by NATO members. The combination of NATO airpower, naval forces, and Polish land-based anti-ship missiles make resupply by sea unlikely. According to Military Balance, there is a Russian corps with major depots but no supporting logistics units to push supplies out. Maneuver forces would have to pull these supplies using organic logistic formations, a range of about 45 miles. The garrison there can hold out in isolation for a long time but cannot conduct ground offensive operations. The Russian army will be able to reach Warsaw but cannot capture it without a logistic pause to halt, reconfigure/repair the railroad, and build tactical pipelines and frontline depots. Instead of pausing for a couple of days as in the Baltic scenario, the pause in the Polish scenario could take up to a couple of weeks. This gives NATO breathing space to build combat power.

    The logistics are also useful to assess a Ukrainian conflict as Russian forces are again massing on the border. The best means of interpreting the seriousness of Russian intentions is to track the buildup of logistic forces and supply dumps rather than count battalion tactical groups that have moved to the border. The size and scale of logistic preparation tell us exactly how far and deep is Russian army planning to go.

    Russian Strategic Reserves

    Russia could reinforce its Western Joint Strategic Command (Western Military district) from other parts of the country to increase logistic power, but not by much. As Michael Kofman has pointed out, NATO has the ability to horizontally escalate the conflict by holding most Russian theaters at risk. The Russian General Staff cannot ignore this threat. As a result, Russia’s Central Command and parts of the Eastern Command are the only joint commands not facing an external threat and are able to reinforce Western Command. However, the sustainment forces they provide would be consumed by the additional combat forces that come with it. There are no extra trucks in the Russian army that are not tied to supporting engaged forces.

    One of the strengths of the Russian army in a war in the Baltics or Poland would be its ability to mobilize reservists and civilian trucks. Russia still has a massive mobilization capacity built into its national economy, a legacy of World War II and the Cold War. However, mobilizing civilians to fight a war has major economic and political costs. To maintain political stability at home, the Russian people would have to genuinely believe they are defending their country. They will not tolerate husbands, sons, and fathers going off to a war on Putin’s whim. The last time the Russian government heavily relied on conscripts and reservists was during the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Within two months, a major antiwar movement appeared, spearheaded by soldiers’ mothers.

    Russia and the Fait Accompli


    The Russian army will be hard-pressed to conduct a ground offensive of more than 90 miles beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union without a logistics pause. For NATO, it means it can worry less about a major Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland and a greater focus on exploiting Russian logistic challenges by drawing Russian forces further away from their supply depots and targeting chokepoints in the Russian logistic infrastructure and logistic force in general. It also means that Russia is more likely to seize small parts of enemy territory under its logistically sustainable range of 90 miles rather than a major invasion as part of a fait accompli strategy.

    From the Russian perspective, it does not appear that they are building their logistic forces with fait accompli or blitzkrieg across Poland in mind. Instead, the Russian government has built an ideal army for their strategy of “Active Defense.” The Russian government has built armed forces highly capable of fighting on home soil or near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, they are not capable of a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.

    Deciphering Russia’s intentions right now is increasingly difficult. It’s military buildup on the border with Ukraine could be preparation for an invasion or it could be yet another round of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, thinking through Russia’s military logistics capabilities could give NATO some insights into what Moscow might be planning to do next — and what the Western alliance might do to protect its interests.

    UK, US and Nato vow to find missing F-35 jet before Russia

    Nato says it is not worried about possibility of recovery effort failing

    An F-35B fighter jet on board 'HMS Queen Elizabeth'. 
    One of the jets ditched into the Mediterranean Sea shortly after take-off
     from the carrier last week. The UK, US and Nato are working to recover
     it amid fears Russia wants to get its hands on the downed aircraft. Getty Images

    The UK, US and Nato have offered reassurances that Russia will not get hold of the downed F-35B plane in the Mediterranean, insisting “we’ll get it first”.

    The allies vowed to retrieve the £100 million ($133.7 million) warplane from the seabed after Britain said the Russians had been playing “close attention” to HMS Queen Elizabeth, which carried the jet before it went down.

    Shortly after take-off last Wednesday, the plane ditched into the sea. The RAF pilot managed to safely eject.

    "We'll get it first, I promise you," said Brig Gen Simon Doran, the top-ranking US officer on board the UK’s flagship aircraft carrier.

    F-35Bs, fifth-generation warplanes equipped to carry out a range of different missions, differ from other F-35s and are designed for short take-off and vertical landing.

    Fitted with radars, sensors and other classified technology, the jets are the most secret and complex aircraft in the UK arsenal. They also carry the highest price tag.

    HMS Queen Elizabeth is returning from its maiden voyage to the Far East and is leading a nine-vessel allied strike group. It is currently near Sicily.

    Nato's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen Tim Radford, told journalists on board the vessel he had no worries about the possibility of a failed retrieval operation.

    "We're not concerned at all about recovering it," he said. “We're not worried because we are working through the issue at the moment.

    “There was obviously a concern when the plane went down. The pilot is safe, which is the most important thing.”

    Gen Radford and other officials declined to give further details about the operation to salvage the jet.

    Commodore Steve Moorhouse, commander of the carrier strike group, referred to the loss of the jet as “a hugely unfortunate incident” and “a setback”.

    But he insisted “the reliability of the aircraft or confidence in it and the project is undiminished” after the loss.

    The public pledge to find the jet came amid fears in Nato that Russia may try to recover the aircraft and glean the cutting-edge technology on board.

    Last week Britain’s Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said Russia had been closely watching the movements of HMS Queen Elizabeth.

    "It is not a secret the Russians have been very interested in the carrier group, both on the way out from the United Kingdom – as she's sailed and her group towards the Pacific – and now she is back in the Mediterranean," Mr Wallace told Sky News.

    "Of course the Russians are playing close attention – it is what I'd expect.”

    So far, the UK has accepted delivery of 21 American-made F-35Bs.

    The majority of the planes are for its two modern aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales.

    BC
    Protest on Pat Bay highway may lead to criminal charges: Saanich police
    The protest occurred on Sunday: Nov. 21, 2021 (Charles Bodi)

    CTV News Vancouver Island
    Published Nov. 22, 2021 

    VICTORIA -

    Saanich police say they're reviewing a protest that shut down part of the Pat Bay highway on Sunday.

    Police say they had no prior knowledge of the protest, which blocked the northbound lanes of Highway 17 beginning around 3:30 p.m.

    Since people were marching on the highway, Saanich police say they moved to block the highway lanes to traffic to protect the safety of protesters and drivers.

    Now, Saanich police say officers with the major crime unit are reviewing the protest to see if any criminal charges should be recommended to Crown counsel.

    "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms affords everyone the right to peaceful, safe and lawful assemblies," said Saanich police in a release Monday. "While the group was peaceful, their actions were neither safe nor lawful."

    Police say they acknowledge that the protest blocked a major travel route, and thanked the community for their patience Sunday.

    "Resolving incidents of this nature safely for the public, the police, and those causing the disruption requires considerable planning and specialized resources, including coordination with other emergency services to develop alternate routes," police said.

    "We acknowledge the significant impact that this incident had on members of our community and regret the inconvenience caused by this traffic disruption."