Wednesday, May 25, 2022

The Conscious Universe


The radical idea that everything has elements of consciousness is reemerging and breathing new life into a cold and mechanical cosmos.



Matthew Craven
FEATUREPHILOSOPHY & CULTURE
BY JOE ZADEHNOVEMBER 17, 2021
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Joe Zadeh is a writer based in Newcastle.

London was a crowded city in 1666. The streets were narrow, the air was polluted, and inhabitants lived on top of each other in small wooden houses. That’s why the plague spread so easily, as well as the Great Fire. So did gossip, and the talk of the town was Margaret Cavendish, the Duchess of Newcastle.

Cavendish was a fiery novelist, playwright, philosopher and public figure known for her dramatic manner and controversial beliefs. She made her own dresses and decorated them in ribbons and baubles, and once attended the theater in a topless gown with red paint on her nipples. In his diaries, Samuel Pepys described her as a “mad, conceited, ridiculous woman,” albeit one he was obsessed with: He diarized about her six times in one three-month spell.

The duchess drew public attention because she was a woman with ideas, lots of them, at a time when that was not welcome. Cavendish had grown up during the murderous hysteria of the English witch trials, and her sometimes contradictory proto-feminism was fueled by the belief that there was a parallel to be drawn between the way men treated women and the way men treated animals and nature. “The truth is,” she wrote, “we [women] Live like Bats or Owls, labour like Beasts and die like Worms.”

In 1666, she released “The Blazing World,” a romantic and adventurous fantasy novel (as well as a satire of male intellectualism) in which a woman wanders through a portal at the North Pole and is transported to another world full of multicolored humans and anthropomorphic beasts, where she becomes an empress and builds a utopian society. It is now recognized as one of the first-ever works of science fiction.

But this idea of a blazing world was not just fiction for Cavendish. It was a metaphor for her philosophical theories about the nature of reality. She believed that at a fundamental level, the entire universe was made of just one thing: matter. And that matter wasn’t mostly lifeless and inert, like most of her peers believed, but animate, aware, completely interconnected, at one with the stuff inside us. In essence, she envisioned that it wasn’t just humans that were conscious, but that consciousness, in some form, was present throughout nature, from animals to plants to rocks to atoms. The world, through her eyes, was blazing.

Cavendish was not the only one to have thoughts like these at that time, but they were dangerous thoughts to have. In Amsterdam, the Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza wrote that every physical thing had its own mind, and those minds were at one with God’s mind; his books were banned by the church, he was attacked at knifepoint outside a synagogue, and eventually, he was excommunicated. Twenty-three years before Cavendish was born, the Italian Dominican friar and philosopher, Giordano Bruno — who believed the entire universe was made of a single universal substance that contained spirit or consciousness — was labeled a heretic, gagged, tied to a stake and burned alive in the center of Rome by the agents of the Inquisition. His ashes were dumped in the Tiber.

If the dominant worldview of Christianity and the rising worldview of science could agree on anything, it was that matter was dead: Man was superior to nature. But Cavendish, Spinoza, Bruno and others had latched onto the coattails of an ancient yet radical idea, one that had been circulating philosophy in the East and West since theories of mind first began. Traces of it can be found in Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christian mysticism and the philosophy of ancient Greece, as well as many indigenous belief systems around the world. The idea has many forms and versions, but modern studies of it house them all inside one grand general theory: panpsychism.
“If the panpsychists are right, it could cast doubt on the foundations of a worldview that has been deeply embedded in our psyche for hundreds of years: that humans are superior to everything around them.”
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Derived from the Greek words pan (“all”) and psyche (“soul” or “mind”), panpsychism is the idea that consciousness — perhaps the most mysterious phenomenon we have yet come across — is not unique to the most complex organisms; it pervades the entire universe and is a fundamental feature of reality. “At a very basic level,” wrote the Canadian philosopher William Seager, “the world is awake.”

Plato and Aristotle had panpsychist beliefs, as did the Stoics. At the turn of the 12th century, the Christian mystic Saint Francis of Assisi was so convinced that everything was conscious that he tried speaking to flowers and preaching to birds. In fact, the history of thought is dotted with very clever people coming to this seemingly irrational conclusion. William James, the father of American psychology, was a panpsychist, as was the celebrated British mathematician Alfred North Whitehead; the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Max Planck once remarked in an interview, “I regard consciousness as fundamental.” Even the great inventor Thomas Edison had some panpsychist views, telling the poet George Parsons Lathrop: “It seems that every atom is possessed by a certain amount of primitive intelligence.”

But over the course of the 20th century, panpsychism came to be seen as absurd and incompatible in mainstream Western science and philosophy, just a reassuring delusion for New Age daydreamers. Karl Popper, one of the most influential philosophers of recent times, described it as “trivial” and “grossly misleading.” Another heavyweight, Ludwig Wittgenstein, waved away the theory: “Such image-mongery is of no interest to us.” As the American philosopher John Searle put it: “Consciousness cannot be spread across the universe like a thin veneer of jam.”

Most philosophers and scientists with panpsychist beliefs kept them quiet for fear of public ridicule. Panpsychism used “to be laughed at insofar as it was thought of at all,” wrote the philosopher Philip Goff in his latest book, “Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness.” But now, we are in the midst of a “full-blown panpsychist renaissance.” Goff is one of a rising tide of thinkers around the world who have found themselves drawn back to this ancient theory. Spurred on by scientific breakthroughs, a lost argument from the 1920s and the encouraging way panpsychism is able to bypass the “hard problem” of consciousness, they are beginning to rebuild and remodel its intellectual foundations, transforming it into a strong candidate for the ultimate theory of reality.

“According to panpsychism,” Goff told me when we met recently in the garden of a pub near Durham University, where he teaches, “consciousness pervades the universe and is a fundamental feature of it. So, it doesn’t necessarily mean everything is ‘conscious.’ The basic idea is that the fundamental building blocks of the universe, perhaps electrons and quarks, have incredibly simple forms of experience, and very complex experience — like that of a human brain — is somehow built up from these very simple and rudimentary forms of experience. … That doesn’t mean your chair is conscious. It means the tiny particles the chair is made up of have some kind of rudimentary experience.”

If the panpsychists are right, it could cast doubt on the foundations of a worldview that has been deeply embedded in our psyche for hundreds of years: that humans are superior to everything around them, disconnected from the insensate matter of nature, marooned on a crumbling planet in a cold and mechanical universe. Panpsychism re-enchants the world, embeds us profoundly within the climate crisis and places us on a continuum of consciousness with all that we see around us.

“We have become used to the Copernican idea that we are not at the center of the universe but simply one planet among many,” Goff wrote in his first book, “Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.” “Perhaps it’s time for a Copernican revolution about our own consciousness.”

The notion of a world awake might seem unintuitive to most of us, but it is something we adopt naturally in childhood. In 1929, the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget found that children between two and four years old are inclined to attribute consciousness to everything around them. A child can happily talk to a grasshopper and blame the pavement if they trip up, and it isn’t such an alien thought, at that age, to think a flower might feel the sunlight and perhaps even enjoy it. Fairy tales and children’s media are infused with animate worlds in which trees, animals and objects come to the aid or annoyance of a protagonist.

Most of us dismiss these notions as we mature. Gradually, we rein the concept of consciousness closer and closer in, until, at least in the West, we usually settle on the traditional view that consciousness is present only in the brains of humans and higher animals.

Along with this goes the premise that consciousness must have sparked into existence from completely non-conscious matter quite recently, cosmically speaking — and only in a tiny corner of the universe. Perhaps a few hundred million years ago, a light bulb flickered on, and something somewhere felt reality for the first time. Before that miraculous spark, the great physicist Erwin Schrodinger wondered, was the universe “a play before empty benches, not existing for anybody, thus quite properly speaking not existing?” As for which higher animals have it and which don’t, there is no agreement, but we have a vague sense. Monkeys and dolphins, definitely conscious; cats and dogs, surely; worms, butterflies and Antarctic krill, probably not.

But in the last 10 years or so, this understanding has been repeatedly disrupted by new scientific breakthroughs. We are now well versed in the playfulness and creativity of cephalopods, the intelligent communication between fungi and the interspecies sharing economy in forests. Honeybees recognize faces, use tools, make collective decisions, dance to communicate and appear to understand higher-order concepts like zero. Plants can feel you touching them. In fact, the evolutionary ecologist Monica Gagliano has suggested that pea plants can learn behavior, identify the sound of running water and grow towards it and communicate via clicking sounds. When you consider that plants account for around 80% of the total biomass on Earth (the biomass of humans is roughly equivalent to that of Antarctic krill), then extending consciousness to them would mean we are living on a vastly conscious planet.

Recent research into slime mold — a single-celled eukaryotic organism that has no brain, no nervous system and looks like a yellow puddle — found that it makes decisions, perceives its surroundings and can choose the most nutritious food from numerous options. As an experiment, researchers arranged oat flakes in the geographical pattern of cities around Tokyo, and the slime mold constructed nutrient channeling tubes that closely mimicked the painstakingly planned metropolitan railway system. At Columbia University, the biologist Martin Picard has discovered that mitochondria, the organelles found in the cells of almost every complex organism, “communicate with each other and with the cell nucleus, exhibit group formation and interdependence, synchronize their behaviors and functionally specialize to accomplish specific functions within the organism.” Nobody is concluding that mitochondria are conscious, but if an animal the size of a dog acted like this, would we intuitively ascribe to it some basic level of consciousness?

“I find it striking,” the neuroscientist Christof Koch told me on a video call, “that after 2,400 years, we are now back to panpsychism. This is like scientists discussing whether the Earth is actually flat, or if the heart is the seat of the soul. I mean …”
“Panpsychism re-enchants the world, embeds us profoundly within the climate crisis and places us on a continuum of consciousness with all that we see around us.”
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Koch, one of the world’s most renowned neuroscientists, is the chief scientist of the MindScope Program at the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, he worked closely with the late Nobel Laureate Francis Crick (who, alongside James Watson, Maurice Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin, discovered the double helix structure of DNA) to build the foundations for a neuroscience of consciousness.

In recent years, Koch has become a champion and staunch defender of Integrated Information Theory (IIT), a leading theory in the neuroscience of consciousness developed by the Italian neuroscientist and psychiatrist Giulio Tononi. IIT is concerned with developing a method to measure the amount of integrated information (which, it posits, represents consciousness) in a physical system. In other words, is something conscious and, if so, how conscious? One of Tononi and Koch’s many ambitions is to create a practical device, “a consciousness meter,” which could measure the level of consciousness in patients in a vegetative state.

Tononi’s scientific research aligned with what some philosophers of consciousness believe about panpsychism: “It says consciousness is graded and much more widely distributed,” Koch said. “Giulio tried to downplay that at first because he felt people would then reject it out of hand, but I kept on pushing.” In 2015, they published a paper together titled “Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?” in which they stated that while IIT was not developed with panpsychism in mind, it did seem to share its central intuitions.

“A lot of people say that’s wacky: Any theory that predicts a microbe is conscious is crazy because it’s so different from my insight into the state of the world,” Koch told me. When people hear the word consciousness, he explained, they assume qualities like self-awareness, emotion, pleasure and pain, but here we are talking about a degree of consciousness that is far more basic: experience. “Clearly, the paramecium doesn’t have psychology; it doesn’t hear bees, it doesn’t worry about the weekend. But the claim is: It feels like something to be the paramecium — and once the cell membrane dissolves and it disintegrates and dies, it doesn’t feel like anything anymore.”

In 2013, Koch traveled to a Tibetan monastery in southern India for a symposium on physics, biology and brain science between Buddhist monk-scholars and Western scientists where he presented the contemporary Western consensus that only humans and some animals are blessed with consciousness. While there, Koch helped with teaching at the monastery. “We showed some movies of little bacteria moving around and asked them what they thought,” he told me. “They said they were clearly sentient. They had no trouble with that.”






Matthew Craven

Arthur Stanley Eddington was a pacifist Quaker from a family of farmers in the north of England. In 1913, at the age of 30, he started working as a professor of astronomy at Cambridge. Six years later, he and the Royal Astronomer Frank Watson Dyson became perhaps the first scientists to prove Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity, catapulting Einstein, who was then mostly unknown in the English-speaking world so soon after the end of World War I, to global notoriety. Eddington and Dyson organized expeditions to Principe and Brazil to observe a solar eclipse and record what Einstein had predicted: Gravity bends light. Newton was overthrown, and a new revolution in science began.

Upon his return from Brazil, Eddington dove into the work of the mathematician Bertrand Russell. One of Russell’s observations, first developed in the 1920s and furthered in the 1950s, was this: “All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to — as to this, physics is silent.” In other words, while physical science might appear to give us a nearly complete account of the nature of matter — what everything is made of — it really only provides a description of mathematical structures: the “causal skeleton” of reality. These descriptions are incredibly valuable and have led to many of humanity’s greatest scientific achievements, because they can be used to predict how matter will behave. But as Goff said to me: “Physical science only tells us what stuff does, not what stuff is. It’s not telling us the underlying nature of the stuff that is behaving in this way.”

Consider this crude breakdown of water. What is water? Water is a colorless, transparent, odorless chemical substance that fills our oceans, lakes, rivers and bodies. But what is it composed of? It is composed of sextillions and sextillions of tiny water molecules. What are they composed of? Well, each molecule contains three atoms: two hydrogen and one oxygen. And what are hydrogen and oxygen made of? Subatomic particles like neutrons and electrons. What is an electron made of? An electron has mass and charge. And what are mass and charge? They are properties of the electron. But what is the electron?

“When I was a young physics student,” wrote the astrophysicist Adam Frank in a 2017 essay, “I once asked a professor: ‘What’s an electron?’ His answer stunned me. ‘An electron,’ he said, ‘is that to which we attribute the properties of the electron.’ That vague, circular response was a long way from the dream that drove me into physics, a dream of theories that perfectly described reality.” In a strange and convoluted way, there is a sense in which we don’t really know what water is. We don’t really know what anything is. As Stephen Hawking wrote in “A Brief History of Time”: “Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”

Eddington, who by the late 1920s was seen as one of the greatest living scientists in the world, agreed with Russell: “The physicist cannot get behind structure,” he wrote in a glowing review of Russell’s 1927 book “The Analysis of Matter.” That same year, Eddington was invited to give the prestigious annual Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh, which he then turned into his own book, “The Nature of the Physical World.” Written for a wider audience, it contained echoes of Russell and became one of the most influential popular science books of the era, selling 72,000 copies in Britain alone.

“Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”
— Stephen Hawking

“The Victorian physicist felt that he knew just what he was talking about when he used such terms as matter and atoms,” wrote Eddington. “Atoms were tiny billiard balls, a crisp statement that was supposed to tell you all about their nature in a way which could never be achieved for transcendental things like consciousness, beauty or humor. But now we realize that science has nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the atom. The physical atom is, like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings” — measurements on a machine.

Eddington, like Russell before him, felt that the intrinsic nature of matter, the thing that has mathematical structure, could be integral to explaining consciousness. He wrote that there is one clump of matter that we know and experience directly, not through perceptions, equations or measuring devices: the matter that constitutes our brains. We know that the intrinsic matter that constitutes our brains must involve consciousness because that is our rich and subjective moment-to-moment experience of reality.

Throughout the history of consciousness studies, the mind-body problem has caused theory after theory to collapse and falter. How does the matter of the brain, which we know and understand, give rise to the mystery of consciousness? Eddington’s panpsychist argument, said Goff, “turned the problem upside down.” In Eddington’s view, matter is the mystery; consciousness is the thing we understand better than anything else. The only matter we experience directly is the matter in our living brains, and we know that to be conscious. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that all matter is conscious. And while critics of panpsychism are quick to challenge its proponents to prove that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter, the panpsychists are equally poised to respond: Prove that it isn’t.

This argument, Goff wrote in “Galileo’s Error,” “is hard to really absorb” because “it is diametrically opposed to the way our culture thinks about science. But if we manage to do so, it becomes apparent that the simplest hypothesis concerning the intrinsic nature of matter outside of brains is that it is continuous with the intrinsic nature of matter inside of brains.” As Eddington wrote in the conclusion to his book: “The stuff of the world is mind-stuff.” Consciousness didn’t emerge or flicker into existence; it has always been there — the intrinsic nature of us and everything around us. This is what breathes fire into the equations.

Despite the popularity of Russell and Eddington’s work in the 1920s and 30s, these ideas were largely lost. Western academia was then being seized by a group known as the Vienna Circle and their logical positivism movement. Interwar Europe was being overrun by extremist violence, dogmatic ideologies and political propaganda, and the logical positivists railed against it all by calling for “exact thinking in demented times” — strict scientific standards and rigorous objectivity. Logical positivism swept through Anglo-American universities and caused a wholesale rejection of abstract metaphysical discussions. The scientific method relied on what could be observed; what went on inside the mind was largely ignored in favor of how humans behaved, ushering in the rise of B.F. Skinner and behavioral psychology. Eddington’s work in particular remained forgotten until Galen Strawson, one of the elder statesmen of modern British philosophy, found his book on the shelf of a holiday home in Scotland and used it to bolster his modern argument for panpsychism.

Since the 1930s, our scientific understanding of the fundamental building blocks of reality has become even weirder. Particles have been shown to behave like waves and waves like particles, depending on the experimental conditions. Particles no longer seem to be the fixed and knowable objects they once were, and different particle physicists will give you different answers to the question, “What is a particle?” Perhaps it is a quantum excitation of a field, vibrating strings or simply what we measure in detectors. “We say they are ‘fundamental,’” Xiao-Gang Wen, a theoretical physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told Quanta Magazine. “But that’s just a [way to say] to students, ‘Don’t ask! I don’t know the answer. It’s fundamental; don’t ask anymore.’”

“Physical science only tells us what stuff does, not what stuff is. It’s not telling us the underlying nature of the stuff that is behaving in this way.”
— Philip Goff

In a landmark 2003 essay, Strawson wrote that this ambiguity only strengthened the argument for panpsychism. The idea of our brains as “lumpish, inert matter, dense or corpuscled, stuff that seems essentially alien to the phenomenon of consciousness,” he wrote, “has given way to fields of energy, essentially active diaphanous process-stuff that — intuitively — seems far less unlike the process of consciousness.” Physics doesn’t show our brain as a spongey blood-filled mass composed of tiny concrete particles, but as “an astonishingly (to us) insubstantial-seeming play of energy, an ethereally radiant vibrancy.”

Of course, panpsychism has its flaws. In October, the Journal of Consciousness Studies dedicated an entire issue to responding to Goff’s book. It featured both critical and supportive essays from philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, the bestselling author Annaka Harris and renowned physicists like Carlo Rovelli, Sean Carroll and Lee Smolin. “The real problem with panpsychism is not that it seems crazy,” wrote the British neuroscientist Anil Seth in his essay, “it is that it explains nothing and does not generate testable predictions.”

Physicists critical of it have said it is trying to add something new into our scientific picture of reality that wasn’t there before, and that would therefore require alterations to the proven laws of physics to accommodate it. But in one of the journal essays that addressed this point, the philosopher Luke Roelofs (of NYU’s Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness) argued the opposite: Nothing is being added to our scientific picture of the world — this is just a different interpretation of that picture. “It rests on recognizing that the physical picture itself is just under-specified: It tells us how this thing called an ‘electron’ behaves, and how these properties called ‘charge’ affect that behavior, but never says (never could say) what any of this is in and of itself.” In other words: Consciousness is exactly what the physicists have been studying the structure and behavior of all along. “For a panpsychist,” Goff said, “the story of physics is the story of consciousness. All there is is forms of consciousness, and physics tracks what they do.”

The most notorious hurdle for panpsychism is known as the combination problem. It has been framed in various ways, but its essence is this: How can lots of tiny conscious entities, like fundamental particles, combine to create one big conscious entity, like the human mind? Goff has explored a possible solution via quantum entanglement. The Norwegian panpsychist philosopher Hedda Hassel Mørch has worked with Tononi and IIT to overcome it. And Roelofs has investigated split-brain cases — a radical procedure used for severe epilepsy in which a patient’s corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres of the brain, is severed — that seem to result in patients experiencing a split or partial split of consciousness. If consciousness can be split, then why couldn’t it be combined?

“Some people dismiss panpsychism simply because the combination problem has not yet been solved,” Goff wrote in “Galileo’s Error.” “To my mind, this is like someone in 1859 rejecting Darwinism on the basis that ‘On The Origin of Species’ did not contain a completely worked-out history of the evolution of the human eye.” Panpsychism as a research program, he told me, is only just getting started.

In the freezing winter of Boxing Day, 1966, the medieval historian Lynn Townsend White Jr. delivered a speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington. Fifty-nine years old at the time, White was a rigorous and provocative historian, and also a devout Christian. But through his studies, he had found something that deeply troubled him, something he felt resonated with the time in which he lived. In 1960s America, the general American public was becoming aware of the effects of pollution and global warming. Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring” had been out for a couple years, and the landmark Air Quality Act (1967) and the Clean Air Act (1970) were not far off. Just four weeks before White gave his speech in Washington, a toxic copper-colored cloud of acrid smog, so thick it could be wiped off car windscreens, smothered New York for three days, causing 168 deaths and adverse health conditions for hundreds of thousands of people.

How we view the world determines how we treat it, and White felt the roots of the climate crisis went deep into ancient history. They must be analyzed, he thought, because to address the climate crisis we must rethink the fundamental mindset that caused it, without which our solutions might create even more serious problems than they solve. “What people do about their ecology,” he said during his speech, “depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them.” In his eyes, the causes weren’t solely scientific, technological, political or economic — they were ideological. Christianity in the West, he thought, was what first separated man from nature and established a relationship of superiority and exploitation with everything around.

Prior to Christianity, ancient paganism revolved around the idea of an animate world. “Before one cut a tree, mined a mountain or dammed a brook, it was important to placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it placated,” White wrote. But Christianity siphoned these spirits out of the Earth and placed them in heaven. “By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects. … The spirits in natural objects, which formerly had protected nature from man, evaporated … and the old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled.” This led White to describe Christianity as the most “anthropocentric religion the world had seen.”

“Consciousness didn’t emerge or flicker into existence; it has always been there — the intrinsic nature of us and everything around us.”

Christianity didn’t create the ecological crisis, White asserted, but it laid the foundations for an abusive relationship between man and nature. This religious ideology was infused with the Scientific Revolution (of which the key drivers were deeply religious Christians like Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Bacon) and ushered in an age of technology, capitalism and colonialism that thrived on exploiting the Earth. The universe came to be viewed not as organic and animate, but as a mindless machine, like a clock, the gears of which are governed by scientific laws. The wonder and unpredictability of nature was transformed into something stable, predictable, knowable and therefore controllable. Forests were there to be cleared, hills were there to be mined and animals were there to be slaughtered. This became known as the “mechanistic worldview.” As the science historian Carolyn Merchant wrote in a 1980 book: “Because it viewed nature as dead and matter as passive, mechanism could function as a subtle sanction for the exploitation and manipulation of nature and its resources.”

While we might think we are now living in a “post-Christian age,” this deeply entrenched mindset still haunts us. This “relation to nature,” White wrote, is “almost universally held not only by Christians and Neo-Christians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians. Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates around our little globe. Despite Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process.” Echoes of this story, Naomi Klein wrote in her 2014 book “This Changes Everything,” reverberate through a “cultural narrative that tells us that humans are ultimately in control of the Earth, and not the other way around. This is the same narrative that assures us that, however bad things get, we are going to be saved at the last minute — whether by the market, by philanthropic billionaires or by technological wizards.”

White’s paper caused shockwaves. Biblical scholars and theologians criticized him heavily, and he received torrents of hate mail accusing him of being the anti-Christ, a Kremlin agent and more. But he was a religious man, with no intention of turning his back on his God. In the final third of the paper, he reminisced on the forgotten panpsychists of Christianity who had implored people to recognize themselves as within nature, not above it. White called for his fellow Christians — roughly a quarter of the world’s population at the time — to look for ways forward in the example of a saint like Francis of Assisi, who spoke to his flowers and envisioned the Earth itself as something divine.


Throughout the 1970s, environmentalists and political activists pored over White’s thesis, and it became a seminal text in universities and ecological studies. But his panpsychist conclusions went largely under the radar. His critique became mainstream, but his call to action, at least in the 1960s, largely failed.

The essence of what White, Marchant and then Klein are getting at is that our mechanistic worldview is not an objectively true portrayal of reality, but something that has been constructed. Therefore, it can be reconstructed. Panpsychism is one possible reconstruction. Our inability to fully comprehend the widespread decline of the natural world could be a consequence of our refusal to see ourselves as part of it. And the potential of panpsychism to put mind back into matter, reconnect us to nature, dispel human exceptionalism and revolutionize our ethics is, for many, a clear way forward.

While analytic philosophers like Goff and Strawson are keen to emphasize that their argument for panpsychism is technical, logical and based on strict theoretical frameworks, the Australian philosopher Freya Mathews has reached similar conclusions via environmental philosophy, which is more concerned with questions about how we live in this world. In 1991, Mathews wrote “The Ecological Self,” a book that essentially described a panpsychist view without using the word — “I didn’t want to shoot myself in the foot by calling it that,” she told me.

She went on: “I don’t think just accepting something like this at a theoretical level would change us. I don’t think that’s how psychology or motivation works. Reason can’t touch motivation; it doesn’t touch our deeper psyche. But if a theory like this gives us permission to experiment experientially with new ways of seeing and exploring the world — and looking for our purpose, as it were — then we might have a chance of discovering it.”

In the 1960s, the physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn analyzed what it takes to cause a paradigm shift in our scientific perspective. A paradigm shift is when a dominant theory is suddenly or gradually overturned when significant anomalies that disprove the theory continue to arise until it goes into a state of crisis. During this crisis, Kuhn wrote, we witness “the proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals.” An example of a Kuhnian paradigm shift is the sudden change from Newton’s simple physics to Einstein’s far weirder theories, which, among many things, completely upended the understanding of time.

Mathews thinks we are now on the verge of another paradigm shift, whether that is to panpsychism or some other worldview that sees nature as more than unfeeling matter. “Our current worldview is leading to the ecological collapse of the planet,” she said. “And it is completely pragmatically self-defeating to continue with it.”

Margaret Cavendish had a fairly robust set of environmental ethics that was rare in 1600s Europe. At a time when Descartes — who gave his dog the very human name Monsieur Grat (“Mr. Scratch”) — was arguing that animals were machine-like senseless automata that felt neither pain nor pleasure, Cavendish was trying to create a dialogue between man and nature.

In her poems “The Hunting of the Hare” and “The Hunting of the Stag,” she abandoned the human perspective to adopt that of the animal being killed. In another, she imagined a conversation between a man and the tree he is about to cut down. These views and others ostracized her from the 17th-century scientific community, and much of her work was either ignored or dismissed. When she became the first woman to visit the all-male scientific institution of the Royal Society in May 1667, Pepys’ account of her visit focused mostly on the offensiveness of her dress. She was viewed by many as insane and irrational; they labeled her “Mad Madge.”


But none of this dissuaded Cavendish, who, in her lifetime, published numerous books of philosophy, fiction, plays and poetry. “I had rather appear worse in singularity,” she said, “than better in the mode.” And if anyone was being irrational, thought Cavendish, it certainly wasn’t her. “Man is more irrational,” she wrote in 1664, “when he believes that all knowledge is not only confined to one sort of Creatures, but to one part of one particular Creature, as the head, or brain of man.”

All That Is Solid Melts Into Information

The torrent of accelerated time without narrative is disorienting our society and fragmenting community, says philosopher Byung-Chul Han. Art can help put the pieces back together.


Sophie Douala for Noema Magazine

APRIL 21, 2022

Byung-Chul Han is a South Korea-born German philosopher and cultural theorist whose recent books include “The Burnout Society” and “The Disappearance of Rituals.” He recently spoke to Nathan Gardels, Noema’s editor-in-chief.

Nathan Gardels: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe once commented that: “When eras are on the decline, all tendencies are subjective; but, on the other hand, when matters are ripening for a new epoch, all tendencies are objective. Each worthy effort turns its force from the inward to the outward world.”

By that definition, ours is an era of decline that has turned from the outward to the inward obsession with identity and “authenticity,” both personal and tribal, fueled by digital connectivity. Paradoxically, social media in this sense is antisocial, leading to the disintegration of community through a kind of connected isolation.

What is the dynamic and what are the mechanisms behind what you call “the crisis of community?” What are the consequences for how we feel and live in our daily lives?

Byung-Chul Han: The inwardly turned, narcissistic ego with purely subjective access to the world is not the cause of social disintegration but the result of a fateful process at the objective level. Everything that binds and connects is disappearing. There are hardly any shared values or symbols, no common narratives that unite people.

Truth, the provider of meaning and orientation, is also a narrative. We are very well informed, yet somehow we cannot orient ourselves. The informatization of reality leads to its atomization — separated spheres of what is thought to be true.

But truth, unlike information, has a centripetal force that holds society together. Information, on the other hand, is centrifugal, with very destructive effects on social cohesion. If we want to comprehend what kind of society we are living in, we need to understand the nature of information.

Bits of information provide neither meaning nor orientation. They do not congeal into a narrative. They are purely additive. From a certain point onward, they no longer inform — they deform. They can even darken the world. This puts them in opposition to truth. Truth illuminates the world, while information lives off the attraction of surprise, pulling us into a permanent frenzy of fleeting moments.

We greet information with a fundamental suspicion: Things might be otherwise. Contingency is a trait of information, and for this reason, fake news is a necessary element of the informational order. So fake news is just another piece of information, and before any process of verification can begin, it has already done its work. It rushes past truth, and truth cannot catch up. Fake news is truth-proof.


“Bits of information provide neither meaning nor orientation. They do not congeal into a narrative.”

 

Information goes along with fundamental suspicion. The more we are confronted with information, the more our suspicion grows. Information is Janus-faced — it simultaneously produces certainty and uncertainty. A fundamental structural ambivalence is inherent in an information society.

Truth, by contrast, reduces contingency. We cannot build a stable community or democracy on a mass of contingencies. Democracy requires binding values and ideals, and shared convictions. Today, democracy gives way to infocracy.

As you suggest in your question, another reason for the crisis of community, which is a crisis of democracy, is digitalization. Digital communication redirects the flows of communication. Information is spread without forming a public sphere. It is produced in private spaces and distributed to private spaces. The web does not create a public.

This has highly deleterious consequences for the democratic process. Social media intensify this kind of communication without community. You cannot forge a public sphere out of influencers and followers. Digital communities have the form of commodities; ultimately, they are commodities.

“Today, we no longer have any narratives that provide meaning and orientation for our lives. Narratives crumble and decay into information.”

Of course, there was information in the past, too. But it did not determine society to such a degree as today. In antiquity, mythical narratives determined people’s lives and behavior. The Middle Ages were, for many, determined by the Christian narrative. But information was embedded in narration: An outbreak of the plague was not pure, simple information. It was integrated into the Christian narrative of sin.

Today, by contrast, we no longer have any narratives that provide meaning and orientation for our lives. Narratives crumble and decay into information. With some exaggeration, we might say that there is nothing but information without any hermeneutic horizon for interpretation, without any method of explanation. Pieces of information do not coalesce into knowledge or truth, which are forms of narration.

The narrative vacuum in an information society makes people feel discontent, especially in times of crisis, such as the pandemic. People invent narratives to explain a tsunami of disorienting figures and data. Often these narratives are called conspiracy theories, but they cannot simply be reduced to collective narcissism. They readily explain the world. On the web, spaces open to make experiences of identity and collectivity possible again. The web, thus, is tribalized — predominantly among right-wing political groups where there is a very strong need for identity. In these circles, conspiracy theories are taken up as offers for assuming an identity.

Friedrich Nietzsche once said that our happiness consists of the possession of a non-negotiable truth. Today, we no longer have such non-negotiable truths. Instead, we have an over-abundance of information. I am not sure that the information society is a continuation of the Enlightenment. Maybe we need a new kind of enlightenment. On a new enlightenment, Nietzsche noted: “It does not suffice that you realize the ignorance in which humans and animals live, you also have to have the will to be ignorant and learn more. You need to comprehend that without this kind of ignorance life would become impossible, that only on condition of this ignorance can what lives preserve itself and flourish.”

Gardels: As you wrote in your most recent book, societal rituals once created that objective narrative bond that held societies together. They “stabilized life” as you put it.

Now such rituals are under assault by the wrecking ball of deconstruction as nothing more than the designs of the privileged who had the power to impose them in the past. In today’s horizontal world, with no legitimate value hierarchy, subjective projection steps in to fill the vacuum.

Out of these ruins of an objective order, how can stabilizing anchors of ritual ever be reestablished? On what basis? On whose authority? What will life look like if that is not possible?

Han: I would not promote a reactivation of past rituals. This is simply not possible because the rituals of Western culture are very closely associated with the Christian narrative. And everywhere the Christian narrative is losing its power. There is little left of it beyond Christmastime.

Rituals found a community. Contrary to the suggestion in your question, it is not inevitable that rituals solidify existing power relations. Quite the opposite. During Carnival, power relations are reversed, so that the slaves can criticize and even mock their masters. Often, roles are exchanged: The masters serve their slaves. And the fool ascends the throne as king. This ritualized temporary suspension of the power structure stabilizes the community.

“After the pandemic, what is most in need of recovery is culture.”


In a world that is completely without rituals and wholly profane, all that is left are consumption and the satisfaction of needs. It is Aldous Huxley’s “Brave New World,” in which every want is immediately gratified. The people are kept in good spirits with the help of fun, consumption and entertainment. The state distributes a drug called soma in order to increase feelings of happiness in the population. Maybe in our brave new world, people will receive a universal basic income and have unlimited access to video games. That would be the new version of panem et circenses (“bread and circuses”).

I am, however, not completely pessimistic. Perhaps we shall develop new narratives, ones that do not presuppose a hierarchy. We can easily imagine a flat narrative. Every narrative develops its own rituals for the purposes of making it habitual, embedding it in the physical body. Culture founds community.

After the pandemic, what is most in need of recovery is culture. Cultural events such as theater, dance and even football have a ritual character. The only way in which we can revitalize community is through ritual forms. Today, culture is held together solely by instrumental and economic relations. But that does not found communities — it isolates people. Art, in particular, should play a central role in the revitalization of rituals.

“Rituals stabilize life by structuring time.”

What we need most are temporal structures that stabilize life. When everything is short-term, life loses all stability. Stability comes over long stretches of time: faithfulness, bonds, integrity, commitment, promises, trust. These are the social practices that hold a community together. They all have a ritual character. They all require a lot of time. Today’s terror of short-termism — which, with fatal consequences, we mistake for freedom — destroys the practices that require time. To combat this terror, we need a very different temporal politics.

In “The Little Prince,” the fox wants to be visited by the little prince always at the same hour, so that his visit becomes a ritual. The little prince asks the fox what a ritual is, and the fox replies: “Those also are actions too often neglected. … They are what make one day different from other days, one hour from other hours.”

Rituals can be defined as temporal technologies for housing oneself. They turn being in the world into being at home. Rituals are in time as things are in space. They stabilize life by structuring time. They give us festive spaces, so to speak, spaces we can enter in celebration.

As temporal structures, rituals arrest time. Temporal spaces we can enter in celebration do not pass away. Without such temporal structures, time becomes a torrent that tears us apart from each other and away from ourselves.

Gardels: You have said that you look to art as “the savior” from the conditions you’ve been describing, since philosophy today lacks the transformational quality it once had. What did you mean by that?

Han: Philosophy has the power to change the world: European science began only with Plato and Aristotle; without Rousseau, Voltaire and Kant, the European Enlightenment would be unthinkable. Nietzsche made the world appear in an entirely new light. Marx’s “Capital” founded a new epoch.

Today, however, philosophy has completely lost this world-changing power. It is no longer capable of producing a novel narrative. Philosophy degenerates into an academic, specialist discipline. It is not turned toward the world and the present.

“Art is nearer to the heart of creation than philosophy.”

How can we reverse this development and make sure that philosophy regains its world-changing power, its magic? My feeling is that art, as opposed to philosophy, is still in a position where it can evoke the glimmer of a new form of life.

Art has always brought forth a new reality, a new form of perception. All his life, Paul Klee said: “Immanently, I cannot be grasped at all. Because I live with the dead, just as I live with the unborn. A bit nearer to the heart of creation than is usual. And not near enough at all yet.”

It is possible that art is nearer to the heart of creation than philosophy. It is therefore capable of letting something entirely new begin. The revolution can begin with as little as an unheard-of color, an unheard-of sound.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

The Tyranny Of Time

The clock is a useful social tool, but it is also deeply political. It benefits some, marginalizes others and blinds us from a true understanding of our own bodies and the world around us.


Marcos Guinoza for Noema Magazine

BY JOE ZADEH
JUNE 3, 2021
Joe Zadeh is a writer based in Newcastle.

On a damp and cloudy afternoon on February 15, 1894, a man walked through Greenwich Park in East London. His name was Martial Bourdin — French, 26 years of age, with slicked-back dark hair and a mustache. He wandered up the zigzagged path that led to the Royal Observatory, which just 10 years earlier had been established as the symbolic and scientific center of globally standardized clock time — Greenwich Mean Time — as well as the British Empire. In his left hand, Bourdin carried a bomb: a brown paper bag containing a metal case full of explosives. As he got closer to his target, he primed it with a bottle of sulfuric acid. But then, as he stood facing the Observatory, it exploded in his hands.

The detonation was sharp enough to get the attention of two workers inside. Rushing out, they saw a park warden and some schoolboys running towards a crouched figure on the ground. Bourdin was moaning and screaming, his legs were shattered, one arm was blown off and there was a hole in his stomach. He said nothing about his identity or his motives as he was carried to a nearby hospital, where he died 30 minutes later.

Nobody knows for sure what Bourdin was trying to do that day. An investigation showed that he was closely linked to anarchist groups. Numerous theories circulated: that he was testing the bomb in the park for a future attack on a public place or was delivering it to someone else. But because he had primed the device and was walking the zigzagged path, many people — including the Home Office explosives expert, Vivian Dering Majendie, and the novelist Joseph Conrad, who loosely based his book “The Secret Agent” on the event — suspected that Bourdin had wanted to attack the Observatory.

Bourdin, so the story goes, was trying to bomb clock time, as a symbolic revolutionary act or under a naive pretense that it may actually disrupt the global measurement of time. He wasn’t the only one to attack clocks during this period: In Paris, rebels simultaneously destroyed public clocks across the city, and in Bombay, protestors shattered the famous Crawford Market clock with gunfire.

Around the world, people were angry about time.


The destruction of clocks seems outlandish now. Contemporary society is obsessed with time — it is the most used noun in the English language. Since clocks with dials and hands first appeared on church towers and town halls, we have been bringing them closer toward us: into our workplaces and schools, our homes, onto our wrists and finally into the phone, laptop and television screens that we stare at for hours each day.

We discipline our lives by the time on the clock. Our working lives and wages are determined by it, and often our “free time” is rigidly managed by it too. Broadly speaking, even our bodily functions are regulated by the clock: We usually eat our meals at appropriate clock times as opposed to whenever we are hungry, go to sleep at appropriate clock times as opposed to whenever we are tired and attribute more significance to the arresting tones of a clock alarm than the apparent rising of the sun at the center of our solar system. The fact that there is a strange shame in eating lunch before noon is a testament to the ways in which we have internalized the logic of the clock. We are “time-binding” animals, as the American economist and social theorist Jeremy Rifkin put it in his 1987 book, “Time Wars.” “All of our perceptions of self and world are mediated by the way we imagine, explain, use and implement time.”


“The clock does not measure time; it produces it.”

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many people have reported that their experience of time has become warped and weird. Being trapped at home or laboring unusually excessive hours makes days feel like hours and hours like minutes, while some months feel endless and others pass almost without notice. It seems the time in our clocks and the time in our minds have drifted apart.

Academic studies have explored how our emotions (such as pandemic-induced grief and anxiety) could be distorting our perception of time. Or maybe it is just because we aren’t moving around and experiencing much change. After all, time is change, as Aristotle thought — what is changeless is timeless. But rarely does the clock itself come into question — the very thing we use to measure time, the drumbeat against which we define “weird” distortions. The clock continues to log its rigid seconds, minutes and hours, utterly unaware of the global crisis that is taking place. It is stable, correct, neutral and absolute.

But what makes us wrong and the clock right? “For most people, the last class they had devoted to clocks and time was early in primary school,” Kevin Birth, a professor of anthropology at the City University of New York who has been studying clocks for more than 30 years, told me recently. “There’s this thing that is central to our entire society, that’s built into all of our electronics. And we’re wandering around with an early primary school level of knowledge about it.”

Birth is one of a growing chorus of philosophers, social scientists, authors and artists who, for various reasons, are arguing that we need to urgently reassess our relationship with the clock. The clock, they say, does not measure time; it produces it. “Coordinated time is a mathematical construct, not the measure of a specific phenomenon,” Birth wrote in his book “Objects of Time.” That mathematical construct has been shaped over centuries by science, yes, but also power, religion, capitalism and colonialism. The clock is extremely useful as a social tool that helps us coordinate ourselves around the things we care about, but it is also deeply politically charged. And like anything political, it benefits some, marginalizes others and blinds us from a true understanding of what is really going on.

The more we synchronize ourselves with the time in clocks, the more we fall out of sync with our own bodies and the world around us. Borrowing a term from the environmentalist Bill McKibben, Michelle Bastian, a senior lecturer at Edinburgh University and editor of the academic journal Time & Society, has argued that clocks have made us “fatally confused” about the nature of time. In the natural world, the movement of “hours” or “weeks” do not matter. Thus the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the sudden extinction of species that have lived on Earth for millions of years, the rapid spread of viruses, the pollution of our soil and water — the true impact of all of this is beyond our realm of understanding because of our devotion to a scale of time and activity relevant to nothing except humans.

During an era in which social constructs like race, gender and sexuality are being challenged and dismantled, the true nature of clock time has somehow escaped the attention of wider society. Like money, the clock has come to be seen as the thing it was only supposed to represent: The clock has become time itself.

Clock time is not what most people think it is. It is not a transparent reflection of some sort of true and absolute time that scientists are monitoring. It was created, and it is frequently altered and adjusted to fit social and political purposes. Daylight savings, for instance, is an arbitrary thing we made up. So is the seven-day week. “People tend to think that somewhere there is some master clock, like the rod of platinum in the Bureau of Weights and Measures, that is the ‘uber clock,’” Birth told me. “There isn’t. It’s calculated. There is no clock on Earth that gives the correct time.”

What’s usually taught in Western schools is that the time in our clocks (and by extension, our calendars) is determined by the rotation of the Earth, and thus the movement of the sun across our sky. The Earth, we learn, completes an orbit of the sun in 365 days, which determines the length of our year, and it rotates on its axis once every 24 hours, which determines our day. Thus, an hour is 1/24 of this rotation, a minute is 1/60 of an hour and a second is 1/60 of a minute.

None of this is true. The Earth is not a perfect sphere with perfect movement; it’s a lumpy round mass that is squashed at both poles and wobbles. It does not rotate in exactly 24 hours each day or orbit the sun in exactly 365 days each year. It just kinda does. Perfection is a manmade concept; nature is irregular.

For thousands of years, most human societies have accepted and moved in harmony with the irregular rhythms of nature, using the sun, moon and stars to understand the passage of time. One of the most common early timekeeping devices, sundials (or shadow clocks), reflected this: The hours of the day were not of fixed 60-minute lengths, but variable. Hours were longer or shorter as they waxed and waned in accordance with the Earth’s orbit, making the days feel shorter in the winter and longer in the summer. These clocks didn’t determine the hours, minutes and seconds themselves, they simply mirrored their surrounding environment and told you where you were within the cyclical rhythms of nature.

But since the 14th century, we’ve gradually been turning our backs on nature and calculating our sense of time via manmade devices. It began in the monasteries of Northern and Central Europe, where pious monks built crude iron objects that unreliably but automatically struck intervals to help bellringers keep track of canonical hours of prayer. Like any machine, the logic of the mechanical clock was based upon regularity, the rigid ticking of an escapement. It brought with it a whole different way to view time, not as a rhythm determined by a combination of various observed natural phenomena, but as a homogenous series of perfectly identical intervals provided by one source.

The religious fervor for rationing time and disciplining one’s life around it led the American historian Lewis Mumford to describe the Benedictine monks as “perhaps the original founders of modern capitalism.” It is one of the great ironies of Christianity that it set the wheels in motion for an ever-unfolding mania of scientific accuracy and precision around timekeeping that would eventually secularize time in the West and divorce God, the original clockmaker, from the picture entirely.

“The more we synchronize ourselves with the time in clocks, the more we fall out of sync with our own bodies and the world around us.”

By 1656, the Dutch scientist Christiaan Huygens had invented the first pendulum clock, which delivered homogenous and regular slices of a small unit of time: seconds. Unlike the inconsistent mechanical clocks of before, the clock time of pendulums was nearly perfect. In that same century, the British astronomer John Flamsteed and others developed “mean time,” an average calculation of the Earth’s rotation. Science had found a way around the Earth’s wobbly eccentricities, producing a quantifiable and consistent unit that became known as Greenwich Mean Time.

Standardized time became vital for seafarers and irresistible to corporate interests, such was the ease it could offer trade, transport and electric communication. But it took longer to colonize the minds of the general public. During the British “railway mania” of the 1840s, around 6,000 miles of railway lines were constructed across the country. Investors (including Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill and the Brontë sisters) climbed over each other to acquire rail company shares in a frenzy of freewheeling capitalism that caused one of the biggest economic bubbles in British history. Companies like Great Western Railway and Midland Railway began to enforce Greenwich Mean Time inside their stations and on their trains to make timetables run efficiently.

Every city, town and village in Britain used to set its clocks to its own local solar time, which gave each locale a palpable sense of identity, time and place. If you lived in Newcastle, noon was when the sun was highest, no matter what the time in London was. But as the railways brought standardized timetables, local times were demonized and swept aside. By 1855, nearly all public clocks were set to GMT, or “London time,” and the country became one time zone.

The rebellious city of Bristol was one of the last to agree to standardized time: The main town clock on the Corn Exchange building kept a third hand to denote “Bristol time” for the local population who refused to adjust. It remains there to this day.

“Railway time” arrived in America too, splitting the country into four distinct time zones and causing protests to flare nationwide. The Boston Evening Transcript demanded, “Let us keep our own noon,” and The Cincinnati Commercial Gazette wrote, “Let the people of Cincinnati stick to the truth as it is written by the sun, moon and stars.”

The 1884 International Meridian Conference is often framed as the moment clock time took over the world. The globe was sliced into 24 time zones declaring different clock times, all synchronized to the time of the most powerful empire, the British and their GMT. Nobody would decipher time from nature anymore — they would be told what time it was by a central authority. The author Clark Blaise has argued that once this was implemented, “It didn’t matter what the sun proclaimed at all. ‘Natural time’ was dead.”

“Clock time is not what most people think it is. It was created, and it is frequently altered and adjusted to fit social and political purposes.”

In reality, this process had already been taking place throughout the 1800s as a result of European colonialism, imperialism and oppression. Colonialism was not just a conquest of land, and therefore space, but also a conquest of time. From South Asia to Africa to Oceania, imperialists assaulted alternative forms of timekeeping. They saw any region without European-style clocks, watches and church bells as a land without time.

“European global expansion in commerce, transport and communication was paralleled by, and premised upon, control over the manner in which societies abroad related to time,” the Australian historian Giordano Nanni wrote in his book, “The Colonization of Time.” “The project to incorporate the globe within a matrix of hours, minutes and seconds demands recognition as one of the most significant manifestations of Europe’s universalizing will.” In short, if the East India Company was the physical embodiment of British colonialism overseas, GMT was the metaphysical embodiment.

The Western separation of clock time from the rhythms of nature helped imperialists establish superiority over other cultures. When British colonizers swept into southeastern Australia in search of gold, they depicted the timekeeping practices of the Indigenous societies they encountered as irregular and unpredictable in contrast to the rational and linear nature of the clock. This was despite the fact that Indigenous societies in the region had advanced forms of timekeeping based on the moon, stars, rains, the blossoming of certain trees and shrubs and the flowing of tides, which they used to determine the availability of food and resources, distance and calendar dates.

“Nineteenth-century Europeans generally conceived of such closeness to nature as calling into question the very humanity of those who practiced it,” Nanni wrote. “This was partly determined by the fact that Enlightenment values and ideals had come to associate the idea of ‘humanness’ with man’s transcendence and domination over nature; and its corresponding opposite — savagery — as a mode of life that existed ‘closer to nature.’”

In Melbourne, churches and railway stations grew quickly on the horizon, bringing with them the hands, faces, bells and general cacophony of clock time. By 1861, a time ball was installed in the Williamstown Lighthouse and Melbourne was officially synchronized to Greenwich Mean Time. British colonizers attempted to integrate Indigenous peoples into their labor force with unsatisfactory results due to their unwillingness to sacrifice their own form of timekeeping. They did not believe in “meaningless toil” and “obedience to the clock,” wrote the Australian sociologist Mike Donaldson. “To them, time was not a tyrant.”

In some parts of Australia, the Indigenous resistance to Western clock time continued defiantly. In 1977, in the tiny town of Pukatja (then known as Ernabella) a giant, revolving, electronically operated clock was constructed near the town center for the local Pitjantjatjara people to coordinate their lives around. A decade later, a white construction worker at a town council meeting noted that the clock had been broken for months. Nobody had noticed, because nobody looked at it.

“Nineteenth-century Europeans generally conceived of such closeness to nature as calling into question the very humanity of those who practiced it.”
— Giordano Nanni

The movement toward standardized time reached its apex in the 1950s, when atomic clocks were judged to be better timekeepers than the Earth itself. The second, as a unit of time, was redefined not as a fraction of the Earth’s orbit around the sun, but as a specific number of oscillations of cesium atoms inside an atomic clock.

“When you look at precision timekeeping, it’s all about insulating and isolating these clocks from responding to anything that goes on around them,” Bastian told me via a video call from her home in Edinburgh. A poster with the words “A clock that falls asleep” hung on the wall behind her. “You have to keep them separate from temperature, fluctuations, humidity, even quantum gravity effects. They can’t respond to anything.”

Over 400 atomic clocks in laboratories around the world count time using the atomic second as their standard. A weighted average of these times is used to create International Atomic Time, which forms the basis of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). UTC isn’t completely non-responsive. Every few years, a leap second is added to it to keep it reasonably close to the rotations of the Earth. But in 2023, at the World Radiocommunication Conference, nations from around the world will discuss whether it is in our best interest to abolish leap seconds and permanently unmoor ourselves from the sun and moon in favor of time we manufacture ourselves.

“It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” wrote the literary critic Fredric Jameson. One of the hardest elements to imagine is what capitalism has done to our perception of time via clocks. It now seems embedded into our very psychology to view time as a commodity that can be spent or wasted.

Capitalism did not create clock time or vice versa, but the scientific and religious division of time into identical units established a useful infrastructure for capitalism to coordinate the exploitation and conversion of bodies, labor and goods into value. Clock time, the British sociologist Barbara Adam has argued, connected time to money. “Time could become commodified, compressed and controlled,” she wrote in her book “Time.” “These economic practices could then be globalized and imposed as the norm the world over.”

Clock time, Adam goes on, is often “taken to be not only our natural experience of time” but “the ethical measure of our very existence.” Even the most natural of processes now must be expressed in clock time in order for them to be validated.

Women in particular often find themselves at the wrong end of this arbitrary metric. Unpaid labor such as housework and childcare — which still disproportionately burdens women — seems to slip between the measurements of the clock, whereas the experience of pregnancy is very much under the scrutiny of clock time. Adam quotes a woman’s account of her birth-giving experience: “The woman in labor, forced by the intensity of the contractions to turn all her attention to them, loses her ordinary, intimate contact with clock time.” But in the hospital environment, where the natural process of childbirth has been evaluated and standardized in clock-time units, a woman is pressured to follow what Alys Einion-Waller, a professor of midwifery at Swansea University, has called a “medicalized birth script.”

“It now seems embedded into our very psychology to view time as a commodity that can be spent or wasted.”

The firsthand experience and intuition of a woman giving birth is devalued in favor of timings and measurements related to the expected length of labor stages, the spacing of contractions, the progress of cervical dilation and other observations. Language such as “failure to progress” is common when a woman doesn’t perform to the expected curve, and diversion from the clock-time framework can be used to justify medical intervention. This is one of the reasons that the home-birthing movement has recently grown in popularity.

Likewise, new parents know that the baby itself becomes their clock, and any semblance of standardized time is preposterous. But in time, of course, the baby joins the rigid temporal hierarchy of school, with non-negotiable class and mealtimes, forcing biological rhythms to adhere to socially acceptable clock time.

As Birth put it to me: “The clock helps us with things that are uniform in duration. But anything that is not uniform, anything that varies, the clock screws up. … When you try to schedule a natural process, nature doesn’t cooperate.”

In 2002, scientists watched in amazement as Larsen B, an ice shelf on the Antarctic Peninsula 55 times bigger than Manhattan — which had been stable for 10,000 years — splintered and collapsed into hundreds of shards the size of skyscrapers. A glaciologist who flew overhead told Scientific American that he could see whales swimming in water where ice a thousand feet thick had been just days earlier.

Virtually overnight, previous clock-time predictions around the mass loss of ice needed to be rewritten to acknowledge a 300% acceleration in the rate of change. In 2017, a piece of the nearby Larsen C ice shelf fell off, creating the world’s biggest iceberg — so big that maps had to be redrawn. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calls such abrupt events, which happen more often than you might think, “surprises.”

The climate crisis is a realm in which linear clock time frequently and fatally misfires. It frames the crisis as something that is measurable, quantifiable and predictable — something we can envisage in the same way as work hours, holidays, chores and projects. Warming temperatures, ocean acidification, ice melting and carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are constantly being translated into clock time to create tipping points, thresholds, roadmaps and sustainable development goals for us to beat or aspire to. When a “surprise” happens, time estimates crumble in the face of reality. Nature doesn’t cooperate.

It works the same way for putting limits on the amount of time we have to stop global warming. The Guardian launched a blog called “100 months to save the world” in July 2008 that used scientific research and predictions to make it “possible to estimate the length of time it will take to reach a tipping point.” That was 154 months ago. Are we 54 months into the end of the world? Perhaps. But one can’t help but wonder if the constant framing of the climate crisis in clock time deadlines, which then pass without comment, has contributed to the inability and inertia of many to comprehend the seriousness of what is actually happening.

“It’s a privilege to live by clock time alone and ignore nature’s urgent temporalities.”

“We can’t say that clock time isn’t important,” Vijay Kolinjivadi, a researcher at the University of Antwerp’s Institute of Development Policy, told me. “There’s certain times when that metric makes a lot of sense, and we should use it. For instance, you and I decided to talk at 10 a.m. There’s no way to escape that. But when we are thinking about capitalism, social crisis and ecological breakdown, it gets problematic.” Clock time, he went on, “is always geared toward production, growth and all the things that created this ecological crisis in the first place.”

One of the most affecting myths of clock time is that we all experience time at the same steady pace. We don’t. “The future is already here,” the science-fiction author William Gibson famously said in 2003, “it’s just not very evenly distributed.” And framing the climate crisis as a ticking clock with only a certain amount of time “to avoid disaster” ignores those for whom disaster has already arrived. The reality is that it’s a privilege to live by clock time alone and ignore nature’s urgent temporalities.

Every few years, the American Midwest is ravaged by floods as the Missouri River swells from intense rainfall, upending the lives of millions. When the floods came during the summer of 1993, a New York Times journalist interviewed a resident about the night he was evacuated. “He remembers everything about the night the river forced him and his wife out of the house where they had lived for 27 years — except for this. ‘I can’t tell you what day it was. … All I can tell you is that the river stage was 26 [feet] when we left.’” The headline of the article was, “They Measure Time by Feet.”

In 1992, the astrophysicist turned author Alan Lightman published a novel called “Einstein’s Dreams” in which he fictionalizes a young Albert Einstein dreaming about the multitude of ways that different interpretations of time would play out in the lives of those around him. In one dream, Einstein sees a world where time is not measured — there are “no clocks, no calendars, no definite appointments. Events are triggered by other events, not by time. A house is begun when stone and lumber arrive at the building site. The stone quarry delivers stone when the quarryman needs money. … Trains leave the station at the Bahnhofplatz when the cars are filled with passengers.” In another, time is measured, but by “the rhythms of drowsiness and sleep, the recurrence of hunger, the menstrual cycles of women, the duration of loneliness.”

Recently, there have been many attempts in both art and literature to reimagine the clock and the role it plays in our lives. At the end of 2020, the artist David Horvitz exhibited a selection of clocks he had created, which included one that was synchronized to a heartbeat. Another artist, Scott Thrift, has developed a clock called “Today,” which simplifies the passage of time into dawn, noon, dusk and midnight as opposed to seconds, minutes and hours. It moves at half the speed of a regular clock, making one full rotation in a day.

Bastian herself has proposed clocks that are more responsive to the temporalities of the climate crisis, like a clock synchronized with the population levels of endangered sea turtles, an animal that has lived in the Pacific Ocean for 150 million years but now faces extinction due to temperature changes. These and other proposals all have the same idea at their core: There are more ways to arrange and synchronize ourselves with the world around us than the abstract clock time we hold so dear.

“They have been trapped by their own inventiveness and audacity. And they must pay with their lives.”
— Alan Lightman

Clock time may have colonized the planet, but it did not completely destroy alternative traditions of timekeeping. Certain religions maintain a connection to time that is rooted in nature, like salat in Islam and zmanim in Judaism, in which prayer times are defined by natural phenomena like dawn, dusk and the positioning of stars. The timing of these events may be converted into clock time, but they are not determined by clocks.

In places where globally standardized time is enforced, some still rebel, like in China, where the entire country is under one time zone, BST (Beijing Standard Time). In Xinjiang, nearly 2,000 miles west of Beijing, where the sun sometimes sets at midnight according to BST, many Uighur communities use their own form of local solar time.

And Indigenous communities around the world still use ecological calendars, which keep time through observations of seasonal changes. Native American tribes around Lake Oneida, for example, recognize a certain flower blooming as the time to start plowing and setting traps for animals emerging from hibernation. As opposed to a standardized clock and calendar format, these ecological calendars, by their very nature, reflect and respond to an ever-changing climate.

In one of the last dreams in Lightman’s book, Einstein imagines a world not too dissimilar from our own, where one “Great Clock” determines the time for everyone. Every day, tens of thousands of people line up outside the “Temple of Time” where the Great Clock resides, waiting their turn to enter and bow before it. “They stand quietly,” wrote Lightman, “but secretly they seethe with their anger. For they must watch measured that which should not be measured. They must watch the precise passage of minutes and decades. They have been trapped by their own inventiveness and audacity. And they must pay with their lives.



Why We Have To Give Up On Endless Economic Growth

Sustainability efforts are scaling and speeding up — but the treadmill of global economic growth is still faster.


Ishaq Fahim for Noema Magazine

BY DOMINIC BOYER
MARCH 3, 2022
Dominic Boyer is an anthropologist who teaches at Rice University, where he also served as Founding Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Research in the Human Sciences (2013-2019). He is a 2021-2022 Berggruen Institute fellow.

A new ecoliberal political consensus is struggling to be born — a consensus whose commitment to a truly sustainable modernity might well prove resilient to the authoritarian-nationalist and collectivist overtures gaining signal strength and ground troops around the world. But it has a long and difficult road ahead of it, and a paradox at its heart.

In 1984 Claus Leggewie and Brice Lalonde wrote about “ecoliberalism,” the idea that classic liberal values like individuality and industry can harmonize with serious ecological politics. The term describes a liberal-democratic trend dating back to the 1970s that has become more prominent in recent years as signs of climate catastrophe and ecologically influenced social destabilization have multiplied around the world.


It is sometimes mistaken for a neo-Keynesian economics, but Keynesianism had no great environmental mission to offer. Where Keynesianism and ecoliberalism do overlap is in their acceptance of growth-oriented capitalist industry as the economic core of liberal-democratic society.

Keynes saw market capitalism as a lesser evil than state-controlled industry, even if he dreamed of doing away with the types of capitalists who demand rents without adding value. Early ecoliberals helped shape the aspiration toward “sustainability,” which was (and is) predicated on the idea that advances in technology could eventually provide a secure industrial infrastructure for ecologically sustainable growth.

Today’s nascent ecoliberal consensus is exemplified by the recent passage of the European Climate Law, a binding framework for bringing Europe’s economy and society to net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Though critics have said it made too many concessions to fossil fuel interests, there is good reason to think we will look back on the ECL as an important watershed in the global struggle against climate change. A legally binding pathway to decarbonizing roughly a sixth of the global economy is a historic achievement by any measure.

The ECL’s broader framework, the European Green Deal, originally aimed to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use.”

“Sustainability efforts are scaling and speeding up — but the treadmill of global economic growth is still faster.”

One could argue that the whole promise of ecoliberalism lives or dies on the term “decoupled.” Unfortunately, there is scant evidence thus far that decoupling economic growth from resource use is both possible and sustainable.

A major study published in 2021 that looked at both production- and consumption-based emissions from 2015 to 2018 in 116 mostly high-carbon national economies found that only 14 of them had been able to decouple GDP growth from both types of carbon emissions growth.

That might seem like progress, since a similar study published in 2012 found that zero countries had achieved decoupling. But the 2021 study also found that 22 countries that had managed to decouple between 2010 and 2015 had actually recoupled again after 2015. In other words, decoupling requires both pressure and vigilance. Worse yet, the study found, “Even countries that have achieved absolute decoupling are still adding emissions to the atmosphere thus showing the limits of ‘green growth’ and the growth paradigm.”

This is the ecoliberal dilemma in a nutshell. Legislation like the European Climate Law and the stalled Build Back Better plan in the U.S. show that sustainability efforts are scaling and speeding up — but the treadmill of global economic growth is still faster. The global supply of renewable energy will increase by about 35 gigawatts from 2021 to 2022.

That would be marvelous news, if not for the fact that the world’s power demand is projected to increase by 100 gigawatts during the same year. The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects a 50% increase in world energy use by 2050, which renewables will only be able to partly cover, thus leaving the world in still worse emissions shape than it is today.

The EIA growth data is more convincing than its prediction that the energy mix will still be predominantly made up of fossil fuels in 2050. Still, it underscores a genuine problem. We are working harder and better at sustainability but finding ourselves falling still further behind.

Of the three core concerns of liberalism — liberty, private property and industry — the attachment to industry is strongest. Liberalism champions freedom and liberty relentlessly, but it has always quietly tolerated dispossessing and even enslaving some as the cost of enabling others. The private property commitment is more resolute, but certain variants of liberalism, notably Keynesianism, have displayed strong commitments to redistributive mechanisms in the name of public goods and national welfare. Industry, meanwhile, is liberalism’s one true love, a connection that dates back to the dawn of liberal political philosophy.

In his “Second Treatise,” John Locke, for example, describes labor as intrinsic to the establishment of property: “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.” But not even all hard work is created equal.

Much as Adam Smith would later echo in this theory of opulence, technology combined with labor (in other words, industry) was the decisive formula for creating value out of the natural resources God gifted humanity. Technology functioned, according to the philosophy of the time, as a sign of grace dividing the world into those with the rational wherewithal to make the most of divine gifts (European men mostly) and those who allowed their gifts to lie fallow and go to waste.

“There is an ancient symbiotic relationship between liberal political ideology and the industrial growth orientation.”

How this equation functioned as a pretext for global colonial occupations and dispossessions for several centuries is the subject for another essay. My point here is that there is an ancient symbiotic relationship between liberal political ideology and the industrial growth orientation that is usually glossed as the internal logic of capitalism. Buried in growth is the pursuit not just of profit, but also of grace, and above all the moral right to accumulate resources and exert dominion.

I believe this history sheds light on why ecoliberalism hasn’t yet proved itself capable of fully acknowledging, let alone remediating, the problems (ecological but not only ecological) created by its centuries-long legacy of relentlessly expanding industrialization. These problems are constantly discounted and marginalized in mainstream liberal politics. Back in the 1970s, when the unsustainability of the current global trajectory first came into clear focus, the few, like André Gorz, who were brave enough to talk about the obvious need for “degrowth” were laughed out of the political sphere.


Today, degrowth is poised to become a much more salient political movement, one that is gaining strength from new economic theories — like Kate Raworth’s doughnut economics, for example, which seeks to rethink economic activity as finding a “safe and just space” for humanity between social minima and planetary maxima. Such theories are being put into experimental practice by city governments in places like Amsterdam and Barcelona.

Mainstream liberals, and many ecoliberals, continue to laugh them off. But the laughter is increasingly nervous, a recognition that degrowth is likely on the horizon one way or another: either through collapse of the current civilizational trajectory or through some of kind of managed transition to widespread industrial and economic downscaling. In a fundamental way, liberalism finds it difficult to imagine, let alone to embrace, such a future. Liberalism has historically always been about the quest for “more.” It has no idea what to do with “less” as a rallying cry.

Instead, at the moment, ecoliberalism (as well as the “green capitalism” that is its symbiotic companion) is betting the only hand it really knows how to play: technology. From massive investments in speculative technologies like nuclear fusion and deep geothermal, to the serial boondoggles of nuclear fission renaissance and carbon capture and humbler options like solar photovoltaic technology, everywhere ecoliberalism seeks the cure for several centuries of rampant industrialism in the emergence of new forms of industry.

It imagines that it can beat out the worst scenarios of environmental collapse by coming up with a technological solution that allows us to have it all: that is, a universal so-called “middle class standard” predicated on massive energy and resource use that can center a global ecoliberal dispensation. But the truth is that it hasn’t yet found an ensemble of technological solutions that are adequate to take on even one of the several hyperobject-level environmental dilemmas facing us (e.g. global warming, plastic and toxic pollution, species extinction) let alone all of them together. And the solutions that is has found so far are not keeping pace with the rising global demand for “middle class” lifestyles.

The problem is less the technologies themselves than the expectation that they must combine efficiently with a model of endless capital development. The more foresighted among contemporary ecoliberals — let’s say Elon Musk — combine a fabulous technological inventiveness with a clear thirst for the extraplanetary as the only way to keep the current ecological Ponzi scheme going more than another few decades. The truth is that if we stay on just this one planet, degrowth needs to be taken more seriously


“Liberalism has historically always been about the quest for ‘more.’ It has no idea what to do with ‘less’ as a rallying cry.”

Degrowth is not a new idea and urtexts like Gorz’s “Ecology as Politics”deserve reevaluation today. In it, Gorz argues that sustainability will never be attained in a capitalist economy because of a dynamic he calls the “poverty of affluence.” Like Marx, Gorz doesn’t doubt that capitalism is very effective at producing useful things through its constant innovation of technology.


What also remains constant, however, is that new technology emerges in a context of scarcity that preserves class inequality and hierarchy. According to Gorz, new technological achievements and luxuries enjoyed first only by the elite attract the desires of the masses toward them. As the masses gain access to old luxuries, new unattainable luxuries develop to replace them. This dynamic is intrinsically growth-oriented: “the mainspring of growth is this generalized forward flight, stimulated by a deliberately sustained system of inequalities.”

Even if capitalism can lift the floor of poverty as measured by consumption, it also raises the ceiling of luxury just as quickly. Technologies may themselves be helpful, but the dynamic of constant innovation and consumption is intrinsically unsustainable. Gorz imagines the world of degrowth as defined instead by universally available highly durable goods, beautiful public dwellings and transportation and a 20-hour work week focused on providing essential needs for all, with the remaining time left over for creative self-realization.

Contemporary degrowth thinking is not simply Gorzian — it is an experimental space for many ideas including ecofeminist and Indigenous interventions like the Red Deal. But it tends to be at least loosely anti-capitalist in its orientation and critical of the luxury consumption trends of the global North. Degrowthers, generally speaking, do not wish to deprive the global South of the opportunity for material development. They want to see the degrowth of Northern high energy consumption, creating the opportunity for a more equitable planetary modernity.

The core reasoning that the global economy needs to slow down — if only to buy ecoliberalism more time to solidify its consensus and improve its technology — is solid. And, in an ambitious way, degrowth synthesizes certain Keynesian and ecoliberal ideas into a worldview that seeks to remediate both social inequality and environmental destabilization at the same time.

Contemporary degrowth theorists tend to share a Pikettyian sensibility that the world does not lack sufficient capital development to address human misery; rather, the problem is resource hoarding by wealthy nations and classes, meaning that the world distributes its abundant existing capital poorly. Here’s how Jason Hickel puts it in “Less is More: How Degrowth Will Save The World,” one of the more comprehensive and persuasive texts in the emerging degrowth canon:

“Capitalism is a giant energy-sucking machine. In order to reduce energy use, we need to slow it all down. Slow down the mad pace of extraction, production and waste, and slow down the mad pace of our lives. This is what we mean by ‘degrowth’. Again, degrowth is not about reducing GDP. It is about reducing the material and energy throughput of the economy to bring it back into balance with the living world, while distributing income and resources more fairly, liberating people from needless work, and investing in the public goods that people need to thrive. It is the first step toward a more ecological civilisation.”

Hickel joins ecoliberals in fierce opposition to obvious scandals like ongoing fossil fuel subsidies and the massive energy waste associated with speculative instruments like crypto. He also offers a rough list of intermediary objectives for making this new civilization, including: ending planned obsolescence, limiting advertising, shifting from ownership to usership, ending food waste, downscaling ecologically destructive industries (industrial beef for example), redistributing labor to avoid unemployment, and reskilling labor toward low carbon industries.

Still, Hickel openly acknowledges that “we don’t yet have all the answers. No one can give us a simple recipe for a post-capitalist economy; ultimately it has to be a collective project. All I’ve done here is offer a few possibilities that I hope will nourish the imagination. As for how to make it happen — that will require a movement, as with every struggle for social and ecological justice in history.”

The pivot away from degrowth governance and toward movement politics inevitably raises questions such as “degrowth by whom?” But I don’t think Hickel and others are trying to be evasive, so much as realistic that talking best practices of governance before a strong social movement emerges is a cart-horse reversal.

“There’s nothing wrong with pursuing a creative, experimental and joyful approach to remaking civilization.”

And where the movements are already vigorous enough to impact governance — for example, Barcelona — the early results of experiments in creating a “solidarity economy” are encouraging. Cooperatives like Som Energíaand Som Mobilitatare more than conventional service providers offering electricity and EV ride sharing, respectively. They are active agents of energy literacy and degrowth ethics who are helping their customers learn to use less power and to drive only when truly necessary. Som Mobilitat even found a way to make degrowth less about denial by sponsoring a lively energy efficiency race, in which the objective was to see who could travel the farthest on a set charge.

With all due respect to good governance, there’s nothing wrong with pursuing a creative, experimental and joyful approach to remaking civilization. Together with Cymene Howe and Daniel Aldana Cohen, I led a public event in Austin, Texas, a few years ago called “Low Carbon Leisure, Low Carbon Pleasure,” the point of which was to remind us high-carbon Northerners that much of what is truly enjoyable in life is either already low carbon or could find a low-carbon substitute with relative ease.

Low-carbon play, in other words, remains available to us even in a world defined by the high-carbon treadmill. Degrowth sounds like sacrifice, especially to ecoliberals. But what if the pursuit of less was framed as the pursuit of happiness by better means? Decoupling is much more likely to be achieved sustainably if citizens and governments are rowing in the same direction.

Ultimately, I think collaboration with the degrowth movement is part of what solves the ecoliberal dilemma. It will help ecoliberalism to fall out of love with industrial expansion while reinforcing the values of liberty, equality and justice that liberalism has long championed. I’m not expecting ecoliberals to fall in love with degrowth, at least not right away. But perhaps they can develop a solid friendship based on their common cause to avoid the worst scenarios of environmental catastrophe.


Capitalism Subverts Community

Cooperative, self-governing institutions — which people join with their hearts as well as their heads — are the best way for us to address capitalism’s most intractable problems.


Clément Thoby for Noema Magazine
MARCH 10, 2022
Robert Neuwirth is the author of two books on the street life of the developing world, “Stealth of Nations” and “Shadow Cities.” He was a 2020-21 Berggruen Institute fellow.

– one –

There are two types of economics active in the world right now — which basically means two radically divergent varieties of economic life. The first is economics as most economists and writers see it and talk about it. The second is economics as most people live it.

Call the first “the top-up.” It’s the economics of competition and asymmetrical knowledge and shareholder value and creative destruction. It’s the dominant system. We know all about the top-up. Tales of the doings of the top-up economy are mainlined into our brains from business articles, financial analysis, stories about our planet’s richest people or corporations or nations. Bezos. Buffett. Gates. Musk. Zuckerberg. The Forbes 400. The Fortune 500. The Nasdaq. The Nikkei. On and on.

Call the second “the bottom-down.” We don’t hear as much about it because it’s a lot less sexy and a lot more sticky. It involves survival mechanisms and community solidarity and cash-in-hand calculations.

But it’s the economic system of the global majority, and this makes it the more important of the two.

– two –

The fundamental opposition is not between what’s mine and what’s yours — it’s between what’s mine and yours and what’s ours.

Ricky Dollison is the fourth generation to take charge of his family’s land in Poulan, Georgia, and he’s become a certified success as a hog farmer. He recently summed up his achievements this way: “The best thing I’ve ever done in farming is to be responsible for my supply chain: I grow my feed, I raise my hogs, I process my meat, I distribute my product.” He’s even got his own brand: Warrior Creek Premium Meats — named after the stream that flows by his fields. And now that his daughter Leiandra has joined the business, he’s passing the legacy to the fifth generation.

Over time, Dollison has come to realize that growth in the modern market will not come from working solo. That’s why, six years ago, he banded together with a cluster of other Black farmers in Georgia and Kentucky to inaugurate the AgFirst Community Cooperative.

“How to grow a crop isn’t a problem,” Dollison said. “It’s all the changes the world system has put in place.”

“There’s a cancer at the heart of the market system.”

Sausage, for example. If he wants to sell sausage in supermarkets, Dollison told me, his farm will have to get certified as having “good agricultural practices” — GAP, for short. That would require major investments in modern practices and equipment. “We’re Black farmers,” Dollison said. “We all had a bunch of old equipment. We can’t afford to buy new stuff. We don’t do enough business.”

As Nancy Dawson, a professor and a fellow member of the co-op who farms a three-acre urban garden in Russellville, Kentucky, explained: “Most small farmers can’t meet these standards on their own. I mean, where am I going to get $35,000 for a new tractor?”

Joining AgFirst (not related to the AgFirst Farm Credit Bank, headquartered in South Carolina, with $37 billion in assets) does not require farmer-members to sign over their land to communal ownership and work their fields in common. Instead it encourages them to share knowledge and resources and to split costs, while continuing to reap rewards individually.

“We didn’t pool together to make a million dollars,” Dollison said. “Yes, we want to make money, but we pooled together because we want to survive.”

* * *

In the picturesque Swiss village of Hinterrhein (population 60 or so) high in the Alpine canton of Graubünden, Carelia Joos prepared to move her family’s herd of 18 cows to pastures on the slopes on the mountains above her home. In this bucolic wonderland, she and her family seem like self-reliant farmers in the tradition of William Tell, the Swiss folk hero-farmer. Yet behind the Joos’ agricultural success are cooperative roots.

Joos sells the milk from her cows to a 176-year-old dairy co-op in the neighboring town of Nefenen. The co-op purchases all the milk from its 20 or so farmer-members, and a hired-cheesemaker produces 160 tons of organic bündner bergkäse — an alpine cheese made in just a few Swiss valleys. Even the co-op’s waste is profitable — the liquid left over once cheese solidifies (whey) is sold to a firm that transforms it into protein powder.

Without the co-op, Joos cheerily confessed, her family’s life would be unsustainable. “There’s no way to make a living as dairy farmers without the co-op making cheese,” she said. “We would have to sell all our cows.”

At the opposite side of Graubünden, Janic Fasser, whose family traces its roots in Val Müstair to the 1400s, also operates communally. Fasser grazes his 20 cows along with several hundred others from 11 other farmers, and they sell their milk to a local cooperative. He loves the co-op model so much that he has helped his fellow farmers form two additional ones — for grain and meat — and is pressing them to go all in, with every field and herd and harvest held in common or rented to the coop. His neighbors are proving hard to convince, but Fasser is undeterred. He said the importance of cooperation is not ideological but social and economic. “This,” he assured me, “would be extremely good for our town.”

* * *

In their own mythology, the merchants of Alaba International Market in Lagos, Nigeria, are ardent apostles of Adam Smith. Ask and they will tell you. Alaba’s astounding ascent over the past four decades — from 18 merchants hiding out in the bush to a global commercial hub with thousands of traders — was a product of two things: unfettered homegrown free-market capitalism and the grace of God.

In this street market, to trade is to hustle and to hustle is a way of life. In Nigeria, more than half of all young people are unemployed, but thousands of youths work in the markets. The naira, the national currency, has been in steep decline, yet merchants still hammer out billions of dollars of deals every year.

No wonder, then, that this massive market seems to offer some sort of experiential proof-of-concept for the free market. “The only politics we understand here is that of the stomach,” the market’s former chairman, Celestine Umeohabike Ezeani, told me.

 “Everything you see here is a result of what the people themselves have been able to put in place.”

“Our economic system promises what it can’t deliver.”


It took me weeks of wandering through the market before I discovered that there was a complementary reality that lay underneath the free-market rhetoric, a hidden parallel structure based on Igbo tribal customs and not described or codified in law. It doesn’t involve trade. It isn’t efficient or profitable. In fact, it involves the selfless dispersal of vast sums of money. In essence, it is a massive, collective, tribal venture capital program in which each merchant brings in apprentices and then seed-funds their solo efforts once they have learned the business. And, unlike traditional V.C. approaches, it’s a pay-it-forward scheme — instead of paying back their funders when they turn a profit, new merchants bring in new apprentices and endow their successors.

One day while I was there, Goddy C. Dike gathered some of his former apprentices in the cramped stall where he sells household appliances. Some of these young men, he confided, have become far more successful than he is — and he proclaimed himself proud, as if he were a teacher whose students have gone on to fame and fortune. More than individual profit, he said, he treasures the idea that his contribution to the market’s unwritten code will nurture his apprentices and his apprentices’ apprentices and his apprentices’ apprentices’ apprentices through the ages, fueling sustainable growth in the market, in the city, in his tribe, in the country, long after he is gone.

* * *

Three dozen people stood in the early morning chill at the crest of a hill. Each clutched a shovel, as if posing for a demented version of Grant Wood’s “American Gothic” painting.

We were there to participate in a modern reenactment of a venerable tradition. For centuries — dating back before the founding of the American republic — people have gathered in villages across northern New Mexico to join in the annual limpia, the spring cleaning of the irrigation channels that bring water to local farms. Near the headgate of the Acequia del Pueblo Abiquiú, above the village where Georgia O’Keeffe lived and worked, fashioning her impressionistic renderings of the harsh and individualist beauty of the southwest — bleached bones and delicate flowers, swirling sands and pointed antlers — we were joining something whose existence contradicts the economic norms our country holds dear.

Each of the 700-odd acequias at work in northern New Mexico is a tiny commons, apportioning mountain run-off as fairly and equitably as possible to farmers in the area. The system was brought to the U.S. in the 1600s by Spanish colonists — and they apparently learned it from North Africans who conquered most of the Iberian Peninsula almost 1,000 years before. “The acequias are really the first form of government,” explained Martha Montoya-Trujillo, an elected commissioner of the 2.6-mile-long Acequia del Rincon in Pojoaque, just outside Santa Fe, which feeds water to 60 private farms and to fields belonging to the Native American Pueblo of Pojoaque. All told, this single small ditch provides water to 158 acres of farmland.

The acequias don’t run according to a profit motive (though the individual farmers who depend on them certainly do) and the field-flooding irrigation favored by most farmers (drip tape and hoop houses can be costly interventions) is said to lose lots of water to evaporation. But through booms and busts, droughts and cloudbursts, changes in ownership and challenges from developers, these tiny collectives have endured.

– three – 

An economy is only as good as it is participatory — that is,
when the percentage of people subject to it who can fully operate in it is high.

Our economic system promises what it can’t deliver.

It vows to provide wealth and equality. That’s what the entrancing metaphor of the invisible hand, coined by Adam Smith in 1759 in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (and restated in somewhat abbreviated form in 1776 in “The Wealth of Nations”), is all about: “[The rich] consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity … they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the Earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”

Smith anointed the division of labor — in which production is split into individual tasks — as the driving force of this process. At the start of “The Wealth of Nations,” he labeled it “the greatest improvement” in “the general business of society” in human history. But in what should be a “How it started … How it’s going” meme in every economics class around the world, here’s what Smith wrote of the same subject some 700 pages later: “The progress of the division of labor” makes a person “as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for any human creature to become. … In every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the laboring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall.”

Despite the magical metaphor, there’s a cancer at the heart of the market system. If it is true, as Smith wrote, that “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable,” then it is impossible to say that any society on our market-mad planet is flourishing and happy.

“Community is an unacknowledged economic category.”

For sure, Smith was not alone in being flummoxed by the incompatibility of individual profit and general welfare. This conundrum has dogged philosophers and economists for thousands of years. More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle saw the solution as a combination of restraint and oppression: “The beginning of reform,” he wrote in “Politics,” “is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated.”

A few decades on from Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill returned to this Aristotelian view that the problem of poverty is the problem of the poor: The poor, Ricardo wrote, “have rendered restraint superfluous, and have invited imprudence.” “Poverty, like most social evils, exists because men follow their brute instincts,” Mill echoed.

Both proposed Aristotelian solutions, though without the ancient philosopher’s faith that the rich can be reined in: “Impressing on the poor the value of independence … that they must look … to their own exertions for support,” was Ricardo’s way of putting it. “Altering the habits of the laboring people” was Mill’s.

“Change always comes from below.”

John Maynard Keynes diagnosed the same problem in his 1936 opus “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”: “The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.” But Keynes feared reining in the rich, seeming to suggest that if you strip wealthy people of their money, they will go on a rampage against everyone poorer. “It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens,” he opined.

Writing less than a decade later, Joseph Schumpeter was also clear-eyed about the failures of the system: “Capitalism does not merely mean that the housewife may influence production by her choice between peas and beans; or that the youngster may choose whether he wants to work in a factory or on a farm,” he wrote in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.” “[I]t means a scheme of values, an attitude toward life, a civilization — the civilization of inequality and of the family fortune.” Schumpeter foresaw a government-controlled socialist future — but with an elitist authoritarian twist: “There is little reason to believe that this socialism will mean the advent of the civilization of which orthodox socialists dream. It is much more likely to present fascist features.”

Simon Kuznets, who won a Nobel Prize in 1971 for developing what has come to be known as the Kuznets curve — a pictogram purporting to show that inequality increases after industrial development but then falls as society adapts to modern realities — admitted in his prize lecture that his graph actually failed to describe much of the world: “Concurrent with the remarkable positive achievements of modern economic growth are unexpected negative results even within the developed countries; while the less developed countries are struggling in the attempt to use the large potential of modern technology in order to assume an adequate role in the one and interdependent world (from which they cannot withdraw even if they wished to do so).” Even in wealthy nations, he asserted, political struggles and tensions “will become more intensive and acute as the perceived gap widens between what has been attained and what is attainable with modern economic growth.”

– four –

No great fortunes without a history of commonality.

The top-up economic sphere functions like a gated community in which people who have money can pretend that everything they do and have in life is based on merit, and that the communal and cooperative boosts from which they profit are nothing but natural outgrowths of that merit.

Legacy admissions to elite institutions of higher education are a perfect example. Elite colleges are such a privileged enclave that most of the schools openly reserve a high number of their entry slots every year for so-called “legacy admissions” — kids whose parents or relatives went to the same institutions and who might not have gotten in otherwise. Ivy League universities have admitted that some 15% of their students are legacies. While the actual number may fluctuate, this much is sure: It is far easier to get into these institutions if you have a family connection than if you’re part of the general pool of applicants. Though the admission rate for Ivy League schools is less than 6% historically, Princeton accepts as many as 41% of its legacy applicants, while Harvard has admitted 33% of its legacy applicants.

For sure, having a degree from an elite institution does not guarantee success. But it is a status marker in a society where these kinds of chits are super important. Having gone to the same college gives you a shared vocabulary, a shared bunch of references and jokes, knowledge of some of the same traditions, the same buildings, professors, bars, coffee shops and local lore. Such familiar referents make you part of an exclusive club. Former Harvard President Larry Summers — an economist who used to advise U.S. presidents — expressed this perfectly when he said, “Legacy admissions are integral to the kind of community that any private educational institution is.”

Most people around the world, of course, don’t live in this gated community. They are part of the bottom-down.

– five –

We’ve got the market backwards. We believe it involves opposed buyers and sellers who exploit asymmetrical knowledge to achieve domination and sometimes creative destruction, when what’s really important is sharing, togetherness, collectivity and satisfaction.

Oddly, I owe some of my thinking about this to the work of a free-market absolutist. Paul Heyne — the author of an influential textbook published 40 years ago called “The Economic Way of Thinking” — was an anomaly as an economist. He began his career as a divinity student with an anti-capitalist ideology. Then he read the economic scriptures and migrated across the political spectrum to become a free-market true-believer. In 2000, just before he died (too early, of cancer), Heyne gave a lecture in which he dismantled all the moral critiques of capitalism — all, that is, except one, which he suggested was indisputably true. In typical no-nonsense fashion, Heyne expressed this one valid criticism in an efficient three-word koan: “Capitalism subverts community.”

Community, Heyne believed, was fundamental to human life. Despite his unwavering commitment to the freedom implicit in an economic way of thinking, he was sure that economics alone would not create togetherness. “Don’t expect the market to generate community. It won’t do it,” he insisted. “We won’t get it by trying to turn the market into some vast California hot tub.” Heyne’s bottom-line advice: “Find ways to nurture community without destroying the market.”

Community is an unacknowledged economic category. On a local level, banding together can cut costs and, as with the Swiss dairy coops, enable communities to retain a greater share of their wealth. But the key benefit of communal and cooperative ties is more basic: They provide platforms from which people can see further as they move forward in the world.

Change always comes from below — and it is in the bottom-down relationships where growth and egalitarianism can flourish. Every volunteer fire department is a community platform. Every mutually managed water system demonstrates that neighbors can build things when they need each other. Every community-based childcare network or parent-teacher association is a nascent collective. Every civic association, neighborhood or church council, social action network or food pantry gives people a broader perspective. Every collectively run savings and credit association demonstrates that communal trust can give people a leg up.

It is through these self-governing institutions — which people join with their hearts as well as their heads — that we can hope to impact our system’s most intractable problems.