TikTok’s growing influence, user rights and the highs of Pakistani politics

With a rise in political content, TikTok needs to maintain its rigourous content moderation. 

Meanwhile, a top official in Pakistan does not rule out the platform adhering to a controversial data law if enacted.

Muskaan Mujahid

Published September 12, 2024 

TikTok in Pakistan is no longer the same so-called ‘cringe’ app it was widely perceived as a few years ago.

It has now deeply pervaded other social media apps — as content creators regularly share their TikTok shenanigans on Instagram, users on Twitter (now X) often stumble across a political edit, and WhatsApp statuses are not spared of the platform’s presence either.

The increase in Pakistan’s young population means that the country’s social media landscape is not only transforming rapidly but also influencing the government’s approach towards it.

Over 30.5 per cent of Pakistan’s population is aged 13 to 29, according to the 2023 census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS). Meanwhile, more than 44pc of eligible voters are aged 18 to 35.

With a youth well aware of the country’s multidimensional crises, the social media they often use is brimming with political discourse and views, which may vex the political dispensation. The current civilian and military leadership have already voiced their concerns multiple times.

TikTok, which has faced four bans within a year over “immoral content”, can hardly afford to be lax when it comes to moderating content on its platform.

Fahad Khan Niazi, the head of public policy and government relations at TikTok Pakistan, briefed Dawn.com about the platform’s moderation process and guidelines in an email interview.

In March, Niazi had met with the minister of state for IT, Shaza Fatima Khawaja, where she had urged TikTok to play an “important role in promoting a positive image of Pakistan”.

Speaking about the extensive efforts made to maintain the platform’s content moderation mechanisms, Niazi told Dawn.com that TikTok has more than 40,000 trust and safety professionals working globally.

He said the platform uses a “combination of technologies and moderation teams to detect, review, and where appropriate, remove content or accounts that violate” its Community Guidelines.

TikTok also has “Trust and Safety teams” who, with their clear understanding of nuances in Pakistan add regional context to how the site applies its policies and content policy enforcement.

“We cover more than 70 languages and dialects, including Urdu and other commonly spoken local languages,” Niazi highlighted.

According to TikTok’s Government Removal Requests Report for July- December 2023, Pakistan ranked sixth out of 72 countries in the number of government requests received to remove or restrict content or accounts.

While TikTok received a total of 303 such requests from Pakistan (each request may list multiple accounts/content), its scale could not be ascertained due to a lack of verified information about the number of TikTok users in Pakistan.

Interestingly, Pakistan took the top place among 72 countries in the number of content (not accounts) against which action was sought for July-Dec 2023.

A total of 15,397 “content” links were requested action against, out of which 12,392 were “actioned” for going against TikTok guidelines while 2,126 were actioned for violating local laws.

The figure below shows a comparison of the content requests made from 2021-2023, with a breakdown of why they were taken action against.

A total of 488 accounts were requested during six months, out of which action was taken on 270 for going against TikTok guidelines while another 59 were “actioned” due to local laws’ violation.

The removal rate — or the percentage of requests accepted for both content and accounts combined — was 93.5 per cent, ranking 10th among countries that made 10 or more requests.
Govt requests vs user rights

Naizi explained that TikTok takes action against content based on two main criteria — if the material was either found to be against the platform’s Community Guidelines or Pakistani laws.

While content against the platform’s rules would be taken down, posts that violate Pakistani laws would likely be made unavailable to the country’s users.

If against local laws but not TikTok’s guidelines, the platform “may restrict the availability of the reported content in the market (country) where it is considered to be illegal”, Niazi explained.

He further said that if the request to remove content was “not legally valid” or the specified content did not violate the Community Guidelines, Terms of Service, or applicable law, TikTok “will reject the request and take no action”.

Asked if the platform was now more compliant with the government’s content removal requests after facing multiple bans, Niazi stressed TikTok’s commitment to “working alongside governments and regulators across the world to ensure that the platform remains a safe space”.

Responding to a question about TikTok’s procedure for processing ‘information requests’ from governments, Niazi reiterated the platform adheres to its Law Enforcement Guidelines.

The guidelines assure users that requests seeking users’ data that go against TikTok’s policies and procedures will be rejected.

Niazi highlighted the platform’s statement on ‘Upholding human rights’ which states that in cases where a government request’s validity was seen as “insufficient”, TikTok would “explore legal means to push back against requests that may undermine international law and international human rights standards”.

However, he added, if an emergency request was believed to involve “imminent harm or the risk of death or serious physical injury to a person”, TikTok may provide “user data necessary to prevent that harm”.
Politik(tok)

The leaders of this country often speak with fervour about how social media may spread “hatred” and “distorted traditions” among the youth.

However, the public and a country’s events also carve out its social media landscape, rather than just the former being shaped by the online space.

The same happened in the wake of last year’s May 9 riots.

According to Abdul Moiz Malik’s analysis published in Dawn, TikTok — left unguarded while other apps were suppressed at the time — became the new frontier for political info-wars.


Numbers showed that the PTI, thanks to rather frail efforts made by the PML-N, used TikTok to effectively take the lead in setting the narrative.

Over the past 15 months, the PTI’s following on TikTok has more than doubled from three million to 6.8m. While the PML-N has seen an exponential increase from around 41,300 to 1.4m, the numbers fail even to be a quarter of its arch-rival.

The third major political party, the PPP, has a seemingly unofficial account, which has been active since at least December 2022 but has been able to gather only around 125,000 followers.

Interestingly, both the PPP and the PML-N have had their account active since the latter half of 2022 — when the devastating floods had the then-coalition government caught up in aid and rescue efforts.

As political parties venture into the realm of TikTok, how does the platform deal with the challenges it poses? How does it prevent users from believing in and amplifying misinformation that parties may peddle? How does it keep itself safe from election scandals?

That’s where TikTok’s policy of classifying accounts related to political individuals as Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPAs) comes in.

“We do not allow political advertising, including both paid ads and creators being paid to make branded political content,” Niazi says, explaining the policy for GPPPAs.

Besides the usual content moderation practices, such accounts have various restrictions imposed on them to curtail political advertising and misuse of those tools.

This is in contrast to Twitter’s policy (now X) which allows political ads as long as they comply with local laws. Then, with the PTI being a prime example here, how do political parties amass extensive engagement on TikTok?

This is simply because “TikTok users are free to repost and share GPPPA content wherever they like”, as per its website.

“Users can share political content organically as long as it is in line with our Community Guidelines,” Niazi says.

“We believe people should be able to express themselves creatively and be entertained in a safe and welcoming environment,” he adds.

Of course, political content is not just limited to what TikTok has categorised as GPPPAs. Views expressed by Pakistanis — not to forget “fan edits” of politicians that even flood Twitter — make up the major chunk of political content on the platform.

This may raise concerns about the government cracking down on content that it may deem harmful to its image. Such concerns are validated by the prolonged ban on X and fellow South Asian countries cracking down on social media.

Clarifying the matter, Niazi said TikTok followed the same moderation rules as for government requests — meaning action would only be taken if the material violated TikTok’s guidelines or the local laws.
The sword of local laws

Now, what if local laws — which TikTok is to abide by — are what the government arms itself with to achieve its barely well-intended aims?

In July 2023, the PML-N-led coalition government came up with Draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2023, raising concerns from various digital bodies.

Section 31(2) of the proposed bill requires organisations and businesses that handle “critical personal data” to process and store such information within servers located in the country, Shumaila Shahani writes in a Prism piece.

She details why the government wants to localise data storage and how it has led to data privacy concerns.

“We store the personal data of our Pakistani users […] in servers located in the USA, Ireland, Singapore, and Malaysia,” Niazi told Dawn.com, listing all locations of TikTok’s data centres.

“TikTok’s second Europe-based data centre in Norway will come online later in 2024,” he added. Niazi further said that the platform also had “world-class third-party data centre providers in the US and Singapore”.

While the data protection bill was approved by the then-federal cabinet, it has not been made into law by the parliament yet. However, the sword hangs over the head as a “final” round of consultations was held last month over data localisation plans.

Commenting on data localisation, Carbon Law founder Mubariz Siddiqui told DawnNews English that a “blanket clause” allows the government to request a proposed commission for “any data that they feel is in either the national interest or is important”.

“And that company will have to share it,” the law expert added, pointing out that the government could even include the local city council based on the definition.

So the question arises: if the bill is enacted into law, how willing is TikTok to establish data centres in Pakistan?

Responding to the question, Niazi said: “While the TikTok platform is global, we take a local approach to regulatory compliance, working with stakeholders to ensure we understand our regulatory requirements, including the draft Personal Data Protection Bill.”

The official affirmed TikTok’s commitment to be a “trusted and reliable partner through transparency and engagement with stakeholders”.

“The privacy and security of our community is a top priority for TikTok and we are committed to providing a safe and protected platform for our users,” Niazi asserted.

With the government seeming a bit too comfortable with rushing various legislation through the parliament, it may not be long before the data protection bill is proceeded ahead with. It remains to be seen if and when the bill becomes law, how social media apps would respond to its requirements.

Header image: — Illustration via Canva AI

FORDISM IN PAKISTAN

Groping in the Dark for Ideas to Enhance Revenue Collections

Mazhar Mohsin Chinoy sees only more trouble ahead for the automotive industry.

Mazhar Mohsin Chinoy

Updated 2 days ago

DAWN

For the last few years, June has been a tense month for the automotive industry in Pakistan, as it anticipates, or rather dreads, another budget bringing darker shades of grey than the year gone by. For most of the year, the industry was reeling from the upsets of Budget 2023-24, only picking up some action in the last quarter. An advance income tax of between six and 10% (depending on engine size) was imposed, jacking up car prices. A 35% customs duty was rung up on the import of car parts and, unexpectedly, no new duty exemptions were given on hybrid electric vehicles to incentivise their use.

The detriments of that budget package were telling. Although sales numbers rallied for some manufacturers in the last quarter of the year, annual car sales in 2023-24 fell 18% over the previous year, with 103,826 units sold versus 126,878 sold in 2022-23. Production numbers also took a major hit, with 79,573 units manufactured in 2023-24 compared to 101,984 units last year, a significant decline of 22%.

Fast forward one year, the economy remains sullied, if not worse-off and industry expectations have mirrored that sentiment. The pre-budget grapevine was ripe with news of an enhanced levy on petroleum, GST on petroleum products, duty increases on imported used-cars, and other regulatory duties on critical car parts. Mostly IMF speak. Not good tidings at all. The government’s financial algorithm for the year was spelled out on June 12, 2024, which, not surprisingly, brought a barrage of increased duties and enhanced tax calculators for passenger cars.

Increased Petroleum Levy

The government normally leverages the energy sector – power, gas and petroleum – to generate maximum revenue. The levy on petroleum, which was previously 60%, increased to a staggering 80%, with a big rise in fuel prices on the cards. This has been an anti-climax to the recent sustained decline in petrol prices after going off the charts for nearly the entire last fiscal year. As per a report by Arif Habib Limited, the highest ever fuel prices experienced during 2023-24 led to the biggest decline in 18 years for petrol and diesel sales, decreasing by eight percent over the previous year to 15.28 million tons sold. If this trend continues, and it is likely that it will, accountants will need to dig into their calculators to assess the degree to which the projected revenue generation target of Rs 1,281 billion can be achieved. The new levy will likely bring even more misery to the lower and middle class sections of society and challenge the government’s efforts to control wild-eyed inflation. Again, one can only look to the heavens and pray that international crude oil prices remain subdued through the year to somewhat offset this steep imposition.

New WHT Regime

The budget proposed an enhanced withholding tax (WHT) regime for new cars, essentially to take advantage of burgeoning car prices and propose a new way of calculating the tax. Doing away with the old system of imposing WHT on the basis of engine size, WHT is now to be calculated based on the invoice/ex-factory price of the vehicle. The tax would range between 0.5 and five percent for vehicles in the 800cc to 2000cc category. While this move will not have a significant impact on relatively lesser-priced cars, such as Suzuki variants like Alto and Cultus, the estimated extra damage to pocket for higher- priced vehicles, (for invoice prices of car variants between 1000cc to 2000cc), will range between Rs 30,000 to Rs 330,000 at current prices, driving up the upfront investment required to purchase a new car.

Trouble for HEV Imports

In 2013, the government announced a 50% customs duty exemption to encourage buyers towards hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs). After 11 years and in an apparent backtracking of the National Electric Vehicle Policy, the budget proposed the withdrawal of this 50% subsidy on regulatory customs duty on the import of HEVs, increasing prices substantially. At current prices, this would have an impact of up to three million rupees for selected imports. For the yea-sayers, this move will be seen to incentivise local production of such vehicles, making them more competitive in price and hence encouraging local assembly.

Car Financing Slide Continues

In June 2022, car financing, as per the State Bank of Pakistan’s data, stood at a healthy Rs 368 billion – but has since declined every month to reach Rs 233 billion as of May 2024, a drop of 21% and Rs 135 billion. This has been a natural function of the increased rates for financing and skyrocketing car prices and will likely remain stagnant, if not slip further, given that interest rates are not projected to decline too quickly in the coming months. Plus, the new tax regime will enhance end-user car prices, effectively closing that avenue to trigger sales via car financing.

Punjab Increases Car Registration 

FeesThe most populous province of the country also decided to elbow in on its own increased revenue generation, hopefully to fund development projects across Punjab. Effective July 1, 2024, registration fees for new cars have been increased from between one and four percent (<1000cc to >4000cc), making new cars more expensive if registered in Punjab. There is bad news for sales of used-cars too. If a new car is sold to another buyer within the first 10 years of purchase, a 10% annual transfer fee will now be imposed in addition to already prevalent transfer costs.

Silver Lining?

The budget also made some modifications to tax cuts specific to imported used-cars, implementing a 16% regulatory duty on such cars in the 1300cc to 1800cc category, but scrapping any duties in the below-1300cc category. This has meant that such cars can now be imported at very competitive prices, troubling the already battered sales of locally produced variants in the below-1300cc category. This may spell doom for the local industry (specifically Pak Suzuki which makes cars in that category), but it does provide greater breadth of selection to consumers in terms of more modern variants at better prices. The euphoria may be short-lived though. The influential Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association has written to the government to formally protest the move and demand the imposition of 15% regulatory duty on imports of used-vehicles in the below-1300cc category.

Tailpiece

Overall, while luxury cars were made more expensive and hence discouraged, no incentives were proposed for smaller cars to benefit the middle class, nor for under-utilised local production facilities for trucks and buses that can save increasingly precious and elusive foreign exchange that is wasted on imports of heavy vehicles. The crushing tax regime proposed in the budget has lent weight to the industry perception that the government continues to grope in the dark for innovative ideas to enhance revenue collections. The nucleus of the ‘solution’ is apparently the continued burdening of the lower and middle classes already coming to terms with a deteriorating way of life and a high-altitude inflation rate that has remained upwards of 22% for the last two years. Budget proposals over other sectors will impose even more rigid austerity on the common Pakistani, in an economy that continues to be demarcated by financial stagnancy and endemic political dysfunction. The automotive industry, resilient as it is, may well continue to take a back seat to progress in the new fiscal term.


Mazhar M. Chinoy has served as a director at LUMS.
mmchinoy@gmail.com

INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

HERITAGE: IN SEARCH OF MELUHHA

Ali Bhutto

DAWN

Published September 8, 2024

The archaeological site of Nahuto, in Umerkot district, where artefacts dating back to the Hakra Ware Phase and the Mature Harappan Phase have been found | Photos by the writer


The bangles cover Radha Kohli’s arms from wrist till shoulder and resemble a coat of armour. Radha, who says her name means “God’s wife,” is the only midwife for miles in the area surrounding the village of Nahuto. This western periphery of the Thar Desert is referred to in the local dialect as ‘Mohrano’, or the beginning, where the dunes gradually give way to the fertile plain of the River Indus.

Radha is known as the village doctor and turns up when called, even if at midnight, in the villages that lie in the vicinity. Trained by her mother-in-law, it took her thirty years to master the art of delivering babies. “Of the nine women in the house, she chose me,” she tells Eos.

In the Thar Desert, bangles signify marital status. Jheeni Kohli, who says her name means “soft-spoken”, discarded her bangles the day her husband died. Like most women in the village, her palms bear the rope-marks of years spent drawing water from wells.

THE LOST CITY OF NAHUTO


Local lore has it that the perennial Hakra River once flowed half a mile from Nahuto. The story goes that the area was a trading post of nine-hundred huts — or shops — and it is from here that the village gets its name — pronounced Nau-hut-o — according to Faqir Irshad Kunbhar, a local resident. One of the defining characteristics of the lost city was the large number of washermen that could be seen washing clothes along the banks of the Hakra.

Within sight of the village, amidst shrubs of euphorbia, lies a mound littered with shards of pottery, bricks and occasionally, bones. It is locally referred to as Nahutojo Bhiro. The word bhiro is the Thari equivalent for daro, or mound, and the name translates into the Mound of Nahuto.

Hoth Khashkeli, a resident of the neighbouring village of Mohobat Ali Shah, was among the locals hired by the provincial department of archaeology to help excavate the site in 2018. Hoth points to the exact spots on the north-eastern side of the mounds, where trenches were dug and then refilled with earth to preserve the ruins.


Despite being among the most advanced of the ancient civilisations, little is known about the Indus Valley Civilisation to this day. Ali Bhutto examines its various aspects, including evidence that hints at a strong matriarchal element, and a lesser-known archaeological site on the peripheries of the Thar Desert…

The excavations lasted three months and were conducted by Qasid Mallah, the chairman of the archaeology department at the Shah Abdul Latif University in Khairpur, and a six-member team. “They said the site was around five-thousand years old,” Hoth tells Eos.

Hoth’s eyes light up when he talks about the skeleton of a large fish that was unearthed here, in the middle of the desert. He also recalls seeing an ornament that depicted the head of a crocodile. (In the winter of 1926-27, a 2.5-inch crocodile head made of shell had been found by the archaeologist Daya Ram Sahni in Mohenjo Daro).

Muhammad Hassan Khashkeli, another local who was among the excavators at Nahuto, says that beads and figurines had also been found. The Sindhi word he uses to describe the latter is “goodi.”

Mallah tells Eos that the site dates back to the Hakra Ware phase (3500 to 3000 BC). The most common find was Hakra pottery, which is handmade, but there was also material dating to the period between 2600 and 1900 BC, when cities like Mohenjo Daro and Harappa were flourishing.

Based on the evidence collected, he believes that this too was once a large city. The artefacts found included human figurines, jewellery and the skeleton of a fish that, when living, would have weighed around 10 kilogrammes, according to him.

“Nahuto was the gateway to Gujarat [in modern-day India],” says Mallah. It served as an ancient junction of sorts. Caravans travelling from the area that is currently Gujarat would have passed through here to get to the cities of Mohenjo Daro, Chahunjo Daro and Lakhanjo Daro, according to him. Similarly, the spot would have been central to journeys made in the opposite direction.

Asma Ibrahim, an archaeologist who is also the founding director of the State Bank of Pakistan Museum and Art Gallery, believes that there was constant intermingling between the people of the Indus Civilisation and those of the wider region, including Central Asia.

Ibrahim, who has done a post-doctorate in archaeological chemistry and whose area of focus is ancient human bones, tells Eos that there was a continuous influx of people across the Kirthar Range, throughout the third millennium BC and earlier. She describes it as a slow migration.

“We have evidence that, during the winters, they were coming down to this area and then they were mixing up, and intermarriages were happening,” she says. “It was a very common thing.”

Figurines from Mehrgarh depicted with elaborate hairdos, on display at the National Museum in Karachi

‘THE BLACK LAND’ OF ANCIENT TEXTS

A Sumerian mythological text from the third millennium BC, titled Enki and the World Order, refers to an exotic land called Meluhha. It is described as a place of abundance and an exporter of luxury goods. The text sings the praises of Meluhha, and mentions, among other things, that it is home to the peacock — a bird indigenous to South and Southeast Asia.

In this text, and a later one, titled The Curse of Agade, dating back to the beginning of the second millennium BC, Meluhha is referred to as “the black land.” The reason behind this is unclear, but some scholars attribute it to the black soil of its cotton fields.

A report of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), for the year 1926-27, provides an interesting clue. “The Babylonian and Greek names for cotton (sindhu and sindon, respectively) have always pointed to the Indus Valley as the home of cotton growing,” writes John Marshall, the director-general of the ASI. He had found pieces of finely woven cotton and evidence of cotton weaving at Mohenjo Daro.

According to Mallah, “the black land” might refer to parts of Gujarat — where black soil, formed from volcanic rocks, occurs naturally. Similarly, black soil can also be found in the Deccan Plateau.

Nilofar Shaikh, an archaeologist and chairperson of the Centre for Documentation and Conservation of the Heritage of Sindh — located at the Endowment Fund Trust’s office in Jamshoro — tells Eos that all the items mentioned in the Sumerian texts as coming from Meluhha, have been found at Indus sites such as Mohenjo Daro.

On the basis of archaeological evidence, Meluhha is believed to be the Indus Civilisation, according to Shaikh. It covered an area that includes Sindh, Punjab, southern and eastern Balochistan, Gujarat, Haryana, and pockets of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Indian Punjab, northern Rajasthan, western Uttar Pradesh and southern Jammu and Kashmir.

Marco Madella, an environmental archaeologist and professor at the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, who has surveyed Sindh for potential archaeological sites, describes it as a very international civilisation. “It had connection with many parts of the world. And to think that was 5,000 years ago, that’s something incredible,” he observes.

One of the statues found by KN Dikshit in Mohenjo Daro, on display at the National Museum in Karachi. Archaeologists believe the statues were a reflection of how women of the Indus cities dressed

ECHOES OF THE PRESENT

Kaleemullah Lashari, who heads the Technical Consultative Committee for National Funds for Mohenjo Daro, believes that using the translation of certain words might result in people missing the context, while referring to terms such as Meluhha and the black land.

“It is often said that Meluhha may have been an area that included Makran, Sindh and parts of Gujarat, or it may have been an area within this larger region,” Lashari tells Eos. There were reasons why specific words were used and they often had connotations that were very different to what they are translated into, according to him.

“Of all the artefacts found at Indus sites, we have mainly jewellery more than anything else,” observes Tasleem Abro, who is the director of the Archaeology and Anthropology Museum at the Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur. “We have found women’s finger impressions on pottery,” she says, adding that even back then, they were “working women.”

The custom of wearing bangles on the entire length of the arm was widespread among women in Sindh up until about 200 years ago, after which it reduced significantly, according to historian and scholar Badar Abro. “Thar is the living museum of Mohenjo Daro,” he says.

“One thing we have to be careful [about] is not to try to connect things in a direct way, because, at the end of the day, if you want to use some adornment on your arms, what do you have? Bracelets,” says Madella. “The same object, when we move it from one society to another, can have radically different meanings,” he adds.

While conducting excavations at Mohenjo Daro in the winter of 1924-25, the archaeologist Kashinath Dikshit found a seven-inch statue of a female adorned with jewellery and an elaborate headdress. He would, over the course of that season, unearth 200 human figurines, mostly female.

Dikshit associated these with the cult of the Mother Goddess and noted in his report that “the female energy, or ‘mother principle’” were central to some of the earliest forms of worship in the ancient world. He believed, as do some archaeologists today, that the sculptures are a reflection of how the women of the Indus Civilisation dressed.

Over the next two years, Dikshit recovered two hoards of ancient jewellery in gold, semi-precious stones and ivory. The items included bangles, ear ornaments, hair clasps, combs, hairpins and a necklace.

In the excavation season of 1925-26, another archaeologist, Madho Vats, found a copper statuette of what “appears to be a dancing girl,” according to his colleague Sahni’s report for that year. This label seems to have stuck, as it was used in the reports that followed and is applied till this day.

In the following year, Sahni would find another “naked dancing girl.” He noted that one of its arms was “covered with bangles from the shoulder to the wrist.” Similarly, in 1930-31, a third statue, also referred to as a dancing girl, was found by British archaeologist Ernest Mackay.

It emerges from these early reports that the ‘Priest King’ label, like that of the dancing girl, was a result of an attempt to describe and make sense of an artefact. When the male bust was found by Dikshit in 1924-25, Mackay wrote in the report for that year, “It seems probable that this head is that of a priest, for priestly statues have been found in Babylonia, wearing garments very similarly decorated with trefoils”.

Ancient jewellery in gold and semi-precious stones on display at the Harappa Museum



THE MATRIARCHS OF THE INDUS

Among the numerous seals that surfaced in Mohenjo Daro, there were some that depicted a human figure wearing a horned headdress, seated in what Mackay describes in his report for the year 1928-29, as “a yoga attitude.” The figure’s arms, Mackay writes, are “adorned with bracelets.”

Indian archaeologists Madhukar Dhavalikar and Shubhangana Atre believe that the figure in the seal is a female. In a research paper published in 1989, they refer to it as “Lady of the Beasts,” or the goddess of fertility.

According to Dhavalikar and Atre, two other seals, found in Mohenjo Daro showing a religious ritual, contain depictions of female devotees and a high priestess. In the seals, the devotees are shown with long braids, while the high priestess wears a horned headdress.

“Women had a very high place in that society,” says Asma Ibrahim, adding, “We have come to know that women were the head of the house.”

A stroll through Mohenjo Daro’s residential neighbourhood reveals that its inhabitants enjoyed better standards of living than most people of the area do today.

In the late eighties, a group of physical anthropologists conducted studies on skeletons in a cemetery at Harappa and found that the women buried there were closely related to one another, while the men weren’t related to each other, or to the women (Pakistan Archaeology, 1993).

Indus figurines on display at the Harappa Museum

On the basis of these findings, American archaeologist Mark Kenoyer, who was in charge of the excavations, writes in Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilisation, that “a woman was buried near her mother and grandmother, and a man was buried near his wife’s ancestors rather than his own.”

It seemed to suggest that it was the husband who was entering the wife’s family, rather than the other way round. Kenoyer goes on to mention that further studies are needed to confirm this theory.

“Genetic studies from the Indus are problematic, because there are not many cemeteries in general,” says Madella. The other problem, he tells Eos, is that the climate of the region is not conducive to the preservation of organic material, such as DNA or collagen, in skeletons. There is, therefore, “very little preservation of the molecules that would have been used for doing this kind of analysis,” he notes.

Lashari tells Eos that the matriarchal element grows stronger the further back one goes, to settlements in the Greater Indus Region, such as Mehrgarh, a site in Balochistan, believed to date back to the 8th millennium BC.

“The radiocarbon chronology of Mehrgarh is a complete disaster and it is absolutely unreliable,” Italian Paolo Biagi, an archaeologist and senior researcher at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, tells Eos via email.

“They made just a few dates, which are very obsolete and the results do not follow the suggested techno-typological sequence,” Biagi says. The only way to know the real chronology of Mehrgarh is to date as many of the human bone remains as possible, he adds.

Mehrgarh figurines dating back to the end of the fourth millennium BC are described in the Mehrgarh Field Reports 1974-1985 as having “heavy pendulous breasts” and a “hooked nose.” Figurines from this period, and the ones from the middle of the third millennium BC, have elaborate, even glamorous hairstyles, setting them apart from those found at Indus sites like Mohenjo Daro and Harappa.

According to Asma Ibrahim, a study needs to be conducted on who was making these complex hairdos during that period and the specialised skills involved. “They have more than five-hundred hairstyles in Mehrgarh,” she says, referring to the figurines.

“If you look at the comparison between the Early Indus period [3300-2600 BC] and the Mature period [2600-1900 BC], there’s a lot of change,” says Nilofar Shaikh. “There is continuity — we have evidence here, but suddenly we have these cities rising up on the banks of the rivers,” she adds.

During this period, there is another change: items in ivory, gold and silver, are being produced on a large scale in Indus cities, whereas in the earlier period, there are only one or two odd cases of gold or silver being found, according to Shaikh.

She says that studies need to be carried out on what triggered these changes. The transfer of technology“ and ‘the exchange of knowledge’ were a result of constant contact with the wider region, including Mesopotamia and Sistan (Iran), according to her.

“Until and unless our own script is deciphered — of the Indus — we cannot say much,” she says.

The writer is a Karachi-based journalist who has written for local and international publications.

His work can be found at alibhutto.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, September 8th, 2024

THE WOMEN OF THE BALOCH SPRING


A movement that began as a protest against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Balochistan is now evolving into a strong political and social force for change.

Muhammad Akbar Notezai 

DAWN

Published September 8, 2024

On January 27, 2024 in Quetta, the leader of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), Dr Mahrang Baloch, addressed a crowd of thousands, which comprised men and women, many of them young students. Having recently returned from a month-long sit-in outside Islamabad’s National Press Club, held to protest enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Balochistan, Mahrang said that this movement was the “voice of Baloch people, from Nokundi to Parom and Koh-i-Suleman to Makran.”

The recent terrorist attacks in Balochistan by the outlawed Baloch Liberation Army, which resulted in the tragic loss of the lives of almost 40 people, tend to take the media spotlight because of the sheer violence involved, but they also do a disservice to the efforts of movements such as the BYC, which have attempted to highlight the alienation of Balochistan’s educated youth in a peaceful and constitutional manner.

Gatherings such as the one in Quetta in January, accompanied by such a large number of attendees, have now become commonplace for the BYC. But what makes this movement unique and sets it apart from any other such group is that women — specifically Baloch women — are the face of this movement.

But how did the BYC come to become such a force? Who are the women spearheading this movement? And how is it that, in a conservative and still-largely patriarchal society, men are turning up in droves to hear these women speak?

A movement that began as a protest against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Balochistan is now evolving into a strong political and social force for change. The women at the forefront of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee have amassed a large following of Baloch men and women, but who are they and how did they become so influential in a largely patriarchal and tribal society?

ROOTS OF DISCONTENT IN BALOCHISTAN

The long-enduring political vacuum in Balochistan has resulted in a rising atmosphere of fear, where both the state and Baloch nationalists have been at loggerheads with each other for decades. Many of the mainstream Baloch nationalists who are peacefully calling for change are of the opinion that their voices have long been ignored. Furthermore, due to the worsening security situation in the province, a number of private militias, locally known as death squads, have sprung up across the region.

Both the Balochistan National Party (BNP-M) and the National Party (NP) — which claim they are fighting for Baloch rights within the framework of the state — have been criticised by Baloch nationalists for not doing enough for the Baloch, despite holding positions in the government and being part of the National Assembly. Under these circumstances, desperate Baloch nationalists have been trying to voice their grievances from non-traditional platforms, in the hope that it will lead to long-term change.

Dr Mahrang Baloch pictured at a BYC gathering in Turbat

In May 2020, three men, allegedly associated with a local death squad, stormed into a house in Danuk, Turbat, which resulted in the killing of four-year-old Bramsh Baloch’s mother. That incident gave birth to these ongoing protests and, in the words of BYC activist Sammi Deen Baloch, that is when the BYC came into being.

But it was the killing of Balaach Baloch in November 2023, supposedly in an ‘encounter’ in Turbat with the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), that sparked a widespread movement in Kech district. The family of Balaach and civil society activists alleged that Balaach had been apprehended by the CTD the month before and had been presented before a local court, which had remanded him in police custody for 10 days. The protests against the alleged extrajudicial killing culminated in the Islamabad sit-in, led by Mahrang under the platform of BYC. This is when Mahrang and the BYC captured the attention of the nation.

After a big power show in Quetta, the BYC held a gathering in Gwadar under the banner of the ‘Baloch Raji Muchi’ [Baloch National Gathering] this July, in which hundreds of protestors from across Balochistan, and other Baloch-dominated areas in the country, joined in — despite the fact that the state had imposed restrictions upon the peaceful protestors in order to stop them from going to Gwadar. After that, the BYC held large gatherings in several places across Balochistan.

According to Mohammad Arif, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Balochistan, “There are three factors fuelling the discontent felt by the people of Balochistan, which is why they protest. Firstly, Balochistan has been ignored by the centre from the very beginning. Secondly, there is rampant corruption in Balochistan, especially by the politicians and bureaucrats, which has hindered development and progress in the province. Thirdly, the region has become a playground for international politics in the wake of Chinese involvement in the region.”

Professor Arif says that people’s dissatisfaction, instead of being allayed, is further increasing by the day. He further adds, “Balochistan does not have much political participation at the centre, where our representation is just six percent. The government can only provide jobs to 10-15 percent of the population, while the rest have to be catered to by a private sector that simply does not exist in Balochistan as such.”

Sammi Deen Baloch receiving the Front Line Defenders Award 2024

On the question of Baloch women becoming the face of political and social change in Balochistan’s tribal and patriarchal society, Professor Arif is of the opinion that this is the product of a social transformation.

“For instance,” he says, “Japan was a tribal society in 1870, too. But they arrived at the doorstep of social change far before us.” Change is indeed a slow process, and the rise of women in the hostile political atmosphere of Balochistan, particularly through the BYC platform, has not happened overnight.

THE RISE OF MAHRANG

Given that she was born into a political family in Balochistan, it is safe to say that politics has been running in Dr Mahrang Baloch’s blood from day one. But she was suddenly pushed into the limelight when she began to spearhead protests after her father, Ghaffar Longove, went missing in December 2009 from outside a hospital in Karachi.

At the time, she was still a student in primary school. The eldest of six siblings, Mahrang would burn her school books in front of the Quetta Press Club in an act of protest, demanding that her father be returned home. Tragically, as often happens in cases of missing Baloch persons, her father’s mutilated body was found in 2011.

While speaking in a combination of Balochi, Urdu and English, Mahrang tells me, “My father was my political teacher. I joined politics because of him, when I was in the fifth or sixth grade.”

Mahrang’s story, like those of many other Baloch households, is one of immense tragedy and trauma. Violence has marred the region without any respite since the fifth Balochistan insurgency began back in 2000. But the tragedy that has marked her life in this volatile province is one that is felt and understood by all those who have lived and grown up in Balochistan.

Gulzadi Baloch protesting in 2021 after the disappearance of her brother

Perhaps this is why Mahrang has been drawing tens of thousands of Baloch men and women to her protests and gatherings — because they see in her a strength that is giving voice to their decades of grievances. Whether she wanted it or not, she has now become the face of the ‘Baloch Spring’.

“Our ultimate goal,” Mahrang reveals, “is to raise a voice against the Baloch genocide, human rights violations and economic suppression in Balochistan. Our organisation hopes to give a voice to the plethora of issues the Baloch are facing. We continue to try to shine a light on these topics, while also trying to mobilise the Baloch community. Issues pertaining to the climate, health, education and safeguarding our rights are just some of the problems that we need the state to address.”

Back in 2019, like other reporters and journalists, I was looking into the University of Balochistan (UoB) sexual harassment scandal. While working on that story, I saw a young female medical student speaking to protestors, most of whom were men, in front of the main gate of UoB on Sariab Road.

“Who is she?” I asked a professor friend of mine. “That is Dr Mahrang Baloch,” he responded. “The daughter of comrade Ghaffar Longove, a Baloch nationalist who was said to be close to the Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Baksh Marri.”

Clearly, she left quite an impression, and she’s only gained a greater following since then. Reflecting on her journey, Mahrang says, “I have participated in jalsas [gatherings], protests, including the ones led by women in Balochistan. I came into the media spotlight after the abduction of my father, and then of my brother in 2017, and then during the video scandal case at the UoB. That was when I started engaging in politics properly for my people. Since then, I have been very active, because doing what I do and giving a platform to the concerns of my people was a conscious decision on my part.”

Since the UoB video scandal, Mahrang has been actively participating in political activities in Quetta, especially through the platform of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), which was set up by Mama Qadeer Baloch. After becoming the leader of the BYC, she is now at the forefront of the movement calling for justice for the families of Baloch missing persons. There has been hardly any protest in Quetta in recent years, especially in front of the Quetta Press Club, that Mahrang has not attended.

After speaking to Mahrang’s teachers, friends and colleagues, it is clear that all of them think very highly of her. One of her teachers tells me that, despite her ability to draw huge crowds across Balochistan, there seems to be no hint of arrogance in her. He further adds she now seems more mature when delivering her speeches than she did in the past.

But not everyone is as pleased. Mahrang’s critics say that she has not been properly nurtured through the necessary political process and training required for one to establish themselves as a true leader. They argue that she resorts to emotional appeals because she does not have any clear answer when questioned about Balochistan’s complex political situation.

Others have even flippantly accused Mahrang and the BYC of being funded by ‘external forces’, allegedly in an attempt to counter the rising Chinese influence in Balochistan. Mahrang rebuts these claims, saying, “We totally reject these kinds of allegations,” adding that the BYC is a political and social movement that is working on human rights issues, and that the people of Balochistan support this movement.

“We are not anyone’s proxy,” she says firmly, “nor have we been anyone’s proxy. The Baloch people are our support. The state, from day one, uses such allegations of foreign funding to crack down on peaceful political movements. That is why we say that the state, instead of using violence, should wisely and politically deal with Balochistan’s issues. Violence only prolongs issues and leads to great loss.”

Mahrang, however, is just one of the many women that have come to form the spine of the BYC.

Women, men and children in Panjgur being addressed by Dr Mahrang Baloch on August 10, 2024: gatherings such as this have now become commonplace for the BYC

SAMMI, THE ASPIRING JOURNALIST

The eldest of three siblings, Sammi Deen Baloch was just a teenager when her father, Dr Deen Muhammad, was reported missing in 2009. Today, 15 years later, he is still missing. Since then, Sammi has spent most of her time at VBMP camps in Quetta and Karachi, desperately hoping that her struggle will lead to some lasting change.

Even at that young age, Sammi began to meet with journalists at press clubs, as well as at missing persons’ camps. Often, she would be accompanied by her younger sister, Mehlab Baloch.

Similar to Mahrang’s father, Sammi’s father and uncles also had a political background. And it was because of his political activism that Deen Muhammad was ‘disappeared’, Sammi claims. In her words, “I was born into a political environment that nurtured me and my other family members early on. But, unfortunately, more than that, the circumstances surrounding my father’s disappearance played a greater role in my political upbringing.”

After Mahrang, Sammi is regarded as the face of the BYC, and she has now gained admission to the Institute of Business Administration’s (IBA) Centre for Excellence in Journalism (CEJ) as part of their masters’ programme. I ask her why she decided to pursue the field of journalism.

“In 2013,” she responds, “I met a female journalist, Mahvish Ahmad [who wrote for Dawn and the Herald], in Karachi at a missing persons’ camp. She used to write extensively about Baloch missing persons. I was enamoured by her.

“In many ways, it had become a routine for me to meet and speak with journalists in Quetta and Karachi, to clamour for the release of my father, to meet other missing persons’ families and to hear stories of their loved ones. I decided in 2013 that I would become a journalist some day and write about the stories of Baloch missing persons, alongside my own personal story.” This year, Sammi was honoured with the prestigious Front Line Defenders Award 2024 in Dublin, Ireland.

Sammi lost her childhood in search of her father, and she reveals that what began as a young girl demanding her father be returned home has now turned into a struggle for the release of all the Baloch missing persons. She tells me, “I started collecting pictures of other Baloch missing persons a long time ago, and I continue to do so, because my struggle is now for all of them — not just for my own father.”

Following her father going missing, Sammi used to hear taunts from people, especially from women, about the fact that she used to travel out of the city so often, that she would interact with men, and that she was neglecting her studies. But things have now changed.

“What is a source of pride for me is that people’s perception — especially that of women — regarding my struggle has changed,” Sammi shares. “I am glad they are now united with us in our efforts, that they join the protests and raise a voice for their own people.”

Sammi says that she is proud that the BYC gatherings are so well-supported and attended by Baloch men. She remarks, “There are tens of thousands of men who attend the BYC jalsas. But, even before us, there were notable female activists here, such as Karima Baloch and Shakar Bibi Baloch.”

GULZADI, THE GIRL FROM THE BUS

Last year, a video of a teenage girl at a Baloch missing persons’ sit-in in Islamabad went viral on social media. The girl, Gulzadi Baloch, was being forcibly returned to Quetta in a bus by law enforcement authorities in Islamabad.

As women swarmed her bus window to try and film her pleas, Gulzadi defiantly, succinctly and persuasively asserted: “We want nothing from Pakistan, nothing at all. We just need our loved ones back who have been forcibly disappeared.”

The journalist and author Mohammed Hanif retweeted the video of Gulzadi with the following statement: “In protest, returning my Sitara-i-Imtiaz given to me by a state that continues to abduct and torture Baloch citizens. Journalists of my generation have seen Sammi Baloch and Mahrang Baloch grow up in protest camps. Ashamed to witness a new generation being denied basic dignity.”

Hailing from the town of Mach in Balochistan’s Bolan district, Gulzadi moved to Quetta after the abduction of her brother, Wadood Satakzai. While talking to me, without me even asking her, she reveals the circumstances that led to the disappearance of her brother.

“On August 12, 2021, my brother went missing in Mach,” she tells me. “After waiting for a few months, and despite many financial issues, I started protesting in Quetta for his release. During my struggle for his release, I encountered several Baloch families who also had their loved ones missing. I found that my story was echoed in their stories. That is why I protest from the platform of the BYC for the Baloch who are missing, even though my brother was released on February 8, 2022.”

According to her, Balochistan has been turned into a security zone, where the males are picked up without any reason whatsoever, which is why women and girls, such as her, have to come to the forefront and ask for justice.

During her school days back in Mach, Gulzadi used to take part in speech and debating competitions. She says that foundation is what gave her the confidence to speak in front of Baloch protestors and command an audience. But her struggle is not limited to the spoken word only.

“I also write poetry,” she says, “in the Brahui language. These writings of mine mostly revolve around poetry of resistance, missing persons, and are against the sardari [tribal] system.”

A rally of the BYC held in Noshki on August 12, 2024: thousands of Baloch men and women look upon the leaders of the BYC as representatives of their collective cause

BEYOND THE MISSING PERSONS ISSUE

Mahrang, Sammi, and Gulzadi, like many other Baloch women, are of the opinion that they came out on to the streets in protest simply because they had no other choice. Since the men of their families had gone missing, the women had to take up the responsibility of fighting for their release.

Mahrang and Sammi acknowledge that the early conversations about politics that they were privy to in their households gave them the necessary acumen at an early age to be able to take a strong stand on political and social issues. Today, thousands of Baloch men and women now look upon the leaders of the BYC as representatives of their collective cause.

Having gone over Mahrang’s recent speeches, it is evident that she has been increasingly talking in expansive terms about ‘the people’. Even during her conversation with me, she keeps using the phrase “Baloch awaam [populace]”, while talking about myriad issues that they are confronted with. The way Mahrang sees it, the Baloch awaam backs the BYC because it has a clear objective.

“The Baloch awaam trusts the BYC because it has got a programme,” she tells me. “Based on that programme, the genuine issues the Baloch are facing are being highlighted.”

But Mahrang and the others know that their cause has to address the many issues in the region that extend beyond that of missing persons. According to Mahrang, “Besides the missing persons cases, the BYC also talks about how the Baloch are denied access to their own resources. We have also spoken against the Reko Diq deal, which has been approved against the will of the Baloch people, and other such projects, such as the Saindak project.”

There is no denying that the work these women have done, and continue to do, is inspiring many — perhaps even generations to come. While working on this story, I came across a relative who has named her second daughter Sammi, while another relative of mine has recently named her daughter Mahrang. Even though these individuals have nothing to do with politics, this gesture on their part is testament to the widespread appeal that the women of the BYC have managed to amass.

One day, while eating breakfast, I saw that my Baloch housemaid was watching Mahrang’s speeches on Facebook. “So,” I asked her, “is she your leader?” She responded, with her eyes still glued to the video: “If Mahrang is not our leader, then who is?”

The writer is a staff member based in Quetta

Published in Dawn, EOS, September 8th, 2024

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BLA-TTP collaboration in Balochistan: alliance or anomaly?

Can the BLA, a secular nationalist militant group seeking complete separation from Pakistan, genuinely form an alliance with the TTP, which seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the country?

Kiyya Baloch 

Published September 12, 2024 

DAWN


In a series of unprecedented and highly coordinated attacks across 11 districts of Balochistan, militants killed over 50 security personnel and civilians, particularly those hailing from Punjab in a single night.

The next day, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a banned separatist outfit, claimed carrying out the attacks. While the militant outfit has long been waging a low-level separatist insurgency in Balochistan, the scale and coordination of the August 26 attacks mark a dramatic escalation in the two-decade-old conflict.

Why August 26?

During the series of attacks, the militants blocked highways, carried out a suicide bombing at a military camp, sabotaged a gas pipeline, damaged railway tracks, and killed several unarmed civilians hailing from Punjab. Some reports even suggest the death toll may have been as high as 70 people, making it one of the deadliest episodes of violence in the ongoing Baloch insurgency.

While Balochistan has previously experienced smaller bombings and hit-and-run assaults, this marked the first time that the BLA launched such a coordinated and deadly offensive, which also included a suicide bombing by a woman targeting the paramilitary Frontier Corps camp in Bela, district Lasbela.

But why did the BLA choose August 26? The day is particularly significant as it commemorates the 18th death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a former governor and chief minister, who was killed in a military operation in 2006 — an event that triggered the current wave of Baloch insurgency which has claimed thousands of lives.

Before Bugti’s death, the Baloch insurgency was largely restricted to the tribal areas of the Marri and Bugti regions. But a misadventure and a non-political decision to address Bugti’s grievances by force escalated the violence. His death acted as a catalyst, sparking an insurgency that has since expanded beyond these tribal areas to affect non-tribal regions, including the Makran belt.

Ever since, the month of August has seen heightened violence in Balochistan, with separatist insurgents frequently staging major attacks on August 14, Pakistan’s Independence Day, and again on August 26.
Alarming spike

The recent surge of violence in Balochistan has even extended to areas previously considered relatively stable. One of the most alarming attacks on August 26 occurred in Musakhail, near the Punjab border, where militants stopped buses, selectively offloaded passengers and shot them dead after checking their ID cards.

This was the first such attack by any Baloch militant group in Musakhail district, indicating the BLA’s capacity to extend the conflict towards or near Punjab.

The same day, the BLA also carried out a suicide bombing in Lasbela, a Baloch-dominated district that has traditionally remained relatively peaceful. In this case, the group employed a young female suicide bomber, a law student from the University of Turbat, which highlights a disturbing trend of educated youth, including women, joining the ranks of Baloch militant groups.

The nature and sophistication of these attacks have shocked both authorities and the public, sparking fresh debate about the group’s operational capabilities and how it managed to carry out such large-scale, synchronised assaults in a single day. The attacks have also exposed the failure on the part of security forces in Balochistan, where as many as seven law enforcement agencies and three intelligence agencies are actively engaged in maintaining law and order.

Various theories explain the BLA’s rising power, but one prominent factor drawing Baloch youth to armed groups is state policy. While militant groups often spend months, if not years, planning such coordinated attacks, of late, Balochistan has increasingly become a breeding ground for insurgency, particularly since 2018. This can partly be attributed to the downward spiral of the province’s political landscape in recent years. The formation of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), for example, and its rapid rise to power further destabilised the political environment of the province — courtesy of deteriorating governance marked by rampant corruption and nepotism in a province already plagued by militancy.

Moreover, heavy-handed state responses, including alleged extrajudicial killings, have fuelled further resentment among Baloch youth. These include the 2020 killing of Hayat Baloch, a university student, who was shot dead in front of his parents in Turbat. There was also the case of four-year-old Bramsh Baloch, a survivor of a death squad which took her mother’s life.

More recently, massive protests erupted across Balochistan after the reported killing of Balaach Mola Bakhsh, who died in the custody of the Counter Terrorism Department last November. Further aggravating tensions was the mistreatment of Baloch women protesters in Islamabad in December, which led to increased angst among the youth.
What government authorities say

For their part, authorities attribute the marked increase in the BLA’s operational capacity to foreign hostile agencies, particularly India’s RAW, as well as the shifting geopolitical landscape in the wake of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.

Following the attacks on Aug 26, the prime minister said that the terrorists aimed to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other development projects. The government, as well as the military, has on many an occasion accused hostile agencies of being behind the violence in Balochistan to undermine CPEC.

Government officials also suggest that the BLA has dramatically bolstered its operational capacity in recent years, allegedly through an alliance with the militant Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and access to a cache of advanced American weaponry from Afghanistan. In a press conference in Quetta on June 26, Balochistan Home Minister Ziaullah Langove announced the arrest of two key militant commanders, TTP’s Nasrullah, also known as Maulvi Mansoor, and Idrees, also known as Irshad.

Langove presented a pre-recorded statement from Nasrullah, who claimed he had served as an “emir” in the TTP’s defence commission since 2023. Nasrullah detailed a January 2024 plan, allegedly orchestrated with the BLA’s Majeed Brigade commander Bashir Zeb, to cross the Pak-Afghan border into southern Balochistan with the help of a guide.

While claims and statements of this nature by the government are not uncommon, reports of an alleged alliance between the two terror groups first emerged in August 2012 when Rehman Malik, the then interior minister, informed the Senate that the BLA, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and the TTP were connected and allegedly acting on behalf of foreign hostile agencies exploiting Balochistan’s indigenous issues. Rehman Malik also made similar claims in 2014.

In recent years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the de facto Afghan government of supporting the TTP and the BLA, claiming that these groups are collaborating and operating from Afghan territory. Kabul, for its part, has vehemently denied these allegations, insisting that its soil is not being used as a base for attacks on its neighbour.

In February 2022, following the BLA’s attacks on two military bases in the remote Panjgur and Naushki districts of Balochistan, then-interior minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed claimed that the BLA was using advanced American weaponry during these assaults. He did not, however, provide details on how the BLA obtained the weapons, nor did he specify whether the Afghan Taliban were involved in supplying the arms or if the weapons were acquired through the black market.

Escalating tactics and troubling patterns

Even without a formal nexus, however, the BLA may have borrowed or learned new tactics from the TTP. Since July 2022, for example, the BLA has reportedly abducted law enforcers and a senior army officer on various occasions, offering prisoner swaps to the government — a tactic seemingly borrowed from the TTP. In June earlier this year, the militant outfit also kidnapped 10 picnickers from the outskirts of Quetta, subsequently proposing a prisoner swap with the government again.

Since August 2018, the BLA has also increasingly turned to suicide bombings, another signature tactic of the TTP, but which was previously avoided by Baloch armed groups.

In 2023, for instance, Pakistan saw the highest number of suicide bombings since 2014, with nearly half of these attacks targeting security forces. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank, Balochistan was the second most terrorism-affected province in 2023 after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgent groups and religiously inspired militant groups carried out a total of 110 attacks in the province, compared to 79 in the previous year.

Can an alliance be formed?

This begs the question: can the BLA, which presents itself as a secular nationalist militant group seeking complete separation from Pakistan, genuinely form an alliance with a group like the TTP, which seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the country?

Baloch insurgents have long viewed the TTP as unreliable, given the group’s history of engaging in peace talks with the Pakistani government as early as May 2022. There are also longstanding concerns among Baloch nationalists about the potential Islamisation of their province, which they fear could undermine their separatist insurgency and secular values.

Considering the TTP’s past negotiations, its demand for Sharia law, and its lack of support for Balochistan’s independence, it is difficult to assess whether the BLA would ally with or trust the TTP.

Given that Balochistan borders Afghanistan, with many Pashtun areas adjoining the Afghan border, it is possible that the Taliban or their sympathisers could facilitate the movement of Baloch armed groups entering and exiting Afghanistan. In exchange, Baloch armed groups or their supporters may provide logistical support to the TTP in Baloch-dominated areas of Balochistan. However, experts remain sceptical about whether these interactions could constitute genuine collaboration.

Muhammad Amir Rana, an Islamabad-based security and political analyst, stressed that there is no concrete evidence of a direct collaboration between the BLA and the TTP.

“One primary reason is that their political and ideological backgrounds are quite different,” Rana explained.

“BLA’s main concern regarding the TTP is that the group has acted as a proxy of the state in the past. The BLA also fears that the TTP could reconcile with the state at any time, which might then be used against the Baloch people. While the TTP has attempted to exploit the issue of Baloch missing persons to gain sympathy, this does not provide a solid basis for closer ties with the BLA,” he added.

In recent years, the TTP has increasingly expressed an interest in Balochistan, using its mouthpiece, Umar Media, to call on the Baloch people to resist alleged state oppression.

Following the triple murders in Barkhan district in February 2023 — reportedly masterminded by former provincial minister Sardar Abdul Rehman Khetran — the TTP released a nine-minute video condemning the killings. The group also previously issued videos in the Balochi language in April and May 2022, urging the Baloch to support its war against the state.

More recently, several lesser-known or previously unknown shadow groups have announced their merger with the TTP from Balochistan.

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, a journalist and co-founder of The Khorasan Diary, covering militancy, Jihadist movement and security issues in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, said that while there is no substantial evidence of direct operational collaboration between TTP and BLA leaderships, their media activities suggest a different perspective.

He noted that whenever the TTP launches an attack, Baloch separatists and their affiliated channels intensely share the news on social media. Similarly, he says TTP-linked accounts amplify reports of Baloch insurgent activities whenever they carry out any attacks in Balochistan.

According to Ihsanullah, TTP Emir Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has repeatedly voiced support for militancy in Balochistan, urging the Baloch to ally with the TTP. This media-based support, he suggests, indicates a diminishing divide between secular nationalism and religious extremism, with the TTP leadership frequently addressing issues of Baloch oppression and nationalism.

“But as for rumours and reports circulating that the [TTP and BLA leadership] meet each other in Afghanistan and support each other at an operational level, I have no such evidence or information,” he said. A Dawn editorial from last year, however, pointed out that “the lack of conclusive evidence at this point does not preclude the possibility of some sort of ‘working arrangement’ between the TTP and the Baloch separatists in the future”.

“Since Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud took charge of the TTP in 2018, we’ve observed a clear shift, with the TTP repeatedly justifying the Baloch armed struggle against the state. Initially, Baloch secular nationalists were known to resist and even clash with Islamist jihadists in Balochistan, such as the Baloch chapter of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, but that division has faded away now.

“Baloch militants no longer oppose jihadists, and similarly, the TTP leadership now openly justifies the Baloch armed struggle,” Tipu added.

He noted, however, that the support and collaboration between the two groups is, so far, only evident on the propaganda front.

Security analyst Rana, on the other hand, observed that while the BLA and TTP are ideologically distinct militant groups with differing ideologies, they have historically supported each other when their objectives are common. “This support might include trading and exchanging weapons or providing logistical aid, but such interactions among militants do not constitute high-level collaboration.”

Whether the recent spike in violence is a result of a marriage of convenience between militant outfits, the act of hostile foreign agencies or a natural progression of the decades-long insurgency, further fuelled by growing resentment towards the state, it is high time that all stakeholders sit together and chalk out a sustainable plan to contain the conflict, lest it engulfs the entire province.

Kiyya Baloch is a freelance Pakistani journalist currently based in Norway. He can be found on Twitter @KiyyaBaloch

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Mexico becomes first country to approve popular election of judges

AFP 

Published September 12, 2024 

Miguel Angel Yunes Linares and his son Miguel Angel Yunes Marquez look on after members of Mexico’s Senate passed the highly contested proposal on judicial reform presented by the government of President Andres Lopez Obrador, in Mexico City, Mexico September 11, 2024 — Reuters

MEXICO CITY: Mexico became the world’s first country to allow voters to elect judges at all levels on Wednesday, after protesters invaded the upper house and suspended debate on the issue.

Outgoing President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador had pushed hard for the reform and criticised the current judicial system for serving the interests of the political and economic elite.

The reform was approved with 86 votes in favor and 41 against, garnering the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution, in an upper chamber dominated by the ruling Morena party and its allies. Debate on the reform had sparked mass demonstrations, diplomatic tensions and investor jitters.

Senate leader Gerardo Fernandez Norona declared a recess after demonstrators stormed the upper house and entered the chamber, chanting “The judiciary will not fall.” Lawmakers were forced to move to a former Senate building, where they resumed their debate as demonstrators outside shouted “Mr Senator, stop the dictator!” Obrador, who wanted the bill approved before he is replaced by close ally Claudia Sheinbaum on Oct 1, said that protesters were protecting the interests of the political elite.


“What most worries those who are against this reform is that they will lose their privileges, because the judiciary is at the service of the powerful, at the service of white-collar crime,” the leftist leader said at a news conference.

‘Demolition of the judiciary’

Opponents, including court employees and law students, have held a series of protests against the plan, under which even Supreme Court and other high-level judges, as well as those at the local level, would be chosen by popular vote.

Around 1,600 judges would have to stand for election in 2025 or 2027. “This does not exist in any other country,” said Margaret Satterthwaite, United Nations special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers.

“In some countries, such as the US, some state judges are elected, and in others, such as in Bolivia, high-level judges are elected,” she said. Mexico’s overhaul puts it “in a unique position in terms of its method for judicial selection,” Satterthwaite said ahead of the vote.

In an unusual public warning, Supreme Court chief justice Norma Pina said that elected judges could be more vulnerable to pressure from criminals, in a country where powerful drug cartels regularly use bribery and intimidation to influence officials. “The demolition of the judiciary is not the way forward,” she said in a video released on Sunday.

Pina said last week that the top court would discuss whether it has jurisdiction to halt the reforms, though Lopez Obrador has said there is no legal basis for it to do so. The reforms were passed last week in the lower house by ruling party lawmakers and their allies, who were forced to gather in a sports centre because access to Congress was blocked by protesters.

Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2024

Silencing Afghanistan’s women

Rafia Zakaria

September 11, 2024 

THERE is no doubt that many have had a role in Afghanistan’s destruction, but the question of who exactly is to blame for the country’s current condition is a thorny and vexing one.

This week, the Republican Party came up with its own report regarding the issue, pinning the blame squarely on the Biden administration for the botched American pullout, following Donald Trump’s withdrawal deal. The report alleges: “The administration’s unconditional surrender and the abandonment of our Afghan allies, who fought alongside the US military against the Taliban — their brothers in arms — is a stain on this administration.”

Republican Congressman Michael McCaul, chair of the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, said that he would use all tools at his disposal to make sure that the Biden administration would be held accountable for “the catastrophic failure of epic proportions their decisions caused”.

As is always the case with matters related to Afghanistan, the assertion is a self-serving one, motivated less by any actual concern for Afghanistan than by a desire and an attempt to come up with material with which to jab the ascending star of the Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris. In truth, both sides, the Democrats and the Republicans, are equally to blame; both had the power to change things and chose not to. There was always bipartisan support for propping up the always flailing and utterly corrupt Afghan governments that ruled from Kabul.

Both sides knew about the hundreds of millions of dollars that had been sunk into development projects and that were supposed to win ‘hearts and minds’ but that really only padded the pockets of various American contracting companies. Afghanistan remained the underdeveloped hinterland beyond the immediate reaches of Kabul, warlords were paid off to maintain the appearance of some semblance of control and there was never more than superficial support for the American-led effort.

Whatever the case, it is the people of Afghanistan, especially the women, who have paid the heaviest price for Taliban misrule, American incompetence, the avarice of various caretaker Afghan governments, and a botched withdrawal. Just as the Americans held up as their vaunted excuse for invasion their shining selfless cause for ‘liberation’ (that was guiding their bombs), the Taliban have once again decided to make one half of the Afghan population the target of their intransigence and tyranny.

An increasingly imaginary ‘international community’ and the UN have only issued a few feeble and robotic warnings.

Just as we have witnessed before, the present round of Taliban degradations began with the impositions of edicts — for women to wear the burqa and to always be accompanied by a male guardian. Then universities were closed and education beyond sixth grade banned, making schooling impossible unless it was in secret. We also saw a ban on beauty parlours so that women were even denied that one remaining avenue of employment and gathering. Today, hardly any woman can work outside the home; it might be possible in a handful of cases, but according to women’s rights groups, the bureaucracies involved make it all but impossible.

Even all of that was not enough. In the last week of August, the Taliban imposed a new ban that is unprecedented. Now women’s voices — in the literal sense — have been all but forbidden.

The latest edict says that women are not to recite poetry aloud, they are not to speak loudly or in public at all — even if they are all covered up. Effectively, this would mean a curb on virtually everything — from a fully covered woman speaking to a women’s gathering, to women who want to go to the market with a male guardian or by themselves.

For its part, an increasingly imaginary ‘international community’ and the UN have only issued a few feeble and robotic warnings. The UN human rights chief Volker Türk has called the measure “outrageous” and warned that the measure, which is known as the vice and virtue law, and that has been formally codified, would bring about “unparalleled repression” to half of the country’s population. Even so, the UN Security Council failed to unanimously condemn the measure. China, Russia and Algeria did not add their voice to the majority consensus that condemned “in the strongest terms the Taliban’s continued systemic gender discrimination”.

The fact that they did not shows just how fractured and ineffectual the international community is. No country has formally recognised the Ta­­liban regime and Afghan foreign reserves remain frozen as sanctions remain in place. The latest round of measures against Afghan women suggest that the Taliban are no longer concerned even about the religious perspective as they continue to impose restrictions.

Instead, Afghan wo­­men seem to have become hostages that are being used by the Taliban to gain the concessions that they desperately need to keep some semblance of an economy going in the country they rule.

It appears that the idea is that if they continue to come up with and then impose ever wilder and more draconian restrictions on Afghan women then perhaps the ‘international community’ will ultimately be galvanised enough to beg the Taliban to ease some of them in exchange for some portion of frozen funds or some other similar concession. The fact that this has not happened yet, does not appear to have shown the Taliban regime that it is unlikely to work in the future.

In the meantime, Afghan women who cannot get an education, cannot work, cannot leave their homes, cannot do any business by themselves, and cannot go to get their hair cut are not going to be able to speak aloud outside their homes.

In this sense, their existence has been all but eliminated. Hostages in their own country, targeted by the men who have been born and raised in the same land, they must endure the world’s most difficult, misogynistic conditions and bear the cost of mistakes that they never made.

The writer is an attorney teaching constitutional law and political philosophy.
rafia.zakaria@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, September 11th, 2024

PAKISTAN

Interwoven crises

DAWN
Editorial 

Published September 12, 2024 

THE 2024 World Risk Index paints a concerning picture for Pakistan, placing it among the top 10 countries most vulnerable to disasters and conflict exposure globally. Ranked 10th in the world for disaster risk, Pakistan’s position holds a mirror to the growing complexities of global crises, where natural disasters, conflicts and economic instability are becoming increasingly interconnected. With Pakistan also ranked among the top three for conflict exposure, our predicament is both a symptom and a warning of these escalating global trends. According to the report, crises are no longer isolated events but deeply interwoven. Extreme weather, pandemics and conflicts increasingly overlap with and amplify one another. For Pakistan, this reality is evident in several climate disasters, such as devastating floods and earthquakes, and is compounded by internal conflicts and political instability. Pakistan’s exposure to such risks is exacerbated by its vulnerability, evidenced by poverty, weak institutions and insufficient disaster preparedness. A notable statistic from the report shows Pakistan ranked alongside countries like the Philippines and Bangladesh, two nations also grappling with severe disaster risks. While these nations are facing increased risks due to climate-sensitive exposure, their ability to manage crises is deeply tied to governance and economic factors. The report emphasises that as the world faces interconnected crises, responses must be holistic and forward-looking. Our struggle to address these risks indicates outdated risk management frameworks that focus on single events rather than the complex, overlapping crises we are faced with.

The recommendations for Pakistan are clear: first, the government must invest in disaster preparedness as a priority. At a time when successive governments are distracted by unending political crises, it is imperative to understand that climate disasters wait for no one. It must also strengthen early warning systems and build robust infrastructure that safeguards both human lives and the economy. Secondly, enhancing institutional capacities to respond to both conflicts and natural disasters simultaneously is crucial. Without strengthening governance and ensuring equitable access to resources, Pakistan will remain trapped in a cycle of reactive crisis management. The complexities of the country’s risk landscape cannot be overstated. It is a country at the epicentre of multiple, interconnected crises and addressing these challenges requires coordinated efforts that span across disaster risk management, conflict resolution, and sustainable development. Failure to act will only see the risks increase in frequency and severity.

Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2024

PAKISTAN

Informal jobs

Neda Mulji

DAWN

Published September 12, 2024

IN the last decade, informal jobs have mushroomed in Pakistan. Part of the reason is the high income tax levy which makes small firms contain costs by hiring cheap labour for informal jobs. Historically, societies have not been able to grow economically without a structured job market. In Tanzania, Ethiopia and the Czech Republic, for example, cheap labour coupled with the scarcity of capital made informal labour predominate even in industry. Clearly, these economies have suffered stagnation as opposed to Taiwan and Vietnam, where the main driver of growth was the formal jobs sector.

With fast automation in all sectors, labour-intensive economies are likely to spiral further downward. Traditionally, in Pakistan, low-cost labour has meant quick income for families that have many mouths to feed. However, this can at best be a survival mechanism for a fledgling economy. Hope for growth can only come from a sound industrial policy that not only creates formal employment but also upgrades the skill level required for those jobs.

Education and training remain the key drivers of economic, industrial and social development as we have seen in many successful economies. Those that have run into roadblocks after a period of intense growth — such as the Philippines and Argentina — have been burgeoning informal economies. Both economies, once successful, struggled due to the exponential growth of their informal sectors, relying on low-skilled labour.

From street vendors to low-wage domestic staff, unskilled handymen to unlicensed midwives, we have seen the unregulated growth of low-wage jobs in Pakistan. Those in low-skill jobs will always be at a disadvantage due to the unsustainable nature of the work, lack of contracts and zero social or legal protection. What’s worse is the lack of economic mobility where generations will be trapped in the disadvantaged strata of society.


Without training, technology will remain out of reach for many.

For sustained industrial growth, STEAM-based and digital literacy programmes need to be established for quick labour mobility — a paradigm shift from low-paying, low-skilled jobs to learning the ropes for more demanding, high-paying jobs. Developments in technology will essentially result in large gaps between those who are unable to rise to the job demands — therefore falling prey to wage stagnation or lay-offs — and those who can upgrade their skills.

In the absence of a higher education system that can develop the skills required by industry, the government will need to establish programmes to upskill workers in a public-private partnership model. Last year, in a bid to contribute to technological development, 100,000 laptops were handed out on a merit basis to university graduates. Initiatives like these are a case of ‘too little, too late’. It is not so much access to technology that is required but the skills to be able to use the technology. Access can be provided on the job. Yet, without training, technology will still be out of reach for many.

This brings us back to the critical need for education and training to address the skills gap, for growth to be enabled in all sectors of the economy. Higher education institutes worldwide provide part-time jobs to students that enables them to earn a little extra, develop basic skills that will lay the ground for their professional lives and also to help them engage in some networking with industry professionals. Part-time jobs at university have a range of benefits, from learning time-management and interpersonal skills to acquiring work discipline; the students are already on a springboard to support their careers.

In Pakistan, however, the jobs that should be open to students are usually taken by less skilled, low-wage earners. In an informal economy, we can’t strictly classify jobs as open to ‘students only’. There are huge opportunities that we haven’t tapped into. We haven’t yet explored the options available for certifying students for jobs because all these and much more are being managed in an informal capacity by untrained workers.

In many countries, students work in libraries, cafeterias, or as administrative and research assistants in a paid capacity. There are university portals that list the available on-campus jobs, and any certification options such as for first-aid worker jobs. This is where students find preparatory ground for soft skills that will be required in a more formal job environment. Students can also undertake shadow work or apprenticeships within the university IT, marketing or curriculum planning teams.

Gradually, we may be able to stem the tide of informal employment and bring more citizens into the safety net through training and regulation.

The writer is a teacher, educator, author, and Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, UK. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect those of her employer.

neda.mulji@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2024