Thursday, June 26, 2025

America’s Most Lawless Agency: ICE Is the Prototype for Tyranny

GESTAPO BY  ANY OTHER NAME

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.

— Justice Louis D. Brandeis

While the U.S. wages war abroad—bombing Iran, escalating conflict, and staging a spectacle of power for political gain—a different kind of war is being waged here at home.

This war at home is quieter but no less destructive. The casualties are not in distant deserts or foreign cities. They are our freedoms, our communities, and the Constitution itself.

And the agents of this domestic war? Masked thugs. Unmarked vans. Raids. Roundups.

Detentions without due process. Retaliation against those who dare to question or challenge government authority. People made to disappear into bureaucratic black holes. Fear campaigns targeting immigrant communities and political dissenters alike. Surveillance weaponized to monitor and suppress lawful activity.

Packaged under the guise of national security—as all power grabs tend to be—this government-sanctioned thuggery masquerading as law-and-order is the face of the Trump Administration’s so-called war on illegal immigration.

Don’t fall for the propaganda that claims we’re being overrun by criminals or driven into the poorhouse by undocumented immigrants living off welfare.

The real threat to our way of life comes not from outside invaders, but from within: an unelected, unaccountable enforcement agency operating above the law.

President Trump insists that ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) is focused on violent criminals, but the facts tell a different story (non-criminal ICE arrests have surged 800% in six months)—and that myth is precisely what enables the erosion of rights for everyone.

By painting enforcement as narrowly targeted, the administration obscures a far broader dragnet that sweeps up legal residents, naturalized citizens, and native-born Americans alike.

What begins with immigrants rarely ends there.

According to the Cato Institute, 65 percent of people taken by ICE had no convictions, and 93 percent had no violent convictions at all.

This isn’t targeted enforcement—it’s indiscriminate purging.

What ICE—an agency that increasingly resembles a modern-day Gestapo—is doing to immigrants today, it can and will do to citizens tomorrow: these are the early warning signs of a system already in motion.

The machinery is in place. The abuses are ongoing. And the constitutional safeguards we rely on are being ignored, dismantled, or bypassed entirely.

When legal residents, naturalized citizens, and native-born Americans are swept up in ICE’s raids, detained without cause, and subjected to treatment that defies every constitutional protection against government overreach, this isn’t about immigration.

It’s not about danger. It’s about power—unchecked and absolute.

This is authoritarianism by design.

Here are just a few examples of how ICE’s reach now extends far beyond a criminal class of undocumented immigrants:

This pattern of abuse is not accidental.

It reflects a deliberate strategy of fear and domination by ICE agents acting like an occupying army, intent on intimidating the population into submission while the Trump Administration redraws the boundaries of the Constitution for all within America’s borders, citizen and immigrant alike.

This is how you dismantle a constitutional republic: not in one dramatic moment, but through the steady erosion of rights, accountability, and rule of law—first for the marginalized, then for everyone.

When constitutional guarantees become conditional and oversight is systematically evaded, all Americans—regardless of status—stand vulnerable to a regime that governs by fear rather than freedom.

We’ve seen this playbook before.

It’s the same strategy used by fascist regimes to consolidate power—using fear, force, and propaganda to turn public institutions into instruments of oppression.

ICE raids often occur without warrants. Agents frequently detain individuals not charged with any crime. Homes, schools, hospitals, workplaces, and courthouses have all become targets. Agents in plain clothes swarm unsuspecting individuals, arrest them without explanation, and separate families under the pretense of national security. In many cases, masked agents refuse to identify themselves at all—creating a climate of terror where the public cannot distinguish lawful enforcement from lawless abduction.

This is not justice. It is intimidation. And it has become business as usual.

ICE has even begun deputizing local police departments to carry out these raids.

Through an expanded network of partnerships, ICE has turned routine traffic stops into pipelines for deportation. According to the Washington Post, immigrants stopped on the way to volleyball practice, picking up baby formula, or heading to job sites have been detained and, in some cases, sent to a notorious mega-prison in El Salvador.

This is what politicizing and weaponizing local police looks like.

Even members of Congress attempting to exercise constitutional oversight have been turned away from ICE facilities. As the New York Times reported, ICE now claims the authority to “deny a request or otherwise cancel” congressional visits based on vague “operational concerns”—effectively placing its operations beyond democratic scrutiny.

Beyond the high-profile arrests, the abuse runs deeper.

Julio Noriega, a 54-year-old American citizen, was snatched up off the street and detained in Chicago for 10 hours without explanation. Leonardo Garcia Venegas, a U.S.-born citizen, was detained because ICE dismissed his REAL ID as fake. Cary López Alvarado, a pregnant U.S. citizen, was handcuffed and arrested for challenging ICE agents who had followed her fiancé to work. Children, veterans, and immunocompromised individuals have all suffered under ICE’s dragnet.

These are not outliers. They are the product of a system that operates without meaningful checks.

ICE agents are rarely held accountable. Internal investigations are ineffective. Congress has abdicated oversight. Directives from the Trump administration—including those authored by Stephen Miller—have turbocharged deportations and loosened any remaining restraints.

From boots on the ground to bytes in the cloud, ICE’s unchecked power reflects a broader shift toward authoritarianism, fueled by high-tech surveillance, public indifference and minimal judicial oversight. The agency operates a sprawling digital dragnet: facial recognition, license plate readers, cellphone tracking, and partnerships with tech giants like Amazon and Palantir feed massive databases—often without warrants or oversight.

These same tools—hallmarks of a growing surveillance state—are now being quietly repurposed across other federal agencies, setting the stage for an integrated surveillance-policing regime that threatens the constitutional rights of every American.

This isn’t about safety. It’s about control.

These tools aren’t just targeting undocumented immigrants—they’re laying the digital scaffolding for a future in which everyone is watched, scored, and subject to state suspicion.

Quotas over justice. Algorithms over rights.

ICE’s operations have little to do with individualized threat assessments. What drives these raids is not public safety but bureaucratic performance. Field offices are under pressure to meet arrest quotas, creating a system that incentivizes indiscriminate sweeps over focused investigations.

As Jennie Taer writes for the NY Post:

“The Trump administration’s mandate to arrest 3,000 illegal migrants per day is forcing ICE agents to deprioritize going after dangerous criminals and targets with deportation orders, insiders warn. Instead, federal immigration officers are spending more time rounding up people off the streets… Agents are desperate to meet the White House’s high expectations, leading them to leave some dangerous criminal illegal migrants on the streets, and instead look for anyone they can get their hands on at the local Home Depot or bus stop.”

Predictive algorithms and flawed databases replace constitutional suspicion with digital hunches, turning enforcement into a numbers game and transforming communities into statistical targets.

Constitutional safeguards are being replaced by digital suspicion.

We now live in a nation where lawful dissent—especially from immigrants or those perceived as outsiders—can place someone under state suspicion. The line between investigation and persecution has been erased.

Fear needs fuel.

And ICE finds it in propaganda: just as the Gestapo used propaganda to justify its cruelty, ICE relies on the language of fear and division. When the government labels people “invaders,” “animals,” or “thugs,” it strips them of humanity—and strips us of our conscience.

This rhetoric serves to distract and divide. It normalizes abuse. And it ensures that, once targeted, no one is safe.

The construction of a new ICE mega-prison in Florida—nicknamed “Alligator Alcatraz” for its proposed moat and remote location—serves as a grotesque symbol of the Trump Administration’s mass deportation agenda: out of sight, beyond accountability, and surrounded by literal and bureaucratic barriers to due process.

And Trump’s shifting stance on industries that rely on migrant labor—one moment threatening crackdowns, the next signaling exemptions for hotels, farms, and construction—reveals what this campaign is really about: not security, but political theater.

It’s not about danger; it’s about dominance.

But the crisis isn’t just rhetorical. It’s systemic. Agents are trained to obey, not to question. Immunity shields misconduct. Whistleblowers are punished. Watchdogs are ignored. Courts too often defer to executive power.

This is not law enforcement—it is authoritarian enforcement.

And it’s not limited to immigrants. It’s creeping into every corner of American life.

When a government can detain its own citizens without due process, punish political dissent, and target individuals for what they believe or how they look, it is no longer governed by law. It is governed by fear.

The Constitution was designed to prevent this. But rights are meaningless when no one is held accountable for violating them.

That is why the solution must go beyond the ballot box.

We must dismantle the machinery of oppression that enables ICE to act as judge, jury, and jailer.

Congress must ban warrantless raids, end predictive profiling, and prohibit mass surveillance. It must enforce real oversight and revoke the legal shields that insulate abusive agents from consequences.

We must reassert the rule of law, not just through legislation, but through a cultural recommitment to constitutional values. That includes transparency, demilitarization, and equal protection for all—citizens and non-citizens alike.

This is not just a fight over immigration policy. It’s a battle for the soul of our nation.

ICE is not the exception. It is the prototype.

As I make clear in my books Battlefield America: The War on the American People and A Government of Wolves: The Emerging American Police State, the same blueprint is being applied across the federal landscape: to protest monitoring, dissent suppression, and data-mined predictive policing.

If we fail to dismantle the ICE model, we normalize it—and risk reproducing it everywhere else.

ICE has become the beta test—perfecting the merger of technology, policing, and executive power that could soon define American governance as a whole.

Make no mistake: when fear becomes law, freedom is the casualty.

If we don’t act soon, we may find that the Constitution is the next to be detained.

James Madison warned that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands… may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”

When ICE acts as enforcer, jailer, and judge for the president, those fears are no longer theoretical—they are the daily reality for countless people within U.S. borders.

John W. Whitehead, constitutional attorney and author, is founder and president of The Rutherford Institute. He wrote the book Battlefield America: The War on the American People (SelectBooks, 2015). He can be contacted at johnw@rutherford.orgNisha Whitehead is the Executive Director of The Rutherford Institute. Read other articles by John W. Whitehead and Nisha Whitehead.


 

More Transparency on US Forces in Australia


Hastie’s Sensible Advice


It was a blast to a past wiped out by amnesia, social media and mental decrepitude.  Andrew Hastie, Australia’s opposition minister for home affairs, had been moved by an idea: greater transparency was needed regarding the US military buildup in Australia.  It was an inspiration overdue by some decades, but it was worthwhile in its unaccustomed sensibility.

In an interview with the Insiders program on the ABC, Hastie proved startling in proposing that Australia needed “to have a much more mature discussion about our relationship with the United States.  I think we need greater transparency.”  He proceeded to recall the frankness of US Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth’s testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, which saw China named “as the pacing threat” in the Indo Pacific.  Australia, Japan and the Philippines were mentioned as part of “the integrated deterrence that the US is building in the region.”

This saddled the Albanese government with significant obligations to the Australian people. Be clear, suggests Hastie.  Be transparent.  “I think we need to talk about operationalising the alliance, building guard rails for combat operations, and of course defining our sovereignty.  And this will make things clearer for us so that we can better preserve our national interest.”  With admirable clarity, Hastie places the Australian security establishment in the dock for interrogation. “We’re not just a vassal stage, we’re an ally and a partner and I think it’s time that we had a good discussion about what that looks like.”

Given that Australia already hosts a rotational US Marine force in Darwin from April to November, the Pine Gap signal intelligence facility in Alice Springs, and, in due course, the Submarine Rotational Force out of Perth from 2027 (“effectively a US submarine base”), it was time to consider what would happen if, say, a war were to be waged in the Indo Pacific. It was “about time we started to mature the [relationship] model and we’re open to the Australian people what it means for us”.

These views are not those of a closet pacifist wishing away the tangles of the US imperium.  Having spent his pre-political life in the Australian Defence Forces as a member of the special services, he knows what it’s like playing valet in the battlefield to Washington’s imperial mandarins.  Not that he rejects that role. Fear of abandonment and Freudian neuroses tend to pattern the Australian outlook on defence and national security.  Yet there was something comforting in his awareness that the American garrisoning of its ally for future geopolitical brawling needed explanation and elucidation.

The response from Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles was typical.  Spot the backbone of such a figure and find it wanting.  US intentions and operations in Australia, he insisted, were adequately clear.  Australians need not be troubled.  There was, he told reporters during a visit to London to meet his UK counterpart John Healey “actually a high degree of transparency in relation to the United States presence in Australia.”  The Australian government had “long and full knowledge and concurrence arrangements in relation to America’s force posture in Australia, not just in relation to Pine Gap, but in relation to all of its force posture in Australia.”  Reiterating another fable of defence orthodoxy, Marles was also convinced Australia’s sovereignty in terms of how the US conducted its operations had been spared.  Given Canberra’s abject surrender to Washington’s whims and interests with the AUKUS trilateral pact, this is an unsustainable claim.

To this day, we have sufficient anecdotal evidence that Pine Gap, notionally a jointly run facility between US and Australian personnel, remains indispensable to the Pentagon, be it in navigating drones, directing bombing missions and monitoring adversaries.  The Nautilus Institute, most capably through its senior research associate Richard Tanter, has noted the base’s use of geosynchronous signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, Space-Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) and its acquisition in the early 2000s of a FORNSAT/COMSAT (foreign satellite/communications satellite) function.

This makes Australia complicit in campaigns the United States pursues when it chooses. Dr Margaret Beavis, Australian co-chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), outlined the potential consequences: “We risk accelerating nuclear proliferation, we risk Pine Gap becoming a target, Tindal airbase becoming a target.”

All efforts to raise the matter before the vassal representatives in Canberra tends to end in a terminating cul-de-sac. Regarding the latest use of US B-2 stealth bombers in targeting Iran’s three primary nuclear facilities, the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, was curt: “We are upfront, but we don’t talk about intelligence”. The bombing had been a “unilateral action taken by the United States.” Australian candour has its limits.

There is also no clarity about what the US military places on Australian soil when it comes to nuclear weapons or any other fabulous nasties that make killing in the name of freedom’s empire so glorious and reassuring. As a signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), Australia would be in violation of its obligations, with Article 5 obligating each party “to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.” Yet deploying B-52 bombers at the RAAF Tindal base would suggest just that, though not all such bombers are adapted to that end.

The naval gazing toadies in foreign affairs and defence have come up with a nice exit from the discussion: such weapons, if they were ever to find themselves on US weapons platforms on Australian soil, would only ever be in transit. In a Senate estimates hearing in February 2023, Defence Department secretary Greg Moriarty blithely observed that, while the stationing of nuclear weapons was prohibited by the treaty, nuclear-armed US bombers could still pay a visit. “Successive Australian governments have understood and respected the longstanding US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on particular platforms.”  It is precisely that sort of deferential piffle we can do without.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.comRead other articles by Binoy.

 

What Drove A Recent Wave Of Arms Industry Consolidation? – Analysis

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By 

By Florian Erdle and Lorenzo Scarazzato


Consolidation within the arms industry has historically been influenced by a combination of three factors: shrinking demand, lack of competitiveness and the political will of governments. For example, in 1993, at a dinner at the Pentagon dubbed ‘the Last Supper’, the biggest arms producers in the United States were told to radically speed up consolidation and restructuring in the face of deep cuts to the US military budget. The spate of mergers and acquisitions this sparked was ultimately halted by another political move, when the US government prevented Lockheed Martin from merging with Northrop Grumman in 1997, fearing it would stifle competition.

The most recent wave of arms industry consolidation in the European and North American arms industries occurred under circumstances different from those at the end of the cold war. Between the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the annual numbers of European and North American companies in the SIPRI Top 100Arms-producing and Military Services Companies that carried out mergers and acquisitions were significantly higher than at any time since 2014 (see figure 1). In the peak year of 2021, the number was double what it had been just two years earlier. By 2023, the annual number of deals was back to the level seen in the first half of the decade.

This backgrounder investigates the circumstances behind this wave of consolidation. To do this, it uses data on mergers and acquisitions among European (excluding Russia) and North American companies appearing in the SIPRI Top 100 in the 10-year period 2014–23. 

Figure 1. Arms industry consolidation surged in Europe and North America in 2021–22 as interest rates fell near zero

The role of (rising) demand

While shrinking demand for arms and military services is traditionally a driver of consolidation, demand has in fact been rising in Europe and North America since at least Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The worsened security environment prompted increases in military expenditure, including the shares dedicated to research and development and to procurement. These increases continued even through the economic turmoil of the pandemic and its aftermath. 

The rise in demand accelerated even further in Europe and North America after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Partly this was to supply Ukraine, which continues to rely heavily on Western partners for ammunition, ground systems, missiles and air-defence systems as well as other materiel, in the form of military aid or procurement by Ukraine. This led to a slew of new orders, as states either ordered new materiel to give directly to Ukraine or to replace what they had provided as military aid from their own stockpiles. At the same time, the USA, Canada and many European states responded to increased threat perceptions concerning Russia with investments in rearmament and military modernization.

One way in which expectations of continuing high demand (and strong returns) appear to have driven consolidation in the arms industry is by encouraging private equity firms to conduct mergers and acquisitions. These firms usually operate by acquiring companies (or parts of companies) with the aim of increasing the companies’ value, before selling them on for a profit. On the US market, two notable private equity acquisitions during the recent consolidation wave were Veritas Capital’s acquisition of Northrop Grumman’s information technology (IT) services division in 2021 for $3.4 billion, for integration into Veritas’s portfolio company Peraton, and the Carlyle Group’s acquisition in 2022 of ManTech, a provider of IT solutions for the arms industry, for $4.2 billion. Both were all-cash deals, indicating high confidence in expected future returns.

Thus, the recent wave of consolidation came at a time of rising demand and long-term commitments to rearmament and increased military spending across much of the NATO alliance, and to some degree was a response to those conditions. 

Striving for competitiveness in specific sectors

States in Europe and North America are seeking to modernize their militaries, creating demand for advanced weapon systems. Tech companies—often small- and medium-sized enterprises—are increasingly active in the military sphere, and traditional arms producers have shown interest in acquiring firms with expertise and capabilities in cutting-edge technologies that can be incorporated into military hardware. This has helped some established players in the arms industry to expand their portfolios and become more competitive in sectors like uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare and cyber. 

The war in Ukraine has underlined the strategic importance of UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and as loitering munitions. An estimated 100 different types of UAV are currently in use in the war—the most advanced, diverse and intensive usage of UAVs in warfare to date. 

The UAV export market is heavily dominated by Chinese and Turkish producers. European and North American arms companies have tried to catch up, including through mergers and acquisitions. Between 2021 and 2022, around 7.6 per cent (8 in total) of all mergers and acquisitions conducted by European and North American SIPRI Top 100 companies targeted companies linked to UAV production capacity. Among notable examples, in 2021 Germany’s Rheinmetall acquired EMT Ingenieurgesellschaft, which produces mainly small airborne reconnaissance UAVs for close-area imaging. In 2022 US company Textron acquired the Slovenian company Pipistrel, which specializes in electric aviation and also develops surveillance UAVs. 

Electronic warfare has emerged as a cornerstone capability in modern military strategy, being responsible for 7.6 per cent (8) of all Top 100 arms industry mergers and acquisitions in 2021–22. With modern warfare increasingly leveraging digital communication and sensor networks, arms companies have been active in acquiring firms specialized in electronic warfare technologies to enhance their capabilities. One example was the 2022 merger of Leonardo DRS—a US subsidiary of the Italian company Leonardo—with the Israeli firm RADA Electronic Industries. The deal fostered the creation of a company ‘aligned to fast growing segments of the US Department of Defense budget [. . .] in advanced sensing’, filling Leonardo’s ‘strategic gap’ in the tactical radar sector. A sign of shifting priorities, the merger followed Leonardo’s sale of its satellite communications segment to Luxembourg-based SES for $450 million. In the same year, Leonardo acquired 25 per cent of German company Hensoldt. Hensoldt is involved in the field of sensors and the acquisition is characterized as helping Leonardo to advance its objective of securing a role in the European defence electronics market. 

Cyber capabilities—including in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity—were involved in 20 per cent (21) of all Top 100 arms industry mergers and acquisitions carried out in 2021–22. This shows the great importance the European and North American arms industries place on being frontrunners in the cyber sector, especially AI. One of the most important deals came in 2021, when Peraton acquired US IT services provider Perspecta. Together with the acquisition of Northrop Grumman’s IT services division, this significantly enhanced Peraton’s cybersecurity portfolio, integrating AI-driven analytics and big data solutions. Other prominent examples in the US market included the acquisition of the small firm Koverse, which specializes in AI, by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in 2021, and Amentum’s acquisition of Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) in 2022.

Thus, while a lack of competitiveness in traditional military products does not seem to have been a significant factor, the latest wave of arms industry consolidation in Europe and North America was driven in part by companies seeking competitiveness in advanced technologies that play a growing role in modern warfare.

Governments tip the scale

Political will is the third main factor that has historically influenced consolidation dynamics in the arms industry. Governments, as the sole buyers for most of the arms industry’s output, have an interest in keeping their domestic industries competitive but avoiding monopolistic practices. Therefore, governments demand that mergers and acquisitions that could affect competition in sensitive sectors are approved by state regulatory bodies before they can go ahead. 

In response to the most recent wave of arms industry consolidation, governments and regulatory bodies have shown increasing caution, with some deals being delayed or blocked. For instance, Lockheed Martin abandoned an attempt to acquire Aerojet Rocketdyne in 2022 for $4.4 billion after the US Federal Trade Commission filed a lawsuit to prevent it. The acquisition would have allowed Lockheed Martin to vertically integrate the USA’s last independent maker of missile propulsion systems, which could ultimately have led to anticompetitive behaviour. US company L3Harris Technologies was allowed to acquire Aerojet Rocketdyne in 2023, but as L3Harris is not a major direct competitor to the primary customers of Aerojet’s propulsion systems, the acquisition did not raise the same concerns. Instead, it was characterized as a way to strengthen the defence industrial base and maintain competition among missile system primes, rather than consolidating power.

Vetting mechanisms are also being used in European states. For instance, in Italy, the government retains a so-called golden power, a mechanism allowing the state to veto the acquisition of what are considered strategic assets. Fearing issues with Eurofighter supplies, in November 2023 the Italian government prevented French company Safran from acquiring Microtecnica, the flight control systems business of US company Collins Aerospace (part of RTX) for $1.8 billion.

The deal was later approved in 2024. In 2020 the Spanish government introduced a process to vet the foreign acquisition of stakes larger than 10 per cent in companies considered to be strategic. The mechanism was triggered in 2023, when Rheinmetall completed its most significant acquisition to date, paying $1.1 billion to acquire Spanish ammunition manufacturer Expal Systems—one of the biggest ammunition producers in Europe. French company Aubert & Duval—involved in the manufacturing of special metal alloys employed in combat aircraft and submarine parts—had been recording losses since 2019 before being affected by the pandemic. In April 2023, to maintain control over a strategic supply chain, the French government allowed for the acquisition of Aubert & Duval by a consortium comprising trans-European company Airbus and French company Safran. The government, the second biggest shareholder of the previous owner of Aubert & Duval, maintained veto power on company decisions to safeguard French strategic interests.

An enabling factor: low interest rates

One additional element explains the wave of mergers and acquisitions in 2021–22. In response to the looming economic crisis brought on by the pandemic, many central banks slashed interest rates from the middle of 2020, only starting to raise them in 2022 (see figure 1). 

This has encouraged some of the consolidation in the European and North American arms industries, as mergers and acquisitions involve large-scale financial resources. Besides the purchase price—which is based on valuations that are especially high compared with company revenues due to the high growth potential in the tech sector—transaction fees and integration and financing costs also occur. Because loans are the dominant source of finance for mergers and acquisitions—either in combination with debt as mixed financing or by themselves—lower interest rates make them cheaper and more appealing to the buyer.

The seller also benefits from lower interest rates, as with financing easier to obtain, deals can happen faster. For instance, L3Harris Technologies sold six business divisions in 2021 for a total of $1.8 billion. The largest sale was of the military training division to the Canadian firm CAE for $1.1 billion. L3Harris used this income, together with debt, for two acquisitions completed in 2023: of US company Viasat’s Tactical Data Links for $2.0 billion and of Aerojet Rocketdyne for $4.7 billion. L3Harris characterized those deals as investments to expand its portfolio.  

While in 2017–23 mergers and acquisitions rose across the general economy in Europe and North America, the increase in the arms industry was even sharper. Between 2020 and 2021, mergers and acquisitions increased by 45 per cent in the arms industry, compared with 30 per cent in the general economy.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the arms industry in Europe and North America struggled with supply chain disruptions and had difficulty ramping up production to meet the intensified demand. At the same time, the rise of new actors and the maturity of new capabilities underscored the lack of competitiveness of more established European and North American arms companies in sectors like UAVs, electronic warfare and cyber. During 2021–22, mergers and acquisitions were mostly used to address this lack of competitiveness or to expand production lines in response to demand. For example, the price Rheinmetall paid for Expal was three times Expal’s revenues at the time, a high valuation explained by Rheinmetall’s claims that the deal allowed it to triple its ammunition production capacity to meet the rising demand—particularly for 155-millimetre artillery shells—from Ukraine and NATO members.

While the wave of major mergers and acquisitions in the European and North American arms industries seems to have receded, these arms industries are likely to continue to focus on deals to enhance competitiveness in cutting-edge technologies. With military expenditures increasing around the world, and large-scale military modernization and procurement programmes set in motion, governments are likely to be the biggest factor in regulating the pace of consolidation in the arms industry, as they try to strike a balance between fostering a competitive arms industry that can meet the needs of modern warfare, while avoiding over-dependence on a handful of domestic producers. 

In June 2025 the European Commission published a raft of proposals aimed at improving Europe’s ‘defence readiness’. Among the measures were some intended to simplify mergers and acquisitions for arms companies, with contribution to defence readiness an important factor when evaluating deals. Furthermore, as interest rates in both Canada and Europe are starting to fall again—while US President Donald J. Trump has made no secret of his wish to see them cut in the USA too—it appears the stage is being set for a potential new wave of mergers and acquisitions within the arms industry.

About the authors:

  • Florian Erdle was an intern with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
  • Lorenzo Scarazzato is a Researcher in the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Source: This article was published by SIPRI


SIPRI

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has a presence in Beijing, and is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.