BALOCHISTAN IS A COUNTRY

Attack on a police convoy in a restive southeastern province of Iran kills 10 officers

JON GAMBRELL
Sat, October 26, 2024 


This is a locator map for Iran with its capital, Tehran. (AP Photo)

Yahoo is using AI to generate takeaways from this article. This means the info may not always match what's in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience.

Key Takeaways

An attack on an Iranian police convoy in Sistan and Baluchestan province killed at least 10 officers, with details remaining scarce.

The assault appeared to target two security force vehicles, resulting in the deaths of all those riding in them, with the truck showing damage from bullets but no explosives being used.

The region of Sistan and Baluchestan has faced a low-level insurgency by Baluch nationalists for over two decades, with relations strained between the predominantly Sunni Muslim residents and Iran's Shiite theocracy.

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — An attack on an Iranian police convoy Saturday in the country's restive southern province of Sistan and Baluchestan killed at least 10 officers, authorities said.

Details remain scarce over the attack in Gohar Kuh, some 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) southeast of the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Initially, reports simply described an attack by “miscreants” without more information. But shortly after, Iranian state media said 10 officers had been killed.

HalVash, an advocacy group for the Baluch people of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, posted photos and video of what appeared to be a disabled truck painted with the green stripe used by Iranian police vehicles. One graphic photo shared by the group showed what appeared to be the corpses of two police officers in the front seat of the truck.

HalVash said the attack appeared to target two security force vehicles and all those riding in them were killed. The truck appeared to have only damage from bullets, rather than any explosive being used.

The state-run IRNA news agency said that Eskandar Momeni, the country's interior minister, ordered an investigation into the incident that it described as causing the “martyrdom of a number of police.”

Authorities identified no immediate suspects for the attack, nor did any group claim responsibility. The assault came after Israel launched a major attack across Iran early Saturday morning.

The Baluch regions across the three nations have faced a low-level insurgency by Baluch nationalists for more than two decades. Verifying information remains difficult in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan, which for decades has been home to violence involving heroin traffickers.

The province is one of the least developed parts of Iran. Relations between the predominantly Sunni Muslim residents of the region and Iran’s Shiite theocracy have long been strained. Typical attacks involve hit-and-run assaults by militants in the region, like the Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl, that kill a few security officials at a time.

However, there have been mass casualty attacks by militants in the past. In April, gunmen wearing explosive vests attacks several sites in the province, killing 10 before security forces gunned down 18 militants. Last December, another assault killed 11 and wounded eight others.

Meanwhile, the Taliban said they are investigating reports that Afghan migrants had been killed by Iranian security forces in the region earlier in October, an incident that threatened to further strain relations between the nations.

___

Associated Press writer Amir Vahdat in Tehran, Iran, contributed to this report.

10 Iranian border guards killed by unknown attackers
Simon Druker
Sat, October 26, 2024 

Ten Iranian border guards were killed Saturday in the southeast province of Sistan-Beluchistan (pictured 2012), by unknown attackers, state media reported. File Photo by Maryam Rahmanian/UPI
Yahoo is using AI to generate takeaways from this article. This means the info may not always match what's in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience.Generate Key Takeaways


Oct. 26 (UPI) -- Ten Iranian border guards were killed Saturday in the southeast part of the country by unknown attackers, state media reported.

Armed attackers descended on two patrol groups of soldiers and police officers in the border province of Sistan-Baluchestan, around 745 miles southeast of the capital city of Tehran, according to the Tehran Times.

No group had yet to claim responsibility for the attack as of 11:30 a.m. EDT Saturday.



The province is the country's second largest and borders Pakistan and Afghanistan. and armed clashes with drug traffickers or groups from the country's Sunni Islam minority population are common.

Iranian border officers also routinely encounter confrontations with the country's minority Baluch population. There are close to 6.9 million of the nomadic ethnic group in neighboring Pakistan and 2 million in Iran.

Armed attackers descended on two patrol groups of soldiers and police officers in the border province of Sistan-Baluchestan, around 745 miles southeast of the capital city of Tehran. File Photo by Maryam Rahmanian/UPIMore

Iranian officials have called for a full investigation into the deadly attack, which the country is referring to as an ambush.

The incident comes as Iran weathered overnight missile strikes launched by Israel. The strikes were in retaliation to Iranian ballistic missile barrages on Israel earlier in the month.

In April, 11 people were killed in two separate incidents in Pakistan's Balochistan region near the Iranian border.


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THE DREADED ISI

Pakistan appoints Lt General Asim Malik as head of powerful spy agency

Lt Gen Asim Malik to replace Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum as Director General of ISI and will take charge on Sept.30, 2024. Photo / X

Tariq Butt, Correspondent

Lt General Muhammad Asim Malik has been appointed as the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) to take charge of the position on September 30, the state-run Pakistan Television (PTV) announced on its official X account.

The new appointee is currently serving as the adjutant general at the General Headquarters (GHQ) of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, the statement said.

He will be replacing Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum, who was picked up for the position in 2021 by then-prime minister Imran Khan on the insistence of the then army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa.

In October 2021, then-Major General Asim Malik had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was then appointed the adjutant general.

During the course of his military career, he served in the Balochistan infantry division and commanded the infantry brigade in Waziristan, the PTV said and highlighted that he had been awarded a Sword of Honour during his army service.

Other than that, Gen Malik also served as the chief instructor at the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad and as an instructor at the Command and Staff College Quetta.

The military officer is a graduate of Fort Leavenworth in the United States and Royal College of Defence Studies in London, the statement added.

He belongs to a military family and his father Ghulam Muhammad was also a lieutenant general in the Pakistan Army.

The outgoing ISI chief retired from the army service last year, but was retained in this post after he was given extension in service.

The post of ISI director general, usually a serving military officer, is one of the most powerful positions in Pakistan, at the intersection of domestic politics, the military and foreign relations.

While the ISI chief technically reports to the prime minister, he is controlled by Pakistan’s army chief.

The shadow games of Pakistan's ISI

Friday, 23 August 2024 | Bhopinder Singh


Often accused of overstepping its professional bounds, ISI has become a player in domestic politics, international intrigue, and personal vendettas

Spy novelist John Le Carre describes spies as complicated and lonely beings, living double lives. Such seclusion makes deception, intrigue and unrequited ambition, their default mode. The fact that they know the deep and dark secrets but are still expected to comply by restrains occasionally leads them to flex their ‘privilege’ (read, confidential information) towards reckless ends. Because they are dangerously privy to so much dirt, they fear their ambition.

Like the proverbial Ceaser’s wife, must always be above suspicion – but often aren’t.Pakistan’s notorious spy agency Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) is infamous for going beyond its professional remit and dabbling in domestic politics, commercial interests or even partaking in cross-border dalliances, beyond their approved mandate. If the Pakistani Army Chief is the real power (pretence of civil politicians, notwithstanding), arguably the second most powerful person is the DG-ISI. Supposed loyalty to the Army Chief or to the PM (in times when the Army takes a backseat and politicians have an upper hand) is implicit, though, in the Pakistani narrative, backstabbing is common.

Ironically for such a powerful ‘number two’ post, there have been 29 DG-ISIs so far, and only one has ascended to the post of Army Chief i.e., the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir. It is reflective of the slippery slope that the post entails which invariably ends up making some power centres in Pakistan unhappy about their conduct e.g., Clergy, Politicians, Americans/Chinese or even their alma mater, the Pakistani ‘establishment’.

Even the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir was abruptly moved out as the DG-ISI as the then PM Imran Khan felt uncomfortable with his conduct (karma later evened out the equation as Imran finds himself languishing in the jail today). Seemingly the profile is for a loyal, unquestioning and low-key DG-ISI who does the job is satisfied with obscurity (shouldn’t be overambitious) and effectively rides into the sunset after retirement, without much fuss. Given the opportunity, lure and access, many do try to take their chances.

There is a curious case of one DG-ISI who did get appointed as the Army Chief, but his tenure was only for a few hours and the same does not go in official records as having become the Pakistani Army Chief. Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt was a typical DG-ISI who went across the Afghan border to meet the dreaded leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, to negotiate – he was in the thick of the dark corridors and machinations of the Pakistani State.

Ziauddin had direct access to the other competing power centre i.e., PM Nawaz Sharif, and was a willing accomplice in Sharif’s attempt to remove Pervez Musharraf as the Army Chief. Before the coup(or countercoup as Musharraf calls it), ‘General’ Ziauddin was hastily appointed the Army Chief and then immediately dumped by the Pakistani Army which refused to back their DG-ISI’s ambition. Spymaster’s gambit failed. Ziauddin was not the first or the last of DG-ISIs to harbour personal ambition beyond what was warranted constitutionally. The shadowy likes of Lt Gen Akhtar Rahman, Hamid Gul, Shamsur Kallu, Zaheerul Islam etc., operated with questionable interests. Yet another one who is in the news for harbouring extraconstitutional ambitions and paying the price for the same is the former DG-ISI, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed. Forced into premature retirement over his dubious role amid the recent turf war between the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (led by previous and current Army Chiefs i.e. Qamar Bajwa and Asim Munir, respectively) against the Imran Khan dispensation – he has been brought back to public news for having misused his then powerful position and arm-twisting people in some realty deal.

While he was earlier afforded a relatively face-saving ‘early retirement’ (though everyone knew better), he could be embarrassingly court-martialed to score fresh brownie points against the deposed Imran Khan dispensation (which Lt Gen Faiz Hameed is popularly believed to be identified with). Many acts of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed did suggest a rather megalomanic, cavalier and overreaching conduct that did not behove the role of spymasters, but perhaps the personal ambition had got the better of him. As the roll of the dice played out, the narrative changed and with it, he too was ousted. Only he is back for a possible second round of infamy and disrepute if the current dispensation has its ways.Whereas the unhinged politicians like Imran Khan who are desperately trying to save their skins and ingratiate themselves to the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (after realising that they are not going anywhere) have disowned and thrown Lt Gen Faiz Hameed under the proverbial bus! Instead of backing their henchman who did their bidding, Imran said, “if Faiz Hameed was involved, it should be investigated” and he welcomed the enquiry!

The whole saga says a lot about the unprofessionalism and complete absence of loyalty in overall governance, as exemplified by Lt Gen Faiz Hameed or by Imran Khan – the former was disloyal to his institution, and the latter to his word. As Israeli Michael Bar-Zohar notes in Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service, “Dirtiest actions should be carried out by the most honest men”, perhaps former DG-ISI Faiz Hameed wasn’t one and will pay the price, again.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views are personal)

Unity, faith, discipline – The ISI of Pakistan

Global Defense Insight
January 28, 2022


ISI was established by Australian army commander Major-General Walter Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8. Later, he became the chief of Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service. Cawthrone based ISI’s design on the British intelligence service MI-6 and the United States’ CIA.

Author Hein G. Kiessling’s book “Faith, Unity, Discipline – The ISI of Pakistan” gives readers a fascinating historical look into the secret world of one of the most admired and dreaded secret services of the modern age.

Kiessling explains ISI’s start and how it was first charged with carrying out foreign operations. He also goes into great detail on the pivotal events that changed the path of history and made ISI what it is today.

The author reflects on the ISI’s early failures, like Operation Gibraltar, which used irregulars to incite an uprising in Kashmir. Although General Ayub Khan approved the ideas, they did not pay off for Pakistan.

The writer explores the role of the ISI in East Pakistan. Its first attempt to inject religion into politics, which ended in failure, was to get enough support for Jammat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. While the Indian RAW, on the other hand, not only completed its core objective of dismembering Pakistan but also posed a threat to the ISI’s emergence as a secret organization.

For years, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was an underdeveloped and unknown organization. It became well-known in 1979 when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in support of their communist ally’s government. To defend the mujahideen against the Soviets, the organization collaborated with the CIA, an American intelligence agency by providing weapons and funding.

Since then, the ISI has expanded its sphere of influence throughout the region. The directorate’s support in Indian-held Kashmir, assistance to the Afghan Taliban, and potential ties to Al-Qaeda are all fiercely debated topics. It also puts the spotlight on the ISI’s participation in the country’s nuclear program and its covert role in the Dr. A.Q. Khan case.

This book provides an excellent overview of the ISI’s participation in internal politics and foreign counter-intelligence operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and North East India, among other places. It details the events of the 1990s when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto established an information-sharing network between the ISI and Pakistan’s foreign office for policy research and other purposes.

The author further claims that ISI wields diplomatic power through the appointment of former military generals as ambassadors.

One of the book’s most intriguing parts is its debunking of the misconception that ISI is a rogue organization. The author argues that such an idea does not exist and ISI is a well-established organization with a robust command structure overseeing the directorate’s operations.

Because there is little public discussion about ISI’s actions, the author’s attempt to dispel some of the agency’s clouds is pushed back.

The material in the book comes from the author’s personal networking with ISI professionals, as well as secondary source data, particularly from Indian academics that view ISI through a RAW lens. This book, on the other hand, succeeds in explaining the workings of intelligence as well as Pakistan’s politics and overall policies.

‘ISI didn’t plan the Taliban victory. The US facilitated it,’ says Adrian Levy

Open Conversation with Adrian Levy, author

Ullekh NP  | 27 Aug, 2021


(Illustration: Saurabh Singh)

Adrian Levy has never stayed back this long in London since he was 16, he says. The Covid-19 pandemic has confined him to his London home from where he currently gives interviews on the latest among several books he has co-authored with Cathy Scott-Clark who, these days, is tied up with an upcoming project: on the American use of torture. Like their previous works, their new book Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I. is an explosive volume that talks about the men and methods of the bitterly rival external intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The 360-page book offers valuable insights into various operations launched apparently by ISI and RAW, the 2019 Pulwama attack, the Pathankot airbase attack of 2016, the Parliament attack and also about people and assets.


There is much more in the book than what has often been said about the two agencies.

The duo, known for their superb investigations, have authored books and made films on jihad, geopolitics, strategy and foreign policy, among others. Their books include The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight; The Meadow: The Kashmir Kidnapping That Changed the Face of Modern Terrorism; The Siege: The Attack on the Taj; Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy.

In his conversation with Open, Levy dwells on the Afghan situation, the role of spy agencies in that country and warns against knee-jerk reactions on the part of the media and analysts to run into judgments on events, saying these could be profoundly damaging. As with terror attacks, he says it is important to understand the distinction between intelligence failures and the intent to allow things to run their course. Excerpts:

How many years did it take you to finish this book?

It’s a continuum for Cathy and myself. Each book is an overlapping enterprise rather than one book or film ending and another beginning. Work goes on concurrently and so it is more horizontal than vertical. For example, when we were doing The Meadow (the 2012 book about the 1995 kidnapping of tourists in Kashmir by an unnamed group to secure the release of dreaded Pakistani militant Maulana Masood Azhar), we had the idea of the Western hostage-taking in mind to look at the wider issue of disappearances. But we couldn’t do it for many years. Finally, after the earthquake happened in Kashmir (in 2005) and the security came down, we got to see the landscape of Kashmir.



Now, building relationships takes a long time. It is a decades-plus-long effort. Cathy must have worked from 1994 to until now, but in terms of specifics, the work on this started in 2009 when we were doing The Siege (on the 26/11 Mumbai attacks). We had this idea then of making a South Asian version of the Israeli film called The Gatekeepers, which is an intriguing, well-made, educative and entertaining documentary feature that got the Israeli security agency Shin Bet to open up. It gave a conflicting, overlapping narrative of oral history, not substantiated by paperwork, how they (members of Shin Bet who agreed to talk) saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We had this idea to make a film in which one of us would be on this side of the LoC and the other on the other side. We started conversations in 2009 with everybody, but on either side, not one person wanted to be on camera (from ISI or RAW).

The issue with spies is that they don’t want to be accountable to anyone. We kept working on it, with new RAW chiefs, new ISI chiefs, telling them to own the narrative. Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it although we kept pleading. So instead of a film we decided to write an oral book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan. But most of these people who spoke to us were people we knew since 1994.



When did you meet Major Iftikhar whom you describe in the book as the nom de guerre for an ISI operations officer?

We met him three years ago, but everyone else who provides the infrastructure were relationships we began when we were kids (laughs) and so they were genial. A lot of meetings, by the way, happened in the Gulf states, Thailand, a proxy territory for a lot of spy agencies. Some meetings took place in France, Germany, Syria, the US and England. These meetings overlapped with another project that is coming up: on American use of torture. We have an extremely thin level of budgeting and so we manage multiple projects together. Otherwise, it would be practically and economically impossible for two people who do freelance work and are not supported by institutions to do such projects.

Do Iftikhar and Monisha (the RAW agent who is a source for the authors) have multiple identities?

Yes. We keep interviews that go back to 1994. All the interviews are taped and transcribed, but we agreed to use trade names. Iftikhar was one of the identities he (the ISI operative) had used. He had five identities all the way from Korea in 1994 up until his vanishing. In fact, Iftikhar was his favourite nom de guerre. Monisha had several identities. She was not in clandestine service. She was an analyst.



In David Muntaner’s 2015 film CIA vs KGB: Battleground Berlin, CIA officers admit that KGB was slightly superior to them because of their ideological drive and commitment. Is that kind of faith-based passion at play between ISI and RAW?

It is a super-interesting question. I have got many different takes on that. I believe that it is true that both outfits take on a different mantle as the time changes. If you take a micro timeline, that is from 9/11 onwards, you can see that there is an evolution of ideology and character within those organisations. It will be tempting initially and incorrectly to say that India is taking on its ideological foe in ISI, which stands for an austere and extreme interpretation of Islam. That is to assume that RAW doesn’t have any politics. I touch upon this because that (giving such a perception) is one of RAW’s biggest achievements. Its projection of itself as benign and vanilla is something it does very effectively.


Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it. So instead of a film we decided to write a book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan

Both organisations have gone on interesting journeys. Both involve inculcation by a faith and a certain kind of worldview, a deepening of a religious-social worldview. It is certainly true of RAW and certainly true of ISI. Let’s not forget that a new kind of nationalism is emerging in India encouraged by the US post-2001. Therefore, the forces that become corrosive in Pakistan become corrosive in India, too. And yet the story is not told that way. You have jealousies on both sides.



Your book quotes Monisha saying that Lodhi Road (RAW headquarters) is dominated by IPS officers who think Muslims are duplicitous. How do you think such an attitude would restrict intel gathering against ISI?

I am not in the business of writing a transformative policy document. I am reporting (laughs). I will make an observation though. India’s Intelligence Bureau (the main internal intelligence agency), for example, has a certain number of Muslims but senior positions are mostly not filled by them with the probable exception of Asif Ibrahim. The organisation, according to insiders—and it is not my view—suffered incalculably because of that. If you look at all spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is all radical. In places like India, such reforms are only on paper.

The result of this attitude could be dangerous. Again, it is very easy to look at everything through the narrow prism of post-2014 politics when BJP returned to power. Actually, it involves a much longer timeline, all the way through various other governments. RAW officers tell you that the organisation does not reflect the humongous gifted communities of India and that it would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment.

Who do you think are the most effective, storied and feared officers of RAW and ISI?

It would be true to say much against the common beliefs that RAW and ISI have both been hugely effective. And yet, because they resist telling stories, what you tend to hear is hugely negative, such as big episodes of infiltration, collapses, the failures like 26/11, etcetera. There are many, many heroes. At a very senior level, I always found that (the late RAW chief) B Raman’s influence just cannot be overstated. He is an extraordinary person who brought in extraordinary changes, professionalism and rigour to RAW.



KC Verma is among such a breed of people who did the impossible, politically as well. A very good example of short-termism is that after 26/11 lots of people said to me that we never imagined the unimaginable. That’s just rubbish, right? What do the security services do? They imagine the unimaginable every day. People like Verma and Raman imagine the unimaginable and try to go into the unimaginable space, including the outreach to Iran, the outreach to China, the balancing of America, Iran and China, the outreach to Russia and so on. They played hugely sophisticated, big-country games that are never really well-documented. The courting of Israel is a story in its own right.

The illicit relationship with Israel, which took place in the 1990s at a time when it couldn’t even be acknowledged, goes right up to Pegasus today. So, I’ve named some of those people. Anyone who is really interested in this psychology of jihad, who is really interested in the pathology of political movements, wants to be with these people. You want to understand how and what are the influences that lead to the cell splitting, the creation of new ideologies and flavours. There is an enormous knowledge base in RAW and it is never shared with its own people.

What do you think is the role of ISI in the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan?

I think there are some useful handholds: in November 2001, ISI under General Ehsan ul Haq manoeuvred Saudi royals to front a deal to protect the Taliban and that was backed by the Tony Blair government, in parts, in the UK. They warned—collectively—that the movement could not be defeated and should be incorporated into what the US intended to do in Afghanistan.

That proposal was taken by the Saudi royal family and Blair to Dick Cheney who rejected it outright—just as he rejected a side deal with Iran which in 2002 and 2003 offered the bin Laden family and top military commanders in their custody, in return for normalisation of relations with the US. Cheney said then that Iran would fall after Iraq and the Taliban, and the US was not prepared for any deals or normalcy as it invaded Baghdad.

The Taliban victory is inspirational for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity

That deal was never forgotten by ISI—and Ehsan’s legacy would live on until 2006-07, when ISI and CIA parted ways, the relationship having soured completelyas ISI would not relinquish the idea. For its part, the US—by now distracted by civil war in Iraq—would not embrace it and could not persuade Pakistan to relinquish its strategic interests.

What we see here is not so much Pakistan’s manifest destiny or even long-haul planning but the abject failure of US policy to launch an impossible low-intensity war in Afghanistan, and then further dilute it with an illegal invasion of Iraq—and finally abandoning both Iraq and Afghanistan, while neighbours in Pakistan continued to hold on to their ambitions.

Imagine if Bush-Cheney had embraced the Saudi-Pak plan at the start and also taken control of the bin Laden family and Al Qaeda military commanders. How many lives would have been preserved? Impossible to know, but a painful thought.

ISI did not plan this victory. And what we are seeing is not the fall of Saigon. It is the failure of Kabul to rule all of Afghanistan, and for a centralised army to represent an ethnocentric nation. Kabul did not equal Afghanistan, ever. Taliban prevailed because the governors of provinces decided not to oppose them, and not to support corruption in Kabul, rather than acceding to the Taliban or their goals and ideals. Provincial governments voted against Kabul and enabled it to be encircled and occupied today. ISI did not do this. The US facilitated it.

How influential do you think RAW is in the Panjshir Valley, the seat of anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan?

ISI was attempting to make outreach here—but stumbled over the fact that a corps of officers, all forged in the 1980s war against the Soviets, held sway over Afghan policy. RAW was doing the same, and had contacts but inside the Panjshir Valley there seems to have been a feeling that these links would not amount to anything substantial—in terms of political capital, actual capital or mentoring.



If you look at spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is radical. In India, such reforms are only on paper. The result could be dangerous. RAW officers tell you that the organisation would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment

The outcome in Kabul is extraordinary—mostly for what it tells us about the US. The campaign to rout Al Qaeda became a war against the Taliban who were not responsible for 9/11. Seeking vengeance, the US lost its way and—instead of reassuring a terrified world post-9/11 and selling the idea of secular democracy—has worked to undo rules-bound systems.

Talibs are from Afghanistan and have regained power in their country upturning a meandering American project. They are not a terrorist movement but a group with stringent precepts and beliefs. So, let’s wait to see what they have become and what they want to achieve. Previously they have not sought influence or power outside Afghanistan. India, for example, was not their enemy. What is also unknown is what their attitude will be to the foreign radical elements in the country—the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Pakistan Taliban, and Sunni fighters from Iran and China. Will they continue to win shelter? Will they be allowed to recoup and strike from Afghanistan?

The Taliban victory is, of course, inspirational—for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. But will it grow movements inside the country or inspire others elsewhere? We don’t know is the short answer. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. There was a fraternal relationship, mentoring by Al Qaeda. And Taliban leaders have been ambiguous in their statements. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity. More government and greater authority rather than a lawless vacuum are preferable.

'Faith, Unity and Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan' reveals the agency's clandestine dynamics

Shantanu Mukharji • 

December 10, 2016,

A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning

Ordinarily , intelligence agencies involved in espionage and counter-espionage the world over are cloaked in deep mystery with people having negligible or no knowledge of their structure and working. Even if some segments of the society have knowledge, they are distorted and garbled .

For Indians, the Pakistan Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is seen as a monstrous and dreaded outfit threatening to harm India by fomenting multiple destructive problems. This belief is deep seated in the Indian mindset. But such a perception is not wide off the mark. A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning. Authored by Hein Kiessling, the book dispels all the misgivings surrounding the ISI and it adequately deals with all the questions about Pakistan’s unwieldy intelligence body which have perhaps not been answered as yet — making it a most readable book on the subject

The author, Dr Kiessling, has lived in Pakistan for thirteen long years (1989- 2002) enabling him to develop a close relationship with the ISI hierarchy and top leadership of Pakistani polity and military. A scholarly personality with history and political science as his forte, Kiessling is a PhD from a well known Munich university. Given his long exposure in Pakistan and close professional interactions with powerful players who mattered , he is best suited to come out with this magnum opus on the ISI.

The highlight of the book in the Indian context is ISI’s direct involvement in funding the Khalistani movement including sheltering of the Sikh extremists in Pakistan. The book adds that ISI threw itself into its Khalistan adventure from the early ’80s. Terrorist training camps for young Sikhs were set up in Karachi and Lahore. ISI had chalked out a three pronged blueprint: to precipitate the alienation of the Sikhs from mainstream India; emphasised the need to subvert the state machinery and trigger off mass agitation launching a reign of terror in Punjab. Further , ISI contributed to the high number of fatalities in Punjab by supplying sophisticated weaponry, adding to the arsenal of Sikh militants .

Continuing his revelations on the ISI machinations, Dr Kiessling writes that ISI had instructed one of the Khalistanis to receive training at a flying college in Mumbai, aimed at crashing at an off shore oil rig. This shows how deeply embedded the notorious ISI was way back in the ’90s, to strike at critical Indian infrastructure.

Glaring revelations are also mentioned in the book about active ISI complicity in the Indian Northeast. In 1990, ISI undercover operatives stationed in Pakistani embassy Dhaka got in touch with Naga insurgent groups — NSCN and ULFA — and commenced supply of arms to the Naga ultras and organised training to ULFA cadres in Pakistan. Several such batches were trained in arms and that eventually saw unleashing of terror in Assam and adjoining places. The Pak embassy Dhaka emerged as the hub of Indian Northeast operations. China too collaborated with ISI in the joint anti India (Northeast) activities which, inter alia, included funding, supply of weapons and providing safe havens to Northeast insurgents, wanted in India.

In the book under review , Kiessling has provided minute details about covert ISI operations in Kashmir, Northeast and Punjab. Readers would find the contents interesting to read themselves rather than to judge by this review alone.

Speaking about the budget of ISI, the author estimates the ‘official’ budget quantum stands today at a whopping USD 300 million. This is in addition to various other channels generating colossal extra funds for the ISI activities from drug trade, counterfeit money, foreign donations etc.

This book is recommended not only for the intelligence community but for all academics and students of Geopolitics to know the truth about the clandestine dynamics the ISI is engaged in to subvert and penetrate the Indian system . There is comprehensive mention of Indian RAW as well, but readers may like to discover themselves the ‘facts’ contained therein.

On the whole, this is worth a read as its 300-plus pages give some insight into the working of this draconian intelligence outfit targeting a diverse range of objectives employing most lethal means. Academically, the book carries the history of the ISI, profiles of their erstwhile chiefs, supported by illustrated plates .

The reviewer is a retired IPS officer and a senior fellow with the Indian Police Foundation. Follow him on Twitter: @Shantanu2818

ISI controlled Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound: Book

The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011.


Published: April 28, 2016 
By Press Trust of India


Washington, Apr 28: The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011, according to a new book. In fact, the doctor Amir Aziz, of the rank of major, who lived in a compound near bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, was rewarded by the CIA with a share of the USD 25 million bounty the US had put up because a DNA sample had conclusively proved the al-Qaeda leader’s identity.

In his latest book, ‘The Killing of Osama bin Laden’, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh claims that ISI got hold of bin Laden in 2006 after paying bribes to some of the tribal leaders. At the time he was said to be very ill. “Early on in his confinement at Abbottabad, the ISI had ordered Amir Aziz, a doctor and a major in the Pakistani army, to move nearby to provide treatment,” Hersh claims, basing his account on a conversation he had with an unidentified retired Pakistan Army official. (ALSO READ: Pakistan was aware of US operation that killed Osama Bin Laden : US Journalist)

And all this while the Pakistani leadership in particular the army chief and ISI boss repeatedly told the US that they did not know the whereabouts of bin Laden. “It’s understood in Washington that elements of the ISI believe that maintaining a relationship with the Taliban leadership inside Afghanistan is essential to national security. The ISI’s strategic aim is to balance Indian influence in Kabul.

“The Taliban is also seen in Pakistan as a source of jihadist shock troops who would back Pakistan against India in a confrontation over Kashmir,” Hersh said in his book that hit stores early this month. “The Pakistanis also know that their trump card against aggression from India is a strong relationship with the United States. They will never cut their person-to-person ties with us,” a senior retired army official is quoted as saying.

Hersh claims that the CIA came to know about bin Laden’s hideout from a senior Pakistani intelligence official who betrayed the secret in return for much of the USD 25 million reward offered by the US. The said official is now living near Washington along with his family.

Hersh said his information collected from US intelligence and other sources was vetted by former ISI head Asad Durrani.

Pakistan's ISI, a hidden, frustrating power for U.S.

By Reuters

October 8, 2010

By Michael Georgy

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Top U.S. defense officials are concerned some elements of Pakistan's main spy agency may be interacting improperly with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, a Pentagon spokesman said on Thursday.
Colonel David Lapan said Pakistani army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, himself a former spy chief, was aware of U.S. concerns about the military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and shared some of them.

Here are some questions and answers about the ISI, the most powerful intelligence agency in Pakistan, a country the United States sees as indispensable to its efforts to tame a raging Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

HOW POWERFUL IS THE ISI?
The shadowy military intelligence agency has evolved into what some describe as a state within a state.
Widely feared by Pakistanis, it is believed to have a hidden role in many of the nuclear-armed nation's policies, including in Afghanistan, one of U.S. President Barack Obama's top foreign policy priorities.

The ISI is seen as the Pakistani equivalent of the U.S. Central Agency (CIA) -- with which it has had a symbiotic but sometimes strained relationship -- and Israel's Mossad.
Its size is not publicly known but the ISI is widely believed to employ tens of thousands of agents, with informers in many spheres of public life.
Hardline elements within the ISI are capable of being spoilers, no matter what position a Pakistani government might take, a reality the U.S. and Afghan governments should take into account if they attempt to exclude Pakistan from negotiations with the Afghan Taliban.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S PAST?

Created in 1948, the ISI gained importance and power during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and is now rated one of best-organized intelligence agencies in the developing world.

The ISI along with the United States and Saudi Arabia, nurtured the Afghan mujahideen, or Muslim holy warrior guerrillas, and helped them win the war. It helped to plan many of their operations and was the main conduit for Western and Arab arms. It later helped create the Taliban.

Although Pakistan officially abandoned support for the Taliban after joining the U.S.-led war against al Qaeda and Taliban, critics, including Western military commanders in Afghanistan, say it has maintained its ties with, and support for, the Afghan Taliban. The military denies supporting the Taliban but says agents maintain links with militants, as any security agency would do, in the interests of intelligence.

Analysts say the main preoccupation of the ISI, and the Pakistani military, is the threat from nuclear-armed rival India and it sees the Afghan Taliban as tools to influence events, and limit India's role, in Afghanistan.

The ISI was heavily involved in the 1990s in creating and supporting Islamist factions that battled Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. Some of those groups have since joined forces with the Pakistani Taliban to attack the state, including the ISI. That militants alliance may be the biggest threat to Pakistan's long-term security, analysts say.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP?

Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha is the director general of the ISI and a close ally of Kayani. Pasha is seen as anti-Taliban, unlike some of his predecessors, and analysts suggest he is using the ISI to broker some sort of deal between factions of the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government. Although he is seen as relatively moderate, the ISI is almost certain to come under a new wave of pressure as the United States gets increasingly frustrated with the army's perceived reluctance to go after Afghan Taliban fighters who cross the border to attack Western forces in Afghanistan. But the strategic interests of the ISI, headquartered in a sprawling, well-guarded complex in Islamabad, will invariably come first, analysts say.

(Additional reporting by Chris Allbritton; Editing by Zeeshan Haider and Robert Birsel)

The ISI, Pakistan's notorious and feared spy agency, comes in from the cold

In its own land the agency is viewed with awe and dread. Now it is opening up – a little – to western journalists


Declan Walsh, 

Islamabad

THE GUARDIAN
Wed 5 Aug 2009 


The entrance is suitably discreet: a single barrier near a small hospital off a busy Islamabad highway. Bougainvillea spills over long walls with barbed wire; a plain-clothes man packing a pistol questions visitors. Further along, soldiers emerge to check for bombs.

Then a giant electric gate slides back to reveal a sleek grey building that would not look out of place on a California technology campus. With one difference: nothing is signposted.

Welcome to the headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, Pakistan's premier spy agency. Powerful and notorious in equal measure, for decades the ISI has operated behind a dense veil of secrecy, impervious to allegations of election rigging, terrorist training, abduction and assassination. Many Pakistanis call it the "state within a state".

Now, though, the ISI is coming in from the cold. Over the past year the agency has invited a stream of western journalists into its swish, modern nerve centre. Over tea and PowerPoint briefings, spies give details of some of Pakistan's most sensitive issues – the Taliban insurgency, the hunt for al-Qaida, the troubled relationship with India.

"We've started to open up a little," said an ISI official authorised to speak to the press. "In the past, irrespective of whether we did something, we were getting blamed for it. Now we want to reach out and get our point of view across."

Yet rehabilitating the ISI's image would tax the most inventive spin doctor. For 30 years its covert operations have been at the sharp end of Pakistani policy, supporting Islamist extremists fighting Indian soldiers in Kashmir, and boosting the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.

At home the agency is viewed with awe and dread. It is the eyes and ears of military power, with huge phone and email monitoring capability and a wide network of informers.

Some Pakistanis refer to its agents – who often wear white shalwar kameez – as "the angels". Under President Pervez Musharraf they abducted hundreds of people, some of whom were allegedly tortured.

Recently, though, it has been the agency's turn to be on the receiving end.

Last May suicide bombers hit an ISI office in Lahore, killing a colonel; in the tribal areas militants have killed 57 agents and wounded 86. Security is tight at the Islamabad headquarters, where last month the ISI asked its next-door neighbour – the city authority – to move to another neighbourhood.

Influencing the local press has always been part of ISI operations, usually through bribes, blandishments or intimidation. But it rarely reached out to the foreign press, until now.

"This is totally unprecedented," said Stephen Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution policy research organisation in Washington. "It seems to be part of a new openness in the military. They're worried about caricatures of Pakistan, especially in the foreign press, such as people saying the country is going to break up in three months."

The briefings, which take place about once a week, belie the agency's gritty image. Reporters are shepherded into a wood-panelled conference room with soft armchairs, a long table and a wall-mounted screen.


Officials in business suits, who could pass for middle management in any company, introduce themselves without full name or job title.

During the interview liveried servants ferry in trays of tea and fried snacks, served on ISI crockery. Smoking is allowed.

Officials speak openly, but journalists expecting them to gush state secrets may be disappointed. Every talk is carefully vetted in advance. "We're opening up but it's not a total glasnost," said the unofficial spokesman.

The ajar-door policy got off to a rocky start last year when the newly appointed ISI chief, Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, told Der Spiegel that the Taliban had a right to "freedom of opinion". The agency later said he misspoke. Now, though, it is paying dividends. Two weeks ago a front page lead in the New York Times, highlighting Pakistani concerns with the US military surge in Afghanistan, was sourced from an ISI briefing.

The agency was pleased. "That was the first time [the journalist] carried both sides of the argument," said the ISI official. "I think we are getting there."

The bolder media policy is part of a wider global trend. The CIA and MI6 have always maintained relationships with selected journalists, an engagement whose importance has increased amid the furore over torture and abduction allegations.

For journalists, the challenge is to sift fact from propaganda. In a recent briefing to the Guardian, ISI officials suggested Indian officials had orchestrated last November's Mumbai attacks. The Indians wanted to cover up an investigation into Hindu extremism, they said.

Days later Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving gunman from the massacre, told an Indian court how he had been trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani jihadi outfit with links to the ISI.

In the briefing the ISI also accused New Delhi of supplying arms and explosives to the Pakistan Taliban, even though the Taliban has killed Indians inside Afghanistan.

"Circles within circles," said an ISI official when asked to explain the apparent contradictions. "It makes an excellent plot for a Le Carré novel."

Western officials quietly support some ISI contentions, such as covert Indian support for nationalist rebels in Baluchistan. But more than anything the briefings reveal how the ISI's world view is framed by its decades-old enmity with India.

"They tell you a lot about themselves even when they don't know it," said Bruce Riedel, a retired CIA official, Obama adviser and trenchant ISI critic. The contradiction at the heart of agency policy, he said, is its support for Islamist militants: "That can't be removed by clever briefings."

Still, the old cliches about the spy collective being a "state within a state" or a "rogue agency" are out of date. These days it is said to be firmly in the grip of the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, who previously ran the agency for three years.

But the new openness does underscore the country's fragile balance of power. Two weeks ago The Hindu reported that the ISI's Pasha had invited Indian diplomats to deal with him directly, bypassing President Asif Ali Zardari's government.

"Formally, Zardari has a lot of power. But on the ground he's not too strong right now," said analyst and newspaper editor Najam Sethi.

Despite its new openness, the ISI remains in the shadows. One question stands out: as well as improving its image, is it ready to really change its stripes? At headquarters, nobody can give a straight answer. Circles within circles, as they say.

 

BALOCHISTAN IS A NATION

Dispelling Myths: Recognizing The True Baloch Identity Amidst Misconceptions – OpEd

Baluchistan, Pakistan. Credit: VOA

 September 14, 2024  0 Comments

By Sehrish Khan

The heart cries tears of blood over the situation in Balochistan. In 2006, an American Colonel Ralph Peter presented a new map of the region titled “Blood Borders” in the American Defense Journal, which is considered the world’s largest defense magazine, showing Balochistan separated from Pakistan.

It was and this is the real agenda of the colonial forces, for the fulfillment of which brutal terrorists and separatist elements are burning Balochistan in the fire of terrorism with their successive heinous incidents. To deal with these conspiracies of the enemy, the top military and civil leadership in the Apex Committee meeting decided to root out terrorism from Balochistan. Undoubtedly, it is the sincere determination of the Pakistan Army that they are offering daily sacrifices of their lives for the motherland.

It is a moment of thought that Balochistan has been made a Battle Ground. Indian intelligence agency is sponsoring sabotage in Balochistan. In Balochistan, RAW along with BLA fueled Baloch nationalism. Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front, Baloch Liberation Organization and Lashkar-e Balochistan are gritty for independent Balochistan. Five districts of Balochistan, Sibi, Khuzdar, Turbat, Quetta and Dera Bugti are severely affected by the killings of these organizations. In the name of nationalism, Baloch Liberation Army is involved in other subversive activities including target killing, firing on trains, explosions, blowing up railway tracks and blowing up gas pipelines in these districts.

According to sources, there are three camps of TTP in Kabul and two training camps of BLA in Jalalabad which are running under the patronage of RAW. More than 400 BLA terrorists are receiving training in these camps and are targeting Chinese citizens in Pakistan at the behest of their foreign masters, they have advanced weapons and communication systems. It was also revealed that banned organizations also receive a share of the proceeds from the smuggling of Iranian oil in Balochistan. Many banned Baloch armed organizations including Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front are directly involved in oil smuggling. BLA has also been involved in gang wars in Karachi. BLA had started terrorist activities in Pakistan on India’s behalf, in return for these activities, RAW provides arms, ammunition and financial support to the terrorists. 

However, the ongoing skirmish in Balochistan has led to widespread misconceptions about the Baloch people. One of the most damaging of these misconceptions is the tendency to equate the entire Baloch community with terrorism. This is not only a gross oversimplification but also an injustice to the vast majority of Baloch citizens who are loyal, peace-loving Pakistanis. It is essential to distinguish between a group of insurgents and the larger Baloch population, who have made significant contributions to Pakistan’s development and prosperity.

The Baloch people, one of the major ethnic groups in Pakistan, have a rich cultural heritage and a deep sense of pride in their identity. Historically, the Baloch have played a crucial role in the formation of Pakistan, contributing to its political, social, and economic development. The contributions of the Baloch community are evident in their active participation in Pakistan’s armed forces, where many Baloch soldiers have served with distinction, defending the nation’s borders. The insurgents, who engage in acts of terrorism, do not represent the Baloch people or their aspirations.

Unfortunately, the actions of these few have led to a dangerous narrative that paints the entire Baloch community with the same brush. It alienates the Baloch people, who are already facing socio-economic challenges and undermines their contributions to the country. Labeling an entire ethnic group as terrorists based on the actions of a few insurgents is a disservice to the nation and an insult to the Baloch citizens who have sacrificed so much for Pakistan.

To overcome this narrative, the media and educational institutions have a role to play in dispelling myths about the Baloch people. By highlighting the positive contributions of Baloch citizens and promoting their rich cultural heritage, these institutions can help build a more inclusive and united Pakistan.

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Sehrish Khan

Sehrish Khan is a freelancer and media activist. She writes on political developments 

and security issues with special focus on South Asia and the region.

 

An election without electors in Iran

WEDNESDAY 3 JULY 2024, BY BABAK KIA

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, elections are always held outside the ballot box. Admittedly, the accidental death of the President of the Republic, Ebrahim Raissi, triggered early elections, but above all it rekindled speculation about the succession of the Leader Ali Khamenei. But this does not change the nature of the regime.

The real power is in the hands of the Leader, those close to him and the Guardians of the Revolution. The Council of Guardians of the Constitution has validated only six of the eighty candidatures submitted.

A SECOND ROUND FOR THE SECOND TIME IN HISTORY

Ali Larijani, former Speaker of Parliament, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former President of the Republic, were not authorized to stand. Similarly, the main candidates from the so-called “reformist” current were rejected.

On the other hand, the Council of Guardians of the Constitution validated the candidacy of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, former mayor of Tehran and former president of parliament, famous for massive embezzlement of public money and corruption, as well as that of Saïd Djalili, an ultraconservative, former nuclear negotiator, one of the Guide’s two representatives on the National Security Council and a supporter of a tougher regime, particularly with regard to the street and women. Facing these two candidates, Mahmoud Pezeshkian represents the "reformist" current. He is supported by former presidents Rohani and Khatami.

The two candidates who qualified for the second round are Mahmoud Pezeshkian and Saïd Djalili, the “reformist” candidate having obtained around 1 million more votes than his opponent. It should be noted that this is the second time in the history of presidential elections that there will be a second round. Coming a distant third, Ghalibaf called on his voters to vote for Djalili on Friday 5 July.

“WE’VE GOT THE RESULTS, WE JUST DON’T HAVE THE VOTERS”

The real news lies elsewhere. The first round saw a record abstention rate, marking a massive rejection by the population.

The official results show a national turnout of 39%. While abstention was even higher in outlying regions, notably Sistan-Baluchistan and Kurdistan, it was also higher in Greater Tehran, where the turnout was less than 25%. Even in the holy city of Qom, the turnout did not exceed 25%... To this must be added the percentage of spoilt ballots, which was close to 5%.

Yet the main issue for the Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the dignitaries of the regime is the legitimization of their power. Everything was done to encourage a high turnout. The authorities even extended the opening of polling stations until midnight.

Calls to vote from the highest levels of government went on and on. There were many “incentives” to turn out. Even in prisons, where inmates were put under extremely strong pressure to vote. But following the example of Nobel Peace Prize winner Narges Mohammadi and imprisoned trade unionists, prisoners of conscience called for a boycott.

The Iranian people know that elections in Iran are nothing but a parody of democracy. A popular joke has the authorities saying: “We have the results, we just don’t have the voters”.

A REFERENDUM AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

One year after the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, against a backdrop of deep economic crisis and ongoing repression, this turnout is a referendum against the Islamic Republic. The people of Iran have only one objective: to put an end to the capitalist and religious dictatorship that is the Islamic Republic as quickly as possible. The "Women, Life, Freedom" movement has shown the way. Social and political change will come about through massive mobilization of young people, women, national minorities, workers and the unemployed, in the streets, places of study and workplaces.

3 July 2024

Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.

P.S.

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ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

• une-elections-without-electors-in-iran_a8579.pdf (PDF - 906.2 KIB)
  Extraction PDF [->article8579]
• an-election-without-electors-in-iran_a8579.pdf (PDF - 906.2 KIB)
  Extraction PDF [->article8579]

Iran

• Campaign to stop the execution of rapper and metal worker Toomaj Salehi
• The mullahs weakened, the people’s struggle continues
• "Tehran found itself backed into a corner by the attack on its consulate."
• Myths and legends of domination
• Pakistan Iran border attacks: in historic perspectives

• Babak Kia

  Babak Kia is an activist in “Solidarité Socialiste avec les Travailleurs en Iran” and member of the Fourth International.

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