Showing posts sorted by date for query CORRUPTION. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query CORRUPTION. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Sunday, April 19, 2026

Soaring tungsten prices add impetus to Vietnam mine sale effort


Some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Hanoi, in Thai Nguyen province, a massive open-cut mine tears into the landscape. Ringed by dense, green hills, the vast, stepped crater is raw gray and brown. Along its sides, huge trucks creep along, while a murky pool lies stagnant at the bottom.

This is Nui Phao, a mine that’s key to Vietnam’s foothold in the global critical minerals market. It contains one of the world’s most important, and largest, non-China sources of tungsten, a metal essential for everything from chips and drilling equipment to armor-piercing weaponry.

With the value of the super-dense material soaring as countries ramp up defense budgets, it’s little wonder Nui Phao’s owner, Masan High-Tech Materials, a unit of Masan Group, is amping up its search for strategic investors.

“We’ve been talking to Japanese, Australian, European and American strategic” investors, Masan Group deputy chief executive officer Michael Hung Nguyen told Bloomberg News after a media tour of the mine on Friday. “A lot of interest is coming from people who want to secure supply.”

With Masan looking to conduct a public listing at some point, “anybody with a strategic equity stake we would obviously be providing a progressive offtake agreement to sweeten the deal and make it long term.”

Masan High-Tech is currently preparing to transfer its shares from Vietnam’s Unlisted Public Company Market, or UpCom, to the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange and hopes that can be done as early as the first quarter of 2027, Masan Group CEO Danny Le told a shareholder meeting on Thursday.

China is the world’s main producer of tungsten and also holds the largest reserves. In February last year, it tightened tungsten export controls to protect its own domestic stash. As the Trump administration intensifies efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains, the material has become one of the metals caught in the crossfire.

“Tungsten is in many ways the model ‘critical mineral’ — production is dominated by China, Beijing has implemented export controls, the US has no domestic mine production, and it is an essential and difficult-to-substitute input to important commercial and defense technologies,” said Chris Kennedy, economic statecraft lead, Bloomberg Economics.

The 921-hectare Nui Phao project, which is licensed until 2034, is one of the biggest producers of tungsten outside China, according to the mine’s operator. With an estimated 3,000 tons in total, Vietnam was the world’s No. 2 producer of tungsten behind Beijing last year, according to the US Geological Survey.

Although Masan is seeking to reduce its stake in Masan High-Tech and bring in a strategic partner, with tungsten central to advanced manufacturing and defense supply chains, any transaction will carry geopolitical significance.

Prospective investors will likely be evaluated not only on financial terms but also on their alignment with party chief and newly appointed President To Lam’s broader industrial policy objectives, including technology transfer, downstream processing and long-term value creation within the domestic economy.

“Critical minerals are a highly sensitive area in Vietnam, so bringing in a partner is in many ways also about choosing a long-term technological partner,” Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute said. “The government is likely to look beyond the financial terms and ask whether a prospective investor fits Vietnam’s broader ambitions.”

Even though Masan is a private company, it will “still need to take those considerations into account,” he said.

Vietnam holds other significant critical minerals deposits too, notably bauxite and titanium, and it’s home to the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths. This could provide Hanoi with leverage as it seeks to develop an industry essential to powering cutting-edge technologies, electric vehicles and the broader green transition.

Masan High-Tech’s mine also produces fluorspar, an industrial mineral that’s used in lithium-ion batteries, bismuth, a metal that’s used in green energy and high-tech electronics, and copper.

But despite its abundant reserves, Vietnam has so far failed to capitalize well on its natural resources.

Complex regulatory hurdles and opaque licensing processes have deterred investors, along with a corruption scandal involving one of the biggest Vietnamese rare earth firms. A new Geology and Mineral Law in 2024 was aimed at improving access to more foreign investors.

In December, the law was amended to restrict exports of unprocessed rare earth ores, signaling a shift toward higher-value domestic processing. That fits with To Lam’s desire to move up the value chain as the country strives for 10% growth.

The European Union, the US and Australia are all positioning themselves to access Vietnam’s critical materials. In January’s upgrade of ties with the EU, both sides agreed to deepen cooperation, including through promoting sustainable mining and processing technologies.

“The EU is ready to support Vietnam in developing its own independent value chain to ensure its strategic autonomy and ensure that both the EU and Vietnam have the necessary critical raw materials for the energy and digital transitions,” EU Ambassador to Vietnam, Julien Guerrier, said. “This is very much in line with what we agreed on in January as we upgraded our partnership with Vietnam to a comprehensive strategic one.”

The US meanwhile, when then-President Joe Biden visited Hanoi in 2023, highlighted improving technical cooperation to support Vietnam’s efforts on rare earth reserves. Last August, Australia hosted a Vietnamese fact-finding delegation aimed at expanding sustainable mineral development as part of its deepening cooperation with the Southeast Asian nation.

While Vietnam is seeking foreign capital and technical overseas know-how, the sector remains dominated by state-owned groups such as Vinacomin, with international investors typically limited to joint ventures.

Australia’s Blackstone Minerals holds a majority interest in the Ban Phuc nickel mine in Son La province. However the mine was suspended between 2016 and 2018 due to financial losses.

In the company’s latest half-year financial report, it said it had struck an agreement with Xuan Loc Tho Co. to progress development, although it classified the mine and planned refinery as a “discontinued operation.”

Masan has had some success wooing overseas suitors before. In 2024, it sold its stake in H.C. Starck’s global tungsten business to Japan’s Mitsubishi Materials Corp. and used the proceeds to pay down debt and refocus on its core business.

Masan High-Tech reported preliminary net profit after tax of 537 billion dong ($20.4 million) in the first quarter, surpassing what it cleared for all of 2025.

The company plans to tap into a further 28 million tons of underground reserves in the current complex, and another 20-21 million tons in the mine’s west pit.

“We have already submitted the application for the exploration license that we are expecting to get within this year,” Aditya Agarwal, Masan High-Tech Materials deputy CEO said.

(By Francesca Stevens and Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen)


Pope Leo XIV condemns 'logic of extractivism' in Angola visit

Pope Leo XIV denounced the “social and environmental disasters” linked to a “logic of extractivism” on Saturday, the first day of his visit to Angola, a country marked by decades of exploitation of its vast resources.



Issued on: 18/04/2026 - 
By: FRANCE 24 

Pope Leo XIV speaks as he attends a meeting with the authorities, civil society and the diplomatic corps in Luanda, Angola on April 18, 2026. © Guglielmo Mangiapane, Reuters



Pope Leo XIV challenged Angola’s leaders to break the "cycle of interests” that have plundered and exploited Africa for centuries, as he arrived in the southern African country on Saturday with a message of encouragement for its long-suffering people.

Leo's arrival in Angola, the oil-and-mineral rich former Portuguese colony, marked the third leg of his four-nation African voyage. En route from Cameroon, he spoke again of the ongoing back-and-forth with US President Donald Trump over the Iran war.

Leo, history’s first US-born pope, said that it was “not in my interest at all” to debate Trump, but that he would continue preaching the Gospel message of peace, justice and brotherhood in Africa.

Pope vs Trump: Has the week of tension weakened the US president?
© France 24
15:44


In Angola, Leo met with President Joao Lourenco and delivered his first speech to Angolan government authorities, in which he referred repeatedly to Angola’s tortured history of colonial plunder and civil war.

“I desire to meet you in the spirit born of peace and to affirm that your people possess treasures that cannot be bought or stolen,” he said. "There dwells within you a joy that not even the most adverse circumstances have been able to extinguish.”

Angola, which has a population of around 38 million, gained independence from Portugal in 1975. But it still bears the scars of a devastating civil war that began straight after independence and raged on and off for 27 years before finally ending in 2002. More than a half-million people are believed to have been killed.

For years, the civil war was a Cold War proxy conflict, with the US and apartheid South Africa backing one side and the Soviet Union and Cuba backing the other.

Angola is now the fourth-largest oil producer in Africa and among the world’s top 20 producers, according to the International Energy Agency. The country is also the world’s third diamond producer and has significant deposits of gold and highly sought after critical minerals.

But despite its varied natural resources, the World Bank estimated in 2023 that more than 30 percent of the population lived on less than $2.15 a day.

“You know well that all too often people have looked – and continue to look – to your lands in order to give, or, more commonly, in order to take,” Leo told the Angolan authorities.

The pontiff said: “It is necessary to break this cycle of interests, which reduces reality, and even life itself, to mere commodities.”

While in Cameroon, Leo had railed against the “chains of corruption” that were hindering development, as well as the “handful of tyrants” who were ravaging Earth with war and exploitation. He raised similar points in Angola.

“How much suffering, how many deaths, how many social and environmental disasters are brought about by this logic of extractivism! At every level, we see how it sustains a model of development that discriminates and excludes, while still presuming to impose itself as the only viable option.”

Leo and 'the tyrants': Does new pope's defiant message resonate?
debate1604 © France 24
43:10



Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the late former president who led Angola for 38 years from 1979 to 2017, was accused of diverting billions of dollars of public money to his family, largely from the country’s oil revenue, as millions struggled in poverty.

After Lourenco took over as president, his administration estimated that at least $24 billion was stolen or misappropriated by dos Santos. Lourenco’s administration has vowed to crack down on corruption and has worked to recover funds allegedly stolen during the dos Santos era.

But critics note that Angola still has deep problems with corruption and have questioned if Lourenco’s actions were more aimed at political rivals so as to consolidate his power.

Angola, on the southwest coast of Africa, was considered to be the epicenter of the trans-Atlantic slave trade as a Portuguese colony. More than 5 million of the roughly 12.5 million enslaved Africans were sent across the ocean on ships departing from Angola, more than any other country, though not all of them were Angolans.

The highlight of Leo’s visit to Angola is expected to be his visit on Sunday to Muxima, south of Luanda. It’s a popular Catholic shrine in a country where around 58 percent of the population is Catholic.

The Church of Our Lady of Muxima was built by Portuguese colonizers at the end of the 16th century as part of a fortress complex and became a hub in the slave trade. It remains a reminder of the inextricable link hundreds of years ago between Roman Catholicism and the exploitation of the African continent.

Leo has Black and white ancestors who included both enslaved people and slave owners, according to genealogical research. He's going to Muxima to pray the rosary, in recognition of the site becoming a popular pilgrimage destination after believers reported an appearance by the Virgin Mary around 1833.

(FRANCE 24 with AP)

Pope Leo warns AI boom could fuel polarisation, violence in Cameroon address

The proliferation of artificial intelligence could spread “polarisation, conflict, fear and violence”, Pope Leo XIV told students at the Catholic University of Central Africa in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé on Friday. The pope has slammed tyrants, corruption and neocolonial world powers over the course of his 11-day tour of Africa.


Issued on: 17/04/2026 - 
By: FRANCE 24

Pope Leo XIV arrives in procession to celebrate Mass at the Japoma Stadium, in Douala, Cameroon, Friday, April 17, 2026 on the fifth day of his 11-day pastoral visit to Africa. © Andrew Medichini, AP

Pope Leo XIV on Friday warned against the use of AI to fan "polarisation, conflict, fear and violence" and criticised the "environmental devastation" caused by the extraction of rare earths to fuel the digital boom.

"The challenge posed by these systems is greater than it appears: it is not just about the use of new technologies, but about the gradual replacement of reality by its simulation," he said in a speech at the Catholic University of Central Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

"In this way, polarisation, conflict, fear and violence spread. What is at stake is not merely the risk of error, but a transformation in our very relationship with truth."

The pope had earlier held a giant open-air Mass at a stadium in Cameroon's economic capital Douala, the biggest event of a visit marked by his calls for peace and spat with US President Donald Trump.

More than 120,000 people attended the celebration, the Vatican said based on local authority figures, with some travelling far or arriving the previous night for a chance to see the leader of the world's 1.4 billion Catholics.

Amid a heavy security presence, Cameroonians began filing into the stadium on Thursday, staying there overnight ​so they could witness Leo’s homily in person.

Leo, the first ‌US pope, on Thursday criticised leaders who spend billions on wars and, in unusually forceful remarks, said the world was “being ravaged by a handful of tyrants”.

After arriving in Douala by plane from Yaoundé, Leo ​said on Friday that many in Cameroon experience "material and spiritual poverty" but called on believers to reject violence as a ‌means to get ahead, regardless of the hardships they face.

"Do not give in to distrust and discouragement," the pope urged, in an appeal made in English during a speech that was otherwise mostly in French.

"Reject every form of abuse or violence, which deceives by promising easy gains but hardens the heart and makes ‌it insensitive."

The pontiff invoked the miracle of the loaves and fishes recounted in the Gospels, in which Jesus fed thousands with meagre resources.

"There is bread for everyone if it is given to everyone," he said. "There is bread for ​everyone if it is taken, not with a hand that snatches away, but with a hand that gives."

Leo's call for caution towards AI came after Trump on Sunday posted an AI-generated image portraying himself as a Christ-like figure with a glowing halo. The image was taken down on Monday.

The pontiff conceded that "Christians, and especially young African Catholics, must not be afraid of new things".

But the continent "also knows the darker side of the environmental and social devastation caused by the relentless pursuit of raw materials and rare earths", he added.

The AI boom is largely reliant on the extraction of cobalt needed to run energy-hungry data servers, with Africa often bearing the environmental, social and human cost of mining.
'Hope will come to rise again'

Notably, competition for the Democratic Republic of Congo's rich veins of cobalt, copper, lithium and coltan has fuelled a spiral of violence in the mineral-rich east that has lasted three decades.

On a 11-day tour across Africa, the pontiff has also decried violations ​of international law by “neocolonial” world powers and said “the whims of the rich and ​powerful” threaten peace.

Cameroon, an oil- and cocoa-producing country, faces ​grave security challenges, including a simmering Anglophone conflict in which thousands of people have been killed since 2017.

Crowds greeting the ​pope on his visit have been enthusiastic, lining the streets along his routes and wearing colourful fabrics featuring images of his face.

Bishop Leopold Bayemi Matjei called Leo’s visit “a moment of great joy” and said he hoped it meant God would bless Cameroon.

“Our ⁠country needs a lot of blessing, a powerful blessing, so that hope will come to rise again,” ⁠said the bishop, ​who leads the Church in Obala, about an hour north of Yaounde.

(FRANCE 24 with Reuters and AFP)



Saturday, April 18, 2026

New Hungarian PM's campaign silence on gay rights worries activists

In his winning campaign, Peter Magyar focused on corruption, the cost of living and Hungary’s place in Europe – but stayed silent on LGBTQI+ rights, which were chipped away under former prime minister Viktor Orban. For Tamas Dombos, a Budapest-based gay rights activist, Magyar’s caution is both understandable and unsettling.


Issued on: 15/04/2026 - RFI

Demonstrators protest against former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban in Budapest, 14 June, 2021. REUTERS - MARTON MONUS

By: Jan van der Made

“They very strategically and tactically avoided discussing this topic,” says Dombos, director of the Hatter Society.

"They did not want this topic to dominate the election campaign, they avoided it as much as possible. They focus on issues that are not divisive, such as healthcare or corruption."

The concern, he says, is that Magyar “failed to make very clear commitments to LGBTQI+ rights” – even as he promised to end the erosion of rights seen throughout the Orban years.


A series of laws

Orban came to power in 2010, and what followed was not a dramatic crackdown but rather, according to Dombos, “a series of [pieces of] legislation being adopted that curtailed the rights of LGBTQI+ people”.

Dombos says the state pushed through laws banning legal gender recognition, restricting adoption, removing gender identity from anti-discrimination rules, limiting minors’ access to LGBTQI+ content and banning Pride-related activities.

“So our work got more difficult, but not to the level of making it impossible,” he says. “The difficulties here came more from banning certain types of activities.”

Tamas Dombos, director of the Hatter Society, in Budapest, 9 April. © RFI/Jan van der Made

The impact was especially severe on transgender people and young LGBTQI+ Hungarians.

“Many people decided to leave the country or were considering it,” said Dombos.

Others, he says, stayed and responded by mobilising. “They stood up for their own rights. They started volunteering in organisations.”


How Hungary eroded LGBTQI+ rights under Orban
May 2020: Ban of legal recognition for trans and intersex people
December 2020: Amendment to the constitution to include the phrases "father is male, mother is female” and "children’s right to identity based on sex at birth"
December 2020: Restriction of adoption by unmarried people
December 2020: Abolishment of the Equal Treatment Authority
June 2021: Ban on promotion or portrayal of homosexuality, transgender identity and gender reassignment for minors
August 2021: Amendment of commerce decree to ban the display and sale of products with LGBT content within 200 metres of schools and churches, and to require such products are packaged and displayed separately
March 2025: Ban of LGBT-themed assemblies, and introduction of facial recognition to monitor participants
April 2025: Amendment to the constitution to include the phrase "human is male or female”, and to say children's rights trump all other rights but the right to life
April 2025: Removal of gender identity as a protected characteristic from the Equal Treatment Act

While Hungary never reached the level of open repression seen in Russia, Dombos says the Orban government helped normalise hostility.

“I don’t think it fundamentally changed how people think about the LGBTQI+ question,” he says, “but they did encourage the expression of hatred and negative feelings.”

He recalls one case in which a man threatened a lesbian couple on a tram with a knife, later claiming he was only enforcing the prime minister’s message that homosexuality did not belong in public life.

Protesters face off with police as they demonstrate against a constitutional amendment in Budapest, 14 April, 2025. AFP - PETER KOHALMI

Shifting public opinion


Hatter, which he describes as “the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisation in the country,” responded through legal action, public education and training.

“We have taken dozens and dozens of cases [to] domestic courts,” he said, adding that some are already before European courts.

However, Dombos says the picture was not uniformly bleak: “The political climate was terrible, but the social climate was slowly but increasingly more welcoming."

One campaign on same-sex parenting helped shift public opinion significantly.

“In 2019, only 17 percent of people agreed fully that a same-sex couple can also be good parents. Now over 60 percent of people agree with this statement.”


A protester holds a placard depicting Hungary's former prime minister Viktor Orban, after parliament passed a law banning LGBTQI+ communities from holding the annual Pride march, 25 March 25. © Marton Monus / Reuters

For now, the question remains what a new government will do with the legacy activists such as Dombos have been gradually building.

“Our first hope is that after 16 years, there will be change,” he said – but added that the country’s new leadership will have to do more than just stop attacking LGBTQI+ people.

“It’s not enough to just say, OK, we’re no longer targeting the LGBTQI+ community,” he said. “The legislation that has been adopted in the past six or seven years has to be revoked.”































EU rushes to unlock billions for Hungary as Magyar prepares for power

European Union officials are meeting Hungarian prime minister-elect Peter Magyar's team in Budapest on Friday, hoping to fast-track cooperation and work towards unblocking billions in funding before he takes office next month.


Issued on: 17/04/2026 - RFI

Celebrations in front of the Hungarian parliament on 13 April 2026, after Peter Magyar defeated Prime Minister Viktor Orban in elections and ended his 16 years in power. © AP - Sam McNeil


The talks will cover several urgent issues, including a massive loan for Ukraine and roughly €17 billion in EU funds frozen during Viktor Orban's 16-year rule.

Magyar's party, Tisza, won a sweeping victory in the 12 April elections.

One of Tisza's campaign pledges was to restore Hungary's ties with the EU and convince it to unblock the funding, which has been withheld since 2022 over concerns about corruption and rule of law.

Brussels accused Orban's government of dismantling judicial independence, restricting media freedom and infringing on minority rights.

Of the €27 billion earmarked for Hungary, €17 billion remains frozen.

"The clock is ticking for a number of topics," European Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho said in Brussels on Thursday. Officials want to ensure that "once the government is in place, action can be taken" without delay, she said.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged swift action to "restore the rule of law, realign with shared European values, and reform" Hungary's policies.

'Difficult financial situation'


Magyar has pledged to prioritise judicial independence, academic and media freedom, and anti-corruption measures to unlock the money.

"Hungary is in a very difficult financial situation," Magyar said on Monday, adding that his government's task would be "to bring home the money that is hers".

The frozen funds comprise €10 billion in Covid recovery money and €6.3 billion in cohesion funds. The deadline to claim the pandemic funds expires at the end of August.

Hungary has already lost around €2 billion due to the two-year suspension. It has also been paying €1 million a day since June 2024, plus a €200 million fine, over Orban's refusal to align asylum processing with EU standards.

Magyar has also confirmed he would honour a December deal to support a €90 billion loan for Ukraine, which Orban consistently vetoed.

Beyond frozen funds, Hungary could access up to €16 billion to invest in defence through the EU's new SAFE security initiative. Combined with the other tranches, total available funds could represent roughly 15 percent of the country's GDP.


EU rushes to Budapest talks with Magyar team to unlock frozen funds amid Ukraine tensions

A man wrapped in the European Union flag waves a Hungarian flag, backdropped by the parliament building, early Monday April 13, 2026 as people celebrate Peter Magyar ousting
Copyright AP Photo

By Sandor Zsiros
Published on 

European Commission officials are due to meet the team of Hungary’s prime minister-designate, Péter Magyar, in Budapest on Friday, just five days after his election victory, to begin the process of unfreezing €17 billion in EU funds, with Ukraine-related disputes also on the agenda.

European Commission officials will meet Péter Magyar’s incoming team on Friday, as Brussels races against time to release EU funds that have been frozen during the current Orbán administration.

Magyar secured a sweeping victory in last Sunday's election, ending Viktor Orbán's 16-year rule. A key campaign pledge was to restore Hungary's ties with the EU and unblock billions in funding that had been withheld over rule-of-law and corruption concerns. Of the €27bn earmarked for Hungary, €17bn remains frozen.

"The clock is ticking for several topics, whether we're talking about the Ukraine loan, whether we're talking about Next Generation EU funds. It is in the interest of Hungary, it is in the interests of the EU, that we make progress as soon as possible," Commission Spokesperson Paula Pinho said.

Euronews understands that the EU delegation will include experts from the budget and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) — the EU’s post-Covid recovery fund. They are expected to provide technical assistance to Magyar’s team to help amend legislation in Hungary.

"There's a big menu from which to choose, and these are first talks. Not sure we'll be able to cover everything" Pinho added.

The recovery funds question is particularly urgent: Hungary stands to lose nearly €10bn if payments are not disbursed before the end of August.

On Monday, Magyar outlined a four-step plan to meet the conditions for accessing the funds, including joining the European Public Prosecutor's Office, restoring judicial independence, and safeguarding academic freedom.

Magyar has already spoken twice with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who pledged her support. The decision by Brussels to send a delegation just five days after the vote is widely viewed as a political signal in its own right.

"There is swift work to be done to restore, realign, and reform" Ursula von der Leyen said in a post on social media following her call with Magyar on Wednesday.

Ukraine-related disputes also on the agenda

Unblocking EU funds will not be the only item on Friday's agenda. Hungary has a raft of outstanding disputes with Brussels, particularly over Ukraine. The country is currently withholding the EU's €90bn aid package to Ukraine, after Orbán blocked a previously agreed decision at the March EU summit.

Hungary has also held up the opening of negotiating chapters in Ukraine's EU accession process and withheld payments through the Ukraine Peace Facility.

It remains unclear whether an agreement on EU funds and Ukraine-related issues will be bundled together. Brussels has stressed that it is not imposing any new conditions for releasing the funds and that its stance on the Ukraine loan remains unchanged.

For Magyar’s incoming government, moving quickly to endorse Ukraine-related commitments upon taking office carries political risks. During the campaign, Orbán repeatedly cast Tisza as a puppet of Ukraine and Brussels. On Wednesday, Magyar urged Orbán to lift his veto before leaving office.

Hungary blocked the Ukraine loan partly over a longstanding dispute concerning the Druzhba oil pipeline, a key artery of Hungary's energy supply that was damaged in a Russian strike in late January.

"In the next 30 days, the Orbán government is still operating as an executive government. So I think, if Druzhba restarts, Viktor Orbán will release his technical veto" Péter Magyar said in an interview with the Hungarian public broadcaster on Wednesday.

Ukraine had been reluctant to carry out repairs, citing technical difficulties and security concerns. However, days after the Hungarian election, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced plans to restore the pipeline by the end of April.


Will Hungary's new leader restore media freedom after years of Orban propaganda?

As Peter Magyar prepares to take over as Hungary's new prime minister, one of his first priorities is to dismantle a media system established by his predecessor, Viktor Orban, that served to limit scrutiny and amplify the ruling party's narrative. But experts question whether the new government wants a truly independent press, and what it will take to restore the public's trust.



Issued on: 16/04/2026 - RFI

An employee of the opposition radio-station Klubradio works at its headquarters in Budapest, Hungary, February 9, 2021. REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo REUTERS - BERNADETT SZABO

By: Jan van der Made|RFI

During its 16 years in power, Orban's government was accused of turning public media into a political instrument, with critics saying it offered little room for opposition voices.

"What we experienced was more subtle curbing of freedoms, which does have an impact on everyday life," says media specialist Eva Bognar of the Central European University's Democracy Institute in Budapest. She says Hungary's current public service media offer "disinformation" and "a lot of Russian propaganda".

Magyar's decisive victory in elections last weekend suggest that voters have had enough of that system.

The incoming prime minister has said Hungary "needs a new media law and a new media authority", and promised his government would suspend state media's news departments until they truly serve the public.

Media mistrust


According to the manifesto that Magyar's centre-right Tisza party campaigned on, the new government will "immediately seize the operations of the news segment of the public service media" until they can "set up a proper public media where the free flow of information is possible".

"We don't know if this will be the case or there's a chance that public service media and the media in general would just serve a different government," says Bognar.

"It would be hugely problematic if it were the narrative that changed but not the structure."

Bognar doesn’t rule out this possibility. "Magyar has been highly critical of independent outlets and made some quite problematic remarks when it came to independent media and independent journalists, calling them propagandists when they criticised him," she says.

Eva Bognar, media researcher at the Central European University's Democracy Institute, in Budapest on 10 April 2026. © RFI/Jan van der Made

Apart from that, she notes that the Orban government has "politicised the media landscape to the extent that it is by many seen as a political actor".

The Orban system first used "legal means" and then "economic means" such as state advertising to reward friendly outlets and weaken critical ones, says Bognar, while also buying up independent media and folding many outlets into the pro-government KESMA conglomerate.

Such interference has left Hungary with widespread scepticism of the media. The 2025 Digital News Report by Oxford University’s Reuters Institute found only 22 percent of respondents in Hungary said they trusted the news most of the time – one of the lowest levels of any country surveyed.

"Journalism, journalists are not trusted, journalism in general is not trusted," Bognar says.

"It will be extremely important for [the new government] to start mending this social fabric that's been so torn apart."

Reform drive

Magyar has pledged to protect media freedom as part of a broader reform drive intended to reset Hungary's relations with the European Union, which suspended billions of euros of funding in objection to democratic backsliding under Orban.

Hungary risks losing out on some €10 billion of EU pandemic recovery funds if it fails to implement reforms to strengthen judicial independence and tackle corruption by the end of August.

In a phone call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Monday, Magyar promised to work to restore Hungary's democratic institutions, including by protecting the freedom of the media and academia, Politico reported.

The incoming PM said on Wednesday that his new cabinet could be sworn in by mid-May.

 

Pope Leo XIV lands in Angola, says it is 'not in my interest at all' to debate Trump


By Manuel Ribeiro
Published on 

After visiting Cameroon, Angola is the third leg of Pope Leo XIV's 11-day tour of Africa. People hope for appeals for peace and for him to tackle the economic woes of the oil- and rare-earth-rich nation.

After visiting Cameroon, Pope Leo XIV landed in Luanda, Angola on Saturday, where he was welcomed by faithful. The Holy Father is about to become the third pontiff to visit Angola, after John Paul II (1992) and Benedict XVI (2009).

Meanwhile, during Pope Leo XIV's plane journey on Saturday he said that it was “not in my interest at all” to debate President Donald Trump about the US-Israeli war in Iran.

But the American pope also took the opportunity to set the record straight, insisting that not everything he says was directed at Trump, but reflects the broader Gospel message of peace.

As soon as Pope Leo XIV landed in Luanda he was scheduled to meet with Angola’s president, João Lourenço, and deliver a speech, the latest on a trip during which he has been stepping up his rhetoric, after becoming the target of criticism from Donald Trump.

On Sunday, the Holy Father will travel by helicopter to the village of Muxima, around 130 kilometres south-east of Luanda, where a 16th-century church built by the Portuguese has become one of Africa’s most important pilgrimage sites.

Five hundred years ago, this Marian shrine became a key point in the transatlantic trade in human beings run by the Portuguese, serving as the place where enslaved people were baptised before being shipped to the Americas.

A new basilica is currently being built in Muxima, part of a multi-million-dollar government project to turn the site into a major tourist destination.

“It is a historic moment of grace, a moment of deep emotion, with tears in our eyes and gratitude in our hearts,” said the rector of the shrine, Father Mpindi Lubanzadio Alberto, speaking to the Catholic news website ACI Africa.

The rector of the Sanctuary of Our Lady of the Conception of Muxima, in the Diocese of Viana, Angola, spoke about the planned apostolic visit of Pope Leo XIV as a decisive spiritual moment for the country.

Tens of thousands of worshippers are expected to travel there to see the leader of the Catholic Church. Pope Leo XIV calls for world peace are likely to resonate in Angola, which in 2002 emerged from a 27-year civil war that broke out after independence from Portugal in 1975.

As well as his appeals for peace, Pope Leo XIV is expected to address the issue of corruption and exploitation in the country, where, despite its vast fossil fuel reserves, a third of the population lives below the poverty line.

Angola is currently Africa’s fourth-largest oil producer and ranks among the world’s top 20, according to the International Energy Agency. It is also the world’s third-largest producer of diamonds and has significant deposits of gold and rare earths.

Yet despite its varied natural resources, the World Bank estimated in 2023 that more than 30% of the population was living on less than €1.83 a day.

Angola has a population of about 38 million, and 44% of Angolans are Catholic. The country gained independence from Portugal in 1975 but still bears the scars of a devastating civil war that began soon afterwards and dragged on, with ups and downs, for 27 years before ending in 2002. It is estimated that more than half a million people lost their lives.

During his four-day visit to Angola, Pope Leo XIV will direct his message particularly to young people, seeking to offer them hope and healing, the Vatican has said.

Pope Leo XIV's tour of the African continent included stops in Algeria and Cameroon, after he visits in Angola, Pope Leo XIV will mark his last stop in Equatorial Guinea.


White House vs the pope: What is behind the clash and Catholic just war doctrine?




Copyright AP Photo

By Aleksandar Brezar
Published on 17/04/2026
EURONEWS

Theologians Euronews spoke to believe that the escalating war of words between Washington and the Holy See has raised important questions over Catholic and Christian moral thought.

When US Vice President JD Vance converted to Catholicism in 2019, he chose Saint Augustine as his patron.

On Tuesday, speaking at a Turning Point USA event, Vance invoked the tradition of the fifth-century theologian and one of the most important Church fathers to push back against Pope Leo XIV's criticism of the war in Iran.

The White House number two warned the pontiff to "be careful when he talks about matters of theology," citing "more than a 1,000-year tradition of just war theory" in his defence.

Meanwhile, the supreme pontiff of the Catholic Church was in the Algerian port city of Annaba, paying homage at the basilica not far from where St Augustine died and was initially interred.

Hippo Regius, as it was known in the bishop's time, is where St Augustine wrote most of what became the intellectual basis of the just war principles Vance was claiming to defend. Pope Leo XIV is the first pontiff to hail from the Augustinian order.


Whether Vance knew what the Holy Father’s itinerary was that day, his office did not say.

Vice President JD Vance shakes hands with Turning Point USA spokesperson Andrew Kolvet during a Turning Point USA event in Athens, GA, 14 April 2026 AP Photo

Vance was not the first member of the administration to weigh in.


Days earlier, US President Donald Trump had posted on Truth Social and later reiterated to the press that Pope Leo XIV was “weak on crime" and "terrible for foreign policy," suggesting the pontiff believed Tehran should be allowed to develop nuclear weapons.

The pope never made any comments regarding the Islamic Republic’s right to nukes.

The post came after the pope had called Trump's threat to destroy Iran's "whole civilisation" "truly unacceptable".

Pope Leo XIV responded the following morning on board the papal plane to Algiers. "I'm not afraid of the Trump administration or of speaking out loudly about the message of the Gospel," he said.

"I will continue to speak out loudly against war, looking to promote peace, promoting dialogue and multilateral relationships among the states to look for just solutions to problems."

What the doctrine says

Just war theory, rooted in St Augustine and further elaborated on by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, sets out strict conditions for the moral use of military force.

The threat must be lasting, grave and certain, and success must be realistically achievable. Most importantly, all other means of resolution must be genuinely exhausted, and the harm caused must not exceed the harm it seeks to prevent.

Put simply, the purpose of this set of rules is to prevent those engaged in war from being the final judges of their own righteousness.

"The just war doctrine doesn't merely ask whether your cause feels just," Joseph Capizzi, Dean of the School of Theology and Religious Studies at the Catholic University of America, told Euronews. “As we all know, everybody thinks their situation is just."

"It understands that most people think of their causes as just. But it is a means by which you can distinguish legitimately just causes of war from illegitimate causes of war.”

Pontificial Swiss Guards enter the St Damasus Courtyard at the Vatican ahead of the arrival of French President Emmanuel Macron, 10 April 2026 AP Photo

The doctrine has also shifted in how it is applied. For most of its history, it was used by priests to authorise their rulers' wars. Spurred on by world wars and the discovery of nuclear weapons, the modern papacy has used it in the other direction.

"Before, just war doctrine was used often by national clergy to give permission to their emperor or their king to go to war," Massimo Faggioli, professor of ecclesiology at Trinity College Dublin told Euronews.

"Right now, it is used mostly — I would say almost always — to say ‘well, no, this military intervention doesn't meet those criteria.’”

Writing as the Roman Empire crumbled, St Augustine had already posed the question of what is righteous in one of the most well-known open checks on power in Catholic moral thought.

"Justice removed,” he asked in The City of God, “what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers?"

Vance has cited The City of God as “the best criticism of our modern age” he has ever read, deeply affecting his religious outlook and thoughts on domestic and foreign policy.

Vatican’s track record

The administration's framing of Pope Leo XIV as a pacifist who simply does not understand that force is sometimes necessary contradicts the pontiff’s and the Church’s track record, experts say.

Before his election just last year, the pontiff was a registered Republican voter. While he has criticised the Iran war, the Holy Father has shown support for Ukraine's right to self-defence.

In recent decades, past popes also carefully deliberated the context before commenting on any given conflict.

The Holy See quietly regarded the post-September 11 intervention in Afghanistan as meeting just war criteria, as the US went after Taliban extremists and Al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden.


Yet Pope John Paul II opposed both the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 invasion of Iraq not as a pacifist, but on the grounds that last resort had not been demonstrated. Pope Leo XIV’s position on Iran is in line with his predecessors, according to theologians.

Charlie Company Task Force 1-64 of the 3rd Infantry Division rolls into a major park in downtown Baghdad, 7 April 2003 Brant Sanderlin/ 2003 Atlanta Journal-Constit

"To accuse the pope of being a pacifist is really absurd," Faggioli said. "Vance and Trump are accusing the pope of thinking about war like a European Catholic. But that's not true.”

"He is using just war doctrine — and the American cardinals who have spoken against the war in Iran, they have used just war doctrine in ways that Europeans would not. So this is, in some sense, an intra-American debate."

There is also the matter of what Vance actually said — not just about just war, but about the pope's remit, after he suggested Pope Leo XIV should confine himself to morality and stay out of foreign policy, Faggioli explained.

"Vance is one of those typical Catholics who thinks that morality is only sexual morality," Faggioli said. "When he said the pope should stick only to morality, he meant sexual morality — as if war were not a matter of morality. Of course it is."

Thousand-year tradition and its tenets

The US bishops and other Catholic Church clergy indeed did not stay quiet. On Wednesday, Chairman of the USCCB Committee on Doctrine Bishop James Massa issued a statement in support of the Holy Father’s position, but also the Catholic Church as a whole.

"A constant tenet of that thousand-year tradition is a nation can only legitimately take up the sword 'in self-defence, once all peace efforts have failed,'" Massa, auxiliary bishop of Brooklyn, wrote.

"When Pope Leo XIV speaks as supreme pastor of the universal Church, he is not merely offering opinions on theology. He is preaching the Gospel and exercising his ministry as the Vicar of Christ."

A woman holds a rosary as she attends a vigil for peace led by Pope Leo XIV inside St Peter's Basilica at the Vatican, 11 April 2026 Gregorio Borgia/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved

Unlike in other public exchanges in recent times with those opposing Washington’s view, the Trump administration has struggled to find the usual levers, experts say. "It's very hard for them to use the usual tactics to delegitimise the pope, because he is American," Faggioli said.

"They can't call him a communist, they can't call him a radical leftist — his record as a theologian doesn't support that."

Euronews contacted several Catholic institutions and theologians for perspectives to further outline the Trump administration's application of just war doctrine, but none agreed to speak on the record.

‘A consistent lesson of our faith’

On Thursday, from a peace meeting in Cameroon — a country not without its own existing tensions — the pope said, “Woe to those who manipulate religion and the very name of God for their own military, economic, and political gain, dragging that which is sacred into darkness and filth."

The post on X from his official Pontifex account drew nearly 10 million views in English alone by Friday evening.

Capizzi urged against reading every papal statement as aimed at Washington, however. “You're in Cameroon, on a continent marked by severe religious conflict; that comment has a much broader application.”

Still, according to Capizzi, the Holy Father’s words are meant for all of the faithful.

"Any believer who appeals to God — as though God is on their side — ought to do so with great fear and trembling,” he said. “That is a consistent lesson of our faith: that a believer is the person who has a healthy fear of God and of God's judgment of his or her actions. And that includes the way he or she speaks about God."

Pope Leo XIV with the Archbishop Andrew Nkea Fuanya frees a white dove at Saint Joseph's Cathedral in Bamenda, Cameroon, 16 April 2026 AP Photo

The same day at the Pentagon, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth led a worship service and read what he described as a prayer recited by Combat Search and Rescue crews during the Iran operation.

He introduced it as "CSAR 25:17," meant to reflect Ezekiel 25:17. What followed was nearly verbatim the monologue delivered by Samuel L Jackson's hitman in Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, in the scene immediately before his character Jules Winnfield commits a murder.

The actual Ezekiel 25:17 is considerably shorter and less specific. Tarantino's version was itself adapted from a 1973 Japanese martial arts film.

‘Nothing against the pope’

Trump won around 55% of US Catholic votes in 2024. A poll conducted in late March, jointly by Republican pollster Shaw & Co Research and Democratic pollster Beacon Research, found his approval among Catholics had fallen to 48%, with 52% disapproving.

A Fox News poll found US Catholics opposed to military action in Iran by 10 points and against Trump's conduct toward Iran by 20. A separate NBC survey found US registered voters now view the pope more favourably than the president by a net margin of 46 points.


US President Donald Trump arrives on Air Force One at Harry Reid International Airport in Las Vegas, 16 April 2026 AP Photo

On Thursday, Trump told reporters he has "nothing against the pope" and is "all about the Gospel," while continuing to state Pope Leo XIV was in favour of Tehran having nuclear weapons.

Trump also said his preference remained with the pope's brother Louis, who lives in Florida. "Louis is all MAGA. He gets it, and Leo (XIV) doesn’t,” Trump said.

"If I wasn't in the White House, Leo wouldn't be in the Vatican,” he reiterated.

The night before, police had surrounded the New Lenox home of a different brother of the pope, John Prevost, following a bomb threat. K9 explosive-detection units found nothing. The investigation remains ongoing.

The greater picture

For Faggioli, the dispute is a symptom of something that has been building for years: not a domestic row about one war, but a contest over what Christianity means and who speaks for it.

"America always had a religious understanding of itself as a nation, but presidents were very cautious about not looking like messianic figures — at least in life,” Faggioli said.

“Trump has exploited the creation of a vacuum of secularisation in America, and he has filled that vacuum with a certain degree of messianism — and some American Christians are happy about that."

"Trumpism is a form of political messianism. He sees himself — and many people see in him — someone with a divine mission: a political Messiah who will deliver salvation to America, to Americans, to Christianity. And he is serious when he posts those things."

 US President Donald Trump and other dignitaries attend the funeral of Pope Francis in St Peter's Square at the Vatican, 26 April 2025 AP Photo

Capizzi, for his part, was more of the belief that the US president would eventually mend bridges with the Holy See. "I actually consider this a hopeful sign — that it's touching and impacting President Trump, despite what he's saying and what he's posted."

"This conversation has shown that the Church retains her moral authority,” he said.

“This is a teaching moment. Catholics and others are getting to see that these doctrines are over a thousand years old, that we have thought about these questions for a very long time, and there is a moral gravity behind these claims."

As for the pope, John Prevost said something crucial about his brother before any of this began. "I don't think he'll stay quiet for too long if he has something to say," he told the New York Times last year. "He won't just sit back."

Russia After Putin – Analysis


April 18, 2026 
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Philip Wasielewski


(FPRI) — Vladimir Putin, 73, has been Russia’s leader for over a quarter of a century and the driving force behind Moscow’s efforts to reassert control over its former Soviet and Tsarist empire. His eventual departure from the world stage will bring hope that a new Russian leader will end these imperial impulses and behavior. However, a review of Russian history, political culture, and elite and public opinion provides a clear warning that such hopes are unlikely to be realized. Russia after Putin is likely to be very similar to Russia under Putin.

As either president or prime minister, Putin’s 27 years in power are the second-longest period of post-Tsarist rule in Russian history after Joseph Stalin’s. Should Putin remain in office, he will surpass Stalin’s record of being in power for 30 years and 11 months in July 2030. There are no indications that, as long as he lives, Putin will give up power voluntarily.

But give up power he eventually shall, if only due to actuarial realities. The average Russian male born in Putin’s birth year of 1952 has been dead for 21 years. Granted, Putin has access to superior health care and has led an active and healthy lifestyle compared to many Russian men. An apparent germophobe, he takes exceedingly strict precautions regarding his health. Yet the day will come when Russian television programming is interrupted to play Swan Lake, the warning sign of death within the Kremlin’s walls. What then for Russia?

Exact scenarios are difficult to predict due to the uncertainty of the when and how of Putin’s demise. However, based on patterns of Russian history, the realities of its political system, the correlation of international and economic forces, and social norms including a general consensus of Russia’s national identity, a broad outline can be drawn to suggest which future is more likely than others. This article proposes that there is little hope of change in a post-Putin Russia absent revolutionary change from within the Kremlin or forced on it from without. Those scenarios are unlikely barring a major geopolitical event that transforms both how Russia is governed and how its elites and society identify themselves.

Russia’s Troubled History of Political Transitions

For the past quarter of a millennium, transitions from one Russian ruler to the next have been marked with various coups, attempted coups, and assassinations or poisonings. A peaceful transition from one ruler to the next has not been the norm.

However, another regular feature of Russian political transitions is that they do bring change in governing style, oscillating between harsher and lighter forms of rule, but always within the confines of some form of autocracy and dictatorship. Assassins (impatient with the pace of reform) ended Tsar Alexander II’s liberal era, to which Alexander III’s reaction was the consolidation of a police state. This was tempered by a more progressive domestic policy under Nicholas II, if only due to the revolution of 1905. Stalin’s terror was followed by Nikita Khruschev’s de-Stalinization and efforts at domestic reforms. When these proved unsuccessful and his foreign policy became too erratic, Khruschev was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Leonid Brezhnev. The Brezhnev years brought stability as well as stagnation. This was countered by Yuri Andropov who sought to bring discipline, energy, and a revitalized belief in Communism back into Soviet society. Only in the transition between Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko was the status quo maintained, if just because Chernenko lived for less than 13 months before being replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev. Putin ended the anarchy of the Boris Yeltsin years but also Russia’s nascent democracy.


Therefore, history suggests that a post-Putin Russian leader may bring some change compared to his predecessor. However, it also indicates that any change will be within the context of measures believed necessary to maintain the current system and not replace it. This should be understood so that in the future Western observers do not misunderstand cosmetic changes for structural ones. We should not forget past misjudgments such as the initial optimistic (and false) reports that Andropov was a closet liberal who met with dissidents to discuss their differences. Russian tsars, general secretaries, and presidents have a history of tactical changes and strategic continuity. The only exception was Gorbachev, whose reforms destroyed the ruling system by a complete misunderstanding of that system. Major changes to Russia’s current system are unlikely due to the nationwide antipathy toward Gorbachev’s tenure that led to collapse and chaos. Both the Russian people and their elites will recoil from any post-Putin leader that could be considered another Gorbachev because his legacy of catastrophic failure still permeates today.




The Structure of Putin’s Russia

Putin’s successor will have to operate, at least initially, within Russia’s present political system. He will also be influenced by international factors, economic realities, and social norms of Russia’s ruling class and society, which have been heavily affected by almost three decades of Putin’s rule including at least four years of war in Ukraine. This article will examine these factors, analyze the limits they impose on Russia’s next ruler, and describe why they are likely to result in continuity or, at best, change only around the margins in a post-Putin Russia.


Russia’s constitution states that in the event of a president’s death, resignation, or incapacitation, he will be replaced by the prime minister until elections are held in ninety days. In reality, Putin has no designated successor because it is too dangerous for any dictator to name a successor and allow opposition forces to accumulate around him. Instead, Putin balances between the leaders of various elite groups who operate the levers of coercion and oversee the sources of wealth within Russia. This balancing keeps possible successors under control by not allowing them to gain too much power. A culture of corruption adds to this internal balance of power because corruption makes all political players controllable by being compromisable.

Described as a “vertical of power,” this system is maximized to maintain Putin’s control over Russia but not transfer that control. Russia’s constitution gives this system just three months to hold elections after a president’s sudden departure. Since Russia’s electoral system is controlled by the Kremlin and will only produce results predetermined by the Kremlin, there will be little time for Kremlin elites to decide upon a new leader and arrange for the façade of an election intended to signify national approval and legitimacy.

The first challenge for any future leader after Putin will be to control a system that is both centrifugal and fragmented with reins of power emanating from the Kremlin but not touching each other. While all lines of authority center on the Kremlin, none are connected, and each are designed to balance, if not challenge, the other. The strength of each major political figure has been purposefully constrained so they cannot gain power with their resources (military or financial) alone and cannot trust those with whom they would have to coordinate to do so.

Kremlin elites live under a surveillance system maintained by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Federal Protective Service (FSO). The FSB, FSO, and other internal security organs such as the National Guard (Rosgvardia) are the primary guarantors of Putin’s system. They can also serve as a springboard for whoever wishes to gain power after Putin, and will be the new guarantors of power for whoever achieves it. Russia’s political structure is unlikely to evolve differently from the system Putin has created while these forces remain or remain unchanged.

Under these conditions, it will be difficult for a reformist leader to emerge. Since the system is not designed for shared power, the next leader will likely be someone who can move quickly to consolidate power and protect himself from competitors. This will limit his freedom of action since he cannot alienate too many Kremlin factions. As Otto von Bismarck once observed, “politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best.” While facing this internal political reality, Putin’s eventual successor will face other limiting factors.

International Factors


International factors for a new Russian leader will include the war with Ukraine (or its immediate legacy), uneasy relations with the West, and economic reliance on China. By illegally annexing Crimea, seizing the Donbas in 2014, and attacking Ukraine in 2022, Putin turned Ukraine into an implacable foe. Whether the war is ongoing when Putin leaves the political scene or there is a ceasefire, his successor will face a perpetually hostile Ukraine intent on recovering lost territories. Even with a ceasefire, Russia will have to maintain a sizeable army in its occupied lands and a war economy sufficient to support it. As long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory, the European Union, the United Kingdom, most other industrial powers, and probably the United States will continue economic sanctions. Foreign investors will avoid Russia due to these sanctions and an investment climate that was deteriorating even before 2014.


Chinese oil and natural gas purchases and sales of dual-use technology for drones, missiles, and other weapons have provided Russia an economic and military lifeline. However, this aid has its limits. China purchased less Russian oil in 2025 than in previous years and overall trade fell as well from 2024. Chinese oil purchases are likely to decline further as Beijing implements an energy policy designed to boost energy self-sufficiency and diversify foreign sources of oil and gas. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has cost Russia its lucrative European market for natural gas. This market cannot be replaced by a pivot to Asia due to sanctions and the limitations of Russia’s energy infrastructure, which is primarily oriented west and not east. While North Korea may provide weapons and ammunition, and India purchases its share of oil, war with Ukraine has left Russia with few trading partners. Additionally, Russia’s position in the Caucasus and Central Asia continues to decline and even historic, if minor, partners such as Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba are either no more or could soon be lost.

This means as long as Ukraine is a permanent enemy, a post-Putin ruler will have limited options to improve Russia’s economy by attracting international trade and investments. The amount of economic relief China will provide has probably been reached. This leads to the next challenge for a post-Putin ruler: improving the economy.


Economic Realities

Russia’s economy is beset by high inflation, high interest rates, and low to non-existent growth, but has low unemployment due to a labor shortage. The labor shortage ameliorates some of the other poor economic trends by allowing workers to find employment, but it also inhibits economic growth. What growth there has been in the economy has been war-related, creating items that will be soon destroyed or designed to explode after production. They neither improve Russia’s infrastructure nor help the economy create wealth. Alexandra Prokopenko best described Russia’s economic situation when she wrote that the economy is busier but poorer with each passing year of the war.

With the exhaustion of savings in the National Wealth Fund, Russia’s government is challenged to fund both its operations and the war. Income and business taxes increased in 2025 but oil revenues were less than expected due to falling world prices. This trend continued into 2026 until the war in Iran radically reversed oil prices. How long this windfall will last is unknown. It provides a welcome if temporary safety valve for Russia’s troubled economy, but no fix to many inherent problems. It may also be counterbalanced by Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil exports.

Because of sanctions, Russia cannot borrow on the international bond markets as most countries do to finance budget deficits. VAT increased from 20 to 22 percent on January 1, 2026, which is supposed to generate $14.3 billion (approximately what a seven-dollar drop in world oil prices costs the government’s budget). Moscow also plans to reduce by sixfold the level at which businesses must begin paying VAT.

Putin’s successor will need to choose between guns or butter since the economy cannot provide both. However, even with a ceasefire, any transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy could threaten the regime. A ceasefire with Ukraine will raise expectations in Russia that wartime economic sacrifices can end. These expectations are unlikely to be met.


As stated above, the requirement to keep a large Russian army on occupied Ukrainian territory means that Russia cannot fully move from a war economy to a peacetime one. Furthermore, even a limited transition is fraught with political peril for the Kremlin. The cancellation of defense contracts, the main agent of limited growth in the economy, and the resulting layoffs of defense workers will raise unemployment at the same time a number of men will be demobilized and looking for civilian jobs. A decrease in defense expenditures will also threaten many banks who have been coerced into providing unsecured credits to the military-industrial complex. High interest rates will make it hard for companies to find the capital to retool their industries back to producing consumer goods.

All of these factors point to a major recession, a normal occurrence in industrial economies once a war ends. For Russia today, even a partial transition to a peacetime economy could lead to bank failures, increased unemployment, continued inflation and high taxes, and negative growth. The Kremlin could face social unrest sparked by the realization that the end of the fighting has not brought an end to sacrifices.

Based on international and economic realities, it would be reasonable for Putin’s successor to attempt to improve international relations, especially vis-à-vis Ukraine, so as to end Western sanctions, remove the need for an army of occupation, and attract foreign investment to buffer the transition from a wartime to peacetime economy to improve life for the average Russian.

This is unlikely to happen for three reasons. First, this is what Gorbachev tried in the 1980s. That gambit cost Moscow its empire and the Communist Party its power. It is not a strategy likely to receive warm approval in the Kremlin. Second, it would require Moscow to give up territories considered to be Russian soil taken or “recovered” at a tremendous cost of human life. This would fly in the face of social norms accepted by most Russians today: elites and average citizens. Third, tension with the West provides the Kremlin with a useful scapegoat to justify economic sacrifices that cannot end.




Russia’s Social Norms


Social norms, the written and unwritten rules that govern acceptable behavior within a group, are a major influence on what is and is not possible within Russia’s body politic. The main norms applicable to a post-Putin Russia are how both Russia’s elites and society view who they are and what they want. This is often expressed in terms of a national idea or a national identity.

Per Ilya Prizel in his book National Identity and Foreign Policy, “a polity’s national identity is very much a result of how it interprets its history.” It can have an enormous impact on not just how a society sees itself but how its government conducts foreign policy based on that image. Russia’s current national identity is not just based on the past few decades of propaganda from Putin’s regime but on centuries of Russian history and political culture. It consists of a mix of Messianism, Imperialism, Eurasianism, and Re-Stalinization to create an image of a Russia oppressed by the West but also morally superior and distinct from it. The result is a national identity with a strong anti-Western animus, which is reinforced by the cult of the Great Patriotic War cultivated by Putin and memories of economic and national weakness during the 1990s. This mindset leaves little room for compromise over Ukraine or détente with the West.


Russian Messianism, the myth of Moscow being the Third Rome, implies both a civilizing mission for Russia and an accompanying need for a sphere of not just influence but control around its periphery. It also implies that its neighbors have a lack of agency to decide their own fates independent of Moscow. This is reinforced by Russian imperialism or at least nostalgia for Russian imperial power when, in the living memory of many Russians, Moscow exerted control from the Elbe River to Vladivostok and from the Arctic to the Oxus. Memories of empire are also memories of lost greatness that feed an identity wishing to return to that greatness.

Eurasianism, the belief that Russia is a unique civilization, neither Western nor Eastern, provides a distinct identity that rejects Western standards rooted in respect for the individual. Instead, Eurasianism emphasizes the importance of the “collective” over the individual and the uniqueness of the Russian soul. This is a message the Russian Orthodox Church also reinforces. While Eurasianism is not accepted by all Russians, it is consistent with a political culture that never experienced the influences of the Renaissance, Reformation, or the Enlightenment but did experience Mongol rule, centuries of autocracy, and Stalinism. Finally, the rehabilitation of Stalin’s image, the greatest mass murderer in Russian history, reinforces aspects of Russia’s national identity regarding the validity of autocracy, imperial rule, dehumanizing enemies, and mass violence to achieve social or political goals. Today, almost two-thirds of Russian citizens have a positive image of Stalin and many Russian politicians are inclined to speak of him in terms of a charismatic leader and strong statesman while hanging portraits of him in their offices.

This identity is reflected in such actions as constant conflict with the West including the use of assassinations, arson, subversion, and economic warfare; war in Ukraine that unapologetically features massive war crimes against civilians and massive casualties for Russia’s own citizens; and acceptance of economic hardships and a lack of personal liberties if in exchange citizens can still perceive themselves to be members of a great international power.

Per a 2014 Pew Research Center poll, nine out of 10 Russians supported the seizure of Crimea, believed Kyiv should accept its loss, and believed that there were parts of other neighboring states that should also belong to Russia. Even those who oppose the Kremlin can hold deep beliefs of Russian nationalism or chauvinism. This included the dissident Alexei Navalny who had espoused Russian nationalist themesregarding Central Asians and varied at times in his outlook on Crimea’s annexation. Alexander Solzhenitsyn resisted Communism but, just before his death, recommended annexing northern Kazakhstan into Russia and creating a Slavic union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine led by Moscow. Even further back in Russian history, the great poet Alexander Pushkin opposed Tsarist autocracy but was quick to pick up his pen to support Russian imperialism in Poland as evidenced by his 1831 poem, To the Slanderers of Russia.

More recent polling indicates that while most Russians would like to see the war end, they are not willing to compromise to do so. In January 2025, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Center pollindicated that three-quarters of Russians expected Russia to prevail in this war. The same poll indicated that 55 percent would like to see Russia as a great power feared and respected by other countries, rather than a country with a higher standard of living (41 percent). At the end of the year, a poll by VTsIOM reported that 70 percent of Russians expected victory in 2026. In January 2026, Levada Center sociologist Lev Gudkov reported that most Russians believe the war in Ukraine was imposed by the West and that Russia would eventually prevail. Gudkov spoke of a “militarization of consciousness” in Russia since it has experienced only six years of peace since the fall of the Soviet Union. He also highlighted a 2024 Levada Center poll that found that 65 percent of Russians agreed with the statement that, “Russia had never been an aggressor or initiator of conflicts with other nations,” up from 36 percent who believed that in 1998.


While caution should be attached to any polling done in a dictatorship, these polls, other studies, and the content of Russian state television warn that there may not be much of a gap in how ordinary Russians and the ruling elites see their national idea. Additionally, support for the war and a “my country right or wrong” attitude towards it among ethnic Russians is easier to sustain when the brunt of the war’s casualties are borne by other ethnicities and society’s outcasts.

Putin’s inner circle, from whom a successor will be drawn, is aware of these public sentiments. That group is also relatively homogenous regarding its worldview, which for most developed in Soviet times while serving in the security services or military. The one member of Putin’s inner circle who showed the slightest concern about the effects of the war in Ukraine on Russia, Dmitry Kozak, was replaced by Kremlin political chief, Sergei Kiriyenko, whose domestic portfolio now includes Russia’s relations with its so-called Near Abroad. Putin, it seems, is culling the herd so after his death there will not be a repeat of the mistake the Soviet Politburo made when they appointed from their midst a successor who destroyed them.

Whoever succeeds Putin will come from a very finite pool of candidates who have similar backgrounds and beliefs and have been together in power for years. They likely have a classic Groupthink mindset. That mindset was best expressed several years ago in an article, Putin’s Long State, by then Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov. In his article Surkov wrote that the current political order had passed its “stress tests” and “will be an effective means of survival and exaltation of the Russian nation for not only years, but also decades, and most likely the whole century.” For the inner circle, it is crucial that Putin’s death or removal means only a leadership change and not a regime change that threatens their own power, wealth, and lives.


Conclusion

Whoever replaces Putin will have limited options to improve Russia’s international and economic situations because to do so requires compromises that are unacceptable to most Russians, could threaten the stability of the regime, and would be incompatible with Russia’s self-image as a superpower. These factors are likely to take precedence over either world peace or a better economy.

Why cannot a new leader decide to end the war, blame it on Putin, and make major territorial concessions, hoping that propaganda and force would maintain his rule? One reason a future Russian leader might not make this decision is that he truly believes in the Russian national idea himself. Another reason is that he would immediately be accused of surrendering sacred Russian lands. This would provide the pretext for rivals to overthrow him. This action would have wide support from Russia’s veterans, military leadership, relatives of those killed in action, Orthodox clergy, ultranationalists, and ordinary citizens imbued with the belief that wherever the Russian flag is planted, it should never be taken down. The coup makers would gain legitimacy as patriots for doing so. Compromise over Ukraine is more likely to lead to a coup than peace.

Economic problems, unless they surpass those of the 1990s (which were bad, but most Russians can also remember surviving), will not force a post-Putin leader to take steps detrimental to his hold on power and contrary to the beliefs of most Russians. Whoever occupies the Kremlin next can never be seen as being dictated to by the West. He is therefore likely to stay on a path first trodden by Putin. This means policies that will continue to have the Russian people sacrifice, and be sacrificed, for the sake of national greatness. Russia’s future is most likely to be a real-world parallel to the perpetual war between Oceania and Eurasia in Orwell’s novel 1984.


Is this the only scenario possible for the future? No, but it is the most likely one, barring a revolutionary change in Russia’s national identity and domestic politics. Russia is unlikely to change its behavior externally until it changes its political culture and national identity internally.

The only other political transition, besides Gorbachev’s, that led to structural changes in modern Russia’s political system and foreign policy was the revolution of October 1917. Real change is unlikely unless preceded by some disaster that requires the Kremlin and Russian society to rethink their national idea as happened to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan after World War II. Such an event would have to be a major catastrophe such as the loss of Asian territories to China in the event of a Sino-Russian war. This might make Russia identify more as a European state with Western values to counterbalance Chinese hegemony. However, losing the war with Ukraine could bring a different type of revolution. Since many Russians believe they are fighting the entire West and not Kyiv, losing the war could lead to political upheaval that reinforces an anti-Western national identity with a “stab in the back” excuse for losing similar to the myth propagated by Germany’s National Socialists after World War One. Therefore, barring an internal upheaval that orients Russia in a Western direction, a change in Russian national identity is unlikely. As the century moves forward, Russia will continue to be “Putin’s Russia,” which is patterned after 18th and 19th century Tsarist Russia or, as it is known to history, Imperial Russia.

This article was reviewed by CIA’s Prepublication Classified Review Board for classified information. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

About the author: Philip Wasielewski is the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Source: This article was published by FPRI



Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Founded in 1955, FPRI (http://www.fpri.org/) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.