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Friday, May 22, 2026

Mines, Blockades, And Coercion: Iran’s Strategy In The Strait Of Hormuz – Analysis

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) prepares to seize the Epaminondas ship in the Strait of Hormuz. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency

May 20, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Sayantan Haldar and Tuneer Mukherjee


The Strait of Hormuz currently sits at the heart of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which began with the launch of air campaigns by the US and Israel against Iran. Tehran’s strategic decision to partially close the Strait in response aims to pressure the US and its partners involved in the conflict to stand down, and has brought to the fore several dimensions of maritime security that continue to shape the war’s trajectory. As part of this effort to partially close the Strait, Iran has effectively blocked most vessel movement through the maritime corridor, with the exception of ships from a handful of countries that Tehran deems friendly.

Tehran’s reported use of naval mines is central to operationalising this selective blockade. The deployment of mines by Iran underscores their enduring value as a strategic tool to deny access to the Strait. While the United States has launched operations to locate and remove the mines, these efforts have faced multiple challenges to date. The episode has reaffirmed the importance of mines as a critical instrument of modern warfare. The unfolding events at sea amid the Middle East conflict have also raised urgent questions about access to and control of maritime corridors and chokepoints. These developments have not only disrupted supply chains of goods, commodities, and resources, but have also rendered the letter and spirit of a rules-based order at sea, which guarantees freedom of navigation, vulnerable to unilateral coercive tactics.

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategically significant maritime passage for oil and energy, and its selective closure has triggered a major upheaval in the global energy market, described as the world’s largest oil supply disruption. In response to Iran’s actions, the US threatened to take sweeping measures to reopen the Strait to all countries and restore stability in global energy supplies. First, President Trump announced that the US would close the Strait to ships transiting to and from Iranian ports, ostensibly to build tactical and economic pressure on Tehran. Washington then briefly launched a naval mission to escort traffic through the mined waterway, before pausing the operation to allow diplomacy with Tehran another chance. Officials from both sides have met in Pakistan on multiple occasions to negotiate an end to the conflict, but have yet to reach an agreement. Amid these developments, Iran’s restrictions on passage through the Strait of Hormuz remain in place — a unilateral closure that raises several pressing questions about maritime security.


How did Iran enforce coercive control over the Strait of Hormuz? Tehran’s strategy to close the Strait combines several tactics. Alongside naval deployments and patrols, there have been reported incidents of gunboat fire to keep vessel movement through the Strait minimal and restricted to only those ships Iran selectively approves. Central to sustaining this closure is Iran’s use of naval mines, which can be tactically placed across the narrow maritime corridor to deter and deny the movement of ships.

Naval mines have a long history of use across conflicts worldwide, playing a critical role in shaping the course of warfare during the First and Second World Wars. However, given that much of the discourse on maritime security has long bent normatively towards freedom of navigation and a rules-based order at sea, the use of naval mines — which are typically deployed to curtail free movement across the oceans — has emerged as a flashpoint in the conversation around maritime security and a potent naval strategy in the context of the Middle East conflict. Iran’s reported use of naval mines should therefore be understood as more than a straightforward attempt to deny passage through the Strait; it reflects Tehran’s broader strategy to cultivate an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability as a means of achieving deterrence.


The threat of Iranian naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz has been a long-established concern in US national security thinking. During the Tanker Wars of the 1980s, both Iran and Iraq mined the Persian Gulf to deter each other, prompting the US to conduct escort missions. During the First Gulf War, Iraq again mined the Persian Gulf to deter US naval operations, necessitating a protracted clearance mission involving eight nations. In the context of the current conflict, not only is the precise number of mines deployed by Iran unknown, but the situation is further complicated by Tehran’s claim that it cannot locate all the mines it has deployed and lacks the capability to clear them. Such ambiguity deepens the risk premium facing international shipping transiting the waterway and places the onus squarely on the US to restore freedom of navigation.

Figure 1. Naval Mines: Types and Trigger Mechanisms

Source: Authors’ illustration, generated with AI assistance. 
Conceptual reference drawn from a Wall Street Journal infographic on naval mines.


Historically, mines have been the US Navy’s greatest vulnerability, damaging more ships than any other armament since World War II. The US therefore faces one of its most serious operational challenges in recent history, as any mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz carries significant risk. Iran has deployed various multi-domain assets along the waterway to enforce its selective blockade and deter any concerted attempt to clear the mines. Mine-clearing operations generally take weeks to complete even in the absence of active threats; given that Iran is likely to counter any such mission before a diplomatic solution is reached, a low-risk clearance operation in the current environment is virtually impossible. Tehran is believed to possess a mix of seabed, moored, limpet, and floating mines, including variants equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors that trigger detonation when a vessel comes within range. Figure 1 illustrates how some of these mines are deployed. Adding to the challenge, certain mines in Iran’s arsenal — such as the Maham 7 — are specifically designed to evade sonar detection.

The US has traditionally relied on dedicated minesweeping assets but has largely retired that fleet in recent years, and its current minesweeping protocols are undergoing transition. The US Navy’s principal assets for this mission are its Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which employ the AN/AQS-20 mine-hunting system. US Central Command has also reported deploying two destroyers to the region to support mine-clearing operations. However, given the operational risks involved, these efforts have yielded limited results. Should the diplomatic impasse continue, the US is likely to deploy uncrewed systems to carry out this precarious mission in such a saturated battlespace. Alternatively, Washington may look to NATO allies with specialised minesweeping capabilities to assist in clearing the Strait.

More than two months have passed since Operation Epic Fury was launched with the stated aim of regime change in Tehran. The situation today is best described as a stalemate: a selective Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, a US counter-blockade in the Gulf of Oman to restrict Iranian oil exports, and a rudderless diplomatic back-and-forth mediated by Islamabad. All the while, Iran has successfully weaponised the chokepoint to advance its strategic goals — deploying naval mines to heighten navigational risk and, in turn, driving up global energy prices. For Iran, the physical denial of passage matters less than maintaining a minefield credible enough to make commercial transit seem prohibitively risky. For the rules-based maritime order, the deeper danger is that freedom of navigation may remain intact on paper while, in practice, being held hostage by deliberate ambiguity beneath the seas.

About the authors:

Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Tuneer Mukherjee is a Non-Resident Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.


Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


The Strait of Hormuz: A Constant in Iranian History

by | May 22, 2026

The strategic and spiritual resonance of the Strait of Hormuz is deeply woven into Iran’s identity. It represents a profound geographic constant in Iranian history. This narrow waterway has served as a central artery for Persian political and economic power, historical consciousness and culture across millennia.

Whether safeguarding Zoroastrian trade routes under the Sassanids, expelling European powers in the Safavid era, or commanding energy routes today, Iran’s geopolitical identity is fused with this narrow stretch of water.  It is a physical manifestation of sovereignty, insuring that the “Passage of the Palm Groves” and its divine namesake “Ahura Mazda” remains a focal point of global history.

Linguists and historians trace the etymology of “Hormuz” to “Ohrmazd,” the Middle Persian derivation of “Ahura Mazda” (the supreme deity of Zoroastrianism). To ancient Persian monarchs, this body of water was more than a trade route; it was an extension of the imperial cosmic divine order.

In the ancient dialect of southern Iran, the name is believed to have evolved from “Hur-Mogh.”  In the local tongue of Hormozgan, Hur means waterway and Mogh refers to palm trees.  For people who lived there for millennia, the strait was not a military chokepoint, it was simply, “The Passage of the Palm Groves.”

The Strait of Hormuz presents a profound historical paradox. Its name honors the Zoroastrian source of cosmic harmony, Ahura Mazda. Yet today, this narrow chokepoint whose foundational ethos, “humata, hukhta, and huvarshta” (good thoughts, good words, and good deeds), is now the epicenter of severe international geopolitical friction and trade instability.

Long before it became the jugular vein of the modern global economy, the Strait of Hormuz was the sacred and strategic maritime gateway to the Persian empire.

The Achaemenid Empire, founded by Cyrus the Great in 550 BC, was the first imperial power to recognize the strait as a strategic artery to be owned.  Its name is tied to the Sassanian dynasty (224-651 CE), the last great pre-Islamic Persian empire and initiator of Zoroastrianism as a state religion.

During the Sassanian era, its Zoroastrian rulers expanded outward from the Iranian plateau to dominate both the northern and southern shores of the strait.

By commanding the entrance to the Persian Gulf by constructing forts and coastal infrastructure, these ancient kings secured their control over the lucrative maritime trade routes, linking Mesopotamia, the Indian subcontinent and the broader world.

Control over the Strait of Hormuz – the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean – has long been a linchpin of imperial power in West Asia.  Its control has shifted across empires, passing from Sassanian Persian rulers and the Abbasid Caliphate to the formidable Kingdom of Hormuz, and eventually into the hands of expanding European colonial powers.

When the Safavid Empire (1501-1736) recaptured the region from the Portuguese in the 17th century, the strait was reestablished as an Iranian geopolitical asset. In the modern era, the reality of the waterway has been magnified on a global scale due to the discovery of petroleum in Iran in 1908.

The impact of the Strait of Hormuz extends far beyond the physical movement of petroleum, liquified natural gas and global commerce.  Historically, this narrow sea passage became a natural crossroads connecting civilizations, diffusing and blending Persian, Arab and Indian art, philosophy and belief systems.  Also, the prosperity generated by taxing trade through the chokepoint allowed for port cities like old Hormuz to build grand mosques and complex architecture.

In the modern era, particularly following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran’s political geography has become inextricably tied to the strait’s unique topographical realities.  Its main navigational corridors are incredibly constrained, forcing commercial and military vessels to travel through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman.

The once-open international thoroughfare, is now at the center of conflict because of the 28 February 2026 U.S.-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic of Iran. For Tehran, control of the natural chokepoint serves as an asymmetric strategy to counterbalance foreign military power.  Iran has successfully relied on its geographical proximity, utilizing coastal missiles, fast-attack boats and strategic islands to assert control over the strait.

Today, the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of the world’s daily energy sources flow, remains the ultimate trump card in Iranian political geography.  The passage grants Iran undeniable economic and strategic leverage.

From the divine association of Zoroastrian antiquity to the modern age of energy diplomacy, the Strait of Hormuz remains a defining feature of Iranian political geography.  It continues to be the narrow gate through the geopolitical ambitions, economic lifeline and historic legacy of Iran intersecting with the wider world.

© 2026, M. Reza Behnam, Ph.D.

Dr. Behnam is a political scientist who specializes in comparative politics with a focus on West Asia. 

Thursday, May 21, 2026

 

Carbon markets underestimate the risks U.S. forests face from climate change



Forests can’t offset emissions as a carbon store if trees are constantly succumbing to droughts, pests and fires




University of California - Santa Barbara





(Santa Barbara, Calif.) — The world’s forests form a vast network of carbon reservoirs, keeping carbon sequestered from the atmosphere where its presence is disrupting Earth’s climate systems. Many corporate, national and sub-national climate policies rely on forests’ essential ability to store carbon, often tracked and funded through a system of “carbon credits” issued to polluting industries in exchange for protecting and restoring forests.

But if trees die — from wildfire, drought or insect infestation — large amounts of greenhouse gasses are released, exacerbating ongoing climate change. And the warming climate is accelerating this problem by making such disturbances more frequent and severe, but only in some places and not in others.

Scientists at the University of Utah and UC Santa Barbara, in collaboration with international experts, sought to determine which forests are most likely to release their stored carbon over the next 100 years, and whether current carbon-credit systems accurately account for those risks.

The results, published in Nature, show that there are places in the United States where carbon emissions from die-backs far exceed what is currently accounted for in carbon-credit systems. This is particularly true for the parched American West. Fortunately, the researchers point out ways it can be corrected.

“Getting to net zero emissions will take a portfolio of solutions,” said co-author Anna Trugman, a forest ecologist at UCSB. “But in many regions, escalating disturbance associated with climate change makes it riskier to count on forests to sequester carbon.”

“Forests are facing increasing durability risks due to climate change,” added senior author William Anderegg, a biology professor at the University of Utah. “Those risks have been underappreciated to date in multi-billion-dollar carbon markets.

“But with better science, we can set these policies up to potentially work better,” Anderegg continued. “We’re providing a potential solution as well.”

Carbon-credit programs aim to cover the risk of fire and other disturbances by using “buffer pools.” These are reserves of extra carbon credits set aside to compensate for forests that suddenly lose carbon if their trees burn or die. However, the study found these buffer pools are currently far too small for US forest projects within the California Air Resources Board (CARB), which manages one of the largest compliance carbon-credit programs in the nation. On average, they would need to be around six times larger to fully cover the expected losses over a century for the projects that have been set up so far.

The research team, which included scientists from seven other universities and organizations, used forest plot data, satellite observations and machine learning to predict where forest losses are most likely to occur. They mapped areas across the continental U.S., and calculated the risks of a carbon reversal — or carbon loss — occurring at least once in the next 100 years from wildfire, drought and insects. The maps show how risks vary across the landscape based on historical models and updated ones that account for climate change. The differences are stark.

While parts of the country remain relatively low risk, the portion of the country projected to experience a reversal expanded from 10% to 33% for wildfire; from 19% to 21% for drought; and from 23% to 25% for insects. Broad areas in Idaho, Southern California, Arizona and New Mexico show an 80% or more chance of experiencing such a carbon loss due to wildfire over the next century.

“Compared to other natural disturbances, we found that wildfire is the largest climate-sensitive risk to durability for forest nature-based climate solutions,” said co-lead author Chao Wu, now at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. “Our analysis shows for the first time what a robust, climate-informed buffer pool would look like to handle accelerating climate threats.”

Along with the maps, the Wilkes Center is releasing a set of interactive tools to help plan where and how to conduct forest management and conservation efforts with the highest chances of success.

Carbon credits are among a host of mechanisms to finance nature-based climate solutions. These strategies harness market incentives to encourage investments that keep greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere. Promoting tree growth is a great way to pull carbon and keep it locked up for decades — as long as the risk of trees dying prematurely is considered and appropriately managed.

“Nature-based climate solutions in forests aim to store carbon and keep it out of the atmosphere,” Anderegg said. “Sometimes that forest carbon is claimed as a ‘carbon offset’ for fossil fuel emissions elsewhere. Somebody’s buying that credit, assuming that a ton of carbon in the trees is the same as a ton of carbon in fossil fuels that you emit to the atmosphere.”

For this system to function as a climate solution, that carbon has to remain in the trees for a long time. Projects are typically planned on a 100-year horizon in the major California program that the researchers examined. Many offset protocols assume risks are stable over time and space. In reality, risks vary widely by location and are increasing due to climate change. And this new research makes it possible for the first time to account for how risks vary through space and time.

Trugman’s lab is currently investigating which species will continue to thrive under emerging climate conditions, why this is, and what managers can do to increase the resilience of high-value ecosystems under threat.

“There is some positive news here,” Anderegg said. “Once you have the best-available science and data directly incorporated into programs and policies, you can then inform and strategically guide where new projects get developed.

“This ability to choose and really focus on forest carbon in low-risk areas is very promising,” he continued. “This can incentivize these forest activities where they’re likely to last, and then maybe steer clear of areas where forests are likely to be gone in 100 years.”

 

Carbon markets underestimate the risks U.S. forests face from climate change


Forests can’t offset emissions as a carbon store if trees are constantly succumbing to droughts, pests and fires



University of California - Santa Barbara





(Santa Barbara, Calif.) — The world’s forests form a vast network of carbon reservoirs, keeping carbon sequestered from the atmosphere where its presence is disrupting Earth’s climate systems. Many corporate, national and sub-national climate policies rely on forests’ essential ability to store carbon, often tracked and funded through a system of “carbon credits” issued to polluting industries in exchange for protecting and restoring forests.

But if trees die — from wildfire, drought or insect infestation — large amounts of greenhouse gasses are released, exacerbating ongoing climate change. And the warming climate is accelerating this problem by making such disturbances more frequent and severe, but only in some places and not in others.

Scientists at the University of Utah and UC Santa Barbara, in collaboration with international experts, sought to determine which forests are most likely to release their stored carbon over the next 100 years, and whether current carbon-credit systems accurately account for those risks.

The results, published in Nature, show that there are places in the United States where carbon emissions from die-backs far exceed what is currently accounted for in carbon-credit systems. This is particularly true for the parched American West. Fortunately, the researchers point out ways it can be corrected.

“Getting to net zero emissions will take a portfolio of solutions,” said co-author Anna Trugman, a forest ecologist at UCSB. “But in many regions, escalating disturbance associated with climate change makes it riskier to count on forests to sequester carbon.”

“Forests are facing increasing durability risks due to climate change,” added senior author William Anderegg, a biology professor at the University of Utah. “Those risks have been underappreciated to date in multi-billion-dollar carbon markets.

“But with better science, we can set these policies up to potentially work better,” Anderegg continued. “We’re providing a potential solution as well.”

Carbon-credit programs aim to cover the risk of fire and other disturbances by using “buffer pools.” These are reserves of extra carbon credits set aside to compensate for forests that suddenly lose carbon if their trees burn or die. However, the study found these buffer pools are currently far too small for US forest projects within the California Air Resources Board (CARB), which manages one of the largest compliance carbon-credit programs in the nation. On average, they would need to be around six times larger to fully cover the expected losses over a century for the projects that have been set up so far.

The research team, which included scientists from seven other universities and organizations, used forest plot data, satellite observations and machine learning to predict where forest losses are most likely to occur. They mapped areas across the continental U.S., and calculated the risks of a carbon reversal — or carbon loss — occurring at least once in the next 100 years from wildfire, drought and insects. The maps show how risks vary across the landscape based on historical models and updated ones that account for climate change. The differences are stark.

While parts of the country remain relatively low risk, the portion of the country projected to experience a reversal expanded from 10% to 33% for wildfire; from 19% to 21% for drought; and from 23% to 25% for insects. Broad areas in Idaho, Southern California, Arizona and New Mexico show an 80% or more chance of experiencing such a carbon loss due to wildfire over the next century.

“Compared to other natural disturbances, we found that wildfire is the largest climate-sensitive risk to durability for forest nature-based climate solutions,” said co-lead author Chao Wu, now at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. “Our analysis shows for the first time what a robust, climate-informed buffer pool would look like to handle accelerating climate threats.”

Along with the maps, the Wilkes Center is releasing a set of interactive tools to help plan where and how to conduct forest management and conservation efforts with the highest chances of success.

Carbon credits are among a host of mechanisms to finance nature-based climate solutions. These strategies harness market incentives to encourage investments that keep greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere. Promoting tree growth is a great way to pull carbon and keep it locked up for decades — as long as the risk of trees dying prematurely is considered and appropriately managed.

“Nature-based climate solutions in forests aim to store carbon and keep it out of the atmosphere,” Anderegg said. “Sometimes that forest carbon is claimed as a ‘carbon offset’ for fossil fuel emissions elsewhere. Somebody’s buying that credit, assuming that a ton of carbon in the trees is the same as a ton of carbon in fossil fuels that you emit to the atmosphere.”

For this system to function as a climate solution, that carbon has to remain in the trees for a long time. Projects are typically planned on a 100-year horizon in the major California program that the researchers examined. Many offset protocols assume risks are stable over time and space. In reality, risks vary widely by location and are increasing due to climate change. And this new research makes it possible for the first time to account for how risks vary through space and time.

Trugman’s lab is currently investigating which species will continue to thrive under emerging climate conditions, why this is, and what managers can do to increase the resilience of high-value ecosystems under threat.

“There is some positive news here,” Anderegg said. “Once you have the best-available science and data directly incorporated into programs and policies, you can then inform and strategically guide where new projects get developed.

“This ability to choose and really focus on forest carbon in low-risk areas is very promising,” he continued. “This can incentivize these forest activities where they’re likely to last, and then maybe steer clear of areas where forests are likely to be gone in 100 years.”

Wednesday, May 20, 2026

India’s strategic $9 bn megaport plan for pristine island


By AFP
May 18, 2026


Local residents sit o Old Shastri Nagaram Beach on the outskirts of Campbell Bay on Great Nicobar Island - Copyright AFP Shubham KOUL


Bhuvan BAGGA

On a remote island in the Andaman Sea, bulldozers are tearing into pristine forests that are home to one of Earth’s most isolated people — part of India’s ambition for a $9 billion megaport, airport and city.

Designed to rival China’s investments around the Indian Ocean, New Delhi’s colossal project will be built on Great Nicobar Island, a site offering a naval presence far closer to Southeast Asia than India’s mainland.

Authorities promise sweeping economic transformation at the entrance to one of the world’s busiest waterways — the Strait of Malacca, through which up to 30 percent of global trade passes.

But secretive military moves are also afoot, with plans for upgraded or new runways for both military and civilian use.

“The Great Nicobar Island Project, which is of strategic, defence and national importance, transforms the region into a major hub of maritime and air connectivity in the Indian Ocean region,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in September.

Access to parts of Great Nicobar requires special permits, particularly for any contact with Indigenous groups.

Roads, bridges and docks will be built on the island, opening it up for port activity and tourism, and serving expanded military installations.

But the project, nearly 3,000 kilometres (1,860 miles) from New Delhi, has also sparked opposition from residents and environmentalists.

Roughly 95 percent of the 910 square kilometre (351 square mile) island, encircled by lagoons and coral reefs, is biologically under-explored forest rich in unique species.

Nearly a fifth of the land will be cleared for the project.

Rights group Survival International warned that the island’s Indigenous groups face “genocide in the name of ‘mega-development'”.

Totalling around 1,200 people, these include the Nicobarese as well as the Shompen, hunter-gatherers who shun contact with outsiders, who Survival describes as “one of the most isolated peoples on Earth.”

– Strategic –

The government insists it has met all “green” requirements and has pledged to protect Great Nicobar’s peoples, communities, as well as its unique flora and fauna, by establishing protected zones.

India’s environmental court has said that it did “not find any good ground to interfere” with the plans.

“We have also noted… the area is located in China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy which is sought to be countered by Indian authorities under India’s ‘Act East’ policy,” the court added.

Beijing has long been accused of seeking to develop facilities around the Indian Ocean — a so-called “string of pearls” — to counter India’s rise and secure its own economic interests.

Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav has said that the project “poses no threat to the island’s tribal groups, does not come in the way of any species, and does not jeopardise the eco-sensitivity of the region”.

The first $4 billion phase on Great Nicobar — construction of a port at Galathea Bay and airport at Campbell Bay — should be completed within three years, according to the archipelago’s governor, former navy admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi.

Once finished, the container port will handle more than 20 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), making it one of India’s three largest ports.

“In the long run, it may well be competing to become the container handling hub in the entire Indo-Pacific region,” Joshi said, rivalling Singapore and Malaysia’s Port Klang.

The megaport may be the showpiece, but the new infrastructure on the southern tip of the 836-island archipelago is only part of a grand plan for the chain, stretching 800 kilometres (500 miles).

Government development plans envision the expansion of existing naval and air facilities across the islands.

Joshi has said two new airports will be built — in the archipelago’s capital Sri Vijayapuram and on Great Nicobar — and older runways expanded to three-kilometre strips, capable of handling heavy-lift cargo aeroplanes.

“All of them will be dual-use runways, used by military and for commercial flights,” Joshi said in February.

One already upgraded runway, on Car Nicobar island, was inaugurated in January by India’s Chief of Defence Staff, Anil Chauhan.

Beyond the runways, the military aspect of the project remains largely secret.

Yet the island’s strategic position has not escaped notice over the centuries, from India’s medieval Cholas to the British, all of whom stationed warships there, just 175 kilometres (110 miles) from Indonesia.

“Great Nicobar Island is like India’s unsinkable aircraft carrier,” said Nitin Gokhale, a New Delhi-based security expert.

“The fact that everyone, including the Chinese, can see our ability to keep a close watch, creates a new paradigm for us.”

– ‘Nonsense’ –

But environmentalists view the plans with dread.

Manish Chandi has been one of the few to regularly visit the small villages of the Nicobarese, which are off-limits except with special permission.

“I just don’t understand the rationale for the project,” Chandi said, noting that there was no clarity about how huge investments can be recovered economically.

Plans extend beyond the port to include a gas-solar power plant, hotels, and a town across 161 square kilometres — multiple times larger than the archipelago’s capital.

The island’s population is projected to grow, from 9,000 people today to 336,000 by 2055.

Tourism projections anticipate 98,000 visitors by 2029, and more than one million by 2055.

The government has promised to compensate for the swathes of trees cut down by planting seedlings in Haryana — a northern state next to New Delhi.

“It is all nonsense,” Chandi added. “We are removing crocodiles from their natural habitat, and saying we are going to conserve them.”

– ‘Duty’ –

Some islanders warn that the isolated Indigenous populations’ millennia-old culture risks being bulldozed away.

“If we lose control of these lands, our culture too will be lost,” said the Nicobarese’s most senior leader, 54-year-old Barnabas Manju.

The Indians who arrived from the mainland are also sceptical.

The first families from outside the islands only settled in 1969, encouraged by the government who feared losing control of the sparsely populated territory.

Sharda Devi, 55, a settler’s daughter, recalls the first arrivals “toiling in some of the harshest conditions” to carve plantations out of the tangled forests.

She initially welcomed the project, before realising the airport would encroach on her land.

“The government is going to take back 11 acres (4.5 hectares) alloted to my father, without offering us another suitable plot of land or even proper compensation,” she said.

Her neighbour, 71-year-old Kusum Mishra, who arrived 50 years ago, also dismissed the “petty compensation” offered, complaining that “they are uprooting us and destroying our lives.”

– ‘See the world’ –

Around 400 kilometres away, change is already starting to ripple through the archipelago’s island of Little Andaman, which Joshi has said will see the “next developmental thrust” after Great Nicobar.

Raja, one of just 143 surviving members of the En-iregale, or “perfect person” in their language, describes a life on Little Andaman where his people still fish in bountiful coral reefs or hunt wild boar in the areas of forest still protected by their millennia-old stewardship.

“We don’t need anything from the government — or anyone,” he told AFP, stressing that “we have everything”.

Past forced contact with outsiders brought trauma, including disease outbreaks that devastated Indigenous populations lacking immunity.

Many of Raja’s community, more widely known as the Onge, still live in near isolation in neat thatched homes on stilts in coastal forests.

But contact is growing rapidly today, even if outsiders are barred from entering Indigenous territory, with members curious about the wider world — and the modern comforts it can offer.

Authorities, treading a delicate line in managing an increasing number of visitors, began last year to recruit more than 500 young men from communities across the archipelago as police “homeguards”.

“They are sons of the soil,” said HGS Dhaliwal, police chief of the archipelago.

Raja, along with his friend Jhaj, was among the first five men from their community recruited.

Jhaj, who speaks some Hindi, which he learnt in a government school around their settlement, has become a keen volleyball player.

Weeks after completing his training, he made a major drug seizure, after finding a seven-kilogramme (15-pound) methamphetamine stash, hidden by traffickers who ply the Andaman Sea south from Myanmar.

“These developments point to better things on the horizon,” Ashish Biswas, 54, who works for a government-backed society, Andaman Adim Janjati Vikas Samiti (AAJVS), which mediates between locals and outsiders.

“I see so many of them in our local school wanting to study and improve, to follow Jhaj and Raja’s inspiration.”

Raja said that his salary was attracting other young members of his community, interested in the world beyond their island.

“They now know that if they wear the uniform, they too will get to travel outside the village and see other places,” Raja said.
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How Zoos Contribute to Disease Transmission Between Humans and Animals


 May 19, 2026