Friday, May 09, 2025

Why Capitalism Is Fundamentally Undemocratic
The antidote is economic democracy.


May 3, 2025
Source: Jason Hickel Substack


It is common in Western discourse to claim there is a natural connection between capitalism and democracy. Sometimes the two concepts are virtually fused together. I always find this odd because I value democracy, but there is nothing democratic about capitalism.

Yes, many of us live in democratic political systems, where we get to elect national leaders every few years, even if we acknowledge that this process is often corrupt and inadequate. But when it comes to the economy, the system of production — which affects our everyday lives and determines the shape and direction of our society — generally not even a pretence of democracy is allowed to enter.

Under capitalism, production is controlled overwhelmingly by capital: the big financial firms, the large corporations, and the 1% who own the majority of investible assets. They are the ones who determine what to produce, how to use our collective labour and our planet’s resources, and what to do with the surplus we generate.

As far as capital is concerned, the purpose of production and surplus reinvestment is not to meet human needs, achieve social progress, or to realise democratically ratified objectives. The purpose is to maximise and accumulate profit and power — that is the overriding goal. These decisions are made in the narrow interests of the capitalist class. The workers — the people actually doing the production — rarely get any voice at all.

This arrangement is completely undemocratic. In fact, it is literally plutocracy. And when you govern a system like this, it leads to perverse outcomes. We end up with massive overproduction of damaging and less-necessary things like fossil fuels, SUVs and industrial beef (which are highly profitable to capital) but chronic underproduction of obviously necessary things like renewable energy, public transit and affordable housing (because these are less profitable to capital or not profitable at all).

The result is that despite having extraordinarily productive capacity, with extremely high levels of output to the point of blowing past planetary boundaries, we nonetheless fail to ensure that everyone has access to basic goods and services. In the United States, the richest country in the world, nearly half the population cannot afford healthcare; in the United Kingdom, 4.3 million children live in poverty; and in the European Union, 95 million people cannot afford decent housing and nutritious food. These are totally artificial scarcities.

It also bears noting that those who control production within this system then leverage their profits to manipulate national elections, through campaign finance and advertising, in support of politicians who will serve their interests. Or through ownership and control over media outlets. Democracy cannot function under these conditions. Indeed, a 2014 study found that the impact of this dynamic on political outcomes in the US means the country more closely resembles an oligarchy than a democracy.

A critic may retort that, leaving all of this aside, capitalism is democratic because every person gets to “vote with their dollars”. According to this argument, consumers get to determine the direction of the economy, which therefore ends up serving people’s needs in the most efficient possible way. But this argument does not hold water, for several reasons.

First, if dollars equal votes, then clearly some people have much more voting power than others. A single individual with a billion dollars would have more voting power than 66,000 workers earning the minimum wage. There is clearly nothing democratic about this. And it is all the more repugnant when we understand that those who hold dollars in excess of consumption requirements (in other words, the rich) are the ones who will have the power to invest in manipulating actual elections.

Second, even if we ignored this problem, the dollars of ordinary people do not equal votes, to the extent that you cannot buy things that are not being produced. We may want renewable energy, affordable housing, longer-lasting products, public transit and regenerative agriculture. But if these things are not being produced — because capital does not consider it profitable enough to do so — then no amount of waving our dollars is going to change that. If it did, then we would not suffer chronic deprivation of these things.

The reality is that capital does not allocate investment on the basis of what ordinary people actually need or want. It allocates investment to what is most profitable to capital, which may or may not align with human needs. Of course, for something to be profitable, there has to be some demand for it. Demand is a necessary but insufficient condition. But it is profitability, not demand, that determines investment. Capital determines production, and we only get to “vote” among the things that capital is willing to produce.

Ultimately, it is not a question of who has the power to consume, but who has the power to produce. Wealth represents not only power over consumption but, more importantly, command over the means of production. This includes command over our labour. Capital determines what we build and what we produce, and thus determines the shape and direction of our civilisation. If we do not have democratic control over production, then we can hardly say we live in a democracy.

None of this is inevitable. We can and should extend the concept of democracy into the economy. We know, empirically, that when people have democratic control over production — economic democracy — they are inclined to organise production more around meeting human needs, they manage resources more sustainably, and they distribute yields more fairly. Researchers have shown that if production were organised around these objectives, we could end deprivation and provide good lives for 8.5 billion people with less energy and resources than we presently use.

Decisions about what to produce and how to use our collective surplus should be democratically determined, rather than controlled by and for the interests of capitalists and the 1%. This can be achieved through universal public services and a public job guarantee (to ensure sufficient production of goods and services necessary for human well-being), democratic ownership of firms (such as in the case of Mondragon or Huawei), and a system of industrial policy, public finance and credit guidance (to ensure that investment and production aligns with democratically ratified objectives).

The path out of capitalism is economic democracy.


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Jason Hickel
Jason Hickel is an author and Professor at the Institute for Environmental Science & Technology (ICTA-UAB) at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is also a Visiting Professor at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He serves on the Climate and Macroeconomics Roundtable of the US National Academy of Sciences, the advisory board of the Green New Deal for Europe, the Rodney Commission on Reparations and Redistributive Justice, and the Lancet Commission on Sustainable Health. Jason's research focuses on political economy, inequality, and ecological economics, which are the subjects of his two most recent books: The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and its Solutions (Penguin, 2017), and Less is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020), which was listed by the Financial Times and New Scientist as a book of the year.

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Trade unions and progressive movements rightly demand better wages and working conditions for employees to improve society. But the question of what good work actually means is rarely asked. And how everyone can benefit from it.

“Good work” cannot be defined in abstract terms. But there are criteria that provide a framework. Work should provide useful goods and services that enable an acceptable standard of living for all. Degrading, unwanted activities should be reduced as much as possible. Production should also be organized in such a way that workers can identify with the output and it not destroys the environmental conditions we rely on.

Capitalism: No Good jobs?

It is easy to see that capitalist production, especially under the rule of globally operating corporations, runs counter to the concept of good work. Entrepreneurs and capital owners determine what jobs are available. They decide on the resources, work processes, and results. 

In addition, production is by no means started in order to produce useful things, but rather to generate profits. Negative effects such as environmental destruction, poverty, social inequality, the promotion of conflicts and wars, etc. are constantly externalized. Workers are both a cost factor and a potential disruptive element that must be controlled. 

Degraded to mere tools of production in capitalist enterprises, employees are constantly threatened by rationalization and “de-skilling”. This is because companies strive to minimize labor costs and enable flexible interchangeability in the battle for market share and returns. 

Of course, there are still good jobs and satisfied employees in capitalist economies. But good work is a very scarce commodity in capitalist-organized production, if it can exist at all – according to the criteria mentioned above.

This is due to the fact that the concentration of the means of production in the hands of a small class structurally undermines democracy and thus the basic principle of good work, which should consist in the expansion of freedom, creativity, and self-determination of people.

More than Better Wages 

Right from the beginning of industrial capitalism, there was therefore massive criticism of the specific organization of production. From Karl Marx to the “Lowell Mill Factory Girls” in the US to socialists such as Rosa Luxemburg, workers, activists, and social critics attacked the undermining of good work by capital-driven societies. 

Anarchists and libertarian socialists simultaneously demanded that the means of production be placed in the hands of those who work in the factories. While in real existing socialism the means of production were monopolized by a party hierarchy and workplace co-determination, as practiced in some countries such as Germany, tended to paralyze workers’ control over production, the idea of workplace democracy remained alive in civil society.

There are also a number of examples where the idea of worker self-management has been put into practice, from cooperative movements and the market socialist model in Yugoslavia to companies that were run and/or managed by their employees, such as the “Fábricas Recuperadas” movement in Argentina in the early 2000s or the Mondragón corporation in Spain.

Give Society a Human Face Again

In addition, a more fundamental critique of the concept of work in industrial society developed, particularly in the post-war period. It was shaped by different currents that can be traced back to conservative, traditionalist, religious, or left-wing and progressive attitudes.

But they all share more or less the same assumption that production in an industrial society cannot create fulfilling work that is appropriate for human beings and a way of life that is compatible with social community and respect for nature. 

On the contrary, it is argued that assembly lines, mines, a network of high-speed transport routes, artificial malls and shopping worlds are constantly destroying nature, craftsmanship, and rural activities, and thus, step by step, the basis of what constitutes good work and good life. 

From critics of civilization such as Robert Jungk and Ivan Illich to the British economist Ernst Friedrich Schumacher and today’s post-growth movements, there are calls to free ourselves from the constraints of technology driven “higher, faster, further” in order to give society and the working environment a human face again.

So, in view of the devastation wrought by modern societies, do we need a major transformation away from industrialism in order to strive for a better, ideal working environment? 

Industrial vs. Agrarian Society

The undesirable developments of capitalist industrialization are certainly obvious. They have exacerbated crises that today threaten the survival of the species. However, “saving” our way out of the social and ecological crisis through industrial contraction or overcoming it in a post-industrial society is misleading. 

The climate and global poverty crisis can only be solved through technological solutions within the framework of industrial society. The global energy question will by no means disappear in a post-industrial world, even if demand in industrialized countries and among the wealthy must be reduced, in some cases significantly. 

Furthermore, capitalist exploitation and destruction on the one hand and technological progress and industrialization on the other have historically gone hand in hand. But they are not two sides of the same coin. 

Technology is more or less neutral. It depends on how it is used. Its character changes depending on the social institutions in which it is embedded. But this also applies to other forms of civilization, such as agrarian societies, which have produced some of the most repressive systems.

Three Arguments

There are a number of frequently cited arguments put forward by industry skeptics and critics of growth to prove that there is no alternative to the exit of industrial society or its decline if we want to enable good work and good life. Three of these are: 

1. Industrial production creates degrading working conditions and an increasing number of “superfluous people.”

2. Technological progress and industrialization are not neutral. Their destructive dynamics are ultimately uncontrollable. 

3. An acceptable standard of living for all is not or no longer achievable industrially due to planetary boundaries. 

The question is, however, whether these arguments are convincing. Is it really true that degrading industrial work, destructive progress, and planetary boundaries make it necessary to reorient society away from industry? Is this the only way to achieve good work? Let’s take a look at the arguments.

Modern Workplaces

In every society, there is work that is uncreative, stressful, or unwanted, not just in an industrial society. But an advanced technological society has the means to reduce many of these activities.

It is true, however, that capitalist industrialization created hellish working conditions that robbed workers of their skills. The reasons for this, however, do not lie in technological progress or industrial production. On the contrary, it was the prevention or misdirection of industrial development that degraded workers. 

A look back at the history of automation shows that its introduction was deliberately designed against the needs of the workers. It led to the “de-skilling” of workers, as David F. Noble impressively shows in his 1984 study “Forces of Production”.

Today, most assembly line work can be done by robots with sophisticated sensors, at least theoretically. This would be a welcome relief for workers from mindless tasks. They could turn to other, more creative work. Artificial intelligence could also be used in this way. 

Certainly, industrial corporations continue to pursue other goals. But here, too, it is not robots that are laying off workers, degrading them, and making them superfluous.

Farming and craftsmanship are often held up as examples of authentic and fulfilling work. But that’s not because there are fewer types of farming and craftsmanship that are stressful, unhealthy, and mindless – cotton pickers in India know all about it. 

The constraints are enormous in some cases, at least in their pre-industrial, non-automated form. Self-sufficiency in agrarian societies is usually a lonely and harsh struggle for survival. Free time, education, cooperation, and exchange across local boundaries are the exception. 

The Blocked Industrialization

The same applies to the technical and industrial progress as a whole. Here, too, it can be shown that the destructive effects are by no means a direct consequence of technology and mass production. 

Take the engine of industrialization, fossil fuel energy production. In itself, this is a good thing. It enabled machines to be operated, which relieved the burden on people. It made mass electricity generation possible and set locomotives, cars, and trams in motion. 

Many useful things have come out of it. But the negative effects were obvious from the start.

Air pollution from coal burning in city centers, and later lead-containing exhaust fumes from car traffic, caused serious, often fatal respiratory diseases in humans and serious damage to the environment. Today, the burning of coal, gas, and oil in the wake of the climate crisis threatens the survival of humanity.

However, this devastation is not a natural consequence of industrialization. Air pollution could have been reduced and prevented from the outset. Air purification technologies (first used in stone processing) and filters were already available in the 19th century

Throughout the course of industrialization and up until the 1970s, little or no value was placed on human health and environmental protection. This was not due to energy technologies, but to companies, investors, and the political class. 

In addition, a better and cheaper alternative to fossil fuels has been available for decades: renewable energies. Countries could have switched to generating electricity from solar, wind, water and geothermal energy long ago if powerful economic and political interest groups had not prevented or slowed down the transition.

Certainly, there are technologies that have no useful purpose. Artillery, atomic bombs, etc. are among them. Given the risks and better alternatives, nuclear power plants are not an acceptable form of energy production for many people. 

But in the end, it is the use that counts, and the social organization of production and life that determines the means. Societies should therefore find ways to use the best available technologies for common good purposes.

Limits

But is an acceptable standard of living for all even industrially feasible given the planetary limits? 

“Acceptable standard of living” is, of course, a relative term. Acceptable means something different to a Western European or North American than it does to someone in Mozambique or a family in a crisis region. 

The United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) is not an ideal measure of living standards, but it does provide a point of reference. The HDI shows that economic development correlates with life expectancy and quality of life. 

According to this, the average Norwegian, German or US American enjoys a high level of material security, even though the neoliberal shift since the 1970s has led to increasingly unequal distribution of resources in industrialized nations, in some cases to a drastic extent. 

The relatively high standard of living in rich countries applies to food, housing, medical and emergency care, cities and infrastructure, nature conservation and environmental protection, social institutions, education and schools, working conditions, leisure time, mobility, etc. This results in a wide range of opportunities and freedoms for individuals and society as a whole. It does not guarantee happiness per se, but all of these things are certainly not detrimental to life satisfaction, civil society, and political culture.

However, according to these criteria, the majority of the world’s population is far from enjoying an adequate standard of living. Often, even basic needs are not met. 

In countries without an own industrial core, families live in extremely precarious, sometimes catastrophic conditions. Many are exposed to hunger and poverty without any protection. Most have no adequate access to electricity, health care, social services, functioning infrastructure, and administration.

Behind the misery lies a fundamental lack of industrialization in the “hungry states”. As the German economist Friedrich List concisely put it in the 19th century, Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans had the “ladder kicked away” from under them, the ladder on which Europeans and Americans climbed to industrial and economic heights. Advanced economies such as Egypt and India were held back by colonial powers and then exploited.

Enough Green Energy

But can we still afford an acceptable standard of living for everyone, including the poor parts of the world – after all, this would mean billions of people consuming significantly more? Isn’t an industrial society for everyone ecologically destructive and incompatible with sustainability? Don’t climate change and raw material shortages show that we in the rich countries are living beyond our means and have now reached a limit that forces us to choose a different path

It is true that capitalist industrialization has damaged the environment in many ways. A radical industrial, and above all energy, transformation is therefore necessary, which, had it not been repeatedly blocked, would not be such an urgent issue today. It is also true that there are a number of possibilities in the industrialized countries that actually exist to get rid of “ballast”, as growth critics like Tim Jackson demand.

But industrial contraction or a post-industrial society are not the solution. Even if industrialized countries were to reduce demand and living standards by 50 percent over the next twenty years, that would not solve the climate problem

The regression would cause an economic and global catastrophe with unforeseeable consequences. Only technologies such as the rapid expansion of alternative energies and a greenhouse gas neutral infrastructure can slow down the climate crisis. What we really need is a Green New Deal, as economist Robert Pollin suggests, that would also create millions of good jobs for the working class.

Industrialized countries will certainly have to temporarily reduce demand over the next two decades in order to prevent dangerous global warming and give developing countries the necessary leeway for restructuring. In the long term, however, there is no shortage of renewable energies for creating a generally acceptable standard of living under industrial conditions. It is merely a question of political will and implementation, not technical feasibility. 

After all, the neo-Malthusian catastrophe, according to which not everyone on earth can achieve an acceptable standard of living because we do not have two planets, is not a law of nature. Resources can be conserved and recycled using green energy. To achieve prosperity for all, we therefore do not need endless growth, which is truly an absurd idea on a finite planet, but rather endless inventive spirit.

When Does Industry Make Sense?

However, this does not mean industrializing and digitizing everything without rhyme or reason. No one would want to defend the existing agricultural industry against sustainable agriculture, for example. 

The disadvantages are obvious. Huge monocultures, artificial fertilizers, chemicals and manure on fields, unacceptable factory farming, the dangerous use of antibiotics, and highly concentrated seed, chemical, and food corporations have severely damaged the environment and rural life and pose enormous risks such as pandemics. 

But it is only an industrial society that has made it possible to establish sustainable agriculture under conditions that allow for an acceptable standard of living and free from the constraints and limitations of agrarian societies. 

So when we talk about good work, we should ask ourselves how we can loosen and finally disconnect industrial societies from their capitalist constraints in order to enable a good life for all. A sensible way forward would be to progressively use the available technologies for the benefit of society. They could bring about better quality of work, more control and self-management of workers in companies, thereby strengthening the position of the workforce vis-à-vis management. 

In any case, unions should fight back when new technologies are used to degrade workers with bullshit jobs and ever-increasing surveillance. Ultimately, it is a political struggle over the use of technology that is as old as industrial capitalism itself, as exemplified by the machine breakers (“Luddites”) in the 19th century.

It goes without saying that an army of robots and AI servers in the hands of corporations, investors, and a global business class without adequate public control does not serve the people or improve the workplace, to the contrary. But as said, machines, cars, information technologies, and automated mass production are not the problem. Industrial society is not a dead end from which we must free ourselves. 

Rather, it is better suited than other forms of civilization to promote freedom and creativity, i.e. good work and good life for everyone. This is true even, or perhaps especially, in a world where technology can replace many mindless jobs.


David Goeßmann is a journalist and author based in Berlin, Germany. He has worked for several media outlets including Spiegel Online, ARD, and ZDF. His articles have appeared on Truthout, Common Dreams, The Progressive, Progressive International, among others. In his books, he analyzes climate policies, global justice, and media bias.

... FACTORIES. AND. WORKSHOPS. OR. INDUSTRY COMBINEDWITH AGRICULTURE. AND BRAIN WORK WITH MANUAL WORK. BY. P. KROPOTKIN. Illustrated and Unabridged. SECOND LARGE ...


Principles Not Personalities
May 7, 2025
Source: SE Queensland IWW





Traditionally, left politics have been based on collective action to challenge, and if possible, transcend structural injustice and systemic inequality. On this count, working class left politics stands in stark contrast to middle class liberalism, which has always understood progress in terms of individualism and upward class mobility; progress is that which extends opportunities for individual advancement. No less than the Harvard Law Review describes this approach in terms of ‘trading action for access.’ Corporate capture of western institutions under neoliberalism only accelerates this process.

As a substitute for intersectional class analysis and critical thinking, so impoverished are bourgeois identity politics that even the Harvard Law Review recognises their limitations. Amidst the corporate capture of politics, captured and corproatised intellectuals try to resolve the contradictions between corporate monopoly and individual rights and responsibilities by rolling corporate hierarchy turds in egalitarianism and inclusion glitter, per the project of ‘trading action for access.’ Providing opportunities for people from diverse backgrounds to become part of the exploiting elite of course does nothing to mitigate their exploitativeness—almost by design.

The combination of corporate capture and the willingness of middle class opportunists to substitute access for action, has been disastrous for movement politics. A great example of the problems that arise where left politics are confused with middle class liberalism is the concept of ‘kiararchy,’ where intersectional class analysis is mimicked by a sort of ‘oppression olympics’ where an individual’s merit as a political actor is based on membership of often multiple oppressed demographics—on identity, in other words, rather than actions, or values lived in them.

Essentialist liberal identity politics are useful for individual advancement, not least where corporate class hierarchies can enjoy the appearance of egalitarianism by offering opportunities for diverse individuals to participate in class exploitation. An eco-technocracy of black, disabled lesbians looks better than an eco-technocracy of white, able-bodied males, but remains an eco-technocracy; the root cause of global warming in an endless-growth economy trying to operate on a finite planet remains untouched. Carbon emissions continue to rise. Politics of personality replaces politics of principle; merit is defined by willingness to conform, to prove that one is willing to enable the corporate status quo and is thus deserving, and to uphold class hierarchy generally, rather than strength of one’s ideas and our ability to live values.

Liberal identity politics are also useful for electoral politics, where the ability to sell an image is often critical for candidates mostly indistinguishable otherwise as members of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ factions of the one pro-big business party. We remember Bob Hawke fondly because he drank beer, and forget that he introduced neoliberal cult economics, the three-mines policy, suppressed wage growth for a decade via the Accord, and spied for the US. Joh Bijelke-Peterson was a fascist, but he was known as a personality. Julia Gilard was seen as a staunch defender of women, especially in talking back to Tony Abbott in federal parliament, but reduced the cutoff age for parenting payments to 8 and removed Australia from the migration zone for purposes of our responsibilites under international refugee conventions. Mainstream rememberings retain the personalities, not the lack of principle.

These kinds of personality-driven politics are accelerated by social media. Internet punditry is all about images and appearance; Russell Brand is just asking questions while he accumulates internet followers until he converts to Christianity and is arrested on charges of rape and sexual assault. Nominally progressive Instagram pundits pander to audiences with rage-bait over extreme examples of discrimination or prejudice that belie everyday structural violence too normal and banal to be memeable. The right for social justice and equality becomes a struggle to have the most followers; the substitution of access and opportunity for action on structural injustice reduces the cause of egalitarianism to a popularity contest.

The popularity contest thus becomes the forum amongst respectable opinion for resolving complex social issues. The fairness of a status quo where action on root causes is traded away for access to upward class mobilty and diverse middle classes is assumed; equality is no longer understood in terms of structural fairness, but opportunities to participate in a structure that is only ever becoming more unfair. Justice is understood in terms of providing and withholding opportunities for upward mobility, depending on one’s capacity to be deserving through conformity and servility. The popularity contest based on personalities rather than principles gets around challenging issues of social and historical root causes by determining right and wrong through trials by internet, performative games of ‘purge the weakest link,’ and aggressive ostracism and shunning.

Purging and aggressive, active shunning of ‘wreckers’ allows moral entrepreneurs to build their (Russell) brand without needing to navigate ethical complexity or nuance, grey area between black and whites, the humanity of the undeserving and difficult to understand, or to live values. Responsibility for the failure of mainstream politics to meaningfully address the structural injustices whose root causes it habitually spurns is laid at the feet of doubters and nonconformists; the underlying assumption that the generalised crisis of neoliberal capitalism is the fault of wreckers and saboteurs, and not the structural contradictions and violence of neoliberal capitalism, ensures that the upward mobility of middle class liberal individualists remains sacred, and is protected.

The purging of wreckers also ensures the values of the political mainstream are upheld, even as they are only asserted in speech, in opposition to some demonised Other, some wrecker or renegade. Meanwhile, the values lived by liberal puritans in actual practise typically approximate the opposite of those they allege in speech. The apostles of liberal personality politics thus render themselves cause and cure of the same problem, while problematising the same mentality in their conservative opponents. Class struggle is hard and demands the ability to cooperate with people we might not necessarily want to have a beer with. It demands principled action and the capacity to live by the same principles we apply to others. Liberal identity politics are easy, and require only that we remain silent in the face of the production of wreckers and deviants on which the regime of access to, or denial of access to, upward mobility seems to turn.

These easy personality politics and their contruction of virtue through exclusion also have the effect of diminishing social debate, our understanding of social issues and our understanding of ourselves and each other. They reduce debate to issues of personal morality. The mentality that equality depends on opportunity rather than structural fairness opens the door for silencing of dissenting or critical perspectives by attacking the person expressing them; the cause of egalitarianism and social justice now depends on the just-world fallacy to explain that criticism of class hierarchy, opportunism and careerism is actually just an attitude problem on the part of the critic. Undeserving nonconformity means that the end justifies the means; pack violence against the undeserving nonconformist and wrecker is now legitimate to protect access to upward class mobility, or egalitarianism.

Under these conditions, the pursuit of progress is reduced to humourless neopuritan stormtroopers lurking around like thieves in the night, sifting through poetry to find the prose, to cut life stories to pieces and produce the philosophy of might makes right from whatever unfavourable fragments they find useful. The cause of freedom and equality demands making political causes out of interpersonal conflict; the cause of social justice becomes a reason to sift through your garbage like the other thought police. The fight you had with your flatmate back in 2002 becomes a reason to exclude and shun you. Errors of judgement become ill intent and patterns of behaviour that makes working class leftists unfortunate enough to be in the orbit of middle class liberals worse than Jordan Peterson or Andrew Tate. Unpopularity becomes a reasonable excuse to problematise reactions to disrespect and launch pileons, pack mobbings and perpetrate wrongs in the name of ending them.

Under these conditions, the only possibility left for egalitarianism and social justice is self-censorship, lest we are proven guily of deviance through association with amoral wreckers and saboteurs—unpersons in their demonic evil as a matter of defintion. Accusation is as good as guilt. There is no open space for new ideas to come through; it is almost as though our rendering of ourselves cause and cure of the same problem is actually about silencing unwanted ideas we are unable to counter or better, and fact we prefer not to know. In the face of not wanting to be wrong, of wanting to salvage our image and our personal superiority, the option left is to attack the messenger. As we burn the Cassandras, brides of Lucifer and heretics who want only to wreck the path to egalitarianism and upward class mobility, might not only equals right—it also equals Left.

Paradoxically then maybe, assassinating Cassandras inevitably diminishes perpetrators, as well as the Cassandras personality politics are weaponised against. Behind our masks of respectable propriety and civility, we resemble the pious and moralistic tory hypocrites we nominally oppose. In our diminishment, our theory and practise falls below the standards of, for example, Alcoholics Anonymous, whose ethic of ‘principles before personalities’ reflects a level of self-restraint and impartiality largely foreign to respectable progressives. The ‘principles before personalities’ ethic is based on the AA understanding that, if a comrade needs help and asks for it, we help them, no matter what personal feelings are involved in our relationship. In nominally left milieus, by contrast, one can often only dream of such openness, much less a comparable level of solidarity towards comrades.

In looking into the AA ‘principles before personalities’ ethic, we find further that, from an organisational perspective, AA adopts this ethic on grounds that ‘everyone has a role to play, and that all roles are honoured and respected,’ that ‘People get stronger when groups emphasise and respect an individuals strengths when working towards a common aim.’ As they tell things, AA ‘practise honesty, humility, compassion, tolerance, and patience with everyone, whether we like them or not . . . putting principles before personalities teaches us to treat everyone equally.’ Members of AA themselves point out the critical importance of this ethic to their capacity to recover; without the ‘love the sinner, hate the sin’ ethic nominally associated with Christianity, but observed more often in the breach, the willing participant in recovery from alcoholism is given space to come to terms with their past, make amends and find better ways of relating to themselves and others. Without this freedom to err, the errant has no hope of recovery, the problem continues to fester, and nothing changes.

This fact begs the question as to the relevance of the ‘principles before personalities’ ethic for nominally progressive milieus that never change or evolve ideas, and don’t change anything, but are themselves changed as a result of their abandonment of principle for opportunity. In applying this ethic to the politics of freedom and social justce, the necessity of the freedom to err begs the question as to whether its denial in the name of protecting upward mobility is not actually counterproductive. Permitting the freedom to err, in a way that does not automatically conflate conflict with abuse, or being criticised with being attacked, may not be so emotionally gratifying, but it may increase our understanding of one another, ourselves, and our capacity to work cooperatively . Demonising ‘wreckers,’ nonconformists and doubters, policing morality to attack messengers when we don’t like the message, and using shame to silence after problematising reactions to disrespect and abuse, are all ways of using conflict as an opportunity for moral grandstanding and exercising control, but they also guarantee stagnation, intellectual serility, and political inertia.

This personality politics-driven approach argubly also ensures no one will want to admit to wrongdoing, if critics, nonconformists and dissenters are going to be held wholly responsible for conflict when it takes two to tango. Denial of the freedom to err to those with whom we find ourselves in conflict further ensures we cut off avenues for processing negative feelings generally, begging the question as to how much of our own attitude is a root cause of vicious cycles of conflict. Regression to ‘sympathy for me, punishment for thee’ might make conflict go away in the short term, especially if we hide behind cliquesm ingroups and tribes in so doing, but it never solves the underlying reasons for conflict in the first place, e.g. selfishness and controlling behaviour. It never helps in resolving differences without resorting to the demonising and purging of those who refuse to fall into line with selfish individualism. Outside of the just-world fallacies of liberal individualists, these are the actual root causes of a world that is anything but just, much less the root of conflict between the selfish and the cooperative. They also help to account for why the politics of personality has left us without politics of principle.


SE Queensland IWWWebsite
The Industrial Workers of the World aims to be a hub for workers and officials across different industries to liase, connnect, and share experience. Too often Australian workers demarcate along industrial lines, which recreates that state of competition that the IWW were formed to counter.


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Why the Centre Will Not Hold
Voters Want The System Upended

By Yanis Varoufakis
May 8, 2025
Source: Unherd


Source: Mark Carney - X.

When Emmanuel Macron beat Marine Le Pen handsomely to reclaim the French presidency in 2022, the liberal establishment was in ecstasy. Their verdict that the centre was holding was as understandable as it was unfounded. In reality, Macron’s second term helped the ultra-Right become France’s strongest political force. Last week, Mark Carney and Anthony Albanese defeated their Trumpish opponents to retain the prime ministerships of Canada and Australia, respectively. Once again, news of the revival of the political centre may prove a centrist delusion.

Long ago, it was reasonable to hope that voters thinking of voting for a scary ultra-Rightist in order to annoy the centrists whose policies kept them down might come to their senses the moment that scary ultra-Rightist looked likely to win government. Something like that happened in France in 2002. Back then, middle-class socialists, young ecologists and working-class communists lined up at the polling stations alongside conservatives to give 82% of the national vote to Rightist Jacques Chirac so as to keep ultra-Rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen — the father of the French ultra-Right’s current leader — out of the Elysée. But this is not what happened in France 25 years later, or in Canada or Australia last week.

In 2002, six years before Western capitalism’s near-death experience, Chirac defeated Le Pen because the socialist and the communist parties directed their voters to him. Under the slogan: “We vote for you today, we oppose you tomorrow morning!”, voters who were at odds with the establishment voted for an establishment figure in order to keep a neofascist out. All the while, they retained their allegiance to parties of the Left. In contrast, Emmanuel Macron won by annihilating the parties of the Left.

Working-class voters, who were suffering the consequences of the centrists’ austerity policies, were incensed with Macron, a former banker determined to impose “green” taxes on them while giving tax breaks to his haute bourgeois mates. With nowhere else to go, these voters drifted en masse to Le Pen. Then something startling happened: Macron and Le Pen grew co-dependent, their mutual antipathy notwithstanding. The more austerity he imposed on the many, the deeper their discontent and the higher her support. And the higher her support, the better able he was to appeal to anti-fascists to hold their noses and vote for him in order to keep her out.

As this dynamic co-dependency grew, the ultra-Right won a staggering 40% of the national vote in the June 2024 parliamentary elections. There is nothing on the horizon to suggest that this trend is unravelling. In this light, history may well remember Macron more as the liberal centre’s gravedigger than its redeemer.

Cut to last week and the decisive defeat of the Rightist Canadian and Australian parties that tried, and failed, to ride the Trumpian wave. Mark Carney and Anthony Albanese won because President Trump made it impossible for them to lose. By threatening to annex Canada, and by slapping tariffs on an Australia that not only has never missed an opportunity to bend over backwards to accommodate Washington’s every whim but also runs a trade deficit with the United States, it is as if Trump was determined that his Canadian and Australian copycats lose last week’s elections. Nevertheless, under the surface of Carney’s and Albanese’s victories, it is not difficult to discern social trends similar to those that rendered Macron’s victory decidedly Pyrrhic.

In Canada, after 11 years of ruling, the Liberals failed to appeal to the large sections of the working-class who either abstained or voted for the conservatives. When the Liberals nevertheless secured a razor-thin majority, they did so by cannibalising, Macron-style, the Left-of-centre (the NDP and the Parti Québécois). In Australia, Labor’s landslide victory obscured the fact that it won with a historically low percentage of the primary vote. Although it won most seats in the working-class suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, Labor did so on second preferences, while continuing to bleed first preferences — especially amongst the immigrant communities which used to be the party’s most reliable vote reservoir. As in Canada, Australia’s centrists won by feeding off the only Left-of-centre force, the Greens, but had no luck in unseating a significant number of Right-leaning independents (the so-called Teals).

So far, so very similar to the political dynamics in France. What makes these similarities so fascinating is that they have taken place in such different countries. France’s economy is joined at the hip to that of Germany and the rest of the European Union. Australia and Canada, on the other hand, are resource-based economies integrated into the energy-industrial-military complex of the United States.

Because of its location, Canada sells 75% of its exports to America, while also directly investing more of its capital in the US than the US invests in Canada. As for geographically isolated Australia, its economy is also deeply intertwined with US conglomerates, albeit indirectly. While Australian mining companies have long been in the business of extracting fossil fuels and digging up gargantuan volumes of the country’s red earth before shipping it all to Japan and China, this roaring trade with Asia’s two superpowers is predicated on the US sourcing two crucial resources from China and Japan: manufactured goods and savings.

This is why the political trends in Canada and Australia are similar to those in France. Despite their vast differences, the three economies are hooked into the same US-centric global surplus-recycling mechanism, whose deep crisis is steering their politics in a direction inimical to the centrists’ medium-term prospects. Politicians like Macron, Carney and Albanese may score impressive victories, but they have no plan for stemming the secular decline of their influence over their increasingly restive electorates. For years now, these electorates have been pummelled by the undercurrents of the global recycling mechanism — a mechanism that once drove their countries’ growth and stability.

The essence of this global mechanism (which I once labelled the Global Minotaur) is simple. Since the Seventies, America’s deficits have provided East Asia (first Japan, then China) and Europe (primarily Germany) the demand for their factories’ manufactures. In return, the European Union, Japan and later China sent their accumulated profits to Wall Street to be recycled into US private and public debt, some equities, and real estate. A Chinese official once described this mechanism to me as a “dark deal”. “Our Dark Deal with the Americans,” the official explained, “turns on the US trade deficit, which keeps demand for our manufactures high. In return, our capitalists invest the bulk of their dollar superprofits into America’s FIRE”. (The acronym stands for “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.”) “Once this process got underway, America shifted much of its industrial production to our shores.”

The problem with this global recycling mechanism was that, to function smoothly, it had to generate larger and larger imbalances: greater trade deficits for the US and more accumulated savings for Northern Europe and East Asia. But there are limits to how large imbalances can grow. Ruptures are inevitable. The longer they are delayed, the greater the pain they inflict — a truth that centrists never acknowledged, not even when it was tearing down their houses.

Trump’s greatest strength comes from asking the pressing question that the centrists refuse to countenance: what comes after the Dark Deal? What comes after the imbalances built on the US trade deficit have proven unsustainably massive? Scott Bessent, Trump’s Treasury Secretary, put it succinctly in a recent speech at the IMF: “Everywhere we look across the international economic system today, we see imbalance… This status quo of large and persistent imbalances is not sustainable… The persistent over-reliance on the United States for demand is resulting in an evermore unbalanced global economy.”

Their proposed solutions may be wrongheaded, half-baked, even crazy, but at least Trump’s team has identified the problem. Voters may not understand that these unsustainable imbalances are at the root of their plight, but enough of them have the sixth sense to intuit that Trump’s people are on to something, unlike the centrists who act like King Canute ordering the tides of discontent to reverse course.

“Their proposed solutions may be wrongheaded, half-baked, even crazy, but at least Trump’s team has identified the problem.”

Inexcusably, centrists treat Bessent and the rest of Trump’s economic team as Neanderthals. They forget that the people they celebrate as the architects of the globalised capitalist order, an order which they now mourn, had warned them in good time. On 10 April 2005, when no one was interested in bad news stories, Paul Volcker, the man who had helped design the devastating Nixon Shock and later headed the Federal Reserve during the formative years of the Dark Deal, foreshadowed everything Bessent is now saying:

“What holds [the US economic success story] all together is a massive and growing flow of capital from abroad, running to more than $2 billion every working day, and growing… As a nation we don’t consciously borrow or beg. We aren’t even offering attractive interest rates, nor do we have to offer our creditors protection against the risk of a declining dollar… We fill our shops and our garages with goods from abroad, and the competition has been a powerful restraint on our internal prices. It’s surely helped keep interest rates exceptionally low despite our vanishing savings and rapid growth. And it’s comfortable for our trading partners and for those supplying the capital. Some, such as China, depend heavily on our expanding domestic markets. And for the most part, the central banks of the emerging world have been willing to hold more and more dollars, which are, after all, the closest thing the world has to a truly international currency… The difficulty is that this seemingly comfortable pattern can’t go on indefinitely.”

Three years later, Wall Street crashed. Two decades of centrist denial followed, bought at the price of gigantic money printing for the few and harsh austerity for the many. With Volcker and his ilk sidelined by the governing centrists, the political centre began to fragment across the West — with deficit countries like France, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (not to mention my country, Greece) closer to the eye of the storm. It was only a matter of time before someone like Trump would rise up, the inevitable outcome of the centrists’ refusal to acknowledge that the global surplus recycling mechanism, the Dark Deal, was dead in the water — just as its predecessor, the Bretton Woods system, was before President Nixon killed it in 1971.

Sure enough, Trump’s policies are unlikely to rebalance the world economy. While some manufacturing will return to America, automation will render this a jobless growth surge. Big Tech’s burgeoning cloud rents will further undermine any actual rebalancing. China will probably move on, gradually transforming the Brics into a Bretton Woods-style system anchored by the yuan. The European Union will fail to rebalance its internal macroeconomy, sinking deeper into stagnation. The planet’s climate will go haywire.

But, though Trump’s policies may not work in the US, France, Australia, Canada or anywhere else, his willingness to upend a broken global system is enough to garner political support for, at home, unprecedented authoritarianism; and abroad, a confrontation with China that casts doubt on our species’ long-term prospects. Meanwhile, centrists stuck in their delusion that the Dark Deal can be sustained are condemned to keep losing even when they win.


Yanis Varoufakis
Yanis Varoufakis born 24 March 1961 is a Greek economist, politician, and co-founder of DiEM25. A former academic, he served as the Greek Minister of Finance from January to July 2015. Since 2019, he is again a Member of Greek Parliament and MeRA25 leader. He is the author of several books including, Another Now (2020). Varoufakis is also a professor of Economics – University of Athens, Honorary Professor of Political Economy – University of Sydney, Honoris Causa Professor of Law, Economics and Finance – University of Torino, and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Political Economy, Kings College, University of London.
Britain

Reform – Labour is feeding the monster


Tuesday 6 May 2025, by Dave Kellaway

The centre cannot hold! In the wake of Reform’s massive gains in local elections, Dave Kellaway investigates the new political landscape.


One comment stood out in the early hours of election night last Thursday: Reform is eating them for breakfast. A party that only managed one MP before the July election, when it won five, has just: taken the biggest vote share of the night,

won a parliamentary by election on a 17% swing
won 650 new councilors
controls ten county councils for the first time
won two mayoralties
is projected to have a national vote share of 30%, giving it a chance of forming or being part of a rightwing coalition government.


All those polls in recent months showing Reform neck and neck or ahead of Labour and the Tories have been validated and even bettered. Its membership at more than 120,000 had already overtaken the Tories. Wealthy donors, including from Trumpland, have boosted its coffers. Having hundreds of councilors not only gives you a profile and material resources but allows you to embed your party in the localities. This in turn makes it easier to campaign next time.

Journalists have commented on Reform’s shift to a more professional set up. Over 80 Tory representatives and staff have defected. This is also reflected in the way they have established a cordon sanitaire with the Tommy Robinson people, despite some members’ affinity with his politics. The most extreme voices were largely kept out of the media during the campaign. Farage’s next targets are the Welsh and Scottish Assembly elections.
Tories and Labour both hit hard

Given that these seats were last up during the heyday of Boris Johnson it meant that the Tories lost more than Labour – 676 seats. Its leadership is being squeezed, like Labour, from both the right and left. For example the Lib Dems defeated them in the South West and Shropshire as well as taking control in Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire.

Many Tory voters, particularly Remainers, did not appreciate the lurch of the leadership towards Reform policies. On the other hand, people like defeated leadership candidate, Robert Jenrick, are pushing for deals with Reform.

Rees Mogg (ex Tory MP) even thought it was a good night for the ‘right’. Clearly one option for these people is a reconfiguration of the right where Reform is an equal or dominant partner. The Italian traditional right has merged into a successful political coalition with the post-fascist Brothers of Italy led by prime minister Giorgia Meloni.

Labour spokespeople seemed stunned at the results. Apparently the reluctance of their traditional support to either turn out or vote for the party is really down to the mess the Tories have left after fourteen years. Labour has to take ‘tough decisions’ because of the Tories so it is really not our fault.

The media has said the winter fuel allowance and disabled cuts came up on the doorstep. Other political choices could have been made: on the two child benefit cap, cutting the winter fuel allowance, savagely reducing disabled peoples/sickness payments or backtracking on green policies. Once you rule out taxing the rich, changing arbitrary fiscal rules or taking resources into common ownership, you are boxed in. Especially if you want to carry out even moderate social democratic policies.

Labour’s leadership also seem to think that atrocious policies on Palestine, international aid, Waspi women, or trans rights will not have a negative effect on voters. Normally new governments benefit from a honeymoon where voters are expectant on some sort of change and are happy about the early policies. Reeves’ iron fiscal rules have limited how many goodies she can throw to the electorate.

Surely too the big decline in membership due the offensive against the left has meant a hollowing out of the party which is obviously affecting the ground operation during key elections. Reform was able to match Labour in the Runcorn bye-election on this terrain and one may imagine this story was repeated in many county council battles.

What next for Labour?


Two options are emerging. Before Runcorn was lost, the right of the party and surely within its central apparatus there was already talk about the opportunity that defeat would provide for Labour to cuddle up even closer to Reform’s anti-migrant policies and to copy its so-called anti-woke agenda. Jonathon Hinder, MP for Pendle and Clitheroe stated recently:

too many working-class people see Labour as the party of immigrants, minorities, those on benefits” (Britain needed) “to drastically reduce immigration, very quickly, and that might mean sometimes prioritising democratic decisions over international legal constraints”. Speaking about the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has often faced criticism from the right for judgments stopping deportations, Hinder said: “I think it’s quite clear that it’s not working”.

Others in the leadership think there is no need to change course much since in the event of a developing, Reform or Reform/rump Tory government there will be a progressive, ‘panicked’, reflex towards Labour to hold off the ‘neo-fascist’ threat. We could christen this the Macron manoeuvre after the French president who got elected twice as the left and progressive forces rallied to him to stop Marine Le Pen becoming president. The problem is that the electoral system here does not work over two rounds, which means it generates less panic until after the final results.

As we have seen on Thursday, the undemocratic first past the post system discriminates savagely against smaller parties… until they break the two party threshold. Reform was winning a lot of seats on far less than 50% of the vote. Just as Labour won its famous landslide on 34% of the popular vote there is nothing to stop Reform repeating the feat – particularly if it reaches a deal with the Tories.

On the other hand, voices even from outside the Socialist Campaign Group, like Rachael Maskell MP from York Central, are arguing for Starmer to do a U turn on policies like the pensioners fuel allowance or the PIP payments for disabled people. There might even be some pressure from inside the cabinet to at least make minor changes that could be shown to respond to such concerns.

Diane Abbott is clearer, stating that the mantra issued by Starmer after the results of going faster and stronger on the Plan for Change need to be altered. One of the few victorious candidates, the Mayor of Doncaster, Ros Jones, tore up the party script and attacked Starmer’s policies on pensioners and disabled people. She even campaigned against them and organized policy in her jurisdiction to mitigate their effects. Probably her efforts at independence helped her hang onto the mayoralty despite a fierce Reform onslaught.

How Labour tacking toward Reform fails

For the left it is clear cosmetic changes cannot defeat Reform nor does abstract denunciation of them as racists or even more clumsily as Nazis. If people are angry and disillusioned about the political process and the cost of living, you must convince them that you will improve their lives – not cut their benefits or do nothing to improve local public services.

You have to show people where you are getting the money from to pay to improve their lives. They know there is plenty of wealth in society to meet this bill. You have to be honest and say that you can make concrete plans for a wealth tax and higher taxes on corporate profits. If Starmer’s response it just to tinker and talk up growth then he will be continuing to feed the Reform monster.

During the general election Labour gave Reform a soft ride. They even pulled out a credible, dynamic candidate who was standing against Farage in Clacton. Very little material was put out targeting Reform. The great strategists like Morgan McSweeney thought Reform would hit the Tories worse and open the gate to a landslide.

It did but this was short-termism. Barely 9 months since the loveless landslide and we see the consequences already. Since the rise of Reform in the polls Labour has gone from ignoring it to mirroring their policies. Hence Yvette Cooper continually boasting about how many deportations she is carrying out and trumpeting the ethnic/migrant listing of offenders.

During the Runcorn campaign the candidate was induced by the apparatus to launch a petition to close the local asylum hotel despite her previous welcoming comments about asylum seekers. Even she felt (later on) that the language used backfired. Always spinning, when Labour lost Runcorn the official statement emphasised it was only a few votes that lost it – what about the other 15.000?

Labour are now facing an opponent unburdened by years of Tory austerity or pandemic incompetence and callousness. For now it also is an opponent that looks like change and newness to many voters.

An electoral space to the left of Labour

In a context of Labour losing 186 councilors and the 45th safest parliamentary seat the Greens vote held up well and they continued to add new councilors. Jessica Elgot, who is not unfavourable to the Starmer government, gives lot of evidence in her article that Labour are continuing to lose more votes to its left and progressive side than to Reform. There is a progressive space to the left of Labour.

In Preston Michael Lavalette and two other independents standing on a pro-Palestinian and anti-austerity platform won seats. The local Muslim community, like most places where it is a significant minority in a ward, have not returned to their traditional Labour home.

The oh-so-clever strategists think that Palestine is some sort of here today gone tomorrow online petition and that these voters have nowhere else to go. They fail to see the near total silence, or worse collusion, of the government on the genocide, the blocking of aid and the sending of British arms will mean no coming back.

The Preston experience also points to a lost opportunity for the political forces to the left of Labour. A continuing debate about whether to launch a new broad left party first on the local level before any national declaration meant that there was hardly any coordinated left electoral intervention in these elections. Such a development would make a difference, including on how well we can build a mass movement of opposition to Reform and its anti migrant racism.

Reform’s Andrea Jenkins lost no time in nailing her vicious anti-migrant rhetoric to the mast. In her victory speech as new mayor of Lincolnshire she said there should be no more asylum hotels, rather let them live in tents like in France.

Professor John Curtice and others are right to declare the two party system is currently not functioning. In some cases we have a five party system and many seats are won with candidates not even close to a 50%+1 majority. We should not rule out a return to two parties, particularly if the Tory party dies or fuses with Reform, but for the moment political volatility is here to stay.

And this new reality creates a more favourable opportunity for a new mass left electoral alternative. Once people change their vote they may do so again for another more progressive party. However the left should still argue for a properly Proportional Representation (PR) system as Labour conference has itself agreed. In principle and practice it is more democratic and could reduce the mass (even majority with these local elections) alienation from the political system. It would give a fair hand to the Greens and any new left alternative too.

Labour will not really challenge Reform. It is the responsibility of the Left to provide both opposition on the streets, in campaigns and electorally to Farage and his party. We need to expose the lies and contradictions in Reform’s policies. There will be an immediate focus in those councils it has won this Thursday. Farage is promising Doge like cuts and attacks on equal opportunity and diversity practices. Local campaigns linked to the council worker unions will be necessary.

Although it is clear that the main organizing of our response to Reform will be based on activists outside Labour we should still look to get support from any left or even soft left MPs who are prepared to speak up against Farage and the government’s policies that are feeding his support. Reform’s success makes discussion on anew left party that even more urgent.

Anticapitalist Resistance 5 May 2025

Attached documentsreform-labour-is-feeding-the-monster_a8976.pdf (PDF - 918 KiB)
Extraction PDF [->article8976]

Britain
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Political Review of 2024 - a view from Britain
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Dave Kellaway
Dave Kellaway is a Socialist Resistance and Fourth International supporter within Anti*Capitalist Resistance.

International Viewpoint is published under the responsibility of the Bureau of the Fourth International. Signed articles do not necessarily reflect editorial policy. Articles can be reprinted with acknowledgement, and a live link if possible.


Source: Craigmurray.org.uk

The UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system can have some remarkable results and is capable of enacting extraordinarily quick political revolution, as in the triumph then rapid fall from power of the great Liberal Party in the first quarter of the twentieth century. We are in such a moment now.

The Labour Party today has a Commons majority of 165 seats, slightly down from the 174 majority on election night. This was almost identical to Tony Blair’s 1997 majority of 178. But extraordinarily, the 178 majority was won on 43.2% of the vote, while Starmer’s 2024 174 majority was won on just 33.7% of the vote — the smallest vote share for any single-party majority government in British history, and yet producing one of the largest majorities.

The system is throwing up perverse results as never before. The reason is that 2024 saw the lowest combined Conservative and Labour vote share since 1910, at 57.4%. This is fundamentally different from the threat to the two-party dominance by the Liberals and Social Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s, when the combined Labour-Tory vote share never fell below 70.0% (1983). So if you are thinking you have seen this before, you are very wrong. This is a far greater shift in voter behaviour.

In the 2010 general election, the combined Labour/Tory vote fell to 65.1%, but 2024 was a further step-change down. Every single opinion poll since has shown that this is a systemic decline, not a blip.

Then we get to the local elections held in England last Thursday, where the combined Labour and Tory vote was 37%, with Labour at just 14%. While these were predominantly (but by no means all) non-metropolitan English elections, Labour suffered near wipeout, losing 65% of the seats they had held under Starmer’s leadership in 2021 in an already devastatingly low performance.

It is important to note that these results for both Labour and the Tories were much, much worse than their local election performance in 2013 at the height of UKIP success, the previous low point for Labour and Tory performance in local elections. Again, you may think, “Oh, I have seen this before. It will pass.”

You have not seen this before, and it will not pass.

The BBC and Sky both made psephological projections for how the local elections would reflect in a general election. These are complicated calculations based on voter movement and with calculated compensation for the kind of seats being fought. It is not a simple projection from irrelevant types of Tory areas to the whole nation. The BBC projection to general election vote share was Reform 30%, Labour 20%, Liberal Democrats 17%, Conservatives 15%, Greens 11%, and Others 7%. The Sky projection was Reform 32%, Labour 19%, Conservatives 18%, Lib Dems 16%, Greens 7%.

Neither the BBC nor Sky projected this to general election seats, but it is undoubtedly the case that both Labour and the Conservatives are steering into the abyss, the tipping point where first-past-the-post massively punishes those who have substantive support but are not winning constituencies (the Liberal Democrat and, to some extent, the Green position for decades). Which of Reform, Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green parties will emerge on top in England is a genuinely open question. Before going on to institutional and policy questions, I might say that my own thought is that the tendency of first-past-the-post everywhere to encourage two-party systems may well lead to Reform and the Liberal Democrats being those two parties; and that is certainly as probable as any other combination.

Institutionally, the Labour Party seems very strong, in that it is rooted in the trade union movement which created it and still funds it. Even under the lurch to the right under Starmer, the Labour Party retains some progressive policies which relate specifically to the rights of those in employment, and increases in the minimum and living wage and the Employment Rights Act reflect this. These are the inescapable tribute to the union paymasters, and a good thing too. Starmer’s right-wing economic policies rather focus attacks on those receiving benefits (some of whom are, of course, in work).

But institutional backing does not in itself ensure continued primacy. The Liberal Party had the active backing of a great many of Britain’s landed and industrial magnates. It did not founder for lack of institutional finance and muscle. Let us merely note that the Conservatives are in more jeopardy than Labour as their finances are reliant on contributions from wealthy individuals and companies which are ad hoc rather than institutional and susceptible to frictionless switching to Reform.

So what are the actual politics of this? Well, Reform voters are primarily motivated by dislike of immigration. While there are respectable economic arguments over the desirability of immigration, the simple truth is that most Reform voters are rather motivated by racist dislike of foreigners. I know that I have commenters here who like to deny this, but frankly, I do not live under a rock, I have fought elections, I used to live in the then-UKIP hotspot of Thanet, and I do not have a romanticised regard for the working class, and I have no doubt that Reform primarily channels racism.

But the interesting thing is that does not mean that Reform voters are “right-wing” in an economic sense. Opinion polls have found that most Reform voters favour renationalisation of public utilities, for example, and Farage has appealed to this by advocating for the nationalisation of the water industry and backing the nationalisation of the steel industry. Reform voters also favour rent controls, employment protections, and minimum wage legislation. On the left/right axis in economic policy, Reform voters are very substantially to the left of their party leadership, who almost certainly do not really believe in any of those things at all, though they may sometimes pretend.

George Galloway with the Workers’ Party has attempted to provide the mix of social conservatism in culture wars, including anti-immigration messaging, combined with left-wing economic policy, which might define a kind of left-wing populism, but failed miserably in Runcorn. It is only fair of me to make my own position clear, having stood for the Workers’ Party in the General Election on the issue of stopping the genocide. I do not support the culture wars agenda of the Workers’ Party and would not associate myself with the “Tough on Immigration, Tough on the Causes of Immigration” messaging the party used in Runcorn, even with the second half of that message emphasising an end to imperialist destabilisation of vulnerable countries. It is still too dog-whistle for my taste.

It remains my belief that Starmer has always been a deep-state operative and that he is deliberately driving the Labour Party to its own destruction. Among the strongest evidence for this, in my view, is the fact that all of the documentation on his involvement in the Assange case, the Savile case, the Janner case, and other high-level paedophile cases while he was Director of Public Prosecutions was allegedly destroyed by the state while the Conservatives were in office and Starmer in opposition. The Deep State was protecting him and preparing his way to power.

It is also interesting that the only time the mainstream media really turned on Boris Johnson during his premiership was in attacking Johnson for referencing Starmer’s involvement in the Savile case, which brought a torrent of media abuse of Johnson in defence of Starmer, even though it was one of the rare occasions where Johnson actually told the truth.

But even if you do not accept my theory that Starmer may be destroying the Labour Party on purpose, perhaps you might accept that Starmer would prefer to see the Labour Party destroyed than see it in power as a left-wing party. The Thatcherite agenda of austerity, benefit cuts and attacks on the non-working and disabled, monetarism, militarism and jingoism, with anti-immigrant policies allied to unquestioning Zionism, is perhaps a true reflection of Starmer’s core beliefs; as these align precisely with the Deep State agenda, the question of whether Starmer is a true believer or a blank cipher for the Deep State is moot.

With Labour emphasising “stop the boats” and deportations, there simply is no left-wing party among the complex five-party pattern emerging in English politics. It is also worth noting that under John Swinney, the SNP is firmly under control of its own neoliberal right wing in Scotland.

It is tempting to believe that a left-wing party must emerge to fill the gap in what is offered to the electorate, but that is not automatic. We may simply have a position where there is no left-wing choice of any stature. Jeremy Corbyn, for whom I have respect, has never indicated the dynamism and toughness required to drive a new party to success. Furthermore, he remains surrounded by the “soft Zionist” crew who convinced him as Labour leader that his best course was to continually apologise for non-existent anti-Semitism and speed up the expulsion of left-wingers from the party.

While a time of great political change is a time of great possibility, my own view is that what is going to emerge in England is going to be a dark period, with the extraordinary authoritarianism of the UK government, as already witnessed in the Public Order ActOnline Safety Act, and major police harassment of dissidents, becoming even more pronounced.

In Scotland, I am ever more confident of the prospects of Independence to escape from this. Scots do not want a right-wing government, and Reform will only split elements of the Unionist vote — it is no real threat to the Independence vote. As it becomes obvious that Westminster rule is going to be authoritarian right-wing rule for the foreseeable future, Scots will increasingly wish to quit the Union fast. Farage is an English archetype which is deeply unappealing to Scots, and, unlike Sturgeon, Swinney does not have the charisma to lead the Independence movement away from its goal.

My own focus in the coming year is very much going to be in moving forward on Scottish Independence. I hope to be adopted by the Alba Party as a candidate for the Scottish Parliamentary elections in 2026.

We are at the beginning of the biggest change in the UK political system for over a century. Get ready to play your part; inaction is not a sensible option in these dangerous times.