Sudan: Threats Against Christian Communities Grow As Conflict Deepens – OpEd

September 25, 2025
By Fernando Carvajal
EURASIA NEWS

As the devastating civil war in Sudan enters its third year, recent events once again raise concerns over the deteriorating conditions and crimes against civilians. The attack on the Pentecostal church in the El-Haj Yousif area of Khartoum on 8 July yet again reinforced the threats made by extremists against Sudanese minority religious groups. Christian Minority groups are increasingly “caught in the crossfire” within a harsher environment.

Sudan’s Christian population is estimated around 5.4 percent of its total population of about 50 million, composed of “Copts and Catholics [in] the majority [and] Protestants…a considerable minority.” The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (CIRF) reported “in April 2024 that more than 150 churches have been damaged since the war began in 2023.” ACT Alliance and Caritas Internationalis have highlighted how “an already fragile situation, spiraling into a severe humanitarian crisis” is exacerbated by indiscriminate targeting of minority groups like Christians. Open Doors’ World Watch List ranks Sudan as the world’s fifth country for persecutions of Christians.

Civilian hopes for reform and emergence of civilian and democratically-based government continue to collapse as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, revert to the Al Bashir era of empowering Islamic extremism. The integration of religious radicals affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood factions within the National Congress Party (NCP) and emerging jihadist factions goes beyond infantry units fighting against rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Islamists are present within both police and security forces. According to witness reports following the attack on the Pentecostal Church (built in 1990) in East Nile, Khartoum on 8 July, “vehicles belonging to police and Sudanese Armed Forces… were clearly marked and their presence allowed the perpetrators to act with impunity.” Khartoum-based Christian clerics warn of deteriorating conditions forcing Christians to turn to secret gatherings for worship and suppressive persecution that has prevented rebuilding of churches and related buildings since start of the civil war in 2023.
Military and Islamist alliance

The civil war has undoubtedly attenuated and dissolved Sudan’s constitutional order. Christian leaders in Khartoum have specifically highlighted the lack of constitutional protections afforded prior to the start of the civil war amid restrictions subsequently imposed by SAF soldiers since the re-capture of Khartoum in March, reversing the progress in religious freedom achieved since Al Bashir was deposed. The persecution of Christians has escalated over the past year, from Nuba mountains to Khartoum and Shamaliya also known as the Northern State which borders Egypt and Libya.

Attacks on Christian communities seem particularly increasing across areas held by SAF or where in conflict with rivals like Harakat Al-Sha’abia Li-Tahrir Al-Sudan-Al-Shamal (SPLM-N) is escalating. Soon after the war began, SAF “bombed and partially destroyed the Evangelical Church in Bahri, north of Khartoum” and a Presbyterian Evangelical Church in Gerief in April 2023. In December 2024, an airstrike by SAF on a church in Khartoum killed 11 persons as government forces took over Wad Madani, the capital of Sudan’s Gezira State. Across the Nuba Mountains, an area in southern Sudan contested by SAF and SPLM-N, civilians reported attackers “raping girls and taking boys to go and train them [as fighters],” In Shamaliya, another area now under SAF control, “mobs of extremists have also started harassing Christians,” according to witness reports. The blatant attacks on Christians coincide with a more prominent role played by “self-described ‘jihadi’” groups allied with SAF in pursuit of rival forces.

These ‘shadow brigades’ have “gained attention through its active role in battles” against their rivals. Most notably among these Islamist militia is Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, led by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha, Anas Omar, and Hudhayfah Istanbul among others. These field commanders are integrated within SAF, with personalities like Anas Omar are other “prominent figure(s) within the dissolved National Congress Party (NCP)” affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Other elements include the “Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) in El Butana in eastern Sudan’s El Gedaref,” between Khartoum and Ethiopia, a group of Islamists that rejects UN-led peace efforts like the Juba Peace Agreement and aims to advance the interests of the Army-Islamist Movement alliance.

This nexus between SAF and Islamist militia not only marks “the return of Islamists from the Bashir era and the emboldening of extremist non-state actors amid growing impunity” that threaten minorities, but also a threat against international organizations and an obstacle to the peace process. The Al Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade allegedly attacked an ICRC convoy in 2023. Two people were killed, and seven were injured, including three ICRC staff members.” The Brigade is estimated at “20,000 strong and equipped with sophisticated weaponry” as the US accuses SAF and allies of using chemical weapons.

Both ACT Alliance and Caritas Internationalis have warned that as the crisis is ‘exacerbated by drastic global aid cuts,” prospects for peace seem farther away and harder to achieve. Such aid organizations “echo the Sudan and South Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference statement in calling for the primacy of human life, restraint and dialogue for peace,” pleading with rival factions to join peace talks and not repeat boycott of the Geneva, London and Addis Abba attempts to de-escalate conflict and violence against civilians.

Fernando Carvajal
Fernando Carvajal served on the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen from April 2017 to March 2019 as a regions and armed groups expert. He has nearly 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and is a specialist in Yemeni politics and tribal relations.

USCIRF Report Warns Of Deteriorating Religious Freedom In Uzbekistan

 September 26, 2025  

By Eurasia Review

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has issued a new report warning that religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan further deteriorated in 2024, with the government continuing to impose restrictive laws, penalties, and censorship on religious communities.

USCIRF, an independent and bipartisan agency established by the U.S. Congress, monitors religious freedom abroad and makes policy recommendations to the U.S. President, Secretary of State, and Congress. Its latest issue update, “Uzbekistan’s Administrative Penalties for Peaceful Religious Activity,” describes how Uzbek authorities applied administrative penalties throughout 2024 to target religious groups and individuals engaged in peaceful practice. The commission said the Uzbek government relies on its 2021 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, commonly known as the “religion law,” to enforce a system of controls over religious life.

The law builds on a 1998 statute and places strict bureaucratic barriers on religious communities. It bans missionary activity and proselytism, prohibits unregistered religious education, and requires state approval for religious materials. In 2024, Uzbekistan’s parliament, the Oliy Majlis, adopted additional legislation penalizing parents or guardians for allowing children to receive unauthorized religious education.

According to USCIRF, these measures reflect lingering Soviet-era policies designed to keep religion under state control. Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov in June ordered the demolition of more than 400 unregistered mosques and prayer spaces for conversion to commercial use, though no demolitions were reported. The commission cited the example of an unregistered mosque in Tashkent’s Yangiyul district, closed by the government in 2007. Despite repeated attempts by its congregation to register, officials refused and later threatened to convert the building into a business.

Other religious groups faced similar restrictions. In February 2024, the Tashkent Inter-District Administrative Court rejected a Jehovah’s Witnesses complaint against an official’s refusal to designate a building as its legal address, which is required for registration. The Tashkent Administrative Court Appeal Board upheld that decision in April. Protestant churches also continued to see registration attempts blocked, while their members reported harassment by the State Security Service. The report noted that officials in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm questioned unregistered church members and, in one case, accused a Protestant Christian of attending an “illegal extremist Wahhabi group” before pressuring him to report on his congregation.

The commission also described continued targeting of Muslims who sought to practice their faith independently of state structures. Authorities issued fines, arrests, and prison sentences in what they said were efforts to counter extremism. USCIRF documented more than 50 cases of Uzbeks imprisoned on vague charges linked to peaceful religious activity. Meanwhile, the quasi-independent Muslim Board of Uzbekistan played a central role in controlling clerics. In April 2024, the board ordered imams to hand in their passports, a move seen as a way to restrict their movement following a terrorist attack in Moscow carried out by Tajik nationals linked to the Islamic State. The following month, imams were instructed not to use social media or engage with other people’s content online.

The Committee on Religious Affairs also maintained a list of banned social media channels and warned citizens not to interact with online religious posts that had not received state theological approval. Officials said such interaction could result in severe consequences, including large fines. In June, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reinforced the government’s stance, warning that “various forces in the world are trying to destroy the essence of religion and lead young people astray from the true path.”

In its 2025 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that Uzbekistan be placed on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for systematic and ongoing violations of religious freedom. In September, the commission also held a hearing examining laws impacting religious freedom across Central Asia, including Uzbekistan.

The latest report calls for further action by the U.S. government. It urged the State Department to impose targeted sanctions on State Security Service officials who repeatedly arrest individuals for peaceful religious activity, including freezing assets and restricting visas under human rights authorities. It also recommended that religious freedom be included in all forthcoming C5+1 discussions between the United States and Central Asian governments. For Congress, the commission advised raising religious freedom concerns in bilateral meetings, delegation visits, and hearings, while suspending the Uzbek government’s annual “Uzbekistan Day” event on Capitol Hill until all individuals imprisoned for peaceful religious activity are released.

Uzbekistan is a majority Muslim country of around 36 million people. Between 88 and 96 percent of the population identify as Muslim, mostly Hanafi Sunni, with a small Shi’a minority. Russian Orthodox Christians account for about 2 percent. Other communities include atheists, Jews, Baha’is, Buddhists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, and Protestant Christians.

USCIRF concluded that religious freedom in Uzbekistan remains severely restricted and showed little improvement in 2024. “Religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan further deteriorated in 2024,” the commission stated, pointing to restrictive laws, harassment of believers, censorship, and the imprisonment of dozens of individuals on religion-related charges.

Teddy Bears Could Be Valuable Conservation Tools—But They Need A New Look

September 25, 2025 

By Eurasia Review


For over 100 years, teddy bears have been a hallmark of childhood nurseries, ubiquitously embedded in our early memories and rarely the object of deep scrutiny. However, according a recent article in BioScience by Dr. Nicolas Mouquet (CRNS) and colleagues, the humble teddy bear is much more than a mere plaything. Instead, the authors suggest that the beloved plushes play a pivotal role in our early conception of nature, potentially shaping the ways we interact with the natural world throughout our lives.

“For many Westerners, the very first intimate, emotional bond with nature may not come from a walk in the woods, but from early exposure to representations of nature, through illustrated books, toys, or plush animals,” explain the authors, who argue that emotional bonds such as these can persist for a lifetime. At issue, then, is whether childhood toys are up to the task of fostering a realistic conception of nature. Unfortunately, say the authors, there may be serious downsides when they fall short: “If the bear that comforts a child looks nothing like a real bear, the emotional bridge it builds may lead away from, rather than toward, true biodiversity.”

To explore this issue, the authors used morphometric and colorimetric analyses to compare 436 teddy bears with their real-world counterparts. The results were striking: “Real bears form a well-defined cluster that is clearly distinct from the teddy bears,” say the authors. Even the giant panda, which comes closest to matching teddy bear traits, “still deviates substantially” from the characteristics that make plush bears emotionally appealing.

This gap raises important questions for conservation. “The further the teddy bear diverges from its biological counterpart, the greater the risk that children grow up with warped or incomplete mental representations of animals and ecosystems,” the researchers warn.

The team suggests that “diversifying the plush palette to include ecologically grounded forms, species with more accurate morphologies and colorations, could help restore some alignment between emotional connection and biological reality.”

The teddy bear may seem an unusual conduit for improving humanity’s relationship with the natural world, but according to the authors, there is a real opportunity to foster change: “By understanding and leveraging the characteristics that make teddy bears powerful emotional tools, we can enhance not only individual well-being but also collective care for the planet.”

Secure And Transparent Investments Through Anti-Money Laundering Controls And Transparency – Analysis

September 25, 2025 
By IFIMES


Today’s global financial market requires far more than mere liquidity and the movement of capital – it demands stability, investment security, and a predictable business environment. In a time when market instability or volatility can wipe out asset value or disrupt capital flows overnight, it is crucial for investors to operate in countries that guarantee clear rules of the game, a transparent regulatory framework, and effective mechanisms for safeguarding the financial system. Institutional and international funds, managing billions of dollars on behalf of clients, seek jurisdictions where the risk of eroding trust, unpredictable political decisions, or legal sanctions are kept to a minimum.



One of the key challenges in this context remains money laundering and terrorism financing – phenomena that not only undermine the integrity of the financial system but also directly endanger the reputation of the country and the investors active in its market. Countries lacking a robust and consistently enforced anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework risk being designated as “high-risk destinations,” which automatically deters serious investors and may trigger international restrictions. For this reason, the European Union and global financial institutions regularly update their lists of high-risk jurisdictions. Unfortunately, even within the European Union, certain countries continue to face major challenges in this area – such as Italy, Malta and Bulgaria – where anti-money laundering controls and crypto market supervision remain inadequate. A similar situation can be observed in some Gulf countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which are struggling with the slower implementation of international standards and weaker institutional coordination.

While Italy, Malta and Bulgaria, despite their membership in the European Union, still balance between ambitions of financial stability and the practical challenges of money laundering control and crypto-market regulation, Belarus, the UAE and Montenegro have taken the opposite course – proactively shaping their economic and regulatory frameworks to attract reputable investment. Whereas European and Gulf jurisdictions such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sometimes lag in implementing international standards or struggle with bureaucratic obstacles, these three countries stand out as examples of a modern and reliable business environment.

Belarus has strategically leveraged regulatory and technological innovation to position itself as a stable destination for international investment, including crypto projects and digital financial platforms. The transparency of its regulatory framework and the effective control of financial flows contribute to investor confidence and minimise the risk of legal or reputational issues.

Through a rigorous AML/CFT framework and clear regulation of digital and crypto activities, the United Arab Emirates has managed to strike a balance between innovation and security. This approach has positioned the country as a regional hub for international financial flows and blockchain technology, while ensuring investors benefit from a high level of capital protection.

Although a smaller economy, Montenegro distinguishes itself by prioritising the attraction of foreign capital through a stable legislative framework and clear procedures for overseeing financial transactions. Its integration into regional and international financial flows, coupled with the modernisation of digital services, positions it as a competitive destination compared to countries that continue to grapple with regulatory challenges.



A blend of robust regulation, openness to innovation and strategic positioning has allowed these countries to emerge as frontrunners in the global financial landscape. They not only minimise risks for investors but also actively shape the future of financial markets, demonstrating that stability, transparency and innovation can go hand in hand.[2]
Reforms and country examples: Belarus, UAE and Montenegro

In recent years, Belarus has made significant strides in strengthening its financial sector and anti-money laundering framework, resulting in a safer environment for investors. Stricter regulations on the reporting of suspicious transactions, reinforced bank supervision, and the implementation of modern transaction monitoring systems have reduced the incidence of suspicious activities, while international cooperation with relevant organisations ensures the practical application of global standards. Decree No. 8 “On the Development of the Digital Economy”, adopted in 2017, legalised cryptocurrencies and digital tokens within the High-Tech Park (HTP), and crypto companies apply Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, transaction monitoring, and mandatory reporting of suspicious activities.

Foreign investments in the financial sector rose by more than 18% in 2024 and 2025, while the number of suspicious transactions dropped by 25%, according to figures from the Central Bank of Belarus. The World Bank has reinforced this momentum by financing projects totalling over USD 2.5 billion, while the China–Belarus Industrial Park has continued to attract billions in additional investment. Statistics for 2024–2025: over 300,000 clients, foreign transactions worth USD 3 billion, and a 25% decline in suspicious activities. These reforms make Belarus an attractive destination for foreign investors seeking a stable and reliable environment for major projects and crypto innovation.

President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s policy, which strongly affirm financial transparency and investment security, gained further confirmation and international recognition when US President Donald Trump held a phone conversation with him on 15 August 2025, while on his way to Alaska for a historic summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The call highlighted Belarus’s importance as a reliable and innovative destination for global investors.

The United Arab Emirates, for its part, has set an example in the Gulf region through a comprehensive AML/CFT framework implemented via the Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) and the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), aligned with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. The EU removed the UAE from its list of high-risk countries under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184, adopted on 10 June 2025, reflecting the country’s success in tightening transaction controls, boosting financial sector transparency, and rigorously applying international standards. This decision significantly reduces regulatory barriers and increases investor confidence across Europe, the United States and Asia, making the UAE a secure destination for capital. Strategic projects in infrastructure, finance and the digital economy are drawing further foreign investment, while openness to blockchain and crypto projects positions the UAE as a regional hub for innovative financial markets.

In 2024, the United Arab Emirates confirmed its status as a leader in the GCC and a prominent global player in both inbound and outbound capital flows. The country received a record USD 45.6 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), accounting for 37% of total FDI flows in the Middle East and North Africa, while also making significant outbound investments in international projects, including USD 310 million in Morocco. These impressive results underscore the UAE’s reputation as a trusted and innovative partner for international investors and strategic projects worldwide.

The country’s President, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, pursues a visionary, globally oriented policy that enables the UAE not only to assert leadership within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) but also to gain global recognition as a reliable and strategic partner in international financial flows, strengthening the country’s role as a hub for innovation, infrastructure and the digital economy.

Although a small economy, Montenegro has strategically recognised the importance of modernising its financial sector, driving digital transformation and strengthening regulatory transparency. On 12 March 2025, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Law Amending the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 24/2025), which came into force on 20 March 2025. The legislation introduced crucial innovations for the financial sector, including the regulation of crypto assets and gambling operators, the registration of crypto service providers, as well as mandatory education and training for prosecutors and police in monitoring and detecting suspicious transactions.

The measures also include monitoring the ultimate beneficial owners of companies and identifying money laundering typologies, thereby reducing the risk of misuse of the financial system and increasing capital security. Transparent application of AML/CFT standards and compliance with international norms provide investors from Europe, the United States and Asia with a reliable and predictable business environment.

At the same time, Montenegro has opened space for the development of the digital economy and the crypto industry, offering favourable conditions for innovative financial projects, blockchain initiatives and fintech start-ups. Through regional integration, infrastructure projects and public-private partnerships, the country is becoming a competitive destination for strategic investment and capital growth.

Data from the Central Bank of Montenegro show that total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in 2024 reached EUR 889.8 million, with net inflows amounting to EUR 489.9 million – 13% higher than in 2023. Most of this investment went into the real estate sector, while investment in companies and banks also recorded growth.

These reforms not only strengthen the regulatory framework but also substantially boost international confidence in Montenegro’s financial sector, positioning the country as an attractive destination for foreign investment in both traditional and digital finance, including crypto, infrastructure and innovation. The swift and effective implementation of reforms, the determined strategic engagement of the Government of Montenegro, and the highly proactive role of the Speaker of the Parliament of Montenegro, Andrija Mandić, make the country an exceptionally appealing destination for international investors, further establishing Montenegro as a reliable, innovative and strategically focused partner for capital projects.

Owing to these reforms and strategic initiatives, Montenegro has the potential to emerge as the jewel of the Adriatic – much as the United Arab Emirates is recognised as the jewel of the Persian Gulf, symbolising stability, innovation and international investment appeal.

By contrast, countries including Italy, Bulgaria, Malta, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Lebanon continue to face serious shortcomings in the consistent application of AML/CFT standards. Italy struggles with weak implementation in the real estate, luxury services and banking sectors; Bulgaria is marked by high corruption and a lack of regulatory consistency; and Malta, despite having rules in place for the financial sector and online gambling, suffers from uneven enforcement. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia possess legal frameworks, yet implementation and international cooperation remain underdeveloped, while Algeria and Lebanon contend with a weak legislative framework, inadequate oversight and a high risk of money laundering.

In comparison, Belarus, the UAE and Montenegro demonstrate how systemic reforms, transparency and adherence to international standards can create a safe and predictable investment environment, attract capital and enable the development of innovative financial and crypto projects.[3]
The US administration and financial security – Trump’s 2025 strategy

Since January 2025, President Donald Trump’s administration has undertaken a series of strategic and decisive measures to bolster US financial security, combat money laundering and establish the country as a global leader in the digital economy. Widely regarded as one of the most effective administrations in the past three decades in tackling this issue, Trump’s team has shown a profound grasp of the complexities of the international financial system and an ability to implement regulatory reforms with remarkable efficiency.

In July 2025, Trump signed the GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act), the first federal law to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for stablecoins. The Act mandates full reserve backing, regular audits and strict adherence to anti-money laundering rules, paving the way for faster and more efficient cross-border payments while ensuring investor confidence and reinforcing the global standing of the US financial system.

The Executive Order establishing the Strategic Reserve of Bitcoin and US digital assets was signed on 6 March 2025, positioning the United States as a global leader in digital reserves policy. At the same time, the administration eased regulatory barriers for cryptocurrencies, facilitated the issuance of stablecoins and supported innovative financial products, thereby accelerating technological development in the financial sector and creating a stable, predictable environment for capital.

The Trump administration strictly applies FATF standards, the global guidelines for preventing money laundering and terrorism financing. This includes Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions, transparency of beneficial ownership and international cooperation. KYC procedures enable the efficient identification and verification of clients, preventing misuse of the financial system and further strengthening investor confidence.

The combination of legislative modernisation, strategic investments in digital assets, the reduction of regulatory barriers, and stronger international cooperation has positioned the United States under the Trump administration as a global leader in financial security and innovation. These measures underscore the administration’s reputation as one of the most effective in the past three decades in tackling key challenges to financial security, boosting investor confidence, safeguarding the stability and competitiveness of the US financial sector, and strengthening the country’s standing in the global economy in 2025.[4]
Conclusion

In the contemporary global financial landscape, stability, predictability, and capital security have become key factors for economic development and sustainable growth, particularly in an era of rapid advances in artificial intelligence and cryptocurrencies. Transparent regulation, rigorous enforcement of international anti-money laundering standards and effective oversight of financial flows help to mitigate risks, preserve market integrity and strengthen investor confidence, while simultaneously creating the conditions for the secure adoption of innovative technologies. Investments in the digital economy, blockchain and crypto initiatives further enhance the competitiveness and dynamism of the financial system, establishing a framework in which capital and innovation can coexist without jeopardising security.

At the global level, the aggressive and disruptive policies of major economic powers – including China, Russia and India – which pursue strategic dominance through control of markets, technologies and resources, underscore the need for reliable and predictable systems of capital oversight. In this context, the United States has a pivotal role to play in resisting these destabilising pressures and in actively supporting countries capable of upholding clear rules and effective regulatory frameworks, among them Belarus, the UAE, Montenegro, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Chile. Such support not only enhances the global stability of financial flows but also drives innovation, digital technologies and sustainable economic growth.

The capacity to enforce clear, effective and predictable rules in the financial sector has become a strategic imperative for global capital markets. Countries that build reliable supervisory systems, transparent regulation and consistent implementation of international standards secure a competitive advantage, attract strategic capital and reinforce international trust, while the United States and other democratic powers can play a pivotal role in shaping a stable, predictable and innovative global financial environment.[5]

[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives.” Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en

[2] Strong AML/CFT frameworks ensure financial stability and investor confidence; weak implementation increases risks, while UAE, Bjelorusija, and Crna Gora are seen as more secure. Available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

[3] The World Bank has confirmed the progress of reforms in Belarus, the UAE, and Montenegro through financing projects that strengthen the financial sector, enhance anti-money laundering controls, and support the development of the digital economy. These investments include infrastructure development, regulation of the crypto industry, and implementation of AML/CFT standards, making these countries attractive destinations for international investors. (www.data360.worldbank.org , www.thedocs.worldbank.org , www.worldbank.org ).

[4] Making America the leader in digital assets. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-signs-genius-act-into-law/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[5] International Monetary Fund. (2025). Global Financial Stability Report – Enhancing Resilience amid Uncertainty. Available at: www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR?utm_source=chatgpt.com
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IFIMES – International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018. IFIMES is also the publisher of the biannual international scientific journal European Perspectives. IFIMES gathers and selects various information and sources on key conflict areas in the world. The Institute analyses mutual relations among parties with an aim to promote the importance of reconciliation, early prevention/preventive diplomacy and disarmament/ confidence building measures in the regional or global conflict resolution of the existing conflicts and the role of preventive actions against new global disputes.

Rohingya Crisis The Ultimate Test Of Refugee Protection Regime – OpEd

A Rohingya man walks inside Balukhali refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar. Photo Credit: BenarNews

 September 25, 2025

By Arab News

By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

With world leaders in New York this week for the UN General Assembly, they are once again affirming their commitment to international law, human rights and the protection of the most vulnerable. Yet one of the gravest humanitarian crises of our time, the plight of the Rohingya, stands as proof that these principles are eroding in plain sight.

Seven years have passed since Myanmar’s military launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya, driving more than 740,000 people into Bangladesh. Today, nearly a million live in sprawling camps around Cox’s Bazar. They are stateless, stripped of citizenship by Myanmar, unwanted in Bangladesh and largely forgotten by the world. International aid, once a lifeline, is collapsing as donor fatigue sets in. Food rations have been cut to the bone. Education and healthcare are minimal. Children are growing up with no future beyond dependency and despair.

This is not simply another refugee crisis. The Rohingya have become a test case for whether the international refugee protection regime, built after the Second World War, has any meaning left. If the world permits one of the largest acts of forced displacement of this century to result in permanent statelessness, then the message is clear: ethnic cleansing works.

The danger of that precedent is not abstract. Other regimes are watching closely. If Myanmar can get away with expelling and erasing an entire minority group, what is to stop governments elsewhere from pursuing the same strategy against unwanted populations? The collapse of the Rohingya’s rights is not just a regional issue, it undermines the entire foundation of international refugee norms.

The UNGA has not been silent. Year after year, it has passed resolutions condemning Myanmar and urging accountability. But resolutions without enforcement are little more than words. The junta, still clinging to power in Naypyitaw, has faced no meaningful consequences. China and Russia continue to shield it at the UN Security Council, blocking any path toward binding action.

Meanwhile, the conflict inside Myanmar has taken a new turn. The Arakan Army now controls much of Rakhine State, where the Rohingya once lived. But the Arakan Army and its political wing, the United League of Arakan, also refuse to recognize the Rohingya identity. They have outlawed the use of the word “Rohingya” in their territory. For refugees hoping for a dignified return, this is yet another door closed.

Bangladesh, for its part, continues to insist that repatriation is the only acceptable solution. But every attempt to broker a return has failed. Dhaka will not grant the Rohingya permanent status or meaningful integration. Yet Myanmar, whether under the junta or the Arakan Army, will not welcome them back with rights. This deadlock is the reason the crisis has become permanent and why the refugee system itself now hangs in the balance.

International accountability mechanisms also face collapse. The International Court of Justice is hearing a case brought by Gambia, accusing Myanmar of genocide. The International Criminal Court has opened investigations. But these processes move at a glacial pace. Survivors of the 2017 massacres are dying without justice. Witness testimony is fading. The longer justice is delayed, the more the world risks normalizing the erasure of the Rohingya.

The consequences of inaction are not limited to law or morality. Leaving nearly a million people in limbo creates a breeding ground for instability. Armed groups and criminal networks are already exploiting the camps. Frustration and despair among the youth are growing. For Bangladesh, this is a security time bomb. For the wider region, it is a source of volatility that could spill across borders.

So, what should the UNGA do? First, governments must reverse the funding collapse. Rations and aid must be restored to prevent outright famine. Second, the Rohingya crisis must be elevated as a test of the refugee protection regime. This is not a marginal humanitarian issue, it is central to whether the global order established after 1945 still holds. Third, international actors should expand engagement beyond the junta. The national unity government, which has pledged to restore Rohingya rights, and the Arakan Army, which now holds real power on the ground, both need to be pressed and incentivized to commit to a just solution.

Above all, the international community must recognize that time is running out. A whole generation of Rohingya children is growing up stateless, denied education and identity. If nothing changes, within a decade the world will have produced the largest generation of permanently displaced people in history. That outcome would not just be a tragedy for the Rohingya. It would signal to the world that the refugee system itself has collapsed, that forced displacement works and that ethnic cleansing can succeed.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC. X: @AzeemIbrahim

Hat Havoc In The Big Apple – OpEd

More than 10,000 gather in Times Square outside the New York Times building to receive updates on the fight between boxers Jack Dempsey and Georges Carpentier in July, 1921. Photo Credit: Unknown author, Public Domain

 September 25, 2025

By FEE

By Katrinia Gulliver

On September 15, 1922, Harry Oldbaum was walking near 116th St and Lexington Avenue in Manhattan. He was suddenly surrounded by a crowd of teens who grabbed at him and stole his hat. Oldbaum was in good enough shape to give chase and apprehend one of his attackers, and haul the perpetrator to a nearby police station. Morris Sikeowitz, 16, was charged with disorderly conduct. It sounds like a minor street incident in a big city, but Oldbaum was just one of many victims that night.

In New York at the time, there were social rules about when to wear straw hats (and at a time when almost all men wore hats, such rules were more visible than today). Much like wearing white after Labor Day, sporting a boater after the end of the summer was seen as inappropriate—at least by people of means. The end-day for straw hat season had originally been September 22, but by the 1920s crept forward to September 15.

However, unlike other fashion solecisms, this one suddenly came with physical enforcement.

CITY HAS WILD NIGHT OF STRAW HAT RIOTS

ran the headline in the New York Times of September 16, 1922.

“Gangs of Young Hoodlums With Spiked Sticks Terrorize Whole Blocks.”

According to the report, gangs of young men set about smashing straw hats in the street, having snatched the hats from their wearers. At one point a mob of 1,000 had to be dispersed on Amsterdam Ave. Police had to put down incidents across the city.

Along Christopher Street, “the attackers lined up along the surface car tracks and yanked straw hats off the heads of passengers as the cars passed.”

At least one victim required hospital treatment. He fought back against hat grabbers and was beaten and kicked.

This was not the first instance of straw hat melees, and those participating had planned ahead (and indeed jumped the gun on the “official” end of summer). The papers reported attacks starting on September 13, when the (appropriately named) magistrate Peter Hatting convicted 7 and fined them $5 each for their part in a “hat smashing saturnalia” at Bowery and East Houston that night. It clearly wasn’t spontaneous (at least for all participants), as some had come prepared with spiked sticks to hook hats off people’s heads.

In another report, the night of the 14th saw “hundreds of boys in Grand, Mulberry and adjacent streets, armed with long sticks to which were fixed long wires, hid in doorways and unhatted all who passed sporting straws.” The reporter noted these hats were accumulated as trophies, jammed onto the handles of the sticks, some of the more “successful” attackers carrying 25 or 30. One hat-smashing group made the tactical error of going after a group of longshoremen, who were not soft targets; police broke up the brawl.

There had been earlier instances of straw hat riots, as in Pittsburgh in 1910. A newspaper there stated that “It is all right for stock brokers on the exchanges to destroy one another’s hats if they like, on the principle that everything goes among friends,” but presumably not all right for random hoodlums to play the game themselves. Apparently smashing up a chap’s straw hat if he wore it too late in the season was a custom with stockbrokers and white-shoe lawyers. As intra-group pranking, it would seem to fit squarely in the category of college hijinks and other WASP male shenanigans.

However, the teenagers who started attacking boater-wearing citizens in the street in 1922 were very much not of that social group. The names of the arrested teens display New York’s immigrant diversity, and few whose names would be in an Episcopal parish register. It seems these teens were working class, attacking men who outranked them in age and social standing, but not necessarily of society’s elites. Some of the victims on the Lower East Side were buttonhole makers and machine operators leaving work.

Interestingly, the claims from the victims don’t state any element of robbery. The hat snatching was the main goal. But hats themselves were expensive, as one of the magistrates involved noted. The working men under attack probably didn’t consider the loss of a hat trivial, as swells at the Yale Club might. They were poor targets if the hat riot was an attempt at class uprising. (Meanwhile, hat shops stayed open late during the fracas to allow potential victims to buy something more autumnal.)

Some police might not have rated the incidents of high importance, until patrolmen became victims themselves. “The police of the East 104th Street station were inclined to regard their activities lightly in spite of numerous complaints at the police station, until detectives and patrolmen in plain clothes began to fall victims to the hat crashers.” It would have been easy to see a hat theft as some kind of general roughhousing, until one was in the crowd and under attack.

The undercurrent of malice is clear from the sticks prepared with a nail sticking out. Supposedly such a stick would be all the better to knock the hats off passers-by, but it doesn’t take particularly deep analysis to say that this was a weapon.

As the arrests continued, the New York Tribune told of an impatient desk lieutenant who came up with his own solution. The parents of some arrested boys (all under 15) were summoned to the station to spank their misbehaving sons. Many of the mob were very young indeed: one ten-year-old suffered a broken leg, having run into the path of a car.

The age of many participants explains the light sentences received by those brought in front of a judge, and also the challenge for police in how to respond. New York’s penal code of 1909 made children aged 7–16 who committed an act that would have been a crime for an adult, instead guilty of “juvenile delinquency.”

The first decades of the twentieth century saw the creation and spread of children’s courts aimed at diverting law-breaking children early (rather than labeling them as criminals). Juvenile reform institutions were created, to avoid putting children into prisons with adult convicts.

This system, depending on one’s political sympathies, either coddles budding felons, or brutalizes children who are victims of their environment. The pendulum on how to respond to underage criminality continues to swing. Perhaps confident that they would face little or no punishment, attacking hats became a trend (which like other teenage fads, also disappeared).

The hat riot boys represented something new in another way. The decades prior to 1922 had also seen social reformers try to eradicate child labor, long a key part of New York’s industrial economy. The horror of the Triangle Shirtwaist fire had spurred legislators to action. Bills were passed at a state (and less successfully, federal) level, to protect children under 14 from working. Although not always followed, these laws represented a societal sea change: the hat wreckers were the first generation of New York children it was illegal to employ. They were at the forefront of a new sociological group: the teenager.

September 1922 was warm, with temperatures in New York City well into the ’80s on the 14th and 15th. An Indian Summer tends to contribute to crime—and to some men, preferring to continue wearing their straw hats and seersucker rather than layer on wool and a felt topper.

But what prompted these boys to riot over hats? To go vigilante in the enforcement of a social code none of them were likely to live by? The arbitrary hat rule created an out-group, a category of “approved” victims for bored teens to attack.

Most scholarship on riots discusses a flashpoint, or simmering grievance, as the motivation. In the hat riots, it is hard to parse a real motive. An early study on boys in gangs (published a decade before the hat riots), offers some insights. J. Adams Puffer described a typical gang practice of “plaguing people.” This meant singling out individuals to harass and attack, with victims often selected by societal prejudice (race being an obvious example).

Such gang behavior towards designated targets occurs regularly to this day, whether directed at neighborhood outgroups or randomly, in the appalling “knockout game.” But these activities don’t involve large crowds. The huge numbers allegedly involved in the hat attacks made it more characteristic of an urban riot.

This makes the hat riots something of an anomaly. If the men attacked had shared a racial identity, different from their attackers, then the assaults would have fit a clearer pattern (and chimed with episodes of racial violence taking place that year). Conversely, if the hat snatching had been part of a riot triggered by a wider sense of outrage, it would have involved a range of participants beyond just teenage boys.

At a century’s distance, the hat riots seem bizarre or faintly amusing. But they demonstrate the power of group dynamics, and how even the strangest thing can become a trigger for violence. New York largely forgot the hat riots: even as occasional hat stompings happened in September over successive years, none rose to the level of 1922. Eventually, men stopped wearing hats; fashion stopped having rules. But if we see hat smashing as a viral “meme,” first practiced among the elites, then copied in a frenzy as it filtered out among working-class teens, the phenomenon is still going on today.

• About the author: Katrina Gulliver is Editorial Director at FEE. She holds a PhD from Cambridge University, and has held faculty positions at universities in Germany, Britain and Australia. She has written for Wall St Journal, Reason, The American Conservative, National Review and the New Criterion, among others.

• Source: This article appeared at FEE and was originally published in Law & Liberty.

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY GANGS OF YOUTH PLAGUED LONDON BY PRICKING PEOPLE IN PUBLIC WITH NAILS IN STICKS. THE GANGS BEGAN USING COLORFUL MONIKERS SUCH AS THE 'DEAD RABBITS'.