Takaichi Administration established by the LDP-JIP Coalition : How to interpret the current Japanese political situation
Friday 7 November 2025, by Toshizo Omori
On October 21, during the Extraordinary Diet session, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) President Sanae Takaichi was nominated as Prime Minister, establishing the Takaichi administration through a coalition between the LDP and JIP (Japan Innovation Party). This development brought to a temporary conclusion the month-and-a-half-long period of “political realignment” that began with former Prime Minister Ishiba’s resignation announcement following the LDP’s crushing defeat in the July Upper House Election and continued through the election of the new LDP President, Takaichi.
This brief essay analyzes the political character of the newly formed Takaichi administration and the framework of Japan’s immediate political situation, situating it within the broader international political context. It also seeks to clarify the challenges and tasks facing the left.
The LDP-Komeito coalition lost its majority in the July Upper House election and subsequent political realignment
In the Upper House election in July, the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition suffered a major defeat, losing its majority in both houses of the Diet. Taking responsibility, Prime Minister Ishiba was forced to resign less than a year after taking office. Meanwhile, the far-right populist party, the Sanseito (Party of Do it Yourself), gained significant support. Combined with the results of last year’s House of Representatives election, this meant that parties positioned to the right of the LDP within Japan’s political landscape formed a single bloc in parliament for the first time. This development significantly influenced the LDP leadership election following Prime Minister Ishiba’s resignation. Contrary to widespread expectations that Shinjiro Koizumi would win the leadership election and continue the policies of the Ishiba administration, Sanae Takaichi, a politician representing the LDP’s right wing who publicly declared her intention to continue Abe’s policies, became the new party president. Subsequently, a series of major political realignments unfolded for the first time in the 21st century: the Komeito withdrew from the coalition, disliking the prospect of a coalition government with Takaichi; the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) attempted but failed to field a unified opposition candidate in the prime minister nomination election; an agreement was reached for a LDP-JIP (Japan Innovation Party) coalition with JIP providing support from outside the cabinet; and finally, Takaichi was elected Prime Minister in the Extraordinary Diet session.
However, in this wave of political realignment, the left-liberal faction—including the parliamentary left and the center-left forces within CDP—was completely left out in the cold. The CDP’s leadership tried to unify opposition candidates behind Tamaki, the leader of the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), in the prime ministerial nomination election—a move designed to further cozy up to the center-right—was flatly rejected by Tamaki himself. Instead, it only served to force him into accepting the party’s stance on “accepting nuclear power” and “accepting the security legislation.”
A major feature of the political realignment since the Upper House election is that it has progressed among conservative-centrist political forces, under conditions where, on one hand, pressure from far-right populism exists, while on the other, there is absolutely no threat (or even a hint of disruption) from the left.
How to consider the global political framework
While examining the various developments surrounding the coalition government during this period is certainly necessary for our analysis of the current political realignment, the most crucial issue is how to grasp the overall framework of the political situation, particularly from an international perspective. Based on this understanding and taking into account the current position of the left, we must clarify the tasks and duties facing the left, including ourselves.
In the position paper submitted by the Japanese section to the 18th Congress of the Fourth International, the following points were made regarding the Japanese political situation:
Generally speaking, as the capitalist system has already lost its ability to encompass the entire society, societies in many countries are becoming more polarized and the far right have been on the rise. Some sectors of the bourgeoisie are turning to support the authoritarian domination and are coming to politically support the far right. The political structures in many countries, mainly in Europe, the United States and Latin America, have more and more tripolarized into the far right, the conservative/centrist (which is often called the “extreme centrist”) and the left, where the conservative/centrist becomes increasingly drawn to the right wing. The political structures common to those in Europe are also emerging in East Asia, although not as significantly as in Europe.
In Japan, while the ruling coalition (Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito [Komei Party]) lost its majority in the general election last fall, two far-right parties (Japan Conservative Party and Sanseito [Party of Do It Yourself]) got a certain number of seats in the parliament for the first time after World War II. On the other hand, political cooperation between the ruling coalition and center-right parties is developing, and it is said that there is a possibility of a so-called "grand coalition" in a way that excludes the left parties.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has both center-right and far-right tendencies within itself, and the current leadership is dominated by center-right politicians, and losing its majority, it is seeking for strengthening its cooperation with the center-right opposition parties. Depending on the result of the July 2025 Upper House election, the possibility of a "grand coalition" cannot be ruled out. In this way, even in Japan, there are signs of a tripartite structure of the far right, conservative/centerist (what is sometimes called "extreme center") and the left, but unfortunately, the left in Japan is decisively weak.
As analyzed here, internationally, within the tripartite structure of far-right, conservative center, and left—typical in Europe—the rise of the far-right is dragging not only traditional conservative forces but even centrist reformist forces to the right. This also reflects the depth of the current crisis of the capitalist system. Within this framework, trends such as global military rearmament, the rise of authoritarian regimes, and the spread of xenophobic sentiment have become pronounced.
A prime example is the UK (England), where the far-right Reform UK has gained ground in local elections and surged to first place in opinion polls. In response, the Conservative Party leader replaced the right-wing faction’s Bede Nock in November 2024. Bede Nock had campaigned on pledges to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights and repeal climate change legislation, decisively breaking with the party’s centrist conservative line. In response to this situation, the British liberal newspaper The Guardian reportedly published an article expressing concern over the disappearance of the Conservative Party as a moderate conservative force. This evokes similarities to the “Don’t Let Ishiba Go” demonstrations that unfolded in Japan for a time, primarily among liberal circles.
Japan’s political situation should be seen as trying to catch up with developments in Europe, albeit a step behind. However, unlike in Europe or the Americas, Japan has persistently faced a situation where the left is decisively weak, lacking influence over the political landscape, and where mass movements and social movements have been unable to gain significant power. It is within this context—where there is no need to consider pressure or threats from the left—that political realignment within the conservative-centrist forces has progressed in recent times.
The crisis of neoliberal globalism is “narrowing the range of policy choices.”
In that sense, the observation by Professor Koji Aikyo of Waseda University, published in this paper’s Issue 2883 (October 20th edition) (based on the summary of his lecture at the “Stop the Constitutional Revision! Osaka Network” lecture), aptly explains the political situation described above.
In a global society of growing inequality, the range of policy choices narrows. While citizens have increased opportunities to participate in democratic processes, dissatisfaction is rising over the perception that public opinion is not reflected in national governance. In advanced industrial nations, regardless of which party holds power, consistent pressure is exerted to ensure national policies benefit the wealthy. The notion that corporations hold a knowledge advantage over governments has become an unquestioned ideology.
Precisely because the scope for policy is narrow, they resort to culture wars. Massive inequality becomes entrenched, propaganda replaces policy, and politics shifts from the politics of necessity to the politics of eternity. The politics of necessity brings democratization through economic development, but in the politics of eternity, the government’s role is not to promise future happiness, but to protect the present society from perceived threats. Permanent politicians fabricate crises and manipulate the resulting emotions. In today’s complex societies, unable to present a vision for the future, they gravitate toward culture wars. Trump politics is the archetype.
Furthermore, the interview with Enzo Traverso titled “Authoritarianism and Democracy in the 21st Century” (International Viewpoint, August 7) also provides an accurate analysis of the significance of the current rise of the far right and the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Traverso, author of “The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right”, positions today’s far right as “post-fascism,” describing its differences from past fascism as follows.
Today, I see nothing comparable in the new right. There is no utopian horizon or project for civilization per se. That’s why I find the concept of "post-fascism" useful, because these radical right-wing movements are profoundly conservative. Their impulse is not forward but backward: what they seek is to restore a traditional order. The values they champion—sovereignty, family, nation—form a kind of red thread that connects them.
This return to the traditional [by Trump] is also evident in its hostility toward environmentalism, its rejection of any global agenda on climate change, and its commitment to domestic production over international agreements. "Make America Great Again" is a slogan that fosters a certain imagination of the future, but it is a regressive imagination: a return to a time when the United States was strong, prosperous, and dominant. This isn’t a new proposal, but rather an idealization of the past.
The far right (and also conservative centrist forces), unable to articulate political differences or offer a vision for the future, seek to alleviate anxiety and stagnation by expelling perceived enemies close at hand (“culture wars”) in order to achieve political stability. This serves as one reason why conservative centrist forces are being pulled toward the far right.
What does Takaichi’s LDP leadership election and Komeito’s exit from the coalition signify?
In my analysis article on the July Upper House election (August 11, Weekly Kakehashi), I wrote as follows:
If Prime Minister Ishiba were forced to resign and the LDP’s right wing were to win the leadership election, the Sanseito would become a potential partner for policy consultations, non-cabinet cooperation, or even a coalition. However, the Sanseito currently holds only three seats in the House of Representatives. This would make it a minority ruling party, necessitating an early general election to significantly increase its seats in the House (Sanseito leader Kamiya has stated that “25 to 30 seats is a realistic figure for the next general election”). Simultaneously, this choice carries the risk of the LDP losing even more seats. Therefore, the LDP’s immediate options are limited. The most realistic path is to pursue policy discussions, extra-cabinet cooperation, and even the expansion of the coalition government through a de facto conservative-centrist “alliance” encompassing the Democratic Party for the People, the Japan Innovation Party, and the Constitutional Democratic Party. Consequently, the LDP will likely choose a president who can advance this strategy (or retain Prime Minister Ishiba).
This prediction proved significantly off the mark regarding the prospects for political realignment, given Sanae Takaichi’s election as LDP president and Komeito’s withdrawal from the coalition. I believe the reason lies in underestimating the impact of the rise of far-right populism, as seen in the Sanseito’s surge, on the LDP (and its indirect ripple effects on Komeito). The sense of crisis within the LDP over the defection of the “rock-solid conservative base” that had supported the Abe administration, triggered by the Sanseito’s surge, was likely stronger than we had imagined.
Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Aso, who backs Takaichi, reportedly envisioned forming a coalition government with the LDP, Komeito, and the Democratic Party for the People, dissolving the Diet early for a general election, securing a majority for the LDP and the Democratic Party for the People, and then expelling Komeito from the coalition (Hokkaido Shimbun Online, October 11).
Komeito may have anticipated Aso’s intentions and proactively dissolved the coalition beforehand. It is also said that continuing the coalition with the LDP led by Takaichi could have led to a situation where the dissolution of the party itself was a real possibility for Soka Gakkai and Komeito.
The realignment of conservative-centrist forces and the formation of the LDP-JIP coalition government
Now, let us also review the realignment process of conservative-centrist forces following the July Upper House election, leading up to the formation of the Takaichi coalition government on October 21. Of course, it is important to note that this realignment process is not complete and remains ongoing.
First, the Komeito, which disliked a coalition with LDP President Takaichi because of her right-wing stance, withdrew from the coalition government that had lasted for 26 years. While Komeito initially seemed to explore some cooperative relationship with the LDP, following the formation of the LDP-JIP government, it has clearly positioned itself as a centrist opposition party. It has now also begun mentioning the possibility of electoral cooperation with the Constitutional Democratic Party.
The DPFP appears to have been most ideologically and politically aligned with Takaichi on issues like constitutional revision, accepting Yasukuni Shrine visits, and pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy. It seems to have been aiming for a coalition government under a Takaichi-led administration comprising the LDP, Komeito, and DPFP. However, faced with Komeito’s withdrawal from the coalition—effectively dissolving the LDP-Komeito alliance—it could not commit to a coalition solely with the LDP. “With Komeito gone, even if we joined the government, we wouldn’t reach a majority, so the discussion has become rather meaningless,” stated Representative Tamaki. Moreover, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), the largest and pro-capitalist national center of trade unions, had made clear its stance that it would not accept its supported parties, the DPFP and the CDP, being divided between the ruling and opposition camps. Meanwhile, one of the CDP’s Diet leaders Azumi proposed the idea of “making Tamaki, chairperson of DPFP, the unified opposition candidate for the prime minister nomination.” The DPFP also declined this proposal, citing fundamental policy differences. As a result, they were ‘scooped’ by the Japan Innovation Party, leading to complaints like, “If only they had said something sooner.” Even in post-nomination polls, DPFP saw a significant drop in support, with the Takaichi administration gaining support from relatively younger generations.
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP) was initially eager to join a coalition government with the LDP and Komeito, assuming Koizumi would become LDP president and hoping to realize its secondary capital concept under his leadership. However, seizing the opportunity created by the DPFP’s reluctance to join the coalition following the LDP presidential election results, it swiftly moved to form a coalition with the LDP under Takaichi. They then reached a coalition agreement with Takaichi, who was desperate to become Prime Minister, essentially forcing her to swallow their policy demands whole. However, the LDP attached numerous reservations to many policies. Furthermore, by choosing the form of “cooperation outside the cabinet” (a factor said to be the difficulty of electoral cooperation with the LDP in the Kansai region, including Osaka), it became a half-hearted and unstable “coalition” that could be abandoned at any time.
The reason for such an eagerness to form a coalition lay in the critical situation: successive defections of Diet members and poor performance in local elections, including in their stronghold of Osaka. Following the three House of Representatives members who announced their departure on September 8th and formed the new faction “Reform Association”, House of Representatives member Hayashi Yumi, elected from the proportional Kinki block, also submitted her resignation from the party. Furthermore, Seiki Sorimoto, a House of Representatives member elected from Hiroshima’s 4th district, also indicated his intention to run as an independent in the next election (forming the regional party “Hiroshima no Taiyo”), hinting at leaving the party. It was necessary to put a stop to this. Additionally, in five local council elections held in Osaka in September, the party suffered significant declines in votes compared to the previous elections. It lost three seats in Settsu City and one seat in Hannan City, facing a severe decline in its political strength.
The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) called for a unified opposition (centrist) candidate in the prime ministerial nomination election during the extraordinary Diet session, but this effort was forced to fail because Tamaki demanded a policy shift from CDP’s line on “nuclear power policy” and “security policy.” Currently, the party positions itself as a centrist opposition force allied with Komeito. However, as former leader Edano, a party liberal, has altered his previous stance, stating that the security legislation—including the recognition of the right to exercise collective self-defense—contains “no unconstitutional elements, so there is no need to change it,” the shift towards a center-right stance advanced under leader Noda is accelerating. This is further isolating the party’s left wing.
How to view the character of the Takaichi-led LDP-JIP coalition government
The Takaichi-led LDP-JIP coalition government emerged from the realignment of centrist conservative political forces. How should we assess its political character? First, regarding security and defense policy, it will undoubtedly accelerate the military expansion course charted by the Kishida and Ishiba administrations.
The coalition agreement signed by the LDP and JIP on the 20th clearly reflects the shift from an LDP-Komeito alliance to an LDP-JIP one. It immediately steered toward hawkish policies, starting with promoting an “independent nation,” further increasing defense spending, and pushing for submarine acquisition with nuclear submarines in mind. Numerous other policies emphasize the “nation,” including a policy to enact a “national emblem defacement crime” in the 2026 ordinary Diet session to punish acts damaging the Hinomaru flag, and a clear statement to begin examining “anti-espionage legislation” to crack down on espionage by foreign powers.
These are all policies long sought by the LDP’s conservative faction but difficult to advance under the coalition government with Komeito. The most symbolic move is the abolition of rules limiting weapons exports to five categories, such as “rescue operations.” Conservative LDP factions strongly pushed for scrapping these categories to fully lift restrictions on lethal weapons exports, but Komeito maintained its cautious stance, leaving these rules barely intact." (October 22, Hokkaido Shimbun Online)
Additionally, Kimi Onoda, an Upper House member whose xenophobic remarks had previously caused controversy, was appointed to the newly created position of Minister for Foreigners’ “Coexistence” under the coalition agreement. The coalition document states: “We will formulate a ‘Population Strategy’ by fiscal year 2026, which will include quantitative management of foreign residents from the perspective of potential social friction if the foreign population ratio increases, along with numerical targets and basic policies for accepting foreigners.” In her policy speech, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “We draw a clear line against xenophobia,” but also declared that “the government will respond resolutely” to “illegal acts and rule violations by some foreigners,” clearly signaling a move toward tighter foreigner regulations.
In economic policy, it aims to carry forward Abe’s policies and develop not “Abenomics” but “Sanaenomics.” While this thoroughly pursues the interests of the wealthiest 1%, it still must ostensibly cite “addressing high prices” as its “top priority.” Consequently, the range of feasible policy options is unlikely to be entirely unrestricted. This is because Japan’s bourgeois ruling class seeks political stability above all else. In this sense, the unstable and fragile LDP-JIP coalition government, reliant on “cooperation outside the cabinet,” is merely transitional, and a more substantial political realignment is inevitable. This could potentially include a “grand coalition” that further pulls the Constitutional Democratic Party to the “right.” The Japanese bourgeois ruling class lacks a clear vision for the future shape of society. Consequently, it will likely seek numerical stability through conservative centrist forces. However, this very approach creates space for the growth of far-right populism. Here too, the marginalization and isolation of the left, coupled with its failure to present and make visible a new alternative, remains the decisive problem.
How will the Left confront the current political situation?
In the Miyagi Prefectural gubernatorial election held on October 26, candidate Masamune Wada—who received full support from the Sanseito through a policy agreement—engaged in a fierce contest, narrowing the gap with incumbent candidate Yoshihiro Murai to just over 15,000 votes. Moreover, within Sendai City, the most populous city in Miyagi, candidate Wada led by more than 36,000 votes. In his “policy memorandum” with the Sanseito, candidate Wada pledged to “review water privatization and promote re-municipalization,” “oppose immigration promotion policies,” “reject the policy of permitting burials,” and “curb or halt large-scale mega-solar and wind power projects.” This strategy skillfully incorporated leftists’ anti-globalization and ecological policies (while linking them to nationalism over “selling water utilities to foreign capital”) and combined them with xenophobic policies. It was precisely the same stance adopted by Europe’s far right. In the fight against the rise of these emerging far-right forces, it is not enough to merely criticize xenophobia. We must also present policies and slogans from a leftist perspective that can break through the distrust and sense of stagnation in the existing system that is fueling the far right’s growth, and concretely build these into movements. Moreover, we must challenge this situation precisely because the existence of the left is not visible, especially to younger generations.
Under conditions where the political situation is fluid and political realignment is underway for some time, space opens up for various mass movements and social movements to reflect their demands in politics. As a result, these mass movements and social movements have the potential to become more active. Moreover, with left-wing forces within parliament being extremely weak, the importance of mass movements and social movements will likely increase. However, there is also the possibility that the fruits of such movements could be reaped by far-right forces.
Today, in countries around the world—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Morocco—young people of the so-called Generation Z are at the forefront of mass movements and uprisings. Rebellions led by Generation Z often lack clear organization or leadership, a feature prominently seen in the 2019 Hong Kong uprising. Yet this is also the responsibility of the left.
In Japan, younger generations, including Generation Z, have only experienced the LDP-Komeito coalition government and thus lacked a tangible sense that “politics can be changed.” However, this situation is clearly shifting. The Reiwa Shinsengumi (we see it as a progressive populist party), led by Taro Yamamoto, was the first to keenly sense this change, appealing that “politics can be changed” and gaining significant support. In the general election in 2024 and the Upper House election this year, these younger demographics shifted their support toward parties like the DPFP and the Sanseito. However, this support is not fixed. We should consider that Japan’s Generation Z is catching up, albeit five or ten years behind, to the emergence of Generation Z on the political stage seen in Europe, America, and Asia. This represents a significant opportunity for the left. Preparing ideologically, programmatically, and organizationally for this is the challenge facing the left, including us.
November 10 2025
Translated by Tsutomu Teramoto from Weekly Kakehashi or https://x.gd/zvDYP.
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Toshizo Omori is a Japanese Fourth Internationalist.
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