INDIA

Cow Vigilantism: Allahabad HC Flags Arbitrary FIRs, Demands Accountability

A first information report (FIR) is a document prepared by police organisations in many South and Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, when they receive information about the commission of a cognisable offence, or in Singapore when the police receive information about any criminal offence. It generally stems from a complaint lodged with the police by the victim of a cognisable offence or by someone on their behalf,

Wikipedia · Text under CC-BY-SA license

CJP Team | 13 Nov 2025

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The Court exposes the way a regulatory law has become a system of targeted persecution of minorities through arbitrary FIRs under the 1955 law while ignoring the Supreme Court’s binding directives to prohibit group violence.

In its recent ruling in Rahul Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9567 of 2025), a Bench of Justices Abdul Moin and Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary of the Allahabad High Court has expressed concern and alarm at the cavalier and arbitrary manner in which police authorities in Uttar Pradesh were registering First Information Reports (FIRs) under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955. The Bench noted that:

The matter might have ended at this stage requiring the respondents to file a counter affidavit. However, the matter cannot be treated to be so simple inasmuch as this Court is deluged with such matters on the basis of First Information Reports being filed left and right by the authorities and complainants under the provisions of the Act, 1955. (Para 15)

In this case, officers intercepted the transportation of nine living and healthy progeny of cows within Uttar Pradesh. Even though a slaughter or transport across state lines was not in issue, the owner of the vehicle was charged under Section 3, Section 5A, and Section 8 of the 1955 Act and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

In determining that no offense had occurred, the Court ordered protection for the petitioner and went even further, directing the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police to personally file affidavits explaining this misuse pattern. The bench also asked for an explanation as to why the State has not issued a formal Government Order (GR) to carry out the Supreme Court’s binding directions from the judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (July 2018) to prevent mob violence and cow vigilantism.

The Preventive Measures mandated by the apex court in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla  case have been encapsulated in this action-oriented pamphlet widely disseminated by Citizens for Justice and Peace that may be read here.

For over a decade, CJP has systematically documented and intervened against the abuse of the “cow protection” laws. Since 2017, CJP’s legal and advocacy teams have tracked the rise of mob vigilantism, along with its legal facilitators, all over India — fact-finding, litigation, and public education being the methods of doing this work. Investigations like India: The New Lynchdom (2018, CJP) and Cow Vigilantism: A Tool for Terrorising Minorities (2020, CJP) have mapped hundreds of instances where such laws have reportedly been used to sanction mob, extrajudicial violence, and have documented how the criminal justice system has been captured, even driven, by majoritarian agendas. Against this background, this becomes an important moment of judicial awareness of what CJP and other human rights defenders have been implementing for years.

It is important to note that this order is not limited to a single petitioner. It represents a judicial and legal recognition that the ongoing misuse of the 1955 Act occurs as part of a broader culture of impunity that encourages vigilantes, criminalizes livelihoods, and undermines the rule of law.

Statutory Background of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955

The 1955 Act was made to ban the killing of cows and their offspring and to control the transport of cows, all for the purpose of implementing Article 48 of the Constitution. The Act defines three regular aspects, where slaughter is banned under Section 3, transport within U.P. out-of-state is restricted under Section 5A, and punishment of three to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹3–5 lakh is introduced under Section 8 for violations. Section 2(d) defines “slaughter” as “killing by any method whatsoever, and includes maiming and inflicting physical injury which in the ordinary course will cause death.” This definition shows that there must be some form of harm that would ultimately lead to death.

The Court emphasised that this requirement is routinely overlooked. It quoted Kaliya v. State of U.P. (2024 126 ACC 61), in which the Allahabad High Court cautioned that the conveyance of cows or calves in Uttar Pradesh does not invoke Section 5A since it only prohibits transport outside of that state. It also relied on the case of Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz (AIR 1962 All 22), a 1962 decision from the Allahabad High Court, which held that there is a difference between mere preparation and an attempt to slaughter. Preparation does not constitute an offence under the Act if the cow is tied up, for example. By citing Parasram Ji, the Bench emphasized that there was more than sixty years of settled law that the police were ignoring.

In this case, where slaughter, maiming, or interstate transportation was not charged, none of the violations applied. The judgment reminded us again of the Court’s own earlier warnings. In Rahmuddin v. State of U.P.(Criminal MISC. Bail Application No. – 34008 of 2020), the Court noted that the Act was being “misused against innocent persons” when it mentioned the meat was recovered, but often claimed all the meat to be cow meat without a laboratory test. In Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P. (Criminal MISC Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. – 182 of 2023), bail was granted before an arrest, as only cow-dung and a rope were recovered, but it was branded a “glaring example of misuse of penal law.” These rulings serve the greater purpose of demonstrating the number of mechanical FIRs that are being registered, even before investigation, and the abuse and incarceration that innocent people continue to experience.

Ambiguous legal provisions and ineffective procedural safeguards enable police overreach and selective police power against certain communities, mostly Muslims and Dalits. Consequently, the findings of the Allahabad High Court lend judicial authority to what human-rights defenders have been calling, for a long time, a systematic abuse of “cow-protection” laws.

This detailed legal explainer prepared by CJP in 2018 de-constructs how such laws have become a source of victimization.

The Court’s reasoning: From Casual FIRs to Vigilantism

After concluding that there was no offence made out, the Bench stated it was “deluged with such matters” resulting from indiscriminate First Information Reports (FIRs) under the 1955 Act (para 15). It directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the DGP to show cause why the officers continue to lodge these FIRs in spite of the clear judicial precedent, in particular, the cases of Kaliya and Parasram Ji refer to cases in para 15. The Court required that the affidavits submitted by the officers included relevant affidavit material as to the taking of proposed disciplinary action by the State against the complainants and police personnel for making unwarranted FIRs, and if not, the Court required explanation for why the State did not issue a formal “Government Order” to legally preclude any such future FIRs, which served, in proportion, to undue disadvantage of cost in furthering the FIR towards frivolous case of prosecution.

In a serious observation, the Bench did not merely engage in procedural fault-finding; it also uncovered a more pervasive social consequence:

Yet another connected aspect of the matter under the garb of the Act, 1955 is vigilantism which is being practiced by various persons. Why we say this is because a few days back, a Bench of this Court was seized of a matter in which the car of the person was stopped by vigilantes and thereafter, it was not traceable. (See- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9152 of 2025 Inre; Bablu Vs. State of U.P and Ors). In the said writ, instructions have been called for by the Court. Violence, lynching and vigilantism is the order of the day. (Para 30).

The Court relied on Bablu v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 9152 of 2025), where vigilantes encircled a vehicle, which later went missing, to illustrate how misuse of the statute invites disorder. Moreover, it established the illustration of occurrence within the wider phenomenon of “mob violence” by linking directly with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India that “vigilantism cannot, by any consideration, be allowed to take shape… it ushers in anarchy, chaos and disorder.”

National Legal Framework: The Tehseen S. Poonawalla Mandate

In the case of Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court remarked on the very real and concerning increase in lynchings and violence related to cows. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud, found that lynching was “a failing of the rule of law and of the lofty ideals of the Constitution itself.” The Court noted that State agencies have the “primary responsibility” to protect against cow-vigilantism or any type of mob violence.

In paragraph 40 of the judgement, the Supreme Court gave a thorough set of preventative, remedial, and punitive directions: every district must appoint a nodal police officer (not below the rank of Superintendent) for oversight for prevention of mob violence; identify sensitive areas; establish fast-track courts for lynching cases; develop compensatory schemes for victims under Section 357A of the CrPC; and identify negligent officials and hold them accountable.

Despite these unequivocal mandates, however, the Allahabad High Court found that Uttar Pradesh had taken no action to meaningfully operationalise the Supreme Court directions. It found that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 could not substitute for a Government Order issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, as such an order would reflect Government policy. The Bench thus required an explanation for the non-compliance and required affidavits showing compliance, on the basis that the lack of the Government Order undermined the prevention and punishment framework contemplated by the Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding these clear directions, the Allahabad High Court noticed that Uttar Pradesh had taken no decisive steps toward operationalizing the guidelines. Its finding was that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 was not an adequate alternative to a Government Order issued pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution. Only a Government Order could adequately reflect the policy of the Government. The Bench mandated a rationale of non-compliance and required affidavits evidencing compliance, noting that, absent an order from the Government, the preventive and punitive framework envisaged by the Supreme Court simply could not be accomplished.

Constitutional Implications: Articles 14, 19, and 21

The aggressive and arbitrary usage of the 1955 Act violates the equality, liberty, and due-process guarantees of the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and this equality is violated when FIRs are lodged with no basis in fact or when officers exercise their discretion to target only particular communities. The equal protection principle is breached when FIRs are lodged “left and right” (para 15) when there are no fundamental elements of an offence. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 19 protects against arbitrary seizure of vehicles or criminalizing intra-State cattle transport, colloquially known as the “anti-cow slaughter provisions,” which interfere with unreasonable restrictions on the lawful trade, profession, and movement of citizens. Kaliya v. State of U.P. explicitly clarified that intra-State transport is not an offence. It is clear how restrictions on engaging in an occupation, profession, or trade when they are established directly restrict citizens’ economic liberty.

Under Article 21, the arbitrary actions are a further deprivation of liberty and dignity without due process of law. In Rahmuddin, the Court noted that accused persons languish in prison because meat samples are rarely sent for analysis and dispose of the need for due process. The combination of legal negligence and social malice undermines the conception of equal citizenship and uses the protection of cows as an excuse to persecute people. The High Court, accepting that using the 1955 Act has “wasted precious judicial time” (para 41) and that citizens should not have to “spend valuable money and time” to seek relief, demonstrates that this violation is both an individualized violation and a burden on the judiciary.

As CJP’s analyses have frequently stated, police impunity and informally inflicted violence contribute to the sense that “there are two sets of citizens: one protected by the law and the other punished by law.”

The judgment’s call for the most senior officials to be held individually accountable brings back an important idea behind constitutional governance: that executive negligence in the enforcement of the fundamental rights of every citizen cannot be excused by the silence of an institution. When the authorities of the State ignore orders made by the Supreme Court and allow vigilantes to act, the authorities of the State cease to execute their constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law.

Misuse, Vigilantism, and the Rule of Law

The Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Rahul Yadav exposes that the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act has transitioned from a regulatory instrument to a tool for arbitrary prosecution. The Court explicitly points out that “under the garb of the Act is vigilantism,” giving judicial voice to what human-rights reporting has documented for some time—that the selective enforcement of cow-protection laws legitimizes mob violence to the detriment of threatened communities.

In reports like Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow, CJP documents how false charges of cow slaughter/transport have been aimed at Muslims and Dalits. Sabrang’s investigations show that even after Tehseen Poonawalla, most States have not yet implemented mandatory measures as required, such as putting in place effective nodal officers or monitoring hate crimes regularly. This collection of ground reports gives both the socio-legal context to what the High Court has now acknowledged formally: the misuse of the 1955 Act has become institutionalized.

The Bench’s instruction that the Principal Secretary (Home) and DGP provide personal affidavits marks a moment when the judiciary will demand institutional accountability, not just individual relief. Whether this results in real change will depend on what the State does, if it finally issues the long-overdue Government Order required by Tehseen S. Poonawalla and takes corrective action with respect to the errant officials.

The abuse of the 1955 Act, therefore, remains a legal and moral paradox—a law intended to protect life but used under circumstances that inhibit liberty, equality, and the viability of constitutional democracy.

The judgment in Rahul Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh can be read here

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here

The judgment in Kaliya v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz, can be read here

The judgment in Rahmuddin v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P can be read here

The judgment in Bablu v. State of U.P. can be read here

Courtesy: Sabrang India

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Hinduism Is Fascism

INDIA

Communalism to Corporate Order: Unmasking Nexus of Power, Profit, Propaganda

Akhilesh Chandra Prabhakar | 15 Nov 2025

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How India’s political landscape has shifted from overt communal mobilisation to a deeper corporate-authoritarian order.

The contemporary political economy of India presents a paradox that demands urgent scholarly attention. A nation that emerged from colonial subjugation with constitutional commitments to ‘secular democracy, ‘social justice, and ‘socialism’ (a socialist pattern of society with providing equitable developmental opportunity to all citizen) has increasingly become the site of a peculiar convergence: the deliberate fusion of communal ideologies with corporate capital accumulation, orchestrated through sophisticated mechanisms of media manipulation and institutional capture.

This article examines how this convergence—the nexus of communalism and corporate order—has systematically remade India's political, economic, and cultural landscape over the past few decades, transforming it into a crony corporate-led Brahmanical socio-economic-cultural order on the name of Hindutva Rashtra.

The transformation is neither accidental nor inevitable. Rather, it represents the strategic deployment of communal polarisation as a tool to facilitate unimpeded corporate expansion and state capture.

This nexus operates through three interlocking mechanisms: First, the capture and control of policy formation through constitutional and legislative reform. Second, the infiltration of administrative institutions and the appointment of ideologically aligned actors to key decision-making positions; and third, the systematic dismantling of accountability institutions—the judiciary, media, and progressive liberal democratic and secular people’s organisations and political parties—that might otherwise expose or resist these processes.

What distinguishes this contemporary formation from earlier authoritarian experiments is its ideological sophistication: it legitimises corporate plunder and wealth concentration by channeling popular grievances toward religious and cultural antagonisms, thereby fracturing the very class consciousness that might generate resistance to economic exploitation.

The scale of this transformation is reflected in stark economic indicators. The top 1% of India's population now controls 62.1% of national wealth, while the bottom 50% survives on a mere 6.4%. This inequality has surpassed levels witnessed during the colonial era—a bitter historical irony that suggests India has regressed from post-independence promises of economic justice.

The concentration of wealth has been accompanied by parallel concentrations of corporate power. Large industrial houses have consolidated monopolistic control over critical sectors—telecommunications, energy, retail, media—while small and medium enterprises face systematic disadvantage.

This economic consolidation mirrors political consolidation: a handful of corporate conglomerates, intertwined with political authority, now determine which sectors receive state investment, which laws are enacted, and ultimately, whose interests are served by the apparatus of the state.​

Yet this corporate hegemony could not have been consolidated without ideological work. The legitimation of neoliberal policies that favour wealth concentration and the erosion of labour protections required a cultural narrative more compelling than technical economic arguments about efficiency and growth. The solution emerged from the systematic mobilisation of communal ideology—specifically, the Hindu nationalist vision of a unified Hindu Rashtra—as the organising principle of political life.

By framing economic transformation within narratives of cultural nationalism, civilisational pride, and religious identity, the corporate-communal nexus has managed to recruit masses of supporters for policies that objectively work against their material interests. The construction of internal enemies—religious minorities, secular intellectuals, labour unions, environmental activists—became a technique for managing consent, deflecting attention from the machinery of wealth extraction operating in plain sight.

The role of propaganda and media capture in sustaining this architecture cannot be overstated. India's media landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation, shifting from a diverse ecosystem of competing narratives to an increasingly consolidated structure dominated by a handful of corporate conglomerates with extensive business portfolios dependent on government favours. These media organisations amplify State and corporate narratives while marginalising critical inquiry.

Major broadcasting networks have systematically promoted communal divisions, disseminated misinformation aligned with ruling party interests, and silenced investigations into corporate malfeasance and state corruption. This media capture operates as soft censorship: journalists, editors, and producers internalise government preferences through economic incentives rather than overt coercion. The result is a public sphere increasingly hollowed of genuine deliberation, replaced by a managed spectacle of nationalist fervour and religious antagonism.​

Historically, India’s political economy has experienced several crucial transitions. The colonial period established extractive economic structures that drained wealth while fragmenting indigenous industries. Post-Independence, Jawaharlal Nehru's developmental State attempted to reverse this through State-led industrialisation, a mixed economy, and the creation of public sector enterprises. For nearly four decades, this model—however imperfectly—maintained the State's primacy over private capital.

The neoliberal revolution initiated in 1991, however, fundamentally inverted this relationship. Capital, once subordinate and nationally embedded, became dominant and internationalised. The State, transformed from guardian of development to servant of corporate interests, began evaluating itself against criteria set by capital rather than by constitutional obligations to its citizens.​

This transition was not inevitable. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, significant portions of India's industrial elite expressed skepticism toward rapid liberalisation, forming organisations like the Bombay Club to advocate for gradual, cautious approaches to market opening. Yet, over time, as foreign investment accelerated, new export opportunities emerged, and regulatory controls diminished, a critical section of the Indian bourgeoisie shifted position. They recognised that neoliberalism, rather than threatening their interests, offered unprecedented opportunities for profit, consolidation, and global expansion.

The manufacturing of consent for neoliberalism proceeded through conventional channels—business associations, policy intellectuals, international financial institutions. But as resistance to inequality and corporate domination grew, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis exposed the vulnerabilities and inequities of liberalised markets, a new technology of consent was required. This is where the communal-corporate nexus became indispensable.

The Hindu nationalist Right, embodied in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its political organisation, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), represented a powerful ideological apparatus with mass mobilisational capacity accumulated over decades. What had previously seemed like parallel projects—corporate profit maximization and communal nation-building—could be synthesised.

Corporate interests discovered in Hindu nationalism a cultural framework capable of mobilising support for anti-labour, pro-privatisation policies. Hindu nationalism discovered in corporate capitalism the resources to expand its organisational reach and media presence. The alliance proved mutually reinforcing: communal narratives justified corporate expansion by framing it as national self-reliance and civilisational assertion; corporate resources and State machinery amplified communal messaging through media control and institutional capture.

This nexus has produced consequences visible across multiple dimensions of Indian life. Labour protections have been systematically weakened through legislative reform, transforming the workforce into a precariat of contract and casual workers. Agricultural policies favouring agribusiness have driven peasants into debt and destitution. Education and healthcare systems, underfunded through regressive taxation policies, deteriorate as private institutions expand to serve the wealthy.

Environmental protections yield to corporate resource extraction. Civil liberties face unprecedented restrictions justified through security and national interest rhetoric. Yet each of these assaults is framed—through managed media narratives—as necessary for national progress, religious protection, or patriotic duty.

The convergence of communalism and corporate order represents, therefore, a distinctive historical formation. It is neither fascism in the classical European sense, nor simple authoritarianism. Rather, it constitutes a hybrid form specifically adapted to post-colonial conditions: one that weaponises democratic forms while hollowing their substance, that employs cultural nationalism to legitimise economic plunder, and that systematises the capture of state institutions at every level—legislative, administrative, and judicial—to serve narrow corporate and ideological interests. Understanding this formation requires analytical tools adequate to its complexity: we must comprehend both its economic logic—the accumulation strategies and monopolistic consolidation that drive it—and its ideological machinery—the narratives of nationalism, civilisational pride, and religious identity that generate mass consent for policies that undermine human welfare.

This study traces the historical consolidation of the communal–corporate nexus as an outgrowth of the contradictions inherent in neoliberal capitalism and the deepening crisis of traditional modes of bourgeois legitimation. It interrogates the processes through which communal ideology is appropriated, reconfigured, and ultimately deployed as a mechanism for corporate appropriation and accelerated accumulation. It further documents the systematic capture and reorientation of key democratic institutions—including the media, the judiciary, and the administrative state—toward the reproduction of this nexus. In doing so, it elucidates how propaganda is engineered not merely as an adjunct to political power, but as a foundational infrastructure indispensable to sustaining this emergent authoritarian formation.

Crucially, the study resists framing these developments as either deterministic or irreversible. By uncovering the material interests, institutional logics, and coercive-consensual mechanisms that uphold the nexus, the research seeks to contribute to the articulation of counter-hegemonic political projects capable of defending democratic principles, reclaiming the emancipatory potential embedded within India’s constitutional order, and forging new pathways toward substantive equality and genuine collective self-determination.

The stakes of this inquiry extend well beyond the confines of academic debate. The trajectory of the communal–corporate nexus in India mirrors—and in certain respects anticipates—political-economic transformations visible across the globe, from Hungary and Poland to Brazil and other contemporary authoritarian-capitalist formations. In each case, convergences between ethno-nationalist ideology and neoliberal economic restructuring have facilitated the capture of state institutions and the reconfiguration of political economies in profoundly unequal and exclusionary directions.

A rigorous understanding of the Indian case thus illuminates broader global dynamics of 21st century authoritarian capitalism, offering insights essential for defending democratic institutions and reimagining egalitarian futures across diverse social and geopolitical contexts.

• The top 1% controls 62.1% of wealth while the bottom 50% holds only 6.4%, according to the World Inequality Database 2024 and research cited in financial analysis of India's wealth distribution crisis.​

• Large industrial houses have consolidated monopolistic control through neoliberal policies that have created structural dependencies between corporate interests and state actors, enabling indirect control of key sectors and policy decisions.​

• Media conglomerates like Network18 (owned by Reliance Industries) exemplify how corporate ownership creates structural dependencies that influence editorial decisions, allowing governments to indirectly control narratives through these consolidated media structures.​

• The relationship between State and capital fundamentally shifted under neoliberalism, transforming capital from a subordinate, nationally defined entity into a dominant, internationalised force that now evaluates state compliance rather than the reverse.​

Emergence of Fascist Modi & Modinomics

The contemporary Indian story is both compelling and deeply troubling. Former Gujarat minister and BJP–RSS leader Shankersinh Vaghela’s statements alleging that the 2002 Godhra train burning was a “staged act” have reignited old debates about State complicity in communal violence. These claims—whether politically motivated or revealing deeper truths—gain urgency in light of Modi’s long ascendancy from Gujarat’s Chief Minister to India’s Prime Minister. Against the backdrop of widening social divisions, corporate consolidation, and democratic regression, the need for scrutiny has never been greater.

Godhra and Its Political Aftermath

On February 27, 2002, coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express was set on fire near Godhra, resulting in the deaths of 59 Hindu pilgrims. The incident triggered statewide communal violence that killed at least 1,044 people, according to official figures (government of Gujarat report, 2002), though several independent studies including the Concerned Citizens Tribunal (2002) and Human Rights Watch (2003) estimated fatalities between 2,000–3,000, most of them Muslims. Over 150,000 people were displaced.

Subsequent judicial proceedings, including the Nanavati-Mehta Commission (2014), upheld the view that the attack was premeditated by local Muslims; yet independent journalists (Siddharth Varadarajan, The Times of India, 2002; The Caravan, 2024) and human rights groups have identified inconsistencies in the official narrative. Vaghela’s 2024 claim that the event was orchestrated to consolidate Hindutva leadership over Modi’s rivals, such as Pravin Togadia, revisits an old fault line in Gujarat’s political history.

Far from distancing himself from the violence, Modi’s government organised public yatras and events that, according to Tehelka (2007) sting operations and Outlook India (2002), celebrated “Hindu pride” in the aftermath, turning communal trauma into political capital.

Precedents of Organised Communal Violence

The Godhra conflict fits a larger historical pattern. Between 1989 and 1993, the BJP and affiliates of the Sangh Parivar, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal, mobilized around the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. Riots in Meerut, Bhagalpur, Mumbai, and Ayodhya led to approximately 9,000–10,000 deaths (Varshney, 2002; Engineer, 1995). The Babri Masjid demolition in December 1992 represented a strategic shift—religious nationalism became the axis of political mobilisation that challenged India’s secular democratic foundation.

Economic Alliances and Corporate Power

Modi’s transformation from a regional leader to a corporate-backed national figure emerged through the Vibrant Gujarat Summits (2003–2013). The 2011 summit, in particular, saw Mukesh Ambani (Reliance Industries) and Gautam Adani (Adani Group) praising Gujarat’s pro-business model, which became the ideological and financial springboard for Modi’s national campaign (Jenkins, 2014; Chhibber & Verma, 2018).

Following this, Union Home Minister Amit Shah was deployed to Uttar Pradesh to replicate Gujarat’s model of cultural polarisation. Subsequent riots in Muzaffarnagar (2013) left 62 dead and over 50,000 displaced (NHRC & Amnesty International, 2013). BJP MLA Sangeet Som, named in police chargesheets, was publicly felicitated by Modi at later rallies, symbolising the political sanctioning of majoritarian mobilization.

Media Consolidation and Information Warfare

Between 2012 and 2014, corporate-media alliances played a pivotal role in crafting the Modi narrative. Groups like Network18 (Reliance), Zee Media (Essel Group), and Adani Enterprises either directly supported or acquired media outlets (Nilekani, 2023). Election Commission data shows over ₹15,000 crore spent on publicity and rallies across 5,000+ events during the 2014 campaign—one of the world’s costliest democratic exercises (CSDS, 2015). Corporate defection funding and ideological alignment tilted news coverage decisively in favour of BJP narratives (Thakurta, 2015).

Crony Capitalism and Economic Exclusion: Bank Write-offs and Corporate Gains

Indian banks wrote off ₹16.35 lakh crore in bad loans from 2014–2024, as per the RBI and Finance Ministry, with the highest annual write-off at ₹2.36 lakh crore (FY19).​ Thus, other types of special benefits, including tax relief, official RBI and Finance Ministry data (2023) show ‘corporate loan write-offs have crossed totalling over ₹25 lakh crore, benefitting conglomerates such as Adani, Ambani, Vedanta, and Essar.

Indian Bank Loan Write-Offs (₹ Lakh Crore) 2014-2024

Corruption reporting

• Land acquisition and leasing policies increasingly favour corporates; long-term leases and asset transfers often involve land initially owned by marginalised communities.​

• Reports indicate that benefits from these disposals accrue predominantly to groups such as Adani and Ambani, who have received favourable lease terms and been major beneficiaries of policy changes.​

Simultaneously, India’s share of manufacturing employment fell from 12.6% (2012) to 10.2% (2023) (CMIE, 2024). The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, 2023) and the World Inequality Lab report (2025) clearly say that wealth inequality reached record highs: the top 1% controls 62% of total wealth, while the bottom 50% own only 6%.

India’s total external debt stood at $663 billion by March 2024 (World Bank Data), while combined IMF-World Bank exposure surpassed $2.5 trillion when including private external liabilities.

Informal Economy and Unemployment

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Indian government data confirm that approximately 90% of India's workforce is in the informal sector, lacking job security and social protections; these workers mostly earn below statutory minimum wages.​ According to the ILO and India Employment Report (IHD–ILO, 2024), approximately 90% of India’s workforce remains in the informal sector, lacking job security and social protection. Furthermore, 40.8% of regular workers and 51.9% of casual workers earn below the average daily minimum wage (ILO/IHD, 2024). Youth unemployment remains alarming—about 83% of India’s unemployed are youth, highlighting structural issues in education and labour-market linkage (ILO, 2024). Youth unemployment reached 83% among educated jobseekers (CMIE, 2024).

Figure 1: Estimated Informal vs Formal Workforce (India, 2024)

Source: ILO, IHD–ILO India Employment Report 2024.

Distribution of Workforce: Informal vs Formal Sectors in India (2024)

Unemployment among educated youth remains a structural challenge: the ILO's India Employment Report 2024 pegs youth unemployment at 83% of all unemployed, with urban unemployment for the educated exceeding 26%.​

Malnutrition and Food Insecurity

India has the largest number of undernourished people globally (194.6 million), with more than 790 million unable to afford a healthy diet (SOFI/FAO, 2024); child malnutrition also remains extremely high, with 31.7% of children stunted and 18.7% wasted.​

Meanwhile, the United Nations’ State of Food Security and Nutrition report (SOFI, 2024) estimated that around 194 million Indians remain undernourished, not one billion as often exaggerated. The World Bank (2024) estimates that roughly 129 million Indians live below the international poverty line of $2.15 per day.

As per the World Bank's updated poverty line ($2.15/day), India’s poverty rate has dropped to 2.3% (2022). However, under the more widely used “lower-middle-income country” poverty line ($3.65–$4.20/day), roughly 24% of Indians—over 300 million people—remain in poverty. Rural poverty is much higher, and food insecurity affects between 194.6 million (undernourished) and 790 million (unable to afford a healthy diet).​

The National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019–21) shows 35.5% of children under five remain chronically malnourished.

Malnutrition and Food Insecurity in India (2023/2024)

• One billion people are not classified as “poor” under international thresholds, but the majority experience some form of deprivation or malnutrition—especially among tribal, Dalit, and minority populations.​

More than half (55.6%) of Indians cannot afford a balanced diet, and over 300 million people regularly face food insecurity.​

GDP, Debt, and Privatisation

• India’s nominal GDP is just under $3 trillion as of 2024, with government debt rising to $2.14 trillion (57% of GDP), and total public and private external exposure around $2.62 trillion.​

• Public sector investment has declined, with privatization and corporatization at the heart of policy decisions since 2014.​

Corruption and Resource Extraction

• Significant scandals, including the ₹62,000 crore “energy scam” exposed by R.K. Singh, have involved deals that transfer major public resources to corporate interests through allegedly inflated or questionable contracts.​

• The open-door policy for foreign multinationals has deepened resource and labor exploitation, undermining local self-reliance and development.​

Social Costs and Decline of Welfare

Price deregulation of essentials, withdrawal of subsidies, and privatization of health and education have intensified economic hardship. The State of Inequality in India Report (NITI Aayog, 2022) found the bottom 20% of Indian households control only 3% of the national income. A UNDP report (2023) noted that multidimensional poverty in eight Indian states rivals sub-Saharan levels, with Bihar (52%), Jharkhand (43%), and Uttar Pradesh (36%) leading in deprivation. More than 300 million Indians face food insecurity (Global Hunger Index, 2023), while enforcement of minimum wage laws remains weak.

Internal migration due to agrarian decline has accelerated, with over 450 million internal migrants recorded in the Census 2011, projected to surpass 600 million by 2025 (IIPS & World Bank projections, 2024).

Spectacle, Faith, and the Retreat of Science

Public expenditures on cultural-religious spectacles—such as the Ram Mandir project (₹1,800 crore) and Kumbh Mela (₹4,200 crore)—contrast starkly with underfunded public universities and hospitals. The Prime Minister’s 92 foreign trips between 2014–2023 cost taxpayers ₹5,455 crore (MEA response to Parliament, 2023), reflecting priorities skewed toward optics over outcomes. During the COVID-19 pandemic, The New York Times (July 2021) and The Lancet (May 2021) estimated excess deaths in India between 3.5–4.7 million, with health infrastructure collapse most severe in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat.

Democracy in Decline

India’s democratic regression has drawn international concern. The V-Dem Institute (2024) classifies India as an “electoral autocracy”, while Freedom House (2023) downgraded India’s rating to “partly free.” The Editors Guild (2023) and Reporters Without Borders (2024) cite increased censorship, online surveillance, and criminal cases against journalists critical of the regime. Parliament’s legislative functioning has weakened, with ordinance usage tripling since 2014 and debates curtailed to record lows (PRS Legislative Research, 2024).

Toward a Just and Inclusive India

The tragedies of Godhra, Muzaffarnagar, and Ayodhya remind the nation that communal division and corporate enrichment cannot form the foundation of a just democracy. India’s path forward requires reclaiming secular constitutionalism, redistributive economics, and rational public discourse. As Ambedkar’s warning in the Constituent Assembly reminds us, political democracy cannot survive without social and economic democracy.

India’s youth deserve employment and dignity over propaganda; its labourers require rights, not precarity; its marginalized citizens deserve protection, not scapegoating. The moral question confronting the republic remains urgent: Can India survive without justice, inclusion, and truth?

The writer is an International Professor of Economics. He also serves as the Director of Global South Social Networks and a researcher of Sustainable Economic Development and the Political Economy of the Global South. The views are personal.

 

Odisha: Time to Conserve, Before Nature Becomes Unforgiving

D N Singh | 18 Nov 2025

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Be it tropical cyclones, tornadoes, hurricanes or floods that worsen the human, flora and fauna life cycle, the state needs to step up conservation, especially of mangroves.

It can be said in Odisha’s context that nature has been so over exploited that it has started speaking out.

The conservation of nature in all its aspects has remained so little in comparison to its destruction that not a year passes when people do not face its wrath; be it tropical cyclones, tornadoes, hurricanes or floods that worsen the life cycle of human, flora and fauna.              

“With a 480-km-long coastline along the Bay of Bengal, the state has to weather a huge number of tidal invasions, when the coastline remains without minimal defence against the calamities spun from the sea,” said Biswajit Mohanty, an environmental activist who has been working on nature conservation in many aspects.

Coastal Conservation and Mangrove Restoration

Odisha has been actively participating in the Central government's MISHTI (Mangrove Initiative for Shoreline Habitats & Tangible Incomes) scheme. By December 2024, the state had planned to plant mangroves on an additional 632 hectares by 2025–26. The scheme focuses on vulnerable coastal districts, such as like Kendrapara, Jagatsinghpur and Balasore to bolster defence against cyclones and sea erosion.  

It may be very late in the day, but Odisha has finally woken up to certain realities. For 2024-2025, the state has allocated Rs. 27 crore for conservation of Bhitarkanika and mangrove restoration.

“When people come to the forefront to face the challenges, working shoulder to shoulder with official agencies to conserve Mangroves, then dismay turns into hope for reinforcing the coastal boarders”, adds Mohanty.

Environmentalist Scripts History After Super Cyclone

Bijay Kumar Kabi, an environmentalist from Kendrapara district, has led a successful community effort to create 25-acres of mangrove forest in the village of Badakot over 12 years. After witnessing the devastating impact of the 1999 super cyclone and the subsequent coastal erosion, he mobilised villagers to plant mangroves, which now act as a robust natural barrier against cyclones and tidal surges, also providing livelihood to the local community.

Another youth, a climate change advocate and founder of the Odisha Paryavaran Sanrakshan Abhiyan (OPSA) Trust, Soumya Ranjan Biswal, has been instrumental in mobilising local fishing and coastal communities, particularly women, for mangrove conservation efforts in Puri and Kendrapara districts. His work has resulted in the restoration of over 1.2 lakh hectares of mangroves and has earned him recognition, including being appointed as a United Nations’ India Yuvah Advocate.

Women Power in Action

Nalini Kandi and other women from the village of Jhadling and other coastal areas are actively involved in collecting mangrove seeds, nurturing saplings in nurseries, and planting them along the coastline.

The women work in groups, often receiving a modest honorarium from OPSA, and their efforts have been crucial in protecting their villages from environmental disasters, such as cyclones and floods.

A ‘Green’ Warrior

:A young "green warrior" from Puri, Rahul Maharana, received the National Youth Award for his work on mangrove restoration and beach cleanup efforts in Astaranga, near the mouth of the Devi River. 

These efforts, often involving donation of private land and significant community participation, highlight the critical role individuals play in protecting Odisha's vulnerable coastline. 

The spread of mangrove forests in Bhitarkanika National Park is a telling example of how a few factors can play a big role in conservation. All along the long tidal creek, thick mangroves stand as sentinels in which the role of over ,1200 salt-water crocodiles, the flag-ship animals of the park, cannot be ignored. They, in fact, do the job of protectors as their presence keeps many wrong-doers at bay.   

Better Late Than Never

Based on reports from 2024 and 2025, special news on conservation in Odisha includes the creation of a new tiger reserve, a pioneering elephant survival centre, significant green restoration projects to battle tidal storms from the Bay of Bengal, and community-based ecotourism initiatives to encourage greater peoples' participation. 

Odisha has long shared an inseparable relationship with major cyclones. In fact, the state’s geographic location makes it more vulnerable to tropical tidal invasions in the form of cyclones, deep depressions.

All said and done now, the time has come for official agencies and people to take up the responsibility to work for conservation so that a major defence can be created against the oceanic wrath.   

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Odisha with over 40 years’ experience in the profession.