Policy Options Instead of Alarmism
SWP 25.04.2024,
7 Pages
doi:10.18449/2024C17
doi:10.18449/2024C17
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While a second Trump Presidency would be challenging for transatlantic ties, US nuclear assurances to its NATO allies in Europe would likely be the last casualty – not the first – of a fraying relationship. There is an intrinsic incompatibility between the United States completely abandoning its role as global actor, which would be the prerequisite for the withdrawal of such assurances, and Trump’s domestic interests. It cannot be denied that the worst-case scenario – namely, the end of extended nuclear deterrence – is possible and requires careful contingency planning on the part of the allies; but it is highly unlikely and should not distract from addressing the more probable outcome. Even in the best-case scenario of a Trump II administration resembling his first term, US nuclear assurances are likely to become less credible. To allay concerns, German and European policymakers should work with their US counterparts before and after the November 2024 election to strengthen transatlantic diplomatic coordination, conventional deterrence and defence, as well as nuclear options.
As Donald Trump told his supporters recently, if re-elected he would encourage the Russians to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member that did not comply with defence spending guidelines. The former US president may win the November 2024 election – a prospect that has triggered frantic waves of media commentary and policy proposals throughout Europe. Some politicians and analysts fear that Trump would take the United States out of NATO – something he had threatened repeatedly during his first term – thereby destroying the institutional basis for nuclear assurance. Others suggest that he would refrain from giving US forces the order to defend an ally under attack and would refuse to use nuclear weapons in an escalating regional conflict with Russia. Still others contend that American extended deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, is on the verge of collapse not least because of public statements like the one quoted above. And many point out that such reckless rhetoric emboldens adversaries and makes allies anxious.
The dire predictions have reinforced calls for European alternatives or complements to US extended nuclear deterrence. Essentially, the importance of nuclear deterrence for European security is not in question: most analysts agree that without Western conventional and nuclear deterrence, Russia’s ambitious and risk-prone leadership would likely attempt to leverage its military power in order to expand its influence across Europe. Some contend that given the prospect of a second Trump Presidency, either one or both of the European nuclear powers – France and the United Kingdom – should take over US commitments. Others suggest that a pan-European nuclear arsenal should be developed or that other major European nations should acquire nuclear weapons. For their part, the more moderate voices propose that Paris and London should supplement Washington’s nuclear assurances with their own commitments.
But at the same time, many note – correctly – that a rapid alternative to US nuclear assurances is not feasible owing to technical, legal, political and strategic factors. Moreover, there would be few additional nuclear-related steps that France or the United Kingdom could take to underpin US commitments.
Although risks loom large and unpredictability is Trump’s trademark, a systematic analysis not only indicates that the worst-case scenario of nuclear assurances being abandoned is unlikely; it also highlights which outcomes would be more probable during a potential Trump second term and which timely policy options could mitigate many of the concerns related to the diminished credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
EPUB | 635 KB
MOBI | 925 KB
While a second Trump Presidency would be challenging for transatlantic ties, US nuclear assurances to its NATO allies in Europe would likely be the last casualty – not the first – of a fraying relationship. There is an intrinsic incompatibility between the United States completely abandoning its role as global actor, which would be the prerequisite for the withdrawal of such assurances, and Trump’s domestic interests. It cannot be denied that the worst-case scenario – namely, the end of extended nuclear deterrence – is possible and requires careful contingency planning on the part of the allies; but it is highly unlikely and should not distract from addressing the more probable outcome. Even in the best-case scenario of a Trump II administration resembling his first term, US nuclear assurances are likely to become less credible. To allay concerns, German and European policymakers should work with their US counterparts before and after the November 2024 election to strengthen transatlantic diplomatic coordination, conventional deterrence and defence, as well as nuclear options.
As Donald Trump told his supporters recently, if re-elected he would encourage the Russians to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member that did not comply with defence spending guidelines. The former US president may win the November 2024 election – a prospect that has triggered frantic waves of media commentary and policy proposals throughout Europe. Some politicians and analysts fear that Trump would take the United States out of NATO – something he had threatened repeatedly during his first term – thereby destroying the institutional basis for nuclear assurance. Others suggest that he would refrain from giving US forces the order to defend an ally under attack and would refuse to use nuclear weapons in an escalating regional conflict with Russia. Still others contend that American extended deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, is on the verge of collapse not least because of public statements like the one quoted above. And many point out that such reckless rhetoric emboldens adversaries and makes allies anxious.
The dire predictions have reinforced calls for European alternatives or complements to US extended nuclear deterrence. Essentially, the importance of nuclear deterrence for European security is not in question: most analysts agree that without Western conventional and nuclear deterrence, Russia’s ambitious and risk-prone leadership would likely attempt to leverage its military power in order to expand its influence across Europe. Some contend that given the prospect of a second Trump Presidency, either one or both of the European nuclear powers – France and the United Kingdom – should take over US commitments. Others suggest that a pan-European nuclear arsenal should be developed or that other major European nations should acquire nuclear weapons. For their part, the more moderate voices propose that Paris and London should supplement Washington’s nuclear assurances with their own commitments.
But at the same time, many note – correctly – that a rapid alternative to US nuclear assurances is not feasible owing to technical, legal, political and strategic factors. Moreover, there would be few additional nuclear-related steps that France or the United Kingdom could take to underpin US commitments.
Although risks loom large and unpredictability is Trump’s trademark, a systematic analysis not only indicates that the worst-case scenario of nuclear assurances being abandoned is unlikely; it also highlights which outcomes would be more probable during a potential Trump second term and which timely policy options could mitigate many of the concerns related to the diminished credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
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