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Sunday, February 22, 2026

IMPERIALIST PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS

‘This Is Murder’: Trump Strike Kills 3 More Boaters in the Pacific

“Demand Congress take action against these strikes now!” said Amnesty International USA.


US Southern Command shared on social media a 16-second clip of a strike on a boat in the eastern Pacific that killed three people on February 20, 2026.
(Photo: screen grab/SOUTHCOM/X)

Jessica Corbett
Feb 21, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

President Donald Trump’s “summary executions continue,” Princeton University visiting professor Kenneth Roth said early Saturday after the US military announced its 43rd bombing of boaters whom the administration claimed were smuggling drugs.

Sharing a 16-second clip of the strike on social media, US Southern Command said late Friday that “Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel operated by designated terrorist organizations. Intelligence confirmed the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the eastern Pacific and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations. Three male narco-terrorists were killed during this action. No US military forces were harmed.”



Trump ‘Murder Spree’ Continues With 11 More People Killed in US Boat Strikes



Death Toll Up to 128 People as Trump Pentagon Commits Two More Killings at Sea

Roth, the former longtime director of Human Rights Watch, noted that “the strike raised the death toll in Trump’s campaign against people accused of drug smuggling at sea to at least 147—each a murder.” Some tallies put the death toll at 148 or 149.

Since Trump started bombing boats in September, critics have condemned the strikes as “war crimes, murder, or both.” The administration has tried to justify the operation by arguing that it is in an “armed conflict” with drug cartels in Latin America, including Venezuela—whose president, Nicolás Maduro, was abducted by US forces last month and subsequently pleaded not guilty to narco-terrorism charges in a federal court in New York.

Various human rights advocates and legal experts, including Democrats and even some Republicans in Congress, have rejected that argument. However, both the GOP-controlled Senate and House of Representatives have declined to pass recent war powers resolutions intended to stop Trump’s boat bombings.

“Three more people have been killed. This is murder. Demand Congress take action against these strikes now!” Amnesty International USA said on social media Saturday, sharing a form constituents can use to contact their representatives.

Multiple journalists highlighted that in this case, and others, the targeted boat appeared to be stationary when the US bombed it.




The Friday bombing came after the US Department of Defense announced that it had killed 11 people on three boats in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific late Monday.

“The US military has carried out strikes every three or four days since the new leader of the Southern Command, Gen. Francis L. Donovan of the Marine Corps, took over last month after the previous commander, Adm. Alvin Holsey, abruptly retired,” the New York Times reported. “Defense Department and congressional officials said Adm. Holsey had expressed concerns about the strikes.”

Saturday, February 21, 2026

A Mockery of Justice: Torture Victim to Face Trial at Guantánamo After 25 Years

by  | Feb 20, 2026 |

Reprinted from Andy Worthington’s website.

In the long, dark farce of Guantánamo’s military commissions, the recently announced and almost entirely ignored decision by the Pentagon to turn down a plea deal for Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, a prominent CIA torture victim and the alleged architect of the Al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, and to proceed, instead, with an unwinnable trial, is just the latest manifestation of a refusal by successive US administrations to reckon with the corrosive effects of the use of torture.

With this decision, the Trump administration has now embraced a sickening and enduring bi-partisan consensus that, when it comes to those accused of the gravest crimes at Guantánamo — including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 — it is preferable to cling to an unworkable belief in vengeance, through a fantastical belief in successful prosecutions that involve the death penalty, than to admit that the use of torture on the defendants has thoroughly undermined that possibility.

The reality, which every administration has denied — from Bush to Obama, and from Biden to Trump — is that torture, undertaken over many years in the CIA’s global network of “black site” torture prisons, is so fundamentally incompatible with justice that the only viable way forward is to agree to plea deals that take the death penalty off the table in exchange for lifelong imprisonment at Guantánamo and full and frank confessions that bring some measure of “closure.”

The history of the military commissions — ill-advisedly revived in November 2001 under the direction of Dick Cheney, revived again in 2006 after a Supreme Court ruling that they were illegal and unconstitutional, and revived again under President Obama in 2009 — is one of almost entirely abject failure, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars to try to prove otherwise.

Only eleven men have been successfully prosecuted, with only two of those verdicts reached after a trial, and with the rest achieved through plea deals, and even this meager number has been undermined by successful appeals that have overturned three of those convictions, and left a fourth hanging by a dubious thread of legitimacy.

However, when it comes to the longest-running efforts to prosecute a handful of “high-value” individuals allegedly involved in major acts of terrorism — Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri and five men accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks — the weight of torture has been stifling efforts to proceed with successful prosecutions for 18 years.

After the men were brought to Guantánamo from the “black sites”, where Al-Nashiri had been held for nearly four years, in September 2006, they were initially charged in 2008, but had those charges dropped when President Obama took office. In November 2009, Obama’s Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced that the 9/11 trial would take place in a US federal court, while five others, including Al-Nashiri, would face trials in a third version of the military commissions.

The New York trial never went ahead. Obama crumpled under Republican pressure, and the trial was shunted back to Guantánamo, where eventually, in 2012, the five men were charged again.

Ever since, however — for 16 years in Al-Nashiri’s case, and 14 in the cases of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the four other men charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks — pre-trial hearings have inconclusively dragged on and on like a Groundhog Day of predictable futility, as the defense teams seek to expose the extent of their clients’ torture, while prosecutors try to keep it hidden.

In Al-Nashiri’s case, numerous international bodies have also, in these long years of unaddressed injustice, issued devastating rulings and opinions regarding his case. In July 2014, the European Court of Human Rights condemned the US for implementing a program of extraordinary rendition and torture, and Poland for hosting a CIA “black site” from 2002 to 2003, where he was held, and in February 2015 the Court ordered Poland to pay €100,000 in damages to Al-Nashiri.

In addition, in 2018, Al-Nashiri’s trial was engulfed in scandal, and there was further international outrage in May 2018, when the European Court of Human Rights condemned the US and Romania for holding Al-Nashiri in a “black site”, and ordered the Romanian government to pay him €100,000 in damages.

Further condemnation took place in June 2023, in another blow to the US government, when the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention condemned Al-Nashiri’s imprisonment as arbitrary and called for his release, including, in their opinion, a devastating declaration by Dr. Sondra Crosby, “an expert in internal medicine and the treatment of victims of torture,” who had met with him for approximately 30 hours, and described him as “one of the most severely traumatized individuals I have ever seen.”

The 9/11 plea deals

Finally, in February 2023, after, as I described it in my summary of the commissions, “convicted Al-Qaeda courier Majid Khan was released via a plea deal, having been allowed to deliver a devastating statement about his torture in CIA ‘black sites’, and at Guantánamo, which shocked his military jury to such an extent that seven of the eight jury members urged clemency for him, prosecutors recognized that a successful prosecution in the 9/11 trial was unviable.”

“As a result”, as I proceeded to explain, “they began negotiations with the defense teams, and the convening authority, Brig. Gen. Susan Escallier, for plea deals, in which, with the death penalty taken off the table, they would be imprisoned for life at Guantánamo, having provided a full and frank account of their actions. The plea deals were successfully concluded at the end of July 2024, but the defense secretary Lloyd Austin then tried to revoke them, even though it seemed clear that he had no authority to do so. Although the military judge overruled him, along with the military commission review court, the [Biden] administration then appealed in federal court, leaving the plea deals in limbo as they left office.”

Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Walid bin Attash and Mustafa al-Hawsawi, all photographed at Guantánamo in recent years by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In July 2025, a three-judge panel in the D.C. Circuit Court (the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) ruled by 2 to 1 that Lloyd Austin “indisputably had legal authority to withdraw from the agreements.” The majority — Obama appointee Judge Patricia Millett and Trump appointee Neomi Rao — added that, “Having properly assumed the convening authority, the Secretary determined that the ‘families and the American public deserve the opportunity to see military commission trials carried out’”, adding, “The secretary acted within the bounds of his legal authority, and we decline to second-guess his judgment.”

The dissenting judge, Robert Wilkins, another Obama appointee, called it a “stunning” ruling (and not in positive sense), chastising his colleagues for not deferring to the decisions of military courts interpreting military rules.

The ruling hurled KSM and his two co-defendants — Walid Bin Attash and Mustafa Al-Hawsawi — back into the seemingly perennial uncertainty of pre-trial hearings, while the other two co-defendants, who had not agreed to the plea deals, continued to face their own ongoing travails. One, Ammar Al-Baluchi, has continued to pursue his own case against the government, while the other, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, was ruled unfit to stand trial by a DOD Sanity Board in August 2023, and, ever since, has been in legal limbo.

The plea deal for Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri

Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, meanwhile, continued to challenge the government’s efforts to use information derived from so-called “clean team” interrogations after he arrived at Guantánamo as evidence in his case, a challenge that mirrored similar efforts by KSM and the 9/11 co-accused.

In August 2023, the judge in Al-Nashiri’s case, Col. Lanny J. Acosta Jr., had delivered a powerful ruling refuting the viability of the “clean team” interrogations, which had been designed to get him to replicate confessions he had made under torture without any coercion being used, on the basis that it was impossible for him to have delivered any kind of uncoerced self-incriminating statement after the torture to which he was subjected.

Prosecutors appealed the ruling, but on January 30, 2025, the appeals court, the Court of Military Commission Review, upheld Col. Acosta’s ruling, with Allison Miller, one of Al-Nashiri’s lawyers, telling the New York Times that the court had “unanimously rejected” the government’s request to “reinstate” the use of his discredited confession.

The decision confirmed a recognition by prosecutors — as with the 9/11 trial two years before — to abandon hopes for a successful prosecution, and, instead, to negotiate a plea deal. The deal, which, as with the 9/11 deal, dropped the death penalty in exchange for a full confession and lifetime imprisonment at Guantánamo, was announced by Allison Miller at the start of two weeks of hearings in March 2025, as reported by the New York Times, which also noted that Miller had said that a decision on the deal would need to be reached by Donald Trump’s defense secretary Pete Hegseth, but that, at the time, “a military chain of command ha[d] yet to send it to him.”

The plea deal had been agreed on December 12, 2024, but the chief prosecutor, Rear Adm. Aaron C. Rugh, had declined to present it to Lloyd Austin so close to the end of the Biden presidency, and the latest judge in the case, Col. Matthew S. Fitzgerald, had “acknowledged the political climate”, as the Times described it, stating, “We all realize we are operating in dynamic circumstances.” The Times also noted that the lead prosecutor, Capt. Timothy J. Stinson, a Navy lawyer, had “declined to comment on whether he had endorsed the agreement”, although Allison Miller “said in court that he had.”

Writing for the Times, Carol Rosenberg also noted that, since the USS Cole attack, “parents of sailors who were killed in the attack have passed away and many victims have stopped traveling to the Navy base to watch the painfully slow pretrial proceedings.”

Only one, Rosenberg noted, James G. Parlier, a retired Navy command master chief who survived the attack, had undertaken the difficult journey to Guantánamo to observe the proceedings. “For years”, she stated, “he had bristled at the delays and pressed for a capital trial”, but had finally “come to support resolving it through a plea agreement, at the risk of angering some of his former shipmates.”

“We’ve got to close that chapter of our lives,” he said, adding, “There are others who feel the same as me, want to get on with it. I know even if there’s going to be a death sentence we’ll be old men or dead by then.”

Having been told that “the proposed sentencing range would be 20 years to life imprisonment”, he said, “I’m fine with that”, noting that, by the time the sentence ended, “Mr. Nashiri would be over 80.”

Trump’s DOD rejects the plea deal

Despite the promise of “closure”, however, as with the 9/11 trial, when the Pentagon finally responded, the DOD, under Trump, took the same position as Lloyd Austin under Biden, rejecting the “plea agreement and a sentence of up to life in prison” and “setting the stage for the first death penalty trial at Guantánamo Bay to start this summer”, as lawyers explained to Rosenberg for the New York Times on February 5.

The decision, which was not taken by Pete Hegseth, was instead taken by Steve Feinberg, the deputy defense secretary, a businessman worth $5 billion, who, during his confirmation hearing, refused to acknowledge that Russia had invaded Ukraine, and also expressed support for large-scale firings within the Defense Department.

Although prosecutors acknowledged that they had supported the plea deal, they “notified the victims and relatives of those killed in the attack of the decision”, and “invited them to sign up to attend the trial, which is scheduled to start with the selection of a military jury on June 1 and could last six months.”

As Rosenberg explained, under the plea deal, “Mr. Nashiri would have admitted to his specific role in the attack and a military panel would have decided a sentence in the range of 20 years to life in prison. Victims would have testified to their loss, and defense lawyers and the defendant could have offered arguments for leniency that would probably have included descriptions of his torture.”

Instead, with his own discredited confessions excluded, “much of the trial evidence will likely involve US agents testifying about people they questioned at the time in Yemen, financial transactions and other documents they tied to an alias for Mr. Nashiri, who is accused of helping the bombers acquire vessels, explosives and safe houses.”

Another of the survivors, Paul Abney, a retired Navy master chief, expressed his disappointment with the decision, stating that he had “supported the plea bargain to resolve the case sooner ‘mainly for the family members, and for the survivors.’”

“It’s been a long, drawn-out process”, he added, further explaining that, although “there may be families that want to see the death penalty, personally I’d just like to see an end to this, to get some accountability and to give some finality to this thing.”

He said, however, that he would attend the trial “to represent the ship, those who had died and survivors who find the trip too painful”, although he made a point of noting that the prosecutors had “wanted the plea deal”, and had “spent a lot of time working on that.”

The disappointment was also summed up concisely by Allison Miller, who said it “would have brought actual finality to a nearly 26-year-old crime.” Instead, she predicted that the trial itself would air “the horrors perpetuated against Mr. al-Nashiri by the American government”, adding that, even if he is convicted, the case “will likely last through decades of appellate and post-conviction litigation.”

As with the aborted 9/11 plea deal, I can only, in conclusion, echo what I said about Lloyd Austin’s capitulation to notions of unfulfillable vengeance 18 months ago; that it was a shamefully missed opportunity to “redress the malignant folly at the heart of the detention policies undertaken in the ‘war on terror’: responding to terrorism with torture.”

Who knows, now, if there will ever be any closure or any kind of justice?

Andy Worthington is a freelance investigative journalist, activist, author, photographer (of a photo-journalism project, ‘The State of London’, which ran from 2012 to 2023), film-maker and singer-songwriter (the lead singer and main songwriter for the London-based band The Four Fathers, whose music is available via Bandcamp). He is the co-founder of the Close Guantánamo campaign (see the ongoing photo campaign here) and the successful We Stand With Shaker campaign of 2014-15, and the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison and of two other books: Stonehenge: Celebration and Subversion and The Battle of the Beanfield. He is also the co-director (with Polly Nash) of the documentary film, “Outside the Law: Stories from Guantánamo”, which you can watch on YouTube here.

Wednesday, February 18, 2026

 

Top Putin Aide Threatens EU Ships in Response to Shadow Fleet Boardings

Russia
Nikolai Patrushev, right, in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2017 (file image courtesy of the Kremlin)

Published Feb 17, 2026 9:26 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

As Europe contemplates stiffer measures against the lightly-regulated, underinsured "shadow fleet" of tankers that carry most of Russia's oil, Russia is threatening to counterpunch. In an interview with outlet Argumenty i Fakty, Kremlin insider Nikolai Patrushev called Western tanker boardings "pirate attacks," and predicted a future in which Europe takes an active, regular role in interdicting Russia-linked tanker traffic. He intimated that Russia's navy is working on ways to "cool the ardor of Western corsairs" who "want to paralyze" the Russian oil economy. 

"The Europeans are deliberately pursuing a scenario of military escalation, testing the limits of our patience and provoking active retaliatory measures. If a peaceful resolution to this situation fails, the blockade will be broken and eliminated by the [Russian] Navy," Patrushev said. "Let's not forget that many ships sail the seas under European flags. We, too, may be interested in what they are transporting and where they are going."

To date, the shadow fleet has been able to operate with relative freedom in and out of Russia's Baltic loading terminals. Often lacking valid insurance, or even a legitimate flag state, the tankers pass through the Kattegat and the North Sea en route to China or India - frequently under the watch of what may be Russian paramilitary forces. On rare occasions involving suspicious activity, these tankers are boarded and searched by EU security forces, but the vast majority - about 240 last year - enter and exit the Baltic without incident. That could change under evolving engagement protocols.

"According to available information . . . attacks on our ships and cargo will become more frequent," Patrushev warned. "If we don't respond firmly, the British, French, and even the Baltic states will soon become so brazen that they will attempt to completely block our country's access to the seas, at least in the Atlantic basin."

Patrushev - a former Soviet intelligence officer who once served alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin in the KGB - said that the Russian Navy would be the best tool for response. "Significant forces must be permanently stationed in key maritime routes, including in regions remote from Russia," he said. "Any attempt at a naval blockade of our country is completely illegal from the standpoint of international law, and the concept of a 'shadow fleet,' which EU representatives brandish at every turn, is a legal fiction."

The proposed European crackdown on the shadow fleet would affect the largest share of Russia-facing tanker tonnage. It would also be an important complement to a proposed EU shutdown of all "legitimate" European maritime services for Russian oil cargoes (currently allowed for consignments priced under $45 per barrel). If every Russian barrel becomes noncompliant for EU shipowners, as is expected soon, the "clean" vessels that currently carry compliant Russian shipments will be forced out of the Russian trade lanes, and the demand for unregulated shadow fleet services will increase. This would drive up shadow fleet traffic to and from Russia - which Europe is now preparing to counter with the possibility of tanker interdictions at sea. 

Escort mission limitations

Russian warships are already providing escorts for key tanker and logistics ship movements in the English Channel and the Baltic, but there is a limit to how much more the Russian Navy can do. 

Patrushev acknowledged that the service is already "under considerable strain." Russia's military actions in Ukraine and Syria have had effects on its navy - including the attrition of the Black Sea Fleet, the closure of the Bosporus to warships, the loss of the Russian base at Tartus, Western sanctions impeding Russian shipbuilding and component imports, and the loss of access to Ukrainian gas turbine engines. 

For recruitment, the navy's manpower availability is limited by the constant need to refill combat roles for fighting in Eastern Ukraine, which is consuming about 1,100 Russian soldiers per day (killed or injured). At least one vessel, the now-defunct carrier Adm. Kuznetsov, has transferred part of its crew to the front lines for ground combat roles.

Patrushev partially addressed this challenge by highlighting the potential of technology to change naval affairs - a "high-tech navy" filled with unmanned vessels of corvette size or larger. 

Tuesday, February 17, 2026

USS Ford Likely to Set Post-Vietnam Deployment Record, Delaying Maintenance

Ford
USN file image

Published Feb 16, 2026 3:45 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The carrier USS Gerald R. Ford has been redeployed from Venezuela to the Mideast to join a growing accumulation of forces aimed at persuading the government of Iran to give up its nuclear program. Ford is under way and about two weeks out from the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Fox News. 

At present, Ford has been deployed and on tasking for 237 days; by the time that she arrives in theater, it will be about 250. Adding as little as 20 days on station and two weeks returning to Norfolk, and Ford could beat the post-Vietnam deployment record set by USS Harry S. Truman in 2021 (285 days). If her time in theater extends for months - as it plausibly could, if negotiations are as protracted as they were during the Venezuelan campaign - she could surpass the all-time record set by USS Midway in 1972-3, during the peak of Operation Linebacker. 

The Navy has repeatedly warned that extra-long, extended deployments take a toll on readiness, starting with maintenance. Yard period schedules get deferred; equipment gets worn down, adding to the repair scope when the ship returns; and the crew have to put off plans for reuniting with their families.

Maintenance cost and timetable are the most significantly affected: during the yard period after a long deployment, unexpected and unscheduled repair issues typically crop up because of the extra wear and tear. This triggers unplanned work and last-minute parts orders, which take lead time to procure, pushing back the schedule. 

Unexpected scope of work can add a year or more to a carrier's time in shipyard - an unplanned year that the vessel is not available for tasking. Multiplied across hulls, a fleet maintenance deficit adds up to limited fleet-wide availability. Coupled with delayed delivery of new tonnage, this means that fewer available carriers have to be stretched further to cover the gap, leading to more extended deployments - leading to further maintenance delays. This cycle is at top of mind for Navy leadership, as they have to think about the long-term readiness of the service - not just the overseas contingency at hand. 

"If [Ford] requires an extension, it’s going to get some pushback from the CNO. And I will see if there is something else I can do," Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle told TWZ last month. 

Caudle has promoted the idea of differently-sized force packages for different taskings, with a mix of lower-end surface combatants for South American / Caribbean counternarcotics and policing operations. The concept is to free up more capable assets for other needs - including training and maintenance. 

Force planning aside, Ford is set to join a growing "massive armada" in U.S. Central Command and Europe. Nearly 30 ships are under way or forward-deployed in the general region, including auxiliaries, in a count provided by analyst Ian Ellis. 

Friday, February 13, 2026

Sustainable Soy: When Collaborating To Protect The Amazon Backfires – Analysis

February 13, 2026 
By SwissInfo


Commodity firms working together to source deforestation-free soy in Brazil are being investigated under anti-cartel laws. They also risk losing tax benefits due to pressure from powerful farming lobbies.


By Anand Chandrasekhar

Businesses selling prostheses, gas water-heaters, electricity meters, cement and even tech giants like Apple and Meta have recently come under fire from Brazil’s competition watchdog, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), for anti-competitive practices. Also among the alleged offenders targeted by CADE are “do gooding” commodity giants that have signed the Amazon soy moratorium.
Financial software

The moratorium, which has been implemented since 2008, is a promise not to source soy from the Amazon following a 2006 Greenpeace campaign that linked soybean cultivation with deforestation. Switzerland is the European trading hub of the biggest commodity firms like Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus Company and COFCO that have signed up to the soy moratorium.

According to Greenpeace, the moratorium has brought the share of new soy cultivation in logged areas down from 30% before the agreement to 4% as of July 2025 even though Brazil has tripled its soy production during this period. Given the results, Greenpeace calls the Amazon soy moratorium as “the world’s single most successful zero-deforestation policy”.

However, this moratorium is now under pressure due to the investigation of commodity firms by CADE after a complaint was filed last year by the Agriculture, Livestock, Supply, and Rural Development Committee (CAPADR) of Brazil’s lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies. The committee’s president, Rodolfo Nogueira, is a cattle rancher himself. Nogueira and the three other members of CAPADR are all pro-agribusiness and belong to the ruralist political bloc that favours the expansion of agriculture.

According to CADE, the fact that competing firms were working together to establish conditions for the purchase of soy in Brazil is anticompetitive and harms the nation’s soy exports. In 2020, Brazil exported almost 83 million metric tonnes of soy. In 2024, exports totalled roughly 98.8 million metric tonnes, mainly fuelled by demand from China.

In August 2025, CADE issued an interim measure against the moratorium’s Soy Working Group to stop all audits of soy sourcing, cease publication of reports and remove any documents on the soy moratorium from the website. An appeal was filed against the measure and Brazil’s supreme court has granted a stay while it assesses the accusation against the commodity companies.

“Currently, CADE’s administrative proceeding is suspended due to a decision by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), which will ultimately determine whether the conducts by the soy moratorium are antitrust violations,” says Débora Alvares, spokesperson for CADE.

If CADE succeeds in convincing Brazil’s supreme court, commodity firms will no longer be able to work together to prevent deforestation at a landscape level. Each company will be reduced to preventing deforestation in its own soy supply chain risking a doubling of effort and covering a much smaller area. Environmental lobby groups like Greenpeace claim that applying anti-cartel regulations against commodity firms in this manner could jeopardise progress made in reducing deforestation of the Amazon for agriculture.

“Greenpeace warns that the various attacks against the soy moratorium put at risk the gains achieved by this agreement over nearly two decades. Ambitious voluntary environmental commitments like the moratorium have proven an essential complement to public policies aimed at preventing deforestation,” says Lis Cunha, a campaigner at Greenpeace International.

Greenpeace Brazil is participating in the case before Brazil’s supreme court in an advisory capacity (amicus curiae), presenting legal and technical arguments to demonstrate the risks of dismantling the moratorium and to help support the court’s final assessment of the matter.

Soy farmers complain of overreach

Among the soy moratorium’s detractors is the powerful Brazilian Association of Soybean Producers (Aprosoja Brasil), a lobby representing 16 state associates located in the main soybean producing states of the country.

Aprosoja argues that the soy moratorium was an interim measure to protect Brazil’s forests in the absence of a specific law against deforestation. According to the industry association, the introduction of the Forest Code law in 2012 should have spelled the end of the moratorium. The Forest Code requires farmers in forest areas to set aside 80% of their land for native vegetation cover.

“The Soy Moratorium no longer has a reason to exist. Almost 20 years later, it remains thanks to the institutional support of the ministry of the environment, which uses it according to its whims,” Pedro Lupion, a Federal Deputy and President of the Parliamentary Agricultural Front wrote on the Aprosoja website.

Aprosoja’s branch in the western state of Mato Grosso, where soy accounts for half of GDP, had also filed a complaint to CADE in 2024 against the soy moratorium. According to the complaint, the moratorium had cost Mato Grosso state about 20 billion reals ($3.8 billion, CHF3 billion) in lost income.

Tax benefits at risk

The state of Mato Grosso also launched another line of attack against commodity firms’ efforts to source sustainable soy from Brazil. In 2024, the state’s lawmakers introduced a law that strips tax benefits of companies that participate in voluntary environmental agreements that go beyond national legislation like the Amazon soy moratorium. Politicians and soy producers argued that even though soy farmers were adhering to Brazilian environmental law, they were being unfairly punished by private, foreign‑influenced standards. Aprosoja’s Mato Grosso branch estimated that soy from 4,000 rural properties, or 3.5% of all farms in the state, was being excluded by commodity firms that had signed up to the soy moratorium.

It is estimated that these commodity traders had received tax incentives worth about 4.7 billion reais ($890 million) between 2019 and 2024 with ADM and Bunge the largest beneficiaries, receiving roughly 1.5 billion reais each.

The new law applies from 2026 and has succeeded in scaring away commodity firms. The Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries, known as ABIOVE, announced in December 2025 that it was withdrawing from the soy moratorium. Among ABIOVE’s members are Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus Company and COFCO International.

This is a U-turn from ABIOVE whose president, André Nassar, had defended the soy moratorium at a public hearing on the moratorium in July 2024 held at the behest of parliamentarians opposed to it at the Agriculture, Livestock, Supply and Rural Development Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

Nassar had tried to get soy producers on board by offering Aprosoja a seat on the soy moratorium’s working group. He had even warned that the end of the soy moratorium could lead to a boycott of Brazilian soybeans abroad.

The opportunity cost to commodity firms from the soy moratorium has not been quantified. However, a study estimates that surplus land legally available to soy producers in the Amazon since the Forest Code was introduced in 2012 is below 50,000 hectares. This represents about 1% of the area already under soy cultivation in the Amazon. The authors of the study claim that the financial benefits of transforming these forested areas into soy farms are low when compared to the export markets for sustainable soy.

According to Greenpeace, ABIOVE’s decision was based on political and economic incentives rather than a legal obligation. “This was a business choice, not a legal necessity, and it is ABIOVE and its members who must take responsibility for the environmental and reputational consequences of that choice,” says Cunha of Greenpeace.

ABIOVE underlined that even though it was withdrawing from the soy moratorium, Brazil’s supreme court still recognises the legality of the voluntary agreement. Along with Forest Code and the September 2025 National Environment Council (CONAMA) Resolution (which laid down the ground rules for clearing native vegetation in rural Brazil), Brazilian soy will continue to maintain its high socio-environmental standards.

“The legacy of monitoring and expertise acquired over almost 20 years will not be lost. Individually, the strict demands of global markets will be met, while also relying on Brazilian authorities to fully implement a new regulatory framework,” said the ABIOVE statement.
Domino effect?

The combination of the anti-cartel investigation and removal of tax benefits could also threaten another sustainable soy sourcing initiative by ABIOVE that is hosted in Switzerland by the Geneva-based World Business Council for Sustainable Development. The Soft Commodity Forum (SCF) comprising Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus Company and COFCO International is a pilot project to source soy without deforestation in the Cerrado.

The Cerrado is a tropical savanna that occupies a little over 20% of Brazil’s landmass and is South America’s second-largest biome after the Amazon. The region also accounts for half of all soy grown in Brazil. The SCF started out as a pilot project in 2018 to trace soy sourced from 25 municipalities in the Cerrado biome. By the end of 2025, the collaboration has expanded traceability to 93%-99% of the soy sourced by members from the Cerrado, representing monitoring of over 200 million hectares.

According to SCF senior manager Matt Inbusch, the partnership is about getting the five commodity firms to align on a common deforestation and land conversion reporting methodology.

“SCF membership does not imply any collective sourcing agreements or cutoffs,” he says.

While CADE does not yet have the SCF in its sights, it doesn’t rule out the possibility of an anti-cartel investigation in the future.

“Thus far, CADE has not ultimately decided whether the alignment of transparency standards and metrics among companies, such as the ones conducted in the Soft Commodity Forum, can be defined as antitrust violations or not, since every assessment depends on the actual analysis of the conduct and its potential competition effects,” says Alvares of CADE.



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DHS Funding Lapse Appears Almost Certain, and U.S. Coast Guard Will be Hit

"The uncertainty of missing paychecks negatively impacts readiness and creates a significant financial hardship for service members and their families," 

Coast Guard boat
USCG file image

Published Feb 12, 2026 6:47 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security - including the U.S. Coast Guard - is expected to officially enter "shutdown" status on Friday night, as Senate Democrats have blocked a key funding package to keep DHS open. The decision to hold up the department's funding stems from Democrats' disagreement with immigration enforcement tactics, particularly the recent shootings in Minneapolis; Senate Democratic leadership demanded extensive changes in federal agents' rules of engagement, and when the Republican majority declined, Democrats voted on party lines to block the bill (via filibuster threat). 

As the Coast Guard happens to be co-located within the same department as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), it will be just as affected - if not more so. For servicemembers and Coast Guard civilian employees, the shutdown could easily mean a gap in pay, along with a requirement for "essential personnel" - the majority of the service - to keep working. 

In a statement, DHS confirmed that as is usual practice, most employees would be required to come to work, without pay. "DHS essential missions and functions will continue as they do during every shutdown. However, during a shutdown, many employees will be forced to work without pay, putting strain on the frontline defenders of our nation," the agency said.

This is a familiar occurrence for the U.S. Coast Guard, and it puts strain on the service,  vice commandant Vice Adm. Thomas Allan said earlier this week.  

"The uncertainty of missing paychecks negatively impacts readiness and creates a significant financial hardship for service members and their families," warned Vice Adm. Allan in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee earlier this week. "This is not a distant administrative issue." Effects could include deferred maintenance on vessels, gaps in training for servicemembers, and negative impact on morale. 

The Democratic caucus' objections are targeted at DHS' Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), but the lapse in funding is expected to have little effect on the target. Unlike the Coast Guard, ICE's finances are buffered by a giant $75 billion supplemental funding package passed as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBA) last year, and it is expected to continue to pay salaries and carry out its activities as normal by drawing down on this exceptionally large funding pool. Much of the burden of the shutdown will instead fall on non-target agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Secret Service.

Thursday, February 12, 2026


Indian Coast Guard Busts Three Iran-Linked Shadow Fleet Tankers

Asphalt Star, seen here in earlier service as the Glory Star, 2011 (mgklingsick@aol.com / VesselFinder)
Asphalt Star, seen here in earlier service as the Glory Star, 2011 (mgklingsick@aol.com / VesselFinder)

Published Feb 8, 2026 5:27 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On Friday, the Indian Coast Guard busted three sanctioned tankers allegedly engaged in a "smuggling racket" in the Arabian Sea.   

The agency identified and followed the three ships using surveillance and data analysis. Based on this information, it launched a coordinated raid and interdicted the three ships at a position about 100 nautical miles to the west of Mumbai - outside of Indian territorial seas and the ICG's coastal-state jurisdiction. 

ICG personnel boarded the three ships on the high seas and conducted "sustained rummaging" to look for evidence. Further examination of electronic data and interrogation of the crew produced clues on the ship's "modus operandi and a global handler network," the ICG said. 

The vessels in question are all under U.S. sanctions, according to TankerTrackers.com. The consultancy identified them as Al Jafzia (IMO 9171498; ex name Chiltern, broadcasting a Nicaraguan flag, formerly false-flagged in Guyana), Asphalt Star (IMO 9463528; falsely broadcasting a Malian flag, formerly false-flagged in Aruba) and Stellar Ruby (IMO 9555199; flagged in Iran).  

AIS data provided by Pole Star Global shows the vessels performed an intricate pattern of voyages and meet-ups that connected known transfer regions for Iranian petroleum - the anchorage areas off Basrah and Khor Fakkan - with ports on India's west coast. Widespread AIS spoofing in the Iranian oil trade allows vessels to engage in Iran-linked activity while appearing to be on ordinary commercial voyages to other nearby nations. 

All three ships are on the Treasury OFAC Iran sanctions list under EO 13902, and are believed to be linked to the network of sanctioned Indian national Jugwinder Singh Brar. According to the Treasury, Brar is a captain and shipowner who has a fleet of about 30 vessels, many operating in the Iran-linked shadow fleet. These ships engage in STS transfers to move Iranian petroleum from the Mideast to foreign buyers, concealing and falsifying its origins. 

“The Iranian regime relies on its network of unscrupulous shippers and brokers like Brar and his companies to enable its oil sales and finance its destabilizing activities,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The United States remains focused on disrupting all elements of Iran’s oil exports, particularly those who seek to profit from this trade.”

As of Sunday, AIS data showed all three seized vessels in convoy and moving together towards a port on India's west coast.



Op-Ed: Iran Plays for Time, But U.S. Response Options Are Ready

Abraham Lincoln
An Osprey lands aboard USS Abraham Lincoln during a visit of U.S. Central Command's top officer, Adm. Brad Cooper, February 7 (USN)

Published Feb 10, 2026 5:37 PM by The Maritime Executive


Iran has a standard playbook when dealing with a foreign policy crisis, a playbook that used to work well until its adversaries figured it out. The playbook involves portraying the political leadership in Tehran as split between hardliners adopting a maximalist, no-concession position and ‘reformists’ who say that they are in favor of negotiations and talk vaguely of possible compromises.

The trick is to lure the other side into negotiations, and string them out as long as possible, keeping alive the idea that an agreement could be possible. By prolonging the process, the Iranians hope the other side will grow weary and soften their demands – with the Iranian side making only marginal concessions and banking on the crisis dissipating as the world’s attention moves on.

These Iranian tactics are fully on display in the latest crisis, although the ‘reformist’ mask slipped recently when the supposedly reasonable President Masoud Pezeshkian re-appointed extreme hardliner retired Admiral Ali Shamkhani to the position of National Security Adviser. The IRGC hardliners have been threatening to use their ballistic missile fleet in retaliation, including to attack infrastructure targets in neighboring countries. The ‘reformists’ suggest Iran might make concessions on nuclear materials, but on nothing else, and want a complete lifting of sanctions in return. Domestically, the hardline rhetoric is played up, the ‘reformist’ messaging packaged primarily for foreign consumption.

After the first round of negotiations in Muscat last week, the Americans made it clear that they wanted a comprehensive deal, covering regional expansionism, the ballistic missile fleet, and an end to repression, regarding nuclear material almost as an irrelevant side issue now that most of Iran’s stock has already been neutralized. The American delegation reinforced the point by visiting the USS Abraham Lincoln off Duqm once the negotiations had closed, to emphasize that the military option was still very much on the table.

US discussions with Israel, with President Trump meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House on February 11, further reinforce the feasibility and possibility of military options.

The rash recently of Iranian-associated dark fleet tanker seizures, both by the United States and allies, is another indicator of robust and coordinated intent.

Iranian threats of ‘massive retaliation’, made by a series of retired generals, do not appear credible. Iranian defenses were severely degraded last year, and neither Russia nor China are rushing to help rebuild and replace. Moreover, any Iranian attack on the Gulf states, given that they have forbidden US attacks from bases on their territory, would invite a very substantial Emirati-Saudi response. Both have powerful, well-equipped and battle-tested air forces.

Pundits have looked at the current American force posture in the region. It is still small in comparison with last year. But this forgets the long-range capability that the United States can deploy. What the United States has done is enhance defensive measures within the region, both in terms of dispersal of assets and air defenses, which gives breathing space for whatever strike assets are needed for a scale-up of offensive capability flying in from US bases, should the need arise.

Not too busy: a US Navy P-8 and 2 x C-130s on the South Pan at Diego Garcia, February 4 (Sentinel-2)

The move of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and other US assets into theater is a small but powerful reinforcement, sufficient for a number of offensive options. Interestingly, the United Kingdom has moved both additional air defense and strike aircraft into the region, broadening the profile of the offensive options. On January 31, the Astute Class attack submarine HMS Anson (S124) passed south through the Suez Canal en route to Australia, having loaded Tomahawk missiles in Gibraltar, and could now be somewhere in a vast area of the Indian Ocean from which any target in Iran could be attacked.

All options are very much on the table, without any further indicators or warnings.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.