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Saturday, October 17, 2026

‘Monstrous’: Netanyahu Casts Doubt on Filmed Israeli Settler Attack of American Journalist

“You mean the footage of the Israeli terrorists beating her up isn’t clear enough?” one critic sardonically asked.



American freelance photojournalist Heidi Levine is transferred on a stretcher into a Palestinian ambulance from the government hospital in the Israeli-occupied city of Ramallah on October 16, 2026.

(Photo by Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images)

Brett Wilkins
Oct 16, 2026
COMMON DREAMS


Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faced blistering criticism Friday after his office published a statement casting doubt on the circumstances surrounding a brutal attack earlier in the day by settlers in the illegally occupied West Bank that left an American journalist hospitalized.

“The facts surrounding the confrontation near Abu Falah, during which Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine was allegedly assaulted, remain unclear and are under investigation,” Netanyahu’s office said on social media.



As Common Dreams reported, Levine—a 63-year-old Jewish American by birth who has reported from war zones including Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria—was covering Palestinian farmers desperately trying to harvest their olives when around 80 masked settler colonists descended upon them.



Armed with rocks, clubs, sticks, assault rifles, and the self-assured belief that their deity figure promised them all the land that was once ruled by Jewish kings millennia ago, the settlers set fire to the olive trees that are the backbone of Palestine’s rural economy and a literal symbol of Palestinians’ rootedness in their homeland.

The assailants fired guns and threw rocks at the olive harvesters, reportedly wounding at least two Palestinians. While documenting the attack, Levine—who, like other journalists killed or wounded by Israel, was clad in a helmet and a blue vest clearly marked “PRESS”—was set upon by settlers, knocked to the ground, and kicked dozens of times while her equipment was stolen.

“Israel unequivocally condemns violence against anyone—Jews, Arabs, Christians, or journalists,” Netanyahu’s office claimed. “Those responsible will be held accountable.”

“But serious questions remain,” the statement continued. “Reports indicate some 200 Arabs and far-left activists confronted approximately 40 Israeli youths. Footage shows masked individuals on both sides hurling objects, amid reports of fireworks fired at Jewish youths. Other footage appears to show Levine knocked down and immediately helped to her feet by the same unidentified individual.”



“The investigation must establish the facts, including who initiated the violence,” the office added. “We will not allow disputed incidents to be exploited to demonize the hundreds of thousands of law-abiding Jewish residents.”

The colonization of the occupied Palestinian territories by Jewish settlers—many of them non-Israelis who are availing themselves of the ethnosupremacist and apartheid policy of allowing any Jew to live in a land whose Palestinian inhabitants have been ethnically cleansed from it for nearly 80 years—is inherently illegal under international law.

Washington Post executive editor Matt Murray pushed back on Netanyahu’s statement on social media, saying: “To be clear: Some facts are neither in dispute nor unclear. Our photographer was clearly marked as press. She was clearly beaten. These are not partisan or risible statements, but indisputable. We urge a thorough investigation and accountability.”

International observers also criticized Netanyahu’s statement.



“They are actually trying to justify an American WaPo journalist being severely beaten by a mob of settler terrorists,” US commentator Krystal Ball said on social media, using the syllabic abbreviation for the Post.

Irish journalist Barry Malone responded to Netanyahu’s post on X, saying: “Hi. There’s video. It’s clear.”

US physician Amira Dalton said, “Israel lies and then calls you an antisemite for calling out their lies.”

The X account Israel Exposed, which has more than 400,000 followers, sardonically asked, “You mean the footage of the Israeli terrorists beating her up isn’t clear enough?”

The Israeli veterans’ group Breaking the Silence said that “you can see the settlers who attacked Heidi Levine, a journalist for The Washington Post. But what you can’t see is the state behind them: a state that funds them, arms them, and, above all, grants them near-total impunity for their actions. This violence does not happen in a vacuum. Israel enables it.”



While Lt. Col. Ariella Mazor, chief international spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces, claimed the military had sent battalions to the West Bank to contain the outbreak of violence, eyewitnesses said the IDF was involved in the attack on Abu Falah.

“The army did nothing to stop the settlers,” Israeli journalist Oren Ziv, who was present during the attack, told The Washington Post.

That’s because Israel’s far-right government is unapologetically seeking to “finish the job of 1948,” as Netanyahu once put it—a reference to the ethnic cleansing of more than 750,000 Palestinians during the creation of the modern Israeli state—and take all of Palestine.

“The entire land is ours,” Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said earlier this month, in the lead-up to Israel’s October 27 elections.“This is our country.”

Last month, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich vowed to do in the West Bank “what we did in Gaza,” where three years of genocidal annihilation have left more than 250,000 Palestinians dead or wounded, nearly 2 million people forcibly displaced, and an estimated 70% of the territory under Israeli control.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, at least 1,138 Palestinians—at least 250 of them children—have been killed by Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank since October 2023.

At least nine Americans have been killed by Israeli settlers and security forces in the West Bank since January 2022, including journalists, human rights activists, and Palestinian Americans visiting relatives.

Despite claims by Israel that perpetrators of such attacks will be held accountable, impunity is the general rule.

“Sadly, none of them will be prosecuted,” Levine said of her attackers. “I am sure of it.”

Multiple US senators demanded that Israel bring Levin’s assailants to justice.

“The continued lack of accountability for settler violence in the West Bank has allowed attacks on innocent people, including multiple Americans, to go unanswered, and it is eroding what should be a strong alliance between the US and Israel,” Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) said on social media. “Prime Minister Netanyahu isn’t doing nearly enough to stop the violence.”

Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) also took to social media after Friday’s attack, writing, “Today, another American citizen and journalist was brutalized by Israeli settlers attacking Palestinians in the West Bank.”

“This repeated violence and brazen impunity for attacks against Americans and Palestinians alike are unacceptable,” he added. “When will [President Donald] Trump and [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio DO SOMETHING?”



Israeli Settlers Brutally Beat Washington Post Journalist Heidi Levine While Attacking Palestinian Olive Farmers

“Unfortunately, I know very well that none of them will be prosecuted for what they have done and continue to do,” she said.



Heidi Levine, American photojournalist for The Washington Post and a foreign solidarity activist, receives medical treatment at a hospital after being attacked by Israeli settlers in the village of Turmusayya, northeast of the city of Ramallah, West Bank, Palestine, on October 16, 2026.

(Photo by Issam Rimawi/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Stephen Prager
Oct 16, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

A gang of masked Israeli settlers brutalized a Washington Post journalist on Friday while they attacked Palestinian olive farmers and set fire to their grove in the occupied West Bank—the latest in an escalating series of state-backed terrorist attacks amid the Palestinian olive-growing season.

Roughly 80 masked men from a nearby hilltop settlement descended upon an olive grove near the village of Abu Falah, north of Ramallah. Video shows them hurling rocks and torching olive trees as Palestinian families fled downhill.



Gunfire could be heard, and at least two Palestinian men were reportedly wounded in the attack. Four more were reportedly hurt in separate attacks nearby.

Documenting the attack was 63-year-old Heidi Levine, an award-winning American photojournalist with the Post who has more than four decades of experience covering wars around the world.

Amid the rampage, Levine—clad in a helmet and a vest with a bright blue “PRESS” marker—was knocked to the dirt by a group of masked settlers, according to video posted by the American journalist Jasper Nathaniel, who was on the scene.



Another video shared by Israeli activist and journalist Andrey Khrzhanovskiy shows one of the settlers repeatedly beating Levine with a long stick while she lies on the ground defenseless. Levine later said she was kicked approximately 50 times and that the attackers took all of her recording equipment and other electronic devices.

Palestinian men reportedly threw stones to ward off the attackers, allowing other journalists to reach Levine.

A video shows Nathaniel, Khrzhanovskiy, and others rushing to a bloodied Levine and helping her to her feet. “They took everything,” she said. “They took all my stuff.” More Israeli settlers hurled rocks at them as they fled the scene.

Levine was taken to a hospital in Ramallah after Palestinian colleagues helped her get an ambulance. From her hospital bed, she spoke about the attack.



“My son Michael has always told me that his biggest fear would be that his mother would be killed by the settlers,” Levine said, noting that she’d covered the Israel-Palestine conflict for more than three decades and also been attacked 15 years ago.

“I was attacked, pushed to the ground,” she said. “Luckily I had my flak jacket and helmet; otherwise I probably wouldn’t even be here, because they just kept kicking me and kicking me.”

Levine, who is Jewish by birth, described the attackers as “Jewish terrorists” who “are giving everyone in the country a horrible reputation.”

“I don’t know how a parent could raise such monsters,” she said.

“While we are relieved that Heidi has received medical care and is safe,” said Washington Post executive editor Matt Murray in a statement Friday morning, “we are outraged by this unwarranted attack on a journalist doing her job and urge a thorough investigation and follow-through from authorities.”

Levine, however, said she was confident that her attackers would never face justice. “Sadly, none of them will be prosecuted,” she told reporters. “I am sure of it.”



Particularly in recent years, under a far-right government that has accelerated the expansion of illegal settlements, settlers almost never face legal consequences for violent attacks.

A Guardian investigation found that from 2020 to 2025, more than 96% of police investigations into settler violence concluded without indictments, and only 2% resulted in convictions. Since 2020, despite dozens of fatal attacks, only one Israeli has been charged with killing a Palestinian in the West Bank.

“This violence does not happen in a vacuum. Israel enables it.”

Lt. Col. Ariella Mazor, chief international spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces, told the Post that the incident is under investigation by the IDF and claimed the military had sent battalions to the West Bank to contain the outbreak of violence.

However, according to eyewitnesses, the Israeli military itself was reportedly involved in the attack on the village, firing tear gas at the Palestinians. Soldiers reportedly drove military jeeps through the olive groves and stood beside settlers rather than dispersing them.

Israeli activist Oren Ziv told the Post, “The army did nothing to stop the settlers.”

This has been the case in many of the more than 1,600 documented attacks that have occurred over the first eight months of the year—during which at least 23 Palestinians were killed and over 1,100 injured, according to the United Nations.


Israeli army soldiers stand behind a masked man swinging a slingshot while hurling stones at Palestinians who had gathered for the annual olive harvest season, during an attack by Israeli settlers on the Palestinian village of Beita, south of Nablus in the occupied West Bank, on October 10, 2025. (Photo by Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP via Getty Images)

Investigations by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented soldiers standing by as settlers attack Palestinians and destroy their property, shielding settlers from Palestinians attempting to defend themselves, and sometimes directly participating in attacks. Israeli authorities have also armed thousands of settlers and incorporated many into military units.

Israel’s Foreign Press Association, which independently provided video of settlers brutalizing Levine, said it had repeatedly warned Israeli authorities about threats to foreign journalists working in the West Bank. “Our repeated calls for action to confront this lawlessness have been ignored,” the group said.

“You can see the settlers who attacked Heidi Levine,” said Breaking the Silence, a human rights group led by Israeli veterans. “But what you can’t see is the state behind them: a state that funds them, arms them, and, above all, grants them near-total impunity for their actions. This violence does not happen in a vacuum. Israel enables it.”

At least nine Americans have been killed by Israeli settlers or security forces in the West Bank since January 2022, while numerous others have been injured—including journalists, human rights activists, and Palestinian Americans visiting family.

Members of Congress have requested information from the State Department about Israeli settler attacks on Americans, but have found themselves stonewalled by Trump administration officials.

Neri Zilber, a journalist and adviser to the US-based Israel Policy Forum, noted the lack of response from American institutions to the surge of settler terrorism.

“This happens every day in the West Bank. Every single day,” he wrote on social media. “Palestinians attacked, journalists attacked, Israeli and foreign observers attacked. When is the IDF going to start taking this seriously? And where is the US Embassy and Trump administration?”

Saturday, September 26, 2026

Canada and EU: A look at the bloc's special relationships
09/18/2026
DW

Though Canada may be some distance from Europe geographically, closer political ties are in the cards. With talk of an associate membership, DW takes a look at other arrangements the EU has with particular countries.

Mark Carney sees Canada and the EU as a natural partnership

Image: Yves Herman/REUTERS

Canada and the EU "see the world with the same eyes," according to European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen.

And the feeling appears mutual.

"Our commitment to the rule of law, and our unyielding defense of human dignity, individual freedom and democracy share the same deep roots, the same unwavering dedication," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said.

In that spirit, and with both parties grasping for an effective way to deal with Donald Trump and his tariffs, von der Leyen floated the idea that Canada could become the European Union's first associate member on Thursday.

Given the concept of associate membership does not yet exist, it's difficult to determine exactly what that would mean. Germany proposed a similar arrangement for Ukraine earlier this year, only for Volodymyr Zelenskyy to reject the idea on the grounds that the country wants full membership.

Though not officially recognized as associates, there are plenty of countries that have strong ties or agreements with the bloc. DW looks at some of them and how they work.
EFTA and single market access — Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland

Under this model, the ‘European Free Trade Association (EFTA)' countries are part of the EU's internal market, so people, goods and services can move freely in the Schengen area. The three countries also follow many EU rules in areas like tourism, environment and education.

But there are some key distinctions. The countries have no part in the decision-making process, bar some input into policy preparation, such as participation in expert groups. They are also not in the customs union, do not use the Euro and are not bound by the EU's common trade policy or justice laws. Iceland held a referendum on whether to go for full membership last month, but the government's push to do so failed and they remain an EFTA country.


Bilateral agreements — Switzerland

While it borders four EU member states (Germany, Italy, France and Austria), Switzerland has never been a full member. Instead, more than 120 bilateral deals have been agreed upon by the EU and Switzerland over the last 50 years. These relate to areas such as trade, transport, security and education. A new package of deals was finalized last year, 20 years after they were last agreed.



More than 1.5 million EU citizens live and work in Switzerland, while 466,200 Swiss have gone the other way. That is possible as Switzerland is also part of theSchengen area, allowing for free movement of people across borders.

Switzerland makes financial contributions to a number of EU member states that joined after expansion in 2004, mostly in the east of Europe, but it has no EU voting rights and adopts only some EU laws. Switzerland can also participate in certain EU programs and research projects, through individual negotiations.

The post Brexit agreement — UK

More than four years after the UK voted to leave the EU in a 2016 referendum, the two parties signed a trade and cooperation agreement. Negotiations were fraught and complex, and the UK now has limited access to the EU market and is aligned with the EU on some areas of policy and regulation, for now at least.

There is no longer free movement of people from the UK to the EU or vice versa, and the UK are not in the single market or the customs union. Since the center-left Labour party replaced the Conservatives in government in 2024, talk of a return to the customs union and alignment on other selected EU policy areas has been more frequent. But any return to full member status seems unlikely for now.

Stabilization and association process – Western Balkan countries

The EU has not admitted a new member state since Croatia in 2013. Several nearby countries in the region are hoping to join the bloc, but must first fulfill a number of criteria under the EU's "stabilization and association process" designed for the "Western Balkans." These are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

Under the plan, the EU has promised to "prepare Western Balkan partners for accession through economic reforms and investment and to bring some of the benefits of EU membership to citizens in the region."

States must first become official candidates for member state status by applying to the EU, with each of the member nations agreeing to them as a candidate country. Then follows a process of negotiation, such as that currently underway with Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, an accession treaty is prepared, which the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament must agree with. Only once that treaty has been signed and ratified by all member states and the candidate country will said country become an EU member.




Edited by: Carla Bleiker

Matt Pearson Reporter and editor@thisismpearson

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

 

Indonesia Takes Delivery of a "Free" Aircraft Carrier

Giuseppe Garibaldi arrives in Indonesian waters (TNI AL)
Giuseppe Garibaldi arrives in Indonesian waters (TNI AL)

Published Sep 17, 2026 10:06 PM by The Maritime Executive



The Indonesian Navy is giving new life to Italy's first aircraft carrier, the 1985-built ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, which arrived in Jakarta on Friday to begin a career as KRI Gajah Mada. The vessel served Italy in multiple conflicts over the span of 40 years, but has been out of commission since 2024; she has been gifted to the Indonesian government and will be revived as a helicopter carrier. 

Garibaldi was envisioned as a cruiser-carrier, capable of combat in her own right, and was fitted with torpedo tubes and missile launchers for self-defense against surface and aerial threats. In her prime, an air wing of up to 16 AV-8B Harrier jump-jets - a design also used by the U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy - provided reach. She contributed to air support during the war in Kosovo, participated in the early stages of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan after September 11, and joined the Italian contribution to the no-fly zone mission over Libya in 2011. 

Garibaldi's position as the Italian Navy's flagship came to an end in 2009 with the delivery of the Cavour, a larger carrier equipped for the modern F-35B stealth fighter. An even larger helicopter carrier, the Trieste - an amphib with a well deck as well as a flight deck - delivered in 2024; with Trieste's arrival, Garibaldi retired from service. 

Seeing an opportunity to acquire a carrier at a favorable cost, the Indonesian Navy expressed its interest in buying Garibaldi in early 2025. After study, the Italian Navy determined that the most economical course of action would be to gift the carrier to Indonesia, thereby avoiding the expense of upkeep and an approved demolition plan. Despite political opposition, the Italian Senate signed off on the transfer, and the Indonesian government became the owner of a carrier overnight. Indonesia paid for the long-distance delivery voyage at a cost of approximately $60 million, but the vessel itself was free of charge. She departed in late August and arrived Friday, in ample time for her formal renaming and commissioning ceremony. 

Indonesia still has to invest in the support infrastructure and upkeep that a carrier requires. Its navy is building out a pier and other support facilities at the naval base in Ratai Bay, Sumatra. It also plans to spend significant sums on modernization and refurbishment for the vessel's long-term use. 

Indonesia's plan is to use the vessel as a helicopter carrier - though she could also be adapted for use as a drone carrier, taking advantage of long-range drone aircraft that Indonesia already owns, as noted by The War Zone. Disaster response is a likely mission set: This week, President Prabowo Subianto called for a large investment in the nation's helicopter fleet for that purpose. 

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

Albania’s Intelligence Chief Suspended For Allegedly Aiding Crime Group


The head of Albania’s State Intelligence Service, Vlora Hyseni. Photo: LSA.

September 23, 2026

Balkan Insight

By Fjori Sinoruka


Key Takeaways:

SPAK on Tuesday put Vlora Hyseni, head of Albania’s intelligence service SHISH since 2023, under house arrest and suspended her for alleged leaking of state secrets and assisting an offender in the AKSHI digital-tenders scandal; media said she is not in Albania.

 A forensic-police sector chief and a businessman were also arrested; former police chief Ilir Proda was questioned and his home searched.

AKSHI runs e-Albania and state IT systems. SPAK says director Mirlinda Karcanaj and deputy Hava Delibashi steered tenders worth about 5.9 billion lek (~€59 million in 19 procedures) toward IT businessman Ermal Beqiraj and Ergys Agasi, who are accused of rigging contracts; Agasi was caught Aug. 27 after months on the run, Beqiraj earlier in France after flying over a nuclear plant. They deny the charges.

Hyseni, once Edi Rama’s security adviser and a former Kosovo KIA deputy dismissed in 2021, is described as the gravest national-security crisis of this kind. The opposition wants President Begaj to convene the State Security Council; Socialists say wait for the courts.

Anti-corruption prosecutors on Tuesday placed Vlora Hyseni, head of Albania’s State Intelligence Service, SHISH, under house arrest and suspended her for allegedly revealing state secrets and assisting an offender.

The Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organised Crime, SPAK, has also questioned the former Chief of Police, Ilir Proda, it announced. Media reported that Hyseni is not currently in Albania.

SPAK added that a sector head of the Forensic Police and a businessman had been arrested in relation to the same case.

Hyseni is being investigated over a corruption scandal surrounding tenders of the national agency overseeing the development of state information systems, the National Agency for Information Society, AKSHI.

Hyeni has headed the SHISH, the most important institution handling national security, since 2023, and her alleged involvement with the AKSHI corruption scandal potentially marks the most serious crisis over national security in the country’s history.

Hyseni was appointed head of SHISH after serving as Prime Minister’s Edi Rama national security adviser for about two years. She had earlier been deputy director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, KIA, but was dismissed from that post in June 2021 by Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

Her appointment as head of SHISH in 2023 was controversial because of her Kosovo citizenship and the unclear reason for her dismissal from Kosovo’s top security institution.


Meanwhile, former police chief Proda was seen at SPAK offices on Tuesday where, according to the media, he was questioned in relation to the AKSHI scandal and his house was searched.

AKSHI coordinates the development of state information systems and digitalisation procedures and administers the state public services portal, e-Albania.

The agency has managed a massive budget; some 19 of its procedures investigated by SPAK alone had an estimated total value of 5.9 billion lek, or about 59 million euros.

The SPAK investigation alleges that AKSHI’s director, Mirlinda Karcanaj, and her deputy, Hava Delibashi, placed many of these funds in the hands of a group linked to organised crime, pre-selected tender winners and ensured the diversion of tens of millions of euros into the accounts of IT businessman Ermal Beqiraj and Ergys Agasi.

Agasi is accused of forming a criminal group with Beqiraj to rig and extort tenders from the AKSHI, even using violence and hostage-taking.

Agasi was arrested in August 27 after being on the run for months. Beqiraj was arrested earlier in France on July 24 while flying a light aircraft through restricted airspace over a nuclear power plant.

Karcanaj, Delibashi and Agasi all deny charges while Beqiraj is still under arrest in France. SPAK alleges that he transferred a portion of his illicit proceeds to France, using the cash to purchase a château, two apartments and motor vehicles, while also depositing over 2 million euros in bank accounts.

The alleged involvement of top security officials in this scheme, providing criminals with information and assisting them, has left many in the country in shock.


“Whenever something happens, we say: ‘This is the end; nothing worse than this could possibly happen.’ But in this country, the problem is that even the end has no end,” Mentor Kikia, a journalist and analyst, wrote on Facebook.

The opposition has urged President Bajram Begaj to call an urgent meeting of the State Security Council.

Ruling Socialist Party MPs are urging caution. “We must await the final judicial verdict. Nothing is true until proven by the courts,” Blendi Cuci, a Socialist MP, told a meeting of parliament’s Committee on Internal Affairs and Defence, after opposition MPs asked for the issue to be urgently included in parliamentary sessions.




About Balkan Insight
The Balkan Insight (formerly the Balkin Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN) is a close group of editors and trainers that enables journalists in the region to produce in-depth analytical and investigative journalism on complex political, economic and social themes. BIRN emerged from the Balkan programme of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, IWPR, in 2005. The original IWPR Balkans team was mandated to localise that programme and make it sustainable, in light of changing realities in the region and the maturity of the IWPR intervention. Since then, its work in publishing, media training and public debate activities has become synonymous with quality, reliability and impartiality. A fully-independent and local network, it is now developing as an efficient and self-sustainable regional institution to enhance the capacity for journalism that pushes for public debate on European-oriented political and economic reform.
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BALKAN BLOG: Serbia’s students are testing a new way of doing politics

BALKAN BLOG: Serbia’s students are testing a new way of doing politics
Anti-government student protest in Belgrade, June 28, 2025 / Gavrilo AndrićFacebookTwitterLinkedIn
By Tatyana Kekic in Belgrade September 21, 2026

For nearly two years Serbia’s student protesters have occupied lecture halls, blocked roads and filled city squares. Now they are trying something rather harder: turning a movement without a conventional leader into a political organisation capable of running a country.

On September 14, the students submitted a list of 250 candidates for the snap parliamentary election on October 25. The list was subsequently certified by Serbia’s electoral commission with 69,099 valid signatures, nearly seven times the legal threshold of 10,000.

It is the clearest sign yet that the movement that emerged in the form of anti-corruption protests after the collapse of the Novi Sad railway-station canopy in November 2024 has the potential to move from the streets into electoral politics.

Its central promise is deliberately broad: change the way Serbia is governed.

The list, called Students’ List—Students Win, is headed not by a veteran opposition politician but by Ilija Srdanović, a cardiologist and professor at the University of Novi Sad who was little known outside academic and medical circles before the protests.

Srdanović has twice declined President Aleksandar Vučić's invitation to a televised debate, including an offer to meet on the independent broadcasters N1 or Nova S, saying he would speak to people who “have something to say and know something”.

Behind Srdanović are doctors, professors, engineers, artists, farmers and activists. Among the better-known candidates are Dejan Bodiroga, the former basketball star and current president of the EuroLeague, former National Bank of Serbia governor Dejan Šoškić, actor Tihomir Stanić and former athlete Mihail Dudaš.

The students say candidates were chosen through plenums and collective decision-making rather than by party leaders. They reject the idea of building the movement around a single figure, saying parliamentary mandates should be treated as public work rather than political prizes.

That puts the list at some distance from Serbia’s established party system, where political organisations have been closely identified with their leaders.

The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) is running under the banner Aleksandar Vučić—United Serbia, putting the president at the top of its list as he prepares to leave the presidency and seek the prime minister’s job.

Vučić is followed by Miloš Vučević, the SNS president and former prime minister, and Ana Brnabić, parliament speaker and former prime minister. The ticket also includes doctors, professors, artists, athletes and students, among them violinist Jovan Kolundžija, actors Branislav Lečić and Lidija Vukićević, former basketball player Željko Rebrača and Miloš Pavlović, a student who organised pro-government rallies.

The wider governing camp contains a generation of ministers and senior officials with years of experience in government, including Siniša Mali, Zlatibor Lončar, Marko Đurić and Bratislav Gašić, although they are not among the 250 parliamentary candidates.

The student movement is bringing people into electoral politics who have worked outside the political establishment, while the governing camp can draw on a deep pool of politicians and officials accustomed to running ministries and state institutions.

That difference is central to the argument the students are making about how Serbia should be governed — and to the questions they will face if they win seats.

From protest to programme

The students have tried to demonstrate that they are offering more than an anti-Vučić campaign. Their 11-point programme is divided into three broad sections: “Serbia or the Mafia”, “Knowledge is Power” and “Serbia Grows With Us”.

Much of it concerns the institutions that protesters say contributed to the Novi Sad disaster. The students propose greater independence for prosecutors and judges, scrutiny of politicians’ wealth, investigations into corruption, greater transparency in public procurement and audits of major infrastructure projects. They also want to reform the media regulator and public broadcaster.

The economic programme includes support for start-ups, domestic businesses and farmers, closer links between universities and employers, competitive appointments to state-owned companies, cheaper medicines and affordable housing. Other proposals include free school textbooks and restrictions on the use of fixed-term employment contracts.

It is a programme focused more on repairing institutions than on radically remaking the economy. There is also relatively little detail on some of the questions that have long divided Serbian politics, including relations with the European Union, Russia and China, Kosovo, energy security and public finances.

That breadth and ambiguity reflect the coalition the students have assembled. The movement has brought together university professors, farmers, artists, liberals, nationalists and people who had previously stayed away from politics. Avoiding positions on issues that could divide that coalition may help preserve it; it could also become harder once parliamentary politics forces decisions on specific policies.

A crowded opposition

The students are not the only opposition force on the ballot. Several established opposition parties have backed the movement rather than fielding their own candidates. These include the Democratic Party, the Green-Left Front, the Movement of Free Citizens and other opposition groups.

But the opposition remains fragmented. A pro-European coalition comprising the Freedom and Justice Party, Serbia Centre and the Solidarity movement is running separately under the name European Serbia. A right-wing alliance of the New Democratic Party of Serbia and the Monarchists is also contesting the election under the banner Authentic Right.

The student movement has therefore entered an electoral field in which it is both an alternative to the established opposition and dependent on some of its support.

The government, by contrast, has a political organisation built over years. The SNS has a nationwide network, established campaign infrastructure and politicians with experience in government.

The students have demonstrated a different kind of organisational capacity: mass mobilisation, local networks and the ability to collect tens of thousands of signatures in a short period.

The experience question

Vučić has already made the students’ lack of ideology and governing experience a central line of attack. He has accused them of lacking political experience and a clear vision for Serbia, arguing that running the state is too serious to be entrusted to people without experience in government.

The composition of the student list offers a different definition of expertise.

A doctor, a university professor or an engineer may have spent years managing complex organisations and making decisions with significant consequences, but that experience is not the same as running a ministry or negotiating a state budget.

The movement has also deliberately avoided appointing a conventional political leader. That has helped it maintain a collective identity during the protests, but government would bring different demands: negotiating coalitions, choosing ministers, managing a bureaucracy and resolving disagreements among people who may share a desire for institutional change without sharing the same views on everything else.

Those questions have so far remained largely hypothetical. The movement's immediate objective has been simpler: turn the energy of the protests into votes.

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

 

Serbia shows off Chinese robot dogs at military exercise

Serbia shows off Chinese robot dogs at military exercise
A "robot dog" at the Pobednik 2026 joint tactical live-fire exercise. / Serbia defence ministryFacebook
By Tatyana Kekic in Belgrade September 14, 2026

Serbia showcased its new "robot dogs" at a major military exercise on September 13, alongside drones, missile systems and other new equipment, as it pushes to modernise its armed forces and expand the use of unmanned systems.

The robot dogs were displayed at the "Pobednik 2026" live-fire exercise at the Pešter training ground in southwestern Serbia, near Sjenica. The robots can carry weapons including machine guns and grenade launchers and are intended to enter potentially mined or inaccessible areas ahead of special forces.

President Aleksandar Vucic said the exercise demonstrated for the first time an attack involving robotic and unmanned systems without direct human participation.

"Today you could see for the first time an attack by robotic, unmanned and unmanned aerial vehicles, without a single human," Vucic said, public broadcaster RTS reported.

The display comes weeks after Chinese robotics company AGIBOT opened a factory in the Serbian city of Sabac with Chinese automotive supplier Minth. The plant will assemble humanoid robots and robotic dogs and test their movement and vision systems as part of a wider €200mn investment plan.

Vucic has said Serbia could initially produce more than 5,000 robots a year and was testing humanoid robots for military applications.

Serbia also displayed China's HQ-17 air-defence system at the exercise, as well as domestically developed unmanned ground vehicles, drones and new multiple rocket launchers.

Belgrade has increasingly turned to China for military equipment, including drones, air-defence systems and CM-400AKG supersonic missiles, while also buying major weapons systems from Western suppliers such as French Rafale fighter jets.

Vucic said Serbia was developing a "digital army" to allow combat vehicles to transmit target information directly to artillery units, reducing battlefield decision-making time.

"We want peace and stability. We want to protect our sky and our land ourselves," he said.

The exercise took place amid continuing tensions between Serbia and neighbouring Kosovo and wider security concerns in the Western Balkans.

Serbia plans to reintroduce compulsory military service from March next year, with the planned service lasting 75 days.

Saturday, September 12, 2026

“War on Terror”

9/11: A Quarter Century of Imperial War


Friday 11 September 2026, by Gilbert Achcar



Gilbert Achcar spoke to Caspar Shaller of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

Gilbert Achcar, where were you on 11 September 2001?

I was at home in Paris; it was my partner who alerted me that something momentous was unfolding, so I joined her watching television. What I saw was appalling. Beyond the appalling character of the crime itself, my immediate fear was for its consequences in the Middle East. It was obvious to me that it would be followed by the deployment of U.S. forces in the region, given that the Bush administration was already intent on invading Iraq. I was fully conscious that this would sow chaos, and that it would ultimately end in failure for the United States.

Before we move on to the global implications of the attack, what effect have 9/11 and the War on Terror had within the West?

The result has been catastrophic. Since 9/11 we have witnessed a succession of murderous attacks, from the Bataclan to Berlin, and each one has served as a pretext for strengthening an already formidable repressive apparatus. The far right has exploited these attacks relentlessly; in a sense, they have amounted to permanent life-support for far-right politics. Today the animating ideology of the far right is anti-Muslim racism, it is the Muslim migrant, not the Jew, who has become its central figure of menace. Antisemitism has not disappeared, to be sure, but it is no longer the animating ideology of the far right.

And in the Middle East, how would you characterise the situation twenty-five years on?

The Middle East has sunk into chaos and repression. As one could have predicted from the start, one notable side effect of the U.S. interventions after 9/11 was the strengthening of Iran, the greatest beneficiary of the region’s destabilisation. Tehran took full advantage of the American occupation of Iraq; it was the United States, after all, that installed pro-Iranian Iraqi parties in government, enabling the creation of a Tehran-dominated corridor running from Iran through Iraq to Syria, and from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. That same regional destabilisation also positioned Iran to help the Houthis seize control of northern Yemen. One of the underlying causes of the recent U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran is precisely the reach the Iranian regime achieved as a consequence of the U.S. intervention that followed 9/11. And look at Iran itself, where the regime is slaughtering its own people. The brutal repression and public executions are designed to terrorise the population into silence. We’ve entered a long-term destabilisation of the region, which today is probably the most unstable part of the world. It is a very sorry state of affairs.

When demonstrations erupted in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in 2011 and what later would come to be called the Arab Spring began, you were quite optimistic. In your 2012 book The People Want your analysis was still relatively hopeful, a position you revised with 2016’s Morbid Symptoms. How did your analysis of the Arab Spring change over time?

When the Arab Spring erupted, I insisted that it was rooted in a deep structural crisis, and that it should therefore be understood not as a fleeting episode but as the opening of a long historical process. The clearest symptom of the region’s social and economic paralysis is that the Middle East and North Africa region has, for decades, held the world’s record rates of youth unemployment, a direct consequence of the collision between neoliberal economics and the type of state and ruling system that prevails there. I have always maintained that whatever happens, there can be no return to the despotic stability that prevailed in the Middle East and North Africa before 2011.

In the beginning, the uprisings everywhere were initiated by progressive forces, but the region was, and to some extent still is, characterised by the existence of reactionary currents of opposition to the old regimes. Religious fundamentalists are not progressive; they are reactionary in their social and cultural programmes. So, what we saw was not a simple binary of revolution versus counter-revolution, but it became clear there was a triangle: one revolutionary camp, and two distinct forms of counter-revolution, the old regimes on one side, and right-wing religious fundamentalist forces seeking to seize power on the other.

But the hopes raised by the Arab Spring have been defeated. We have watched civil wars erupt, dictatorships return in forms even harsher than before, and the continuation of U.S. wars in the region, peaking in the U.S.-Israeli genocidal war in Gaza and onslaught on Iran. The condition of the Palestinian people has reached its lowest point in history; it has never been worse. Hamas’s attacks are among the worst miscalculations in the history of anticolonial struggle. In my view, all this is the consequence of the absence of a credible political alternative in the region: no progressive force has emerged capable of channelling the mass anger generated by social and economic crisis into meaningful change. That failure has produced a political blockage layered on top of the existing social and economic one.

How would you assess the current state of the Islamist pole of the triangle you described?

When the uprisings began, the progressive forces that had unleashed them were too weak organisationally to constitute a real alternative to the existing governments. Into that vacuum stepped the Muslim Brotherhood, which had spent decades in opposition and now seized its opportunity, presenting itself as the alternative. In the immediate aftermath of 2011, the Brotherhood took advantage of the moment, winning elections in Egypt and Tunisia. But for all its claims, it offered no social or economic alternative: its project is fundamentally ideological and political rather than socioeconomic. It did not represent a real social alternative to what already existed, and its political project collapsed accordingly. By 2013, 2014 the Muslim Brotherhood was defeated everywhere, with the military coup in Egypt and the political crisis in Tunisia. When the second wave of uprisings arrived in 2019 — in Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon — the Islamic fundamentalist forces were no longer part of it; they were rather enmeshed in the existing regimes

You said Sunni Islamist forces were largely defeated, yet in Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, former leader of the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, now controls the state and is consolidating power. Even the Kurdish YPG in the northeast has agreed to integrate into the Syrian army. Doesn’t that suggest Sunni Islamists have, in fact, succeeded in some places?

There is a certain irony in the Islamic fundamentalists’ victory in Syria, because it was a side effect of Israel’s wars in Lebanon. By dealing a devastating blow to Hezbollah, Israel removed the last pillar propping up the Syrian regime. That regime had previously relied on Iranian and Russian military support, but after invading Ukraine, Russia became so bogged down there that it withdrew most of its forces from Syria. Once Israel had crippled Hezbollah’s capacity to intervene on behalf of Iran, the fundamentalist forces controlling Idlib in the north were able to sweep in with relative ease. the Assad regime collapsed, much as the Kabul government did in 2021.

Since then however, Al-Sharaa has tried to project himself as a moderate. He is trying quite hard to get accepted by the West. He has made no major moves until now to impose Sharia, although there are signs of Islamisation of the state and society. That is not the same as the way they ruled the Idlib province until 2024 or even less the way Daesh, the so-called Islamic State or ISIS, ruled parts of Syria and Iraq declaring its so-called caliphate.

So, in essence, you would say the Islamist project has failed?

It could never have succeeded, because it does not represent a real alternative to the underlying crisis. The same applies to al-Sharaa: he is simply replicating the socioeconomic policies of other Arab states, which is already generating an acute social crisis in Syria, one that will produce growing discontent, quite apart from the unresolved issues facing the country’s minorities.

Why have the Kurds in Rojava agreed to fold themselves into the Syrian state? At the same time, the PKK in Turkey has agreed to disarm and has entered peace talks with Erdoğan. Why have Kurdish movements in both countries given up their bases of power?

Foremost of course in the Syrian case, because they were abandoned by the United States. Once Daesh had been defeated, Washington no longer needed the Kurds. Trump showed no interest in supporting them any longer.

Erdoğan, meanwhile, has been losing electoral ground since 2015 and is trying every available means to cling to power: suppressing the opposition, arresting its leading figures, even meddling in the leadership of the CHP. His outreach to the Kurds is another such manoeuvre: a bet that the Kurdish movement will not play the role it played in 2015, when it threatened the AKP’s dominance in parliament.

The Kurdish leader Öcalan has been advocating compromise with Ankara for years. It has become clear that the PKK’s armed strategy failed. Turkey, after all, has the second-largest army in NATO. Having bent the movement’s strategy toward armed struggle for so long, Öcalan has now bent it completely in the opposite direction, toward compromise. But I am not convinced this will succeed either. The oppression of the Kurdish nation has not subsided, and there are no real guarantees for Kurds in either Turkey or Syria. There are disagreements within both the Turkish and Syrian branches of the movement, and some members resent the ongoing self-dissolution and warn of what may follow.

The agreement with the Syrian government envisions dissolving the Syrian Democratic Forces and folding them into the Syrian army, but that remains largely theoretical. Who commands the forces in practice? Will command remain in the Kurdish-administered areas in Rojava, or will Damascus take control of the northeast? This process will encounter many obstacles, not least the role of women. Feminism has been central to the Kurdish struggle, but women fighting in army units, such as the YPJ, have no place in al-Sharaa’s conception of society.

Given the rightward drift you’ve described across these very different states, are they really all moving in the same direction?

Not at the regional level. Most Arab states remain traditional despotic regimes; they have not so much shifted to the right as always occupied that position. The Iranian regime, similarly, isn’t meaningfully described as far right. What I would call neo-fascism at the global level, represented by forces like the AfD in Germany, the Rassemblement National in France, and the MAGA movement around Donald Trump, finds its clearest regional equivalent in the Netanyahu government, which has already reached the far right’s outer edge. And then there is Erdoğan’s own drift toward the far right within the Turkish regime.

In your 2002 book The Clash of Barbarisms on the immediate aftermath of 9/11 you described a dynamic in which reactionary forces across different contexts feed off and radicalise one another. That was twenty-five years ago. Has this process slowed, or has it simply continued?

I countered Samuel Huntington’s idea of the so-called “clash of civilisations” with the thesis of a “clash of barbarisms”. The wars between Western imperialist powers and Islamic fundamentalist forces were not opposing civilizations, but barbaric tendencies inherent in each side’s civilization. This is still ongoing; it is dreadful to watch the Israeli government’s drift toward the far right, and the wars it has waged since 7 October.

That process has reached its peak with Gaza. I described Gaza as the first genocide perpetrated by an industrially advanced state since 1945, since the defeat of Nazi Germany. There have been other genocides since then, Rwanda among them, but none carried out by an industrialised state backed by Western powers.

You’ve written that Gaza marks the definitive end of the Western liberal order. Why not the invasion of Iraq in 2003 already?

Because the invasion of Iraq was opposed by figures like Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, and by some voices even within Washington. The illusion persisted that liberal forces would ultimately correct course. Barack Obama, after all, built part of his political identity on having opposed the Iraq invasion, and adopted a principle of only joining a war with UN cover. He intervened in Libya only once the Security Council authorised the no-fly zone. That illusion of a liberal, rules-based order survived and was later used against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. But the contrast in how Western governments responded to Ukraine and how they responded to Gaza was the final nail in that order’s coffin.

You mention Chirac and Schröder opposing the Iraq war, but they still granted overflight rights and cooperated in other ways. Was that resistance genuine or largely symbolic?

At the time of the Iraq invasion, the United States stood at the very peak of its global hegemony, so neither Chirac nor Schröder dared provoke Washington to the point of denying it use of their airspace or military cooperation. Still, each had real interests at stake. France had invested heavily in its relationship with the Saddam Hussein regime and understood that it stood to lose that investment through U.S. invasion. Schröder, for his part, recognised that German public opinion was strongly opposed to the war, and he thus found an easy way of trying to be popular. With Gaza we have not seen any resistance to Israel’s wholly disproportionate response to October 7th. The last fig leaf of liberal decency is gone. Hamas’s attacks triggered an intensification of the instrumentalization of the memory of the Holocaust, one that left Western governments unable to muster a critical position toward Israel for several months into the genocide.

That’s a surprisingly idealist claim for a Marxist to make. Do you believe this is a matter of cultural legacy rather than material interest?

The United States has a clear material stake in its alliance with Israel as a subcontracted enforcer of American hegemony in the region. European governments’ support for Israel has far less to do with material interest. The starting point regarding their stance on Gaza is ideological, it is the way October 7th was represented as the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. This sentence was repeated again and again. The attack led by Hamas produced a wave of shock and sympathy, and Western governments rallied behind Israel’s so-called right to self-defence. Only months later, once the scale of destruction became impossible to ignore and it became clear how disproportionate the Israeli response was, did they begin shifting toward calls for a ceasefire.

In terms of material interest, it is certainly not in the interest of Europe’s liberal governments to have a government like Netanyahu’s in power in Israel, it creates no end of problems for them. Netanyahu has no sympathy for the liberal European governments at all, and he keeps showing it. Even the United Kingdom now has tensions with Israel. Europe is far closer geographically to the Middle East than the United States, so whatever happens in the region has immediate consequences in Europe. That simple fact reveals that there is a clear divergence between the interests of the different Western powers in the Middle East. But Europe is subordinate to the United States. That is a quite peculiar strategic position for the Europeans to be in. A handful of governments, Spain and Ireland among them, have dared to speak out against what the Israeli government is doing. In doing so, they arguably represent European interests more faithfully than those who remain silent.

The neoconservatives famously pursued American interest with little regard for anyone else. The neocons were quite dominant in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but now almost no one speaks of them. What was their project, and did it succeed?

The neocons are remembered chiefly for their doctrine of “regime change”, the idea that the United States had a mission to impose liberal democratic rule across the globe. The illusion of rebuilding an Iraqi state on the Western model led the occupation to dismantle the existing state apparatus entirely. And this led to chaos. It was a total failure as an exercise in imposing a “liberal” order by force.

So Washington then shifted away from its ostensibly democratic project for Iraq, which had actually empowered pro-Iranian actors , toward a more pragmatic reliance on tribal structures and the withdrawing of its troops. Even before the occupation formally ended, Iran had already gained more influence in Iraq than the United States itself. And from this, the so-called lessons of Iraq were drawn: the error, it was believed, consisted in dismantling the dictatorial state, which should have been kept intact, just changeing its orientation like what happened in Venezuela at the beginning of this year.

There is currently a rift within the American right between interventionists and isolationists. Trump’s own approach seems different in both method and aim from either camp. How would you characterise this split?

The American far right has always contained an isolationist strand alongside a hawkish one. Trump has tried to weld together its different currents, from the isolationists to the conspiracy-theory milieu, appealing to all these constituencies simultaneously, a fact that accounts for the many contradictions in his behaviour. Trump is a Frankenstein’s monster of the American right, assembled from all these disparate parts. But one thing is certain: he has no regard for democracy whatsoever. He is fighting democracy at home in the United States! So, it should surprise no one that he makes no pretence of exporting it elsewhere.

In any case, narrowing the debate to a simple opposition of intervention or no intervention misses the nuances of imperialist policy. The type of intervention matters enormously. Today, rather than replacing regimes it considers rogue, the U.S. attempts to preserve them, simply forcing them to collaborate. Before taking office, Trump was explicit in embracing this lesson of Iraq and publicly criticised the “regimechange” illusion. His approach to Venezuela is entirely consistent with that: he removed Maduro, and the remainder of the apparatus was simply made to collaborate with Washington, with no attempt to impose democratic elections or bring back the so-called liberal opposition. Even with Cuba, where Marco Rubio has a particular interest, Washington is negotiating with figures from within the regime; the grandson of Raúl Castro is among its main interlocutors! And that’s what Trump tried to achieve in Iran as well. He believed that he could force the regime to collaborate with him, except that his actions have been reinforcing the hardliners instead of those who would be willing to make a compromise.

Where does that leave American liberals, caught between these competing camps?

They are thoroughly disoriented, unsure what position to adopt. This is precisely why we are seeing a resurgence of the left: people recognise that the half-hearted liberalism that the establishment offers is no longer credible, and they are looking for more radical answers to their social, economic, and political circumstances, even in the defence of democracy itself. Liberals have proven far too pusillanimous, for instance, to mount a frontal challenge to the ongoing strangulation of Cuba. What is happening there is criminal. Decades of embargo have now reached the point of imposing outright hunger on the population, and this is provoking far less international reaction than it warrants, not only among governments, but among mass movements, which should be expressing far greater solidarity with the Cuban people. These sanctions punish the population more than the regime.

Your 2023 book The New Cold War tackles the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you see Russia’s attack as a long-term consequence of the War on Terror and neoconservative interventionism?

In a sense, the 2003 Iraq invasion demonstrated to Russia, to China, to everyone, that the United States would not abide by the rules of the order it claimed to champion. The invasion of Iraq was a flagrant violation of international law. After the Soviet Union collapsed, matters could have unfolded quite differently; there was talk of a "peace dividend" and all that. Instead, the U.S. made deliberate political choices that antagonised Russia, particularly the expansion of NATO. I believe this was done on purpose. Washington wanted Russia to remain a scarecrow for the rest of Europe, so that other European states would remain in a vassal-like relationship with the US.

Helmut Kohl also initially favoured eastward expansion, since it served German capital’s interest in establishing hegemony over Eastern Europe. But by the time Georgia and Ukraine were invited by George W. Bush to join NATO, Angela Merkel actually came out against it. Again, here we have a divergence between American interests and the interests of European states like Germany.

None of this, however, justifies in any way the invasion of Ukraine, a terrible crime whose price is being paid by the Ukrainian people, and increasingly by the Russian people as well. Putin bears the greatest responsibility for that catastrophe.

Looking back at a quarter century of U.S. imperial intervention and the War on Terror, where does the U.S. stand today?

Every war the United States launched after 9/11 was, in a sense, "lost". I would put that in quotation marks because Washington did succeed in destroying the regimes it targeted. The real losers were the civilian populations of these countries, not the United States itself. Still, America failed to achieve its own stated objectives in every case.

This has been a classic case of imperial overstretch. In the late 1980s, the British historian Paul Kennedy wrote a bestselling book observing the fairly obvious fact that empires decline once they take on more than they can control. But he was wrong in his reading of the Reagan era: Reagan managed to reboot both the American economy and American hegemony. After the Soviet collapsed, however, the Bush administration succumbed to hubris. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were a textbook case of overstretch, well beyond what the United States could actually control, and it failed in both countries. But anyone who believes the American empire is finished is simply dreaming. The U.S. remains an extraordinarily powerful state, still the most powerful on earth, still capable of enormous destruction. Its limitations, however, are now far more visible than they were at the turn of the century.

Is there anything that gives you hope in this situation?

Absolutely, I hold on to hope, hope rooted in the new generation and its capacity to invent new forms of struggle, as we have seen recently with the Moroccan Gen Z movement, an extraordinary moment, with thousands of young people mobilising and using modern technology to coordinate their action. I make a crucial distinction between optimism and hope, they are not the same thing at all. Optimism is the belief that the best outcome will happen. Hope is the belief that a better outcome is possible, with no guarantee attached. I can keep hoping, while recognising that today the balance of evidence weighs heavily toward pessimism.

10 September 2026

Source: [Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung: To start pagehttps://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/55207.