India’s Strategic Autonomy In The Russia–Ukraine War: Analysing Challenges And Opportunities

LONG READ

President of China Xi Jinping, President of Russia Vladimir Putin, and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi during a concert ahead of an informal lunch for the heads of BRICS delegations held as part of the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan. Photo Credit: Alexandr Kryazhev, Photohost agency brics-russia2024.ru

 June 11, 2025

By Dr. Sunita Meena

Introduction

This paper critically examines India’s strategically neutral position in the Russia–Ukraine war and its implications for global diplomacy. Since the outbreak of the war in 2022, India has maintained a careful calibrated stance, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful resolution while abstaining from several key United Nations resolutions that condemned Russia’s actions, including those in the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN General Assembly. This approach reflects a broader commitment to strategic autonomy, shaped by India’s historical relationship with Russia, long-standing non-alignment policy, and evolving global priorities.

The analysis situates this stance within India’s historical ties with Russia, its long-standing commitment to non-alignment, and evolving global strategic priorities. This piece of work explores key dimensions such as defense dependence, geopolitical considerations (involving China and Pakistan), economic pressures, and diplomatic engagement with both Moscow and Kyiv.

The study highlights the challenges India faces, including international scrutiny and economic disruptions, alongside emerging opportunities like discounted energy imports, expanded trade potential, and a growing global diplomatic profile. Additionally, the paper argues that India’s approach exemplifies a calibrated exercise in strategic autonomy, reinforcing its position as a responsible global actor and potential mediator in future peace negotiations.

Background 

The Russia–Ukraine war began on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. This marked a dramatic escalation of hostilities that had persisted since 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. The invasion triggered a severe humanitarian crisis and drew strong global condemnation, resulting in widespread sanctions against Russia and military support for Ukraine. (Roy, 2023).

The international community has responded with a range of measures, including economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia, and military aid to Ukraine.  Amid this global polarization, India has maintained a carefully balanced diplomatic position. While refusing to label Russia’s actions as an “invasion,” India has repeatedly emphasized the importance of dialogue and peaceful resolution. It has abstained from key UN resolutions condemning Russia, including in the UN Security Council, UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly (Laskar, 2023).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s message to Putin during SCO meeting in Samarkand that “now is not an era of war” has been echoed in India’s calls for de-escalation and diplomacy (Haider, 2022). India has positioned itself as a country advocating multilateralism and peace. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, India has urged both sides to prioritize humanitarian concerns, implement ceasefires and allow safe passage for civilians. While India has not taken a confrontational stance against Russia, it has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and engaged diplomatically with both President Putin and President Zelenskyy. Modi’s visits to both Kyiv and Moscow underscore India’s strategic engagement and aspirations to serve as a bridge-builder in international diplomacy.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has significantly altered the global geopolitical landscape, reshaping energy routes, trade alliances, and security structures across the world. As a major democracy and a leading voice of the Global South, India’s stance carries weight in shaping alternative narratives to Western bloc politics. This paper explores India’s strategic neutrality through five key lenses: historical relations, defense cooperation, geopolitical calculations, economic management, and diplomatic initiatives under the Modi government. 

India–Russia Relations from a Historical Foundations to Contemporary Dynamics

The diplomatic relationship between the Soviet Union (later Russia) and India has been defined by a long-standing policy of mutual neutrality and strategic alignment on the international stage. This partnership, rooted in historical ties and shared geopolitical interests, has evolved over decades, shaping their respective foreign policies and responses to global issues. India’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for instance, reflects its historical commitment to non-alignment, a policy established during the Cold War to maintain independence from major power blocs. This tradition of neutrality continues to guide India’s foreign policy, allowing it to navigate complex international dynamics without direct entanglement in conflicts. (Ministry of External Affairs, 2021).)

The foundation of India-Soviet relations was laid shortly after India’s independence in 1947. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as a key supporter of India on contentious global issues. For example, in 1961, when India deployed its military to end Portuguese colonial rule over Goa, Daman, and Diu, the Soviet Union opposed a Western-backed UN resolution condemning India’s actions.

Similarly, in 1955, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev reaffirmed the USSR’s commitment to India by explicitly supporting its sovereignty over Kashmir, famously declaring, “We are so near that if ever you call us from the mountain tops, we will appear at your side” (Chaudhary: 2020). This alignment was further demonstrated during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, when the signing of the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation gave India diplomatic backing and strategic security. The Soviet Union also used its veto power at the UN Security Council to support India’s actions and shield it from international criticism (Attri, 2018). These instances underscore the USSR’s pivotal role in shaping India’s foreign policy choices and security calculations during a volatile regional environment.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India faced the challenge of adapting to a changing global order. Despite this, Russia and India worked to sustain their strategic partnership. In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee formalized this renewed relationship through the “Declaration of Strategic Partnership.” A decade later, in 2010, the two nations elevated their ties to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” underscoring Russia’s continued support for India, particularly on the Kashmir issue. Russia has consistently supported India’s stance on contentious international issues. For example, it defended India’s decision to abrogate Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, labelling it an internal matter. Russia also opposed a China-led move in the UN to internationalize the Kashmir issue in 2020, emphasizing bilateral resolution between India and Pakistan.

Such instances reflect the enduring trust and geopolitical alignment between the two states. Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, reaffirmed Russia’s stance on the issue. In a tweet, he stated that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had discussed Kashmir during closed-door consultations. He further emphasized Russia’s firm support for the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan, expressing hope that any differences between the two nations would be resolved through bilateral negotiations (Sen, 2022). 

India has reciprocated through diplomatic support in multilateral settings. For example, India opposed a UN Human Rights Commission resolution criticizing Russia’s actions during the Second Chechen War and voted against a 2008 UN resolution affirming the “right of return” for those displaced by Russia’s campaign in Abkhazia. India also abstained from UN resolutions

in 2013 and 2016 condemning the Assad regime in Syria, which was backed by Russia. Similarly, in 2014, India abstained from a UN resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea and in 2020, voted against a Ukraine-sponsored resolution on human rights violations in Crimea. These actions reflect India’s consistent diplomatic alignment with Russia, rooted in mutual trust and shared strategic interests (Ibid). In the present era of geopolitical flux, the India–Russia relationship remains an anchor of India’s foreign policy calculus defined less by ideology and more by realism, strategic autonomy and sectoral interdependence in defense, energy, and global governance.

Defence and Security Ties

The India–Russia defense partnership has long been regarded as the cornerstone of their “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” While the two countries cooperate across a wide range of areas such as civil nuclear energy, space exploration, counterterrorism, and multilateral diplomacy. it is the defense and security dimension that remains most vital to India’s strategic autonomy. In the context of the Russia–Ukraine war and shifting geopolitical alliances, India’s continued military cooperation with Russia reveals both historical dependence and pragmatic strategy.

The genesis of this relationship dates back to the Cold War, particularly following India’s military setback during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Facing increasing threats from both Pakistan and China, and wary of the Western alliance system, India found a strategic ally in the Soviet Union. The USSR not only provided military hardware but also extended favorable credit terms, political support at international forums, and importantly access to defense technology, which Western powers were reluctant to share. The ideological affinity between Prime Minister Nehru’s socialist orientation and Soviet internationalism further deepened this engagement (Hooft & Barrow, 2022: 8).

Throughout the Cold War and well into the 21st century, Russia (and earlier, the Soviet Union) became India’s principal arms supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), around 85% of India’s military inventory is of Russian origin. This includes iconic platforms such as the MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30 fighter aircraft, T-90 and T-72 tanks, Kilo-class submarines, and the Smerch multiple rocket launcher systems. India has also leased nuclear submarines from Russia and received training and technical support for their operations.

Currently, India is Russia’s top defense partner, accounting for 28% of Moscow’s global arms exports. Therefore, this relationship is more than transactional. It reflects strategic depth, technological cooperation, and mutual trust. One of the most successful examples of Indo-Russian collaboration is the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, jointly developed under a bilateral agreement and manufactured in India under the ‘Make in India’ initiative.

In 2018, India signed a landmark $5.4 billion deal to procure five S-400 Triumf air defense systems from Russia, despite considerable pressure from the United States under its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Deliveries began in 2021, reaffirming India’s commitment to diversify its security portfolio without compromising on strategic autonomy. (Muratbekova (2022). India’s ‘Make in India’ defense policy, launched under the Modi government, also benefits significantly from Russian collaboration. The AK-203 rifle production in Amethi, the licensed manufacture of T-90 tanks, and potential joint ventures in futuristic platforms like fifth-generation fighter jets are examples of Russia’s willingness to engage in technology transfer and co-development. (Ministry of Defence, 2022). 

Moreover, Russia’s willingness to transfer critical military technologies, engage in joint production, and offer cost-effective pricing distinguishes it from many Western suppliers. Unlike the United States and several European nations, Russia does not impose intrusive end-user monitoring agreements or restrict the use of military platforms in specific operational theatres. This flexibility has allowed India to customize and integrate Russian systems with indigenous technologies, enhancing operational efficiency and self-reliance (Tellis, 2011). 

India is likely to increase its procurement from Western countries and develop indigenous defense capabilities but Russia will remain a vital partner particularly in systems where India already has operational dependency or where Russian support for training and maintenance is indispensable. Additionally, as part of global defense rebalancing and evolving security architecture in Asia, India may utilize its partnership with Russia as a counterbalance to growing Sino-Russian military alignment.

Geopolitical Considerations and Strategic Neutrality

Geopolitical factors also contribute to India’s neutral stance on Russia-related global issues. India and Russia share a historically strong bond that dates back to the 1950s. During this time, the Soviet Union consistently backed India on critical international matters, notably using its UN Security Council veto to support India on the Kashmir issue. This partnership deepened throughout the Cold War, with the U.S.S.R. often acting as a mediator between India and Pakistan. Reflecting this enduring relationship, India’s External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, described the India-Russia relationship as “the one constant in world politics” in December 2023, underscoring the deep and continuous ties between the two nations. (The Moscow Times, 2025).

One of the most significant geopolitical motivations behind India’s balanced position is the strategic challenge posed by China and Pakistan. Both countries are strengthening ties with Moscow, raising concerns in New Delhi. India views its engagement with Russia as a way to prevent Moscow from moving too close to Beijing or Islamabad. Maintaining strong bilateral ties with Russia is thus considered essential to moderate Russian policy in South Asia and protect Indian interests (Tellis, 2011: 1,2). India, Russia, and China are all part of multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which foster regional political and economic dialogue. Although India remains wary of China’s increasing assertiveness, especially in the Indo-Pacific, its participation in these groupings allows it to remain diplomatically connected while promoting a multipolar regional order (Muratbekova, 2022). 

India’s defense import patterns also reflect a shift driven by strategic necessity.  India bought 36% of its weapons from Russia between 2020 and 2024. This is much less than before 55% in 2015–2019 and 72% in 2010–2014. (SIPRI, 2025). This means India is now buying more weapons from other countries for instance, France and the United States that now collectively supply 46% of India’s military imports. India’s strategic realignment is further evident in its Indo-Pacific vision, particularly through its active participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which comprises India, the United States, Japan, and Australia.

During the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo in July 2024, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar emphasized the need for a coalition of “democracies, pluralistic societies, and market economies” to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, citing growing concerns over China’s regional posture (Chaudhary, 2024India’s involvement in naval exercises like Malabar under the Quad framework, along with its participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), highlights its growing convergence with Western nations on issues such as maritime security and strengthening supply chain resilience (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). Despite this strategic shift, India remains committed to its policy of “strategic autonomy,” often described as “multi-alignment.” This approach allows India to cooperate with rival global powers without entering into binding alliances. The Modi government’s emphasis on “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India), especially in the defense sector, aligns with this vision.

In this context, As External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar emphasized at the Raisina Dialogue 2022, “India believes in strategic autonomy… we have strategic partnerships with different countries, based on our national interest, not alliances” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). While multi-alignment offers flexibility, it may also lead to strategic ambiguity. Critics caution that walking a tightrope between the West and Russia could erode trust on both sides. For example, India’s growing engagement with the Quad contrasts with its silence on Russian aggression. A lack of clear stance may limit India’s influence in future crisis mediation or security coalitions.

Modi Government’s Role in the Russia–Ukraine War

In the early days of the conflict, the Modi government launched Operation Ganga, a large-scale mission to evacuate Indian nationals, especially students, stranded in Ukraine. Beginning in late February 2022, the operation brought home over 22,500 Indians through special Air India, Indian Air Force, and chartered flights (NDTV, 2022). Indian embassies in Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Hungary worked under intense pressure to coordinate evacuations via land corridors as Ukraine’s airspace remained closed.

Prime Minister Modi personally spoke with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ensure safe passage for Indian citizens, including students trapped in cities like Sumy and Kharkiv (The Hindu, 2022). He also chaired high-level meetings with senior ministers and foreign service officers to supervise the evacuation process (MEA, 2022a). This operation not only demonstrated the government’s commitment to citizen welfare abroad but also reinforced India’s neutral diplomatic credibility as both sides cooperated in facilitating safe exits for Indians (Indian Express, 2022).

In the months and years that followed, India built upon this early diplomatic engagement through sustained dialogue with both Russia and Ukraine eventually culminating in high-level visits and participation in peace summits in 2024.

In 2024, the Modi government intensified diplomatic outreach to both warring sides in a bid to assert India’s relevance as a global mediator. Prime Minister Modi became one of the few world leaders to visit both Russia and Ukraine within a short span. His July 2024 visit to Moscow coincided with ongoing Russian airstrikes, including the bombing of a children’s hospital in Ukraine, which led to international criticism and strong reactions from President Zelenskyy, who called the visit a “huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts” (Chaudhary, 2024). In response, the Indian government recalibrated by organizing Modi’s historic August 2024 visit to Kyiv, the first by any Indian prime minister since the establishment of bilateral ties in 1993.(Bajpaee & Toremark, 2024).

On August 23, 2024, Modi met with Zelenskyy in Ukraine at the latter’s invitation. This engagement highlighted India’s commitment to a peaceful resolution through diplomacy, a stance reinforced by its participation in the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, held in Burgenstock, Switzerland, in June 2024. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to advancing bilateral relations for the mutual benefit of their nations, founded on principles of trust, respect, and transparency. They reviewed the consistent and positive development of bilateral relations, which have significantly strengthened over the past thirty years. The leaders acknowledged the importance of regular interactions between India and Ukraine at various levels, including their meetings in Apulia in June 2024 and Hiroshima in May 2023 during the G7 Summits, the visit of Ukraine’s Minister for Foreign Affairs to New Delhi in March 2024, as well as numerous interactions and phone conversations between India’s External Affairs Minister and Ukraine’s Foreign Affairs Minister, and between India’s National Security Advisor and the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine.

These engagements, alongside the 9th round of Foreign Office Consultations held in Kyiv in July 2023, have played a crucial role in enhancing mutual understanding and cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office, 2024). India’s role in these summits is consistent with its traditional identity as a voice for the Global South, advocating for peaceful coexistence, and opposing bloc politics. India’s presence in peace talks is often framed not just as bilateral diplomacy but as part of a larger mission to reshape the global order into a multipolar, dialogue-driven system (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024; Handelsblatt Interview with S. Jaishankar, February 2024). Modi’s Kyiv visit highlighted India’s humanitarian concerns and long-standing support for the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty under the UN Charter. This balancing act allowed India to retain credibility both with Western allies and its traditional Russian partner, without sacrificing its non-aligned identity.

In this context, CIA Director William Burns acknowledged that Prime Minister Modi’s communication with President Putin helped in de-escalating Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during high tensions in 2023. This recognition from a senior U.S. intelligence official underscore the quiet but significant influence that Indian leadership has wielded behind the scenes (Times Now, 2023). While high-level visits to Moscow and Kyiv reflect India’s proactive diplomacy, their actual impact on peace negotiations remains limited. These moves may serve more as symbolic demonstrations of neutrality than concrete steps toward mediation. Without sustained institutional engagement, India risks being seen as a cautious observer rather than an effective peace broker.

Impact on Indian Economy, Oil Sector, and Inflationary Pressures

The Russia–Ukraine war has produced profound ripple effects on the Indian economy, especially through rising energy prices, disrupted trade, and inflationary pressures. The Western sanctions regime particularly imposed by the United States and the European Union—contributed to the freezing of approximately $300 billion of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves (U.S. Treasury, 2022), which led to increased global market uncertainty and a reshuffling of energy trade flows. Both Russia and Ukraine are significant exporters of wheat, corn, and minerals such as nickel, palladium, and aluminium, whose global shortages contributed to an economic spillover, affecting India’s import costs and supply chain dynamics (World Bank, 2022). The immediate economic impact of the conflict has been felt in India’s oil sector. Rising crude oil prices have contributed to financial market volatility, widened the current account deficit, and led to currency depreciation against the U.S. dollar.

Additionally, increased fuel prices have exacerbated inflationary pressures. For example, Oil constitutes a significant portion of India’s imports from Russia. The imposition of sanctions may drive oil prices to unprecedented levels, leading to a domestic surge in petroleum product prices. This escalation in fuel costs could, in turn, intensify inflationary pressures within the country. It is noteworthy that the Economic Survey 2021–22 identified three major challenges facing the Indian economy: recurring COVID-19 waves, disruptions in supply chains, and rising inflation. The war in Ukraine directly exacerbated the latter two challenges, further widening India’s current account deficit. 

To mitigate this impact, the Indian government adopted a pragmatic strategy that balanced economic necessity with geopolitical caution. India refused to join the Western-led oil price cap on Russian crude and instead increased its imports from Moscow at discounted rates. This decision was in line with India’s sovereign energy policy and was supported by major government schemes under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, which emphasizes domestic resilience and policy autonomy.

By bypassing the price cap, India managed to secure oil at rates lower than the global average, helping to stabilize domestic fuel prices and keep inflation under check. he results of this strategy were economically significant. According to government trade data, bilateral trade between India and Russia doubled from $13 billion in 2021–22 to $27 billion by the end of 2022, with projections suggesting it would surpass $30 billion in 2023.  Apart from crude oil, Russia became a major supplier of chemical fertilizers, another critical input for Indian agriculture. Russia emerged as the largest oil and fertilizer supplier to India by the end of 2022 (Laskar, 2023). 

The government’s actions in securing affordable oil and fertilizers contributed to managing food inflation, especially at a time when global food prices were rising due to supply disruptions in Eastern Europe. India imports approximately 2.5 million tonnes of sunflower oil annually, of which nearly 70% came from Ukraine before the war (Verma & Gupta, 2023). The war significantly affected these supply lines, but the diversification into Russian oil and expanded sourcing from other regions helped mitigate shortages. In addition to managing imports, the conflict offered India new trade opportunities. With Western markets halting cargo from Russia and Ukraine’s exports reduced, Indian agricultural exporters saw increased demand for wheat, millet, maize, nuts, and processed foods. This served as a timely economic boost for Indian farmers and agri-exporters, helping them expand into new markets while maintaining domestic supplies. (Ministry of Commerce, 2023).

Conclusion

India’s position on the Russia–Ukraine war shows a careful and balanced foreign policy. Without taking sides, India has focused on promoting peace, protecting its national interests, and continuing its traditional values of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. It kept strong ties with Russia especially in defense and energy while also calling for dialogue and respect for sovereignty at international forums.

The Modi government’s balanced diplomacy visiting both Moscow and Kyiv, taking part in the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, and continuing talks with leaders on both sides has shown that India can be a trusted global partner. India also handled the economic impact of the war by buying discounted Russian oil and fertilizers, helping control inflation and protect farmers. At the same time, Indian exporters gained new market opportunities, especially in agriculture and pharmaceuticals. India’s stand is not passive neutrality—it is an active call for peace. Its strong ties with both the West and Russia give it a unique position to act as a future mediator in the conflict.

As a country trusted by many and guided by a long tradition of diplomacy, India can help bring both sides to the table. India is also increasingly seen as the voice of the Global South—speaking for developing countries on global platforms, promoting fairness, and pushing for reforms in global institutions.

This growing role was clearly recognized by UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron, who said during his visit to India on October 21, 2024,“India is a friend of Ukraine and a friend of peace, and its credibility is immense. India can play a vital role in resolving this crisis. It is time India gets a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.”

This shows that India’s balanced approach is not only helping its own people but also gaining international respect. As the war continues, India’s role as a responsible power, a peace advocate, and a leader of the Global South will become even more important. Nonetheless, India’s calibrated stance faces inherent contradictions. While aiming to serve as a peace advocate, India’s reluctance to openly condemn aggression or take a firm diplomatic lead may undercut its ambitions. If India seeks a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, it must go beyond non-alignment and demonstrate leadership grounded in principles, not just pragmatism. 

Endnotes

2.  Ministry of External Affairs (2022), Impact of Russia–Ukraine War on India (Question No. 3771), Lok Sabha,Government of India. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/loksabha.htm?dtl/35061/QUESTION_NO3771_IMPACT_OF_RUSSIAUKRAINE_WAR_ON_INDIA

3.  Press Information Bureau. (2024, August 23), India-Ukraine Joint Statement on the Visit of Prime Minister of India to Ukraine. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2048245

4.  Ministry of Finance. (2022), “Economic survey 2021-22: Vol. 1* (Chapter 1, p. 12)” Government of India.
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/echapter.pdf

5.  NDTV. (2024, October 21). India has credibility to mediate in Ukraine war: David Cameron at NDTV World Summit. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/india-has-credibility-to-mediate-in-ukraine-war-david-cameron-at-ndtv-world-summit-6836810

References (* Indicates Primary Sources)

• *Ministry of Commerce & Industry (2023), Annual Report 2022–23, Government of India, New Delhi. URL: https://www.commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Annual-Report-FY-2022-23-DoC.pdf
• *Ministry of Defence (2022), India–Russia Defence Cooperation Agreements, Government of India, New Delhi. URL: https://mod.gov.in
• *Ministry of External Affairs (2021), India–Russia Bilateral Relations, Government of India, New Delhi. URL: https://mea.gov.in/india-russia-bilateral-relations.htm
• *Ministry of External Affairs (2022), Update on Operation Ganga, Government of India, 4 March. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/34943/Update_on_Operation_Ganga
• *Ministry of External Affairs (2022b), Remarks by External Affairs Minister at Raisina Dialogue, Government of India. URL: https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35217
• *Ministry of External Affairs (2022), Impact of Russia–Ukraine War on India (Question No. 3771), Lok Sabha, Government of India. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/loksabha.htm?dtl/35061/QUESTION_NO3771_IMPACT_OF_RUSSIAUKRAINE_WAR_ON_INDIA
• *Ministry of External Affairs (n.d.), Official Communications and Archives, Government of India. URL: https://mea.gov.in
• *Prime Minister’s Office (2024), India–Ukraine Joint Statement on the Visit of Prime Minister of India to Ukraine, Government of India, 23 August. URL: https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/india-ukraine-joint-statement/
• Chaudhary, D. R. (2020), “Russian Support to India on Kashmir Is Rooted in History”, The Economic Times, New Delhi, 20 January 2020. 
• Chaudhary, D. R. (2020), India’s Strategic Choices in International Forums, New Delhi: Policy Research India.
• Chaudhary, S. D. (2024), “Modi Visits Ukraine in Show of ‘Strategic Autonomy’”, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 21 December. [Online: web] Accessed 16 Dec. 2024. 
• Haider, S. (2022), “Modi Tells Vladimir Putin ‘Now is Not an Era of War’”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 17 September, 2022. 
• Hooft, P. A. and Barrow, A. (2022), India’s Approach to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: An Example of the BJP’s ‘India First’ Thinking and What It Means for the West, The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, [Online: web] Accessed 17 Dec. 2024, URL: https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PDF-Indias-approach-to-the-Russian-Invasion-of-Ukraine-An-Example-of-the-BJPs-India-First-Thinking-and-What-it-Means-for-the-West-3.pdf
• Indian Express (2022), “Explained: What is Operation Ganga, India’s Evacuation Mission in Ukraine?”, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 9 March, 2022. 
• Jaishankar, S. (2024), Why Bharat matters, India: HarperCollins Publishers
• Laskar, R. H. (2023), “India Explains Why It Abstained at UN Vote on Ukraine with 3 Piercing Questions”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 25 February, 2023. 
• Laskar, R. H. (2023), “India–Russia Trade Up by $27 bn but ‘Too One Sided’, Says Indian Envoy”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 15 December, 2023. URL: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-russia-trade-up-by-27-bn-but-too-one-sided-says-indian-envoy-101702555678455.html
• NDTV (2022), “Over 22,500 Indians Brought Back from Ukraine under Operation Ganga, Says Centre”, NDTV, New Delhi, 6 March, 2022. URL: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/over-22-500-indians-brought-back-from-ukraine-under-operation-ganga-says-centre-2804324
• Pant, H. V. (2016), Indian foreign policy: An overview, Manchester :Manchester University Press.
• The Hindu (2022), “Modi Speaks to Putin, Zelenskyy on Safe Passage of Indians”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 7 March, 2022. URL: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-speaks-to-putin-zelenskyy-on-safe-passage-of-indians/article65096671.ece
• Times Now (2023), “PM Modi’s Words on War Had Impact on Russians: CIA Chief”, Times Now, New Delhi, 9 March, 2023. URL: https://www.timesnownews.com/international/pm-modis-words-on-war-had-impact-on-russians-cia-chief-article-98567890
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Dr. Sunita Meena

Dr. Sunita Meena is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kalindi College, University of Delhi. She holds an M.A. in Politics (with specialization in International Relations), and has earned her M.Phil. and Ph.D. from the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Her areas of interest include international relations, Indian foreign policy and Eurasian geopolitics.

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Trump’s Unrealistic Demand That Walmart ‘Eat The Tariffs’ – OpEd

A Walmart store. Photo Credit: Inoyamanaka79, Wikimedia Commons.

 June 11, 2025 

By FEE

Recently, a post from President Trump on Truth Social went viral. An attempt to convince retail giant Walmart to keep prices down despite the tariffs, it read:

“Walmart should STOP trying to blame Tariffs as the reason for raising prices throughout the chain. Walmart made BILLIONS OF DOLLARS last year, far more than expected. Between Walmart and China they should, as is said, “EAT THE TARIFFS,” and not charge valued customers ANYTHING. I’ll be watching, and so will your customers!!!“

Trump’s demand here is, simply put, unreasonable, and it reflects a basic misunderstanding of how pricing decisions are made in a market economy. Let’s unpack why.

Walmart’s Thin Margins

The biggest problem with the President’s view is that it doesn’t pass a basic numbers test. To break it down, let’s look at Walmart’s financials.

It’s true that Walmart generates billions of dollars in revenue each year, but revenue alone doesn’t tell us how much Walmart makes.

To understand that, we need to consider profit, which accounts for the company’s costs. More specifically, we want to look at Walmart’s net profit margin, because that’s an extremely important indicator of whether Walmart could realistically “eat the tariffs.”

Depending on the source, Walmart’s net profit margin is somewhere between 2% and 3%. Let’s split the difference and say it’s 2.5%. What does that mean?

That means, if Walmart sells you $1 of goods, it only keeps 2.5 cents in profit. That’s right, 97.5 cents goes toward inventory, employee wages, store maintenance, and a variety of other operating costs.

Put another way, if you spend $100 at Walmart, they make $2.50 in profit.

Now let’s say you buy a $100 television that Walmart imports. A $20 tariff is imposed—an added cost Walmart has to pay to import the TV. Before the tariff, Walmart was making $2.50 in profits. After the tariff, it’s now taking a $17.50 loss.

The only way Walmart can still sell this TV is by raising the price.

At this point, a tariff supporter might respond: “The easy way to fix this is to buy US-made TVs instead!”

Sure—you can avoid tariffs by only buying domestic, but the problem is that domestic TVs tend to be more expensive. If they weren’t, Walmart wouldn’t be importing them in the first place. So even if Walmart pulls international TVs off the shelves and replaces them with US-made ones, the prices still increase.

Here’s the key point: “eating” the tariffs is not an option. Walmart operates on slim margins, barely making pennies on the dollar—there isn’t room to eat 20% cost increases!

The Fallacy of Seller Price Determination

Trump here echoes a fallacy often heard from the Bernie Sanders left—the idea that companies can just choose their prices!

While it’s true that companies can put any number they want on a price tag, it’s fallacious to assume that they control prices. To see why, let’s consider a simplified example.

Suppose Walmart wanted to set the price of a TV at $10,000. Could they do it? Technically, yes: the store could change the price tag for a TV. But the product wouldn’t sell. Competitive pressure from other retailers would drive customers to alternatives.

Now suppose Walmart priced the TV at $1. This might seem more feasible—people would jump at the opportunity to buy a $1 TV. But in the long term, that price point is just as unsustainable. Walmart can’t make a profit on $1 TVs, and savvy customers would resell them at a markup. Eventually, the losses generated by the $1 would be too great to bear, and Walmart would either need to raise prices or go out of business.

Businesses print the price tag, but they do not determine prices. In a market economy, prices are set according to the subjective valuations of consumers and the relationship between supply and demand. If people don’t value a TV at $10,000, the price will not go that high. If people value TVs at significantly higher than $1, the price will not stay that low.

This is the fundamental flaw in Trump’s demand that Walmart “eat the tariffs.” Walmart cannot simply freeze prices, because Walmart does not control prices. When tariffs are implemented, fewer TVs flow into the country, consumers compete for scarce goods, and prices go up.

Telling Walmart to “eat the tariffs” reflects a fallacious way of thinking. Walmart has razor-thin margins, and telling them to keep prices low is essentially telling them to operate at a loss. In the competitive world, businesses that make losses don’t survive. As Margaret Thatcher might say, the problem with telling businesses to keep prices low is that eventually, you run out of other people’s money.

• About the author: Peter Jacobsen is a Writing Fellow at the Foundation for Economic Education.
• Source: This article was published by FEE

FEE

The Foundation for Economic Education's (FEE) mission is to inspire, educate, and connect future leaders with the economic, ethical, and legal principles of a free society. These principles include: individual liberty, free-market economics, entrepreneurship, private property, high moral character, and limited government. FEE is a tax-exempt, 501(c)3 educational foundation

 

Scorsese Reflects On ‘Spiritual Act’ Of Making Film About The Dalai Lama

Filmmaker Martin Scorsese at the screening of his 1997 film "Kundun" at Tribeca Festival in New York, June 6, 2025. (Tenzin Pema/RFA)

 June 11, 2025  

By RFA

By Tenzin Pema

The making of Martin Scorsese’s 1997 Oscar-nominated film Kundun was a “spiritual act” and a “very personal and special project,” the legendary filmmaker said at a rare public screening of the film on the big screen at the Tribeca Festival in New York. 

Friday’s screening was part of global celebrations honoring the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday. Kundun chronicles the early life of the Tibetan spiritual leader, from his discovery as the 14th Dalai Lama as a young child in Tibet to his escape into exile in India at age 23 following the 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule.

“The experience of making Kundun changed my life for the better in many different ways,” Scorsese told the audience at New York’s SVA Theatre, where Kundun — meaning “presence” in Tibetan, a reverent title for the Dalai Lama — screened in its original 35mm format before hundreds of attendees, including Scorsese fans and members of the Tibetan community. 

The film represents a dramatic departure from the director’s typical crime epics like Goodfellas (1990) and Casino (1995). Unlike those acclaimed works, Kundun remains largely inaccessible on major streaming platforms, making the screening at Tribeca a coveted experience for film enthusiasts.

“It’s a big blindspot in a filmmaker whose work I have seen most of and is hugely influential in my love for cinema and the work I do,” Giovanni Lago, a New York-based writer and podcaster, told RFA. “For some reason, you can’t find it on streaming apps. You can’t find it online … So to see it on film at Tribeca with Martin Scorsese himself introducing it is just the perfect recipe.” 

Following the film’s completion, the Chinese government pressured Disney to shelve the project entirely. While Disney ultimately gave the film a limited Christmas release in 1997, the company’s then-CEO Michael Eisner publicly apologized for the production.

“The bad news is that the film was made; the good news is that nobody watched it,” Eisner said at the time. “I want to apologize, and in the future, we should prevent this sort of thing, which insults our friends, from happening,” he said. 

Even today, Kundun is not available on major streaming platforms, including Disney’s own service, Disney+. Disney did not immediately respond to RFA’s request for comment. 

“The Chinese government has consistently suppressed all the films about the Dalai Lama produced in the West … because if these films were shown in China, mainland audiences would gain a more genuine understanding of who the Dalai Lama really is,” Kunga Tashi, Tibetan liaison officer at the Washington-based office of Tibet’s government-in-exile, told RFA. 

China banned Scorsese, screenwriter Melissa Mathison, and even her then-husband Harrison Ford — who had no direct involvement in the film — from entering the country. This reflected Hollywood’s complex relationship with China, where access to the lucrative Chinese market often trumps artistic expression. Similar bans affected actor Brad Pitt for his role in Seven Years in Tibet (1997) and Richard Gere for his Tibet advocacy.

“Given that China has consistently sought to restrict and suppress the distribution and screening of this film … I believe this screening at the financial capital of the U.S. is a great win for the Tibetan race, and a matter of pride and joy for me as a Tibetan,” Tara Lobsang, a Tibetan entrepreneur and artist based in New York, told RFA.

A spiritual journey

Making Kundun was a profound spiritual journey for Scorsese, a Roman Catholic who a few years earlier courted religious controversy and even faced death threats for The Last Temptation of Christ (1988). Mathison, who wrote the screenplay for Steven Spielberg’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial (1982), brought Scorsese the script for Kundun, setting the director on what he described as his own “spiritual exploration.”

“I was really always intrigued by Tibetan Buddhism and the nature of Tibetan culture,” Scorsese reflected. “It seemed very far from my experience. But making films was always, for me, a path to discovery: discovery of new forms of expression … of different cultures, (and) different ways of existing.”

Scorsese finalized the script with Mathison after consulting with the Dalai Lama himself in a meeting at Mathison’s Wyoming home, emphasizing the project’s authenticity and reverence.

But the film’s production proved as challenging as its subject matter was sensitive for China. 

Scorsese, who later traveled to Dharamsala, India, to meet the Dalai Lama again ahead of the making of the film, initially set his sights on shooting the movie in various places in India, but the team ran into a “lot of bureaucracy” and finally settled on Morocco, where Scorsese had shot The Last Temptation of Christ. 

Using the Northern Sahara Desert and Atlas Mountains, along with specially constructed sets – to depict the Dalai Lama’s winter and summer palaces, the Potala Palace and the Norbulingka, and the streets of Tibet’s capital Lhasa – the crew painstakingly created a convincing illusion of Tibet in Morocco. 

Hundreds of Tibetans, including monks from the Dalai Lama’s Namgyal Monastery and performers from the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts in Dharamsala, traveled to Morocco, working alongside a multilingual crew who hailed from more than half-a-dozen nations. 

“We were dealing with seven languages on set – Tibetan, English, French, Italian, (Hindi), Arabic, and Berber – just to say ‘action.’ But once we got one word down, we figured the rest out,” Scorsese recalled, drawing laughter from the audience at the screening.

The screening at Tribeca marks one of the first events on the Compassion Rising World Tour — a global movement launched by the Washington-based advocacy group International Campaign for Tibet to celebrate the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday and his vision of a more compassionate world.

“As the Dalai Lama approaches his 90th birthday, we are not just celebrating a life — we are celebrating a force of compassion that has touched every corner of the world,” said Tencho Gyatso, president of the International Campaign for Tibet. “His message is a call to awaken the best in humanity: courage without anger, strength without violence, and love without limits. This global tribute is our collective effort to carry that light forward.” 

Gyatso – who is the Dalai Lama’s niece and had portrayed his late mother, Gyalyum Chenmo, or her own grandmother in the film – told RFA the event was special as it kicks off the 30-day countdown to the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday on July 6, 2025, and launches the 2025 Year of Compassion in honor of the Dalai Lama’s storied life and achievements.

Many other original cast members, including Tenzin Thuthob Tsarong and Gyurme Tethong who played two of the three actors who portrayed the Dalai Lama at different ages in the film, were also present at the screening. 

The making of Kundun was as much a “spiritual act” for the Tibetan cast members, advisors, artisans and crew members, as it was for Scorsese himself, the director said.

“They really weren’t acting; they were really being, they were existing in the film,” he said. “Whenever I was shooting at a 100 degrees in the heat and troubled, I’d look up and I’d see them and they grounded me and re-inspired me every day. Their devotion to their culture, keeping the culture alive after their country had been taken away from them is overwhelming.”

Scorsese reflected on the experience of filming with Tibetans who were non-professional actors and a crew that spoke a myriad languages in a country with a culture that was far-removed from the one being filmed about.

“It was stunning. We were making a film about Buddhism and Buddhists in a Muslim country directed by a Catholic. I mean, basically, we all worked in harmony because we had a common goal, which made our major cultural differences beside the point,” he said.

For Scorsese, the film remains deeply personal. 

Shortly after its completion, his mother passed away and his daughter Francesca was born. 

“Out of Kundun came our wonderful daughter Francesca,” he said. “It’s a very, very personal, very, very special project for me. And I hope that the generosity of spirit that we shared is evident in the picture itself when you see it.”

RFA

Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

 

How A Fake News Study Tested Ethical Research Boundaries – Analysis

 June 11, 2025  

By SwissInfo

A controversial fake news study, carried out by Swiss-based researchers on the social media platform Reddit, has highlighted the ethical responsibilities and challenges of conducting studies on society. 

By Matthew Allen

The research team, which has been linked to the University of Zurich, covertly tested the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) to manipulate public opinion with misinformation on a subreddit group.

For several months, the researchers stretched the ethical boundaries of observing social behaviour beyond breaking point. They used Large Language Models (LLMs) to invent opinions on a variety of subjects – from owning dangerous dogs to rising housing costs, the Middle East and diversity initiatives.

The AI bots hid behind fictitious pseudonyms as they churned out debating points into the subreddit r/changemyview. Members of the group then argued for or against the AI-composed opinions, unaware they were part of a research project until the researchers came clean at its completion.

The revelation provoked a storm of criticism within Reddit, the research community and the international media.

At first, the researchers, who will not reveal their identities for fear of reprisals, defended their actions, because the “high societal importance of this topic” made it “crucial to conduct a study of this kind, even if it meant disobeying the rules” of the channel, which included a ban on AI bots.

They later issued a “full and deeply felt apology” as “the reactions of the community of disappointment and frustration have made us regret the discomfort that the study may have caused.”

‘Bad science is bad ethics’

“The issue here is not only about conducting research involving deception,” said Professor Dominique Sprumont, president of the Vaud Cantonal Research Ethics Commission in Switzerland. “It is about willfully breaking the rules of a community of human beings who build trust in their network based on those rules.”

“Furthermore, the scientific quality of the project is more than dubious. Bad science is bad ethics.”

The Swiss team ran into a problem familiar to many researchers: how much information to withhold from participants to make the study realistic.

Previous fake news research has faced the same conundrum, according to Gillian Murphy and Ciara M Greene from the University College, Cork, and University College Dublin, Ireland, who have conducted their own misinformation research and examined the results of other studies.

Researchers sometimes disguise the exact purpose of the study at the outset, and only inform participants once it has been completed, they wrote in an article, published in the journal sciencedirect in 2023.  For example, by stating at the outset that the research is about news consumption in general, rather than specifically on fake news.

Limits to deception

“For some misinformation research, it would be impossible to study how participants naturally respond to misinformation without employing this kind of deception, as participants’ suspicions, motivations and behaviours may change when they know the information they will be shown might be misleading,” wrote the authors.

But the authors also note that there are limits to deception. Researchers have a moral duty to respect the human rights and privacy of test participants, inform them at the outset that they are taking part in research, gain explicit consent for using their data and to take steps to avoid inflicting damage on people.

In this video, we explain some of the ways researchers can approach such research ethically. 

In 2014, Facebook was criticised by academics, lawyers and politicians for covertly manipulating thousands of newsfeeds to test how users’ moods were impacted by negative or positive posts submitted by their friends.

The social media platform said the experiment was important to test the emotional impact of its newsfeed service on users but later admitted it had gone about the study in the wrong way.

Responsibility unclear

The Swiss fake news study on Reddit has likewise been condemned for failing to inform people in advance that they were participating in a research project.

It has also stirred up confusion as to who is responsible. It was conceived by a researcher employed at the University of Zurich and presented to its Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in April of last year as one of four tests – and the only one of the four that involved AI bots.

At the time, the ethics body red-flagged the Reddit study as “exceptionally challenging”, according to the university. It recommended that researchers should inform participants “as much as possible” and fully comply with the rules of Reddit.

But the lead researcher left the university in September and only started the study after leaving, the university says, adding that responsibility for the project and publication therefore lies with the researchers and not the university.

“There were no [Zurich university] researchers or students engaged in the Reddit project at the time it was carried out.”

The research team’s preliminary findings were published at first but were later taken offline.

Stricter review process

Zurich Data Protection Commissioner Dominka Blonski has not yet started a formal probe of the matter, but her office is aware of the controversy. “We do not know whether the research was conducted by the University of Zurich or its faculty, or by individual researchers on their own initiative,” she told SWI swissinfo.ch.

Blonski must first identify whether to investigate the university or individuals. But she is concerned at evidence in media reports that point to potential violations of data protection laws, particularly related to the apparent profiling of some Reddit users.

The university must also contend with unspecified “formal legal demands” from Reddit and is investigating the incident internally.

“In light of these events, the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences intends to adopt a stricter review process in the future and, in particular, to coordinate with the communities on the platforms prior to experimental studies,” said a spokeswoman.

SwissInfo

swissinfo is an enterprise of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SBC). Its role is to inform Swiss living abroad about events in their homeland and to raise awareness of Switzerland in other countries. swissinfo achieves this through its nine-language internet news and information platform.