India’s Malacca Strait Move: Strategic Signal Or Regional Overreach? – Analysis

The Strait of Malacca. Photo Credit: dronepicr, Wikimedia Commons

 September 24, 2025  

By Institute of South Asian Studies

India’s proposal to join the Malacca Strait Patrol made incremental progress last week after Singapore formally acknowledged it for the first time. However, the prospect of the Indian Navy patrolling the strait remains unlikely. New Delhi’s push to join the patrol is a signal to Beijing that the recent Sino-Indian thaw must not be mistaken for capitulation. The Malacca Strait Patrol issue also highlights the fact that the Southeast Asian countries are not always comfortable with India’s expanding security footprint in the region.

By Dr Sandeep Bhardwaj

Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong visited New Delhi from 2 to 4 September 2025, during which he announced the Roadmap for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Among numerous new goals and promises listed in the Joint Statement was a sentence reading “Singapore acknowledges with appreciation India’s interest in the Malacca Strait Patrol”. This is the first time India’s interest in joining the patrol has been officially recognised. India’s foreign ministry officials later explained that they hoped India would participate in the patrol or establish “some kind of coordination” with it.

An estimated quarter of all the world’s traded goods passes through Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS). It is one of the busiest shipping lanes on the planet and, therefore, strategically critical to several countries. The Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) is a framework for the four littorals of the strait – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand – to cooperate to combat piracy in the critical waterway. It comprises coordinated sea patrols, combined maritime air patrols and intelligence exchange.

Over 55 per cent of India’s trade moves through the SOMS. India is also a neighbour to the strait as its territory in the Andaman Sea shares maritime borders with Thailand and Indonesia that run up to the mouth of the SOMS. India has offered to provide security to the sea lane since as early as 2004. However, the littorals have repeatedly turned down its offers.

In the recent years, India has considerably increased its naval presence in Southeast Asia through ship visits and bilateral or multilateral exercises. However, its role as a security provider around the SOMS remains limited. The Indian Navy conducts coordinated patrols (Corpats) with Thailand and Indonesian navies along their maritime boundaries. Although some Indian statements hint that the Corpats operate within the Malacca Strait, it is highly unlikely. In a coordinated patrol, navies remain on their own sides of the border and under separate commands. So, the Indian Navy likely operates only up to the mouth of the strait.
The Standard Operating Procedures for the India-Thailand and India-Indonesia Corpats were established in the early 2000s and apparently have not been refreshed since then. This suggests that maritime patrolling cooperation between India and its two neighbours has not qualitatively changed in the last two decades.

Singapore’s “acknowledgement” of New Delhi’s interest in the MSP is a small step forward, although the prospect of India joining the patrol in the near future remains unlikely. The littorals have long asserted their sovereignty over the strait as most of it falls within their territorial waters. In the 1970s, the littorals established the legal principle giving them exclusive jurisdiction of the SOMS. When in 2004 the United States (US) suggested that it would start policing the strait to curb rising piracy, the littorals hastily established the MSP to forestall US intervention.

Although Singapore is amenable to the involvement of outside powers in securing the SOMS, other littorals are strongly opposed to the idea. They shot down Japan’s proposal to create patrolling framework involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three countries. They are likely to remain just as reluctant to accept Indian involvement in the MSP even though it is a contiguous state unlike Japan or the US. Beyond the question of India’s involvement, the littorals are likely to worry that it may open door for other powers to assert their claims to join as well. Furthermore, Indian participation in the MSP is bound to cause serious alarm in Beijing since the SOMS is a critical chokepoint for Chinese trade flow and oil supplies. In fact, Indian participation is likely to make even the US, Japan and South Korea uncomfortable since they too see the waterway as strategically vital.

Given all these complications, New Delhi’s bid to join the MSP will probably remain stalled. Then why is India publicly pursuing it? Indian motivations are likely a combination of three objectives of differing time horizons.

In the short-term, New Delhi may be signalling to Beijing that its recent willingness to repair their relationship is not coming from a place of weakness. Even as it pursues reproachment with Beijing, New Delhi has undertaken several moves in the last month that may upset China: strategic partnership with the Philippines, condemnation of Chinese aggressive posture in the South China Sea and the first joint India-Philippine naval patrol in the contested sea. India’s expression of interest to join the MSP can be read as another warning to China that its cordiality should not be mistaken for fecklessness.

In the medium-term, India does hope to arrive at some sort of arrangement with the MSP even if it is just a coordinated patrolling arrangement at the mouth of the SOMS. This fits well within India’s larger goal of expanding its maritime presence in Southeast Asia as a way of developing a diversified network of security relationships in the region to balance the Chinese challenge.

In the long run, the argument that India belongs to the MSP as a contiguous state is another incremental step towards its assertion of its geographic identity as an integral part of the region (rather than a peripheral actor it is often perceived).

India’s difficulties in joining the MSP also serve as refutation of the oft-touted claim that the Southeast Asian states want it to play a larger security role in the region as a counterweight to China. While it may be true of some ASEAN member countries, others would not welcome expanded Indian naval presence in the region. After all, the ASEAN member countries are not a monolith.

• About the author: Dr Sandeep Bhardwaj is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at sbhardwaj@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.By Sandeep Bhardwaj
• Source: This article was published by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

Institute of South Asian Studies

The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) was established in July 2004 as an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). ISAS is dedicated to research on contemporary South Asia. The Institute seeks to promote understanding of this vital region of the world, and to communicate knowledge and insights about it to policy makers, the business community, academia and civil society, in Singapore and beyond.

Reports From Regions Show The Cost of Putin’s War Outside Moscow – Analysis

 September 24, 2025  

By Paul Goble

Russian President Vladimir Putin has primarily recruited soldiers from non-Russian republics and poorer but predominantly ethnically Russian regions to keep his February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine from having an immediate effect on the more politically febrile population of Moscow (see EDM, March 8, July 14, 2022).

Republics and regions have been offering large sign-up bonuses to meet the Kremlin’s recruitment targets (see EDM, October 24, 2024). The outsized combat losses of the republics and regions have garnered significant local media attention because the Kremlin has adopted the late-Soviet “criticize but do not generalize” media strategy. This approach enables local media to report on regional developments honestly, as long as they do not portray problems as systemic. By doing so, local media gain certain authority, as they report on-the-ground realities, while allowing the Kremlin to dismiss broader criticisms as anecdotal. The loss of men from some non-Russian and poorer ethnic Russian locations is now so staggering, however, that attention is growing beyond local coverage commensurate with its immense social and demographic impact on Russia.

Moscow has recruited a  disproportionate share of the male population from non-Russian republics and from the poorer predominantly ethnic Russian regions since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, April 4, 9, 16,30, 2024). It has long been recognized that these groups have suffered disproportionate combat deaths in Ukraine (Kedr, May 8).

Few attempts to come up with overall combat losses by the Russian forces in Ukraine have devoted much attention to the ethnic or regional breakdown of these costs because non-Russians form a relatively small part of the country’s population and because Moscow has cut back on the release of combat death statistics (see EDM,December 21, 2023, September 4).

Over the last several weeks, this lack of coverage has been addressed with the release of a slew of articles that focus on the differences in deaths in non-Russian and low-income regions compared to Moscow and other major cities (Window on Eurasia, August 26).

Three articles published in the past week are emblematic of this trend, with one covering losses among poorer, predominantly ethnic Russian regions than from non-Russian republics. The first, by the independent Lyudi Baikalamedia outlet in Irkutsk, says that of the more than 9,000 men drafted from the Irkutsk Oblast and the Buryat Republic at the start of the war, approximately a third have died or been permanently disabled (Lyudi Baikala, September 19).

Independent reports by local media and individuals strongly suggest that the number of soldiers and the number of deaths from Irkutsk and the Buryat Republic have increased since Moscow stopped publishing such statistics.

The second article, by the independent Important Stories outlet, adds that one in four soldiers recruited from the Tomsk Oblast has been killed, wounded, or is missing in action (Important Stories, September 19). Important Storiesstates that it has gained access to previously unpublished data from the region’s military recruitment authorities, but notes that the figures cover only the first round of recruitment and have likely increased in the years since.

The third article from the Okno Press project published interviews from the Kamchatka settlement of Sedanka, where half of the draft-age men signed up to fight in Ukraine, and many lost their lives (Okno, September 20). The men who have returned from the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine complain that local officials are willing to spend enormous sums on the erection of monuments to their contribution to the war effort, but nothing to fix up their houses and schools. In many cases, their homes do not have plumbing or central heating and are collapsing. At least some of them wonder why they fought and some of their fellows died in Ukraine when there is so much that needs to be done at home.

These stories have not been picked up by the Moscow media, largely due to Putin’s media strategy. The strategy, an updated version of the Kremlin’s “criticize but do not generalize” approach during the final decades of the Soviet Union, meant that journalists could report on specific problems as long as they did not suggest that the problems were systemic. Talking about a bad road in one place was usually acceptable, but suggesting that Soviet highway construction was deeply flawed was not.

Gorbachev’s glasnost policy, which lasted into the early years of Putin’s rule, further relaxed constraints on media and speech in Russia. Especially since his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin has brought back “criticize but do not generalize” in his effort to control the media. Journalists in Russia can generally still report on local problems, as long as they do not suggest that these issues reflect systemic problems or imply that blame falls on Kremlin-backed officials. By allowing coverage of local events, the Kremlin ensures that the media is less at odds with what people observe while still avoiding any criticism of Kremlin policy.

The return of the “criticize but do not generalize” policy also affects foreign coverage of issues inside Russia. Most foreign journalists rely on Moscow media, so they often fail to read local media or cover local stories, limiting themselves in ways that favor the Kremlin. It is possible, however, for those who want to understand the Russian reality to look at local media and connect the dots.

This strategy was pioneered by many of the best Soviet specialists in the West. It is a tradition that should be revived if the West is to fully understand Putin and his regime. As the three articles cited above demonstrate, Western experts must focus on both the non-Russian republics and poorer, predominantly ethnic Russian regions, places that seldom attract much attention but could hold the key to understanding Russia’s future (Window on Eurasia, March 2, 2024).  

• This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 125

Paul Goble

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .

White Paper On China’s National Security – Analysis

 September 24, 2025  

By Gateway House

By Lt Gen S L Narasimhan

When China’s National Security Commission was established in 2014, one of the tasks given to it was to formulate a National Security Strategy.  On 11 May 2025, a White Paper on China’s National Security (WPCNS) was issued by Beijing. The method in which this paper was released was uncommon. In the past, China would release its Defence White Papers biannually with an official briefing. That practice was not followed this time.  An abridged version of the Defence White Paper was released in English and the original paper itself was in Chinese. A rough translation of the full paper was released a day later by a China-watcher from the U.S. Naval War College[1] he abridged version released by China’s State Commission Information Office does not do justice to the full text.

The global response to this Defence White Paper has been muted, unlike past documents, which were analysed threadbare. Only a couple of articles[2], one in India’s Economic Times and another in The Diplomat magazine appeared that examined some aspects of the paper. The response is subdued this time because of two reasons. One, the world is in a state of flux with the Russia–Ukraine and Israel-Gaza conflicts. Two, the tariff issue in Mr Trump’s second tenure has drawn the attention of many countries to their internal concerns.

The Defence White Paper is 36 pages long in six parts with a preface and conclusion and is also philosophical in nature.

The preface sets the tone and states that the aim of the Defence White Paper is “to comprehensively explain the innovative concepts, vivid practices and achievements of China’s national security work in the new era, share experiences and practices, and work with other countries to promote world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for mankind”.

In the Defence White Paper, eight trends can be seen. One, China appreciates itself for jointly maintaining peace and development that brought in stability in a tempestuous world and for creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South, which has resulted in an adjustment of the international balance of power. It pats China’s back for maintaining international fairness and justice, adhering to true multilateralism, and promoting global governance by a process of consultation.

China feels that the Asia Pacific is stable in an uncertain world because countries in this region resolve issues by dialogue. However, China’s proactive actions in the East and South China Seas indicate the opposite.

Two, veiled accusations against the U.S. for abdicating responsibilities, undermining global stability and the multilateral trading system, unilateralism, protectionism, creating small groups (read Quad), playing the Taiwan card, controlling key technologies and complicating the maritime domain.

Three, the paper points to non-traditional security challenges which are increasing in the form of climate disasters, ecology, food and energy security, along with the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, as also major transnational epidemics. Traditional and non-traditional security threats, it says, are becoming intertwined.

Four, the paper makes a subtle projection of China’s ideology and model of governance. It highlights the contribution of the Communist Party of China for its theoretical achievements and practical experience in maintaining national unity. It plays up the contribution of Chinese wisdom in promoting and improving global security governance.

Five, the Defence White Paper enunciates a concept of “big security” which encompasses everything from traditional and non-traditional security, various regions of the world, scientific development, data security, biosafety governance to nuclear safety. Some concern is palpable when the Defence White Paper talks of national security lying with the Party, maintaining the security of the regime, system and ideology, colour revolution, street politics, secessionist and sabotage activities, some elements promoting Western democracy, freedom, human rights, universal values and other internal threats. Economic risks such as government debt, real estate and sluggish domestic demand contribute further to this concern. On economic security, China seeks to improve the fiscal and taxation system.

Six, the white paper links development with security and further connects China’s security with “common security”, implying thereby that it associates world peace and development with its own development. To support that argument, the Defence White Paper mentions the application of zero per cent tariff to all items originating from the least developed countries (LDCs) that have established diplomatic relations with China. However, it has been seen in many countries that this does not benefit the LDCs, as they export very little to China. The expectation is that the LDCs will return the favour, which will benefit China more.

Seven, the Defence White Paper lists out its core interests as state power, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, people’s well-being, and sustainable economic and social development. It does not include other core interests like the political system[3], concepts that have been enunciated from time to time. This paper exhorts countries to respect each other’s core interests and major concerns.

Eight, and finally, all its global initiatives find mention, and the community of a shared future appears many times.

The Global Security Initiative (GSI) proposed by China is the mainstay of the Defence White Paper, wherein it shows how expansive the concept is, and projects it as a world chapter for overall security. One of the major aspects of GSI, that is, creating an alternative global security architecture under the UN Charter and China’s support for UN peace keeping operations, finds an oblique mention. The red lines that have been specifically spelt out in the Defence White Paper are the Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, the path and system (implying connectivity, corridors and anti-decoupling and supply chain disruptions) and the right to development. Missing are some of the usual red lines, like the South China Sea[4] enunciated from time to time.

This time, the Defence White Paper gives out how China sees its relations with the U.S., Europe, the Indo pacific, the Middle East, Africa and takes note of its mediation efforts for Palestine and Ukraine. This paper extols China’s efforts to promote global food and security governance, the causes of the Global South and the community with a shared future. It reiterates the No First Use of nuclear weapons. China’s support for combating all forms of terrorism finds a place. However, China seems to be selective on the terrorism issue. The first deployment of weapons in outer space and data and artificial intelligence governance, have been duly claimed as initiatives launched by China and supported by the UN.

Over the decades, several security laws and regulations have been passed by China through which China seeks to modernise and strengthen its security system – a unified system layout, public security governance mechanism, social governance system, and foreign-related national security mechanism by 2035. Improving joint combat capabilities as part of building a strong defence barrier has been emphasised.

Expectedly, the usual promises of not seeking hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence have been made. The mention of Peaceful Reunification and not giving up the use of force, indicate China’s focus on Taiwan. The reference to the polar regions will have implications for the Arctic architecture that is still evolving. In 2018, China declared itself a near- Arctic state, though factually it is not, as its coasts do not border the Arctic Sea.

The global initiatives launched by China in the Defence White Paper warrant a deeper analysis. The Global Community of Shared Future is the overarching concept into which all the initiatives announced by China, namely One Belt One Road (OBOR), Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), and Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative (GAIGI), fit in. The initiatives that are announced later subsume the ones declared earlier, and all of them culminate into the Global Community of Shared Future (see diagram below).

Source: Gateway House 

This concept seems to emerge clearly in the Defence White Paper. The priorities for various aspects of national security[5] seem to be shifting, and some new ones seem to have gained importance. The Comprehensive Security Concept is not new, but the Defence White Paper has made some additions to it.

For the world it means a China that is prescribing measures to be taken by all other countries in the aspects that it has mentioned in the initiatives and in the Defence White Paper. It indicates a China that feels it has arrived on the international scene. The initiatives mentioned in the paper and the Defence White Paper itself are done from a position of strength and superiority, signalling that China is serious.

For India, it means that it has to contend with an assertive China. It must take stock of its position on the Global Initiatives by China and this White Paper – for India’s and China’s interests may conflict with each other in the future.

Overall, this paper reveals a confident China but also a country now concerned with issues both internal and external.

• About the author: Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.
• Source: This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References:

[1] Andrew S, Erickson, “New White Paper: ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’.” Andrew S. Erickson, May 12, 2025. https://www.andrewerickson.com/2025/05/new-white-paper-chinas-national-security-in-the-new-era/

[2] The Economic Times. “National Security White Paper Marks China’s Push for Global Order on Its Terms” May 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/national-security-white-paper-marks-chinas-push-for-global-order-on-its-terms/articleshow/121330816.cms

[3] Feng, Zhaokui. “What Are China’s Core Interests?” China US Focus, October 21, 2014. https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-are-chinas-core-interests-2

[4] RFA Staff. “China Warns Philippines of ‘Red Line’ in the South China Sea.” Radio Free Asia, February 17, 2025. https://www.rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2025/02/17/munich-security-conference-south-china-sea/

[5] Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). “China’s National Security White Paper, with Katja Drinhausen und Helena Legarda.” MERICS China Podcast, July 4, 2025. https://merics.org/en/podcast/chinas-national-security-white-paper-katja-drinhausen-und-helena-legarda

[6] Valchev, Ivaylo. “China’s 2049 Plan a Big Challenge before the World.” South Asia Monitor, April 11, 2021. https://www.southasiamonitor.org/china-watch/chinas-2049-plan-big-challenge-world

Gateway House

Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations is a foreign policy think-tank established in 2009, to engage India’s leading corporations and individuals in debate and scholarship on India’s foreign policy and its role in global affairs. Gateway House’s studies programme will be at the heart of the institute’s scholarship, with original research by global and local scholars in Geo-economics, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy analysis, Bilateral relations, Democracy and nation-building, National security, ethnic conflict and terrorism, Science, technology and innovation, and Energy and Environment.

From Discoveries To Development: Strategic Growth In Africa’s Oil And Gas Basins – OpEd

 September 24, 2025  

By Elizaveta Evseeva

By focusing on solid infrastructure, enhancing local skills, and developing several production sites instead of just large projects, this new exploration wave could finally tap into Africa’s long-awaited energy potential

Africa’s hydrocarbon frontier is at an inflection point. Large areas remain underexplored, but recent breakthroughs point to deliberate, strategic growth. The situation in these basins — a series of high-impact deepwater discoveries in Southern and West Africa alongside renewed onshore interest in Angola — challenges the old logic that Africa’s success depends only on mega-projects. These developments underscore how geology, export infrastructure and domestic politics must be considered together when judging a basin’s commercial prospects.

The Southern African Renaissance

According to the African Energy Chamber’s State of African Energy 2026 Outlook, Namibia’s Orange Basin has emerged as the epicenter of African exploration. TotalEnergies’ Venus discovery offshore Namibia is more than a deepwater find: it is a breakthrough that reshapes industry perceptions of Southern Africa’s potential. The development centers on a 160,000-barrel-per-day FPSO tied to roughly 40 subsea wells. Venus is moving into development planning, with a final investment decision expected in 2026 and first oil targeted between 2029–2030. TotalEnergies also plans to drill the Olympe-1X prospect in Block 2912. This marks a daring westward venture into unknown areas as it is the furthest west any well has been drilled in the Orange Basin. If successful, this four-way closure in Lower Cretaceous formations could unlock new play concepts.

South Africa’s participation in this renaissance cannot be overlooked. The basin’s eastern extension signals growing confidence. Examples include Rhino Resources (Volans-1X) and Eco Atlantic (Block 1). Shell is planning a five-well campaign in South Africa, close to its discoveries in Namibia. This highlights the basin’s cross-border potential. However, commercial constraints — strict fiscal terms, monetization challenges, geological complexity — and legal headwinds such as the ongoing judicial challenges to seismic/exploration approvals for the Wild Coast and related licences remain a drag on timelines.

Angola presents a fascinating duality in frontier exploration. The ultra-deepwater is still a Tier-A chance, especially with Azule Energy’s (Eni-BP joint venture) Quitexe-1 well in Block 47. However, the real surprise might come from onshore. The Kwanza Basin, inactive for four decades, could see its first pre-salt exploration well since the 1980s. Corcel’s planned 2026 drilling of the Sirius structure, potentially holding one billion barrels in place, represents a contrarian bet that could unlock an entirely new petroleum province. The deals are subject to final approvals. Of particular significance are the institutional, regulatory and contractual reforms the Angolan government is currently implementing. Our recent State of African Energy 2026 Outlook examines these reforms in depth.

West African Resurgence

Côte d’Ivoire has positioned itself as a compelling exploration destination. Murphy Oil’s Civette-1 well will be drilled by the Deepwater Skyros in the fourth quarter of this year. This well could reveal new play concepts in an area proven by Eni’s Baleine field. The prospect portfolio includes Caracal, which has a potential of 150-360 million barrels, and Kobus, with up to 1.26 billion barrels. These figures demonstrate the materiality of remaining opportunities.

The Gulf of Guinea’s broader renaissance extends to often-overlooked jurisdictions. São Tomé and Príncipe, Africa’s second-smallest nation by land area, exemplifies this trend. Shell’s Falcao-1 wildcat in Block 10 is set for late September 2025. It builds on Galp Energias’ 2022 Jaca-1 discovery with a proven working petroleum system. The updated view of the subsurface geology now resembles already producing countries like Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. As a result, there’s a surge of drilling plans for 2026-2027.

The ultra-deepwater journey in West Africa remains nascent, with few wells venturing deeper than 3,000 meters in this region. As such, the region stands as one of the last true frontiers for offshore exploration.

Reframing Risk and Reward

Recent African exploration reveals a surprising truth: “failures” can be valuable. Non-commercial wells that encounter source rocks or show petroleum systems may seem disappointing, but they help refine basin models and cut future exploration costs. Even a few technical successes, even if not commercially viable, can significantly lower expected finding costs for a basin. Portfolios that quickly adapt to negative information and change their exploration strategies tend to do better than those stuck with old geological models.

Investors often favor mega-fields, especially in high-risk areas in Africa. However, smaller, quicker oil projects have strong benefits. These projects can act as a public-policy force multiplier and provide clear cash flows that are able to change government incentives. Examples include Senegal’s Sangomar field, which accelerated licensing through early revenues, and Angola’s smaller post-2018 tiebacks, which sustained local services and prompted regulatory reforms.

Multiple modest FPSO developments build political goodwill. This reduces future political risk better than one large project. Early cash flows have the potential to change the political landscape by speeding up licensing rounds and supporting local projects. Companies such as Rhino Resources use a ‘first-to-first-oil’ approach — prioritising early, smaller-scale production to build presence and negotiating leverage. It sees early production as not just revenue, but as a key investment for better future access and terms. Smaller projects also tackle Africa’s human capital challenges better than large megaprojects do. They spread employment across regions without overwhelming local capacity. This enables gradual skills transfer and avoidance of the boom-bust cycles that have plagued resource economies elsewhere.

Turning Discoveries into Development

Africa’s next exploration wave defies simple characterization. It’s not just a boom or a careful exploration. It’s a smart, multi-faceted push into the world’s last frontier basins. The view of Africa as only a high-risk, quick-reward region is evolving. Now, patient investment, strong infrastructure and careful planning are as crucial as geological skills. Companies that treat ultra-deepwater wells as chances to build networks, prefer quick adjustments over strict plans and see the value in early production could gain more. By focusing on solid infrastructure, enhancing local skills, and developing several production sites instead of just large projects, this new exploration wave could finally tap into Africa’s long-awaited energy potential.

Elizaveta Evseeva

Elizaveta Evseeva is a senior-year student at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), Moscow, specializing in international economics, African studies, and development. She currently works with the African Energy Chamber and at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, HSE. Previously, she served as an analyst at the Center for African Studies (HSE) and at the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.