Thursday, October 02, 2025

Venezuela: Political Crisis And U.S. Policy – Analysis

File photo of protester facing the Venezuelan National Guard during a protest. Photo by Efecto Eco, Wikipedia Commons.

By  Congressional Research Service (CRS)

By Clare Ribando Seelke


Over the past several Congresses, some Members have expressed concerns about authoritarian rule under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro (2013-present). Maduro took office after a narrow electoral victory following the death of Hugo Chávez (in office 1999-2013), founder of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

Maduro has remained in power following elections in 2018 and 2024 that were both considered fraudulent by international observers and the U.S. government. After the July 2024 election, Maduro claimed victory even though precinct-level vote tabulations comprising more than 80% of votes cast indicated that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won 67% of the vote. On January 10, 2025, Maduro began a third term. 

The Trump Administration has coordinated removal flights to Venezuela and prisoner swaps with Maduro officials while increasing pressure on Maduro and allied criminal groups. The Administration has designated the Tren de Aragua (TdA) prison gang and the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as foreign terrorists, enabling new sanctions, law enforcement and immigration actions against these entities and their members. Congress may assess how the implementation of these policies may affect U.S. interests in Venezuela and regional security. Congress could consider legislation or oversight actions to authorize, restrict, or otherwise shape U.S. policies, including U.S. military operations near or in Venezuela. 

Political Situation 

Venezuela, which the nongovernmental organization Freedom House categorized as “partly free” under President Chávez, has deteriorated to “not free” under Maduro. Chávez, a charismatic politician, benefited from high oil prices and strong popular support. In contrast, Maduro experienced narrow wins and some electoral defeats (including the 2015 legislative elections). The opposition remained united as the Unitary Platform (PUD) under the leadership of Maria Corina Machado from 2022 to 2024 but has since split over whether to participate in future elections. Most PUD parties boycotted legislative and municipal elections held in May and July 2025, respectively. Maduro’s PSUV dominated both contests. 

Maduro has relied on security forces and corrupt influence over the courts to quash dissent. He has allowed security forces to enrich themselves through illicit gold mining, drug trafficking, and extortion. The International Criminal Court is investigating alleged crimes against humanity committed by Venezuelan security forces since at least 2017. 


Security forces have detained and reportedly abused Maduro’s opponents, including dissidents in the military, opposition politicians, and protesters, particularly since the 2024 elections. After Venezuela’s attorney general issued an arrest warrant for González, he fled into exile in September 2024. Machado remains in hiding in Venezuela.As of September 29, 2025, the government held 827 political prisoners, according to Venezuelan human rights group Foro Penal. 

Economic and Humanitarian Crisis

By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged the economy and engaged in widespread corruption. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Venezuela’s gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by more than 80% from 2013 to 2020, exacerbated by low global oil prices and declining oil production. In 2021, a U.S. Government Accountability Office report found that U.S. sanctions imposed since 2017 on Venezuela’s oil industry had contributed to that economic decline. In 2024, Venezuela’s estimated annual GDP growth reached 5.3%, but the country’s economy remained less than half the size it was in 2013 (not adjusted for inflation). Income levels remain insufficient for most households to purchase basic necessities. According to a national survey by a Venezuelan university, roughly 73.2% of the population of 26.7 million lived in poverty in 2024. 

In 2025, an estimated 7.9 million Venezuelans (28.6% of the population) require humanitarian assistance, according to the UN. Many households lack reliable access to potable water; electrical service and gas supply interruptions persist. Despite some 40% of Venezuelans experiencing food insecurity, the World Food Program reportedly halved its programs in August 2025, citing a lack of donor support.

UN agencies estimated there were some 7.9 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants globally in December 2024. As of May 2025, some 6.9 million of those resided in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Venezuelan refugees and migrants reportedly face obstacles accessing job opportunities and health care services; they may be vulnerable to human trafficking and other abuses. 

U.S. Policy

The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019 and recognizes the democratically elected, opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly as “the only legitimate branch of the Government of Venezuela”; most of its members are in exile. From January 2019 through its dissolution in December 2022, the 2015 National Assembly backed an interim government led by its former speaker, Juan Guaidó. The Guaidó government received U.S. and international recognition but never exerted power in Venezuela. The U.S. government recognizes Edmundo González as the “rightful president” of Venezuela. 

Successive U.S. Administrations have employed various strategies to address human rights abuses and autocracy in Venezuela. The first Trump Administration sought to promote democracy through aid to the Guaidó government, diplomacy, and a “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy to try to compel Maduro to cede power. The Biden Administration offered limited sanctions relief to try to incentivize Maduro to convene fairer elections in 2024, as per an agreement he signed with the PUD. After Maduro officials failed to comply with that agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department ended most sanctions relief, except for specific licenses allowing certain companies, including U.S. oil company Chevron, to work with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA). 

The second Trump Administration has yet to define a consistent policy toward Venezuela. Since January 2025, U.S. officials have negotiated two U.S. detainee releases and the resumption of U.S. removal flights with Maduro officials. Treasury revoked and then granted a restricted license to Chevron that reportedly has halved the amount of oil the company is able to export to the United States.

Recent Trump Administration actions have signaled a hardening of U.S. policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated the TdA a foreign terrorist organization, and Treasury designated the Cartel of the Suns—a drug cartel led by Maduro, per a 2020 U.S. indictment—a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In August 2025, the State Department doubled the reward offered for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to $50 million.

In August, the U.S. military deployed several Navy ships to waters near Venezuela, ostensibly to combat Venezuela-linked drug trafficking. Ships reportedly deployedinclude but are not necessarily limited to a group of three amphibious ships with a total of about 2,200 Marines, a cruiser, and multiple destroyers. These ships are capable of performing various missions at sea or against land targets, suggesting aims that could go beyond drug interdiction. In September 2025, U.S. forces reportedly carried out three lethal strikes on vessels allegedly transporting drugs from Venezuela; the operations reportedly have killed 17 people in total. Some observers have questioned the legality of the strikes. Others are concerned about the effects of the strikes and other potential future U.S. military actions on the political and security situation in Venezuela, regional stability, and U.S. relations with the region. 

Sanctions. The United States imposes various sanctions on Venezuela-related individuals and entities. The sanctions are based in various legislated authorities, including the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278). They include targeted sanctions on individuals and entities for terrorism, drug trafficking, antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-278P.L. 114-194). In his first term, President Trump imposed sanctions on PdVSA (E.O. 13808 and E.O. 13884); Maduro-issued cryptocurrency (E.O. 13827); transactions involving Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835); and sectoral oil sanctions, as well as sanctions on Venezuela’s central bank and the state gold mining company, among other entities (E.O. 13850).

Migration. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has terminated the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that had shielded over 600,000 Venezuelans from removal. DHS also has begun the process to end a Biden-era parole program for Venezuelans. TPS holders and parolees who have not obtained another immigration status once their current status expires could be subject to removal.

DHS has conducted removal flights to Venezuela and reportedly has removed thousands of Venezuelans to third countries. In March 2025, DHS sent more than 200 Venezuelans alleged to have ties to TdA to a prison in El Salvador, citing the 1798 Alien Enemies Act; in July, those prisoners were returned to Venezuela in exchange for 10 Americans detained by Venezuela. In September 2025, an appellate court blocked DHS from removing Venezuelans under the Alien Enemies Act.

U.S. Assistance. From FY2017 to FY2024, U.S. democracy, development, and health assistance for Venezuela totaled around $336.2 million. Over that period. the United States provided over $3.5 billion in humanitarian aid to Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. 

The Trump Administration paused, reviewed, and ultimately canceled thousands of foreign assistance grants and contracts worldwide. The terminations reportedly include health and agriculture programs in Venezuela as well as most democracy and human rights assistance to the democratic opposition and civil society. UN agencies and other implementers have scaled back their programs in Venezuela and for Venezuelans in other countries following the U.S. aid cuts. The United States was a major donor. 

Congressional Action

Congress has supported efforts aimed at restoring democracy in Venezuela through foreign assistance and targeted sanctions, but Members have disagreed on whether broad sanctions should have been imposed and under what circumstances sanctions relief should be granted. The last legislation guiding U.S. policy in Venezuela, the VERDAD Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-64), expired in December 2023.

Congress appropriated $50 million in democracy assistance for Venezuela in FY2024 (P.L. 118-47) and in FY2025 (P.L. 119-4) and is currently considering the FY2026 budget request (which does not have country-specific allocations). The House Appropriations Committee’s proposed FY2026 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriation (H.R. 4779) would provide $50 million for democracy programs in Venezuela.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee-reported State Department Authorization Act (H.R. 5300) includes an amendment that would create a fund from Chávez/Maduro-linked assets seized by the United States to support pro-democracy and other activities in Venezuela approved by the Secretary of State. Congress could authorize the use of U.S. military force against Foreign Terrorist Organizations in Venezuela or consider a concurrent (H.Con.Res. 51) or joint resolution (S.J.Res. 83) to remove U.S. forces from such hostilities. Congress also could consider legislation to shape Venezuela-related sanctions and/or authorize foreign assistance to Venezuela. Oversight could examine the degree to which U.S. sanctions and licenses, foreign aid cuts, and law enforcement and military actions may affect U.S. policy goals regarding Venezuela.


CRS

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

Navigating Water Challenges In Vietnamese Mekong Delta: How Can A Shift In Water Management Help? – Analysis

mekong river boat delta

LONG READ

By 

By Thong Anh Tran and Ming Li Yong


Water Scarcity as a New Challenge

The Anthropocene era has witnessed increasing climate change risks globally, particularly in countries of the Global South.1 This is notably evident in the Mekong region, where water infrastructure development has been pursued to support agriculture-driven national economic growth. These efforts, combined with the rapid development of upstream hydropower dams and climate change events (e.g., El Niño and droughts), have created critical challenges to the Mekong water systems. The storage of vast quantities of water in hydropower dam reservoirs in China,2 for example, has disrupted downstream water flows and the transport of sediment essential for sustaining riverine deltas.3 Located in the southernmost region of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), the Vietnamese Mekong Delta (VMD) is heavily affected by these complexities.

Water scarcity has become a critical issue in the LMB in recent years.4 The VMD, for example, has seen the recurring disruption of water flows over the past few decades.5,8 This unprecedented phenomenon places increasing pressure on agrarian communities and their livelihoods.6 It is, therefore, crucial to understand how water scarcity has precipitated a paradigm shift in water management to achieve water security while safeguarding agriculture-based livelihoods for the agrarian communities across the delta.

Evidence presented in this paper was drawn from the case studies conducted in two provinces within two distinct ecological zones of the VMD: An Giang Province in the floodplains (upper delta) and Ben Tre Province in the coastal zone (lower delta). An Giang has faced severe impacts from the upstream climate and infrastructure development dynamics, illustrated by the recurring disruptions of Mekong river systems. Meanwhile, Ben Tre grapples with the increasing intensity and complexity of saline intrusion.7 These evolving ecological challenges in both localities have jeopardized the freshwater supply essential for the water-depen- dent livelihoods of agrarian communities.

Water scarcity in the VMD can be attributed to several factors. At the regional level, climate change and upstream hydropower development have presented critical challenges, such as fluctuating water flows, to the delta. Additionally, the 180-kilometer-long Funan Techno Canal, which aims to create a navigation route between Cambodia’s coastline and the Mekong River near Phnom Penh, is likely to exacerbate issues of saline intrusion in the Mekong Delta by altering river flows.8 Water loss from this large-scale project is likely to exacerbate existing water scarcity issues in the delta. At the delta scale, it is also important to mention the sustained efforts of the Vietnamese government to invest in water infrastructure across the delta. Following the state-led “rice everywhere” campaign,9 an extensive network of infrastructure, including low and high dykes, canals, and sluices, has been constructed. While these efforts aimed to promote national and regional economic growth, drive rural modernization, and boost household income in rural areas, they have inadvertently intensified pressure on the delta’s water regimes and rural livelihoods.

The VMD’s waterscapes have undergone substantial transformation. With the intersecting transboundary and in-situ climate and develop- ment impacts, water scarcity will become a critical issue in the delta. The transformation of water- scapes and associated livelihood systems in the VMD can be attributed to water infrastructure development policies. This traces back to the flood-expulsion policy of the late 1990s, during which a network of lateral canals was constructed to channel the excessive volumes of floodwaters from the floodplains to the West Sea (Gulf of Thailand).10 The primary aim of this policy was to eliminate flooding in the region and to create “safe” zones for intensified rice production in the floodplains.


Similar efforts were undertaken in the coastal zones through the construction of large-scale water infrastructure. This underscores the state-led “freshening coastal zones” policies that were conducted in two phases.11 The first phase took place in the Ca Mau Peninsula, demonstrating the national government’s initiative to transform brackish coastal zones into permanent freshwater zones for rice production, supported by extensive dike systems.12 The second phase involved a more ambitious transformation of the coastal zones, including the conversion of rivers into reservoirs, as exemplified by the Ba Lai system in Ben Tre Province.13 This “highly modernist” approach to water management aimed to ensure year-round water availability to meet growing demands of agricultural production and domestic use, while addressing the incremental rate of saline intrusion during the dry season. However, in some areas, rural communities lack necessary resources, knowledge, or capacity to adapt to changing water conditions. While securing a sufficient water supply in the coastal zones remains a significant challenge,14 livelihoods are expected to become increasingly vulnerable to environmental impacts.15

Water governance under the conventional “command and control” framework in the VMD presents significant challenges in achieving effective water management. There is insufficient participation by relevant stakeholders in water management decisions. This top-down and technocratic approach often results in institutional inertia, leading to delayed responses to the evolving water dynamics of the Mekong River.16 Additionally, the heavy reliance on water engineering systems can contribute to the overuse and mismanagement of water resources.17 However, acknowledging these institutional limitations provides an opportunity to develop new pathways for learning and adapting to the delta’s changing waterscapes.18

Insights from our case studies in An Giang and Ben Tre Provinces suggest that conventional “grey” infrastructure systems, such as dikes and sluices, remain central to local water management strategies. Despite their widespread implementation, there are concerns among environmental experts about their ability to address emerging water challenges, such as water scarcity, and to ensure sustainable water security in the delta. These cases highlight the paradoxical outcomes of decades-long water control policies. While these policies aimed to manage water resources to support rural communities’ livelihoods, the unintended environmental repercussions of disrupting natural flood patterns have put livelihood systems under pressure. On a broader scale, the national government’s sustained efforts to transform the VMD into a highly productive agricultural frontier have drastically reshaped its waterscapes, turning it from a water-abundant to a water-scarce delta.

The recurring complexities arising from anthropogenic changes to the Mekong River’s water regime in recent years have thus prompted broader policy learning and adaptation efforts at the government level. This has led to the implementation of an adaptive management approach, which is defined as a structured cycle of knowledge accumulation through conceptualizing, monitoring, reflecting, learning, and adapting.19 From an adaptive management perspective, the shift in water management in the VMD first became evident with the redirection of policy focus from the floodplains to coastal zones, driven by the heightened environmental risks of saline intrusion and its associated impacts on the environment and farmers.20 In the VMD, water scarcity compounds livelihood challenges already intensified by land subsidence, sand mining, and rising sea levels in the coastal zones,21, 22 creating additional hardships for local communities.23 At the household level, a significant transition has already taken place— from “living with floods” to “living with saline intrusion”—reflected in the innovative agricultural practices rural farmers have adopted to adapt to changing environmental conditions.24

These adaptive efforts are reflected in a corre- sponding shift in the local government’s mindset and priorities, emphasizing water retention as a pivotal strategy to support local economic devel- opment. This transition highlights the evolution of water management—from expelling water to retaining it—under the compounded challenges of climate change and upstream infrastructure devel- opment. The previous policy of expelling excessive floodwaters to the West Sea has failed to address emerging water challenges, such as water scarcity and saline intrusion, which is now a critical issue. This approach revealed significant shortcomings in water management by underestimating the economic benefits that floodwaters could bring to local communities.

The paradigm shift from water expulsion to water retention presents evidence of learning and adaptive policy actions in tackling the draw-backs associated with the former. Water scarcity has become a driving force that prompts a paradigm shift towards achieving water security in the VMD. In alignment with the Vietnamese government’s climate-resilient and sustainable development strategies stipulated by Resolution 120 on “Climate Resilience and Sustainable Development of the Mekong Delta Region,”25 ensuring a consistent, year-round water supply to sustain agriculture-based livelihoods has emerged as a new priority. Within this context, water retention plays a crucial role in addressing emerging water challenges at both local and transboundary levels. This strategic emphasis on water security marks a significant shift from the long-standing national policy focus on food security, which has dominated the VMD’s development agenda for many decades.

The water retention approach prioritizes water quantity over quality to tackle water scarcity. Given the severe impacts of water shortages on farming communities in recent years, this approach is perceived as a practical solution to secure water availability for agricultural production and household consumption during the dry season. In particular, it supports the adoption of diverse water management strategies, including the construction of freshwater reservoirs and the use of natural wetland systems in peripheral areas of the delta to retain water.26 This reflects a policy shift towards integrating grey and green infrastructure solutions in water management.27 In An Giang Province, for example, water retentions are achieved through household ditches, dike compartments, canals, and natural wetlands such as Bung Binh Thien Lake. In Ben Tre Province, schemes like the Ba Lai Reservoir enable the storage of significant freshwater volumes to support crop production and household needs. However, concerns remain about the efficiency of such large-scale reservoirs due to high construction costs, space requirements, location suitability, and high evaporation rates.28

Various eco-friendly water retention approaches have been widely adopted to secure freshwater availability. Traditional water retention practices in the VMD demonstrate that rural inhabitants have extensive experience in harvesting rainwater during the rainy season and storing it for household use during the dry season.29 These methods include using cisterns, cement tanks, and other storage tools, as well as large plastic bags for convenient freshwater storage. These approaches help minimize reliance on groundwater pumping, which is common among coastal residents. Excessive groundwater extraction is a major contributor to land subsidence and associated environmental issues, including salinization and coastal erosion.30

To secure the sustainable future of the VMD, we should not await the outcomes from negotiating with upstream Mekong countries; we need to store water at hand. While considerable emphasis is placed on retaining freshwater through water retention approaches to ensure long-term water security in the VMD, water quality has received comparatively less attention. This is particularly critical in intensive rice production areas, where rural farmers heavily rely on agrochemicals and synthetic fertilizers to boost rice productivity. Although local agricultural institutions promote the application of innovative farming models, such as “3 Reductions, 3 Gains” or “1 Must Do, 5 Reductions,” which seek to reduce the application of water, fertilizer, and pesticides while sustaining rice yields,31 hidden competition among rice farmers persists. Many farmers continue to believe that increased application of agrochemicals and fertilizers would result in higher crop yields. These conventional practices, as a result, have induced the widespread application of these agricultural inputs on rice fields, causing the substantial contamination of both surface and groundwater resources.32

Referring to the concept of water security defined by Grey and Sadoff (2007, p. 545) as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems, and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments, and economies,”33 this paper argues that the persistent reliance on these conventional farming practices, coupled with the quantity-oriented water management policy in the VMD, has overlooked the operational role of water quality, which is equally vital to the livelihoods and well-being of rural communities. Consequently, this approach fails to ensure the long-term water security of the delta.

Recognizing the Multiple Dimensions and Values of Water

From a water security perspective, it is also crucial to recognize the multidimensional nature of water security and the economic values of different types of water—freshwater, brackish, and saline. Effective management of these resources should be based on a fair recognition of how they can be used for various livelihood activities, especially in the coastal zones. This approach facilitates the reconciliation of state-led water management with farmer-led livelihood strategies, contributing to ongoing efforts towards achieving sustainable water security. Recent evidence highlights the potential of sustainable farming systems, such as rice-shrimp farming and organic farming, as viable alternatives to mitigate environmental impacts.34 These systems not only help sustain household income but also reduce carbon emissions associated with conventional agricultural practices. In the longer term, this opens pathways for the commercialization of organic and clean agricultural products in the delta.35

An adaptive learning approach in water management emphasizes the need for local governments to change their perception of water resources and acknowledge the equal contribution of freshwater, brackish, and saline water to ensuring sustainable livelihood strategies in the new environmental context. This was exemplified in Ben Tre Province, where freshwater was prioritized to support the local economy.36 While the essential role of freshwater is recognized, considerations should also be given to brackish and saline water. These resources have remained undervalued and marginalized in rural development policies.37

The case of Ben Tre Province highlights the critical role of freshwater in local economic development. In freshwater zones, shrimp farming is prohibited due to concerns that wastewater from shrimp ponds may negatively affect neighboring areas where freshwater-based crops are grown. However, the local government’s prioritization of freshwater over brackish and saline water overlooks the interests of shrimp farmers. From the perspective of the latter, shrimp farming offers significantly higher incomes compared to freshwater-based commodities, such as fruits and bananas, which are often susceptible to recurring market volatility. In response to the government’s ban, shrimp farmers have engaged in forms of “everyday politics” to assert their rights and advocate for their interests in shrimp farming as a sustainable livelihood option.38

We often encounter the market instability of agro-commodities. Crop investment is costly. Cultivated in the saline and acid sulphate soil conditions, coconut trees, for example, cannot grow well—unlike other areas, here it takes about six or seven years for a coconut tree to produce fruit. Recognizing the values of brackish and saline water is essential for diversifying and enhancing the livelihoods of coastal communities and boosting local economies, particularly in the face of increasing water challenges in the VMD. This calls for greater attention to resolving the competition between the local government and farming communities, as exemplified in the case of Ben Tre Province. It is therefore essential to underscore the importance of incorporating the economic values of all water resources into local development agendas, grounded by the shared understanding between these actors. This policy reframing will enable local governments to address farmers’ livelihood aspirations while simultaneously attaining agreed-upon strategies for effectively managing the water complexities.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This article highlights a paradigm shift in water management in the VMD to address the compounding effects of climate change, upstream hydropower dam operations, and local water infrastructure development. Emerging water challenges, such as water scarcity and saline intrusion as highlighted by the case studies, have incrementally aggravated the challenges faced by rural house- holds in responding to changing water conditions and sustaining water-based livelihoods. This shift—from water expulsion to water retention, and more broadly, from a focus on food security to water security—holds critical policy significance for tackling long-term climate and development challenges in the VMD.

The reframing of water policy towards water security in the VMD needs to focus on the following key areas: First, from a water security perspective, it is essential to integrate water quality into local water management policies, which have traditionally prioritized water quantity. Second, while freshwater takes precedence in local government’s water management policies, particularly in relation to agricultural production, the importance of brackish and saline water should not be overlooked. Instead, these resources must be recognized as essential contributors to coastal livelihood systems. It is equally essential to include local level water development policies within the broader institutional efforts for achieving sustainable development in the VMD in the long term. This necessitates improved spatial and sectoral coordination as stipulated in the Prime Minister’s decisions39 on regional and provincial integrated planning of the delta in the periods of 2021–2030, with a vision towards 2050.

It is widely acknowledged that coastal communities are in the best position to understand local ecosystems and utilize their capacity to support their livelihoods. These communities possess a wealth of valuable experiential knowledge gained from generations of living with saline water in coastal zones. Local institutions need to adopt a more open, flexible, and participatory approach that facilitates the inclusion of community-held knowledge into local water management and adaptation policies, and coordinates the co-development of governance arrangements to deal with environmental complexities. This collaborative approach can create space for local governments and agrarian communities to engage in meaningful dialogue, enabling them to articulate and recognize their respective interests and values. It also fosters a shared understanding of how water management can maximize economic benefits for local communities while promoting sustainable water use and protecting aquatic environments.

On the regional scale, local governments in the VMD need to engage more proactively in dialogues with key stakeholders, including the Vietnam National Mekong Committee, Mekong member countries, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), as well as other international agencies. This collaboration is vital for coordinating regional efforts to address challenges posed by climate change and infrastructure development, which have transboundary water implications, and for articulating these issues to a broader public. This endeavor aligns with the principles of the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which encourages compliance with guidelines for the reasonable and equitable use of the Mekong River’s waters by the countries in the LMB. Moving forwards, the Mekong River Commission should also play a proactive role as a platform through which Vietnam and upstream countries can collaboratively work to diagnose and mitigate the transboundary environmental impacts of water resources infrastructural development in the LMB while simultaneously advancing more pre-emptive strategies to ensure long-term water security in the VMD.

Research for this article was made possible by the Henry Luce Foundation and the Seed Fund for Research and Training (SFRT) Program of the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA).

About the authors:

  • Thong Anh Tran, Ph.D., is a human ecologist with extensive work experience in mainland Southeast Asia. His research investigates climate and development dynamics in the Mekong region, with a particular focus on (transboundary) environmental governance, agrarian transitions, livelihood resilience, climate change adaptation, social learning, rural innovations, and institutional change. He contributed to the conceptualization, methodology, investigation, and writing of this article. His email address is thong.tran@anu.edu.au.
  • Ming Li Yong, Ph.D., is a Fellow in the Research Program at the East-West Center. She studies transboundary water governance and hydropower development in the Mekong River Basin and has conducted research on community-based natural resource management, civil society movements, institutional governance arrangements, and public participation. She contributed to the editing and validation of this article. Her email address is yongm@eastwestcenter.org.

Source: This article was published by the East-West Center

Endnotes:

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  4. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and AWP (Australian Water Partnership). (2023). Managing water scarcity in Asia and the Pacific—A summary: Trends, experiences, and recommendations for a resilient future. Rome and Canberra: FAO and AWP.
  5. Le, A. T. (2020). Analysis of flood and drought variability in the Mekong River Delta in the last 20 years. Journal of Science and Technology, 62(11), 22–27.
  6. Tran, T. A., and Cook, B. R. (2024). Water retention for agricultural resilience in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta: Towards integrated ‘grey- green’ solutions. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 40(3), 532–553.
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  10. Tran, T. A., Tran, D. D., Vo, O. V, Pham, V. H. T., Van Tran, H., Yong, M. L., Le, P. V., and Dang, P. T. (2024). Evolving pathways towards water security in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta: An adaptive management perspective. Ambio, 1–15.
  11. Tran, T. A., Tran, H. V., Pittock, J., and Cook, B. R. (2022). Political ecology of freshening the Mekong’s coastal delta: Narratives of place-based land-use dynamics. Journal of Land Use Science, 17(1), 471–486.
  12. Benedikter, S. (2014). The Vietnamese hydrocracy and the Mekong Delta— Water resources development from state socialism to bureaucratic capitalism. Berlin: LIT.
  13. Tran, T. A., Tran, H. V., Pittock, J., and Cook, B. R. (2022). Political ecology of freshening the Mekong’s coastal delta: Narratives of place-based land-use dynamics. Journal of Land Use Science, 17(1), 471–486.
  14. World Bank and ICEM (International Center for Environmental Management). 2022. Climate Resilient Rural Water Supply in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam. Volume III: Resilient Infrastructure Recommendations for Water Supply in the Mekong Delta. Washington DC: World Bank
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  38. Ibid.
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