Sunday, October 05, 2025

 

The new hybrid working norm in the UK: How many days in the office?

Workers walk over London Bridge towards the City of London financial district during the morning commute, in London. 24. Jan 2022.
Copyright AP/Matt Dunham


By Servet Yanatma
Published on 


While hybrid work is on the rise, UK employers are requiring more in-office days. Two- and three-day schedules now account for 81% of hybrid roles.

Remote working, or working from home, rose sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic in many parts of the world, especially in Europe. As restrictions eased, office returns began, and the number of people working from home gradually declined. 

Hybrid working is now more common. In the United Kingdom, 28% of staff worked in this setup in the first quarter of 2025, according to ONS. This is compared to around 10% during the same period in 2021. Hybrid work was also more common among full-time workers, reaching 34% in early 2025. 

While hybrid work is on the rise, the number of days employers require staff to be in the office is increasing in the UK, based on job posting data from the global hiring platform Indeed.

“2 to 3 days a week in the office has become the norm in the UK,” Indeed finds.

In 2025 through August, 85% of UK job postings mentioned a hybrid schedule requiring at least two days a week in the office, compared with 65% in 2022, according to Indeed.

The number of in-office days in hybrid roles shifted significantly between 2022 and 2025. One-day requirements fell from 35% in 2022, to 15% in 2025. Two days rose from 48% in 2022, to 56% in 2025. Three days increased from 16% in 2022, to 25% in 2025. 

Four days reached 4% in 2025, up from 1% in 2022.

“Employers are tightening these hybrid arrangements, requiring more frequent office attendance than before,” said Jack Kennedy, Indeed's senior economist.

The figures show that two days in the office is the most common hybrid pattern, accounting for 56% in 2025. Together, two and three days make up 81% of hybrid roles.

Occupation matters in hybrid work

The type of job a worker has plays a key role in the number of in-office days for hybrid positions in the UK. Accounting, human resources, and software development have the highest average minimum in-office requirements, while social sciences and architecture jobs require relatively few, according to Indeed.

On average in 2025, the occupation with the highest number of required office days is accounting (2.4 days), followed by human resources (2.3 days) and IT infrastructure, operations & support (2.3 days).

Software development roles

Almost half (48%) of UK software development jobs mention remote or hybrid work, the highest share among all occupations tracked by Indeed. However, these jobs now require an average of 2.3 days in the office, up 0.6 days over the past two years. Indeed notes this as surprising for an industry long seen as relatively remote-friendly.

“The increase in required office days could reflect employers wielding more leverage in a subdued market for tech talent, and/or wanting to promote greater in-person collaboration,” Kennedy explained in an Indeed blog post.

Occupations with fewer in-office days on average include social science and architecture, both at 1.6 days.

UK postings mentioning remote and hybrid work

The share of UK postings mentioning ‘remote and/or hybrid work’ has remained fairly stable at around 15% for several months, close to all-time highs. This is significantly lower than the ONS figures because they measure different indicators. Indeed’s data is based on job postings from its platform, while ONS reflects the actual workforce in the country.

“Several years after the pandemic-driven shift to remote work, hybrid arrangements remain in flux, and there remains substantial variation in employer policies,” Jack Kennedy noted.

He also pointed out that market conditions continue to play a role. With the current softness in the labour market, employers may feel they have the upper hand, leading some to push for greater on-site attendance.

According to the Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA), the UK has the highest rate of remote working among 18 European countries, with employees averaging 1.8 days a week at home. More broadly, this places the UK second out of 40 nations.

 

European Commission to consider fund for EU-wide access to abortion

People show posters and shout slogans as they attend a demonstration for the legalisation of abortion in Berlin, Germany.
Copyright AP Photo

By Paula Soler & Marta Iraola Iribarren
Published on 


The European Commission will study a proposal to create a fund to help women access safe abortions when they cannot do so in their own countries due to restrictive laws, following a citizens’ campaign that gathered one million signatures across the EU.

At 26 weeks pregnant, Mirela Čavajda found out her baby had a grave medical condition and would either be born with life-threatening conditions or most likely die before birth.

When Čavajda sought medical support in Zagreb, doctors at four different hospitals refused her request, some without explanation, while others said they could not confirm the diagnosis or did not have the necessary conditions to perform the procedure.

She then travelled to neighbouring Slovenia on doctors' advice, where a commission approved her request to terminate the pregnancy. The procedure cost her around €5,000.

In Croatia, abortion on request is legal up to 10 weeks of pregnancy. After this point, it is only permitted in specific circumstances, such as Čavajda's. The Croatian law dates back to 1972, and around one in every six doctors are conscientious objectors, meaning they can refuse to perform the procedure for moral or religious reasons. 

Čavajda's 2022 case drew massive media attention and sparked street protests. Within just two days, NGOs raised about €29,000 from 1,472 citizens and 16 organisations to support her. The surplus funds, according to the Croatian NGO leading the effort, were used to help women cover the costs of other healthcare services.

While a secondary commission approved her abortion amid public anger, and the health ministry promised to cover any costs of treatment abroad, the prolonged procedure and medical professionals' hesitation made Čavajda feel "left all alone", as she told media at the time.

While Croatian law remains restrictive, it is not the most severe in the EU, where Poland and Malta enforce near-total or total bans on abortion.

In Malta, the case of Andrea Prudente made headlines in 2022. Prudente, at 16 weeks pregnant and on "babymoon" in the Mediterranean island, suffered an incomplete miscarriage and had to seek an abortion, but could not have it in Malta, where it remains illegal under any circumstances. Because her life was in grave danger, her insurance arranged for her to be airlifted to Spain, where doctors carried out the abortion.

The case eventually led the Maltese lawmakers to ease the blanket ban on abortion where there was a risk to the pregnant person’s health. However, the law was subsequently amended to stipulate that they must be at risk of death to access an abortion — and even then, only after three specialists' consent.  

In Poland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that a woman's rights were violated when she was forced to travel abroad after a 2020 constitutional court ruling banned abortions due to severe fetal abnormalities.

Another 2021 case of a woman named Izabela, who died of sepsis after doctors delayed a life-saving abortion, led to massive country-wide protests and the conviction of three doctors for endangering her life. However, the court ruling and other restrictions remain in effect.

Currently, an estimated 20 million women in Europe lack access to appropriate abortion services, according to the EU-wide My Voice, My Choice activist movement.

To prevent similar scenarios, My Voice, My Choice is now urging the European Commission to intervene.

“The idea is that the citizens of countries where they cannot get an abortion because of different reasons will be able to travel,” said Nika Kovač, leader of the movement, speaking to reporters on Wednesday after meeting with European Commissioner for Equality Hadja Lahbib. 

“Such practices already exist, for example, women from Poland have a good network of NGOs which are supporting their travels and medical procedures. But those medical procedures are costly, so what we want to do is to establish a way that NGOs or women themselves do not need to pay for them,” Kovač added.

The initiative has already gathered more than 1 million signatures — enough to trigger an official response from Brussels.

Brussels to respond by March

In response, the European Commission is reviewing the possibility of establishing a new voluntary fund to cover the costs of abortion for women who cannot access the procedure in their own country and must travel abroad for it.

As the proposal is still in its early stages, the exact details of how the fund would work are yet to be determined. However, it is proposed that member states would be able to choose whether to participate, with the EU providing financial support.

The Commission is expected to give campaigners an official reply by March 2026, outlining the actions it intends to take, if any. 

For a European citizens’ initiative like this one to be valid, it must meet certain conditions, including falling within areas where the Commission has the power to propose legislation.

If the Commission does put forward a legislative proposal, it would then need approval from the EU’s co-legislators — the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

Both steps could prove challenging, as some representatives of different member states argue that abortion remains a moral and religious matter, citing the need to protect human life, which in their opinion extends to unborn children at any stage of pregnancy.

The initiative does not aim to grant a right to abortion at the EU level, Commission spokespeople told Euronews.

In December 2024, Commissioner Lahbib pointed out that initiatives to amend abortion laws remain squarely in the domain of individual countries.

"It's a member state competence, so we will need an agreement from all of us. We will need this unanimity, but I hope that we will be able to protect women's lives," said Lahbib during her first appearance in the Parliament’s public health committee. 



 

















 

U$A

Crypto Legislation: An Overview Of H.R. 3633, The CLARITY Act – Analysis

Bitcoin Blockchain Cryptocurrency Money Exchange

By   The Congressional Research Service 

By Paul Tierno


On June 23, 2025, the House Committees on Financial Services and Agriculture reported H.R. 3633, the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (or the CLARITY Act). The bill would give the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) a central role in regulating digital commodities and related intermediaries while preserving certain aspects of Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) authority over primary market crypto transactions, subject to a new limited exemption from SEC registration requirements for fundraising.

The bill would define digital commodity as a digital asset whose value is “intrinsically linked” to the use of the blockchain. The term digital commodity would exclude securities, derivatives, and stablecoins. A summary of the major provisions of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is below. For more on the CLARITY Act, see CRS Insight IN12584, Crypto Legislation: CLARITY Act’s (H.R. 3633) Potential Effects on SEC Jurisdiction, by Eva Su. 

Defining Mature Blockchains

H.R. 3633 would require that the value of a digital commodity related to a mature blockchain be “substantially derived from the use and functioning of the blockchain,” that it not restrict or privilege any users, and that it limit ownership by certain holders to less than 20% of outstanding units, among other things. Maturity (or intended maturity) would be a precondition for certain features of the bill’s framework.

The bill would allow a digital commodity issuer to certify to the SEC that its related blockchain is mature and would identify criteria by which the SEC would assess blockchain maturity. H.R. 3633 would define mature blockchain as “a blockchain system, together with its related digital commodity, that is not controlled by any person or group of persons under common control.” 

SEC Jurisdiction

The bill would provide an exemption from the Securities Act of 1933‘s registration requirement for offers of investment contracts involving digital commodities on mature blockchains that meet certain conditions. Issuers relying on the exemption would be required to limit sales of digital commodities to $75 million over a 12-month period. H.R. 3633 would require issuers relying on the exemption to file an “offering statement.” Issuers of digital commodities related to blockchains that are not mature would have additional reporting requirements. The bill would direct the SEC to write rules within 270 days of enactment implementing additional requirements for blockchains that fail to mature and would be permitted to limit such an issuer’s reliance on the exemption to raise additional funds.


The bill would not limit access to accredited investors based on income or net worth participation thresholds. 

The bill suggests that some of the digital commodities subject to this bill may also be investment contract assets—digital assets that, among other traits, are sold pursuant to investment contracts (a type of security). However, the bill would clarify that an “investment contract” does not include an “investment contract asset.” This seems to imply that an instrument must be issued through an investment contract to qualify as an “investment contract asset” but that an “investment contract asset” is not itself an investment contract and thus not a security. 

H.R. 3633 would allow traditional securities markets participants registered with the SEC to engage in secondary market trading upon notification to—but not registration with—the CFTC provided regulation by the two agencies is “consistent.” The bill would permit an alternative trading system (ATS) registered with the SEC, subject to certain limitations, to trade any digital commodity that meets listing standards. The SEC would have jurisdiction and rulemaking authority over the digital commodity transactions of these market participants. 

CFTC Jurisdiction

The bill would provide the CFTC with exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over transactions in digital commodities—including in spot or cash markets—by or on any entity registered with or required to be registered with it. The bill would require digital commodity exchanges (DCEs), such as the centralized platforms that currently dominate crypto trading, and digital commodity brokers and dealers to register with the CFTC. The bill would establish Core Principles, with which exchanges would be required to comply, and would include trade monitoring, record keeping and reporting, addressing antitrust considerations, and minimizing conflicts of interest, among others. The bill would prohibit a DCE from comingling its assets with those of customers, but a customer could waive this for certain reasons. The bill would prohibit DCEs and their affiliates from trading for their own accounts but would allow the CFTC to write rules permitting such trading for certain specified purposes. The bill would require that the bankruptcy code be updated to account for funds held by DCEs but would omit funds waived from the comingling prohibition. 

DCEs would be permitted to offer for trade only digital commodities whose related blockchains are certified as mature or—for blockchains not yet mature—whose issuers comply with ongoing reporting requirements. Prior to listing new digital commodities, DCEs would be required to publish certain information, including source code, transaction history, and “digital commodity economics.” New certifications would become effective 20 days after filing. CFTC disapprovals would require detailed analysis. 

Provisional Registration and Other Provisions

H.R. 3633 would establish a provisional registration that would regulate DCEs, brokers, and dealers until the bill is implemented. Entities that apply for registration would be considered compliant with the provisional registration regime subject to certain conditions, which include protecting customer assets and allowing the CFTC to access their books and records. A provision permitting the CFTC to collect fees from intermediaries filing under the provisional registration would sunset after four years. 

Decentralized finance activities, such as validating, would be excluded from the bill’s requirements but not from the agencies’ anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authorities.

The bill would also:

  • apply the Bank Secrecy Act to new DCEs, brokers, and dealers, subjecting them to its anti-money laundering requirements; 
  • amend the Bank Holding Company Act to allow financial holding companies and qualifying banks to conduct digital commodities activities;
  • limit SEC and CFTC jurisdiction over payment stablecoins to transactions involving registered entities; and
  • create a qualified digital asset custodian requirement (which may include banks) that could be subject to state or federal regulation by various regulators, depending on type.
  • About the author: Paul Tierno, Analyst in Financial Economics

CRS

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

























 

Inside Tibet’s Digital Prison: PLA And Police Merge To Enforce China’s Grip – Analysis

surveillance technology china grok


By 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) controls Tibet through a combination of military force, comprehensive surveillance technology, and integration with civilian police and administrative bodies. The Chinese government treats urban areas in Tibet like a battlefield, deploying civilian AI-driven surveillance systems derived from military command-and-control frameworks.


The PLA’s tactics are increasingly integrated with civilian police and administrative functions. The military provides the technology, while the police and local officials execute the day-to-day surveillance and enforcement.

This combination of military force, advanced technology, and integrated police control is used to suppress any form of dissent or perceived threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. Tibetan cultural and religious activities are heavily monitored and protests are quickly and harshly put down, as seen in the crackdown on anti-dam protests.

Chinese software developers openly acknowledge that they treat cities and towns in Tibet like a battlefield. The AI-driven civilian surveillance systems deployed in the region are derived from military-grade C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems.

China has created a “widespread optical fibre cable network” and uses satellite stations (VSAT) to create an effective and secure command and control network across Tibet. Comprehensive broadband connections enable the government to monitor and control the flow of information.

A new report, titled ‘Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet’ by Free Tibet’s sister organisation Tibet Watch and the research organisation Turquoise Roof, uncovers new and alarming evidence of the Chinese government’s deepening digital intrusion into Tibetan lives through the mandatory installation of an app on smartphones at police checkpoints


It sheds new light on the extent to which Party mechanisms infiltrate the personal sphere. This is not only changing the way people communicate, but also creating a society-wide chilling effect on the way they think, feel, and relate to one another, in many cases leading to a complete breakdown of contact.

The integration of a panoply of advanced technologies in Tibet  – AI-driven systems fusing facial recognition with internet browsing and app-based monitoring, DNA and genomic surveillance, and GIS tracking data – underlines the emergence of a terrifying approach to governance in the 21st century. It uses machine learning to power systems that prioritise state control and suppression over individual liberties and self-determination.

The Turquoise Roof team conducted a dynamic analysis of the Android version of the app installed by the Chinese police, in order to assess the likelihood that the collected data could feed into broader control mechanisms, including integration with databases managed by the Criminal Investigation Bureau, reflecting wider surveillance and oversight strategies in the region.

The report also investigates a big data policing platform known as the ‘Tibet Underworld Criminal Integrated Intelligence Application Platform’. Analysis of government procurement notices revealed that this system amalgamates data from various existing Public Security Bureau systems in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) into a central Oracle database. This database system, developed on top of US technology, is instrumental in a campaign that criminalises even moderate cultural and religious expression, Tibetan language study groups, and community welfare work in Tibet.

This report uncovers the Chinese government’s escalated digital surveillance in Tibet, marked by the compulsory installation of the ‘National Anti-Fraud Centre’ app on smartphones. Initially presented as a fraud prevention tool, the app is in fact a crucial element of a larger surveillance network. This report, developed in collaboration with Tibet Watch, London, is based on accounts from a Tibetan refugee in Golog in eastern Tibet (present-day Qinghai province).

According to the report, a dynamic analysis of the Android and Windows Desktop versions of this app found that data collected could extend beyond internet fraud detection, feeding into broader control mechanisms. This includes integration with databases managed by the Criminal Investigation Bureau, reflecting broader surveillance and oversight strategies in the region.

This investigation into the weaponisation of big data analytics in Tibet by the Chinese security state sheds new light on the reach of Party mechanisms into the personal sphere. This is not only changing the way people communicate, but having a society-wide ‘chilling effect’ on the way they think, feel and relate to each other, in many cases leading to a complete breakdown of contact.

There are clear parallels in the deployment of spyware and Universal Forensic Extraction Devices (UFEDs) at police checkpoints in both Tibet and Xinjiang. Similarly, sophisticated big data analytics platforms are in operation in both regions, and although specific systems might differ, the same overarching strategy of control and suppression through intelligence-led policing is evident in both regions.

Chinese software developers have acknowledged this evolution in which cities and towns where people live are treated like a battlefield, the report stated. Now this is an extremely dangerous trend. On one hand, the international human rights organisations just jump onto the bandwagon led by Pakistan and supported by China to condemn alleged human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces in Kashmir and the North East, but turn a blind eye to the suppression by the PLA in Tibet and Xinjiang province. This is because either they have business interests with China or are crushed under the weight of the Chinese debt trap. It can’t get worse than treating humans and their settlements as virtual battlefields.

In contrast to the PLA, The Indian Army implements Operation Sadbhavana in Kashmir and other conflict-affected regions to win the hearts and minds of the local population through welfare and development projects like Army Goodwill Schools and vocational training programs. In Kashmir, this includes national integration tours and direct engagement with youth through Mission Pehal to address grievances and build trust. In the North East, similar community-focused initiatives are undertaken, aiming to counter terrorism and foster trust. 

The strategy of “Winning Hearts and Minds” (WHAM) is a people-centric approach used by governments and militaries to gain the trust and support of local populations in conflict-ridden areas, which aims to counter the influence of terrorism and foster normalcy. In the North East, the Indian Army also conducts military civic action programs similar to those in Kashmir. These programs focus on infrastructure development and welfare activities to address the needs of local populations and gain their confidence.

Those who find ways to criticise the Indian Army every now and then, should know that the other international armies like the PLA are no match for the Indian Army – be it on the battlefield or dealing with ordinary citizens of their country.


Ashu Mann

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.